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Defense & Security
Buenos Aires, Argentina, Feb 16, 2024: People protesting in front of the obelisk, downtown, with posters in the colors of the Palestinian flag forming the text Free Palestine.

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and Operation al-Aqsa Flood

by Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Yarmouk Universi

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction In 2010, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was established and ratified in 2011, with membership expanding to 33 countries. According to the organization’s statements, its aims include “deepening the integration of Latin American countries, promoting international peace, and respecting human rights.” Additionally, there is an implicit ambition among several members to reduce the political and economic influence of the US in the region, as suggested by the context of some of the organization’s statements.[2] With a total population of about 635 million people, covering an area of about 22 million km², and accounting for 17% of the United Nations (UN) voting power, their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis for 2023 is approximately $12.8 trillion, equivalent to 7.8% of the world’s GDP. However, four of the 33 countries contribute more than $9.6 trillion, or about 75% of the GDP. These four countries also comprise 68% of the total population of the regional group, as shown in the following table:[3]   CELAC’s Position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood The Latin American and Caribbean region has the highest percentage of leftist political regimes in the world. Among the 19 most significant countries in the region, 12 are now run by left-wing governments, accounting for 63% of the total. These leftist-led countries represent 92% of the region’s people and 90% of its GDP.[4] This demographic and economic dominance is clearly reflected in CELAC’s stance on two interconnected issues: the position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood, marked by varying degrees of rejection of Israeli policy, and a relative independence from US influence in the region. First: CELAC’s Stance as a Political Bloc on Operation al-Aqsa Flood[5] At the eighth CELAC summit, held in March 2024 in Kingstown, the capital of St.Vincent and the Grenadines, a lack of consensus emerged among the members regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Despite the compromise language in the conference statement, 27 countries endorsed it while 6 countries opposed it.[6] The resolution included the following points:[7] a. Condemning the killing of civilians on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides and emphasizing the need to protect civilians in accordance with international law.b. Supporting the UN General Assembly call for a ceasefire.c. Demanding the immediate and unconditional release of hostages.d. Urging the delivery of humanitarian aid to the affected areas in the Gaza Strip (GS).e. Calling for a peaceful solution based on the two-state solution. Second: Stances of the Central States within CELAC[8] Countries with left-leaning governments are often the most vocal in supporting the Palestine issue, as reflected in their leaders’ statements. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro slammed “the international position regarding the ongoing genocide in Gaza,” and pointed out that “international justice exists only to protect the interests of American, European, and Western imperialism, in order to conceal the massacres committed against Palestinian families.” Brazilian President Lula da Silva aligned with this view, calling on “the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to set aside their differences and put an end to the genocide in Gaza.” He reiterated his call for an immediate ceasefire, as outlined in the CELAC statement from the 8th Congress. Additionally, he noted Brazil’s efforts to support UN Security Council resolutions aimed at halting the fighting in GS, which were vetoed by the US. Colombian President Gustavo Petro criticized both the United States and Europe for supporting “Israel in committing genocide against the Palestinians,” with similar sentiments expressed by Nicaragua. Generally, the positions of CELAC countries, particularly the major powers, can be categorized into three distinct stances, as illustrated in the table below:[9]   1. Countries closest to the Israeli position: This group varies in their level of support for Israel, as illustrated by the following indicators: a. The Salvadoran stance is notably one of the most vehement against the Palestinians, despite President Nayib Bukele being a Christian of Palestinian descent who calls for the “demise of the Palestinian resistance.” This position aligns closely with that of Paraguay, one of the few countries to label the Palestinian resistance as “terrorism” and announce plans to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Paraguay’s stance on Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is marked by a consistent lack of condemnation at the UN and frequent abstentions from voting on resolutions that support Palestinian rights. b. The Jewish minority in Argentina plays a significant role in influencing the government. With a population of between 300–400 thousand, Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Latin America and the fifth largest in the world. The attacks on Jewish institutions in Argentina during 1992–1994, which were linked to Iran—a key supporter of Palestinian resistance—also influenced the government’s stance, despite opposition from the pro-Palestinian Worker’s Left Front – Unity party. c. Guatemala, with a population of about 18 million, was the first Latin American country to move its embassy to Jerusalem. It is also one of the centers of gravity for Anglican Christianity, which tends to be more sympathetic to Zionism. 2. Countries that have adopted a middle ground, attempting to balance support for and opposition to both sides of the conflict: a. Both Mexico and Brazil criticized the attack on Israel on 7/10/2023, but strongly condemned the Israeli response. b. In the diplomacy of Brazil and Mexico, a role reversal was observed. The presidencies of both countries adopted more articulate positions than their foreign ministries, where traditional diplomatic language prevailed. c. Mexico has not severed ties with Israel; however, its representatives at the UN have sharply criticized the Israeli government. d. Ecuador can be included in this group due to its effort to mediate peace between the Palestinian resistance and Israel by sending Ecuadorian Vice President Verónica Abad in October 2023. Additionally, Ecuador has backed Palestine’s bid for full membership in both the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, though it has explicitly condemned the resistance attack that occurred in October 2023. 3. Countries that support Palestinian rights are typically left-leaning and their policies often exhibit the following characteristics: a. Nicaragua unequivocally supported the Palestinian position and even received some Palestinian leaders after the war. b. Colombia has taken a definitive stance in strong support of Palestine. It is one of the most vocal critics of Israeli policies, culminating in its decision to sever diplomatic ties with Israel. Colombian President Gustavo Petro has sharply condemned Israeli actions in Gaza, labeling them as “genocide.” It is important to note that Colombia’s position is significant given its historical and strategic ties with Israel. Although Colombia relies on Israeli military equipment for combating armed opposition and drug trafficking groups, and there has been a free trade agreement between the two countries since 2020, as well as various agreements since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1957, trade data shows a 53% decline in trade between Israel and Colombia following the recent conflict, compared to 2022. c. The Cuban and Venezuelan position was a continuation of their traditional support for the Palestinian right, and Cuba justified the Palestinian attack on 7/10/2023 as a reaction to 75 years of oppression of the Palestinians. d. Bolivia did not condemn the Palestinian attack in October, instead focusing its statements on de-escalating the conflict between the two sides. However, the lack of Israeli response to its calls led Bolivia to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. Additionally, Bolivia supported South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and endorsed a case before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Colombia and Belize have also cut ties with Israel. Notably, during the last week of June 2024, Bolivia experienced a failed coup attempt, raising suspicions that the US and Israel may have been involved as retaliation for Bolivia’s clear stance on the Gaza war.[10] e. The significant presence of the Palestinian community in Chile, the largest in Latin America with nearly half a million having Palestinian roots, has notably influenced Chilean politics. This influence is reflected in the Chilean Senate’s Human Rights Commission decision to ban companies from importing goods produced in Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. A US State Department official characterized this decision as one that unfairly singles out Israel.[11] f. Honduras has exhibited a decrease in its support for Israel following Israeli attacks on civilians, leading the government to summon the Israeli ambassador to protest these actions. In 2021, Honduras was one of the first countries to relocate its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, joining Guatemala and Paraguay, which had made similar moves in 2018. However, Guatemala reversed its decision and returned its embassy to Tel Aviv shortly thereafter. The shift in Honduras’ stance can be attributed to the change in leadership from a right-wing to a left-wing administration after Xiomara Castro assumed the presidency in 2022. g. Since the beginning of the war, Latin American countries’ positions in support of Palestine have evolved at the diplomatic level in particular, and have begun cutting ties and recalling ambassadors from Israel, which was initiated by Chile, Colombia, and Honduras, while Bolivia and Belize cut diplomatic ties with Israel completely. Bolivia was one of the five countries that referred the situation in GS to the ICC for investigation in November 2023. In the referral, Bolivia cites evidence of crimes against Palestinians including murder, torture, inhumane treatment, persecution, apartheid, forced displacement, and the destruction of Palestinian cultural heritage. Mexico and Chile did the same in January 2024, whereas Brazil’s and Colombia’s foreign ministries issued statements supporting South Africa’s legal action against Israel before the ICJ. The Brazilian position has been the leading one, which has strained relations between Brazil and Israel despite efforts by the Brazilian Israelite Confederation (CONIB) to mend fences. However, the Brazilian president’s remarks that “what is happening in the Gaza Strip with the Palestinian people hasn’t happened at any other moment in history” except one: “When Hitler decided to kill the Jews,”[12] combined with the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s endorsement of European countries’ recognition of Palestine as a state and support for a two-state solution, have solidified Brazil’s stance against Israeli policies. CELAC’s Vote at the UN A review of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions reveals that the countries most resistant to supporting resolutions favoring Palestinian demands are Guatemala, Paraguay and Argentina, followed by Haiti, Uruguay, Panama and El Salvador. These countries often either oppose or abstain from voting. Argentina, with a population of nearly 46 million, is the most significant ally of Israeli policy. This is followed by Guatemala with about 18 million people, Paraguay with around 7 million, Panama with 4.5 million and Uruguay, with approximately 3.5 million people. Argentina ranks third among CELAC countries in terms of GDP and fourth in terms of population. Argentina’s stance on Palestinian rights reflects the political shift introduced by President Javier Milei, who aims to align Argentina more closely with the Western capitalist bloc through his foreign policy.[13] Argentina did not support the General Assembly resolution calling for a ceasefire in December 2023 and opposed the resolution to grant Palestine full membership in the UN. The Argentine position can be attributed to the following reasons:[14] a. President Javier Milei’s religious inclination towards Judaism was evident in his prayers at the Western Wall in Jerusalem in 2021, accompanied by Rabbi Shimon Axel Wahnish, who was later appointed as Argentine ambassador to Israel. Although the Argentine president is a Catholic Christian, some sources suggest he is considering converting to Judaism. However, other sources claim that President Milei’s display of Jewish faith is a way to express repentance and counter accusations that he concealed his support for a Nazi sympathizer. b. The Argentine president’s intention to strengthen ties with the Jewish minority in Argentina, as previously mentioned, faced opposition from nearly four thousand Argentine Jewish intellectuals, who voiced concern over Milei’s “political use of Judaism.” This concern was highlighted when he became one of the first world leaders to visit Israel after the war erupted, offering high praise for Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies and pledging to move Argentina’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Interestingly, the Argentine president demonstrated a clear bias towards Israel when he cut his state visit to Denmark short, following the Iranian attack on Israel in April 2024, which was in response to the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. President Meli then convened a crisis committee alongside the Israeli ambassador to Argentina and his security minister, who began criticizing the positions of other Latin American countries, such as Bolivia and Chile, describing them as “Islamic hotbeds” and accusing them of hosting Hezbollah elements. He also criticized the defense agreement Iran concluded with Bolivia in July 2023. c. Milei, a university economics professor, bases his economic ideology on far-right principles and anti-leftist Peronism in Argentina, making him the most eager to strengthen the relationship with the US and, consequently, with Israel. d. It is noted that trade relations between Israel and Argentina are escalating significantly. Israeli exports to Argentina increased annually by 15.2% from 2017 to the end of 2022, reaching $156 million in 2022. Similarly, Argentine exports to Israel increased annually by 25.2%, reaching $200 million in 2022. Third: Trends in Public Opinion in CELAC Countries Quantitative studies on access to information and data from various sources show that Latin American countries lead the world in relying on social media for obtaining and sharing information. This trend has influenced Israel’s public image in the region.