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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The integration of Artificial Intelligence into military frameworks by India and Pakistan is reshaping regional security dynamics, fueling a doctrinal shift with profound implications for strategic stability. As AI-driven systems enhance military capabilities, the accompanying risks of miscalculation, escalation, and ethical dilemmas demand urgent dialogue and regulatory measures to mitigate potential conflict. The rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a transformative technology has reshaped global dynamics across various domains, including national security. As states increasingly incorporate AI into military frameworks, the implications for strategic stability, particularly in nuclear-armed regions like South Asia, are profound. The militarisation of AI by India and Pakistan, underpinned by their historical rivalry, is catalysing a doctrinal evolution with both opportunities and risks for regional security. AI is becoming a cornerstone of military innovation in South Asia with capabilities of autonomous weapons systems, surveillance technologies, and decision-making frameworks becoming increasingly relevant. The development of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, often termed “killer robots,” epitomises the dual-use nature of AI—it offers strategic advantages but also raises concerns about malfunction, miscalculation, and escalation. These concerns are amplified when AI technologies are integrated into nuclear and conventional military frameworks, especially in volatile regions like South Asia. India’s AI-driven military modernisation India has positioned AI as a central element of its strategic ambitions, supported by initiatives such as the Defense AI Council and the establishment of the Centre for AI and Robotics (CAIR) under its Defense Research and Development Organization. The country’s AI-focused projects include developing multi-agent robotic frameworks, advanced surveillance systems, and AI-powered drones. Additionally, HAL Tejas, a multi role combat aircraft, has been modernised by CAIR to assists in maintaining Indian Air Force systems. Meanwhile, the acquisition of over five thousand drones in 2016 have come into action in defence frameworks.  The multi-agent robotic drones work in groups by forming teams for swarms. Collaborative efforts with international partners, including Israel and Japan, have further bolstered India’s AI capabilities, including in teaming initiatives. The integration of disruptive technologies has come along way, evolving with doctrinal changes, particularly with the Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces (2017) and the Land Warfare Doctrine (2018). While both included the potential for AI capabilities, the LWD placed specific emphasis on multi-front environmental frameworks, hybrid warfare, and the incorporation of disruptive technologies in the military domain to secure strategic edge. The deployment of AI-enabled systems along sensitive borders, such as its northwestern frontier with Pakistan, underscores an intent to enhance both offensive and defensive operations. Pakistan’s Response to AI Militarisation Pakistan has also begun integrating AI into its military strategies, albeit this has taken place at an earlier stage. Initiatives such as the establishment of the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Computing and the Army Centre of Emerging Technologies highlight Pakistan’s focus on leveraging AI for defense and cybersecurity. Pakistan’s collaborations with China, a global leader in AI, have facilitated the development of unmanned systems and other AI-enabled technologies. For instance, a joint venture with Chinese Chengdu Aircraft Company is helping to develop unmanned aerial vehicles. Meanwhile, Pakistan has purchased from China Cai Hong drones (Rainbow4/CH-4) that can be effectively deployed for strike missions and reconnaissance. Evolving Nuclear Doctrines India’s nuclear doctrine, historically anchored in a no-first-use (NFU) policy, has evolved to reflect greater flexibility and ambiguity. Statements by Indian officials, coupled with advancements in AI and surveillance technologies, indicate a potential shift toward counterforce strategies. This can be assessed from the statements by national security officials, including 2010 national security advisor Shivshankar Menon, who remarked that “India’s NFU doctrine applied to non-nuclear weapons states, implying that the NFU would not apply to Pakistan.” Rajnath Sing, tthe current Indian defense minister, hinted at flexibility of NFU by saying that “India has strictly adhered to this doctrine. What happens in future depends on the circumstances.” Doctrinal transformations, such as the Land Warfare Doctrine further highlights India’s focus on leveraging AI to enhance its strategic edge. These changes, coupled with the deployment of AI-enabled surveillance systems along borders, signals India’s intent to strengthen its deterrence posture while maintaining the flexibility to adapt to emerging threats. