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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The European Union was taken by surprise by the geopolitical turning point of 24 February 2022. Yet, at a time when the geography of enlargement is changing, the Union is struggling to revive a process in the Western Balkans on which its credibility and, increasingly, its security depend. The European Union’s failure to ensure that its vulnerabilities in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia do not worsen calls for a rethink of the European policy of influence in the region. The EU’s policy of influence in the Western Balkans is based primarily on the accession process in which Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are currently participating. This process, initiated in 2000 at the Santa Maria da Feira European Council, makes these countries’ progress towards joining the EU conditional on the implementation of key reforms, with the aim of meeting the Copenhagen criteria. By pursuing this political, economic and legal convergence objective, the Union aspires to transform and shape the countries of the region in its own image. This goal reflects the ideals of the European project, from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Lisbon, affirmation of Europe’s ambition to be a powerful force along its own borders. The EU’s strategy over the last 20 years has enabled the countries of the Western Balkans to be integrated into the European geography and system. And yet it has not brought them significantly closer to the door of membership. Reform proposals and a blind spot The situation is alarming. The fading membership prospects of the countries in the region, combined with political and institutional deadlocks within the EU, have created gaps into which rival powers, starting with Russia, are rushing. To offset this vulnerability, the EU has endeavoured to revive its accession policy with a series of summits and aid plans, to no avail. Under French leadership, it adopted a new approach in 2020, which emphasised the importance of the political logic inherent in the accession process, in addition to the reforms to be carried out. However, progress is slow, especially at a time when the EU faces new challenges in the East. The EU granted Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia the status of candidates for accession in 2022 —three countries whose territorial integrity is in dispute—. The EU has already opened accession negotiations with the first two countries. As the East seems to be overtaking the Balkans in the race for membership, the idea of reforming the accession process is now becoming a necessity in most capitals. The June 2022 European Council called for acceleration of the accession process. Various proposals have been put on the table: progressive accession, accession in stages, accession to the single market, setting an indicative date for accession, etc. Most of these proposals aim to further strengthen the integration of the countries in the region into the European system. They assume, as the Commission has done for the past twenty years, that integration is a guarantee of membership; that the former necessarily leads to the latter. This axiom is misleading, as the case of Northern Macedonia illustrates perfectly. The integration of the countries in the region is necessary, as are the reforms, but it is not sufficient to bring to a successful conclusion a process whose outcome, membership of the EU, is a matter of co-optation. One of the most ambitious proposals is the report released by the Franco-German Working Group on EU Institutional Reform, also known as the Group of Twelve, which is the fruit of Franco-German reflection. It has the merit of considering the enlargement of the EU in the light of the need for institutional reform, so that Europe’s ability to act and its sovereignty can finally be strengthened in a fragmenting world. The idea is to reform the accession process as part of a political project that the Union must carry forward both among its Member States and in the Western Balkans. Among these proposals, however, there is an unresolved issue: territorial disputes and disputed sovereignty, a key area in which the EU is struggling to take action. Yet what influence can the Union aspire to in the Western Balkans and beyond, if it sidesteps the most sensitive issues in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia? These issues, which involve sovereignty, territorial integrity, irredentism and geopolitics, are of cardinal importance. It is crucial that the EU now gets involved in these areas, so that the accession policy is no longer limited to promoting the rule of law, good governance and economic integration. It is not only necessary to affirm the credibility of the Union today in the Western Balkans, but also tomorrow in the East. Is the EU at an impasse in Bosnia-Herzegovina? In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU is confronted first and foremost with strong irredentism in Republika Srpska, which is contributing to a poisonous climate in the country. In its report of 23 November 2023, the Council of Europe condemned inter-ethnic violence, ethno-nationalist and hate speech, the denial of genocide and war crimes, the glorification of war criminals and, more generally, the intolerance that is gaining ground. This irredentism, which has been fuelled for several years by the historic leader of the Serbian entity, Milorad Dodik, is expressed at a political level by an assertive secessionism, striving to dismantle the Bosnian state. To achieve this, the Serbian entity is trying to challenge the authority of central institutions, starting with the courts, whose decisions it is hindering. It is also challenging the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court, where international judges sit to ensure compliance with the Dayton Accords, and the authority of the High Representative, who is also responsible for the Dayton Accords. The weakening of these institutions, further exacerbated by the spectre of a secessionist referendum, would pave the way for the dismantling of other regal bodies, notably the army, posing an existential threat to the country’s sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, Russia is stepping into these cracks, as the instability in the country is hardly attracting the attention of the West. The ties forged between Republika Srpska and Russia have been strengthened against a backdrop of international tensions. While the EU was anticipating a difficult winter, Milorad Dodik travelled to Moscow in September 2022, much to the EU’s displeasure. In January 2023, Milorad Dodik honoured Vladimir Putin with the highest distinction awarded by the Serbian entity, then went to the Kremlin at the beginning of the summer to receive a distinction himself —the Order of Alexander Nievsky—. This collusion between the two men prevents the central state of Bosnia-Herzegovina from aligning itself with the European sanctions against Russia; it facilitates the penetration of Russian propaganda into the country, and gives Serbian secessionism in Bosnia-Herzegovina an international dimension, since Russia is in a position to block or slow down certain decisions relating to the international presence in the country. According to a poll published in June 2022, 89% of Bosnian Serbs have a positive opinion of Russia’s role in the country, and Vladimir Putin’s popularity is undeniable. As well as undermining the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik is suspected of embezzlement, corruption and nepotism. But unlike the United States, which adopted sanctions against him in 2022, the EU remains on the sidelines. And there’s a clear explanation for this. Milorad Dodik has an ally among the Member States: Hungary. Political affinities link the leader of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina to its leader, Viktor Orbán, with political and financial support given specifically to Republika Srpska. Both politicians harbour the same ideological distrust of Brussels and progressive values. On the European stage, Milorad Dodik can count on Viktor Orbán’s protection, particularly when it comes to sanctions, since Orbán opposes any decision in this regard. However, Hungary is not the only country hampering Europe’s policy of influence. Croatia is also playing a shady game. It has lobbied, through the EU, for the adoption in 2022 of an electoral reform that consolidates the power of the Croatian nationalist party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even if it means deepening the ethnic divisions in the country. This reform, which was also supported by Hungary, ran counter to the European vision of a system based on civic rather than ethno-national identities. The EU’s response to these challenges remains limited to the (necessary) promotion of the rule of law and fundamental rights, the fight against corruption and public administration reforms. In 2019, the EU identified fourteen priorities prior to opening accession negotiations, and then granted Bosnia-Herzegovina candidate status in 2022, despite the limited progress made in this area. For this reason, France, the Netherlands and, to a certain extent, Germany were less than enthusiastic about the decision. But in the current geopolitical context, it was the position of Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Italy that prevailed, and in the end this enabled Bosnia-Herzegovina to move forward without penalising the political elites compromising the country’s future, or calling into question their relays among the Member States. Is the EU stuck in a rut in Kosovo? In Kosovo, the EU is facing a particularly serious challenge, and it has been working for over 10 years to tackle it through the dialogue it facilitates between Belgrade and Prishtina. Yet its efforts have not led to the much hoped-for normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. In fact, the security situation on the ground has continued to deteriorate. Serbia, which opposes the country’s independence, supports pockets of instability and parallel institutions in the north of Kosovo, and fuels irredentism among a section of the Serb population that is resolutely hostile to the authority of the central Kosovan state. In March 2023, tensions arose when Kosovo Albanian mayors were forcibly prevented from taking up their duties in the north of the country, following municipal elections that had been the subject of a Serb boycott orchestrated by Belgrade. Scuffles broke out, with the participation of agitators from Serbia; the Serbian army was placed on alert, and for the first time Serbian protesters attacked Kosovo Force (KFOR) soldiers, an international NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo under the UN mandate. Instead of incriminating Serbia and Serbian irredentism in Kosovo, the EU, at the instigation of France and Germany, adopted sanctions against the authorities and civil society in the weakest party to the dispute, Kosovo. An even more worrying incident occurred shortly afterwards, in September 2023, when a group of Serb nationalists, armed with an impressive arsenal of weapons, attacked police forces, killing a Kosovar policeman. The attack, carried out by a Kosovo Serb political leader with close links to the political party of the president of neighbouring Serbia, gave rise to considerable concern, especially as Belgrade was at the same time reinforcing its armed forces on Kosovo’s borders. Nationalist, militaristic and pro-Russian rhetoric in Serbia fuelled the perception of an imminent threat to Kosovo, along the lines of that posed by Russia in Ukraine. KFOR stepped up its presence accordingly. In Serbia, a day of national mourning was declared in response to the death of three Serb assailants killed in the shoot-out. In European capitals, the incident was condemned, but the responsibility of the authorities in Prishtina, more so than Serbian irredentism in the north of Kosovo and the diplomacy of the srpski svet in Belgrade, was singled out. These serious incidents attest to the hardening of irredentism fuelled by Belgrade. Above all, they illustrate the current impasse in the dialogue facilitated by the EU. Devoid of any strategic objective, the dialogue has been limited to preparing the ground for an illusory agreement to “normalise” relations between Belgrade and Prishtina. To this end, it focused mainly on technical issues of document recognition, border management, freedom of movement and so on. This was the case, for example, with the “historic” agreement reached in Brussels in 2013, and the dozen or so others that followed. However, these agreements have all been poorly implemented. Furthermore, the attention paid to each stumbling block, along with the resulting tensions, has led the EU to lose sight of the political objective of resolving the dispute – that of Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state and of its territorial integrity. This is not one of the objectives of the dialogue. The dialogue is focusing increasingly on issues of internal governance in Kosovo. In particular, the creation of an association of Serbian municipalities in the north of Kosovo is giving rise to controversy, as it is reminiscent of the problems encountered by Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But with an added pitfall. The dialogue currently supported by France and Germany is now making the granting of a form of autonomy to these irredentist municipalities a prerequisite for the “normalisation” of relations with Serbia, with no guarantee that Kosovo will eventually gain international recognition. To increase pressure on Prishtina, France, Germany and Italy have now gone as far as withholding support for Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe in an unprecedented move that brought about satisfaction in Belgrade and Moscow. Unable to adopt a common position on the matter due to five Member States (Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Romania and Slovakia), the EU is struggling to project a policy of influence on this issue through dialogue. Instead, it finds itself forced to manage repeated crises as a matter of urgency, to prevent the situation on the ground from flaring up. To no avail, as the incidents worsen and multiply, the EU leaves a gaping hole into which the regimes in Serbia and, unsurprisingly, Russia rush. Both have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo on this issue, which is a vector of instability, and in ensuring that the EU stays in the same rut. The EU’s limited influence in Serbia The European policy of influence is showing its limits in Serbia too. It has failed to effectively support the democratic forces in Serbia that had been protesting for months against the rise of authoritarianism there. It continues placing its faith in a regime that has continuously demonstrated its neglect for democratic processes and political pluralism. The rigged elections of late 2023, which the EU has not sanctioned, illustrates the EU’s geopolitical helplessness and incapacity to itself face a local authoritarian regime at its doorsteps. The EU, likewise, has failed to significantly influence Serbia’s foreign policy towards Russia. In 2009 Serbia entered into a strategic partnership with Russia, which was extended in 2013 to include cooperation on security and defence. This partnership paved the way for the acquisition of various Russian weapons systems (fighter aircraft, guided missiles, etc.), and for joint military exercises to be held between 2014 and 2021 with Russia and other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which Serbia joined as an observer. Economically, cooperation has intensified with the conclusion in 2019 of a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, although trade between Serbia and Russia, representing less than 10% of exchanges, remains well below that with the EU. The war in Ukraine and the EU’s policy of isolating Russia has not lead Serbia to reconsider its approach. At the United Nations, Serbia has indeed supported a number of resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, without saying so loud and clear. But this has not meant that the country has aligned itself with the European sanctions against Moscow. It has only adopted measures against Belarus and pro-Russian figures in Ukraine, and dual-use technologies banned from export by the EU are said to be finding their way to Russia via Serbia. Belgrade has also failed to align itself with most of the statements made by the EU High Representative and the decisions taken by the Council in all areas of foreign and security policy. Yet this is a contractual obligation under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Art. 10.) it concluded with the EU in 2013. Its behaviour as a candidate country for EU membership is troubling. In June 2022, Serbia was represented at ministerial level at the official St Petersburg International Economic Forum, alongside Milorad Dodik. In August 2022, as the situation in Kosovo deteriorated, Belgrade sent Aleksandar Vulin, then head of Serbian intelligence, now deputy prime minister and figurehead of irredentism and srpski svet diplomacy in the Balkans, to the Kremlin. He was decorated by the Russian defence minister. In September 2022, Serbia signed an agreement with Russia reinforcing cooperation in foreign policy. After a few months of restraint, Aleksandar Vučić became more vocal in March 2023 when he expressed his disapproval of the International