[15] Public opinion polls in Latin America reveal that approval of the way US President Joe Biden’s is dealing with the GS war is modest. A survey of six major Latin American countries showed the following results:[16]   The approval rate with Biden’s GS war policy in six countries is notably low, at around 26%. In contrast, the same survey indicates that the disapproval in these countries is more than double the approval rate, reaching approximately 57%. Meanwhile, the people of CELAC countries expressed their solidarity with Palestine after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. This solidarity was evident in demonstrations involving former presidents, civil society organizations, popular sectors, football associations, artists and universities, particularly in Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, Mexico, Uruguay, Peru and Argentina, etc. Conclusion The “instability” in political orientations towards international issues is a key feature of Latin American countries’ policies, largely due to the frequent shifts in political regimes and the consequent changes. In analyzing the positions of Latin American countries on the Arab-Israeli conflict, four factors seem to be the most significant in shaping this relationship:[17] 1. The political shifts between leftist and rightist regimes, whether due to coups or presidential elections, often characterize these countries as “unstable.” This is particularly evident in major countries within this group, such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia. This instability is reflected in their stances on the Arab-Israeli conflict: leftist regimes typically support Palestine, while rightist ones back Israel. 2. The positions of these countries on Israel are notably influenced by US policies. Some countries align with the US stance to avoid potential pressure, a pattern observable since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. 3. A growing trend among Catholic Christians toward Anglicanism, which shares a closer religious alignment with the Israeli position. 4. Israeli presence in the technological sector of the Latin American economy is significant. In major Latin American countries like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia, more than 450 Israeli companies are active in this industry. The data we have discussed highlight the need for resistance forces to recognize the significance of this region in the following ways: 1. Despite a noticeable division among Latin American countries in their responses to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath, the balance of support leans considerably toward the resistance. This is due to the increasing leftist inclination in the region, particularly in its major countries. Demonstrations in support of Palestine have occurred in Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Peru and Chile. 2. Cutting ties with Israel, recalling ambassadors, or participating in cases against it in the ICJ and the ICC by Latin American countries is perhaps the most significant in terms of political impact. This development requires follow-up, including providing these countries with relevant information and support to reinforce this trend. 3. Despite their Anglican background, public opinion trends in these countries reveal a strong sympathy for Palestinian suffering, which is more than twice as significant as the sympathy for Israel. This is evident from the approval rates toward President Biden’s pro-Israel policies. These findings suggest the need for engaging with leftist forces in the region based on shared libertarian values. 4. Comparing the trade between Latin American and Israel, which was $6 billion in 2022, to the trade with Arab countries, the trade volume with the Gulf countries alone is more than three times greater than that with Israel. However, the political influence of these trade relations with the Arab world remains relatively modest.[18] 5. Arab and Palestinian diplomacy should focus on four Latin American countries-Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia—due to their significant political, economic and demographic influence in the international arena. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals. [2] CELAC/ Zone of Peace: “A key step to countering the globalization of militarism” – UN Expert, site of The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 3/2/2014, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2014/02/celac-zone-peace-key-step-countering-globalization-militarism-un-expert [3] World Economic Outlook Database: October 2023, site of International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October/weo-report?c=311,213,314,313,316,339,218,223,228,233,238,321,243,248,253,328,258,336,2; GDP, PPP (current international $) – Latin America & Caribbean, site of World Bank Group, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?locations=ZJ; and List of Latin American and Caribbean countries by GDP (PPP), site of Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_American_and_Caribbean_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)#cite_note-1 [4] Latin America’s left-wing experiment is a warning to the world, site of The Economist newspaper, 18/5/2023, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/05/18/latin-americas-left-wing-experiment-is-a-warning-to-the-world [5] For a historical overview of Israel’s relations with Latin America, see Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Academic Paper: Israeli Relations with Latin America, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 5/4/2021, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2021/04/05/academic-paper-israeli-relations-with-latin-america/ [6] Estimates vary, but the number of signatories is likely to be 27, see CELAC member states divided over Israel-Gaza war stance, site of SEARCHLIGHT, 5/3/2024, https://www.searchlight.vc/front-page/2024/03/05/celac-member-states-divided-israel-gaza-war-stance; and Brazil, 23 other Celac countries call for immediate ceasefire in Gaza, site of Agencia Brasil, 4/3/2024, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2024-03/brazil-23-other-celac-countries-call-immediate-ceasefire-gaza [7] CELAC summit fails to take unanimous position on Gaza, site of iWitness News, 2/3/2024, https://www.iwnsvg.com/2024/03/02/celac-summit-fails-to-take-unanimous-position-on-gaza [8] Latin American peace, anti-imperialism, and Gaza at the heart of CELAC, site of Al Mayadeen English, 1/3/2024, https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/latin-american-peace–anti-imperialism–and-gaza-at-the-hear; Oliver Stuenkel, The Israel-Hamas War Is Inflaming Polarization in Latin America, site of Americas Quarterly (AQ), 16/11/2023, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-israel-hamas-war-is-inflaming-polarization-in-latin-america; Ecuador VP says she will go to Israel amid spat with president, Reuters News Agency, 28/11/2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ecuador-vp-says-she-will-go-israel-amid-spat-with-president-2023-11-28; and At CELAC, Lula extols the potential of Latin Americans and Caribbeans as an integrated bloc, site of Planalto, 5/3/2024, https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/03/at-celac-lula-extols-the-potential-of-latin-americans-and-caribbeans-as-an-integrated-bloc [9] For detailed information on the positions of CELAC countries, either individually or as a bloc, please refer to the following references, see Rogelio Núñez Castellano and Carlos Malamud, Latin America and the Gaza crisis, site of The Elcano Royal Institute, 24/11/2023, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/latin-america-and-the-gaza-crisis; Enrique Reina (@EnriqueReinaHN), site of X (Twitter), 3/11/2023, 10:01, https://x.com/EnriqueReinaHN/status/1720531624289575107; Brazil’s president withdraws his country’s ambassador to Israel after criticizing the war in Gaza, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/5/2024, https://apnews.com/article/brazil-lula-israel-ambassador-withdrawn-af9d295d989a86c4fcd8ca4531350f42; Colombia breaks diplomatic ties with Israel but its military relies on key Israeli-built equipment, AP, 3/5/2024, https://apnews.com/article/colombia-israel-diplomatic-ties-military-equipment-0c04009ccfc6110e20ee358403509500; President Milei’s surprising devotion to Judaism and Israel provokes tension in Argentina and beyond, AP, 3/6/2024, https://apnews.com/article/milei-judaism-hezbollah-israel-hamas-war-netanyahu-d8831369a6bc8a96205d4080d2b2045b; Argentina demands that Bolivia explain its new defense agreement with Iran, AP, 25/7/2023, https://apnews.com/article/argentina-bolivia-iran-defense-mou-2cb8c5917fdb6d3e01af4c67af969797; Israel/ Argentina, site of Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/isr/partner/arg; Latin America divided and nuanced on Israel-Hamas conflict, site of Buenos Aires Times, 1/11/2023, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/latin-america/latin-america-divided-and-nuanced-on-the-israel-hamas-conflict.phtml; Marta Tawil Kuri, Perspectives from the Global South: Latin America’s Fragmented Approach to Palestine, site of Arab reform initiative (ARI), 15/12/2023, https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/perspectives-from-the-global-south-latin-americas-fragmented-approach-to-palestine; IntelBrief: Leaders in Latin America Speak Loudly on Gaza, site of The Soufan Center (TSC), 1/3/2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-march-1; Honduran president in Israel for opening of Jerusalem embassy, site of i24NEWS, 24/6/2021, https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy-defense/1624517565-honduran-president-in-israel-for-opening-of-jerusalem-embassy; Angeline Montoya, In Honduras, the mixed track record of President Xiomara Castro, site of Le Monde, 10/2/2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/02/10/in-honduras-the-mixed-track-record-of-president-xiomara-castro_6015218_4.html; Latin America countries hold rallies in support of Palestine, site of Anadolu Agency (AA), 4/3/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/latin-america-countries-hold-rallies-in-support-of-palestine/3154305; Latin America: Demonstrations expressing support for Palestinians scheduled in several regional cities Oct. 20-22, site of Crisis24, 20/10/2023, https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2023/10/latin-america-demonstrations-expressing-support-for-palestinians-scheduled-in-several-regional-cities-oct-20-22; Gaza solidarity sweeps across Latin America, site of Middle East Monitor (MEMO), 23/10/2023, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231023-gaza-solidarity-sweeps-across-latin-america; Alejandro Santos Cid, University Gaza solidarity protests extend to Mexico: ‘We are urgently calling for an end to genocide’, site of EL PAÍS, 4/5/2024, https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-05-04/university-gaza-solidarity-protests-extend-to-mexico-we-are-urgently-calling-for-an-end-to-genocide.html; site of PRIMICIAS, 7/10/2023, https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/ecuador-condena-ataque-hamas-israel (in Spanish) [10] See Lithium, severing ties with Israel, or rapprochement with Russia? What is the secret to the failed Bolivian coup?, site of RT, 28/6/2024, https://arabic.rt.com/world/1578053- الليثيوم-غزة-أم-موسكو-أيهم-كلمة-السر-في-الانقلاب-البوليفي-الفاشل/; and Türkiye and Bolivia: Experiences of Resisting Coups in a Changing World, site of Turk Press, 29/6//2024, https://www.turkpress.co/node/102003 [11] Patricia Garip, What Does Latin America Think About the Israel-Hamas War?, site of Foreign Policy, 29/1/2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/29/israel-hamas-gaza-war-latin-america-chile-argentina-colombia-mexico-genocide/ [12] Lazar Berman, Israel livid as Brazil’s Lula says Israel like ‘Hitler,’ committing genocide in Gaza, site of Times of Israel, 18/2/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-livid-as-brazils-lula-says-israel-like-hitler-committing-genocide-in-gaza/ [13] Argentina shifts historic position on Palestine as UN member state, Buenos Aires Times, 10/5/2024, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/world/argentina-shifts-historic-position-on-palestine-asun-member-state.phtml [14] AP and TOI STAFF, Argentinian president’s surprising devotion to Judaism and Israel provokes tension, Times of Israel, 3/6/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/argentinian-presidents-surprising-devotion-to-judaism-and-israel-provokes-tension/; Argentina/ Israel, site of Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/arg/partner/isr; and Israel/ Argentina, OEC, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/isr/partner/arg [15] 4 Trends Among Latin American Internet Users That Will Impact the Market in 2022, site of Americas Market Intelligence (AMI), 9/1/2022, https://americasmi.com/insights/trends-latin-american-internet-users-marketing/#:~:text=In%20Latin%20America%2C%2083%25%20to,websites%2C%20broken%20down%20by%20country; and Annie Pforzheimer, Latin American Views on the Gaza War Are in Flux, site of The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune journal, November 2023, https://jstribune.com/pforzheimer-latin-american-views-on-the-gaza-war-are-in-flux [16] Survey conducted in Spring 2024, see Majorities disapprove of the way Biden is dealing with the Israel-Hamas war, site of Pew Research Center, 10/6/2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/06/11/how-well-is-biden-handling-international-issues/gap_2024-06-11_us-image-2024_5_06 [17]Gian Luca Gardini (ed.), External Powers in Latin America: Geopolitics between Neo-extractivism and South-South Cooperation (Routledge, 2021), pp. 153-163; and Political stability – Country rankings, site of TheGlobalEconomy.com, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_political_stability/Latin-Am [18]Chase Harrison, Explainer: Latin America’s Relationship with Israel and Palestine, site of Americas Society (AS), Council of the Americas (COA), 16/11/2023, https://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-latin-americas-relationship-israel-and-palestine; and “Cultivating Ties: Deepening trade and investment between Latin America and the GCC,” site of Economist Impact, The Economist Group, 2022, https://impact.economist.com/perspectives/sites/default/files/economist_impact__dcci_latam_report_10th_march_2022_english_web.pdf