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has evolved from a first-use policy to a more nuanced approach encapsulated in the Full Spectrum Deterrence and Quid Pro Quo Plus strategies. The policies of quid pro quo plus and full spectrum deterrence conveys that Pakistan would respond to any kind of cross border military adventure from India in more than a tit-for-tat, a clear message that the response would be a notch higher on the escalation ladder while still posturing the threat of nuclear retaliation at every step of the escalation ladder. These frameworks aim to counter India’s conventional and nuclear superiority by maintaining credible deterrence across the escalation spectrum. These include the development of tactical nuclear weapons and advancements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Challenges and Risks The militarisation of AI in South Asia introduces several challenges, including the erosion of strategic stability, the lowering of the nuclear threshold, and the risk of accidental escalation. AI-driven systems, while efficient, lack the nuanced judgment of human operators. This increases the risk of unintended escalation during crises. Additionally, the integration of AI into nuclear command-and-control systems could compress decision-making timelines, heightening the risk of hasty or ill-informed actions. The proliferation of AI technologies also raises concerns about their acquisition by non-state actors, who could exploit these systems for malicious purposes. Finally, the deployment of autonomous weapons systems poses ethical dilemmas and challenges existing frameworks of international humanitarian law. To address these challenges, it is imperative for South Asian states to adopt regulatory frameworks and confidence-building measures. Potential steps include bilateral and multilateral dialogues. For instance, India and Pakistan could engage in dialogue to establish norms and protocols for the use of AI in military operations. Additionally, transparency initiatives, such as data-sharing mechanisms and joint exercises, can help reduce mistrust and prevent miscalculation. Prioritising AI applications for defensive purposes, such as enhanced surveillance and early warning systems, can also mitigate risks while strengthening deterrence. Conclusion The militarisation of AI is reshaping the strategic landscape of South Asia, driving doctrinal evolution, and altering the balance of power. The integration of AI in the military domain is leading India and Pakistan towards a potentially deepening security dilemma. This demonstrates that South Asia, in the age of AI militarisation, will be dominated by feelings of mistrust and erosion of strategic stability. By fostering dialogue and adopting regulatory measures, South Asian states can ensure that AI serves as a tool for stability rather than a catalyst for conflict. In an era of rapid technological advancement, the imperative to manage AI’s military applications responsibly has never been greater. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russia President Vladimir Putin sent a guarded message of congratulations to Donald Trump on inauguration day, but then held a long direct call with his “dear friend,” Chinese leader Xi Jinping. From Putin’s perspective, this makes sense. Russia gets billions of dollars from energy sales to China and technology from Beijing, but from Washington, until recently, mostly sanctions and suspicion. Moscow is hoping for a more positive relationship with the current White House occupant, who has made his desire for a “deal” to end the Ukraine war well known. But talk of exit scenarios from this 3-year-old conflict should not mask the fact that since the invasion began, Putin has overseen one of the worst periods in Russian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Transatlantic unity The war in Ukraine has foreclosed on options and blunted Russian action around the world. Unlike the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the 2022 invasion produced an unprecedented level of transatlantic unity, including the expansion of NATO and sanctions on Russian trade and finance. In the past year, both the U.S. and the European Union expanded their sanction packages. And for the first time, the EU banned the re-export of Russian liquefied natural gas and ended support for a Russian LNG project in the Arctic. EU-Russian trade, including European imports of energy, has dropped to a fraction of what it was before the war.   The two Nordstrom pipelines, designed to bring Russian gas to Germany without transiting East Europe, lie crippled and unused. Revenues from energy sales are roughly one-half of what they were two years ago.   At the same time, the West has sent billions in military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, enabling a level of resilience for which Russia was unprepared. Meanwhile, global companies and technical experts and intellectuals have fled Russia in droves. While Russia has evaded some restrictions with its “shadow fleet” – an aging group of tankers sailing under various administrative and technical evasions – the country’s main savior is now China. Trade between China and Russia has grown by nearly two-thirds since the end of 2021, and the U.S. cites Beijing as the main source of Russia’s “dual use” and other technologies needed to pursue its war. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has moved from an energy-for-manufactured-goods trade relationship with the West to one of vassalage with China, as one Russia analyst termed it. Hosting an October meeting of the BRICS countries – now counting 11 members, including the five original members: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – is unlikely to compensate for geopolitical losses elsewhere. Problems at home... The Russian economy is deeply distorted by increased military spending, which represents 40% of the budget and 25% of all spending. The government now needs the equivalent of US$20 billion annually in order to pay for new recruits. Russian leaders must find a way to keep at least some of the population satisfied, but persistent inflation and reserve currency shortages flowing directly from the war have made this task more difficult. On the battlefield, the war itself has killed or wounded more than 600,000 Russian soldiers. Operations during 2024 were particularly deadly, producing more than 1,500 Russian casualties a day. The leader who expected Kyiv’s capitulation in days now finds Russian territory around Kursk occupied, its naval forces in the Black Sea destroyed and withdrawn, and one of its own generals assassinated in Moscow. But probably the greatest humiliation is that this putative great power with a population of 144 million must resort to importing North Korean troops to help liberate its own land. ...and in its backyard Moscow’s dedication to the war has affected its ability to influence events elsewhere, even in its own neighborhood. In the Caucasus, for example, Russia had long sided with Armenia in its running battle with Azerbaijan over boundaries and population after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow has brokered ceasefires at various points. But intermittent attacks and territorial gains for Azerbaijan continued despite the presence of some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers sent to protect the remaining Armenian population in parts of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. In September 2023, Azerbaijan’s forces abruptly took control of the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh. More than 100,000 Armenians fled in the largest ethnic cleansing episode since the end of the Balkan Wars. The peacekeepers did not intervene and later withdrew. The Russian military, absorbed in the bloody campaigns in Ukraine, could not back up or reinforce them. The Azeris’ diplomatic and economic position has gained in recent years, aided by demand for its gas as a substitute for Russia’s and support from NATO member Turkey. Feeling betrayed by Russia, the Armenian government has for the first time extended feelers toward the West — which is happy to entertain such overtures. Losing influence and friends Russia’s loss in the Caucasus has been dwarfed by the damage to its military position and influence in the Middle East. Russia supported the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad against the uprisings of the Arab Spring in 2011 and saved it with direct military intervention beginning in 2015. Yet in December 2024, Assad was unexpectedly swept away by a mélange of rebel groups. The refuge extended to Assad by Moscow was the most it could provide with the war in Ukraine having drained Russia’s capacity to do more. Russia’s possible withdrawal from the Syrian naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Khmeimim would remove assets that allowed it to cooperate with Iran, its key strategic partner in the region. More recently, Russia’s reliability as an ally and reputation as an armory has been damaged by Israeli attacks not only on Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon and Syria, but on Iran itself. Russia’s position in Africa would also be damaged by the loss of the Syrian bases, which are key launch points for extending Russian power, and by Moscow’s evident inability to make a difference on the ground across the Sahel region in north-central Africa. Dirty tricks, diminishing returns Stalemate in Ukraine and Russian strategic losses in Syria and elsewhere have prompted Moscow to rely increasingly on a variety of other means to try to gain influence. Disinformation, election meddling and varied threats are not new and are part of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. But recent efforts in East Europe have not been very productive. Massive Russian funding and propaganda in Romania, for example, helped produce a narrow victory for an anti-NATO presidential candidate in December 2024, but the Romanian government moved quickly to expose these actions and the election was annulled. Nearby Moldova has long been subject to Russian propaganda and threats, especially during recent presidential elections and a referendum on stipulating a “European course” in the constitution. The tiny country moved to reduce its dependency on Russian gas but remains territorially fragmented by the breakaway region of Transnistria that, until recently, provided most of the country’s electricity. Despite these factors, the results were not what Moscow wanted. In both votes, a European direction was favored by the electorate. When the Transnistrian legislature in February 2024 appealed to Moscow for protection, none was forthcoming. When Moldova thumbs its nose at you, it’s fair to say your power ranking has fallen. Wounded but still dangerous Not all recent developments have been negative for Moscow. State control of the economy has allowed for rapid rebuilding of a depleted military and support for its technology industry in the short term. With Chinese help and evasion of sanctions, sufficient machinery and energy allow the war in Ukraine to continue. And the inauguration of Donald Trump is likely to favor Putin, despite some mixed signals. The U.S. president has threatened tariffs and more sanctions but also disbanded a Biden-era task force aimed a punishing Russian oligarchs who help Russia evade sanctions. In the White House now is someone who has openly admired Putin, expressed skepticism over U.S. support for Ukraine and rushed to bully America’s closest allies in Latin America, Canada and Europe. Most importantly, Trump’s eagerness to make good on his pledge to end the war may provide the Russian leader with a deal he can call a “victory.” The shrinking of Russia’s world has not necessarily made Russia less dangerous; it could be quite the opposite. Some Kremlin watchers argue that a more economically isolated Russia is less vulnerable to American economic pressure. A retreating Russia and an embattled Putin could also opt for even more reckless threats and actions – for example, on nuclear weapons – especially if reversing course in Ukraine would jeopardize his position. It is, after all, Putin’s war. All observers would be wise to note that the famous dictum “Russia is never as strong as she looks … nor as weak as she looks” has been ominously rephrased by Putin himself: “Russia was never so strong as it wants to be and never so weak as it is thought to be.”