Criminal Court’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. In September 2023, he received the Russian ambassador in Belgrade to discuss the situation in northern Kosovo, and finally, in October 2023, he met Vladimir Putin in Beijing, with whom he had a “cordial exchange”. The presence of Russian media in Serbia, and the control of the press by the Serbian authorities, means that public opinion is shaped accordingly. Criticism of the depraved and hegemonic West is commonplace, as is that of the hypocrisy of the EU, the aggressiveness of the United States and NATO, and the injustice allegedly suffered by the patriots of srpski svet. Unable to assert itself on either the issue of recognition of Kosovo or Serbia’s geopolitical orientation, the EU has also had to deal with the close ties between Aleksandar Vučić and Viktor Orbán, and their affinities with the Enlargement Commissioner, Olivér Várhelyi. These connections facilitate Serbia’s access to European funds. Despite the democratic setback and pro-Russian ambiguities in the country, in February 2023 the Commission awarded Serbia the most generous subsidy (€600 million) ever granted in the region. This is part of a package worth more than €2 billion allocated to Serbia to finance a high-speed railway line extending the section that China is currently building between Belgrade and Budapest —a project plagued by corruption scandals, but which meets the objectives of trans-European connectivity—. Likewise, when it comes to accession policy, Aleksandar Vučić finds in Viktor Orbán an influential ally in the Council, to ensure that authoritarian and pro-Russian abuses in Serbia are not punished. The serious irregularities that marred the Serbian general elections in December 2023 and the poisonous climate that reigned during the campaign bear witness to the abuses taking place in Serbia. Can a policy of alliance make up for the EU’s powerlessness? Unable to exert strategic influence on the most sensitive issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia, the EU faces a major challenge. Where could it be better to practice the “language of power” than in this small, landlocked region that has been earmarked for accession? The EU, which is an imperfect power, is struggling to shake off the illusion that the transformative power it is trying to exert through its accession policy will act as a miracle cure in a region plagued by irredentism, Russian disinformation and authoritarian tendencies. This illusion may prove harmful, for the Balkans lie in the shadows of an even more complex problem in the East. Institutional reform of the EU, which in the future may make qualified majority voting the norm, will not enable the Union to project strategic and political influence overnight, at least not in these most sensitive areas. The same is true of enhanced conditionality that emphasises the rule of law. So how will this help to establish the disputed sovereignty of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to anchor Serbia geopolitically in the European camp? Unfortunately, in the absence of a strong and visionary Commission, the Union cannot be expected to do much, as the Member States, and therefore the Council, do not share the same vision of the political union to which the European project should aspire. Some of them, mainly in the East, remain faithful to sovereignty and intend to resist the Union’s logic of interference everywhere. Others, such as Germany, swear by neofunctionalism and struggle to think of the (political and territorial) purpose of the European project beyond economic integration. As for France, it calls for a political deepening of the Union through a revival of intergovernmentalism but it rejects any federalist logic. These differences in vision inhibit the Union’s ability to develop a policy of influence that is not limited to a membership process that ultimately proves inadequate. To compensate for this weakness, what if the EU were to make greater use of alliances? Within the Union, this would mean strengthening coordination between Member States that share the idea that the challenges in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia should be the subject of a strong political and diplomatic commitment that is separate from the EU accession process. The challenge for the Member States in question would be to help the Union learn the “language of power”, with the aim of consolidating the contested sovereignties of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina and changing Serbia’s foreign policy. In the Western Balkans, this logic of alliance would find support in civil society, in the opposition in Serbia and among the new generation of political leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Stronger support for these progressive political forces, including on the streets, and more scathing criticism of those figures, elected or not, who are fuelling irredentism and instability in the region, would send out an important signal and, above all, develop new levers of influence.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском I. Introduction Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. As the invasion enters its third year, its most immediate and visible consequences have been loss of life and large numbers of refugees from Ukraine. However, given the interconnected structure of the international political, economic, and policy systems, the ramifications of the conflict can be felt well beyond Ukraine and Russia.Much of the recent literature and commentaries have focused on the military and strategic lessons learned from the ongoing Ukraine conflict (Biddle 2022; 2023; Dijkstra et al. 2023). However, the conflict has potentially much wider global consequences for various policy areas. Robert Jervis noted that the international system is not only interconnected but also often displays nonlinear relationships and that “outcomes cannot be understood without adding together the units or their relations.” (Jervis 1997, 6).  This article focuses on the economic effects of the Ukraine war, emphasizing the energy issue, because Russia has been a major player in the global energy market.  II. Literature on the effects of wars Wars have the potential to alter the parties and “transform the future” of belligerents (Ikle 1991), they also bring about fundamental changes to the international system (Gilpin 1981).  Scholars in Economics have provided considerable analysis of the macroeconomic effects of a conflict across spatial levels: locally, nationally, regionally and internationally. Studies have examined the effects of specific wars such as the Syrian civil war (Kešeljević and Spruk, 2023) or the Iraq war (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). They have also examined the effects of war in general. For instance, Reuven Glick and Alan Taylor (2010) examine bilateral trade relations from 1870 to 1997 and find “large and persistent impacts of wars on trade, and hence on national and global economic welfare.” Similarly, Vally Koubi (2005) investigates the effects of inter- and intrastate wars on a sample of countries and finds that the combined pre-war contemporaneous and postwar effects on economic growth are negative.  A “war ruin” school emphasizes that the destruction caused by wars is accompanied by higher inflation, unproductive resource spending on the military, and war debt (Chan 1985; Diehl and Goertz 1985; Russett 1970). By contrast, a “war renewal” school argued that there could be longer-term positive economic effects from war because war can lead to increased efficiency in the economy by reducing the power of rent-seeking special interests, triggering technological innovation, and advancing human capital (Olson 1982; Organski and Kugler 1980). Early analysis estimated that the Russian invasion of Ukraine had an economic cost of 1% of global GDP in 2022 (Liadze et al. 2023)Some political scientists focused on the domestic consequences of war. For example, Electoral political scientists have often examined the effects of war on public opinion. A key concern has been whether war produces a “rally around the flag effects” to bolster the support of incumbent leaders – or whether war weariness can contribute to declining support for governments, including those governments committed to conflicts abroad. John Mueller (1970) was the first scholar to develop the concept of the “rally-round-the-flag”, with later scholars identifying some of the factors that may shape or mitigate the effect (Dinesen and Jaeger 2013). Kseniya Kizilova and Pippa Norris (2023) considered any rally effects during the first few months of the Ukraine war. They claim that the reason that motivated Putin’s military invasion was an attempt to boost popular support among the Russian electorate. They show evidence of a surge in support for Putin following the invasion, which persisted longer than usual in democratic systems. However, Kizilova and Norris question whether this will likely be sustained as the economic costs of the war increase.   III. Brief Summary of the Ukraine War The roots of the Ukraine war go back to the early 1990s when Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union. While the Ukrainian economy was still firmly tied to the Russian economy, the country shifted its political focus towards the EU and NATO. This shift culminated in the Orange Revolution 2004 and the “Euromaidan” demonstrations in 2013. Portraying the “Euromaidan” protests as a Western-backed coup, Russia invaded Crimea and declared the annexation of Crimea into Russia in March 2014. Conflict soon erupted in the Eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, where Russia supported pro-Russian separatist forces (Walker 2023a). Despite attempts to negotiate a ceasefire through the Minsk Agreement I and II, the conflict in the Eastern part of Ukraine had continued (Walker 2023a), resulting in over 14,000 deaths between 2014 and 2021. Against this backdrop, on 21 February, 2022, Russia recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. Three days later, confounding most Western observer’s expectations, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, calling it a “special military operation”. During the initial weeks, Russia made substantial advances (CIA Fact-book 2024) but failed to take Kyiv in the face of strong Ukrainian resistance supported by Western allies. In October 2022, Russia declared the annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia (even though they were not entirely under Russian control) (Walker 2023b). As of February 2025, the meeting between the US and Russia to end the war is underway. IV. The Effects of the Ukraine war The impacts of war are far-reaching and devastating. War causes immense destruction of property and loss of life. It also creates psychological trauma for those who have experienced it firsthand. War can also have long-term economic impacts, such as increased unemployment and poverty. War can also lead to the displacement of people, as we have seen the millions of refugees who have been forced to flee their homes due to conflicts. War can also have political effects, such as creating new states or weakening existing nations. It can also lead to the rise of authoritarian regimes in many post-war nations. War can also increase militarization as nations seek to protect themselves from future conflicts.  Regarding the effects of the Ukraine war, Bin Zhang and Sheripzhan Nadyrov (2024) claimed that in addition to inexpressible human suffering and the destruction of infrastructure, the economic and financial damage inflicted on European countries would be profound, especially in the context of rising inflation. The positive changes due to the conflict may occur in four areas: acceleration of the Green Deal, increased European attention to defense, improved prospects for individual countries to join the European Union (EU), and the unfolding of broader Eurasian economic integration.  The Ukraine war might have broader economic consequences. The supply chains may be affected because of the destruction of infrastructures and resources. War mobilization may affect the workforce and economic production. Actors in the economy may also act strategically to deploy resources elsewhere, to support the war effort or because the war has affected incentive structures or decide to cease production altogether because of expected losses. These effects can be local to geographical areas engulfed in conflict but also cause ripple effects to a broader regional area and the global economy. Trade, production, consumption, inflation, growth and employment patterns may all be influenced.  Figure 1: Global implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the European and World Economies. Source: Peterson K. Ozili. (2022)  Ozili (2022) claimed that the scale of the Ukraine war had a negative impact on the economies of almost all countries around the world. As Figure 1 shows, the main effects of the Ukraine war on the global economy are: Rising Oil and Gas Prices – European countries import about a quarter of their oil and 40% of their natural gas from the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is the second largest oil producer in the world and the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe. After the invasion, European oil companies will have problems getting these resources from the Russian Federation. Even before the Russian invasion, oil prices rose because of growing tensions between countries, the COVID-19 pandemic, and other factors, but remained in the $80–95 per barrel range. After the invasion, this price reached $100 and could reach $140. Natural gas prices have risen 20% since the war began. Rising gas prices can drive high inflation and increase public utility bills.  Decline in production and economic growth, rising global inflation, and the cost of living are more related to the consequences of the above-mentioned factors, especially rising oil and gas prices, which lead to high inflation and, therefore, a decline in supply and demand.  Impact on the global banking system: This factor’s negative effect will be felt more strongly by Russian banks and is associated with international financial sanctions. Foreign banks that will suffer significant damage from sanctions are those that have conducted large operations in the Russian Federation.  The Russian Federation’s export ban and its own counter-ban on imports of foreign products disrupted the global supply chain, resulting in shortages and higher prices for imported commodities. As Ozili (2022) claimed, higher inflation is a perceived negative consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 2 shows, inflation in the EU jumped in the first month of the invasion, and the increasing trend continues. EU inflation in 2022 peaked in October and amounted to 11.5%, a historical record. However, inflation has slowly declined as energy prices have gone down.  This higher inflation in Europe resulted from an increase in energy prices. As Figures 3, 4, and 5 show, energy prices in Europe skyrocketed in 2022. As Figure 3 shows, energy prices have been the most important component of inflation in the EU. Figure 2: Average inflation rate in the EU (%). Source: EurostatCreated with Datawrapper   Figure 3: Main components of inflation rate in the Euro areas.  Figure 4: Natural gas prices in Europe, January 2021- end 2024  Figure 5: Crude oil price, January 2020-January 2025 Source: Eurostat Created with Datawrapper As Figure 6 shows, the inflation rate in major EU countries such as Germany and France followed the pattern of EU countries in which inflation skyrocketed in 2022 and then slowly declined over time. Figure 6: Inflation rate in major EU countries. Source: Eurostat Created with Datawrapper  As Ozili claimed, a lower growth rate was also a perceived negative consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 7 shows, GDP in the EU was down to 3.5 % in 2022 compared to 6.3% in 2021, and it was further down to 0.8 % in 2023 because economic stagnation and high inflation caused by the Ukraine war impacted European economies. The European Commission forecasts that the European economy will grow by 0.9 % in 2024 and 1.5% in 2025.  Figure 7: Average annual GDP growth rate in EU, 1996-2025. Following the pattern of entire EU countries, growth rates in four big European countries declined in 2022 & 2023 after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and are expected to grow moderately in 2024. The growth rates in four big European countries are in Table 1 and Figures 8-11.    Figure 8: Growth rate in Germany  Figure 9: Growth rate in France  Figure 10: Growth rate in the UK   Figure 11: Growth rate in Italy    Regarding the effect of the Ukraine war on the global banking system, the effect was minimal because most international financial sanctions targeted Russian banks. The sanctions, including the ban of selected Russian banks from SWIFT, only affected foreign banks with significant operations in Russia. Many foreign banks experienced losses after several Western countries imposed financial sanctions on Russian banks, the Russian Central Bank, and wealthy Russian individuals. The most affected banks were Austria’s Raiffeisenbank, Italy’s Unicredit, and France’s Société Générale. Other foreign banks recorded huge losses when they discontinued their operations in Russia. The losses were significant for small foreign banks and insignificant for large foreign banks.  