Diplomacy
NATO symbol on the background of the American flag. Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The future of NATO after the US elections

by Evelyn Gaiser, Konrad Adenauer Foundation , Max Willem Fricke, Konrad Adenauer Foundation

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском More European responsibility for a sustainable transatlantic relationship ' US geopolitical priorities will continue to shift to the Indo-Pacific region in the coming years, despite the warlike events in Europe. ' Regardless of the outcome of the US elections, it can be assumed that US defense resources will be withdrawn from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. ' Russia is already waging a hybrid war against NATO members in the form of sabotage, espionage, cyber-attacks, and disinformation. Militarily, Russia is threatening the European NATO partners. Europe must function as a credible deterrent against this threat. ' In view of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine and possible further Russian expansionist ambitions, it is in Europe's own interest to be prepared for a possible partial withdrawal of US troops. ' The US is still the backbone of NATO's defense capabilities in areas such as reconnaissance and deterrence. European countries must contribute significantly more to their defense capability to complement US support and take over parts of it in the medium term. ' By collaborating with partners in the Indo-Pacific, Germany and other European NATO members promote interoperability and competence and signal to the US a willingness to contribute to security beyond the defense of the European Alliance area. ' Whoever rules from the White House after January 20, 2025, must consider the signal the US will send to China if support for Ukraine and engagement in NATO is scaled back. If Russia's war of aggression is successful, China will take note and draw its own conclusions. Introduction The US election campaign is being followed with great interest by security experts and transatlanticists in Europe. This is because the outcome of the election on November 5 will have a major impact on the future of NATO - and thus the most successful defense alliance of all time. This Monitor analyzes what an election victory by Donald Trump on the one hand and an election victory by Kamala Harris on the other could mean for the transatlantic alliance and how the European NATO partners must position themselves to keep transatlantic relations on a sustainable footing. The geopolitical priorities of the USA will continue to shift towards the Indo-Pacific region in the coming years, despite the warlike events in Europe. For decision-makers in Germany and other European NATO states, this means that there is an urgent need to consistently develop their defense policy and take responsibility for security policy. This is the only way to ensure peace and freedom in the European NATO states in the future. A decisive strengthening of European defense capabilities should be the key to shaping a sustainable and future-proof transatlantic partnership. Concerns about a second term for Donald Trump: Trumpproofing NATO There is concern in many European capitals that a second term in office for Donald Trump could have a decisive impact on the stability of transatlantic relations and NATO.1 The buzzword “Trumpproofing NATO” is therefore being used on both sides of the Atlantic to prepare for a possible second Trump administration. There are plenty of reasons for this. Trump has openly threatened to reduce the US troop presence in Europe, restrict intelligence sharing with NATO allies, cut a deal with Russia over Ukraine's head and revoke NATO's Article 5 security guarantee for those who do not contribute sufficiently.2 Take him seriously, not literally!  Trump's unpredictability is part of his political strategy. And so, Europe should prepare for various scenarios. The recommendation made by Republican MPs to their transatlantic partners at the recent NATO summit in Washington appears to be quite groundbreaking: Trump is not to be taken literally, but he should certainly be taken seriously.3 European decision-makers should also look at existing security policy ideas from Trump's environment, as he could - without a security policy strategy of his own - use these as a guide. “Dormant-NATO” - possible withdrawal of large parts of US troops  The concepts of conservative security policy pioneers such as Elbridge Colby4, Sumantra Maitra5 and Dan Caldwell6 are well-known. Colby was the architect of the national security strategy under Trump in 2018 and is considered a candidate for a top security policy post in a possible Trump II administration.7 Caldwell is Vice President and Maitra is a Senior Fellow at the influential Trump-affiliated think tank “Center for Renewing America”. The aforementioned experts advocate an increase in defense spending by European NATO members far above the 2014 target of two percent of gross domestic product.8 Furthermore, they call not only for increased burden-sharing, but also for burden-shifting within NATO.9 So far, Western Europe has acted as a free rider and exploited the US involvement in NATO (“freeriding”) - an insight that has long been shared by Republicans and Democrats, albeit in different tones.10 However, the Republicans go further: in view of rising debts, problems with recruiting soldiers and a defense industry that cannot keep up with the challenge posed by Russia and China, the US can no longer avoid a realignment of NATO.11 Maitra's “Dormant NATO” concept suggests that the USA should only be active in Europe with a limited naval and air force presence in future and would only operate in acute threat situations and in extreme emergencies with nuclear deterrence.12 The majority of the infantry, armored forces, logistics and artillery previously provided by the USA should therefore be provided by the Europeans.13 According to Maitra, the costly US leadership role in NATO is no longer in the interests of the United States, as Russia no longer poses an immediate threat to the US.14 Europe is therefore called upon to take over the conventional defense of its own continent, which is also justified by the fact that the US must focus its security policy resources on the Indo-Pacific and the protection of Taiwan. About Ukraine, Trump is considering a deal with Russia if he wins the election. The content of such a deal could be the end of NATO's eastward expansion and the rejection of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Trump could also negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin over Moscow's Ukrainian territorial claims - over the heads of Ukraine.15 JD Vance - Isolationist approaches of a vice-presidential candidate Donald Trump's vice-presidential candidate JD Vance also criticizes NATO and calls for US resources to be prioritized in Asia, particularly to deter a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan. However, his position on Ukraine stands out in particular: he is completely opposed to US military aid for Ukraine.16 Vance believes that Ukraine cannot win the war against Russia in purely numerical terms and is in favor of negotiations with Russia.17 Another accent of the vice presidential candidate is his clear criticism of the rules-based world order. With him as Vice President, a break with the traditional foreign policy of the United States could become more likely.18 However, Vance has also shown himself to be very changeable in terms of his opinions and convictions, which is why he - like Trump - is difficult to assess overall. Despite the ambiguities and versatility that Trump and his foreign and security policy makers stand for, they are united by a tendency towards isolationism and criticism of NATO. Although a withdrawal from NATO is unlikely, Trump could drastically reduce the US role in the European security architecture. A Trump II scenario could pose further dangers for Ukraine in particular. Continuity under Kamala Harris? While the transatlantic agenda of a Democratic presidential candidate Biden was considered predictable, the nomination of Kamala Harris has brought a new dynamic to the debate about the future of transatlantic relations in case of a Democratic victory. Against this backdrop, it makes sense to look at the defense policy approaches that a Kamala Harris presidency could entail. Would Kamala Harris mean continuity in transatlantic relations? Would Harris be a transatlanticist? Kamala Harris gained important insights into foreign and security policy not only as Vice President, where she was present in the Oval Office or Situation Room for all important foreign policy decisions,19 but also as a Senator on the Home-land Security and Intelligence Committees. This applies to the investigation into Russian influence on the 2016 US elections in the Intelligence Committee, which is also likely to have shaped her view of Vladimir Putin.20 Kamala Harris is regarded as an advocate of transatlantic cooperation. As Vice President, Harris took part in Ukraine peace conference in Switzerland in the summer, met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky six times and attended the Munich Security Conference three times. There she reaffirmed the USA's unwavering commitment to NATO and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.21,22 Her previous statements during the election campaign - particularly at the Democratic Party conference - also indicate that her foreign policy approach will continue to be in line with Joe Biden's NATO policy. Harris emphasized the importance of alliances, her commitment to NATO and her support for Ukraine against the Russian occupation. In the TV duel against Donald Trump, she described NATO as “the greatest military alliance the world has ever known ”23 and announced that she would continue to support Ukraine if she won the election. However, she left open whether she would supply Ukraine with added weapons or authorize the use of American weapons against targets on Russian soil.24 Her current security advisor, Phil Gordon, a proven expert and friend of Europe, is also being touted as a candidate for a high-ranking position in a possible Harris administration.25 There are therefore initial indications that the transatlantic alliance would continue to play an important role in foreign and security policy under Kamala Harris. Tim Walz: Foreign policy profile Harris' candidate for Vice President, Tim Walz, does not yet have a clear foreign policy profile. However, as a long-standing and high-ranking representative of the National Guard, he has ability in military matters. In the past, he has spoken out against military operations in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.26 He also joined Republican politicians in 2016 who spoke out against cuts to the military, as it needs to be well funded in order to meet the challenges in the world.27 The China expert spoke out against Trump's trade arms race with China, but also denounced human rights violations. Walz clearly condemned the Russian war of aggression, signed a law as governor of Minnesota that ended the state's investments in Russia28 and expressed his support for Ukraine29. However, many of his foreign policy positions are unlikely to be completed and will depend on which advisors he chooses to surround himself with. Generational change in the White House Despite Kamala Harris' fundamental support for NATO, her inauguration would mark a generational change in the White House. While President Joe Biden, who was born three years before the end of the Second World War, was significantly socialized politically by the Cold War, Harris began her political career a good twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and does not share the same historical ties to Europe. At the same time, Harris must respond to changing domestic and geopolitical realities. The United States is still the global superpower with a claim to military leadership. However, NATO has recently lost support in public opinion in the USA and the willingness to fund European defense is dwindling.30 Support for Ukraine is also viewed increasingly critically.31 There is also a consensus in broad circles of the Democratic Party that Europe must take more responsibility for its own defense. The economic policy agenda now announced by Harris in the election campaign would be enormously costly.32 This makes a significant increase in defense spending unlikely. The public, politicians and experts33 now perceive China as by far the greatest threat to the security and prosperity of the United States, and Harris is also concerned about China's quest for global political power. Harris has already announced at the party congress that she will ensure that America wins the competition for the 21st century against China.34 In view of increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific, the transfer of additional military resources, particularly air force and navy, from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region will be unavoidable in the medium term. About NATO, the difference between a Harris and a Trump-led administration is likely to lie in the scope and speed of the withdrawal of US defense resources from Europe. While a withdrawal under Trump could be implemented quickly, an election victory for Harris is more likely to mean a gradual withdrawal and would give the Europeans time to position themselves better in terms of defense policy.35 NATO is still the most important instrument for European defense cooperation. Against the backdrop of the volatile security environment and the shift in priorities in the USA, Europeans must take on more responsibility for the defense of their own continent. This is the only way to ensure that NATO is still a successful defense alliance in the future. However, this debate should not be about Donald Trump or Kamala Harris, but about improving military capabilities to deter and defend against attacks on alliance territory. In view of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine and possible further Russian expansionist ambitions, it is in Europe's own interest to be prepared for a possible partial withdrawal of US troops. This can only take place in close coordination with the USA and within NATO structures. Europe's security still depends on the USA. Because even if the European pillar of NATO is placed on a more stable footing, European security can only be guaranteed with American support for the near future. The USA is indispensable in NATO. The partners lean on its capabilities and are guided by developments. The US defense budget accounts for around two thirds of defense spending within NATO. There are currently around 85,000 soldiers stationed in Europe.36 This means that US defense spending is almost ten times higher than that of Germany, which has the second highest defense budget in NATO. A substantial proportion of US defense spending currently goes towards protecting European NATO members.37 At the same time, nine NATO countries, including Canada, Spain, and Italy, still spend less than two percent of their GDP on defense. Most of the so-called "strategic enablers", such as reconnaissance, aerial refueling and satellite communications, are currently provided by the USA, whose forces, in contrast to most European armies, are quickly deployable, combat-ready and equipped with sufficient stocks of ammunition.38 Despite all the debates that are taking place in this regard, the nuclear umbrella is likely to remain Europe's life insurance in the future. "New" threat situation requires a rethink. Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference39 in 2007 was followed by action: Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, its illegal annexation of Crimea and the start of the protracted conflict in the Donbass in 2014, its withdrawal from the arms control and security architecture and finally its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.40 The assumption is that, in the event of military success in Ukraine, Putin will declare further territorial claims and take military action. Security experts warn that Russia could press ahead with its imperial expansionism in just a few years and be capable of waging war against a NATO country.41 Russia is already waging a hybrid war against NATO members in the form of sabotage, cyber-attacks and disinformation.42 However, Russia is not the only threat to European security. From the Sahel to the Middle East, there are numerous complex challenges: Terrorism, ongoing conflicts and fueled instability on the southern flank have a negative impact on Europe. The resulting migration movements also have destabilizing effects. Military exercises with Chinese participation in Belarus and cyber-attacks on European NATO partners are also signs of China's growing claim to power in Europe. The ever-closer cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is a challenge for NATO. Decisive strengthening of the European security architecture for a sustainable transatlantic relationship For NATO to support a sustainable foundation, the European and German security architecture must be better secured and coordinated in the future. In the long term, defense spending in Europe should be increased beyond the envisaged two percent of gross domestic product and permanently integrated into national budgets. Resilience means creating resilience, deterrence, and defense capability. In the case of Germany, the threat situation and the resulting security policy requirements do not yet appear to be sufficiently anchored in political awareness. A consistent rethink is needed here. More efficient organization of defence structures and military procurement is needed. At present, the Bundeswehr is only partially capable of defending the country and the alliance, also in view of the gaps that have arisen due to the transfer of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine. A study by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy found that at the current rate of procurement, Germany would need up to almost 100 years to reach the military stocks of 20 years ago.43 Although the turnaround in Germany has been proclaimed, it has not been sufficiently driven forward politically and has not been set up sustainably in terms of financial policy - beyond the special fund. A consistent implementation of the turnaround for a defensible Germany would inevitably require painful savings elsewhere. This must be considered in the domestic political discourse to prepare the public for future necessities. This also includes the debate on compulsory military service and the creation of a new security culture in society. This will only be possible if the threat situation and, conversely, the need for a turnaround are communicated in all their urgency and consistency. In the German arms industry, ability building and close cooperation and coordination with European partners are of crucial importance.44 Promises made to NATO partners must be backed up financially, in terms of personnel, structure and material. While Russia has switched to a war economy, Europe is finding it difficult to significantly increase production. This also requires a stabilization of defence spending. To build up sustainable abilities, the industry needs planning security. And the budget, which provides for hardly any growth in defense spending, does not offer this.45 It is precisely this planning security that would enable the defense industry to create new jobs in the long term and thus take on employees who currently have less of a future in the weakening automotive industry, for example. The (not yet officially published) draft for the new National Security and Defense Industry Strategy, which aims, among other things, to ease access to loans and capital market-based financing for the security and defense industry (SVI), sends a positive signal. The draft states that the “SVI activities are fundamentally compatible with ESG criteria” (Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance) from the perspective of the federal government.46 Strengthening joint commitment in the Indo-Pacific It is not only the USA that has recognized the danger of China's desired supremacy in the Indo-Pacific. European NATO members also see increasing challenges in Asia and have an interest in supporting a rules-based order and free sea and trade routes in the Indo-Pacific, which is of crucial importance not least for an export nation like Germany. European NATO states, including Germany, are becoming increasingly involved in the Indo-Pacific region.47 At the anniversary summit in Washington in July, NATO toughened its tone towards China and clearly stated the danger posed by the ever closer cooperation between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.48 At the same time, cooperation with the so-called Asia-Pacific 4, the NATO partner states Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific, is becoming closer. This cooperation must be further strengthened, for which the partner countries Australia49 and Japan50 or the multinational maneuver RIMPAC51 are particularly suitable. By cooperating with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific and participating in multinational exercises and freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs), Germany and other European NATO members not only defend their interests and promote interoperability and competence, but also signal to their partner, the USA, their willingness to get involved beyond the defense of the European alliance territory and make a contribution to transatlantic security.52 NATO is not a one-way street: clearly communicating added value for the USA. Without the leadership of the United States, NATO will not be able to continue its success story. For this reason, it is crucial to convince the American side and to highlight the strategic interest of the US in preserving this treaty-based peace order and stability in Europe.53 In doing so, the European NATO partners should not only effectively communicate their defense policy progress, but also increasingly provide up-to-date data and figures on the benefits of NATO engagement for the US. The evidence shows that US security engagement has significant positive effects on US trade. According to calculations, trade losses that could result from a US withdrawal from international security commitments in the medium and long term would exceed the potential savings in defense resources.54 European partner states are also making significant purchases of military equipment in the US, as illustrated by the example of the F35 fighter aircraft, for which numerous European states have concluded purchase agreements.55 Since the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, European demand for US military equipment has risen sharply and in 2023 the US Department of Defense recorded record sales of military equipment and hardware, particularly to European partners and allies.56 NATO's deterrent effect has been instrumental in preventing armed conflict in member countries since its start. The stability that the alliance guarantees therefore also relieves the strain on American resources. Whoever takes office in the White House on January 20, 2025, must consider the signal the US will send to China if support for Ukraine and involvement in NATO are scaled back. If Russia's war of aggression is successful, China will take note and draw its own conclusions. A vacuum in Europe would not only be used by Russia, but also by China to expand its presence and influence on the continent. A US withdrawal from NATO in favor of a stronger focus on its strategic rival China could therefore ultimately play right into the latter's hands. References 1 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/tun-wir-genug (last request 15.08.2024) 2 https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-trump-proofing-natos-real-adversaries (last request 15.08.2024) 3 https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/07/11/trump-nato-republicans-con-gress/ (last request 15.08.2024) 4 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/31/elbridge-colby-trump-foreign-policy-military-china/ (last request 16.08.2024) 5 https://americarenewing.com/team/sumantra-maitra/ (last request 20.08.2024) 6 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/foreign-policy-republican-american-power (last request 02.09.2024) 7 https://www.politico.eu/article/former-president-donald-trump-ally-europe-joe-biden-us-elec-tions-pentagon/ (last request 16.08.2024) 8 https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-ally-warns-eastern-europe-to-rapidly-increase-defense-budgets/ (last request 21.08.2024) 9 https://ip-quarterly.com/en/nato-thrive-europe-needs-wake (last request 29.08.2024) 10 https://americarenewing.com/policy-brief-pivoting-the-us-away-from-europe-to-a-dormant-nato/ (last request 15.08.2024) 11 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 15.08.2024) 12 https://americarenewing.com/policy-brief-pivoting-the-us-away-from-europe-to-a-dormant-nato/ (last request 15.08.2024) 13 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 02.09.2024) 14 https://americarenewing.com/policy-brief-pivoting-the-us-away-from-europe-to-a-dormant-nato/ (last request 15.08.2024) 15 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 02.09.2024) 16 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/18/j-d-vance-trump-foreign-policy-china-ukraine-vice-presi-dent-pick/ (last request 15.08.2024) 17 https://www.cfr.org/blog/meet-jd-vance-republican-vice-presidential-candidate (last request 29.08.2024) 18 https://www.cfr.org/blog/meet-jd-vance-republican-vice-presidential-candidate (last request 29.08.2024) 19 https://english.elpais.com/usa/elections/2024-09-02/kamala-harriss-foreign-policy-continuity-in-substance-a-new-style-in-form-and-the-hot-potato-of-gaza.html# (last request 02.09.2024) 20 Vgl. https://www.npr.org/2024/07/24/nx-s1-5049698/a-perspective-on-kamala-harris-poten-tial-foreign-policy-priorities (last request 08.08.2024)21 Vgl. https://de.usembassy.gov/de/rede-von-us-vizepraesidentin-kamala-harris-auf-der-muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-2023/ (last request 08.08.2024) 22 Der Artikel 5 zum Bündnisfall der NATO sieht vor, dass im Falle eines bewaffneten Angriffs gegen ein Mitgliedsland, die anderen Mitgliedsstaaten dem angegriffenen Land Beistand leisten. Vgl. Nordatlantikvertrag: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm?selec-tedLocale=de (last request 08.08.2024) 23 https://www.youtube.com/live/SGRydccYp0c?si=L4RBnZ0pBsF_JGmm (last request 12.09.2024) 24 https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4874527-the-debate-failed-on-foreign-policy/ (last request 12.09.2024) 25 Vgl. https://www.politico.eu/article/philip-gordon-us-politics-kamala-harris-us-elections-eu-rope-joe-biden-emmanuel-macron/ (last request 08.08.2024) 26 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/07/harris-walz-us-election-progressive-foreign-policy-war-israel-gaza-ukraine/ (last request 09.08.2024) 27 https://fpc.org.uk/us-presidential-election-what-would-a-harris-walz-foreign-policy-look-like/ (last request 02.09.2024) 28 https://www.cbsnews.com/minnesota/news/gov-walz-signs-bill-ending-state-investments-in-russia/ (last request 02.09.2024) 29 https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/06/tim-walz-vp-harris-veterans-00172782 (letzter Ab-ruf 14.08.2024) 30 https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/05/08/americans-opinions-of-nato/ (last request 12.09.2024) 31 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67649497 (last request 09.08.2024) 32 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/08/16/kamala-harris-2024-policy-child-tax-credit/ (last request 19.08.2024) 33 https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5038077/pacing-challenge (last request 30.08.2024) 34 https://www.ft.com/content/5d50d474-dc4d-4504-8002-7a81874153a8 (last request 03.09.2024) 35 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/natos-missing-pillar (last request 21.08.2024) 36 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074 (last request 09.08.2024) 37 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 03.09.2024) 38 https://ip-quarterly.com/en/nato-thrive-europe-needs-wake (last request 30.08.2024) 39 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm (last request 04.09.2024) 40 https://ecfr.eu/publication/defending-europe-with-less-america/?amp (last request 03.09.2024)41 https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/wir-mussen-raketenabwehr-aufbauen-bundeswehr-sieht-russland-in-funf-bis-acht-jahren-zu-krieg-gegen-nato-fahig-11406908.html (last request 15.08.2024) 42 https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-trump-proofing-natos-real-adversaries (last request 15.08.2024) 43 https://www.ifw-kiel.de/de/publikationen/aktuelles/kriegstuechtig-in-jahrzehnten-deutsch-land-ruestet-viel-zu-langsam-gegen-russische-bedrohung-auf/ (last request 18.09.2024) 44 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/tun-wir-genug (last request 15.08.2024) 45 https://www.dbwv.de/aktuelle-themen/verband-aktuell/beitrag/wuestner-sich-die-augen-zu-halten-reicht-nicht (last request 15.08.2024) 46 https://table.media/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/12162241/Entwurf_Strategie-Staerkung-SVI.pdf (last request 12.09.2024) 47 https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/german-air-force/pacific-skies-24- (last request 05.09.2024) 48 Vgl. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/nato-jubil%C3%A4umsgipfel-2024-mehr-verantwortung-zemle/ (last request 08.08.2024) 49 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/fernbeziehung (last request 04.09.2024) 50 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/die-zusammenar-beit-zwischen-japan-und-der-nato (last request 04.09.2024) 51 https://www.cpf.navy.mil/RIMPAC/ (last request 05.09.2024) 52 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/memo-to/nato-leaders-indo-pacific/ (last request 05.09.2024) 53 https://youtu.be/2_djNsTnJcI (last request 14.08.2024) 54 https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR518.html (last request 04.09.2024) 55 https://euro-sd.com/2024/07/articles/39541/f-35-in-europe-a-takeover/ (last request 04.09.2024) 56 https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3736017/dod-has-seen-huge-in-crease-in-military-sales-since-ukraine-invasion/ (last request 04.09.2024)