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Finally, after many leaks, hints, intimations and procrastinations, US President Donald Trump might have come up with something a bit more specific than his initial general promises to put an end to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 24 hours. For the first time a draft of his peace plan is on the table. The plan was revealed by various Ukrainian and European media last week and though it has never been officially confirmed by the White House or the State Department, there are reasons to believe that we indeed observe a gradual shaping of the new Administration’s position on arguably the most destructive and dangerous military conflict of our times. However, the devil is always in details. Let us have a closer look at what Trump has or may have in mind. Ceasefire According to the plan, the peace process should start with Presidents Putin and Zelensky having an urgent phone call followed by a face-to-face meeting no later than in the end of February or in the beginning of March. A complete ceasefire along the present line of contact should be in place by the day of 2025 Christian Easter (April 20) and European peacekeeping units will be asked to police a demilitarized zone separating the two sides (American troops will not have their boots on the ground). Shortly after that, by the time of the 80-year anniversary of the V-day in Europe (May 9), a comprehensive peace agreement should be signed and, if needed, ratified by the parties to the conflict. This is an exceptionally bold and ambitious time-table, but is it nonetheless realistic? First, it would be quite a challenge even to make Putin and Zelensky directly talk to each other. In fall of 2022, the Ukrainian President signed a special executive order forbidding himself engaging in any direct negotiations with his Russian counterpart. On the Russian side, there are serious doubts about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian leader since his term in power already expired in May of 2024 and no national elections have been held after that. More importantly, it would be very hard to enforce the ceasefire, if and when such a ceasefire is reached. The experience of the Minsk Agreement implementation and international monitoring is not very reassuring, and the line of contact today is much longer than it was back in 2015. To put together a well-trained and properly equipped international monitoring mission of tens of thousands uniformed men and women would be next to impossible, at least within the time framework suggested by the US Administration. Needless to say, Russia would hardly accept a EU/NATO peacekeeping mission on its territory. Territorial compromises Trump apparently suggests that both sides should stick to the territories that they now have under their control. This idea logically implies a demand for Kyiv to accept Russian sovereignty on the parts of the four former Ukrainian regions as well as on the Crimean Peninsula that was reunited with the Russian Federation eleven years ago after the referendum of March, 2014. The Ukrainian side should also withdraw from the Russian territories in the Kursk region that it currently occupies. In exchange Russia should stop its ongoing offensive in Donbass and limit its territorial acquisitions to what it already has in its possession. This proposal is clearly not exactly what either Kyiv or Moscow would like to see as the final peace settlement. In Ukraine, they still hope that at some point thy will be in a position to restore the territorial integrity of the country including what they lost back in 2014—namely, parts of Eastern Donbass and Crimea. The Russian leadership, in its turn, intends to capture at least all the remaining territories of the four regions that it does not fully control now (Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye) and maybe even to advance further West. (Kharkov, Odessa and so on). To reach a compromise between these two positions would be truly a formidable task. Future status of Ukraine According to Donald Trump, Ukraine should not become a NATO member—at least, in the foreseeable future. He remains skeptical about a possible Ukrainian contribution to the Alliance security, he does not want to enlarge the NATO’s zone of responsibility, and he does not want to cross Moscow’s red line on this very issue. However, Ukraine may still aspire to join the European Union before too long, and the United States is ready to assist Kyiv in meeting its European aspirations. A neutral status for Ukraine is something that many in Kyiv would lament and consider a serious setback, while many in Moscow would definitely appreciate and support. However, how can this neutrality be secured in the long