After almost 20 months into the full-scale war, Ukraine’s banking sector continued demonstrating remarkable resilience and functioning as the backbone of the real economy. No bank runs have occurred, and access to cash was maintained. In addition to crucial reforms since 2014, comprehensive measures by the National Bank of Ukraine and a strong level of digitalization are key reasons for the observed stability. However, a significant liquidity buffer is not only a sign of resilience. It also reveals a lack of lending. The bank loan portfolio declined by around 30% compared to pre-war levels in real terms.  Regarding the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on European stock markets, Figures 12 and 13 show the movement of the FTSE 100 and Euro Area Stock Market Index (EU50). As seen from Figures 12 & 13, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, both indices showed a noticeable decline in 2022, particularly early 2022. However, both indexes showed a noticeable rise after late 2022. Although there were ups and downs in both indices in 2023 and 2024, they show upward movement from 2023 to 2025.  Figure 12: The FTSE 100 index in Europe  Figure 13: Euro Area Stock Market Index (EU50)   Regarding the global supply chain, military operations during the Russian invasion of Ukraine disrupted multiple sectors. In particular, Russia’s ban on exports and retaliatory ban on imports, including its refusal to allow foreign cargoes to pass through its waterways and airspace during the early phase of the invasion, disrupted the global supply chain.  Regarding global supply chain disruption, this article focuses on Russian oil and gas because they are the most important Russian products that affect not only Europe but also the world.  Figures 14 and 15 show a world map of the countries that exported oil and gas to Europe: the color of the country corresponds to the percentage share of the country’s exports (indicated below the Figure). In 2021, around a third of Europe’s energy came from gas (34%) and oil (31%), according to Al Jazeera’s data analysis from BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy. Europe was the largest importer of natural gas in the world. Russia provided roughly 40% and 25% of the EU’s imported gas and oil before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 16 shows, major gas importers from Russia in 2021 were European countries. Figure 14: EU oil import sources in 2021. Figure 15: EU natural gas import sources in 2021. Source: Eurostat  Figure 16: Major EU importers from Russian Gas in 2021.  However, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, more than 9,119 new economic sanctions have been imposed on Russia, making it the most sanctioned country in the world. At least 46 countries or territories, including all 27 EU nations, have imposed sanctions on Russia or pledged to adopt a combination of US and EU sanctions. The sanctions have strongly affected, resulting in a 58% decline in exports to Russia and an 86% drop in imports from Russia between the first quarter of 2022 and the third quarter of 2024 (see Figure 17). Figure 17: EU trade with Russia  Russia has blamed these sanctions for impeding routine maintenance on its Nord Stream I gas pipeline which is the single biggest gas pipeline between Russia and Western Europe. In response, Russia cut its gas exports to the EU by around 80% since the Russian invasion, resulting in higher gas price in Europe, as Figure 18 shows. As a result, many European countries had to rethink their energy mix rapidly. The ripple effects of higher natural gas prices were felt in Europe and around the world. One of the most immediate consequences of Russia’s cut in gas delivery and sanctions on Russia, as well as sanctions on Russian was a sharp increase in European demand for LNG imports: in the first eight months of 2022, net LNG imports in Europe rose by two-thirds (by 45 billion cubic meters compared with the same period a year earlier).  Russia’s pipeline gas share in EU imports dropped from over 40% in 2021 to about 8% in 2023. Russia accounted for less than 15% of total EU gas imports for pipeline gas and LNG combined. The drop was possible mainly thanks to a sharp increase in LNG imports and an overall reduction in gas consumption in the EU. Figure 18: Natural gas price in Europe, January 2021- December 2024  Figure 19 shows how gas supply to the EU changed between 2021 and 2023. Import from Russia declined from over 150 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2021 to less than 43 bcm. This was mainly compensated by a growing share of other partners. Import from US grew from 18.9 bcm in 2021 to 56.2 bcm in 2023. Import from Norway grew from 79.5 bcm in 2021 to 87.7 in 2023. Import from other partners increased from 41.6 bcm in 2021 to 62 bcm in 2023. Source: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-gas-supply/#0) Figure 19: Major EU import sources of Gas.  However, as Figure 20, shows the EU’s import from Russian gas increased in volume in 2024.  Figure 20: EU trade of natural gas with Russia     EU imports of Russian petroleum oil also dropped. Russia was the largest provider of petroleum oil to the EU in 2021. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a major diversion in the trade of petroleum oil took place. In the third quarter of 2024, the volume of petroleum oil in the EU imported from Russia was 7% of what it had been in the first quarter of 2021 (see Figure 21) while its value had dropped to 10% in the same period.  The EU’s share of petroleum oil imports from Russia dropped from 18% in the third quarter of 2022 to 2% in the third quarter of 2024 (see Figure 22). The shares of the United States (+5 pp), Kazakhstan (+4 pp), Norway (+3 pp), and Saudi Arabia (+2 pp) increased in this period. The U.S. and Norway became the EU’s no.1 and no.2 petroleum oil providers, respectively. Figure 21: EU trade of petroleum oil with Russia    Figure 22: EU’s leading petroleum oil providers  The EU’s de-Russification policy has successfully reduced the EU’s dependence on Russian energy. However, the EU’s de-Russification policy allowed Russian fossil fuels to flow into other regions. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), a think-tank in Finland, compiles estimates of the monetary value of Russian fossil fuels procured by each country and region (Figure 23). Figures 23 & 24 show the countries that imported Russian coal, oil and gas since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China has been no. 1 country that imported Russian fossil fuels most, followed by India, Turkey, and the EU. Asian countries such as Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan are among the major importers of Russian fossil fuels.  Figure 23: Value of Russian fossil fuels purchase (January 1, 2023 to January 24, 2024)  Figure 24: Largest importers of Russian fossil fuels (January 1, 2023 to February 16, 2025)  Moreover, according to Statista, value of fossil fuel exports from Russia from February 24, 2022 to January 27, 2025, by country and type is as follows as Figure 25 shows. China have been no. 1 country that imported Russian fossil fuels most, followed by India, Turkey, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and South Korea. Figure 25: value of fossil fuel exports from Russia from February 24, 2022 to January 27, 2025, by country and type.  However, Figures 23, 24, and 25 show some differences among major importers of Russian fossil fuels. China, India, and Turkey imported more Russian oil than gas or coal, while EU imported more Russian gas than oil or coal. Interestingly, South Korea imported more Russian coal than oil or gas. If we focus on Russian oil, we know that China and India’s imports of Russian oils significantly increased, as shown in Figures 26, 27, and 28. Since the EU imposed its embargo on Russian crude oil shipments, China purchased the most from Russia, at EUR 82.3 billion, followed by India and Türkiye, at EUR 47.0 billion and EUR 34.1 billion, respectively. The EU came in fourth, with oil and gas imports continuing mainly through pipelines to Eastern Europe. Notably, the oil-producing countries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) purchased oil (crude oil and petroleum products) from Russia.  Figure 26: Russian Oil Exports, by country and region, 2021-2024. (Navy blue: EU, Blue: US & UK, Light green: Turkey, Green: China, Yellow: India, Orange: Middle Eastern nations) Since the advent of the Ukraine crisis, China and India have been increasing the amount of crude oil they imported from Russia. According to statistics compiled by China’s General Administration of Customs, as Figure 27 shows, monthly imports increased from 6.38 million tons in March 2022 to 10.54 million tons in August 2023. Annual imports in 2023 exceeded 100 million tons for the first time.  Figure 27: China’s monthly crude oil imports from Russia (2021 to 2023)   As Figure 28 shows, India, which historically imported little crude oil from Russia, rapidly increased its imports partly due to the close geographical distance since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to statistics compiled by India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry, its imports of Russian crude oil increased from March 2022 onward, with the total amount imported during 2022 exceeding 33 million tons. Crude oil imports from Russia grew into 2023, with monthly imports in May 2023 reaching a record-high level of 8.92 million tons. Annual crude oil imports from Russia in 2023 were expected to be at least 80 million tons. Figure 28: India’s monthly crude oil imports from Russia (January 2021 to November 2023)  In conclusion, after EU ban on Russia until January, 2025, the biggest buyers of Russia’s fossil fuels are as follows as Figure 29 shows: China has been no. 1 country that imported Russian coal, and crude oil the most, while the EU has been the largest importer of Russian Gas, both pipeline and LNG. Figure 29: Which country bought Russia’s fossil fuels after EU ban until January 2025 Still, although the EU has significantly reduced gas imports from Russia since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU still is no. 1 importer of Russian gas. However, China replaced EU as the biggest buyer of Russian crude oil. China is also the biggest buyer of Russian coal. Data from January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2025 show how Russian fossil fuels have flowed by geography as Figure 30 shows. The flows of Russian energy to EU have significantly declined, while the supply of Russian energy to China, India, and Turkey has significantly increased.  Figure 30: The flows of Russian energy to regions    Despite the EU’s restrictions on Russian-sourced energy, Russia has maintained a substantial revenue level by selling it to other countries. As Figure 31 shows, Russian energy revenues have somewhat declined between January 2022 and January 2025. Russian energy export revenue was a little less than 750 million Euro in January 2025 compared to 1000 million Euro in January 2022 just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, considering that Russia’s total oil and gas revenues were 72.6 billion dollars in 2020, 122.9 billion in 2021, 169.5 billion in 2022, and 102.8 billion in 2023 and that 2022 was the best year for energy revenues in recent years, Russian energy revenues after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was not insufficient. This in turn has blunted the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the West.   Figure 31: Russian energy export revenue between 2022 and 2025.  V. Conclusion  This article examined the economic effects of the Ukraine war based on the argument of Ozili (2022). This article investigated four economic aspects (Inflation, economic growth, global banking, and global supply chain) on which the Ukraine war has had impacts. This article focused on Europe and the global supply chain because Russia and Ukraine were parts of Europe and because Russian energy has had a significant impact on Europea and all around the world.  This article showed that the Ukraine war significantly affected European inflation, economic growth, stock markets, and energy markets while the war had minimal impact on global banking. However, this article showed that the economic effects of the Ukraine war on inflation, economic growth, stock markets, and energy markets in Europe were short-term. The oil and gas prices in Europe skyrocketed in 2022 and then declined slowly and continuously. In addition, growth in Europe declined in 2022 & 2023 after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and energy prices jumped up. However, European countries grew moderately in 2024 and are expected to increase in 2025. The same thing happened to European stock markets. The FTSE 100 and Euro Area Stock Market Index (EU50) showed a noticeable decline in 2022, in particularly early 2022. However, both indices showed a noticeable rise after late 2022.  On the other hand, after Russia invaded Ukraine, European countries significantly reduced imports of Russian fossil fuels. The EU’s de-Russification policy allowed Russian fossil fuels to flow into other regions. After EU’s imposition of sanctions on Russian energy, Russian fossil fuels mainly went to Asian and Middle East markets, mainly to China, India, and Turkey. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Does the resolutely pro-Moscow approach of the new team in Washington mean that Russia is the big winner in the Ukrainian war at this stage? That Ukraine will have resisted for three years for (almost) nothing? That the United States will reap the long-term benefits of this strategic position in Europe? And will the EU be marginalized and reduced to a secondary role on its own continent? Visible success should not obscure the strategic setbacks of the self-proclaimed winners. Ever since the second Trump administration unilaterally opened direct and exclusive talks with Russia on the fate of Ukraine in Saudi Arabia on 18 February, MAGA communicators everywhere have heralded the end of the conflict. Even if a simple ceasefire now seems highly unlikely, the new American president proclaims that he will soon lead the "peace side" to victory, since he claims to be its leader. Who knows if he will have the courage to apply for the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize himself? After three years of war, if the terms of negotiation announced last week are confirmed, we must return to the essential question of victory and the corollary question of defeat: who can claim the title of victor in this armed conflict? And, conversely, who is to be condemned to the status of the vanquished? The war of narratives has long since doubled and intensified the military war: European geopolitics is now confronted with a viral narrative that portrays Russia and the United States as winners to relegate Europeans and Ukrainians to the status of "losers". But if geopolitics feed on narratives, narratives - especially propaganda narratives - do not exhaust the strategic situation. As Machiavelli noted in Chapter XVII of The Prince: "The politician knows how to create illusions, but when it comes to assessing the strengths and weaknesses of an enemy, he must avoid relying solely on his eyes (which judge appearances) and instead use his hands (which feel reality). Let us be clear: at this stage of Ukraine debate, the reality of victory and the irreversibility of defeat are still matters of narrative. Let us plunge into reality. Ukraine, now vilified and resilient According to the Trumpian narrative broadcast everywhere today, Ukraine and its president must be treated as losers, even defeated. Everything about the behaviour of the American president and his team is aimed at hastening and consecrating the country's defeat: After having been asked to surrender its rare earth resources at rock-bottom prices, Ukraine, like the vanquished in the two world wars, is being excluded from the negotiating table on its own destiny by its self-appointed protector; its legitimate government is being openly denigrated and its legitimacy undermined; it is even being threatened with "war sanctions" to compensate the United States for the financial effort it has made to support it in the face of an illegal invasion. Beneath the strategic shift and the military evasion lies a continuity: for the United States, Ukraine is not a participant but a stake. Ukraine's symbolic defeat - that of history - is obviously compounded by its real setbacks. In addition to the 80,000 to 120,000 soldiers killed on the battlefield, the country of forty-three million people has lost more than six million refugees and millions of citizens who have been incorporated into the Russian Federation. And more than 20% of its territory is now in danger of officially falling under Russian sovereignty. Deprived by the Trump administration of the prospect of NATO membership, it risks a demilitarization comparable to that imposed on Germany after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. At a time when symbolic defeat seems destined to go hand in hand with human and material misery, Ukraine can only save itself from despair by remembering that it has manifested its national identity - so often denied - with arms in hand. The narrative is that of a failed, slaughtered state, while the strategic reality is that of a state that has repelled the total occupation of its territory. The Ukrainians may not be the winners, but they are not "losers" reduced to an international minority. The United States, strategically discredited Can Washington, for its