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Defense & Security
Myanmar military coup soldiers, flag map background

Myanmar military regime enters year 5 in terminal decline

by Zachary Abuza

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The junta still holds a third of Myanmar, and two-thirds of the population, but misrule has left the regime broke. Myanmar’s military approaches the fourth anniversary of the coup d’etat that put them in power in terminal decline. The economy continues to atrophy, with even more pronounced energy shortages, less foreign exchange, and an even larger share of the budget allocated to the military. The battlefield losses are staggering, as the opposition has withstood Chinese pressure to stop their offensives, and continues to hand the over-stretched military defeat after defeat. Opposition forces now control two of the 14 military regional commands. According to the National Unity Government (NUG) Ministry of Defense, the opposition is in full control of 95 of 330 townships, while the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta calls itself, had full control over 107 townships. By the junta’s own admission, they are only able to conduct a census and safely organize elections in 161 of Myanmar’s 330 townships. Losses on all battlefronts Having taken 15 of 17 townships in Rakhine state, the Arakan Army is now in almost total control of the key western state. They’ve surrounded the Rakhine capital of Sittwe and come up to the border of Kyaukphyu where China’s special economic zone and port are located. Although the capture of Buthidaung and Ann were neither quick nor easy, the AA was able to sustain sieges of over a month at each, and in the case of the former, tunneled beneath the last military outpost in a stunning display of grit. Having captured the southern city of Gwa, the Arakan Army has now crossed into Ayeyarwaddy, taking the fight into the Bamar ethnic majority heartland. In the north, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has shrugged off extensive Chinese pressure, and taken the strategic junction town of Mansi, which will make the overland resupply of the besieged city of Bhamo from Mandalay very hard for the junta. Fighting is ongoing in Bhamo, Kachin’s second largest city. The KIA is now in control of well over half of Kachin, including most of the resource rich regions. Although they are known for fractiousness, Chin opposition forces are now in almost full control of that state that borders India and Bangladesh, holding five of nine townships, roughly 85% of the territory. In Shan state, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) temporarily succumbed to Chinese pressure to stop their offensive in November, but they’ve neither surrendered Lashio nor ceded territory, despite airstrikes. Citing a new military offensive in Naungcho township, the TNLA, which controls nine townships, announced an end to the ceasefire on Jan. 9. In eastern Myanmar, Karenni resistance have continued to battle, despite concerted military regime efforts and airstrikes, and their acknowledged ammunition shortages. The Karenni National Defense Force and allied People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) militias claim to control 80% of Kayah state. Further south, the Karen National Liberation Army and allied people’s defense forces (PDFs) are slowly taking pro-junta border guard posts along the frontier with Thailand. In Tanintharyi, local PDFs have increased their coordination and are pushing west from the Thai border towards the Andaman Sea coast, diminishing the scope of the military-controlled patchwork of terrain in Myanmar’s southernmost state. Some of the most intense fighting of late has been in the Bamar heartland, including Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay. The military has stepped up their bombings, artillery strikes, and arson, intentionally targeting civilians for their support of the opposition forces. A number of PDFs have expanded their operations into the dry zone. Mounting troubles The Myanmar military regime faces severe headwinds as the fourth anniversary of the Feb. 1, 2021 coup approaches. Prisoners of war from multiple fronts have recounted that the military’s ability to resupply and reinforce troops in the field has all but broken down. They have a limited number of heavy lift helicopters, including three new Mi-17s that entered service in December. But even those are vulnerable: Some six Mi-17s and two other helicopters have been lost since the coup. In some cases, the military has tried to parachute in supplies, but those often fall into the hands of the opposition forces. Nothing demoralizes troops more than the feeling that the headquarters has abandoned them. The military has always treated Myanmar as a country under occupation, with thousands of remote outposts scattered throughout the country. The NUG claims that opposition forces have captured 741 of these through 2024, and they continue to fall. The military is increasingly short of manpower. Over a thousand POWs have been taken in recent months, more have surrendered and others have deserted. The military has now taken in nine tranches of conscripts, amounting to roughly 45,000 troops, and is increasingly dragooning men. But they are deployed almost immediately and are untrained and poorly motivated, in sharp contrast with ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) and PDFs. That loss of manpower includes senior officers. The NUG claims that in 2024, 53 senior officers, ranked colonel to major general, were killed, captured or injured. The military is so broke that they recently announced that they would no longer pay death benefits to conscripts. At the same time, the military is often labeling their dead as “MIA”, rather than “KIA”, to avoid paying benefits. While the junta fumbles, the degree of tactical battlefield coordination between the legacy ethnic armies and the new PDFs is unprecedented. Every major offensive outside of Rakhine, entails cooperation between them, and even there, the AA was assisted by Chin PDFs who blocked the military’s resupply from Magway. The increased PDF operations have been made possible by increased assistance from EROs. The AA and Chin PDFs are pushing in from the west and assisting local PDFs in the Bamar heartland. The AA’s foray into Ayeyarwaddy was done in concert with local PDFs. The United Wa State Army appears to be defying China by arming and equipping the Mandalay PDF and others that are operating in Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing. In its favor, the military has finally caught up to the opposition and effectively employed unmanned aerial systems down to the tactical level. These include drones that can drop munitions, kamikaze drones, and those for intelligence gathering or for more accurate targeting of artillery. This has proven costly for the opposition and impeded some of their offensives. Nonetheless, their deployment of drones has been too little too late, and will not fundamentally alter the battlefield dynamics. The military continues to use air power. Indeed, they put their fifth and sixth SU-30 imported from Russia and three more FTC-2000Gs imported from China into service in December. It’s the economy But air power is primarily used as a punitive weapon against unarmed civilian targets, not in support of ground forces. For example, the Jan. 9 bombing in Rakhine’s Yanbye township that killed 52, wounded over 40 and destroyed 500 homes, had no military utility. Finally, the state of the economy is even more precarious given the loss of almost all border crossings. Although the SAC technically still controls Muse and Myawaddy, which links them to China and Thailand, respectively, opposition forces control much of the surrounding territory. While Karen forces have not made a bid to take Myawaddy, the main border crossing, they are pinching in along Asia Highway 1 to Yangon. On Jan. 11, some 500 reinforcements in 30 armored personnel carriers were deployed from Hpa-An to Kawkareik in Kayan state near the Thai border to keep the last main overland trade artery open. To sum it up, the junta is entering the fifth year of military rule with its power rapidly slipping away. Although they still control one-third of the country – land that holds two-thirds of the population – their mismanagement of the economy has left the military regime broke. Spread too thin across too many fronts simultaneously, it’s hard to see the SAC doing anything to arrest their terminal decline in 2025.   Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington DC 20036.