term? After all, Ukraine has already been neutral; this status was explicitly stated in the very first declaration on Ukrainian sovereignty approved by the Ukrainian Parliament even before the Soviet disintegration and later on incorporated into the Ukrainian Constitution. And yet, since at least 2008 Kyiv was contentiously drifting away from this initial position; finally, the national Constitution was revised and the pro-Western Ukrainian political leadership started actively seeking membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. What would prevent future Ukraine from changing its mind once again in five or ten or twenty years from now, when neither Trump, nor Putin is around to stop it from moving in the NATO membership direction? Security guarantees Instead of offering Kyiv prompt NATO membership, Trump is ready to provide US security guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for getting for the US business a preferential access to valuable Ukrainian mineral resources—including natural gas, lithium, titanium and graphite. The United States will continue to assist Ukraine with military hardware deliveries till at least 2030, but these deliveries will no longer take form of charity—they should generate appropriate profits for the US defence sector and create jobs for American workers. This part of Trump‘s proposals remains highly ambiguous and unclear. What kind of security guarantees is the United States willing to offer Ukraine? Are we going to see US military bases on the Ukrainian soil or any other manifestations of the US military presence there? Is Trump ready to turn Ukraine into another Israel or another Japan? If this is the case, then does such an arrangement really differ a lot from a Ukrainian membership to NATO? Would Moscow easily accept a not-so-symbolic US military presence so close to its borders? The proposed US access to Ukraine’s natural resources also raises many questions. Ukraine indeed has repositories of valuable minerals (arguably amounting to USD 15 trillion of total value), but most of these repositories are located on the territories that are now controlled by Russia. Sanctions As an additional incentive for Moscow to demonstrate the needed flexibility, Trump offers Russia to lift economic sanctions as a part of the overall peace arrangement. He argues that the Western sanctions have a profound negative impact on the Russian economy, slow down Russia’s modernization and prevent the country from taking its rightful place within the international economic system. The prospect of lifting sanctions should therefore motivate the Kremlin to go for a reasonable compromise in order to put an end to the fratricidal conflict. This idea sounds great, but it seems that Trump offers more than he can deliver. First, Russia suffers more from the EU sanctions than from the US sanctions; the Russia-EU trade has always been significantly larger than the Russia-US trade. No US President can simply ‘order’ the European allies of the United States to completely reverse their current policy towards Moscow, even if the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is miraculously stopped. The odds are that the EU sanctions imposed on Moscow will be in place for a long time, even if the US sanctions are lifted. Second, even on the US sanctions lifting, Donald Trump is not that omnipotent. Some of these sanctions have been approved by the US Congress and have become national laws. To recall or even to ease them, one should pass an appropriate legislative decision on the Capitol Hill, which might turn out to be extremely complicated and protracted. Reconstruction of Ukraine Like in many other cases, Trump has absolutely no intention to spend large amounts of US taxpayer’s money on reconstructing such a distant land as Ukraine. Instead, the US President would like to impose this heavy burden on the European Union (exactly like he intends to impose the financial burden of Gaza reconstruction on the Arab Gulf states). The price tag of Ukraine’s reconstruction might amount to USD 500 billion, and EU should be prepared to annually allocate up to USD 50 billion for ten years. A part of the funding, however, can come from special duties imposed on Russia’s energy exports in exchange for lifting Western sanctions on the Russian hydrocarbons production. This part of Trump’s proposals is based on a number of arbitrary assumptions, which are hard to assess at this point. Nobody really knows how much the Ukrainian reconstruction will ultimately cost and how long time it will take. The actual financial capabilities of the European Union might turn out to be more modest than Trump apparently expects, especially given the fact that the US Administration’s wish list for Europe is not limited to supporting Ukraine only, but also includes more generous contributions to NATO, multiple trade concessions, more economic engagement in the Middle East and so on. Ukraine’s absorption capacity might turn out to be limited as well, given the present state of economic and administrative reforms, rampant corruption and the exodus of a large part of the county’s population to Europe. Finally, it is hard to imagine how Trump will convince Putin to pay duties on Russia’s energy exports, particularly when Trump remains committed to bringing the global energy prices down to the extent possible. European security So far, the Trump Administration has not been very prolific on how the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict should affect a more general problem of the European security. Still, this dimension