part, claim the trophy of strategic victory in Ukraine? Is the second Trump administration not determining the destiny of the old continent just as the Biden administration claimed to do, but in a different direction? Can't the United States now, more than ever, claim to be Europe's arbiter? Nothing is less certain: Ukraine's policies over the past decade (the Obama, Trump 1, and Biden administrations) have indeed demonstrated the United States' refusal to play a leadership role in Europe. They encouraged Ukraine's inflexibility towards Russia but failed to prevent it from annexing Crimea in 2014, escalating tensions under the first Trump administration, and then invading in 2022. It then supported it for almost three years, only to disown it in a political transition. Washington has behaved not as a leader but as an arsonist in Ukraine, declaring on the one hand that Kyiv should be free to pursue its alliance policy but ruling out any concrete prospect of NATO membership on the other. One of the main lessons of Washington's Ukraine policy is that being one of the United States' "allies" is a risky business: not only does it leave you at the mercy of sudden shifts in alliances, but it also exposes you to constant admonishment and vilification on the international stage. The Europeans have paid the price: criticized by the Biden administration for their pacifism at the start of the war, they are now being criticized, along with the Ukrainians, for failing to bring the war to an end. The United States has made no major strategic gains in this war: it has undermined its own network of allies, damaged its largest military alliance in the world, NATO, and failed to dislodge its strategic regional rival, Russia. Trump's communication tricks will not change this: the United States has suffered undeniable structural strategic setbacks in this conflict. The long Ukrainian crisis, from the Orange Revolution to the current talks, via Euromaidan and the annexation of Crimea, is the opposite of a show of strength for US international strategy: it is a financially costly and strategically ruinous fiasco. The contamination effect on Asian alliances is likely to be massive and rapid: who will want to rely on the American umbrella against the People's Republic of China? Russia, permanently "de-Europeanized What about Russia? Is it the big winner in all this? After all, hasn't it received the promise of Ukraine's non-membership of NATO, its demilitarization, and its transformation into a rump state between Russian and EU territory? In addition to the 20% of Ukrainian territory (population and natural resources) it has seized, it wants to enjoy the prestige of being treated as a strategic peer by the United States. But is this a victory, even a Pyrrhic one? In historical terms, Moscow has lost in just a few years all the investment it made in its dialogue with the West between 1990 and 2000. It has deliberately squandered its relations with its natural economic outlet: Europe. Russia has been permanently de-Europeanized and will pay the price of this divorce in the form of lower growth potential (loss of markets, investors, assets) and in the form of a substantial defence effort that it will have to maintain in the long term throughout its western part, unless political forces favorable to it come to power simultaneously in the main EU countries, which seems unlikely. Again, we must measure this success with our hands, not our eyes: Russia has not achieved all its war aims, far from it. It did not make Ukraine disappear, and it did not make NATO retreat. Will this strategic hiatus - deliberately pursued by Russia in this war - be compensated for by a successful "pivot to Asia"? At best, the People's Republic of China could give Russia the role of "brilliant second" that Prussia gave Austria-Hungary. It is not so much a Pyrrhic victory as a strategic gamble that China has taken, the payoff of which is neither certain nor substantial. The EU faces up to its responsibilities Despite the condescending statements of the second Trump administration, can the EU claim to have made any strategic gains in this war? Again, the gains are meagre and the costs high: it has made great strides in terms of its capabilities but has not moved into a war economy; it is supporting the Ukrainian state at arm's length but has not forced its way to the negotiating table. If it proves reactive and creative, it can, in the medium term, take advantage of the gaping holes left by Russia and the United States on the European scene. As a result, it can no longer attract states to its side without the threat of arms. The Union must therefore quickly resume its enlargement efforts in order not to leave any space on its doorstep. On the other hand, the United States has openly renounced its status as Europe's protector: it wants to be its ideological dynamo, its industrial and technological supplier, and its strategic dominator. If Europe does not want to be among the losers in the Ukrainian war, it must therefore resolutely take full responsibility for its own defence. The time has come.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine of February 2022 has propelled EU enlargement to the top of Europe’s political agenda and linked it inextricably to the question of European security. The reshaping of the global political landscape, where strategic competition, growing global instability and attempts to undermine the rules-based international order are prominent features, has added further complexity to EU enlargement. The geopolitical imperative has seemingly expedited EU enlargement, while the merit-based transformative objectives of the process sit uncomfortably in the balance. This article provides a critical analysis of the evolution of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, zooming in on the EU perspective and key initiatives of its Member States. It explains how the initial ambition and hope that the enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans embodied drifted towards enlargement fatigue. It also outlines the hurdles confronting the enlargement process and the Western Balkans, the efforts exerted to revive EU enlargement, and finally considers the questions facing the EU during the new legislative term. EU enlargement perspective – strict but fair? EU enlargement is perceived historically as having played a transformative role. It supported the consolidation of democracy in the Southern European countries and later, in the Central and Eastern European countries, the EU accession process is seen as having fostered stability, democratisation and economic prosperity. The arduous transformative process has, however, been longer and bumpier for the Western Balkans. North Macedonia has been stuck in the EU’s lobby for almost 20 years, Montenegro since 2011, Serbia since 2012 and Albania since 2014. This was partly due to the hardening of rule of law conditionality. A key lesson identified from Romania and Bulgaria’s EU accession path was that the transformation of a country, in particular in the rule of law area, was not only a long process but it was also fraught with obstacles, notably resistance from applicant governments. To remedy the shortcomings identified, the 2005 negotiating framework for Croatia strengthened rule of law conditionality by introducing a specific Chapter 23 on ‘judiciary and fundamental rights’ in addition to the existing Chapter 24 on ‘justice, freedom and security’ in the EU acquis communautaire. This approach continued and was hardened during the EU accession negotiations with the Western Balkan countries. The Western Balkans were first promised a “European perspective” at the Zagreb Summit of 2000. At the June 2003 EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki, the EU reaffirmed that the future of the Western Balkans is within the EU. To deliver on this, the enlargement process was tied to substantial financial and technical support through which the EU has aimed to push for the democratisation and resilience of Western Balkan institutions, societies and economies. EU support was made conditional upon the Western Balkans meeting ‘European standards’ (conditionality), including (and especially) rule of law prerogatives. This approach was reflected in the negotiating framework adopted in June 2012 for negotiations with Montenegro, in the High-Level Accession Dialogues respectively with North Macedonia (then former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, fYROM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and the Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law with Kosovo, [1] all launched in 2012. The European Commission, but most adamantly civil society in the Western Balkans, repeatedly pointed to the failings of the region’s governments to implement reforms, leading to façade compliance. In parallel, the ‘Brussels dialogue’ between Kosovo and Serbia has oscillated between normalisation and a state of strained peace and conflict prevention, with the signature of the April 2013 ‘First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations’ (known as the Brussels Agreement) constituting an exception of ephemeral hope. [2] Moreover, slowly but firmly, stabilitocracy grew roots. Autocrats in the Western Balkans, ruling through informal power structures, state capture by ruling parties, patronage and control of the media, managed to combine EU accession with stronger domestic control. [3] Certain Member States turned a blind eye to or downplayed the democratic backsliding, (indirectly) supporting autocratic leaders accused of nurturing stabilitocracy. Notable examples include Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, Montenegro’s President Milo Djukanović and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić who Member States initially hoped would be able to settle the Kosovo status question. EU enlargement fatigue: the breaking point The multiple and overlapping crises that Europe has faced since 2008, from the global financial crisis to the perceived 2015 migration crisis, to the 2020 Covid crisis and the energy and inflationary crisis that followed, relegated the EU integration of the Western Balkan countries to second tier. At the beginning of the Juncker Commission, it had become clear that EU enlargement would be for the long haul. The unfortunate European Council decision of October 2019 not to open EU accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania manifested the fatigue felt with the EU enlargement process, not only in the Western Balkans but on the EU side too. The merit-based process no longer rewarded prospective members engaging in reforms. While Skopje turned a page with Prime Minister Zoran Zaev’s election in May 2017, ending stabilitocracy, signing the historic June 2018 Prespa Agreement with Greece that solved the name issue, it was NATO that granted North Macedonia membership in March 2020. The EU accession process was (and continues to be) often kept hostage by the vetoes of individual Member States which are utterly unrelated to the economic and democratic conditions that supposedly govern the process. The exasperation felt in the Western Balkan countries because of the empty promises and broken dreams, gave rise to alternative scenarios and Plan Bs if EU enlargement to the Western Balkans were not to materialise. It opened the doors of the region to other donors and contested powers, in particular Russia through disinformation, China on investments in infrastructure, and Turkey and the Gulf countries through investments and cultural programmes. Their influence in the region came to the detriment of EU leverage. [4] With EU enlargement on the backburner, ways to keep the momentum for reform and initiatives from the region were welcomed. The Berlin Process, a diplomatic initiative by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, was launched in 2014 with a view to reinvigorating the integration process. A platform focusing on increased high-level regional cooperation and connectivity between the Western Balkan Six —Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia— and the EU Member States, the process also involves the EU institutions, international financial institutions and the region’s civil society. In addition, the 2013 Brdo-Brijuni Process is a regionally owned platform for political dialogue on sensitive bilateral and regional issues, initiated by Slovenia and Croatia. The ‘Western Balkans Six’ format enables the region’s governments to agree on and promote joint initiatives, with the full cooperation of the European Commission. These initiatives were also a way to show other powers —notably Russia, Turkey and China— that the EU is in the region to stay. Revitalising EU enlargement? The 2018 Strategy for the Western Balkans of the Juncker Commission marked a U-turn, putting the enlargement perspective of the region back on the EU agenda. It also set the tone for the 2019-2024 legislative term. Already during her campaigning for votes in the European Parliament for the confirmation of her nomination as Commission President following the 2019 European elections, Ursula von der Leyen had expressed her support for enlargement. This became clear in her Political Guidelines for the 2019-2024 Commission, in which she committed to supporting the European perspective of the Western Balkans. [5] At the same time, experts argued that a move from Juncker’s political Commission to Von der Leyen’s geopolitical and therefore “politicized” Commission would translate to more pressure from Member States on the Commission. That could compromise the Commission’s role as guardian of the EU Treaties, they explained. [6] In a way, EU Member States’ backroom dealings that led to a deviation from the expected Spitzenkandidat process in 2014, were a precursor to how they would deal with the EU enlargement process. The February 2020 revamped EU enlargement methodology, urged by French President Emmanuel Macron, aimed to make the process more credible, more dynamic and predictable. It also sought to make the enlargement process more robust by putting pressure on those candidate countries (notably Serbia) that have been comfortably hiding behind empty political promises for reform while nurturing stabilitocracy. In terms of EU decision-making, the new methodology decreased the number of Member State’s veto points in the Council by introducing the opening of clusters instead of individual chapters, which was hoped would expedite the enlargement process. In addition, some experts highlighted that “by reinvigorating democratic reform, facilitating foreign and security policy alignment, and making real once more the idea that Western Balkan countries are welcome as new Member States, the EU would suck the oxygen from competing and malign illiberal influences”. [7] Nevertheless, at the outset, the prospective new members perceived the novelties in the enlargement methodology as yet another way to slow down the accession process. The new methodology further reinforced the requirements for rule of law reforms (including the oversight of the relevant institutions) allowing Member States to put negotiations on hold, re-open closed chapters, reconsider funding availability and, in the worst-case scenario, suspend accession negotiations altogether. Moreover, it took the Commission more than three years to implement the methodology, fuelling the uncertainty felt in the Western Balkans. At the same time, North Macedonia, in particular, and Albania as its collateral victim, given that its accession progress was coupled to that of North Macedonia, faced intense resistance to progress on its EU accession path both from France and the Netherlands. The European Council gave its long-awaited green light to start North Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations in March 2020 (together with Albania). But even then, the unity in Council was tarnished by Bulgaria, which requested that a statement be attached to the March 2020 Council conclusions, insisting, among other things, on scrapping references to the Macedonian language and to the existence of an ethnic Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. [8] These hurdles have effectively meant that accession negotiations have not started with either North Macedonia or Albania. In that light, more initiatives parallel to the EU enlargement process were launched, raising controversy. On the Western Balkans side, Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia agreed on the Open Balkans Initiative (better known as Mini-Schengen), in August 2021, although it had been under discussion since 2019. Its stated aim was to deepen political and economic ties by opening the borders between the three countries and creating a common market that would bring the countries closer to EU integration. Kosovo and Montenegro have expressed support for this idea, while Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been able to garner the necessary political support. Geopolitical EU enlargement: a turning point The 2022 Russian war in Ukraine has “injected new urgency into the enlargement debate but it has also underscored enlargement as a strategic necessity” for European security. [9] In June 2022, EU leaders expressed their full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans and called for acceleration of the accession process. The latest EU Strategic Agenda “underscores the importance of enlargement as a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity” [10] That geopolitical urgency led at last to the official opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia in July 2022. The enlargement momentum, which accelerated the opening of accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova and an offer for conditional candidacy to Georgia in December 2023, spilled over to Bosnia and Herzegovina despite its constitutional blockage. The EU decided to open accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2024. These political decisions were a clear signal that the EU is still serious about the enlargement process. At the same time, in line with the general framework of the Copenhagen political criteria and the 2006 renewed EU consensus on enlargement, the Council’s latest conclusions on enlargement of 12 December 2023 stressed the need for fair and rigorous conditionality and the principle of own merits. The June 2024 endorsement of the rule of law benchmarks (Chapters 23 and 24 in the ‘fundamentals cluster’) at Montenegro’s Intergovernmental Conference (ICG) is a key milestone for the country’s EU accession path, but also of the centrality of the merit-based approach. In parallel, the Council led by French President Macron, has also stressed the importance of ensuring that the EU can maintain and deepen its own development, including its capacity to integrate new members. This new hurdle in the way of EU accession has led experts and policy-makers alike to consider the latest Council decisions on EU accession as “relatively symbolic”. Besides the length and unpredictability of the enlargement process, this is also the case because of the number of obstacles applicants have found on their way to the EU, including vetoes over bilateral disputes that are unrelated to the Copenhagen criteria. [11] In addition to the vetoes North Macedonia has faced consecutively from Greece and Bulgaria, Tirana’s opening of the first cluster of negotiation chapters was obstructed more recently by Athens over the jailing of an ethnic Greek Albanian mayor accused of electoral fraud. The momentum for EU enlargement has revived concerns about the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’, i.e., the EU’s preparedness for accepting new members. These concerns have revived the debate on the need for EU institutional reforms to ensure the effective functioning of the Union post-enlargement. Yet much of this debate is linked to the decision-making bottlenecks in the Council, when responding to urgent and complicated crises (particularly the war in Ukraine). In terms of the legal feasibility of EU enlargement, the Treaty of Lisbon contains the necessary provisions regarding institutions and decision-making processes for the EU to be able to welcome new members without any Treaty changes. In addition, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU has liberated seats in the European Parliament that would make the absorption of small new members possible. In reaction, some experts and policy-makers have seen the determination with which France and a few other Member States push for EU internal reforms as yet another attempt to either hinder EU enlargement and/or rather move towards a multi-speed EU. [12] Against this backdrop, the rise of the populist right in the European elections and national elections across the EU has amplified the mantra that EU “values and the rule of law are our compass, both internally and externally”, [13] led by a group of Member States with France in the lead. Hence, support for EU enlargement may be more complicated in the Council, where a number of EU governments have shifted to the far right and when, in a super-election year, more such parties are likely to find themselves at the helm of or in governing coalitions in the EU Member States. Nevertheless, the European Commission and Parliament are likely set to continue to support EU enlargement in the 2024-2029 legislative term. In her political priorities, incoming Commission President von der Leyen has framed enlargement as “a moral, political and geostrategic imperative” for the EU and appointed a Commissioner dedicated specifically to enlargement. In support for boosting enlargement, von der Leyen has also committed to presenting in her first 100 days in office, pre-enlargement policy reviews across a wide array of EU policy sectors, implying that there will be post-enlargement phase. [14]  The political priorities also note that the “emphasis on the rule of law and fundamental values…will always remain the cornerstone of the EU’s enlargement policy”. [15]  This could entail further delays in the accession process, for reasons already explained. The Parliament has applied a ‘cordon sanitaire’ on all leadership positions (Committee chairs and vice-chairs, Quaestors and Vice-Presidents) to block those seen as positioning themselves against the EU project (namely the far right). It is hoped this will ensure that the EP’s mainstream positions hold, including its strong support for EU enlargement. In that regard, David McAllister MEP (EPP, Germany) was re-elected chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), which is the main committee legislating on and scrutinising progress in EU enlargement. Initiatives on EU enlargement for a new legislative term 2024-2029 Several ideas have been discussed in EU circles on how to move forward with enlargement and capitalise on the current enlargement momentum. The EU has also launched new initiatives aiming to incentivise the Western Balkans to make the necessary reforms to meet the enlargement requirements. The discussion on gradual integration or “phasing-in”, in the words of the European Commission, is not a new concept. The idea of fashioning a new kind of conditionality, a way to encourage reform especially in the rule of law, but also in regional integration, good neighbourly relations, reconciliation and the resolution of bilateral disputes, now goes beyond the promises of the revised EU enlargement methodology. It became more concrete with the adoption of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, in May 2024, whose stated aim is to support the Western Balkans partners on their EU path by encouraging faster socio-economic convergence with the EU. Specifically, in return for socio-economic and fundamental reforms, including in the rule of law and fundamental rights, the Western Balkans countries will benefit from EU integration in the areas where they have met the acquis requirements. In addition to those conditions, Serbia and Kosovo are expected to engage constructively on the normalisation of their relations, leading to tangible results. At the centre of this new plan is the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, a new financial instrument that will provide €6 billion (€2 billion in grants and €4 billion in loans) over the 2024-2027 period. An additional €2 billion was allocated to the Facility as part of the mid-term revision of the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027. For their part, each candidate and prospective candidate has prepared a detailed reform agenda explaining how it will undertake EU-related reforms. But experts have raised questions on whether the financial support is sufficient for such broad-based and demanding reforms, whether the carrots offered are enough to convince Western Balkan governments to implement reforms, whether conditionality is applicable and how it will be monitored and measured. [16] The idea of introducing qualified majority voting (QMV) —55 percent of Member States representing at least 65 percent of the EU population— in the Council of the EU for decisions pertaining to the common foreign and security policy has inspired experts and politicians alike to consider QMV for decision in the intermediary steps of EU enlargement. The European Parliament has been a strong proponent of this idea during the last legislative term, but importantly, this idea has gained traction in the Council itself, the ultimate decision-maker on EU enlargement. Specifically, a Slovenian-German non-paper to the General Affairs Council of January 2024 proposed that the opening (and only the opening) of negotiating clusters, including the Opening Benchmark Assessment Reports (OBAR) be decided in Council by QMV. This proposal is supported by some 15 other Member States. Experts have explained that introducing QMV could facilitate bypassing blockages that result from bilateral disputes between Member States and candidate countries. [17] It has also been argued that QMV could be way of providing a realistic accession scenario for the Western Balkan countries thus, on the one hand, helping the EU regain its credibility in the eyes of the Western Balkans while, on the other, rendering the enlargement process fairer and more effective. [18] Combining these two broad themes, some experts have pushed for a ‘staged accession’ to restore positive momentum to EU enlargement and ease the most serious concerns that EU Member States have regarding the prospect of further enlargement. Among other things, this proposal suggests granting QMV powers —rather than veto powers— to new Member States upon accession, in anticipation of and conditioned on streamlining the whole EU decision-making process. In that case, ‘new Member States’ could be regarded as avant-garde, in that their exclusion from veto voting power would align them to the revamped EU, which would itself progressively adapt institutionally by reducing unanimity requirements. In parallel, this provisional period of socialization would allow new Member States to be gradually introduced to the intricacies of EU policy-making. [19] The geopolitical imperative for enlargement is likely to be felt more strongly in the coming years. Russia, China and others remain active in the Western Balkans and continue to “capitalise on every opportunity that the EU fails to use and on any moment of strategic confusion and hesitance”. [20] The return of Donald Trump to the White House will likely mean a call for the EU to tackle its own responsibilities on its continent. It will take resolute EU leadership for progress in EU accession to be concrete. It implies that the enlargement process should be recalibrated so that the Western Balkan candidates are not left lingering behind the Eastern trio. It also requires that the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) starting later next year adequately reflects enlargement as a priority. Geopolitical choices cannot resort to ‘selective democracy’ as each of the Western Balkan countries should be treated on its merits. Ultimately, the EU integration of the Western Balkans needs to be understood as a win-win for all. References and footnotes 1 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.2 Ioannides, I. (2018). “Peace and Security in 2018: An evaluation of the EU peacebuilding in the Western Balkans”. EPRS, European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_STU(2018)6218163 Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (2017). “The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy”. Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz. https://www.biepag.eu/publication/policy-paper-the-crisis-of-democracy-in-the-western-balkans-authoritarianism-and-eu-stabilitocracy/ 4 Bechev, D. (2017). Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe. Yale University Press. See also Shopov, V. (2021). “Decade of patience: How China became a power in the Western Balkans”. European Council for Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/decade-of-patience-how-china-became-a-power-in-the-western-balkans/ 5 Von der Leyen, U. (2019). “A Union that strives for more. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024”. Directorate-General for Communication. European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/063d44e9-04ed-4033-acf9-639ecb187e87_en?filename=political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf 6 Blockmans, S.; Gros, D. (2019). “From a political to a politicised Commission?” Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/from-a-political-to-a-politicised-commission/ 7 Dimitrov, N.; Cvijic, S.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Armakolas, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2022). “What is to be done? The war, the Western Balkans and the EU”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/blog/what-is-to-be-done-the-war-the-western-balkans-and-the-eu 8 Ioannides, I. (2020). “The New EU Budget and Recovery Fund: A Positive Omen for the EU Enlargement Process?” IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/the-new-eu-budget-and-recovery-fund-a-positive-omen-for-the-eu 9 Armakolas, I.; Dimitrov, N.; Ioannides, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2024). “EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/eu-enlargement-to-the-western-balkans-where-there-is-a-will-there-is-a 10 European Council (2024). “Strategic Agenda 2024-2029”. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/4aldqfl2/2024_557_new-strategic-agenda.pdf 11 Armakolas, I.; Dimitrov, N.; Ioannides, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2024). “EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/eu-enlargement-to-the-western-balkans-where-there-is-a-will-there-is-a 12 Buras, P.; Morina, E. (2023). “Catch-27: The contradictory thinking about enlargement in the EU”. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/catch-27-the-contradictory-thinking-about-enlargement-in-the-eu/ 13 European Council (2024). “Strategic Agenda 2024-2029”. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/4aldqfl2/2024_557_new-strategic-agenda.pdf 14 Von der Leyen (2024). “Europe’s Choice: Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024−2029”. Strasbourg, July 18, 2024, p. 25, p. 30. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 15 Von der Leyen (2024). Mission Letter from Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President, to Marta Kos, Commissioner-designate for Enlargement. Brussels, September 17, 2024, p.5. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/1a2d0ad0-270d-441b-98c8-b6be364d8272_en?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20KOS.pdf 16 Uvalic, M. (2024). “The Potential of the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans”. Civil Society Forum – Tirana 2023. European Policy Institute – Skopje. https://epi.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/The-Potential-of-the-New-Growth-Plan-for-the-Western-Balkans.pdf 17 Zweers, W.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Dimitrov, N. (2024). “Unblocking decision-making in EU enlargement: Qualified Majority Voting as a way forward?” Clingendael, DGAP, ELIAMEP, and Solutions. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/PB_Unblocking_decision-making_in_EU_enlargement.pdf 18 Dimitrov, N.; Cvijic, S.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Armakolas, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2022). “What is to be done? The war, the Western Balkans and the EU”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/blog/what-is-to-be-done-the-war-the-western-balkans-and-the-eu 19 Emerson, M.; Lazarević, M.; Blockmans, S.; Subotić, S. (2021). “A Template for Staged Accession to the EU”. Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/a-template-for-staged-accession-to-the-eu/ 20 Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Dimitrov, N. (2023). “It’s a Package Deal! Reforming and Enlarging the European Union in a Contested World”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/its-a-package-deal-reforming-and-enlarging-the-european-union-in-a 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine is no longer in control of its own war; great power politics have overtaken its struggle for sovereignty, as seen in its exclusion from key diplomatic negotiations and its increasing reliance on external military and economic aid. While Kyiv fights for survival, the U.S. and Russia pursue larger strategic goals, reshaping the global order. This is not a war of democracy versus autocracy—it is a battle over power and influence, with Ukraine caught in the middle. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022, the U.S. has framed the war as a defense of democracy, shaping public perception and policy decisions by justifying increased military aid and economic sanctions against Russia. This framing has also strengthened NATO cohesion and rallied Western support for Ukraine, though critics argue it oversimplifies the conflict’s geopolitical realities. But this narrative masks a deeper reality: a geopolitical contest over Eastern Europe’s balance of power. The U.S. strengthens NATO to contain Russia; Russia fights to keep Ukraine in its orbit. As a result, Ukraine’s ability to act independently is shrinking. At the core of the conflict is a long-standing power struggle between Washington and Moscow. The U.S. aims to maintain dominance over European security, while Russia seeks to dismantle the post-Cold War order that placed NATO on its borders. The Kremlin has repeatedly warned that Ukraine’s Western alignment is a red line, but U.S. policymakers have dismissed these concerns as revisionist grievances rather than legitimate security threats. This deadlock has turned Ukraine into the focal point of an escalating power struggle. For Russia, the war is not just about territory—it is about status. Vladimir Putin frames the conflict as a defense against Western encirclement, citing NATO’s expansion and U.S. military aid to Kyiv as provocations. Moscow’s broader goal is to force a realignment in European security, one that recognizes Russia’s sphere of influence and weakens U.S. hegemony. Under Joe Biden, the U.S. provided billions in military and economic aid to Ukraine, arguing that supporting Kyiv was essential for upholding the liberal order. However, as the war drags on and domestic concerns over foreign spending grow, this approach is being reassessed. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, U.S. policy has shifted toward a transactional approach, a shift that became evident when he excluded Ukraine from recent U.S.-Russia negotiations in Saudi Arabia, dismissal of NATO allies’ calls for a unified stance against Russia, and willingness to negotiate directly with Vladimir Putin—effectively sidelining Kyiv from key discussions that will determine its future. His strategy prioritizes economic agreements over direct military support, shifting U.S. engagement toward a pragmatic recalibration of interests. This shift was further highlighted during the recent confrontation between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House. The meeting, originally intended to finalize a U.S.-Ukraine rare-earth minerals deal, devolved into a heated exchange. Trump accused Zelenskyy of being “disrespectful” and “gambling with World War III,” revealing deep fractures in U.S.-Ukraine relations. The cancellation of a planned joint press conference underscored the breakdown in diplomatic relations, signaling that Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations with Washington is diminishing. The Trump administration’s treatment of Zelenskyy serves as a stark warning to smaller nations reliant on Western support. It highlights the precarious nature of alliances based on strategic convenience rather than genuine commitment to democratic values or sovereignty. Ukraine, once a symbol of Western resolve against Russian aggression, is now being subjected to political maneuvering that undermines its struggle for self-determination. The world is witnessing how great powers prioritize their own interests above the survival of their supposed allies, reinforcing the notion that smaller states can never fully trust the policies of global hegemons. This behavior is not just characteristic of Trump and his administration but is a fundamental aspect of how great powers operate. They perceive their own interests and ideological positions as superior to those of smaller nations, imposing their will under the guise of strategic necessity. The treatment of Ukraine illustrates this dynamic vividly—portraying Ukraine’s justified struggle for sovereignty as though it were a reckless endeavor rather than an existential fight against aggression. The U.S. and its allies, despite claiming to defend Ukraine, have manipulated its war effort for their own geopolitical advantage while simultaneously blaming Ukraine for the very crisis it was forced into. Trump recently emphasized this approach in a statement following a meeting with President Emmanuel Macron at the G7 Summit. He highlighted a proposed “Critical Minerals and Rare-Earths Deal” between the U.S. and Ukraine, describing it as an “Economic Partnership” aimed at recouping American investments while aiding Ukraine’s economic recovery. Simultaneously, he revealed discussions with President Vladimir Putin regarding an end to the war and potential U.S.-Russia economic cooperation, signaling a shift away from military support toward economic and diplomatic agreements. However, tensions flared when Trump and Vice President JD Vance berated Zelenskyy during his February 28 visit, accusing him of ingratitude and pressuring him into a peace deal on U.S. terms. The heated exchange led to the cancellation of a joint press conference and minerals deal signing ceremony. Zelenskyy left the White House abruptly, further deepening the rift between Ukraine and its supposed ally. The public fallout reinforced how great powers prioritize their own strategic interests over the sovereignty of smaller nations, leaving Ukraine increasingly sidelined in decisions that determine its fate. As global power struggles intensify, Ukraine finds itself increasingly excluded from decisions about its own future. Kyiv remains committed to its defense, but external actors—Washington and Moscow—are negotiating their interests over Ukraine’s fate. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s exclusion from key diplomatic discussions, such as the Saudi-hosted talks, underscores this reality. While Biden framed Ukraine as a vital partner in the West’s struggle against Russia, Trump’s approach suggests that Kyiv’s role may be reduced to a bargaining chip in a larger geopolitical realignment.  The Ukraine crisis illustrates the brutal calculus of great power politics, where smaller states become instruments of broader strategic struggles. The U.S.-Russia rivalry has dictated the war’s course, with shifting U.S. policies—from Biden’s interventionism to Trump’s pragmatism—reshaping its trajectory. As Washington and Moscow explore possible diplomatic realignments, Ukraine’s sovereignty risks becoming secondary to great power interests. Great powers dictate the terms of war and peace, leaving Ukraine with fewer choices of its own. The question is not whether Ukraine will survive, but under whose terms it will exist. The text of this work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.  For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In response to its recent retaliatory tariffs on US energy imports, a delegation of major Chinese energy firms visited Kazakhstan in February 2025 to explore new trade opportunities. It was led by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), which focused on diversifying supply chains and reducing dependence on western markets. The visit highlights Beijing’s commitment to deepening economic ties in Central Asia through trade, infrastructure investment, and energy cooperation amidst the escalating tensions between China and the West. Traditionally, Russia exerted a dominant influence in Central Asian countries due to its Soviet-era legacy and security ties. However, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and expanding economic partnerships with Central Asian nations have established Beijing as a key player in the region. As US presence has diminished, and Russia remains preoccupied with its conflict in Ukraine, China has leveraged economic partnerships, infrastructure projects, and strategic diplomacy. China has emerged as Central Asia’s primary trade partner, even surpassing Russia in economic influence. In 2023, trade between China and Central Asia reached $89.4 billion, reflecting a 27% increase from the previous year. This surge highlights China’s efforts to solidify its economic presence through investments, trade agreements, and infrastructure projects. Kazakhstan remains Beijing’s most significant economic ally in the region, with trade reaching $43.8 billion by the end of 2024, a 9% rise from 2023. Likewise, Uzbekistan has upgraded its ties with China to an “all-weather” comprehensive strategic partnership, aiming to boost trade from $14 billion to $20 billion. Chinese investments in Uzbekistan’s renewable energy sector have grown fivefold, underscoring Beijing’s focus on sustainable development. Infrastructure development is a cornerstone of China’s engagement in Central Asia. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway is a flagship project designed to provide China with a direct access route into the region, reducing dependence on Russian transit networks. China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a trilateral agreement that will carry out the project in June 2024. This aligns with Beijing’s broader goal of diversifying trade routes, particularly amid global disruptions such as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. China has expanded its influence and investments in the energy industry, extending its reach beyond transportation infrastructure. The China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline, spanning Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and China, is crucial to Beijing’s energy security strategy. This infrastructure ensures a steady supply of natural gas while providing Central Asian states with an alternative to Russian-controlled routes. In October 2023, KazMunayGas (KMG) and China National Chemical Engineering Group Corporation (CNCEC) agreed to construct a gas turbine power plant at the Atyrau oil refinery. This facility aims to enhance power supply reliability and support the energy needs of the Atyrau region.Similarly QazaqGaz and Geo-Jade Petroleum Corporation are set to develop the Pridorozhnoye gas field in Turkistan Region. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is implementing four oil and gas projects in collaboration with Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Kazyna. On a regional scale, PetroChina plans to resume construction of Line D of the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline in 2025, pending the finalization of a gas supply contract with Turkmenistan, further strengthening China’s energy ties with the region. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Beijing plays a dominant role in the extraction of essential minerals, while its economic ties with Kazakhstan continue to strengthen. China’s molybdenum imports from Kazakhstan increased to around $19.6 million in 2022, demonstrating the country’s reliance on Kazakh resources. Meanwhile, 1.5% of Tajikistan’s total exports to China were zinc, and 17.5% were copper, demonstrating China’s rising influence over Central Asia’s minerals and the potential for raw material exploitation in Central Asian countries. Despite China’s growing economic footprint, Central Asian states remain cautious about excessive dependence and actively seek to diversify their partnerships, including engagement with the United States. Beijing has heavily invested in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, financing essential infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, hospitals, and government buildings. These investments reflect China’s broader strategy of fostering economic development as a means to ensure regional stability. By funding key projects, Beijing not only stimulates economic growth but also deepens its political influence by cultivating relationships with local elites. Chinese direct investments in Kyrgyzstan reached $220.8 million in 2023. Specifically, China has been involved in the construction of roads and infrastructure, and Bishkek, China provides grants for the construction of interchanges to solve traffic jams. China and Kyrgyzstan have extended their Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation until 2026, aligning the infrastructure project with Kyrgyzstan’s national development strategy. China has been the largest national contributor to Tajikistan’s expanding transport infrastructure, accounting for 26 percent of the total value, or $570.2 million. Of this, $37 million has been provided in grants, while the remaining $533.2 million were loans. China has committed $230 million in funding to Tajikistan for the construction of a new parliament  building. The 2023 China-Central Asia summit in Xi’an marked a turning point in Beijing’s regional strategy. Historically, China engaged with Central Asian states through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where Russia played a significant role. However, the establishment of an independent China-Central Asia summit signals Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the region and a strategic shift toward reducing Russia’s traditional influence. In May 2023, President Xi Jinping hosted leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan for the inaugural  China Central Asia summit, which took place in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province. China announced during the summit that it would upgrade bilateral investment agreements, introduce more trade facilitation initiatives, speed up the construction of the D-line of the China-Central Asia gas pipeline, and give Central Asian countries 26 billion in financing support and non-reimbursable assistance. Kazakhstan will host the next summit in 2025–2026. At the summit, China pledged substantial development aid, expanded energy partnerships, and strengthened security cooperation, reflecting its broader commitment to regional stability and economic integration. Although China’s engagement in Central Asia remains primarily economic, it is increasingly asserting itself on political matters as well. Beijing has taken diplomatic stances that occasionally diverge from Moscow’s interests. For instance, China has openly supported Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity in response to Russian nationalist rhetoric, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared during his September 14, 2022 visit to Kazakhstan that his country backs Kazakhstan’s independence and territorial integrity and is against any meddling in its domestic affairs. However, despite these political maneuvers, China remains cautious about direct security involvement in the region. While Beijing maintains a military presence in Tajikistan and deploys private security firms to protect its investments, it continues to operate within Russia’s established security framework rather than attempting to supplant it. This cautious approach was particularly evident in China’s limited response to border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, signalling its reluctance to assume a direct security guarantor role in the region. Meanwhile, Russia’s traditional dominance in Central Asia has weakened due to its ongoing war in Ukraine. Central Asian governments are distancing themselves from Moscow, with Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev openly rejecting Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine. Moreover , the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Moscow’s regional economic bloc, has struggled to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which provides more substantial investments and infrastructure development. As a result, China’s influence in Central Asia continues to expand, filling the gaps left by Russia’s declining geopolitical leverage. While China’s engagement in Central Asia has traditionally focused on economic investments, its security presence is steadily expanding. Beijing has increased arms sales, military cooperation, and counterterrorism efforts. Chinese military exports accounted for only 1.5% of Central Asia’s total arms imports, between 2010 and 2014,  but by 2019, this figure had surged to 18%. In a significant development, in 2021, Tajikistan approved the construction of a new base after an agreement between the country’s Interior Ministry and China’s Public Security Ministry or police force. The fact that the Public Security Ministry, not the Chinese military, signed the agreement indicates that counterterrorism is a priority in the face of growing concerns about instability in neighbouring Afghanistan. This facility enhances Beijing’s security footprint near Afghanistan, a region of strategic concern due to potential instability affecting Xinjiang. Unlike Russia, which maintains a direct military presence, China takes a different approach to security cooperation. Rather than deploying conventional troops, Beijing relies on Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs) to safeguard its economic interests and infrastructure projects. These contractors, often led by former Chinese military personnel, protect Chinese investments across Central Asia. While negotiating its non-interference policy’s limitations, these PMSCs handle security concerns ranging from terrorism to local unrest impacting Chinese workers and projects by offering a variety of services such as armed protection, intelligence collection, and military training. In line with its security diplomacy and larger Global Security Initiative, China uses PMSCs to strengthen security cooperation and increase its influence in the region. Companies such as Zhongjun Junhong Group and China Security and Protection Group have established branches in nations like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China launched the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in 2022, reinforcing its commitment to regional security. The GSI prioritizes sovereignty, noninterference, and counterterrorism collaboration, aligning with the security priorities of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which face domestic stability challenges. Beyond military engagement, China has intensified law enforcement cooperation with Central Asian states. Beijing has established intelligence-sharing agreements, police training programs, and cybersecurity initiatives aimed at combating organized crime and terrorism. These efforts serve China’s broader goal of maintaining regional stability while protecting its economic interests. Despite China’s growing economic and security ties with Central Asia, local resistance poses a significant challenge. Public opposition to Chinese investments has been fuelled by concerns over debt dependency, land acquisitions, job displacement, and environmental impact. In 2016, proposed land reforms in Kazakhstan sparked widespread protests across the country, as many citizens feared that the changes would allow Chinese investors to buy large tracts of Kazakh land. The government had introduced amendments to the Land Code, which included provisions for leasing agricultural land to foreign investors for up to 25 years. This led to public concerns about the potential