Defense & Security
Main img

China targeted by the Turkestan Islamic Party

by Johann C. Fuhrmann

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском What is behind the threats of Uyghur Islamists from Damascus? It has long been known that the foreign militant Islamists fighting in Syria include Uyghurs from northwest China. After the fall of the Assad regime, the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) issued a clear threat to China in December 2024. In a propaganda video, a masked spokesperson for the group declared: "Here in Syria, we are fighting for Allah in all cities, and we will do the same in Urumqi, Aqsu and Kashi." These cities are located in the Chinese region of Xinjiang, which the Islamist fighters refer to as "East Turkestan". This message marks an escalation in the propaganda of the TIP, which has been active in Syria for over a decade. It not only highlights its involvement in the fighting in the Syrian civil war but also emphasizes its goal of taking the conflict to China. But how serious is this threat really, and what challenges does it pose for Beijing? The controversial role of the TIP China observer Wolfgang Hirn is one of the few German-language authors to have dealt intensively with the latest developments in the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). "The party was founded in the 1990s. Its aim was to establish an Islamic state in Xinjiang and Central Asia. It had its bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan and was mainly recruited from Uyghurs who wanted to leave Xinjiang or had to leave due to Chinese persecution," explains Hirn.1 The Uyghur jihadists of the TIP pursue the goal of forcibly achieving the secession of the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang from the People's Republic of China and establishing an Islamic Republic of East Turkestan. While the TIP was primarily active in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the early years, it later increasingly expanded its activities to Syria. There it allied itself with other Islamist alliances of various militias, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Many of the Uyghur fighters and their families sought refuge in the Syrian rebel stronghold of Idlib. "The Chinese government does not use the name TIP, but ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement). It serves as a kind of collective term for all militant Uyghurs. The reason for this is probably that ETIM was listed as a terrorist organization by the USA between 2002 and 2020, which lent legitimacy to the official Chinese interpretation. The United Nations also has ETIM on a corresponding list," reports Björn Alpermann from the University of Würzburg on the LinkedIn platform.2 Background: ETIM was added to the US terror list as part of then US President George W. Bush's efforts to gain China as an ally in the US-led "War on Terror". Designated as a "terrorist organization" on this exclusion list, ETIM members and supporters were banned from entering the US.3 However, ETIM was removed from the US terror list again "because there has been no credible evidence for more than a decade that ETIM continues to exist", the US State Department announced in July 2020.4 Under pressure from the US and China, ETIM was also added to the UN Security Council's sanctions list in 2002, on which it is still listed. "China regularly blames the ETIM, also known as the Turkestan Islamic Party, for attacks and uses the group to justify its crackdown in the predominantly Muslim region of Xinjiang," Deutsche Welle reported in 2020.5 "Human rights groups estimate that hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Hui or members of other minorities in Xinjiang have been sent to re-education camps. China rejects the accusations and speaks of training centers," according to SPIEGEL.6 Beijing claims that the TIP was responsible for terrorist attacks in China between 2008 and 2015, including knife attacks in public places, car bombs and suicide attacks.7 But how strong is the TIP today and what role does it play? "The TIP has always maintained good relations with the HTS and has often acted as a mediator in disputes between the HTS and other rebel groups. It was once described on Syrian television as HTS's favorite ally. The TIP troops took part in many battles alongside the HTS, for example in the liberation of Latakia, Hama and Aleppo. They are considered to be well organized and experienced. The size of the force varies," reports Wolfgang Hirn.8 In 2017, the Syrian ambassador to China at the time, Imad Moustapha, stated that there were up to 5,000 Uyghur fighters in Syria.9 However, experts estimate the number to be lower and assume that there are between 1,500 and 4,500 fighters.10 Media: Irritated reactions from China At the end of last year, the TIP intensified its propaganda activities and published numerous images of its leaders posing with their uniformed troops and showing them fighting in Syria. On December 13, 2024, The Telegraph then published a video on YouTube that deals with the history of the TIP and shows various excerpts from its propaganda videos, accompanied by epochal music. To date, the four-minute video has had more than 2.6 million views.11 The South China Morning Post reacted with unusual irritation to this reporting. In an opinion piece, columnist Alex Lo described The Telegraph's video as a "documentary-like clip" that was "practically an advertisement for the TIP", while repeating all the Western anti-China narratives "as if to justify the group's promised terrorism against Chinese. "12 Thus, "the Western-constructed genocide in Xinjiang (...) also serves as a practical justification for the militant group". The extensive dissemination of the video only led to "the Chinese having to raise the alleged TIP threat at the United Nations. "13 However, this is a grotesque claim: in New York on 17 December 2024, Geng Shuang, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, had only made a rather coarse statement. In New York on December 17, 2024, Geng Shuang, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, merely made a rather sober statement, emphasizing that "Syrian territory must not be used to support terrorism or threaten the security of other countries. "14 The fight against the TIP was repeatedly described by Beijing's Foreign Ministry as "China's core concern in the fight against terrorism".15 Ultimately, Alex Lo's text should probably be understood as an - apparently rather emotional - appeal to "the West" not to portray or regard the TIP fighters as freedom fighters. Outlook: Strategic risks for Beijing "After the victory over Assad in Syria, the question arises as to whether the TIP fighters will remain in the region and organize their fight against China from there," says Wolfgang Hirn.16 So far, however, the TIP, which has been active in Syria for some time, has not been able to organize attacks in China from Syria. In addition to the geographical distance, the strict security precautions in China also play a role, making travel for such fighters very risky. Terrorism experts nevertheless see dangers, particularly from "online activities that lead to radicalization in China but could be organized from Syria. "17 "I sympathize with them, but their fight against China is not ours," Syria's new strongman Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of the Islamist HTS, recently said about his stance on the TIP.18 Nevertheless, the Uyghur fighters are apparently becoming increasingly powerful within Syria: Meanwhile, recent media reports that members of the TIP have been given high-ranking positions within the Syrian army are causing new concern in China. It is reported that Abdulaziz Dawood Khudaberdi, the commander of the TIP forces in Syria, has been appointed brigadier general.19 Two other Uyghur fighters are said to have been given the rank of colonel. However, a possible return of the TIP to its previous areas of retreat in Afghanistan and Pakistan is also likely to cause headaches for those in power in Beijing, as Afghanistan and Pakistan have become safe havens for terrorist groups such as ISIS-K, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in recent years, writes Yang Xiaotong from the Chinese think tank Grandview Institution in the Asia Times.20 The proximity to China's western borders and the weak control by the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the central government in Pakistan are exacerbating the situation. One thing is clear: China's investment in infrastructure projects and the sending of thousands of workers abroad, particularly to Pakistan, increase the country's vulnerability. In recent years, the number of attacks on Chinese citizens and assets has risen significantly, especially in Pakistan. Beijing suspects that these attacks are organized in collaboration between the TIP and ISIS, al-Qaeda and the BLA in order to undermine Chinese interests and investments.21 "Should battle-hardened TIP militants return to Pakistan and join forces with the TTP, BLA and other groups, it would pose a serious threat to China's strategic interests as its flagship project - the Belt and Road Initiative - runs through the country (...). The likelihood of this scenario has increased exponentially," warns Yang Xiaotong. The TIP is "still officially part of the global al-Qaeda network and, unlike HTS, has never broken away from al-Qaeda," explains terrorism expert Hans-Jakob Schindler from the Counter Extremism Project. "The fact that HTS accepts TIP in its coalition is one of the main arguments that call into question the ideological orientation of HTS. "22 There is no question that the future of TIP is closely linked to Syria's uncertain prospects. Information The text of this work is licensed under the terms of "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International", CC BY-SA 4.0 (available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de) References 1 Hirn, Wolfgang 2025: What is the Turkistan Islamic Party and what are its plans?: https://www.chinahirn.de/2025/01/05/politik-i-xinjiang-i-was-ist-die-turkistanislamic-party-und-was-hat-sie-vor/, last access: 12.01.2025.  2 Alpermann, Björn 2025: Post on LinkedIn from 8.01.2025, available at: Link to the post by Björn Aplermann https://www.linkedin.com/posts/bj%C3%B6rn-alpermann-1873b38_turkistan-islamic-party-uses-video-from-syria-activity-7282380785922281472-cNKy/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop3 DW 2020: US removes China-condemned group from terror list, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/us-removes-separatist-group-condemned-by-china-fromterror-list/a-55527586, last access: 12.01.2025.   4 Ebd. 5 Ebd.6 SPIEGEL 2021: EU extends sanctions against China, available at:  https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/uiguren-eu-verlaengert-sanktionen-gegen-china-umein-jahr-a-e45ffbf6-7727-4052-8512-eb01a958f781, last access: 12.01.2025.  7 Yang Xiaotong 2024: China has cause to be terrified of rebel-run Syria, available at: https://asiatimes.com/2024/12/china-has-cause-to-be-terrified-of-rebel-run-syria/, last access: 12.01.2025. 8 Hirn, Wolfgang 2025.  9 Yang Xiaotong 2024. 10 Hirn, Wolfgang 2025.  11 The Telegraph 2024: Uyghur fighters in Syria vow to come for China next, available at: https://youtu.be/8DRzaZiI8_Q?si=kYaGco2aEk6bw5vx, last access 12.01.2025.  12 Alex Lo 2024: Is Turkestan Islamic Party a foreign proxy force to destabilise Xinjiang?, SCMP, available at:  https://www.scmp.com/opinion/article/3291565/turkestanislamic-party-foreign-proxy-force-destabilisexinjiang?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article, last access 12.01.2025.  13 Ebd.  14 Zhao Ziwen 2024: Syria-Xinjiang link: China warns leaders in Damascus not to threaten security elsewhere, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3291393/syria-xinjiang-link-chinawarns-leaders-damascus-not-threaten-securityelsewhere?module=inline&pgtype=article, last access: 12.01.2025.  15 Global Times 2024: Combating ETIM is China's core concern in counter-terrorism and shared responsibility of intl community, available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202402/1306930.shtml, last access: 12.01.2025.  Combating ETIM is China's core concern in counter-terrorism and shared responsibility of intl community: FM, available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202402/1306930.shtml, last access: 12.01.2025.  16 Hirn, Wolfgang 2025.  17 Hauberg, Sven 2025: Allies of Syria's new rulers set their sights on China, available at:  https://www.fr.de/politik/verbuendete-von-syriens-neuenmachthabern-nehmen-china-ins-visier-zr-93509789.html, last access: 12.01.2025. 18 See also: Hauberg, Sven 2025.  19 SCMP 2025: Syria appoints foreign Islamist fighters, including Uygurs, to military: sources, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/3292859/syriaappoints-foreign-islamist-fighters-including-uygurs-militarysources?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection?module=inline&pgtype=article , last access: 12.01.2025.  20 Yang Xiaotong 2024. 21 Ebd.  22 Hauberg, Sven 2025.

Energy & Economics
Mexico City, MEXICO - Jan 14 2025 : A post titled “Indonesia Joins BRICS Group of Emerging Economies” is displayed on an iPhone from the BRICS website.

Indonesia’s Membership in BRICS: Strengthening Emerging Economies and Elevating the Global South

by Amrita Jash

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Indonesia’s inclusion in BRICS enhances the representation of the Global South and strengthens efforts to reform global governance institutions. This move positions the bloc as a stronger platform for collaboration among developing nations. On 7 January, Indonesia officially joined the BRICS grouping. In welcoming Indonesia, the Brazilian Government issued a statement, saying: “With the largest population and economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia shares with other members a commitment to reforming global governance institutions and contributes positively to deepening South-South cooperation.” With full membership, Indonesia has become the first country in Southeast Asia to join BRICS. Currently, Thailand and Malaysia are official partners, but not full members. Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its statement said the BRICS membership is “a strategic step to improve the collaborations and cooperation with other developing nations, based on the principle of equality, mutual respect, and sustainable development.” Economically, this could mean an increase of 0.3 percent growth to GDP, and the expansion of Indonesia’s access to BRICS markets. Geopolitically, it provides Indonesia a bargaining position in the global arena as well as a platform to voice the aspirations of the Global South. For BRICS, Indonesia’s membership adds another feather to its hat by bringing in greater representation of the Global South to its multipolar vision. This makes it imperative to assess the trajectory of the grouping. What started as an acronym “BRIC,” coined by Jim O’Neill in 2001 in the report “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” the grouping was projected in the next decade to grow significantly. Founded in 2009 by the four countries—Brazil, Russia, China, and India—the bloc’s first expansion came in 2010 with the joining of South Africa. In the last 16 years, BRICS has graduated from being a popular buzz word in international politics to a significant platform of emerging economies representing the “Global South.” What is noteworthy is that BRICS is not yet a formal multilateral organisation like the United Nations, World Bank or the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but increasingly there has been a greater demand among states (mostly developing countries) to join this club of emerging economies. Despite its informality, what made BRICS relevant in the international order was the 2008 financial crises, which raised scepticism and concerns over the dollar-dominated monetary system. This invariably challenged the effectiveness of the West-led Bretton Woods institutions given the suffering of the United States and Europe in the wake of the financial crisis. In contrast, the BRICS economies showed resilience. The first BRIC summit was held in Yekaterinburg in 2009, where the Joint Declaration put forward the desire of BRIC countries to develop “an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open, and transparent dialogue and cooperation” that is “conducive not only to serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but also to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.” This was reaffirmed at the most recent 16th BRICS Summit held in October 2024 in Kazan. With the indicative expansion of its institutional framework and functionaries since 2009, the most significant outputs have been the New Development Bank (NDB), which provides developmental funds to countries; the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with a resource pool of US$100 billion, which provides a mutual support mechanism for short-term balance of payments pressures, enhancing the financial safety net of member countries; and the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 for effective integration of BRICS enterprises into global and regional value chains. A significant milestone was the call, during the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg in 2023, for the expansion of BRICS by inviting new states to join. Another, in 2024, was the deliberation on the formation of the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative (also known as BRICS Pay), where BRICS countries would trade with each other without converting to US dollars by utilising blockchain technology and tokens to circumvent the SWIFT financial payment system. Although BRICS Pay is still only a concept, its development would seriously undermine the US dollar’s long-standing dominance. Today, the inter-governmental organisation boasts of 10 full members with the inclusion of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in January 2024, and Indonesia in January 2025; and has nine official partner countries—Nigeria is the ninth partner country of BRICS (admitted on 17 January 2025), joining Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Statistically put, BRICS member countries comprise about 45 percent of the world’s population, 28 percent of the global economy, and collectively they produce more than a third of the world’s crude oil. And if Saudi Arabia joins the group (which it is yet to consider the BRICS invitation), the grouping would then produce some 43 percent of global crude oil. This growth among emerging nations is set to widen the gap between BRICS+ and the G7 nations. As IMF estimates suggest, BRICS+ will account for 37.6 percent of world GDP at purchasing power parity in 2027, compared with 28.2 percent for the G7. This will signify a shift in economic power towards emerging economies, enhance intra-BRICS trade and regional networks rather than relying on G7 markets, and also lead to the creation of alternate alliances and institutions. Apart from expanding its membership, BRICS has also broadened its agenda beyond economics to include global challenges. The two main pillars of BRICS are practical cooperation in various fields through meetings of Working Groups and Senior Officials, and consultation on matters of shared interests through meetings of Leaders and Ministers of Finance, Trade, Health, Science & Technology, Education, Agriculture, Communication, and Labour, among others. The intra-BRICS collaboration now includes social welfare, intellectual property, tourism, science & technology, culture, outer space, think tanks, and internet governance and security. With BRICS+, emerging economies are establishing new standards for order making. In other words, despite its informal existence, BRICS has emerged as a strong contestant for building an alternative discourse on global governance—one that is non-western. The expansion gives BRICS a greater economic and demographic weight as well as a stronger voice to the Global South, potentially reshaping discussions in institutions like the UN and WTO. However, the long-term success of an expanded BRICS will depend on its ability to balance diverse interests and act as a unified voice on the global stage. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