of a potential agreement has to be kept in mind, if the idea is to provide for a lasting peace in the Euroatlantic space. Russian officials have stated more than once that the ongoing conflict is not just a clash between Russia and Ukraine, but rather a standstill between Russia and the ‘collective West’. That implies that any settlement should include a broader range of arrangements on the future European security architecture, such as multilateral confidence building measures, mil-to-mil contacts at various levels and even some forms of conventional arms control in Europe. The problem is that Trump has never been particularly interested in any meaningful forms of multilateralism including multilateral arms control or confidence building measures. Moreover, he has always been skeptical of any arms control, bilateral including, regarding it as an unnecessary and potentially even harmful way to limit the US abilities to outspend and to outperform all its adversaries and rivals. This is why during his first term in power Trump decided to abandon the US-Soviet INF Treaty, was not eager to extend the New START Agreement and decided to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. It is not clear how with such an attitude Donald Trump is planning to ensure that there will be no other dangerous crisis in Europe soon after a settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is reached. To sum up, it is definitely good news that Donald Trump has finally come with some kind of a peace plane for Ukraine. To have something to consider and to discuss is undoubtedly better than to have nothing and to speculate about what the White House may or may not offer. Still, the Trump plan in its current form is only half-baked. It might be the right first step, not much more than the very first step. A lot will now depend on the US Administration commitment, stamina, patience and its attention span. Peace talks are different from business negotiations that Trump is so used to. In business negotiation, you can accept failures to reach a good deal and you can move on to other opportunities, which you will always find around in plenty. In peace talks, failure is not an acceptable outcome. First published in the Guacha.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The conflict in the African Great Lakes region, which had long remained in a low-intensity state, flared up again in the second half of January 2025. In the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter – DRC), rebel forces of the anti-government group M23, fighting against the Armed Forces of the DRC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC), launched an offensive and captured new territories. As of January 27, M23 entered the city of Goma, the largest city in the province [1]. Moreover, the DRC authorities claim that the city is also occupied by regular units of the Rwandan Armed Forces [2]. The rebel offensive has triggered panic and an outflow of local residents as well as refugees – Goma had been a refuge for several hundred thousand displaced persons. There are casualties not only among civilians but also among the UN peacekeeping contingent (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo, MONUSCO) and peacekeepers from the Southern African Development Community – Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, SAMIDRC. The escalation of the conflict has been condemned by leading world powers and the United Nations – the UN Security Council has demanded an immediate ceasefire [3].  Rwanda plays a distinct role in these events. The Congolese rebel group M23 consists of ethnic Tutsis living in the DRC and aims to “ensure the rights of the Tutsi ethnic minority in the DRC” [4]. It was formed in 2012 and, after several military operations against government forces, ceased hostilities. However, in October 2022, M23 resumed military operations in North Kivu. The DRC government almost immediately accused Rwanda of fully supporting M23 — accusations that Rwanda has categorically denied and continues to deny to this day [5]. However, the United States and several European countries, citing intelligence reports, have openly stated that M23 is being used by Rwanda as a proxy force to conduct military operations in the eastern DRC [6]. The current fighting in North Kivu is a direct consequence of the failed attempt by the government of the Republic of Angola to mediate the peace process. The President of the DRC, Félix Tshisekedi, ran in the 2018 elections partly on a promise to achieve peace in the east of the country. However, throughout his time in office, he has failed to make any significant progress in this direction. In 2024, Angolan President João Lourenço proposed direct negotiations between the leaders of Rwanda and the DRC [7], which led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the two countries at the end of June 2024. However, further progress toward peace encountered a major obstacle: Tshisekedi categorically refused to recognize M23 as a participant in the negotiation process, stating that they are terrorists with whom direct dialogue is impossible [8]. Nevertheless, after a series of meetings between the foreign ministers of Angola, the DRC, and Rwanda, an agreement was reached that M23 representatives would still take part in the negotiations [9]. However, the trilateral summit in Luanda, scheduled for December 15, 2024, was canceled just days before it was set to take place. Both sides blamed each other for the meeting’s collapse [10]. As it now appears, the failed summit may have served as a starting point for M23's January offensive in North Kivu. Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, Angola’s Foreign Minister, Téte António, during a working breakfast with members of the UN Security Council, called on the Council to continue its strong support for the negotiation process, effectively acknowledging that Angola’s efforts on this track had failed [11]. At the same time, Rwanda’s Foreign Minister, Olivier Nduhungirehe, speaking at the UN Security Council on counterterrorism issues, sharply criticized the DRC government, stating that “despite the direct and clear threat of terrorism, the DRC is trying to divert attention from addressing real problems” and accusing the DRC of distorting the actual situation in the east of the country [12]. Just days after these statements, M23 launched its offensive. It is important to note that the rebels launched their offensive well-prepared. As early as October 2024, reports emerged that revenue from the sale of minerals was bringing M23 at least $300 000 per month, which the rebels used to arm and equip their combat units. For more than a year, M23 has controlled mines in the Rubaya area of North Kivu — these deposits contain 15% of the world’s coltan reserves, a strategically critical mineral essential for high-tech industries [13]. At the same time, FARDC units stationed in the province suffered from supply shortages and demonstrated low combat readiness [14]. As a result, M23 forces rapidly broke through, capturing key cities in the province. Currently, M23 (and, as it is believed, the Rwandan army) has taken control of the cities of Sake and Goma — securing all key crossroads and roads in this part of North Kivu. Sake provides M23 with a route south to the Numbi mining region, which is rich in tin, tantalum, niobium, and tungsten [15]. If this region also falls to the rebels, the revenue from mineral extraction and sales will reach enormous levels, transforming M23 from a purely military force into a political power. Additionally, Goma is a port on Lake Kivu, and with access to watercraft, the rebels could launch amphibious operations anywhere along the northern shores of the lake, further expanding their controlled territory. The most enigmatic factor at the moment remains the behavior of Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Since the start of M23's offensive on Goma, his administration has not issued a single official statement. The last time Kagame commented on the situation in North Kivu was during a press conference on January 9, where he expressed hope that the new U.S. administration would take a more thoughtful and balanced approach to the conflict, considering all influencing factors [16]. On January 26, 2025, Rwanda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a press statement expressing deep concern over the renewed escalation and reaffirming its commitment to a political resolution [17]. Apart from this, there have been no high-level statements from Kigali. However, political experts from various countries unanimously agree that all Rwandan state institutions, particularly the armed forces, are under Kagame’s total control [18]. They assert that any involvement of the Rwandan military in the DRC conflict — whether confirmed or merely suspected — would be impossible without his direct order. The most likely assumption is that Rwandan President Paul Kagame has begun implementing his long-term strategy: creating a buffer zone in eastern DRC with the help of M23. This would not only push the border further away (currently, the distance from Kigali to the DRC border is 150 km) but also significantly improve Rwanda’s economic position. The buffer zone’s territory would provide Rwanda with abundant water, agricultural, and mineral resources [19]. Moreover, such a buffer zone would give Kagame additional leverage in future negotiations, as the territories occupied by M23 would be directly linked to the political resolution of the conflict. A new territorial reality has already been established in eastern DRC. For Angolan President João Lourenço, this is a highly unfavorable outcome — his bid to become a regional peacemaker has failed [20]. One possible reason for Lourenço’s failure is the loss of U.S. interest in the DRC conflict at the end of 2024. As some analysts suggest, “Once Washington stopped applying pressure, Rwanda realized there was nothing to fear and withdrew from the negotiation process” [21]. Now, the task of translating this territorial reality into diplomatic and political terms has been taken up by Kenyan President William Ruto. On January 27, he issued an official statement announcing that a meeting between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame would take place in the near future. If this meeting occurs and results in any agreements, it will mark a diplomatic success for Ruto and strengthen his position on the regional stage [22]. Notes: [1] Rwandan-backed rebels enter Congo's Goma in major escalation // https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rebels-enter-centre-congos-goma-after-claiming-capture-city-2025-01-27/[2] DR Congo says Rwanda army in Goma // https://www.dw.com/en/dr-congo-says-rwanda-army-in-goma/a-71422564[3] Rebel Conflict in Congo Escalates with Capture of Goma // https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/latest-news/today-in-security/2025/january/goma-capture-congo-M23/[4] Luanda summit postponed: Kinshasa’s maneuvers to frustrate peace process // https://www.thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=Luanda--summit--postponed%3A--Kinshasa%E2%80%99s--maneuvers--to--frustrate--peace--process_1626[5] Rwanda