Defense & Security
Harris and Trump presidential election 2024. Word cloud showing their political key issues.

The Armageddon Agenda: Kamala Harris, Donald Trump, and the Race to Oblivion

by Michael T. Klare

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The next president of the US will face various challenges that divide the nation, including a nuclear defense policy. The next president of the United States, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will face many contentious domestic issues that have long divided this country, including abortion rights, immigration, racial discord, and economic inequality. In the foreign policy realm, she or he will face vexing decisions over Ukraine, Israel/Gaza, and China/Taiwan. But one issue that few of us are even thinking about could pose a far greater quandary for the next president and even deeper peril for the rest of us: nuclear weapons policy. Consider this: For the past three decades, we’ve been living through a period in which the risk of nuclear war has been far lower than at any time since the Nuclear Age began — so low, in fact, that the danger of such a holocaust has been largely invisible to most people. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the signing of agreements that substantially reduced the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles eliminated the most extreme risk of thermonuclear conflict, allowing us to push thoughts of nuclear Armageddon aside (and focus on other worries). But those quiescent days should now be considered over. Relations among the major powers have deteriorated in recent years and progress on disarmament has stalled. The United States and Russia are, in fact, upgrading their nuclear arsenals with new and more powerful weapons, while China — previously an outlier in the nuclear threat equation — has begun a major expansion of its own arsenal. The altered nuclear equation is also evident in the renewed talk of possible nuclear weapons use by leaders of the major nuclear-armed powers. Such public discussion largely ceased after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when it became evident that any thermonuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would result in their mutual annihilation. However, that fear has diminished in recent years and we’re again hearing talk of nuclear weapons use. Since ordering the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened to employ nuclear munitions in response to unspecified future actions of the U.S. and NATO in support of Ukrainian forces. Citing those threats, along with China’s growing military might, US Congress has authorized a program to develop more “lower-yield” nuclear munitions supposedly meant (however madly) to provide a president with further “options” in the event of a future regional conflict with Russia or China. Thanks to those events and related developments, the world is now closer to an actual nuclear conflagration than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And while popular anxiety about a nuclear exchange may have diminished, keep in mind that the explosive power of existing arsenals has not. Imagine this, for instance: even a “limited” nuclear war — involving the use of just a dozen or so of the hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possessed by China, Russia, and the United States — would cause enough planetary destruction to ensure civilization’s collapse and the death of billions of people. And consider all of that as just the backdrop against which the next president will undoubtedly face fateful decisions regarding the production and possible use of such weaponry, whether in the bilateral nuclear relationship between the U.S. and Russia or the trilateral one that incorporates China. The U.S.-Russia Nuclear Equation  The first nuclear quandary facing the next president has an actual timeline. In approximately 500 days, on February 5th, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear accord between the U.S. and Russia limiting the size of their arsenals, will expire. That treaty, signed in 2010, limits each side to a maximum of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads along with 700 delivery systems, whether ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or nuclear-capable heavy bombers. (That treaty only covers strategic warheads, or those intended for attacks on each other’s homeland; it does not include the potentially devastating stockpiles of “tactical” nuclear munitions possessed by the two countries that are intended for use in regional conflicts.) At present, the treaty is on life support. On February 21st, 2023, Vladimir Putin ominously announced that Russia had “suspended” its formal participation in New START, although claiming it would continue to abide by its warhead and delivery limits as long as the U.S. did so. The Biden administration then agreed that it, too, would continue to abide by the treaty limits. It has also signaled to Moscow that it’s willing to discuss the terms of a replacement treaty for New START when that agreement expires in 2026. The Russians have, however, declined to engage in such conversations as long as the U.S. continues its military support for Ukraine. Accordingly, among the first major decisions the next president has to make in January 2025 will be what stance to take regarding the future status of New START (or its replacement). With the treaty’s extinction barely more than a year away, little time will remain for careful deliberation as a new administration chooses among several potentially fateful and contentious possibilities. Its first option, of course, would be to preserve the status quo, agreeing that the U.S. will abide by that treaty’s numerical limits as long as Russia does, even in the absence of a treaty obliging it to do so. Count on one thing, though: such a decision would almost certainly be challenged and tested by nuclear hawks in both Washington and Moscow. Of course, President Harris or Trump could decide to launch a diplomatic drive to persuade Moscow to agree to a new version of New START, a distinctly demanding undertaking, given the time remaining. Ideally, such an agreement would entail further reductions in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals or at least include caps on the number of tactical weapons on each side. And remember, even if such an agreement were indeed to be reached, it would also require Senate approval and undoubtedly encounter fierce resistance from the hawkish members of that body. Despite such obstacles, this probably represents the best possible outcome imaginable. The worst — and yet most likely — would be a decision to abandon the New START limits and begin adding yet more weapons to the American nuclear arsenal, reversing a bipartisan arms control policy that goes back to the administration of President Richard Nixon. Sadly, there are too many members of Congress who favor just such a shift and are already proposing measures to initiate it. In June, for example, in its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2025, the Senate Armed Services Committee instructed the Department of Defense to begin devising plans for an increase in the number of deployed ICBMs from 400 of the existing Minuteman-IIIs to 450 of its replacement, the future Sentinel ICBM. The House Armed Services Committee version of that measure does not contain that provision but includes separate plans for ICBM force expansion. (The consolidated text of the bill has yet to be finalized.) Should the U.S. and/or Russia abandon the New START limits and begin adding to its atomic arsenal after February 5th, 2026, a new nuclear arms race would almost certainly be ignited, with no foreseeable limits. No matter which side announced such a move first, the other would undoubtedly feel compelled to follow suit and so, for the first time since the Nixon era, both nuclear powers would be expanding rather than reducing their deployed nuclear forces — only increasing, of course, the potential for mutual annihilation. And if Cold War history is any guide, such an arms-building contest would result in increased suspicion and hostility, adding a greater danger of nuclear escalation to any crisis that might arise between them. The Three-Way Arms Race  Scary as that might prove, a two-way nuclear arms race isn’t the greatest peril we face. After all, should Moscow and Washington prove unable to agree on a successor to New START and begin expanding their arsenals, any trilateral nuclear agreement including China that might slow that country’s present nuclear buildup becomes essentially unimaginable. Ever since it acquired nuclear weapons in 1964, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued a minimalist stance when it came to deploying such weaponry, insisting that it would never initiate a nuclear conflict but would only use nuclear weapons in a second-strike retaliatory fashion following a nuclear attack on the PRC. In accordance with that policy, China long maintained a relatively small arsenal, only 200 or so nuclear warheads and a small fleet of ICBMs and SLBMs. In the past few years, however, China has launched a significant nuclear build-up, adding another 300 warheads and producing more missiles and missile-launching silos — all while insisting its no-first-use policy remains unchanged and that it is only maintaining a retaliatory force to deter potential aggression by other nuclear-armed states. Some Western analysts believe that Xi Jinping, China’s nationalistic and authoritarian leader, considers a larger arsenal necessary to boost his country’s status in a highly competitive, multipolar world. Others argue that China fears improvements in U.S. defensive capabilities, especially the installation of anti-ballistic missile systems, that could endanger its relatively small retaliatory force and so rob it of a deterrent to any future American first strike. Given the Chinese construction of several hundred new missile silos, Pentagon analysts contend that the country plans to deploy as many as 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035 — roughly equivalent to deployed Russian and American stockpiles under the New START guidelines. At present, there is no way to confirm such predictions, which are based on extrapolations from the recent growth of the Chinese arsenal from perhaps 200 to 500 warheads. Nonetheless, many Washington officials, especially in the Republican Party, have begun to argue that, given such a buildup, the New START limits must be abandoned in 2026 and yet more weapons added to the deployed U.S. nuclear stockpile to counter both Russia and China. As Franklin Miller of the Washington-based Scowcroft Group and a former director of nuclear targeting in the office of the secretary of defense put it, “Deterring China and Russia simultaneously [requires] an increased level of U.S. strategic warheads.” Miller was one of 12 members of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, a bipartisan group convened in 2022 to reconsider America’s nuclear policies in light of China’s growing arsenal, Putin’s nuclear threats, and other developments. In its final October 2023 report, that commission recommended numerous alterations and additions to the American arsenal, including installing multiple warheads (instead of single ones) on the Sentinel missiles being built to replace the Minuteman ICBM and increasing the number of B-21 nuclear bombers and Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines to be produced under the Pentagon’s $1.5 trillion nuclear “modernization” program. The Biden administration has yet to endorse the recommendations in that report. It has, however, signaled that it’s considering the steps a future administration might take to address an expanded Chinese arsenal. In March, the White House approved a new version of a top-secret document, the Nuclear Employment Guidance, which for the first time reportedly focused as much on countering China as Russia. According to the few public comments made by administration officials about that document, it, too, sets out contingency plans for increasing the number of deployed strategic weapons in the years ahead if Russia breaks out of the current New START limits and no arms restraints have been negotiated with China. “We have begun exploring options to increase future launcher capacity or additional deployed warheads on the land, sea, and air legs [of the nuclear delivery “triad” of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers] that could offer national leadership increased flexibility, if desired, and executed,” said acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy Vipin Narang on August 1st. While none of those options are likely to be implemented in President Biden’s remaining months, the next administration will be confronted with distinctly ominous decisions about the future composition of that already monstrous nuclear arsenal. Whether it is kept as is or expanded, the one option you won’t hear much about in Washington is finding ways to reduce it. And count on one thing: even a decision simply to preserve the status quo in the context of today’s increasingly antagonistic international environment poses an increased risk of nuclear conflict. Any decision to expand it, along with comparable moves by Russia and China, will undoubtedly create an even greater risk of instability and potentially suicidal nuclear escalation. The Need for Citizen Advocacy  For many of us, nuclear weapons policy seems like a difficult issue that should be left to the experts. This wasn’t always so. During the Cold War years, nuclear war seemed like an ever-present possibility and millions of Americans familiarized themselves with nuclear issues, participating in ban-the-bomb protests or the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign of the 1980s. But with the Cold War’s end and a diminished sense of nuclear doom, most of us turned to other issues and concerns. Yet the nuclear danger is growing rapidly and so decisions regarding the U.S. arsenal could have life-or-death repercussions on a global scale. And one thing should be made clear: adding more weapons to the U.S. arsenal will not make us one bit safer. Given the invulnerability of this country’s missile-bearing nuclear submarines and the multitude of other weapons in our nuclear arsenal, no foreign leader could conceivably mount a first strike on this country and not expect catastrophic retaliation, which in turn would devastate the planet. Acquiring more nuclear weapons would not alter any of this in the slightest. All it could possibly do is add to international tensions and increase the risk of global annihilation. As Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan research and advocacy outfit, put it recently: “Significant increases in the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal would undermine mutual and global security by making the existing balance of nuclear terror more unpredictable and would set into motion a counterproductive, costly action-reaction cycle of nuclear competition.” A decision to pursue such a reckless path could occur just months from now. In early 2025, the next president, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will be making critical decisions regarding the future of the New START Treaty and the composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Given the vital stakes involved, such decisions should not be left to the president and a small coterie of her or his close advisers. Rather, it should be the concern of every citizen, ensuring vigorous debate on alternative options, including steps aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating the world’s nuclear arsenals. Without such public advocacy, we face the very real danger that, for the first time since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons will again be detonated on this planet, with billions of us finding ourselves in almost unimaginable peril. The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