Energy & Economics
DAVOS, SWITZERLAND - OCTOBER 31, 2021: Building of the Davos Congress Center, place of the world economic Forum wef

Davos 2025 as a Concentrated Expression of Geopolitical Uncertainty

by Vladislav Belov

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From January 20 to 24, 2025, the traditional World Economic Forum (WEF) took place in Davos. The organizers registered approximately 2,000 participants from over 130 countries, including around 1,600 executives from major corporations, among them 900 CEOs. The political agenda of the WEF was supported by more than 50 heads of state and government. As part of the official program, about 300 sessions were held, 200 of which were broadcast live. Press accreditation was granted to 76 media companies. For official events, 28,043 square meters of space were allocated, accommodating 117 meeting rooms and 23 lounge areas. Additionally, several participating companies (such as HSBC, EY, and Cognizant) rented additional venues separately for their own events. WEF President Børge Brende, announcing this meeting, emphasized that in 2025, due to geopolitical conflicts, ongoing economic fragmentation, and the acceleration of climate change, the forum would be held under conditions of exceptionally high global uncertainty for the first time in decades. The theme of the Forum was “Cooperation in the Age of Intelligence”. On January, WEF experts presented four reports. The first one, a traditional report and the 20th edition, analyzed the most significant global risks and threats facing the international community. The study is based on a survey of over 900 experts from various fields and covers short-term (2025), medium-term (until 2027), and long-term (until 2035) perspectives. The key risks identified for these periods include the following:- in 2025 the most serious threat for most respondents is interstate armed conflicts, followed by extreme weather events and geoeconomic conflicts, including sanctions and trade measures;- by 2027 key risks include disinformation and fake news, which undermine trust in institutions and intensify social polarization, tension, and instability, as well as an increase in cyberattacks and espionage cases;- by 2035 environmental threats are a major concern, including extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, ecosystem destruction, critical changes in Earth's systems, and natural resource shortages. Additionally, technological risks such as the negative consequences of artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies are highlighted.The authors emphasize the need to strengthen international cooperation and increase resilience to global threats. According to them, rising geopolitical tensions, climate challenges, and other risks require coordinated global action to prevent the escalation of existing issues and the emergence of new crises. The second report presents the perspectives of leading experts on the global economic outlook for 2025. They predict moderate economic slowdown, driven by geoeconomic fragmentation and protectionist measures. The most resilient economic growth is expected in the United States and South Asian countries, while Europe, China, and Latin America may face significant challenges. Inflation is projected to rise in most countries, primarily due to increased government spending and shifts in global supply chains. Most experts consider a further escalation of the U.S.-China trade war likely, along with continued regionalization of global trade, leading to the formation of more isolated economic blocs and reduced global interdependence. While experts acknowledge the high potential of artificial intelligence (AI), they emphasize the need for greater investment in infrastructure and human capital to fully leverage its benefits. The third study provides a comprehensive analysis of employment issues. The main conclusion is that ongoing changes, global trends and new technologies will cause 92 million people to leave the labor market worldwide by 2030, but will also create 170 million new jobs. One of the challenges in this regard is the need to improve skills and train for new specialties. The fourth report assesses the state of global cooperation across five key areas: trade and capital, innovation and technology, climate and natural capital, health and well-being, and peace and security. After analyzing more than 40 indicators, the authors conclude that due to heightened geopolitical tensions and instability, overall cooperation remains at the same level. However, positive trends are observed in areas such as climate, innovation, technology, and health. Davos as a Symbolic Benchmark of Switzerland Despite existing criticism, the Davos Forum remains a key platform for the annual interaction of leading figures in global politics, business, and the expert community. Without Switzerland's neutral status, the Davos Forum likely would not exist. However, it was Klaus Schwab, who founded the World Economic Forum (WEF) on January 24, 1971, who played a crucial role in transforming this event and its host location into one of Switzerland’s comparative advantages in political and economic terms. Despite his advanced age, Schwab continues to be an active ideologue and architect of Davos, moderating key discussions while fine-tuning his creation and addressing annual criticism. Yet, he has his own limitations—despite Switzerland’s neutrality and his personal reputation for impartiality, Schwab once again refrained from inviting Russian representatives, even at the level of individual entrepreneurs and experts. Such a move, rather than formal attempts to broaden participation and accessibility, could have enhanced the forum’s status. The participation of a Russian delegation would have been particularly relevant in this critical year for global politics, marked by the unpredictable presidency of Donald Trump, which is set to shape most geopolitical and geo-economic processes worldwide. Including Russian representatives could have strengthened the WEF’s competitive standing, but once again, it did not happen. The Swiss leadership highly values the opportunities that the Davos platform provides, particularly in the realm of foreign policy and, most notably, foreign economic relations. In September 2024, both chambers of the Swiss Parliament—the Council of States (the smaller chamber) and the National Council (the larger chamber)—decided to continue state support for the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos and allocated budget funding for the period 2025–2027. During the discussions, lawmakers emphasized that the event strengthens Switzerland’s role as a global hub for international dialogue, while also having a positive economic impact on the Graubünden region. As the host country of the forum, Switzerland actively leverages it to advance its own interests. This year, six out of the seven members of the Swiss Federal Council (Cabinet of Ministers) attended the WEF. As part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Swiss Economy Minister Guy Parmelin signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Kosovo and Thailand, bringing Switzerland’s total number of FTAs to 37. There are also plans to adapt and update the existing FTA with China. One of Bern’s key priorities remains securing an FTA with the MERCOSUR bloc. As a result, a focal point of this year’s WEF was Argentine President Javier Milei, who, during an “exceptionally warm bilateral meeting,” invited Swiss President Karin Keller-Sutter to visit Buenos Aires in 2025. The Trump Factor The opening of the current WEF coincided with the inauguration of Donald Trump, who, in recent months, has made numerous provocative statements and promises, swiftly beginning their implementation upon taking office on January 20. The U.S. president signed nearly 100 executive orders, including the repeal of 78 regulations enacted by his predecessor, Joe Biden. Among these were directives for all federal agencies and departments to address rising living costs and to end government-imposed censorship of free speech. The most significant orders included the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization, as well as the declaration of a state of emergency at the U.S.-Mexico border to enforce strict immigration controls. In one way or another, the presence of the “new-old” president was felt across nearly all discussion platforms at the forum. On January 23, Donald Trump addressed the participants of the Davos Forum via video conference, outlining the following agenda:- NATO defense spending: Member states should increase their defense budgets from 2% to 5% of GDP to ensure a more equitable distribution of financial burdens within the alliance.- Trade tensions with the EU: The EU and its member states treat economic relations with the U.S. unfairly. European business regulations, including tax policies, disadvantage American companies, particularly in the tech sector, prompting Trump’s call for tariffs on European imports.- Criticism of the EU’s Green Deal: Labeling it as a “new green scam”, Trump emphasized that the U.S. would ramp up oil and gas production and expand power plant construction to become the “capital of artificial intelligence and cryptography”.- Oil prices and the Ukraine conflict: Trump suggested that lower oil prices from Saudi Arabia could help resolve the Ukraine conflict and urged Saudi leadership to take necessary steps, emphasizing their responsibility in the matter.- Tariffs on companies outsourcing production: Countries whose companies manufacture outside the U.S. will face tariffs to incentivize production relocation to American soil.- China's role in Ukraine: Trump called on China to support ending the Ukraine conflict, while stating his own efforts to mediate a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine.- U.S. domestic policy shift: A large-scale deregulation program is underway in the U.S., including tax cuts and potential elimination of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, which Trump views as discriminatory.Trump’s speech elicited mixed reactions among forum participants. His focus on protectionist policies and sharp criticism of international partners raised concerns about potential consequences for the global economy, particularly among European attendees. Additionally, his stance signaled an escalation in the strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing, which is expected to play out through potential trade conflicts, tensions in the South and East China Seas, continued arms sales to Taiwan, and other geopolitical developments. The Europe Factor   At Davos, Europe is traditionally represented by the European Union, with the United States as its primary political and economic partner. Ursula von der Leyen, re-elected as President of the European Commission and beginning her new term on December 1, 2024, addressed the forum on January 21. Her speech largely responded to challenges outlined by Donald Trump before the WEF began, setting out the EU’s key priorities for the coming years: overcoming economic stagnation, enhancing competitiveness, and further integrating the single market across all 27 member states. A central theme of her address was the “Competitiveness Compass” initiative, first introduced in late 2024. This strategy, shaped by recommendations from Mario Draghi’s influential report, aims to drive economic reform and growth within the EU. The European Commission planned to unveil the full document by the end of January. At Davos, Ursula von der Leyen effectively introduced the concept of “Europe United” as a counterbalance to “America First” and cautioned the U.S. against igniting a trade war with the European Union. She emphasized the importance of early engagement and dialogue on shared interests, stating: “Our priority will be to initiate discussions as early as possible, focusing on common interests and readiness for negotiations. We will be pragmatic, but we will always adhere to our principles. Protecting our interests and defending our values is the European way”. At the same time, the European Commission president highlighted the high level of interdependence between the European and American economic models. She underscored that the era of global cooperation has given way to intense geostrategic competition, stating: “The world's largest economies are competing for access to raw materials, new technologies, and global trade routes—from artificial intelligence to clean technologies, from quantum computing to space, from the Arctic to the South China Sea. The race is on”. Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (ECB) emphasized that Brussels must be prepared for U.S. trade tariffs which are expected to be more “selective and targeted”, especially given the “existential crisis” facing the EU economy. She also noted that the ECB is not overly concerned about the impact of inflation from other countries, including the U.S., on the eurozone. The UK was also represented at Davos, with its delegation led by Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves. She used the trip primarily to promote Britain’s economic landscape, focusing on the country’s political and economic stability, its business-friendly environment, and recent government efforts to reduce regulatory barriers—all under the central message: “Now is the time to invest in Britain”. However, the extent to which this narrative aligns with reality remained beyond the scope of the Forum. The true assessment was left to the executives of major corporations with whom Reeves held meetings, including JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs, discussing investment opportunities in the UK's infrastructure and green projects. Additionally, the UK delegation engaged in negotiations aimed at restoring and strengthening ties with sovereign wealth funds and private investors from the U.S. and the Gulf states. The Ukraine Factor Due to the ongoing Ukraine conflict, Davos once again served as a prelude to the Munich Security Conference, which traditionally takes place in early February in Bavaria. While the war and Donald Trump’s influence shaped many discussions, Ukraine was not the central focus of the forum, resulting in a somewhat reduced emphasis compared to previous years. Ukraine’s interests at the World Economic Forum (WEF) were primarily represented by V.Zelensky, who took it upon himself to “educate” European politicians and “interpret” the signals previously sent by Donald Trump. His focus was on defense spending, emphasizing that a significant portion should go toward supporting the Kyiv regime, the presence of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory, and the need for “real security guarantees”. In the first days after taking office, the U.S. president made several key clarifications regarding his previously stated 24-hour timeline for resolving the Ukraine conflict — this period has now been significantly extended. The reason lies in the fact that, regardless of the revocation of Zelensky’s well-known decree, Ukraine must have a head of state authorized to negotiate and officially confirm any agreements or their outcomes. As of late January, no such figure was present in Kyiv, and Washington is aware of this reality. Switzerland, while emphasizing its neutral status (despite being designated by Russia as an “unfriendly state”), consistently maintains that it provides Ukraine only humanitarian aid and diplomatic support at Kyiv’s request. At the 2024 WEF, the well-known Bürgenstock Conference was announced, which later took place in the summer. However, in 2025, no similarly large-scale initiatives were introduced. Nevertheless, discussions at the Forum once again touched on the possibility of granting Switzerland the right to represent Kyiv’s interests on the international stage. Additionally, it was reported that a Swiss-Ukrainian memorandum was signed, with Ukrainian Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko representing Kyiv. The agreement focuses on the participation of Swiss private businesses in Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts. V.Zelensky used Davos as an opportunity to meet with world leaders, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who had recently blocked additional aid to Ukraine. However, his main competitor in Germany’s upcoming snap Bundestag elections, Friedrich Merz, was more open to the idea of support, and Zelensky also held a discussion with him. Both meetings were held behind closed doors, and no details were disclosed. Meanwhile, German Green Party leader Robert Habeck managed to avoid an impromptu conversation with Zelensky, who had attempted to engage with him on the spot. At a January 23 briefing, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova commented on V.Zelensky’s speeches at Davos 2025, describing them, among other things, as “narcotic madness”. The Germany Factor Germany, still holding its position as the political and economic leader of the European Union, was represented at Davos by key political heavyweights: Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Economy and Climate Protection Minister (and Vice-Chancellor) Robert Habeck, and CDU/CSU Chairman Friedrich Merz. All three have been selected by their respective parties as key candidates for chancellor in Germany’s snap Bundestag elections scheduled for February 23, 2025. Given this, it was no surprise that they used the Swiss platform as part of their election campaigns. The current head of the German government had an objective advantage: he delivered a keynote speech on behalf of Germany, in which he focused on the presence of traditional standard factors (the largest economy in the EU; efficient small, medium and large businesses; government support for investments; low level of government debt), which should help to overcome the crisis. Regarding the United States, he declared his interest in maintaining close relations with the new administration, but “without false fawning and servility”. D. Trump and his team, according to him, will keep the whole world on edge in the coming years, but the German leadership will be able to cope with this. O. Scholz's main message is that constructive European-American interaction “is of decisive importance for security throughout the world and is the engine of successful economic development”. It is noteworthy that there were many empty seats in the hall and after the Chancellor's speech there were no questions for him for a long time, which greatly surprised the moderator of the session, K. Schwab. O. Scholz's closest associate, Finance Minister J.Kukis, who was appointed to this position to replace K. Lindner, who was dismissed in early November 2024, was participating in the Forum. He was unable to provide any special pre-election support to his boss during the Forum, and did not distinguish himself in any special way. Incidentally, K. Lindner himself preferred to remain in Germany and continue to fight there for the votes of voters, which are extremely necessary for the liberals to overcome the five percent barrier and get into the Bundestag. F.Merz, who is very likely the future head of the German Cabinet, and his possible future deputy R. Habeck also sought to prove their chances of winning the elections during their speeches. O. Scholz and F.Merz organized meetings with leading representatives of German business, trying to show which of them understood their problems better and was ready to solve them constructively. Despite all their differences, they were united on one issue - the need to soften the provision on the “debt brake” enshrined in the Basic Law (Constitution) and increase support for entrepreneurs. External observers considered that F.Merz was more convincing, including regarding the transatlantic economic vector. R.Habeck unexpectedly engaged in self-criticism during the podium discussion, stating that he initially believed that the difficult economic situation in the country was due to a short-term cyclical crisis, but it turned out that this was a consequence of a long-term structural crisis. Such “self-education” of the minister cost Germany dearly. During the Forum (January 22) in the Bavarian town of Aschaffenburg, an Afghan refugee subject to deportation committed a crime, killing a child and an adult who was protecting him. This event pushed the issue of migration regulation to the top of the election campaign agenda. Unexpectedly, F.Merz found himself in a sticky situation, when his parliamentary request as the leading representative of the opposition in the current Bundestag for stricter controls at the external borders of the FRG could only count on success with the support of the unpopular Alternative for Germany and the center-left Sahra Wagenknecht Union. From Davos, Olaf Scholz traveled to Paris for a meeting with Emmanuel Macron. The French president was unable to attend the Forum due to domestic political circumstances and the need to manage the situation on the ground. The two leaders discussed the prospects for cooperation between their countries in strengthening their economic and political frameworks, as well as the European Union as a whole. None of the three key chancellor candidates managed to present a clear vision for Germany’s economic and political future, one that would be based on creativity, radical progress, technological breakthroughs, and prosperity—transforming the country into an innovation powerhouse not only for Europe but for the collective West as a whole. This means that Germany risks falling behind, failing to establish itself as an economic model capable of competing on equal terms with Donald Trump’s transforming North American economic space.Under Friedrich Merz, Olaf Scholz, and Robert Habeck, Germany faces the danger of remaining trapped in the past, relying too heavily on its post-war economic miracle—Made in Germany—which was achieved through the brilliance of ordoliberal economists and engineers. Davos 2025 made it clear that leaning solely on past achievements is no longer enough to drive a radical leap toward the future. If the German political elite, represented by the “handshake” established parties, remains in such reactionary positions in relation to the need for qualitative changes in economic policy, then the German standard will have no chance to take a leading place among the world's innovation locations. Here we will briefly indicate that, according to the estimates of the authors of the global risks report, the main ones for Germany are (in descending order): a shortage of highly qualified labor, recession / stagnation of the economy, illegal migration, disinformation, and a shortage of energy resources. They are the ones that largely determine the content of the current election campaign for the German parliament. The China Factor Among the political heavyweights representing the countries of the Global South at Davos 2025, the participation of the Chinese delegation, led by Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Ding Xuexiang, stands out. In his keynote speech, he emphasized Beijing's commitment to economic globalization, which is “not a zero-sum game, but a process of mutual benefit and common progress” and declared that protectionism does not lead to success, and trade wars have no winners. Among the key messages were that China is economically attractive, does not seek a trade surplus, is ready to import more competitive and high-quality goods and services to achieve balanced trade, is open to investment from foreign companies, and is ready to solve problems faced by both domestic and foreign firms. While condemning protectionism, he emphasized the importance of multilateralism and the role of the UN. While mildly critical of the “new-old” US president, he never mentioned him by name. Ding repeatedly referred to Xi Jinping, including his initiatives on global development and security. As part of the Forum, Ding Xuexiang hosted a private luncheon with top global financiers and business leaders, including the CEOs of BlackRock, Bridgewater Associates, JPMorgan, Blackstone, and Visa. Discussions centered on China’s ongoing economic reforms, efforts to stabilize the real estate market, stimulate domestic demand, and attract foreign investment. Experts noted that global business leaders responded positively to Ding Xuexiang’s statements, signaling growing confidence in China’s economic direction. In general, he fulfilled the standard mission assigned to him: to increase the international community's confidence in China's economic policy and confirm its role as a key player in the global economy. At the same time, the Forum participants remained concerned about a slowdown in China's economic growth, especially in the context of a possible increase in tariffs by the United States. The Artificial Intelligence Factor One of the leitmotifs of the forum, along with rethinking economic growth, industrial development prospects, climate and restoring trust, were discussions on the rapid development of AI, its impact on the labor market, prospects and challenges associated with the integration of this technology into various sectors of the economy. Experts identified a few trends that will emerge by 2030. AI and automation will increase the demand of enterprises for specialists in the field of AI, big data analysis, digital marketing, and cybersecurity. About half of the current skills of such employees in these areas may become obsolete, which suggests the need for timely adaptation of secondary and higher education to such a challenge. Employees whose professions will become unclaimed due to automation, especially in traditional sectors, will have to undergo advanced training programs. Special attention in the expert sessions was given to the ethical aspects of AI application and the related problems of developing the necessary standards. Issues of international cooperation took an important place, including in the context of ensuring a fair distribution of the benefits of AI application, as well as minimizing the potential risks it generates for society (for example, possible discrimination and bias in algorithms, as well as the protection of users' personal data). In terms of geopolitical rivalry in the field of AI, the global race for leadership in this area, which has already begun between the United States, China and several EU countries, was discussed. Experts pointed out the concerns of the leaders of the latter regarding the need to strengthen the positions of European companies in this area. Strategies for government stimulation of innovation and support for businesses developing AI were discussed. In addition, the participants in the discussions considered the possibilities of using artificial intelligence technologies to achieve sustainable development goals, including combating climate change, improving healthcare and increasing resource efficiency. Examples of using AI to monitor the environment, optimize energy consumption, develop new methods of treating diseases, and improve various aspects of life were of interest. *** The World Economic Forum 2025 in Davos was predictably held under the sign of global challenges, the Ukraine conflict, and increased economic competition, set against the backdrop of geopolitical and geoeconomic changes. Børge Brende, summarizing the event, accurately noted that the current time is “a moment of serious consequences and uncertainties”. This is largely linked to the return of Donald Trump to the White House. At the Forum, the United States’ priorities in strengthening national interests were outlined, including the goal of reducing import flows. This move drew criticism from the European Union and other participants, who expressed growing concerns about the escalation of trade conflicts and the fragmentation of the global economy. The President of the European Commission highlighted the prospects for strengthening the EU’s competitiveness and increasing its independence, considering the intensifying rivalry between the American and Chinese economic spheres. In this regard, representatives of China advocated for reducing trade tensions and strengthening regional alliances, while Germany emphasized the current risks facing its economic standard, outlining the difficulties of finding ways to minimize them. The Ukrainian conflict once again became one of the central topics, but with the formal support of the leaders of the collective West, delegations from the global South showed a restrained reaction to V.Zelensky's speech and messages. Discussions about AI became quite meaningful. Overall, Davos 2025 and its participants confirmed the important role of the WEF as a platform for discussing global challenges and finding constructive answers to them. The need for collective efforts to solve the most pressing issues was noted. One of B. Borge's final messages: the only way to achieve progress in solving global problems is to work together and “find solutions that will make the world a better place”. It is evident that Russia could have significantly contributed to enhancing the effectiveness of this approach.