for Chinese ownership of Kazakh land, given China’s increasing economic influence in the region. Demonstrations took place in major cities like Almaty, Atyrau, and Aktobe, drawing thousands of people. The scale of the protests forced the Kazakh government to suspend the reforms and impose a moratorium on land sales to foreigners, highlighting the deep-seated anxieties over national sovereignty and economic dependency on China. Protests occurred in several cities in 2019 including Astana, Almaty, and Zhanaozen in Kazakhstan. Demonstrators opposed Chinese industrial projects, fearing environmental harm and long-term economic dependence on China. There was also widespread suspicion that Chinese investments would lead to land leases or permanent settlements by Chinese workers, further fueling public discontent. In Naryn, Kyrgyzstan, violent protests erupted against a planned $280 million Chinese logistics and industrial project. Protesters were concerned about potential environmental damage, the loss of land to foreign companies, and a perceived lack of economic benefits for local communities. The unrest led to the cancellation of some Chinese-backed projects. China’s treatment of ethnic minorities of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz in Xinjiang has further complicated its relations with Central Asian populations. Protests against the mass detentions have mainly occurred in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. From 2018 to 2019, the activist group Atajurt Eriktileri organized frequent demonstrations in Almaty and Nur-Sultan (Astana), demanding the release of detained ethnic Kazakhs. Since January 2021, relatives of detainees have held weekly protests outside the Chinese Consulate in Almaty. In Kyrgyzstan, smaller protests took place in Bishkek in February and December 2019, where activists urged the government to act against China’s repression. China’s growing trade, security, and political influence in Central Asia is a key testing ground for its broader geopolitical ambitions. The future of this engagement will depend on China’s ability to balance its economic interests with local concerns, ensuring that its expanding role contributes to stability rather than fostering tensions. Beijing’s influence in Central Asia is steadily increasing, making it a dominant economic and security partner. Through initiatives like the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the China-Central Asia (C+C5) mechanism, China has deepened its presence by offering financial investments, security cooperation, and diplomatic engagement. This approach has been well-received by Central Asian governments, which seek economic growth and stability. Although Russia remains a major geopolitical actor in the region, its influence is diminishing as China’s economic power continues to rise. Beijing’s emphasis on respecting sovereignty and promoting development has helped solidify its relationships with Central Asian states. However, challenges such as local resistance to Chinese investments and potential geopolitical tensions with Russia persist. The long-term success of China’s regional strategy will depend on its ability to manage these complexities while maintaining its strategic foothold. The text of this work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It was to be expected, and we were poorly prepared for it, Donald Trump’s phone call to Vladimir Putin has undoubtedly ended 75 years of transatlantic relations. We, the French, had long warned that our security interests with the United States were not always aligned and that these differences could lead to serious disputes. There was the Suez Canal in 1956, there was Iraq in 2003, and there was, in a more moderate sense, Macron’s brain-dead stance on a dispute arising from Turkey’s actions in Syria in 2019. From now on, there will be February 12, 2025. But today, the situation is more serious because it is the security of Europe itself that is at stake, the very security that forms the heart of the existence of the Atlantic alliance. One can understand that the war in Ukraine is unwinnable and that a solution must be found to stop this war. One can understand that Ukraine’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a red line for Russia. One can also understand that the United States wants Europeans to take a more significant share of the burden of their defence. However, the problem is that the United States made Ukraine’s NATO membership a goal of the Atlantic alliance at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, against the advice of France and Germany at the time, thus worsening a relationship with Russia that was already deteriorating. The problem also is that Trump wants to negotiate peace between Ukraine and Russia without inviting the European Union and other European countries to the negotiating table, while Europe’s security is at stake. The risk is now clear: a form of bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia, benefiting the interests of both countries, could leave Ukraine severely weakened and an easy prey for Moscow, thereby weakening other European countries consequently. As a consolation prize, we will have to ensure Europe’s conventional security, as US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth announced to Europeans at the opening of the NATO ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 12–13 February 2025. This situation will place Europeans in a terrible dilemma: Either they do not wish to give security guarantees to Ukraine and completely discredit themselves in the eyes of powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, as Europeans will have shown that they are unable to defend the continent, while also creating a significant long-term risk to Europe’s security.Or they provide security guarantees to Ukraine, accepting the cost of a financial burden that will affect the European Union’s competitiveness in the long term.In light of this situation, some advocate for the establishment of a European pillar within NATO. This solution, however, seems outdated given the new context. If one considers that the United States is negotiating peace in Europe without and against the Europeans, and that they no longer wish to defend Europe with conventional military means (will they respect the NATO Defence Planning Process?), it is better for Europeans to fully take on Europe’s security. This would mean taking control of NATO: Europeans must quickly discuss this option and communicate their decision to Secretary General Mark Rutte. It will also be easier to make NATO and the European Union work together with a more Europeanised organisation.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Germany’s presumptive new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, faces challenges both at home and overseas following his conservative alliance’s election victory on Feb. 23, 2025. A strong showing from the hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) – which Merz, in line with other mainstream German parties, refuses to countenance as a coalition party as part of an unofficial “firewall” against extremism – will make forming a functioning government tricky. But in the moments after the election results, it was the future of the European Union and its relationship with America that was his immediate focus: “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.” To understand why that is such a concern for Germany now and what “real independence” from Washington means, The Conversation U.S. turned to Garret Martin, an expert on U.S.-Europe relations at American University, for answers. What prompted Merz’s ‘real independence’ line? Presumably it was a response to a series of recent announcements and actions by the Trump administration that have shocked the German political establishment. This includes the sudden revelation that the U.S. would negotiate directly with Russia to end the war in Ukraine, but seemingly without the Europeans or Ukrainians involved. That development went down like a lead balloon in Berlin, especially considering Germany’s significant financial support of Kyiv since 2022. Moreover, the German establishment has also frowned at a series of recent declarations by members of the Trump administration. Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, in which he harshly criticized Europe for allegedly undermining freedom of expression, provoked clear pushback from German leaders. Trump, for his part, hardly endeared himself to his German allies when he denounced Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a “dictator.” And, of course, Elon Musk’s interference in the German elections – as well as his open support for the far-right Alternative for Germany – provoked a fierce response from Merz. The then-candidate promised that Musk would need to be prepared for legal consequences for his meddling. How would this ‘real independence’ be achieved? Defining what “real independence” means and being able to implement such a drastic change in transatlantic relations will be a tall order. If by “real independence” Merz means that Germany would no longer rely on the U.S. for its security, then that would require several major steps. Merz would first need to convince his likely coalition partners, the Social Democrats, that this is the right goal. After all, German governments are bound by very detailed coalition agreements. Second, Merz would need to significantly increase German defense spending. As it stands, Germany’s annual defense budget is slightly over US$90 billion, or 2% of its GDP. But a recent study by the economic think tank Bruegel suggests Berlin would need to increase its budget by $145 billion annually to defend Europe without the assistance of the U.S. But to achieve this, Merz will likely need to increase defense spending by such a level that it will contravene the country’s “debt brake.” This 2009 constitutional rule essentially caps the annual deficit that the government can take on. But overturning this mechanism would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers of the German Parliament. Merz’s Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union party won 28.6% of the vote – and even with the support of the country’s main center-left party, the Social Democrats, Merz will fall short of the parliamentary votes needed. Finally, “real independence” would also require convincing other European Union partners to join him down that path. Assuming that the Trump administration continues its current trajectory and further undermines NATO, the EU would have to step in to become a more prominent security actor for the continent. It might also require, as Merz hinted, that the United Kingdom and France be ready to share their nuclear weapons, since the U.S. may not be trusted anymore to defend NATO countries. All of these steps would cover “real independence” only in the security sphere and not touch other crucial policy areas, such as trade and energy. And that would be an equally tall order given the level of economic ties binding Germany to the U.S., as well as the looming threat of tariffs. What does this mean for German-US relations? Merz’s “real independence” statement would have been noteworthy coming from any German chancellor. But it is even more striking when one considers the fact that Merz is a committed transatlanticist who deeply admires the U.S. and counts Ronald Reagan as one of his role models. At 69, Merz came of age during the final years of the Cold War, when the U.S. played a key role in enabling German reunification. He worked for years for Atlantik-Brücke, a lobbying group pushing for closer transatlantic ties. And he has, by his own account, traveled more than 100 times to the U.S. Independence will not likely mean a complete divorce between the U.S. and Germany – the ties binding the two countries, whether economic, cultural or political, run too deep. However, we can expect that Berlin will not hesitate to take a more combative approach toward Washington when necessary, so to protect German and European interests. As Merz pointed out, it is clear that the Trump administration does “not care much about the fate of Europe.” What does this signal for Merz’s view of Germany’s position in the EU? Merz’s win will certainly lead to important shifts in Germany’s position in the EU, and could be a major boost for a union in need of leadership. His predecessor, Olaf Scholz, was hampered by a weak economy, divisions within his coalition and indecisive leadership in Europe. Moreover, poor relations with French President Emmanuel Macron also stalled the Franco-German partnership, normally a key engine of leadership in the EU. Merz certainly plans to take a very distinct approach toward the EU than his predecessor. His calls for “real independence” will certainly be very welcome in France, which has long called for Europe to be more responsible for its own security. As such, it opens up the possibility of far closer ties between Paris and Berlin than we saw in recent years. Moreover, Merz, with his more hawkish position toward Russia, could be counted on to provide greater support for Ukraine.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russia President Vladimir Putin sent a guarded message of congratulations to Donald Trump on inauguration day, but then held a long direct call with his “dear friend,” Chinese leader Xi Jinping. From Putin’s perspective, this makes sense. Russia gets billions of dollars from energy sales to China and technology from Beijing, but from Washington, until recently, mostly sanctions and suspicion. Moscow is hoping for a more positive relationship with the current White House occupant, who has made his desire for a “deal” to end the Ukraine war well known. But talk of exit scenarios from this 3-year-old conflict should not mask the fact that since the invasion began, Putin has overseen one of the worst periods in Russian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Transatlantic unity The war in Ukraine has foreclosed on options and blunted Russian action around the world. Unlike the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the 2022 invasion produced an unprecedented level of transatlantic unity, including the expansion of NATO and sanctions on Russian trade and finance. In the past year, both the U.S. and the European Union expanded their sanction packages. And for the first time, the EU banned the re-export of Russian liquefied natural gas and ended support for a Russian LNG project in the Arctic. EU-Russian trade, including European imports of energy, has dropped to a fraction of what it was before the war.   The two Nordstrom pipelines, designed to bring Russian gas to Germany without transiting East Europe, lie crippled and unused. Revenues from energy sales are roughly one-half of what they were two years ago.   At the same time, the West has sent billions in military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, enabling a level of resilience for which Russia was unprepared. Meanwhile, global companies and technical experts and intellectuals have fled Russia in droves. While Russia has evaded some restrictions with its “shadow fleet” – an aging group of tankers sailing under various administrative and technical evasions – the country’s main savior is now China. Trade between China and Russia has grown by nearly two-thirds since the end of 2021, and the U.S. cites Beijing as the main source of Russia’s “dual use” and other technologies needed to pursue its war. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has moved from an energy-for-manufactured-goods trade relationship with the West to one of vassalage with China, as one Russia analyst termed it. Hosting an October meeting of the BRICS countries – now counting 11 members, including the five original members: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – is unlikely to compensate for geopolitical losses elsewhere. Problems at home... The Russian economy is deeply distorted by increased military spending, which represents 40% of the budget and 25% of all spending. The government now needs the equivalent of US$20 billion annually in order to pay for new recruits. Russian leaders must find a way to keep at least some of the population satisfied, but persistent inflation and reserve currency shortages flowing directly from the war have made this task more difficult. On the battlefield, the war itself has killed or wounded more than 600,000 Russian soldiers. Operations during 2024 were particularly deadly, producing more than 1,500 Russian casualties a day. The leader who expected Kyiv’s capitulation in days now finds Russian territory around Kursk occupied, its naval forces in the Black Sea destroyed and withdrawn, and one of its own generals assassinated in Moscow. But probably the greatest humiliation is that this putative great power with a population of 144 million must resort to importing North Korean troops to help liberate its own land. ...and in its backyard Moscow’s dedication to the war has affected its ability to influence events elsewhere, even in its own neighborhood. In the Caucasus, for example, Russia had long sided with Armenia in its running battle with Azerbaijan over boundaries and population after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow has brokered ceasefires at various points. But intermittent attacks and territorial gains for Azerbaijan continued despite the presence of some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers sent to protect the remaining Armenian population in parts of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. In September 2023, Azerbaijan’s forces abruptly took control of the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh. More than 100,000 Armenians fled in the largest ethnic cleansing episode since the end of the Balkan Wars. The peacekeepers did not intervene and later withdrew. The Russian military, absorbed in the bloody campaigns in Ukraine, could not back up or reinforce them. The Azeris’ diplomatic and economic position has gained in recent years, aided by demand for its gas as a substitute for Russia’s and support from NATO member Turkey. Feeling betrayed by Russia, the Armenian government has for the first time extended feelers toward the West — which is happy to entertain such overtures. Losing influence and friends Russia’s loss in the Caucasus has been dwarfed by the damage to its military position and influence in the Middle East. Russia supported the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad against the uprisings of the Arab Spring in 2011 and saved it with direct military intervention beginning in 2015. Yet in December 2024, Assad was unexpectedly swept away by a mélange of rebel groups. The refuge extended to Assad by Moscow was the most it could provide with the war in Ukraine having drained Russia’s capacity to do more. Russia’s possible withdrawal from the Syrian naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Khmeimim would remove assets that allowed it to cooperate with Iran, its key strategic partner in the region. More recently, Russia’s reliability as an ally and reputation as an armory has been damaged by Israeli attacks not only on Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon and Syria, but on Iran itself. Russia’s position in Africa would also be damaged by the loss of the Syrian bases, which are key launch points for extending Russian power, and by Moscow’s evident inability to make a difference on the ground across the Sahel region in north-central Africa. Dirty tricks, diminishing returns Stalemate in Ukraine and Russian strategic losses in Syria and elsewhere have prompted Moscow to rely increasingly on a variety of other means to try to gain influence. Disinformation, election meddling and varied threats are not new and are part of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. But recent efforts in East Europe have not been very productive. Massive Russian funding and propaganda in Romania, for example, helped produce a narrow victory for an anti-NATO presidential candidate in December 2024, but the Romanian government moved quickly to expose these actions and the election was annulled. Nearby Moldova has long been subject to Russian propaganda and threats, especially during recent presidential elections and a referendum on stipulating a “European course” in the constitution. The tiny country moved to reduce its dependency on Russian gas but remains territorially fragmented by the breakaway region of Transnistria that, until recently, provided most of the country’s electricity. Despite these factors, the results were not what Moscow wanted. In both votes, a European direction was favored by the electorate. When the Transnistrian legislature in February 2024 appealed to Moscow for protection, none was forthcoming. When Moldova thumbs its nose at you, it’s fair to say your power ranking has fallen. Wounded but still dangerous Not all recent developments have been negative for Moscow. State control of the economy has allowed for rapid rebuilding of a depleted military and support for its technology industry in the short term. With Chinese help and evasion of sanctions, sufficient machinery and energy allow the war in Ukraine to continue. And the inauguration of Donald Trump is likely to favor Putin, despite some mixed signals. The U.S. president has threatened tariffs and more sanctions but also disbanded a Biden-era task force aimed a punishing Russian oligarchs who help Russia evade sanctions. In the White House now is someone who has openly admired Putin, expressed skepticism over U.S. support for Ukraine and rushed to bully America’s closest allies in Latin America, Canada and Europe. Most importantly, Trump’s eagerness to make good on his pledge to end the war may provide the Russian leader with a deal he can call a “victory.” The shrinking of Russia’s world has not necessarily made Russia less dangerous; it could be quite the opposite. Some Kremlin watchers argue that a more economically isolated Russia is less vulnerable to American economic pressure. A retreating Russia and an embattled Putin could also opt for even more reckless threats and actions – for example, on nuclear weapons – especially if reversing course in Ukraine would jeopardize his position. It is, after all, Putin’s war. All observers would be wise to note that the famous dictum “Russia is never as strong as she looks … nor as weak as she looks” has been ominously rephrased by Putin himself: “Russia was never so strong as it wants to be and never so weak as it is thought to be.”

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Finally, after many leaks, hints, intimations and procrastinations, US President Donald Trump might have come up with something a bit more specific than his initial general promises to put an end to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 24 hours. For the first time a draft of his peace plan is on the table. The plan was revealed by various Ukrainian and European media last week and though it has never been officially confirmed by the White House or the State Department, there are reasons to believe that we indeed observe a gradual shaping of the new Administration’s position on arguably the most destructive and dangerous military conflict of our times. However, the devil is always in details. Let us have a closer look at what Trump has or may have in mind. Ceasefire According to the plan, the peace process should start with Presidents Putin and Zelensky having an urgent phone call followed by a face-to-face meeting no later than in the end of February or in the beginning of March. A complete ceasefire along the present line of contact should be in place by the day of 2025 Christian Easter (April 20) and European peacekeeping units will be asked to police a demilitarized zone separating the two sides (American troops will not have their boots on the ground). Shortly after that, by the time of the 80-year anniversary of the V-day in Europe (May 9), a comprehensive peace agreement should be signed and, if needed, ratified by the parties to the conflict. This is an exceptionally bold and ambitious time-table, but is it nonetheless realistic? First, it would be quite a challenge even to make Putin and Zelensky directly talk to each other. In fall of 2022, the Ukrainian President signed a special executive order forbidding himself engaging in any direct negotiations with his Russian counterpart. On the Russian side, there are serious doubts about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian leader since his term in power already expired in May of 2024 and no national elections have been held after that. More importantly, it would be very hard to enforce the ceasefire, if and when such a ceasefire is reached. The experience of the Minsk Agreement implementation and international monitoring is not very reassuring, and the line of contact today is much longer than it was back in 2015. To put together a well-trained and properly equipped international monitoring mission of tens of thousands uniformed men and women would be next to impossible, at least within the time framework suggested by the US Administration. Needless to say, Russia would hardly accept a EU/NATO peacekeeping mission on its territory. Territorial compromises Trump apparently suggests that both sides should stick to the territories that they now have under their control. This idea logically implies a demand for Kyiv to accept Russian sovereignty on the parts of the four former Ukrainian regions as well as on the Crimean Peninsula that was reunited with the Russian Federation eleven years ago after the referendum of March, 2014. The Ukrainian side should also withdraw from the Russian territories in the Kursk region that it currently occupies. In exchange Russia should stop its ongoing offensive in Donbass and limit its territorial acquisitions to what it already has in its possession. This proposal is clearly not exactly what either Kyiv or Moscow would like to see as the final peace settlement. In Ukraine, they still hope that at some point thy will be in a position to restore the territorial integrity of the country including what they lost back in 2014—namely, parts of Eastern Donbass and Crimea. The Russian leadership, in its turn, intends to capture at least all the remaining territories of the four regions that it does not fully control now (Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye) and maybe even to advance further West. (Kharkov, Odessa and so on). To reach a compromise between these two positions would be truly a formidable task. Future status of Ukraine According to Donald Trump, Ukraine should not become a NATO member—at least, in the foreseeable future. He remains skeptical about a possible Ukrainian contribution to the Alliance security, he does not want to enlarge the NATO’s zone of responsibility, and he does not want to cross Moscow’s red line on this very issue. However, Ukraine may still aspire to join the European Union before too long, and the United States is ready to assist Kyiv in meeting its European aspirations. A neutral status for Ukraine is something that many in Kyiv would lament and consider a serious setback, while many in Moscow would definitely appreciate and support. However, how can this neutrality be secured in the long term? After all, Ukraine has already been neutral; this status was explicitly stated in the very first declaration on Ukrainian sovereignty approved by the Ukrainian Parliament even before the Soviet disintegration and later on incorporated into the Ukrainian Constitution. And yet, since at least 2008 Kyiv was contentiously drifting away from this initial position; finally, the national Constitution was revised and the pro-Western Ukrainian political leadership started actively seeking membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. What would prevent future Ukraine from changing its mind once again in five or ten or twenty years from now, when neither Trump, nor Putin is around to stop it from moving in the NATO membership direction? Security guarantees Instead of offering Kyiv prompt NATO membership, Trump is ready to provide US security guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for getting for the US business a preferential access to valuable Ukrainian mineral resources—including natural gas, lithium, titanium and graphite. The United States will continue to assist Ukraine with military hardware deliveries till at least 2030, but these deliveries will no longer take form of charity—they should generate appropriate profits for the US defence sector and create jobs for American workers. This part of Trump‘s proposals remains highly ambiguous and unclear. What kind of security guarantees is the United States willing to offer Ukraine? Are we going to see US military bases on the Ukrainian soil or any other manifestations of the US military presence there? Is Trump ready to turn Ukraine into another Israel or another Japan? If this is the case, then does such an arrangement really differ a lot from a Ukrainian membership to NATO? Would Moscow easily accept a not-so-symbolic US military presence so close to its borders? The proposed US access to Ukraine’s natural resources also raises many questions. Ukraine indeed has repositories of valuable minerals (arguably amounting to USD 15 trillion of total value), but most of these repositories are located on the territories that are now controlled by Russia. Sanctions As an additional incentive for Moscow to demonstrate the needed flexibility, Trump offers Russia to lift economic sanctions as a part of the overall peace arrangement. He argues that the Western sanctions have a profound negative impact on the Russian economy, slow down Russia’s modernization and prevent the country from taking its rightful place within the international economic system. The prospect of lifting sanctions should therefore motivate the Kremlin to go for a reasonable compromise in order to put an end to the fratricidal conflict. This idea sounds great, but it seems that Trump offers more than he can deliver. First, Russia suffers more from the EU sanctions than from the US sanctions; the Russia-EU trade has always been significantly larger than the Russia-US trade. No US President can simply ‘order’ the European allies of the United States to completely reverse their current policy towards Moscow, even if the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is miraculously stopped. The odds are that the EU sanctions imposed on Moscow will be in place for a long time, even if the US sanctions are lifted. Second, even on the US sanctions lifting, Donald Trump is not that omnipotent. Some of these sanctions have been approved by the US Congress and have become national laws. To recall or even to ease them, one should pass an appropriate legislative decision on the Capitol Hill, which might turn out to be extremely complicated and protracted. Reconstruction of Ukraine Like in many other cases, Trump has absolutely no intention to spend large amounts of US taxpayer’s money on reconstructing such a distant land as Ukraine. Instead, the US President would like to impose this heavy burden on the European Union (exactly like he intends to impose the financial burden of Gaza reconstruction on the Arab Gulf states). The price tag of Ukraine’s reconstruction might amount to USD 500 billion, and EU should be prepared to annually allocate up to USD 50 billion for ten years. A part of the funding, however, can come from special duties imposed on Russia’s energy exports in exchange for lifting Western sanctions on the Russian hydrocarbons production. This part of Trump’s proposals is based on a number of arbitrary assumptions, which are hard to assess at this point. Nobody really knows how much the Ukrainian reconstruction will ultimately cost and how long time it will take. The actual financial capabilities of the European Union might turn out to be more modest than Trump apparently expects, especially given the fact that the US Administration’s wish list for Europe is not limited to supporting Ukraine only, but also includes more generous contributions to NATO, multiple trade concessions, more economic engagement in the Middle East and so on. Ukraine’s absorption capacity might turn out to be limited as well, given the present state of economic and administrative reforms, rampant corruption and the exodus of a large part of the county’s population to Europe. Finally, it is hard to imagine how Trump will convince Putin to pay duties on Russia’s energy exports, particularly when Trump remains committed to bringing the global energy prices down to the extent possible. European security So far, the Trump Administration has not been very prolific on how the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict should affect a more general problem of the European security. Still, this dimension of a potential agreement has to be kept in mind, if the idea is to provide for a lasting peace in the Euroatlantic space. Russian officials have stated more than once that the ongoing conflict is not just a clash between Russia and Ukraine, but rather a standstill between Russia and the ‘collective West’. That implies that any settlement should include a broader range of arrangements on the future European security architecture, such as multilateral confidence building measures, mil-to-mil contacts at various levels and even some forms of conventional arms control in Europe. The problem is that Trump has never been particularly interested in any meaningful forms of multilateralism including multilateral arms control or confidence building measures. Moreover, he has always been skeptical of any arms control, bilateral including, regarding it as an unnecessary and potentially even harmful way to limit the US abilities to outspend and to outperform all its adversaries and rivals. This is why during his first term in power Trump decided to abandon the US-Soviet INF Treaty, was not eager to extend the New START Agreement and decided to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. It is not clear how with such an attitude Donald Trump is planning to ensure that there will be no other dangerous crisis in Europe soon after a settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is reached. To sum up, it is definitely good news that Donald Trump has finally come with some kind of a peace plane for Ukraine. To have something to consider and to discuss is undoubtedly better than to have nothing and to speculate about what the White House may or may not offer. Still, the Trump plan in its current form is only half-baked. It might be the right first step, not much more than the very first step. A lot will now depend on the US Administration commitment, stamina, patience and its attention span. Peace talks are different from business negotiations that Trump is so used to. In business negotiation, you can accept failures to reach a good deal and you can move on to other opportunities, which you will always find around in plenty. In peace talks, failure is not an acceptable outcome. First published in the Guacha.