Diplomacy
Russia, China and USA political confrontation concept.

USA, China, Russia: Multiplying Deterrence

by Ivan Timofeev

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Minimising the number of one’s enemies while multiplying one’s number of friends is a basic principle of diplomacy that has existed for centuries. The simplicity of the principle itself is more than compensated by the complexity of its practical implementation. In international relations, the price of friendship may be too high, limiting freedom of manoeuvre, while open hostility brings existing contradictions to the limit, radically resolving them in favour of one side or another. Advising a diplomat to expand alliances and limit confrontations is like advising a stock market player to buy shares when they are cheap and sell when they are expensive. It is obvious that minimising the number of rivals allows you to save resources, concentrate them on the tasks of internal development, and not be torn on several fronts. However, it is also obvious that competition may be preferable to concessions to the demands of the opposite side, especially when it comes to issues of principle. The situation is further complicated by the fact that countries can compete in some areas while remaining partners in others. Then adjusting the balance of cooperation and competition becomes even more difficult. The transition of international relations to extreme forms of rivalry is quite possible; history is full of such episodes. In such situations, the key task becomes not so much preserving the remnants of friendship as a preparation for the upcoming war, which the parties may consider inevitable, waging war by proxies, and entering into confrontation at a convenient moment. The bottom line is that the one who finds the optimal balance of allies and rivals will be able to conserve resources, and if confrontation is inevitable, will be able to withstand it, emerge victorious, and make use of the results of victory. The current state of international relations demonstrates a steady tendency towards the multiplication of deterrence tasks among the three key global centres of military power—the United States, China and Russia. Each of them has an increasing number of opponents. Moreover, the increase in their number, as well as the degree of confrontation, has its roots in the relatively favourable situation of the 1990s and early 2000s, when Washington, Beijing, and Moscow enjoyed much more favourable external conditions: the number of rivals was negligible, while the density of partnerships was unprecedented. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the United States had virtually no rivals among the major powers. Relations with Russia were defined by a network of arms control treaties. It was difficult to call them cloudless, but even a semblance of confrontation from the Cold War era was very difficult to imagine. The key security problem for the United States was radical Islamism in its terrorist guise; Russia actively helped the United States in its fight against international terrorism, and China simply did not interfere. North Korea and Iran formed an “axis of evil” whose nuclear ambitions Washington tried to restrain with sanctions. Moscow and Beijing, if they did not help the Americans, then at least tried to find the optimal formula for solving nuclear problems via the UN Security Council. Some twenty years later, the situation for the United States has changed quite radically. China is perceived as a powerful and long-term rival in all senses. We are talking about a military-political, economic, and even ideological rivalry. It is difficult to compare China with the USSR during the Cold War. But in all three of these dimensions, it represents an alternative to American politics. Although the United States would like to keep the rivalry with China under control, especially given the close ties between the two economies, the task of containing China will become a priority for decades to come. Russia has turned from a weakened and extremely cautious partner into a tough and uncompromising adversary, as its interests in the post-Soviet space are being infringed upon, and its economy and military-industrial complex are being restored. Enmity with it requires a manifold increase in investments in support of Ukraine, an increased presence in Europe, and the modernisation of nuclear potential, taking into account the advance appearance of new missile systems in Moscow. The arms control regime has been torn to shreds. Washington is trying to control the escalation but could find itself at war with Russia, with the unlikely but growing risk of a nuclear exchange. The DPRK has both nuclear weapons and missiles capable of launching them. It would now be more difficult to crush North Korea.  US enmity towards Russia and its rivalry with China has provided an opportunity for Pyongyang to emerge from isolation. The same goes for Iran. The aggravation of US relations with Russia and China plays into Tehran’s hands in overcoming isolation and the blockade. The “axis of evil” that the United States so actively fought against has only strengthened, and in interaction with Russia and partly China, it will continue to strengthen. Russia and China themselves are also getting closer. A military alliance is a long way off. Moscow and Beijing are not striving for it. But their interaction is now closer, and the United States will no longer be able to use Russia to balance China. Chinese diplomacy has been building an extremely cautious foreign policy since the late 1970s. Beijing has most consistently adhered to the principle of minimizing adversaries and maximizing friends. In many ways, China has achieved its goal, having managed to create favourable foreign policy conditions for enormous economic growth, increasing the well-being of citizens and modernising the army. The problem is that such PRC growth, even taking into account the lack of expressed ambitions, has caused growing concern in the United States. As a result, Beijing was faced with the fact that Washington decided to act proactively, containing China while the possibilities for such containment remained in the arsenal of American foreign policy. Perhaps the PRC leadership would prefer to continue to enjoy the benefits of global peace and live amid conditions of minimal competition. But the results of successful modernisation are now becoming an issue that the United States considers a security challenge. This means China will have to live in response to the American policy of containment, which includes the building of anti-Chinese alliances. Here, American diplomacy will try to place its bets, including in India. However, India is too large and powerful a country to play a passive role. China, in turn, is building a special relationship with the United States' European NATO allies. Here Beijing could take into account the Russian experience of “special” relations with the European Union. Finally, Russia at the turn of the century had practically no serious rivals. The country was seriously weakened by the fall of the Soviet Union and controversial reforms. Political relations with the West have gradually deteriorated since the late 1990s, but still haven’t reached a critical level, having been compensated with a high level of economic cooperation. In Asia, relations with US allies Japan and South Korea were also especially cordial without the burdens that remained in matters of European security. Today, almost the entire collective West is fighting against a strengthened Russia in Ukraine, supplying Kiev with weapons and ammunition, and providing Ukraine with finances, intelligence, military specialists, etc. Economic relations have been undermined for a long time by sanctions. Tokyo and especially Seoul have taken a more cautious position, but are still forced to follow the American line. The bottom line is that all three powers, for various reasons, have found themselves in a situation where the tasks of containment, expanding confrontation, and the need to resolve security issues involve using force or the threat of its use. Past economic ties have not held back political contradictions. Apparently, we are only at the beginning of an exacerbation. After all, the real fight between the two key rivals—the USA and China—is yet to come. One can argue for a long time about what is the root cause of the increase in deterrence—mistakes of diplomats or objective factors giving rise to rivalry. The result is what’s important. The three largest military-political centres simultaneously faced deteriorating foreign policy conditions, whereas twenty years ago all three were in a much more peaceful environment. The fate of the future world order still depends on the ability of the ‘troika’ to control rivalry and on the results of such rivalry. First published in the Valdai Discussion Club. Original published in Russian. https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/ssha-kitay-rossiya-umnozhenie-sderzhivaniya/

Defense & Security
American nuclear button concept. USA missile launches from its underground silo launch facility, 3D rendering

Revision of US Nuclear Operational Guidelines

by Kim Tae-Woo

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Kim Tae-woo, former head of the Institute for Unification Studies Today, I would like to tell you that the US nuclear strategy is changing . As President Biden’s term draws to a close, the US is changing its nuclear weapons operational guidelines. President Biden , like President Obama, originally argued for a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons. That is why, when he took office as president in 2020, he advocated for sole purpose nuclear use and no first use (NFU). ‘Sole purpose nuclear use’ means that the US will only use nuclear weapons when it is directly attacked by nuclear weapons, and NFU is an abbreviation for ‘No First Use’, which means that it will not use nuclear weapons before its adversary. When a president changes, the US publishes a strategy document called the ‘Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)’, which declares its nuclear strategy and nuclear operational policies to the outside world. Allies were concerned that if President Biden included such content in the NPR, they would distrust the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. Perhaps conscious of these concerns, the 2022 NPR did not include such content, but President Biden’s nuclear philosophy was reflected throughout the strategy book. As a result, the United States decided to stop developing submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and retire the B83-1 (1.2 mt) missile, an aircraft-delivered nuclear weapon. The Biden administration has changed. In March, it ordered the US military to create nuclear operational guidelines to prepare for a situation in which China, Russia, and North Korea cooperate to launch a nuclear attack on the US, and approved the newly created guidelines. At the same time, it also ordered the development of necessary new weapons and the modernization of the nuclear operational system. In June, the director of the White House National Security Council (NSC)’s nonproliferation office also said, “If the nuclear threat from China, Russia, and North Korea increases, the US will also increase its deployed nuclear weapons,” and hinted at the possibility that “nuclear weapons can be used in conventional warfare.” This is a reversal of President Biden’s policy of giving up preemptive nuclear use. In this way, President Biden is adopting new nuclear operational guidelines and nuclear doctrine while changing his previous position with less than a year left in his term. The reason for this change in the US nuclear doctrine is that he is taking the nuclear arms buildup of China, Russia, and North Korea very seriously in the new Cold War situation, and the strategic focus on the North Korean nuclear issue is changing from ‘North Korea’s nuclear abandonment’ to ‘prevention of nuclear use.’ Although the sensitive parts of the newly created nuclear weapons operational guidelines have not been made public, it is known that they contain explicit concerns about China’s nuclear arms buildup. The guidelines are based on the US Department of Defense’s estimate that China’s nuclear weapons will increase to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, and are intended to prepare for the possibility that China could threaten the US by cooperating with Russia and North Korea on nuclear weapons. The same goes for North Korea. In March, the US, through the NSC and experts, mentioned the need for “interim steps” that are a step back from the goal of “denuclearization,” and said, “We are willing to talk to North Korea unconditionally for negotiations.” The terms “denuclearization of North Korea” and “CVID,” or “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,” disappeared from the platforms of the US Democratic and Republican parties announced ahead of the November presidential election. North Korea may say that “the US has recognized our possession of nuclear weapons,” but that is a misinterpretation. It does not mean accepting, or tolerating, North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but rather recognizing, and is trying to lower the nuclear threat through dialogue, recognizing that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons immediately, but responding strongly if North Korea refuses. As such, the nuclear issue is now reaching a dead end. As the military closeness and nuclear cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea intensifies, it is ultimately triggering a response from the US. Naturally, South Korea cannot just keep watching. In Korea, civic groups are currently conducting a campaign to collect 10 million signatures calling for nuclear armament, but it is unclear how much this movement will change national policy in the future. If this trend continues, there may be countermoves in Japan and Taiwan as well. It is difficult to understand why North Korea should really increase its nuclear weapons and strengthen its military power with drones and artillery, even though food shortages are starting again, the youth are opposing the one-party dictatorship, and the elite are increasingly defecting to seek freedom. “Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org.”