Diplomacy
Foreign Minister Schallenberg on a trip to the Middle East, 27-29/02/2024 - 40

Lebanon enters new creative era

by Viktor Mikhin

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The election of General Joseph Aoun as President of Lebanon marks the beginning of a new era of hope for a country that has been mired in crisis for decades. The election and General Aoun’s position This election is not just a step towards ending a protracted constitutional crisis, but the beginning of a critical period of challenges and opportunities that require wise leadership and a clear vision to achieve Lebanon’s security and prosperity. From the outset, General Aoun has shown himself to be a leader committed to transparency and clarity. His words after taking the oath of office were devoid of the usual diplomatic platitudes and reflected his honest character and deep love for his country. He has a clear vision and firm goals that prioritise restoring security and rebuilding Lebanon’s institutions on a solid foundation that serves its people and ensures justice. In his speech, Aoun stressed the importance of restoring the authority of the state and strengthening its sovereignty – essential foundations for building a secure future. His speech on institutional reform underlined his desire to strengthen the state and restore public confidence. He also stressed the importance of national unity and the vital role of youth in driving change, expressing his hope for Lebanon’s rebirth with the participation of all its citizens. Lebanon today faces many challenges, but these challenges can be the starting point for reconstruction and its rise. Restoring trust between the state and its people will require concrete steps to fight corruption and increase transparency, principles that Aoun stressed: “Lebanon will rise only thanks to its loyal citizens”. Moreover, fulfilling international commitments such as UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701, which call for, among other things, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah, will be crucial to establishing stability and removing Lebanon from regional power struggles. Aoun’s firm stance that Lebanon “will not become a battleground for settling scores” offers hope for a sovereign and independent future for the country, free from regional tensions. At this critical juncture in Lebanon’s history, the appointment of a competent prime minister is an urgent task. This person must have both economic experience and integrity, be able to lead economic reforms and attract investment to restore confidence in state institutions. Such an appointment will lay the groundwork for the successful implementation of the plan to return Lebanon to a path of growth and stability, politically, economically and spiritually. Lebanon has always been a beacon of culture, diversity and tolerance and now, with the election of a new president, the Lebanese hope that the country will regain its rightful place among other nations of the world. Aoun recognizes the important role of the Gulf countries in supporting Lebanon’s renaissance and calls on them to return and invest in rebuilding the country’s economy. This call is not only economic: it is an expression of gratitude and appreciation for the vital role that the Gulf monarchies have historically played in Lebanon’s development. Position of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement In the second round of voting, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement decided to support the election of Joseph Aoun as Lebanon’s president, ending a two-year presidential deadlock. The resounding statement by the ‘Shiite duo’ was that the crucial decision on the numerical and political quorum was largely up to the resistance movement and that the president could not be elected without it. Reluctantly, the ‘Shiite duo’ gave in to unprecedented foreign pressure, while still claiming a powerful presence in the Lebanese political arena. In fact, the ‘duo’ put Lebanon’s best interests and national harmony first. Mohammed Raad, head of the Loyalty to the Resistance bloc, paid tribute to the “martyrs of the resistance who defended the country so that a meeting uld be held, and national harmony could be achieved in this difficult period. By postponing the election of the president, we wanted to send the message that we are the guarantors of national harmony”. A consensus was reached before the second round during a meeting between Mohammad Raad and Ali Hassan Khalil and Joseph Aoun, who allayed the Shia duo’s fears about the military, security and politics. The meeting focused on the responsibilities of the new era, particularly in terms of reconstruction, forming a national government and preserving the achievements of the resistance movement. Joseph Aoun promised to rebuild what the Israeli enemy had destroyed, saying: “Our dead are the spirit of our determination, and our prisoners are the pillars of our strength”. Moscow welcomes Aoun’s election as Lebanese president This opens up prospects for strengthening Lebanon’s domestic political stability and improving the country’s difficult socio-economic situation, the Russian Foreign Ministry said. Moscow welcomes the resolution of the presidential crisis, which has lasted since October 2022. This opens up prospects for strengthening internal political stability in Lebanon and rectifying the difficult socio-economic situation in the country, the Foreign Ministry said. It said: “Russia believes that the restoration of a broad national consensus is the key to ensuring unity and civil peace in multi-confessional Lebanon. The Russian Federation reaffirms its unwavering position in support of the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the friendly Republic of Lebanon. It is determined to further develop Russian-Lebanese relations and closely coordinate efforts in the interests of ensuring peace and security in the Middle East region, which is going through a period of military and political turbulence,” the ministry added. Aoun’s election is a milestone in Lebanon’s history. His honest leadership and transparent approach inspire hope for a bright future. But realising that hope will require collective effort and serious action. Lebanon deserves the best, and with strong leadership and the support of its people and allies, a country worthy of its history and status can be rebuilt. Let this new era be a great opportunity for a fresh start, and let us always remember that hope is built on action and commitment.

Energy & Economics
Reading, Berkshire, England - June 04, 2018, representation of trade tariffs imposed by the United States of America on steel and aluminium imports

Trump’s 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico amp up the risk of a broader trade war

by Markus Wagner

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It’s official. On February 1, US President Donald Trump will introduce a sweeping set of new 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico. China will also face new tariffs of 10%. During the presidential campaign, Trump threatened tariffs against all three countries, claiming they weren’t doing enough to prevent an influx of “drugs, in particular fentanyl” into the US, while also accusing Canada and Mexico of not doing enough to stop “illegal aliens”. There will be some nuance. On Friday, Trump said tariffs on oil and gas would come into effect later, on February 18, and that Canadian oil would likely face a lower tariff of 10%. This may only be the first move against China. Trump has previously threatened the country with 60% tariffs, asserting this will bring jobs back to America. But the US’ move against its neighbours will have an almost immediate impact on the three countries involved and the landscape of North American trade. It marks the beginning of what could be a radical reshaping of international trade and political governance around the world. What Trump wants from Canada and Mexico While border security and drug trade concerns are the official rationale for this move, Trump’s tariffs have broader motivations. The first one is protectionist. In all his presidential campaigning, Trump portrayed himself as a champion of US workers. Back in October, he said tariff was “the most beautiful word in the dictionary”. This reflects the ongoing scepticism toward international trade that Trump – and politicians more generally on both ends of the political spectrum in the US – have held for some time. It’s a significant shift in the close trade links between these neighbours. The US, Mexico and Canada are parties to the successor of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Trump has not hidden his willingness to use tariffs as a weapon to pressure other countries to achieve unrelated geopolitical goals. This is the epitome of what a research project team I co-lead calls “Weaponised Trade”. This was on full display in late January. When the president of Colombia prohibited US military airplanes carrying Colombian nationals deported from the US to land, Trump successfully used the threat of tariffs to force Colombia to reverse course. The economic stakes The volume of trade between the US, Canada, and Mexico is enormous, encompassing a wide range of goods and services. Some of the biggest sectors are automotive manufacturing, energy, agriculture, and consumer goods. In 2022, the value of all goods and services traded between the US and Canada came to about US$909 billion (A$1.46 trillion). Between the US and Mexico that same year, it came to more than US$855 billion (A$1.37 trillion). One of the hardest hit industries will be the automotive industry, which depends on cross-border trade. A car assembled in Canada, Mexico or the US relies heavily on a supply of parts from throughout North America. Tariffs will raise costs throughout this supply chain, which could lead to higher prices for consumers and make US-based manufacturers less competitive. There could also be ripple effects for agriculture. The US exports billions of dollars in corn, soybeans, and meat to Canada and Mexico, while importing fresh produce such as avocados and tomatoes from Mexico. Tariffs may provoke retaliatory measures, putting farmers and food suppliers in all three countries at risk. Trump’s decision to delay and reduce tariffs on oil was somewhat predictable. US imports of Canadian oil have increased steadily over recent decades, meaning tariffs would immediately bite US consumers at the fuel pump. We’ve been here before This isn’t the first time the world has dealt with Trump’s tariff-heavy approach to trade policy. Looking back to his first term may provide some clues about what we might expect. In 2018, the US levied duties on steel and aluminium. Both Canada and Mexico are major exporters of steel to the US. Canada and Mexico imposed retaliatory tariffs. Ultimately, all countries removed tariffs on steel and aluminium in the process of finalising the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Notably, though, many of Trump’s trade policies remained in place even after President Joe Biden took office. This signalled a bipartisan scepticism of unfettered trade and a shift toward on-shoring or re-shoring in US policy circles. The options for Canada and Mexico This time, Canada and Mexico’s have again responded with threats of retaliatory tariffs. But they’ve also made attempts to mollify Trump – such as Canada launching a “crackdown” on fentanyl trade. Generally speaking, responses to these tariffs could range from measured diplomacy to aggressive retaliation. Canada and Mexico may target politically sensitive industries such as agriculture or gasoline, where Trump’s base could feel the pinch. There are legal options, too. Canada and Mexico could pursue legal action through the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement’s dispute resolution mechanisms or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both venues provide pathways for challenging unfair trade practices. But these practices can be slow-moving, uncertain in their outcomes and are susceptible to being ignored. A more long-term option for businesses in Canada and Mexico is to diversify their trade relationships to reduce reliance on the US market. However, the facts of geography, and the large base of consumers in the US mean that’s easier said than done. The looming threat of a global trade war Trump’s latest tariffs underscore a broader trend: the widening of the so-called “Overton window” to achieve unrelated geopolitical goals. The Overton Window refers to the range of policy options politicians have because they are accepted among the general public. Arguments for bringing critical industries back to the US, protecting domestic jobs, and reducing reliance on foreign supply chains gained traction after the ascent of China as a geopolitical and geoeconomic rival. These arguments picked up steam during the COVID-19 pandemic and have increasingly been turned into actual policy. The potential for a broader trade war looms large. Trump’s short-term goal may be to leverage tariffs as a tool to secure concessions from other jurisdictions. Trump’s threats against Denmark – in his quest to obtain control over Greenland – are a prime example. The European Union (EU), a far more potent economic player, has pledged its support for Denmark. A North American trade war – foreshadowed by the Canadian and Mexican governments – might then only be harbinger of things to come: significant economic harm, the erosion of trust among trading partners, and increased volatility in global markets.

Defense & Security
Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence during a two-day meeting of the alliance's Defence Ministers at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on February 14, 2023.

Where is the transatlantic relationship heading?

by Florentino Portero

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The social dimension of the Alliance The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the organization created by the signatory states of the Washington Treaty to achieve the goals set by the Alliance, is an institution characteristic of the democratic realm, where governments depend on their respective public opinions when trying to establish a security policy. The people matter – and this is something we must keep in mind – when reflecting on their future. The simplest and most logical answer to the question posed in the title of this conference, the one that responds to common sense, is wherever its member states want. And this is the core of the problem. Do the allies have a common vision? Do they share interests as they did in 1949? Do they still believe they are a community united by their commitment to democracy? Is it reasonable to consider that they form a “collective defense system”? Without clearly answering these questions, it becomes very difficult to move forward with this analysis. We would be venturing into speculative territory. On the other hand, we cannot ignore reality, and this leads us to acknowledge that it is unlikely we will receive clear answers due to a set of considerations characteristic of the present time. The first refers to the lack of reliability of the State because of the high fragmentation of public opinion. Globalization and the Digital Revolution are causing social and economic changes that have led the population to distrust their political elites. Traditional parties are disappearing or losing seats, while new political forces emerge, questioning many of the paradigms we have been working with for years. The societies of the member states no longer have as clear a sense of the purpose of the Alliance as they did a decade ago, because there is confusion about what the actual risks, challenges, and threats they face are. The second is the absence of prominent figures with the authority to exercise leadership at the heads of the allied governments. We cannot ignore that in times of uncertainty, leadership is more necessary than ever, because in its absence, it becomes extremely difficult to shape a sufficiently common position among the citizens. The third is the empirical realization that the Alliance has not been able to manage the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine in a competent and professional manner. In the first case, the European allies decided to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty even though it wasn’t necessary, but wanting to show their solidarity with the state that had guaranteed their security for decades. However, on the battlefield, the vast majority shield themselves behind their ‘rules of engagement’ to avoid complicated situations. The goal was to comply with the United States more than to commit to victory. For its part, the United States was unable to maintain consistent objectives and strategy over time, which led to a humiliating defeat. What was the point of the waste of lives and money if, in the end, the same people returned to power? What was the point of the Alliance's technological superiority if it was defeated by poorly armed militias? In the second case, we have observed that despite the obvious incompetence of its armed forces, its limited capabilities, and its dire economic situation, Russia has managed to consolidate its control over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and continues to advance. For the average citizen, it is incomprehensible that, having committed ourselves to reclaim all Ukrainian sovereign territory and being much wealthier, our strategy has led Ukraine to the unfortunate situation it finds itself in. Why didn’t we offer them the weapons they needed from the very beginning? Why have we deprived them of the victory we formally committed to? The fourth is a derivative of the previous one. In this context, does it make sense for the citizen to trust the Alliance? Isn’t it understandable that they try to seek refuge within the national framework and fear that the Alliance, in the hands of unqualified people, will drag them into scenarios that are not critical to their lives? Whether we like it or not, the citizen's distrust in NATO is as justified as their intuition that only NATO can guarantee their security, which includes both their freedom and their well-being. What is the Alliance today? In circumstances as complex as those we are currently experiencing, it is virtually impossible for an organization composed of thirty-two member states to be a community committed to the defense and promotion of democracy. The mere reference to Turkey, Hungary, or Spain is proof of how far there are nations within it that are heading in a different direction. The evolution of European political systems points to a worsening of the situation rather than the exceptional nature of the mentioned cases. The community, as well as the idea that it constitutes a "collective defense system," falls within the realm of aspirations. The Alliance has been a “collective defense system,” and I have no doubt that there are allies who continue to act consistently with this idea. However, putting aside formalities, I believe that when assessing the transatlantic relationship, we must focus on its strict condition as an alliance. NATO is an asset that no one wants to lose, even though in its current state, it leaves much to be desired. Its strength does not lie in the common perception of the threat, the solidarity of its members, the available capabilities, or in sharing a strategy, which is clearly nonexistent. What makes its members want to keep it alive is the accumulated legacy after 75 years of shared experiences and the deep sense of insecurity in the face of the dual realization of a world undergoing profound change and poorly prepared national defenses from any point of view. Outside the Alliance, it’s even colder. NATO provides us with a starting point to try to react collectively, knowing that, in reality, except for the United States, no member state has the critical size to act as a "strategic actor." We have a history, an institutional framework, civilian and military bodies, doctrines, resources... that allow us to try to adapt without having to start from scratch. The European Perspective In recent years, the European states that are members of the Alliance have experienced the contrast between the claim that the European Union should assume the role of a "strategic actor" and the harsh, relentless reality of its impotence to effectively and competently address the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. In parallel, they have shifted from contempt for the United States, due to its erratic foreign policy and its inability to successfully complete its foreign initiatives, to seeking shelter once again under its military strength, considering the evidence of their own inability to understand international politics and act accordingly. It seems beyond doubt that the dynamics of the European integration process are heading towards the establishment of a federation. The transfer of sovereignty represented by the single currency was a milestone, marking the creation of "political Europe" through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, we are moving toward a single fiscal policy, with banking union, European monetary fund... ultimately towards the consolidation of an economic and monetary policy. Such significant common economic interests demand both a shared legal framework and a unified foreign policy. However, the factor of time plays a fundamental role. The passing of generations has allowed us to make progress, overcoming nationalist prejudices. Despite the formidable progress made, which is easily reflected in the recognition by young people that we live in a common cultural environment, the reality is that we are still far from forming what Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón referred to decades ago as a "European people." One thing is to delegate certain public policies to European institutions, and another, undoubtedly very different, is the exercise of actions that are characteristically sovereign. History and geography matter, and we must acknowledge that we have not yet formed that continental identity that would allow us to credibly face the formidable challenge of establishing a common foreign policy. The advantages of planning together and having the same capabilities are obvious, but above all, what matters is its viability. The Union is still not in a position to replace American leadership. This humbling realization transforms into a flow of energy in favor of the Alliance, assuming as inevitable the implementation of changes that allow it to adapt to a new international environment. For years, we have been aware that the Washington Treaty, and especially its Article 5, are anachronistic. The emergence of new domains – space, cyber, and cognitive – and the development of hybrid strategies challenge some of its foundations. Even so, we try to adapt without facing a reform of the treaty, in an exercise of understandable but risky caution. We are aware that the European theater is no longer the same as it was in 1949, that globalization and the "competition among great powers" in the race to win the "Digital Revolution" have shaped a considerably different scenario that we must integrate into, but we feel dizzy at the thought of leaving our own geographic zone, when we are not even in a position to effectively address our own problems. The American Perspective Since the creation of the United States, American society has lived with the contradiction between its isolationist vocation and its dependence on foreign trade. It fears becoming involved in the affairs of others at a high cost. However, the commercial dimension of its economy demands freedom of navigation, legal security, access to raw materials, and the ability to penetrate other markets, conditions that lead to an international role. From the First and Second World Wars, they learned that it was impossible to turn their back on what was happening in other countries, that they had to commit to international security, trying to establish an order that would guarantee their national interests. After years of involvement in international conflicts that seemed to have no end, isolationist and nationalist sentiment has grown, as a classic pendulum effect. In this context, it is understandable that the public debate openly questions its presence in the Atlantic Alliance. Is NATO a guarantee of the security of the United States? In the years immediately preceding the Madrid Summit, it was evident that the Alliance lacked a threat to unite it, a strategy to guide its steps, and capabilities that would allow it to carry out combined activities. It should therefore come as no surprise that since the second term of the Bush Administration, statements from senior officials have been warning of the dangerous drift of the Organization or threatening its withdrawal. There has been much talk about the low defense spending by many of the European allies. It is evident that without investment, there is no modernization, and without it, there is a technological disconnect that prevents the joint action of the armed forces of the different member states. However, what is truly concerning is what this implies in terms of abuse and disregard towards the United States. Hence, the heated reactions we receive from the other side. It is indecent that we spend on welfare, reaching levels that are unattainable for the average American, while we let them bear the cost of our security, both in economic terms and in human lives. As grave as, or even more than, the lack of investment is the absence of a shared vision and strategy, but it is understandable that the debate has focused on investment, an instrumental element. For European allies, increasing defense spending under the current economic circumstances will be as difficult as it is painful, but it will not be any less difficult or painful to reach an agreement that gives meaning to NATO's existence in the coming years. One of the few consensuses in the Capitol is to consider China as its main rival, around which all its economic, foreign, and defense policies revolve. In the Strategic Concept approved in Madrid, we can read that China is a “systemic challenge” for all of us. What policy have we derived from this categorical statement? Is there an Atlantic vision on this? It is hard to imagine that the Alliance can have a future if the states on both sides of the Atlantic do not reach a common position on how to engage with the great Asian power. In the same document, we find the statement that Russia is a “threat,” which does not align with statements from American leaders of both parties, though more from the Republican side than the Democratic one. It is neither acceptable nor responsible that, after the approval of such an important document, just two and a half years later, the United States acts as if the problem is not theirs. Putting formal aspects aside, is Russia a threat to the United States? To what extent does the behavior of the Moscow government in Eastern Europe affect U.S. national interests? Does it make sense for the United States to get involved in the war in Ukraine? Was Biden's behavior a reflection of a Cold War veteran, detached from the international circumstances of today? The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance was not the result of U.S. leaders in the early postwar years being convinced that the Soviet Union posed a threat to their national interests. On the contrary, they were fully aware that it did not. What concerned them was the extreme weakness of the European states, ravaged by a brutal war, the absence of a democratic culture, the high risk of totalitarian currents feeding off misery and uncertainty, and leading the Old Continent to a Third World War. European governments felt Soviet pressure. The area occupied by the Red Army was experiencing the extermination of representative institutions, Germany was torn between neutrality and partition, communist parties were gaining parliamentary positions in significant countries like France and Italy, supported by the prestige earned in the Resistance. For U.S. analysts, the European perception of the Soviet threat was exaggerated, but its effects could be concerning. The United States chose to engage in European reconstruction to prevent its drift towards fragmentation and totalitarianism, as the consequences of this drift could directly affect their national interests. They established a comprehensive strategy based on two pillars, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance. NATO has been and continues to be an instrument to guarantee cohesion and democracy on the Old Continent. The second Trump administration must resolve the tension between the isolationist demand of the citizenry, the need to create jobs on domestic soil through the erection of tariff barriers, the necessity of securing supply and distribution chains, and the consolidation of alliances or understandings between different regional blocs in response to Chinese initiatives. It is a set of contradictory actions wrapped in the populist demagoguery characteristic of our time, but which will require decisions in times marked by a succession of crises. Time for decisions An organization inhabited by officials does not need meaning to continue functioning. From 9 AM to 5 PM, qualified staff will move papers from one office to another, showcasing their professionalism and operational efficiency. However, it is important not to confuse NATO with the Alliance. The latter does need meaning, which is now in question. Whether we like it or not, the coming years will be crucial for its future. We will witness how the decisions made regarding a set of circumstances and debates will ultimately determine it, as well as the link between the two shores of the Atlantic. As happened at its origin, that link will go far beyond security, which is instrumental in consolidating that community which was the original aspiration and is now marked by its absence. The war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the central issue in the transatlantic relationship, as it brings to the negotiation table many of the fundamental issues that question its very existence. We are facing a continental conflict that arises after a Russian diplomatic attempt to reach an agreement on a new balance of power. Moscow's proposal demanded the withdrawal of U.S. units from areas bordering its territory and the removal of its nuclear weapons stationed in the Old Continent. Putin’s government felt threatened by NATO and the European Union's eastward expansion and demanded compensation. When it was not granted, it launched its third campaign on Ukraine and its fifth on territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. This is not a campaign that can be understood in a bilateral Russia-Ukraine logic, but rather as part of an effort by a revived Russian imperialism to reconstitute its historical sphere of influence. This invasion is not the first, and unless the Alliance acts wisely, it will not be the last. The role played by the Europeans has been disappointing. Their response to previous aggressions – Moldova, Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas – was the perfect example of how supposedly educated elites learn nothing from history. The French, Germans, and Italians collectively made the same mistakes as Chamberlain in Munich, thinking that the aggressor would be satisfied by acknowledging their right to aggression, when, in reality, they were encouraging them to proceed and prepare for new expansionist ventures. This attitude provoked the logical irritation and distrust in the Slavic-Scandinavian space, which was never deceived by the ongoing process under the Russian government. These powers refused to believe U.S. intelligence warnings about Russia's willingness to invade and reacted too late and poorly. All this, combined with the old problem of lack of investment in defense, made European armed forces ineffective and their industry powerless in responding to a demand for military capabilities in a short period of time. If the Europeans do not take their defense seriously, if they have become accustomed to parasitizing U.S. leadership, the frustration of their elites with their European allies is understandable. The Biden administration tried to use the Ukraine War to reconstitute the Alliance, but the strategy of attrition applied, renouncing victory out of fear of its political and military consequences, has led to a very high number of Ukrainian casualties and to public fatigue, which, following the Russian plan, is pushing through new political formations from both the right and the left to reach an unfeasible understanding with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. In the new international scenario, characterized by competition among great powers to achieve technological hegemony within the framework of the Digital Revolution, the United States needs Europe as much as Europe needs the United States. Russia does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, but it has become a vassal of China and an instrument of Beijing to weaken the cohesion of the Western bloc. The Trump administration must not fall into the temptation of turning its back on its allies, no matter how irresponsible and incompetent they may be, as this would cede ground to the rival. An even more protectionist policy could push European states, if not the Union itself, to seek alternative markets in China. A policy of greater withdrawal would encourage both division among continental powers and the pursuit of a middle ground between the two superpowers. What is at stake is much more than tariffs or investment in defense. What we will decide soon is whether we are a community or not, whether we face the challenges of a new era together, or if we choose separation. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States has valuable allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the Slavic and Scandinavian blocs. Attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine War could mean a victory for Russia by recognizing its right to alter Europe's borders by force, and the loss of trust from these allies, who are aware that even Trump would have fallen into the Munich trap, and despite his brash rhetoric, he would have ended up playing Chamberlain’s role. This would be a grave mistake for the United States, which, on the contrary, should rely on these countries to contain Russian expansionism and send a very clear message to Beijing about its commitment to updating and maintaining the cohesion of the Western community. Such an update would require allies, this time for real, to commit to defense investment and be prepared to use their capabilities when necessary. The Alliance needs a strategy. The concept approved in Madrid was merely the political framework to develop it. It is up to the Trump administration to lead its development in order to ultimately agree on what to do about the "Russian threat" and the "systemic challenge" posed by China. The Middle East crisis is unfolding in a scenario defined by two fronts established after years of diplomatic work: the "Abraham Accords" and the Axis of Resistance. Hamas’ aggression towards Israel has materialized in a harsh military campaign in the Gaza Strip, which has severely damaged the political and military capabilities of the Islamist group, and has extended to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is also suffering a heavy blow. In addition, Iran has seen its defense industry, anti-aircraft artillery systems, and, more limitedly, its nuclear network has suffered significant damage, while its intelligence system has been humiliated and degraded. In this context, despite the damage suffered by the Gazan population, the block formed by the Abraham Accords has remained cohesive, aware of Hamas' blackmail and the cost of yielding to it. On the other hand, Europe has presented itself as divided, lacking a strategic vision, not understanding that this was not a problem between Israelis and Palestinians, but an instrumental conflict aimed at undermining the regimes of Arab countries not aligned with the Axis of Resistance. Its criticism of Israel for the effects of its military campaign on the Gazan population consciously ignored both Hamas’ responsibility in turning them into human shields and the cost that accepting Hamas' blackmail would have had for all of us — Arabs, Israelis, and Europeans — if the campaign had not continued. How is it possible that we have so easily forgotten how the Axis powers were defeated? What would have happened in Europe during WWII if we had followed the European Union's demands during the Gaza War? The Middle East is a critical space for the Atlantic Alliance. It is understandable that the United States is frustrated with many of its European allies who, once again, have acted in a frivolous and irresponsible manner, unable to think in strategic terms. Israel has long chosen to turn its back on Europe, in response to a behavior it associates with a new form of anti-Semitism. The Arab bloc appreciates the European sensitivity to the suffering of the Gazan or Lebanese people, but it seeks security under the umbrella of the United States and Israel in the face of the Axis of Resistance, which poses a challenge of internal subversion, asymmetric warfare, and nuclear threat. A renewed Alliance needs to establish a strategy for the MENA region focused on containing Islamism and consolidating moderate regimes. China and Russia are taking advantage of the instability to infiltrate and hinder our missions. For them, instability on our southern front is a strategic objective, one that would fuel migration and insecurity, and with them, division within the Alliance and the Union. The Arab-Israeli bloc distrusts the United States due to its inability to maintain a strategy over time and does not rely on the Europeans. Only a firm stance from the Alliance in favor of this group of countries and against the Axis of Resistance could overcome this situation and guarantee both the cohesion of the Alliance and its authority in the region. The circumstances that led to the creation of the Alliance are behind us. They are history. However, today the Alliance is more necessary than ever. The circumstances have changed, but the community of values and interests remains the same, even though not everyone may understand this. Dissolving this community would be a grave mistake that would only benefit those powers whose goal is nothing more than to "revise" our legacy. Reviving it will not be easy. It will require political awareness and high-level diplomacy. Challenges that are impossible to achieve without leadership that matches the times. 