Energy & Economics
The concept of a fragile, vulnerable, unstable world order.

World Order Transformation: Economy, Ideology, Technology

by Aleksandr Dynkin

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The concept of a multipolar (or polycentric) world order [1] was first coined by Academician Yevgeny Primakov in 1996 [Primakov 1996]. Like everything new, it was not immediately accepted, but ultimately became a significant contribution to both domestic and world theory of international relations, offering a compelling alternative to Western approaches, particularly the one proposed in Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations [Huntington 1993]. It informed the idea of trilateral cooperation between Russia, China and India, implemented by Primakov and later embodied in the BRICS group. By now, the idea of multipolarity has been recognized in global political science, has entered the conceptual framework and the language of international diplomacy and is used in Russia’s doctrinal documents. In 2015, we proposed the scenario of a new bipolarity [2] as one of the possible trajectories for global development. Today, many scholars, both Chinese and American, [3] suggest that China-centric and U.S.-centric poles are emerging. This article discusses the “multipolarity — new bipolarity” dichotomy. Long Global Macro-Transformations World history shows that a new world order typically emerges after the end of a major war (see Table 1). Table 1. International system (world order)    Source: systematized by A.A. Dynkin, IMEMO RAS Europe was usually the “kitchen” where the world order was cooked. Take the last 200 years. After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Concert of Europe emerged and lasted for 100 years. The century-long stability of that system could be explained by the homogeneity of the political organization of its guarantor states. All members of the Concert of Europe were monarchies. World War I produced the Versailles system, which lasted only 20 years. One of the reasons for its short life was the exclusion of the Soviet Union, Germany and China. The Yalta-Potsdam system was formed by the victors in World War II. Its guarantors were the “Big Three” powers—the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the UK—along with France and China. The three defeated powers—Germany, Japan and Italy—were discriminated and disenfranchised. This system existed for 45 years and was initially thought to be polycentric, but quickly degenerated into a bipolar order, and the Cold War commenced. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the system became unipolar, dominated by the West, primarily the U.S. It disregarded Russia’s interests and, from 2018 onward, began discriminating against China as well. February 2022 can be considered the formal date of the unipolar world’s demise. However, today’s predictions suggest it will take at least 10 years before the new post-unipolar system becomes stable. The economic center of gravity is a spatial indicator of the economic strength of states, borrowed from physics. To put it simply, this is a geographical point of equilibrium for GDP, trade and investment flows of different countries. Figure 1 shows a map of how the world’s economic center of gravity shifted for over a thousand years. It appeared in Central Asia, on the territory of the Ghaznavid Empire (modern-day Afghanistan). The center then migrated northwest, while the devastation in post-war Europe forcefully pushed it (within just 10 years) to the West, toward Greenland. Then it turned east again. The sharpest shift, to the southeast, occurred in 2000–2010 and is associated with the rise of China. The economic center of gravity has almost returned to the same meridian but remained more than 2,000 km north of the starting point, which indicates a return to the millennial balance of economic power between the West and the East. Figure 1. “Journey” of the three-dimensional economic center of gravity    Source: Dobbs R., Remes J., Manyika J. et al. Urban world: Cities and the rise of the consuming class. McKinsey Global Institute, 2012. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/urbanization/urban-world-cities-and-the-rise-of-the-consuming-class. Statistic calculations by IMEMO RAS for 60 years of peace (1960–2021) indicate the stability of the center’s latitudinal (horizontal) position. This suggests a relatively consistent proportion of GDP production by the countries in the Global South and Global North, under the economic leadership of the Northern Hemisphere. The shift to the East has also been clearly confirmed. According to our projections up to 2050, the future position of the globe’s center of economic activity will lie on the border of India and China. This method of analysis reveals a high level of inertia in time and geographic monotonicity of changes in the balance of economic power of states. It also shows that wars can drastically disrupt the natural course of events. The center of gravity method can also be applied to the arsenals of strategic and tactical weapons (see Figure 2). For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. had a huge advantage, but then there was a clear pivot to the northeast—the creation of superior nuclear capabilities in the Soviet Union. With the onset of arms control in 1993, a reversing loop emerged, heading southwest. This was followed by a curve to the east with an implied southward inclination, which reflects the growing nuclear stockpiles of India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the rapid buildup of strategic and tactical nuclear forces in China. The military center of gravity follows its economic peer with a lag of 20 years, reflecting the geopolitical ambitions of Asian powers. These interpretations also clearly demonstrate the end of unipolarity and point to the rise of multipolarity. Figure 2. Movement of the nuclear center of gravity Source: calculations by K.V. Bogdanov, Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS, based on the data from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/. Technology. Politicians tend to be techno-optimists. Barack Obama predicted that 3D printing would transform the entire world. [4] George W. Bush promised that decoding the human genome would revolutionize medicine. [5] All false starts. Economists traditionally measure the rate of technological progress (TP) using the total factor productivity (TFP) index. To put it simply, this is the part of economic growth driven not by an increase in inputs—labor and capital—but rather by improvements in the efficiency of their use. Technological progress means not only the generation of new scientific and technological ideas but also their mass replication. Without economic validation of the impact of wide dissemination of innovations, scientific or technological achievements remain in history as brilliant breakthroughs with only local economic effects, giving rise to journalistic generalizations at best, such as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” or “the sixth techno-economic paradigm.” Statistical metrics rely on data of technologically advanced nations, while catching-up countries have room for growth by approaching the TP frontier, i.e. adopting and improving existing ideas and technologies. Technological leaders spend more resources pushing the TP frontier, while those catching up can accelerate at lower costs, effectively staying in the “wind shadow” of the leaders. The TFP index growth rate has been steadily declining in developed countries for many years, but this has been especially conspicuous since the mid-2000s. Today, the growth is below 1.5% and even 1% per year (see Figure 3). Figure 3. Average annual growth of total factor productivity, % Source: calculations by IMEMO RAS based on the data from the International Productivity Monitor. No. 38, Spring 2020. http://www.csls.ca/ipm/ipm38.asp#:~:text=Martin%20Neil%20Baily%2C%20Barry%20P.%20Bosworth%20and %20Siddhi%20Doshi%0ALessons%20from%20Productivity%20Comparisons%20 of%20Germany%2C%20Japan%2C%20and%20the%20United%20States%C2%A0; Innovative China: New Drivers of Growth. World Bank Group, and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P.R. China. 2019. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1335-1. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/833871568732137448/pdf/Innovative-China-New-Drivers-of-Growth.pdf. A similar pattern of dramatic TFP deceleration was observed in China. The consensus interpretation of these figures is that the main effects of the Third Industrial (i.e., computer) Revolution have largely been exhausted, and no new general-purpose breakthrough technologies (such as electricity, internal combustion engines, or computers and mobile communications) have emerged. However, it seems that the intellectualization of technologies and approaches to project management, as well as informatization, simply do not fit into the traditional factor-based view of progress that was established many years ago. The scale of knowledge is growing, new professions are springing up, the role of emotional intelligence and cognitive functions is increasing. All this dramatically changes the structure of capital assets (see Figure 4). From the beginning of the 21st century and until the 2008 crisis (2000–2007), equipment accounted for over 50% of the increase in capital’s contribution (investment) to output growth, whereas in 2019–2021, almost 63% of this increase was attributable to intellectual property assets. This result of our research suggests a refocusing of technological progress from final products to intellectual technologies, enabling the production of a range of innovative goods and services tailored to highly segmented demand. Figure 4. Transformation of the capital structure in the U.S. private sector Source: Total Factor Productivity for Major Industries—2022. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/prod3_03232023.htm. There are now hopes that the pace of technological progress may accelerate due to the development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, which will spark a new industrial revolution. An indirect sign of its imminence is the sharp rise in the rate of business births and deaths in the U.S. economy in 2020–2022. [6] The spillover of labor from companies that are losing efficiency to corporations with increasing market shares has also accelerated. These are some sort of leading indicators that suggest the structural results of TP are approaching. Similar developments occurred 30 years ago, on the cusp of the computer revolution. The above-mentioned intellectualization of fi ed capital, where trusted AI will be applied, adds credibility to these hopes. In addition, AI is one of the critical areas of technological sovereignty. It is no coincidence that Vladimir Putin described AI as “crosscutting, universal and essentially revolutionary technology.” [7] The Russian President announced the preparation of a new edition of the National AI Development Strategy and a respective decree. I believe that this prioritization is justified. China’s experience in the semiconductor race is a good model to be emulated (see Figure 5). Its distinguishing feature is the focus on companies as drivers of development, with massive, cumulatively growing state support. Figure 5. Focusing on China’s priorities (nanometer chip race) Source: Systematized by I.V. Danilin, IMEMO RAS The U.S. strategy of curbing technological development of Russia (in all areas) and China (in semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing and electric cars) leads to stiff competition in high technology, which is fraught with fragmentation, diversification of technical standards, legal norms and rules. And this is another argument in favor of a new bipolarity. Demographic processes. According to UN projections, by the middle of the 21st century, Russia will drop from its current 9th place to 14th in terms of population, while remaining the most populous country in Europe. [8] A more significant problem for Russia is population aging. The proportion of elderly people, who are typically not part of the labor force, is increasing. Japan, Spain and Italy are leading this process today, but neither China nor India will be spared. Nigeria appears to be the only major country where population and the share of young people will continue to grow until the end of the 21st century. As of December 2023, one in 10 people worldwide was aged 65 or over, with health spending taking up 10% of global GDP. [9] In this context, the importance of medical technologies cannot be overstated, as they can extend not only people’s life expectancy but also the duration of their healthy and socially active life, thereby easing labor market pressures. Needs always steer technological progress toward overcoming economic growth constraints tied to the scarcest resource in any given historical period. A serious risk associated with the problem of aging is a slowdown in innovation, since it is people under 40—the age group that will shrink throughout the 21st century—who are the primary drivers and consumers of innovation. So far, this risk has been mitigated by the large youth cohorts in China and India. This is why these two nations are experiencing almost exponential growth in patenting, massive reengineering and, consequently, in middle-class numbers. Demographics give India an edge until around 2060, which is already evident in the growth rates of Indian economy. Combined with the influx of hi-tech investments and the contribution of the Indian diaspora, India has good prospects, making its position crucial to the future architecture of the world order, regardless of how it evolves. The U.S. understands this and has been figuratively “clinging” to this nation for the past 20 years. I believe that the Russian Academy of Sciences should significantly bolster scientific and educational ties with India and its dynamically developing neighbors in Southeast Asia—Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. The anticipated tension in the global market of new generations of innovators aggravates inter-country competition for this scarcest resource. I think that the international reputation of the Russian Academy of Sciences is a powerful tool to attract and retain young people and foster their creative motivation. We should reassert this as we celebrate the 300th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences. Ideology. Dirigisme [10], or statism, is the main trend in both economic theory and economic policy of the West. A pivot to a more state-controlled economy began with the disappointing outcomes of the Washington Consensus, which aimed to guide post-socialist countries from planned to market economies. The 2008–2009 financial crisis cemented the trend toward statism, and the COVID-19 pandemic elevated it to unprecedented proportions. In the U.S., Democrats are among the most vocal proponents of greater government intervention in all spheres of life, but they are not alone. Republicans are also actively advocating industrial policy, repudiation of free trade, as well as strict control over Big Tech, among other measures. The popularity of the so-called cultural Marxism is on the rise. [11] Its origins go back to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (H. Marcuse, E. Fromm and others). These ideas are moving from the realm of ideological and theoretical confrontations into political activism. For example, the leaders of the BLM movement publicly self-identify as “trained Marxist organizers.” The essence of the strategy inspired by “cultural Marxism” is the rejection of direct political struggle on the barricades, since the proletariat has been “bought off by the bourgeoisie and is no longer capable of anything,” and the ranks of the classic proletariat are rapidly thinning. The direction of social change is set, on the one hand, by intellectuals with personal power and, on the other hand, by marginalized groups seeking to assert their “right to identity.” The strategy of activists who form this paradoxical combination of intellectuals and marginalized individuals is the creeping takeover of the main institutions of power and society by planting “correct” ideas in the mass consciousness. In the U.S., the fighters for political correctness have already hijaked the school system, university campuses, major media outlets and the entertainment industry (Hollywood). Civil servants are forced to take courses in critical race theory, which postulates not only the socially constructed nature of race and the recognition of systemic racism [Delgado, Stefancic 2017: 45] but also a sense of guilt in one part of society toward another. This, in turn, allegedly requires addressing moral and material injustices by organizing public life in line with such an ideology. Similar concepts are being pushed into public discourse as well. It is already dominated by the ideas of radical feminism, cancel culture, anti-systemic racism and postcolonialism, the fight against global warming and the green agenda, which claims to be universal and non-negotiable. As a result, the energy transition is motivated more by ideology than by the comparative market efficiency of energy supplies. Different environmental-political discourses—eco-nationalism, eco-imperialism and green growth—are competing in shaping the green agenda, eroding the attractiveness of the dominant sustainable development model. Another universal weapon in fighting any dissent is political correctness. Large corporations, government agencies and universities are developing and implementing strategies to promote DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) principles, which are nothing but tools of ideological control over employees. Universities are required to fi reports on their compliance with such principles and efforts to promote them, which causes mounting criticism as they violate academic freedom and cultivate ideological conformity. [12] However, ideological censorship has already taken deep root in various spheres of public life, and questioning its compatibility with democracy is deemed politically incorrect. Revising cultural norms has become a cultural norm in and of itself, deepening