Diplomacy
Syrians celebrate after Assad regime toppled, war in the middle east, rebels and islamists, Porta Nigra in Trier, Germany, 08.12.2024

Syria: Living Under the Roof of a Unified State

by Yuriy Zinin

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском A wave of comments and reports has flooded the media landscape and social networks of the Middle East following the coup in Syria and the rise to power of new forces. These reactions reflect a diverse mosaic of opinions and perspectives on the reasons behind these events. Amid the general chorus of views, there is a noticeable trend celebrating the “victory of the Syrian people, oppressed for decades”. At the same time, the commentators’ euphoria over the regime’s unexpected fall is tempered by fears of uncertainty and the unpredictability of the country’s future. Headlines such as “Syria: No Victor!”, “Syria Is Further Away From Its Resurrection”, and “Today’s Syria in the Shadows of Internal Division” encapsulate these sentiments. Regional analysts predict conflicting scenarios for the country’s future: one envisioning a peaceful and bloodless transition to a new system of governance, and the other foreseeing a descent into chaos and civil strife. What Ash-Sharaa Proclaims Many writers focus their attention on the biography, actions, and statements of the head of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham*” (HTS), Al-Jolani – the unofficial leader of the conglomerate of forces now in power after the coup. They suggest that his public image is undergoing a transformation. Al-Jolani fought under the banner of “Al-Qaeda*” in Iraq, spent five years in an American prison there, and recently replaced his nom de guerre with his real name, Ash-Sharaa. According to the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, his public appearances and interviews are designed for external audiences. These include the West first and foremost, followed by the Gulf states, Israel, neighboring countries, and influential actors in Syria such as Iran and Russia. Everything Ash-Sharaa communicates serves the purpose of projecting the message that he is no longer the man many once knew. He expresses a desire for good relations with the global community. In Damascus, doors have been opened to delegations from several European countries as well as the United States. The aim of these visits was to establish communication channels with Syria’s new rulers. In recent days, the new leadership has laid out the red carpet for visiting diplomats from Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar. Qatar has offered to provide technical assistance to resume commercial flights and has expressed interest in investing in various sectors of Syria, including energy. Jordan has voiced its “readiness to support Syria in areas such as trade, border security, electricity supply, and more”. It also seems that the Arab delegations visiting Damascus are unwilling to leave the field open for Turkey’s active involvement in Syria or allow it to impose its agenda on the Syrian people. Western countries are trying to determine their approach to relations with Syria’s new administration. They are waiting to assess its policies and actions before considering lifting the sanctions imposed on Damascus. Following a meeting with Ash-Sharaa, a U.S. representative announced the cancellation of the previously offered $10 million financial reward for information leading to his capture. Despite this, HTS* remains on the U.S. list of officially recognized terrorist organizations. Positive Signals from the New Syrian Authorities The new Syrian authorities appear eager to send positive signals emphasizing “social justice and equality among all religious and ethnic components”. These efforts aim to reassure the international community, gain recognition, and pave the way for official cooperation. Experts and political analysts find these signals encouraging. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to the UAE president, described statements about national unity and HTS’s promises not to impose its ideas on all Syrians as “reasonable and rational”. However, he expressed concerns about the nature of the new forces and their historical ties to groups like the Muslim Brotherhood* and Al-Qaeda*. Prominent Saudi researcher on political Islam and extremism, Yousef al-Dini, analyzed tweets from jihadist figures, including statements by Ash-Sharaa. He concluded that the primary issue HTS faces lies with the “remnants” of foreign fighters and mercenaries within their ranks. These individuals have struggled to adapt, lacking the pragmatism demonstrated by their leaders, he noted. The media across the Middle East highlight the atmosphere of caution and anticipation currently permeating Syrian society. The sudden upheavals have caught many off guard, disrupted established perceptions, and presented scenarios that do not rule out turbulent events. As Arab sociologists remind us, Syria is home to sixteen racial and ethnic groups, including Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, Druze, Shiites, Alawites, Christians, Yazidis, and others. The history of the Syrian people has destined them to live intertwined within a shared social fabric, preserving the cultural heritage of the ancient Levant. The new regime in Syria faces a daunting challenge. To survive and sustain itself, it must transform its rhetoric into the reality of a lawful national state that embraces coexistence under one roof for all components of its diverse society. *Organisations banned in the territory of the Russian Federation

Energy & Economics
Close up to a Port Vila city with a yellow pin needle into Vanuatu country political map