divisions in modern polarized societies, primarily in the U.S., but also in Old Europe [Semenenko 2023: 27-35]. Another curious phenomenon is associated with the new agenda. In the 20th century, the left championed progress, advocating faster economic growth, rapid technological advancement and better social welfare. Now the ideas of zero or even negative growth and post-growth are popular among them. [Buchs, Koch 2017: 218]. Such ideological narratives exacerbate the question of how to treat the poor countries of the South, but also their own poor: the welfare state for all no longer fit into this agenda. On the contrary, it becomes a selective tool of backing the “right” minorities. This creates a breeding ground for stronger positions of populist forces. Such contradictory internal political processes distort public consciousness as well as domestic and foreign policy decision-making. The new elites are extremely ideologized. The U.S. political system is becoming less effective at regulating the economy. Two rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings, have downgraded the U.S. credit rating to AA+ from the top mark of AAA. In November 2023, Moody’s lowered its outlook on the U.S. credit rating to “negative” from “stable.” All three agencies agree on the main reason for the downgrade: the growing dysfunctionality of the political system. In foreign policy, the U.S. has withdrawn from 16 major international treaties and agreements on arms control, global trade, climate and the Arctic since the beginning of the century [Dynkin 2020]. In other words, the unipolar world order with its unbridled appetite for expansion has brought the world into a zone of extra-high risks. And the paradigms that are dominant in the West have proven incompatible with either Russian or Chinese value-oriented political projects. Therefore, the ideological sphere will inevitably see increased confrontation, marking another step toward bipolarity. IMEMO RAS researchers have repeatedly warned about the West’s miscalculated strategic hopes: 1) that Russia would face an economic catastrophe because of an unprecedented sanctions war in modern history; 2) that the unipolar world order would remain unchallenged; 3) that a global blockade of Russia’s export-oriented economy would be feasible. And we were not the only ones who made these warnings. In response, we only heard propagandistic clichés like “a gas station masquerading as a country,” “a regional power” and “Russia is isolated with its economy in tatters”. This kind of “expertise” led the Washington establishment to believe that Russia is a “declining power” whose strategic interests could be safely neglected. This “strategic lunacy” is a consequence of a universalist mindset—a product of the West’s political experience and culture, which tends to elevate Anglo-Saxon and European historical tradition to absolutes—and of a failure to understand the shifts in the balance of power in the 21st century. Today, Russia is the world’s fourth-largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP), while the top fi e global economic powers include three BRICS nations and none from the blooming “garden” of Josep Borrell, the EU foreign policy chief who has recently been fired. Now a new narrative has been launched into the propaganda orbit: “Russia is about to attack Eastern Europe.” The logical gap between the image of a declining power and that of an “aggressive bear” is conveniently ignored. This primitive, one-dimensional perception of complex non-linear processes can only lead to disappointment—just as it did when the West lulled itself into believing that Chinese reforms would eventually lead to political pluralism. As a result, the West has an inexhaustible stream of surprises. It appears that their experts are increasingly out of touch with Russian (and any other non-Western) realities. Figuratively speaking, they are staring into a distorting rearview mirror constructed by their own rhetoric and propaganda. But the main real surprise was the fantastic resilience of the Russian economy. I dare say that no other economy in the world, not even China’s, could withstand such aggressive pressure. The high resistance of the Russian economy to external shocks can be explained by three fundamental reasons. First, it is the result of difficult, sometimes agonizing institutional and structural reforms. These efforts have ultimately produced a self-sufficient, adaptive and highly diversified market economy. Second, the crisis of 2022 was the fifth (!) in the history of post-Soviet Russia. The government, federal regulators and the Bank of Russia have accumulated hard-earned professional experience in crisis management and counter-cyclical strategies. The same can be said about business. Our economic entities have demonstrated time and again that there are always more effective solutions than there are problems. Finally, the West miscalculated its ability to isolate our economy. The dual containment of Russia and China, in fact, only strengthens ties between the BRICS member states. Transformations of the 2020s. The first half of the 2020s has fi y buried what was once known as “European security.” It is impossible to glue this “broken cup” back together without Russia. The unwillingness of the Ukrainian side and the West to stop the armed conflict at its very beginning, the dangerous escalation, NATO’s constant violation of its own “red lines” and the accession of Sweden and Finland to the North Atlantic Alliance are all symptoms of the European security system transforming into a transatlantic one. Meanwhile, the Eurasian security system is taking shape. The outcomes of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China hint that the “political East” is starting to form, if not as an alternative to the long-standing “political West,” then at least as an equal partner. Without considering its interests, any debate about “rules-based” global security will be mere fantasy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Moscow after his recent reelection is in the same vein. Of course, geography cannot be changed, and Russia has been and will remain a European power. However, it is also the geographic center of Eurasia, providing the infrastructure backbone for the Eurasian partnership—from the Northern Sea Route and up to the Trans-Siberian Railway, Baikal–Amur Mainline, Trans-Asian Highway and cross-continental pipelines. The “post-Ukrainian” world seems to be moving toward a new, indivisible Eurasian security architecture, relying on existing institutions: the Union State, CSTO, EAEU, CIS, BRICS, SCO and ASEAN. Minsk has put forward an initiative to develop a Eurasian Charter for Diversity and Multipolarity—a strategic vision for a new system of international relations to replace the “rules-based” world order. An important event of 2024 in this context is the expansion of the BRICS club (see Figure 6). Its combined economic power could potentially reach $67 trillion, surpassing the total GDP of the G7 countries. Figure 6. Economic potential of BRICS countries Source: calculations by A.A. Dynkin, IMEMO RAS, based on the data from the IMF, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Steel Association, Energy Transition Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2023, International Energy Agency. And there are still 28 more countries on the “waiting list”. In several important markets such as metals, automotive industry, oil and mineral fertilizers, BRICS already matches or exceeds the potential of the G7 nations. Russia, which took over the BRICS rotating presidency in 2024, faces the task of energizing the harmonized economic and technological policies of the members. This approach is the institutional cornerstone of the future polycentric world. What will the coming world order look like? It is difficult to say which of the two trends—bipolarity or polycentrism—will prevail in the end. It is more likely that they will coexist: for example, rigid bipolarity in the Global North and polycentrism in the Global South. Signs of military, economic and technological bipolarity are already visible in the North. Interestingly, New Delhi tends to categorize China as a country of the North [Jaishankar 2020: 240]. This viewpoint has substance, as China is far ahead of other countries of the Global South in terms of GDP per capita ($12,541). For comparison, India’s GDP per capita is $2,612. [13] The decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies has not affected trade flows yet, but only technology and investment. In 2023, China saw a reversal of foreign direct investment inflows, with funds previously invested being withdrawn. Negative trends took hold, and the outflow approached negative $1.5 trillion (see Figure 7). Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific macro-region is gaining greater internal dynamics, unlike Europe or North America. Figure 7. U.S.–China Economic Decoupling Source: UN Comtrade Database. https://comtradeplus.un.org/; State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) of the People’s Republic of China. https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/. Meanwhile, the trend toward political polycentricity persists. For example, New Delhi and Ankara were initially poles apart on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. This is also the dawning of post-unipolarity, where the new centers of power are increasingly guided by their own interests in decision-making rather than by any “rules” or advice from Washington, Beijing or Moscow. It would be unrealistic to expect that the future world order will be free of conflict. The world will retain its diversity, with different potentials of countries and their competition. It is crucial that, despite their differences, the interests of larger and smaller nations are respected, and problems are solved through constructive dialogue. Russia was the first to challenge the notorious unipolar world order. Today we can state that most countries in the Global South have responded to this challenge and refused to subscribe to the Western interpretation of the conflict in Ukraine . The future world order is taking shape right before our eyes. I am sure that a multipolar world is preferable for Russia as a developed, self-sufficient and sovereign nation. But this world also requires a new system of global governance, development and strengthening of its institutions, such as BRICS, G20, SCO and EAEU. For instance, the EAEU member states (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan) are faring much better than the five other post-Soviet countries. In 2022, GDP per capita in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union was 3.5 times higher than the average for the fi e other CIS states that are not part of the EAEU (Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) (see Figure 8). Our strategy in these organizations requires a solid approach and “stereoscopic” vision from socio-economic, scientific, technological and political perspectives. Here, the Russian Academy of Sciences should play a major role as a leader of scientific and expert community. Figure 8. Economic trends of EAEU and CIS countries Source: EEC. https://eec.eaeunion.org/?ysclid=lr7rtdg7np631919243; IMF. https://www.imf.org/; World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/.  Conclusion In conclusion, there are compelling arguments both for multipolarity and for a new bipolarity. Leading U.S. experts are asking similar questions: “What order will replace the crumbling US-led system is far from certain. Will China push aside the United States as the global hegemon to lead a world according to rules written in Chinese characters? Will the world become bipolar, divided between two more or less rigidly defined blocs led by the United States and China? Will a genuinely multipolar world emerge based on several states or coalitions of more or less equal strength?” [Graham 2023: 272]. These questions are yet to be answered, and definitive conclusions in this case are premature. Given this high uncertainty, one should be prepared for any scenario. The essential prerequisite for such readiness is Russia’s strategic autonomy based on military-strategic parity with the U.S. The fundamental question to which the author has no answer today is: how likely is the emergence of a new world order without a major war? In 2024, presidential or parliamentary elections will take place (or have already taken place) in 50 countries, which account for more than 45% of the world’s GDP and population. Perhaps their results will clarify our vision of the near future. Dynkin A.A. (2024). World order transformation: economy, ideology, technology. Polis. Political Studies, 5, 8-23. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2024.05.02 This article was prepared with the support of a grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation for major scientific projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development No. 075-15-2024-551 “Global and regional centers of power in the emerging world order”. The author expresses gratitude to his colleagues at IMEMO RAS R.I. Kapelyushnikov, V.D. Milovidov, I.S. Semenenko, I.V. Danilin, S.V. Zhukov, K.V. Bogdanov, A.P. Guchanova for consultations and assistance in preparing this article. References Büchs, M., & Koch, M. (2017). Critiques of growth. In M. Büchs, & M. Koch. Postgrowth and Wellbeing: Challenges to Sustainable Welfare (pp. 39-56). London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3319-59903-8_4 Delgado, R.,& Stefancic, J. (2017). Critical race theory. Anintroduction. New York: New York University Press. Graham, T. (2023). Getting Russia right. UK: Polity Books. Huntington, S.P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22-49. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations Jaishankar, S. (2020). The India way: strategies for an uncertain world. New Delhi; New York: Harper Collins Publishers India. Kupchan, C. (2021). Bipolarity is back: why it matters. The Washington Quarterly, 44(4), 123-139. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020457 Yan Xuetong. (2016). Political leadership and power redistribution. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 9(1), 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow002 Dynkin, A.A. (2020). International turbulence and Russia. Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 90(2), 127-137. https://doi.org/10.1134/S101933162002001X. Primakov, E.M. (1996). Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya nakanune XXI veka: problemy, perspektivy [International Relations on the eve of 21st century: problems, prospects]. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’, 10, 3-13. (In Russ.) Semenenko, I.S. (2023). Razdelyonnye obshchestva [Divided societies]. In I.S. Semenenko (Ed.), Identichnost’: lichnost’, obshchestvo, politika. Novye kontury issledovatel’skogo polya [Identity: The Individual, Society, and Politics. New Outlines of the Research Field] (pp. 27-35). Moscow: Ves’ Mir. (In Russ.) https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/publ/2023/Identichnost-Semenenko-2023.pdf Литература на русском языке Дынкин А.А. 2020. Международная турбулентность и Россия. Вестник РАН. Т. 90. № 3. С. 208-219. https://doi.org/10.31857/S0869587320030032. EDN: WINCQO. Примаков Е.М. 1996. Международные отношения накануне XXI в.: проблемы, перспективы. Международная жизнь. № 10. С. 3-13. Семененко И.С. 2023. Разделенные общества. Идентичность: личность, общество, политика. Новые контуры исследовательского поля. Отв. ред. И.С. Семененко. М.: Весь Мир. С. 27-35. https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/publ/2023/Identichnost-Semenenko-2023.pdf. EDN: NTQYRB. 1. The world order or international system is a stable set of institutions and norms of military-political and economic relations, which is institutionalized and legitimate in the international legal sense. The world order remains stable during the active life of at least one generation—a universal measure of social time. However, in the wake of geopolitical macro-crises, illegitimate systems emerge, forcibly imposed by the winner. This was the case with the unipolar world order. 2. Dynkin A., Burrows M. Here’s the Playbook for Getting U.S.–Russian Cooperation Back on Track. The National Interest. 07.12.2015. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/heres-the-playbook-getting-us-russian-cooperation-back-track-14527. 3. For example, see: [Yan Xuetong 2016; Kupchan 2021]. 4. Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address. The White House. President Barack Obama. 12.02.2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address. 5. President Bush Calls on Senate to Back Human Cloning Ban. Remarks by the President on Human Cloning Legislation. The East Room. The White House. President George W. Bush. 10.04.2002. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020410-4.html. 6. Private sector establishments birth and death, seasonally adjusted. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 25.10.2023. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cewbd.t08.htm. 7. Artificial Intelligence Journey 2023 conference. President of Russia. Official website. 24.11.2023. http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/72811. 8. World Population Prospects 2024, Online Edition. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024). https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/MostUsed/. 9. Global Health Expenditure database. World Health Organization. https://apps.who.int/nha/database. 10. Dirigisme is a policy of active state intervention in the national economy, pursued by France and the UK in mid-1940s. 11. Mendenhall A. Cultural Marxism is Real. The James G. Martin Center for Academic Renewal. 04.01.2019. https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2019/01/cultural-marxism-is-real/. 12. AFA Calls for an End to Required Diversity Statements. Press Release. AFA. Princeton, NJ. 22.08.2022. https://academicfreedom.org/afa-calls-for-an-end-to-required-diversity-statements/. 13. World Economic Outlook Database (October 2023 Edition). International Monetary Fund. 10.10.2023. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October.