Election 2025: Earthquake aftershocks expose high cost of Vanuatu’s democracy

by Anna Naupa

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Vanuatu’s self-sabotaging political class has left the country struggling to deal with social and economic shocks of recent natural disasters. Out of the rubble of the 7.3 magnitude earthquake that hit Vanuatu’s capital Port Vila on Dec. 17 and the snap election due on Jan. 16, a new leadership is required to reset the country’s developmental trajectory.  Persistent political turmoil has hampered the Pacific nation’s ability to deal with a compounding set of social and economic shocks over recent years, caused by climate-related and other natural disasters.  The earthquake is estimated to have conservatively caused US$244 million [VUV29 billion] in damage, and the Vanuatu Government’s ability to pay for disaster response, the election, and resume public service delivery will require strong, committed and stable leadership.  Prior to the devastating quake and dramatic dissolution of parliament on Nov. 18, economist Peter Judge from Vanuatu-based Pacific Consulting warned of an evolving economic emergency. Vanuatu’s US$1 billion economy faced a concerning decline in government revenue from value-added tax, down 25% on the previous year.  This was a ripple effect from the decline in economic activity after the collapse of national airline Air Vanuatu last May, as well as the falling revenues from the troubled Citizenship by Investment Program. Both were plagued by lack of oversight by parliamentarians. In 2024, Vanuatu is expected to record about 1% economic growth, as it struggles to climb out of the red and back to pre-pandemic levels. Conversely, Vanuatu has a much more positive, although somewhat contradictory democratic profile.  According to the Global State of Democracy Initiative, Vanuatu is one of the more democratic states in the Pacific islands region, and currently ranks as 45th in the world.  But this performance comes with a significant price. Leadership turnover is frequent, with 28 prime ministerial terms in just 44 years of statehood, 20 of those in the last 25 years, the highest frequency of change in the Melanesian region.  The impacts of disrupted leadership and political instability are highly visible. Government decision-making and service delivery is grindingly slow. In Vanuatu’s Parliament, the legislative process is frequently deferred due to regular motions of no confidence, with several critical bills still awaiting MPs’ attention. Last October, for example, the Vanuatu Government proposed a 2025 budget 10% smaller than 2024’s, due to reduced economic activity and declining government revenue.  Parliament was unable to approve this year’s budget due to its sudden dissolution on Nov. 18, only two-and-a-half years into a four-year political term. This is the second consecutive presidential dissolution of parliament, the previous one in 2022 also occurring barely two-and-a-half years into its term.  The Bill for the appropriation of the 2025 budget now awaits the formation of the next legislature for approval. In the meantime, earthquake recovery and election management costs accumulate under a caretaker government.  With deepening economic hardship and industries facing slow economic growth across multiple sectors, voters are looking for leadership that can stabilize the compounding cost of living pressures.  The new government will need to urgently tackle overdue, unresolved issues pertaining to reliable inter-island transport and air connectivity, outstanding teacher salaries and greater opportunities for the nation’s restive youth.  The youth unemployment rate is at 10.7% and rising. Democracy with political stability is the holy grail for Vanuatu. But attaining this legendary and supposedly miraculous prize comes with costs attached. In response to civic and youth activism in late 2023 calling for political stability and transparency, the last parliament approved a national referendum to make political affiliation more accountable and end party hopping. The rules come into force in the next parliamentary term for the first time. The referendum passed successfully on May 29, 2024, but cost US$2.9 million. The 2022 snap election required US$1.4 million and the 2025 poll is expected to require another US$1.6 million. While revenue from candidature fees of US$250,000 does cover part of these costs, each legislature transition also weighs on the public purse. The current crop of outgoing 52 parliamentarians were paid out US$1.62 million in gratuities and benefits – around US$31,000 per MP – even though most did not see out their full terms. Vanuatu’s average annual household income in 2020 was US$9,000. Whatever the outcome of the 2025 snap election, the incoming government will need to refocus attention on stabilising the trajectory of Vanuatu’s economy and development. The next legislature – the 14th – will need to commit to stability in the interests of Vanuatu’s people and the nation’s development. The most immediate priorities for a new government should be the passage of the 2025 national budget and the implementation of an earthquake recovery and reconstruction plan.  In the 45 years since throwing off the British and French colonial yoke, citizens have enthusiastically done their duty at elections in the expectation of a national leadership that will take Vanuatu forward. Now their faith appears to be waning, after the 2022 poll saw voter turnout - a key indicator of the health of a democracy - dropped below 50% for the first time since independence.  This election therefore needs to see a return on the considerable investment made in Vanuatu’s democratic processes, both in terms of financial cost to successive governments and donors, and more to the point, a political dividend for voters.  Copyright ©2015-2024, BenarNews. Used with the permission of BenarNews. 

Defense & Security
Greenland for sale? asks a Donald Trump doll, Denmark, January 10, 2025

4 reasons why the US might want to buy Greenland – if it were for sale, which it isn’t

by Scott L. Montgomery

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump has sparked diplomatic controversy by suggesting the U.S. needs to acquire Greenland for reasons of “national security” and refusing to definitively rule out using military force to do so. Greenland, a self-governing Danish territory, “is not for sale,” said Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen. Trump’s interest in Greenland is not new. He first expressed interest in the territory in 2019, but it never developed into any action. Whether or not Trump has actual plans this time around to advance any attempt in Washington to own Greenland is far from clear. But given the incoming president’s repeated statements and invocation of national security, it’s worth considering what strategic value Greenland might actually have from the perspective of the U.S.’s geopolitical priorities. As a scholar of geopolitical conflicts involving natural resources and the Arctic, I believe Greenland’s value from an international political perspective can be viewed in terms of four fundamental areas: minerals, military presence, Arctic geopolitics and the territory’s potential independence. A matter of minerals Greenland’s most valuable natural resources lie with its vast mineral wealth, which holds real potential to advance its economy. Identified deposits include precious metals such as gold and platinum, a number of base metals – zinc, iron, copper, nickel, cobalt and uranium – and rare earth elements, including neodymium, dysprosium and praseodymium. A detailed 2023 summary published by the Geologic Survey of Denmark and Greenland suggests new deposits will be found with the continued retreat of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Greenland’s rare earth resources are particularly significant. These elements are essential not only to battery, solar and wind technology but also to military applications. If fully developed, the Kvanefjeld – or Kuannersuit in Greenlandic – uranium and rare earth deposit would place Greenland among the top producers worldwide. During the 2010s, Greenland’s leaders encouraged interest from outside mining firms, including leading Chinese companies, before finally granting a lease to the Australian company Energy Transition Minerals (formerly Greenland Minerals Ltd). When China’s Shenghe Resources took a major share in Energy Transition Minerals, it raised red flags for Denmark, the European Union and the U.S., which felt China was seeking to expand its global dominance of the rare earth market while reducing Europe’s own potential supply. The issue was put to rest in 2021 when Greenland’s parliament banned all uranium mining, killing further development of Kvanefjeld for the time being. That same year saw the government also prohibit any further oil and gas activity. Predictably, a majority of mining companies have subsequently steered clear of Greenland due to perceived concern of any investment being jeopardized by future political decisions. Fears of China abroad China’s interest in Greenland stretches back at least a decade. In 2015, Greenland Minister of Finance and Interior Vittus Qujaukitsoq visited China to discuss possible investment in mining, hydropower, port and other infrastructure projects. One firm, China Communications Construction Company, bid to build two airports, one in the capital, Nuuk, the other in Ilulissat. Another Chinese firm, General Nice Group, offered to purchase an abandoned Danish naval base in northeastern Greenland, while the Chinese Academy of Sciences asked to build a permanent research center and a satellite ground station near Nuuk. None of this sat well with the first Trump administration, which put pressure on Denmark to convince Greenland’s government that a significant, official Chinese presence on the island was unwanted. The Danes and Greenlanders complied, rebuffing Chinese attempts to invest in Greenland-based projects. The Trump administration, in particular, viewed China’s interest in Greenland as having hidden commercial and military motives, concerns that continued under the Biden administration in its recent lobbying of another Australian mining firm not to sell any of its Greenland assets to Chinese companies. Long-standing US interest The U.S. has had a long-standing security interest in Greenland dating from 1946, when it offered Denmark US$100 million in gold bullion for it. The Danes politely but firmly declined, with their foreign minister saying he didn’t feel “we owe them the whole island.” In the early 1950s, the U.S built Thule Air Force Base 750 miles (about 1,200 kilometers) north of the Arctic Circle. Originally a missile early warning and radio communications site, it was transferred to the newly formed U.S. Space Force in 2020 and renamed Pituffik Space Base in 2023.   The northernmost military facility of the U.S., Pituffik has updated radar and tracking capabilities to provide missile warning, defense and space surveillance, and satellite command missions. While it also supports scientific research focused on the Arctic, the base is intended to increase military capabilities in the Arctic region for both the U.S. and its allies. The base has the ability to track shipping as well as air and satellite positions, giving it both real and symbolic importance to American strategic interests in the Arctic. As a result, much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, not just those in Trump’s orbit, view any notable Chinese presence in Greenland, whether temporary or permanent, with concern. Geopolitics of the Arctic Greenland is geographically situated between the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, two Arctic shipping routes whose importance is growing as sea ice shrinks. By around 2050, a Transpolar Sea Route is likely to open through the central Arctic Ocean, passing Greenland’s eastern shores. Furthermore, the island is the basis of Denmark’s sovereignty claim to the North Pole – rivaled by claims by Russia and Canada. While international law recognizes no national sovereignty in international waters, that has done little to end the diplomatic tug-of-war over the pole. The matter is far from trivial: Sovereignty would give a country access to potentially significant oil, gas and rare earth resources, as well as superior scientific and military access to the future Transpolar Sea Route. Yet, this dispute over ownership of the North Pole is only one part of the geopolitical struggle for offshore territory in the region. Russia’s growing militarization of its enormous coastal area has been countered by NATO military exercises in northern Scandinavia, while China’s own moves into the Arctic, aided by Moscow, has seen the launch of several research stations supported by icebreakers and agreements for research and commercial projects. China’s government has also asserted it has rights in the region, for navigation, fishing, overflight, investment in oil and gas projects, and more. Greenland for Greenlanders? All of these factors help decipher the realities involved in the U.S.-Denmark-Greenland relationship. Despite Trump’s words, I believe it is extremely unlikely he would actually use U.S. military force to take Greenland, and it’s an open question whether he would use coercive economic policies in the form of tariffs against Denmark to give him leverage in negotiating a purchase of Greenland. Yet while Trump and other foreign policy outsiders view Greenland through an external strategic and economic lens, the island is home to nearly 60,000 people – 90% of them indigenous Inuit – many of whom treat the designs of foreign nations on their territory with skepticism. Indeed, in 2008, Greenland voted to pursue nationhood. The island receives an annual subsidy of 500 million euros ($513 million) from Denmark, and to further economic independence, it has sought foreign investment. Interest from China has accompanied Greenland’s moves toward independence, backed by Beijing’s strategy to be an Arctic player. The thinking in Beijing may be that an independent Greenland will be less shackled to NATO and the European Union, and as such, more open to investment from further afield. Ironically, Trump’s recent comments have the potential of achieving something very different than their aim by encouraging Greenland’s prime minister, Mute Egede, to propose a referendum in 2025 on full independence. “It is now time for our country to take the next step,” he said. “We must work to remove … the shackles of colonialism.”