Defense & Security
japan,australia,usa and india friendship against china.Quad plus countries flags Quad plus countries flags over china flag.Quad plus countries. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Trump II and US Nuclear Assurances in the Indo-Pacific

by Liviu Horovitz , Elisabeth Suh

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.

Diplomacy
Casa Rosada (Pink House), Argentine Presidential Palace - Buenos Aires, Argentina

Remarks by the President of the Nation, Javier Milei, at the Global Peace Summit for Ukraine

by Javier Milei

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Good afternoon, everyone. It is an honor for me and for Argentina to participate in this Peace Summit organized by President Zelenski, with whom we have established a close relationship. We Argentinians are fully aware of the value of peace and democratic coexistence as guiding principles of life in society, and that is why I want to especially thank you for the invitation to this event. I want to express, on behalf of the Argentinian people, our utmost support for the people of Ukraine and our friend, President Zelenski, as defenders of the idea of freedom, we condemn any form of violence, whether between individuals, but particularly, we repudiate war as an illegitimate mean of resolving conflicts between nations. War, tragic by nature, can never be the answer to problems that should be resolved in the political sphere. War is not a legitimate tool for resolving conflicts; it is the last resort of a people who must defend themselves, nothing more, nothing less. We are defenders of the idea of freedom. Liberalism, as we understand it, is the respect and protection of the life projects of others, based on the principle of non-aggression, in defense of the right to life, freedom, and private property. As defenders of freedom, we can advocate for nothing other than peace among free peoples and nations. When we say that the guiding principle of our doctrine is the defense of individuals' lives, liberty, and property, we are expressing that there is a direct relationship between peace, commerce, and prosperity. There is no economic prosperity without free trade, and there is no free trade without peace. Free trade naturally promotes peace, because as Bastiat said, "where trade enters, bullets do not," or as Milton Friedman said, "I may hate my neighbor, but if he doesn't buy my product, I go bankrupt." As a fervent believer in the philosophical consciousness found in liberalism and peace, I make this brief defense of these principles today, as they seem to have gone out of fashion. I believe it is an important step for Argentina to be present first at the G7 Summit and now here at this Peace Summit. It is part of the great shift we are undertaking as a country after decades of turning our back on the world. There is a new Argentina that is once again embracing the ideas that, 150 years ago, made it one of the most prosperous countries in the world. There is a new Argentina that also seeks to reclaim the prominent role in the concert of nations that it once held and never should have abandoned. Know that Argentina will always be committed to defending the ideas that made great the West, and that for us, peace among free nations is not only a moral duty but also a necessary condition for prosperity. Thank you all very much.

Defense & Security
Disputed Claims In The South China Sea.

Africa’s delicate diplomacy in the South China Sea dispute

by Samir Bhattacharya

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The ongoing skirmishes in the South China Sea between China and regional states represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting Africa. As China grows increasingly aggressive in its race for global hegemony and influence, and the United States (US) slowly plunges into the battle to prevent China’s rise, the world is watching the unfolding of this rivalry with unease. Although a few places have felt intense pressure from this alarming competition, the South China Sea (SCS) region is where a violent showdown looks increasingly probable. Unlike the war in Ukraine or Gaza, the US and China may start a direct war in the SCS. And amidst this multifaceted new Cold War 2.0, Africa remains cautious. The South China tinderbox On 23 April, another skirmish took place between China and the Philippines when two Filipino patrol boats approached the shallow turquoise waters of a disputed shoal around 194 km west of the Philippine Islands province of Palawan. The patrol boats were there for an underwater survey near the disputed shoal claimed by both China and the Philippines, thus prompting a Chinese response. A Chinese coast guard, via radio, instructed them to leave the area and threatened hostile measures. Following several radio exchanges, the Chinese coast guard damaged both the Philippine patrol boats by firing high-pressure water cannons at them. However, this was not the first time China’s assertion in this region has caused friction with other SCS neighbours, including Japan and South Korea. China has used an unconvincing U-shaped “nine-dash line” that crosses the exclusive economic zones, or EEZs, of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam to demonstrate its claim in the region. Despite their low intrinsic value, the region lies along a vital trade and supply corridor that supports over US$3 trillion in yearly shipborne commerce. Oil, gas, and fishing sources abound in the area. Beijing has declined to acknowledge a 2016 decision from the Permanent Court of Arbitration that ruled Beijing’s broad claims invalid based on historical grounds. China and the Philippines have already fought many times over the Second Thomas Shoal and the Bashi Channel. China has become increasingly aggressive in the region in the last few years, putting regional stability at high risk. So far, these skirmishes will likely remain regional without the risk of any full-scale war. However, there are risks of casualties or even the vessel capsizing. Making of Cold War 2.0 over the SCS Washington’s response to the upcoming crisis is still modest. US President Biden raised concerns about China’s actions in the SCS , including efforts to impede the Philippines from resupplying its forces on the fiercely disputed Second Thomas Shoal. The US has repeatedly warned China that it’s obligated to defend the Philippines, its oldest treaty ally in Asia, if Filipino forces, ships or aircraft come under an armed attack. The US also conducted Balikatan drills (‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ in Tagalog) with the Philippines with more than 16,000 American and Philippines military personnel. Indeed, its resources are thinly stretched, and Beijing seems to be moving ahead. To deter China by stepping up regional defence diplomacy, Washington is exploring the possibility of a security alliance with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, tentatively called SQUAD. This is in addition to two other existing groupings in the region, “Quad” and “AUKUS,” a defence pact among Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. While AUKUS is a defence pact, Quad is simply a dialogue platform. Africa’s tricky balancing act Even while the socioeconomic repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war have not yet wholly subsided in Africa, the ongoing skirmishes in the SCS represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting several African nations. Despite being geographically far, the conflict’s spillover effect would impact the continent’s food security in terms of both the availability and pricing of some food crops. In addition, the SCS region represents a crucial geographic sweet spot for Africa as a source of trade and investment, translating into growth and development for many African economies. The crisis can potentially fuel price rise, particularly for oil-importing countries. The prospect of a consequential price rise of essential commodities will have enormous ramifications for domestic stability in most African countries. Furthermore, many African economies heavily rely on trade, investment, and aid from South and Southeast Asia, the crisis will significantly hamper the development and growth of the continent. There are also strategic lessons for Africa to learn from the conflict. China’s principal interest in Africa consists of protecting its BRI investments and ensuring steady trade flow. Africa is also essential for China to fulfil its resource needs, maintaining industrial growth and energy security. Therefore, securing stability in countries where China has invested is in China’s interest, just like keeping a stable relationship with China is in the interest of those investment-starved countries. Further, since many investment projects in China are located in different African countries, these countries should be careful. China can become aggressively irredentist, even in Africa. Currently, China owns a naval base in Djibouti and a ballistic missile tracker Yuan Wang 5, off the coast of Durban. It has strong economic influence across the countries of Africa’s east coast thanks to its Belt Road Initiative (BRI). On the West Coast, China has many seaports financed or constructed by Chinese entities. If the national governments of these countries fail to pay, China would happily take control of these ports through lease as it did in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. In addition to Sri Lanka, other South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar also faced dire consequences due to the failure of their BRI debt payment, leading to economic crises, and sometimes even political crises. Therefore, caution would be expected from these African governments. Conclusion China’s increasingly aggressive posture over the SCS raises concerns about the stability of the region. As the current uneasy détente between the US and China bears remarkable similarities to the Cold War, questions are raised regarding the possibilities of a new Cold War 2.0. Questions are also raised concerning the possible reactions from different African countries vis-á-vis Chinese aggression in the region. Undoubtedly, any serious conflict between China and the Philippines would be dangerous. These frequent skirmishes may not lead to a direct war between the US and China. Yet, the risk of vessel capsizing and casualties is high. Any such event would ultimately spark a crisis in Africa. So far, Africa is cautious and continues to balance its great power relationships. Undoubtedly, it is increasingly concerned with the aggressive posture of the Chinese in the region. On the other hand, it needs China for economic purposes. Therefore, Africa will continue to walk the tightrope where it would want US involvement in de-escalating the situation without ruffling any feathers with China. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Diplomacy
USA and Iran relationship. US America and Iran flags on chess kings on a chess board.

US-Iran conundrum: Not all doors are shut

by Vivek Mishra

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Iran’s leadership crisis may have come at an important time for the US, amid an ongoing political slugfest at home in an election cycle and a litmus test for US relations with Israel. In the wake of the helicopter crash that tragically claimed the lives of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran finds itself at a critical juncture, grappling with both internal and external challenges. Foremost among them is its relationship with the US. Iran is in the middle of a tense regional competition with Israel over the latter’s war in Gaza with Hamas. Washington is invariably drawn into what constitutes a historically contested triad shaping stability and instability in broader West Asia. Iran’s leadership crisis may have come at an important time for the US, amid an ongoing political slugfest at home in an election cycle and a litmus test for US relations with Israel. Two factors, however, are likely to dampen any US expectations from Iran. Iran’s topmost leadership remains intact under the aegis of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the next president will be expected to meet the benchmarks set by previous leaders. For the US, the Iran challenge is likely to remain complex, both due to the leadership transition inside Iran and the growing regional power and influence projected by Tehran. If the Biden administration, despite its initial will, couldn’t bind Iran within the constraints of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a possible Trump presidency would be even less likely to succeed. Regional anti-American sentiments in West Asia, especially among Iran and its proxy groups, seem further entrenched. However, the Biden administration has an opportunity to mitigate regional hostilities by fostering a Saudi-US détente, which remains on the table but is heavily dependent on how much influence Washington can wield with Israel’s highly conservative cabinet in restraining its behaviour in Gaza. Iran’s regional outlook and relations with the US may not be poised for significant shifts, given the predictability associated with the regime, yet the challenge of nurturing inter-generational leaders looms large for Iran. Leadership succession in Iran’s internal politics has always been meticulously planned and nurtured over the years, undergoing a rigorous process to ensure continuity. Internally, Iran faces a crucial test of its leadership amid a situation it has not encountered in decades. However, there is solace in the fact that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei remains alive, poised to select the most suitable candidate. Internally, the vacuum left by the untimely demise of two top leaders presents a crisis as well as an opportunity. However, the socio-cultural divergence with the West, exemplified by the Iranian leadership’s lingering reluctance to embrace any change, may continue to strain the relationship. The crisis in leadership compounds this internal struggle, as no state wishes to appear leaderless during times of uncertainty. Externally, the challenges for Iran are manifold, particularly in filling the leadership void that has been growing since the death of General Qasem Soleimani in 2020 after a US-targeted strike. The new leadership in Iran will be tested in how it continues to project its regional influence and maintain the momentum of clandestine efforts it has propagated across its axis. Internationally, the Iranian leadership’s challenge will primarily be in its tussle with the West on the one hand and maintaining poise in its relationships with varied actors such as China, Russia, and India, all while avoiding Western sanctions. Iran, which has been persistently characteristic in its distinct political stance even in the face of sanctions and regional tensions, has found an alternative axis of support, most notably through partnerships with China and Russia. Besides, Iran has fostered a network of regional support through proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Kataib Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and others. This solidarity axis is now bolstered by a shared commitment to the Palestinian cause. However, the post-October 7, 2023, landscape has seen a nuanced shift in perceptions, including those of regional Arab leaders. As such, the current period is particularly tumultuous in West Asiawith the unabating Israel-Hamas conflict. The loss of key figures in Iran’s leadership couldn’t have come at a worse time, especially as Iran finds itself at a crossroads, balancing unfinished conflicts and shifting regional loyalties. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran is now enriching uranium to as much as 60% purity and possesses enough of this material that, if further enriched, could be sufficient for two nuclear weapons. Now that the ‘breakout’ time is close to zero, there are strong incentives for keeping Tehran engaged through the IAEA, if not bilaterally. Despite the seeming belligerence of Iran’s leadership, avoiding war and efforts towards regional peace and stability lie at the core of Tehran’s long-term regional vision. Just a week before the fatal crash, Iran’s foreign minister met with the IAEA chief, and Iran engaged with US officials through intermediaries in Oman on how to avoid the risks of a wider regional war. If anything, these efforts show that both the Biden administration and the Iranian leadership are still willing to sit at the table. That may not be bad inspiration for the next generation of leaders in Tehran to pick up from. This commentary originally appeared in Deccan Herald. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).