denies backing armed group in DRC // https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/dr-congo-accuses-rwanda-of-backing-militia-violence-3828930[6] Rwandan army ‘ready to invade DRC’ and help rebels seize city // https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/jan/25/rwandan-army-ready-to-invade-drc-and-help-rebels-seize-city[7] Presidente angolano propõe diálogo directo entre Rwanda e RDC // https://angop.ao/noticias/politica/joao-lourenco-propoe-dialogo-directo-entre-rwanda-e-rdc/[8] Avancée du M23: Discours de Félix Tshisekedi (Intégralité) // https://actualite.cd/2022/11/04/avancee-du-m23-discours-de-felix-tshisekedi-integralite[9] POSTPONEMENT OF LUANDA SUMMIT DUE TO UNRESOLVED CRITICAL ISSUES // https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/postponement-of-luanda-summit-due-to-unresolved-critical-issues[10] Emergency ministerial meeting on the current escalation of the conflict in Eastern DRC // https://amaniafrica-et.org/emergency-ministerial-meeting-on-the-current-escalation-of-the-conflict-in-eastern-drc/[11] Angola Aims for UN Security Council Support On DRC Issue // https://allafrica.com/stories/202501230042.html[12] Africa: Rwanda Proposes Five Steps to Reinforce Africa's Counter-Terrorism Effort // https://allafrica.com/stories/202501230067.html[13] M23 rebel roup generates approximately $300,000 a month from mining-UN // https://www.africanews.com/2024/10/01/m23-rebel-group-generates-approximately-300000-a-month-from-mining-un//[14] Advancing M23 Fighters In DR Congo Aided By Rwanda Backing, Army Weakness // https://www.barrons.com/news/advancing-m23-fighters-in-dr-congo-aided-by-rwanda-backing-army-weakness-f021df51[15] Petrology and Detail Geological Mapping of the Precambrian Basement Rocks of the Sn-Ta-Nb Numbi Deposit, Democratic Republic of the Congo // https://www.iieta.org/journals/eesrj/paper/10.18280/eesrj.090102[16] Africa’s anticipation of Trump’s foreign policy // https://en.igihe.com/politics-48/article/africa-s-anticipation-of-trump-s-foreign-policy[17] STATEMENT ON SITUATION IN EASTERN DRC // https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/statement-on-situation-in-eastern-drc[18] The Case Against Rwanda's President Paul Kagame // https://www.newsweek.com/case-against-rwandas-president-paul-kagame-63167[19] What does Rwanda want in the DRC? // https://www.egmontinstitute.be/what-does-rwanda-want-in-the-drc/[20] Thousands uprooted as Congo M23 rebels near Goma in major advance // https://www.yahoo.com/news/thousands-uprooted-congo-m23-rebels-105837754.html[21] Advancing M23 Fighters In DR Congo Aided By Rwanda Backing, Army Weakness // https://www.barrons.com/news/advancing-m23-fighters-in-dr-congo-aided-by-rwanda-backing-army-weakness-f021df51[22] Rwanda, Congo presidents to meet as rebels take Goma, Kenya's leader says // https://www.voanews.com/a/rwanda-congo-presidents-to-meet-as-rebels-take-goma-kenya-leader-says-/7952210.html

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Security dialog among like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was founded in 2007 by the USA, Japan, Australia, and India to promote a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, secure freedom of navigation and balance the growing influence of China. After a temporary dissolution, QUAD was revived in 2017. Since then, there have been regular meetings of heads of state and government and foreign ministers, which have led to concrete working groups in areas such as maritime security, modern technologies, infrastructure, climate change, health, space, and cyber security. QUAD has made considerable progress, including the provision of COVID-19 vaccines, decarbonization initiatives, the promotion of renewable energy and programs to improve maritime surveillance and digital infrastructure. QUAD is not a formal alliance, but an informal forum without a mutual defense commitment. Germany and the EU should strengthen bilateral partnerships with the QUAD states to promote common goals such as maritime security, infrastructure development and climate protection and offer a sustainable alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Will QUAD change the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific? Founded in 2007 as an informal alliance by the USA, Japan, Australia and India, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) has proven its worth as a platform for regional security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, despite difficulties and interim dissolution. The original motivation for QUAD was the increasing concern about China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and the challenges to the rules-based order in the region. In recent years, cooperation in the QUAD has deepened and includes issues such as maritime security, maintaining free shipping lanes, the fight against terrorism and the promotion of sustainable economic development. Securing a free and open Indo-Pacific - in which all countries can act sovereignly and free from coercion - is a central concern of QUAD. The beginnings of cooperation between the four countries can be traced back to 20041. In response to the devastating Boxing Day tsunami in 2004, which killed over 230,000 people2, the USA, Australia, India, and Japan spontaneously formed an ad hoc grouping to pool and coordinate their resources and capacities for emergency relief in the disaster areas. The grouping disbanded after the end of the reconstruction aid in January 2005, but the positive outcome of the cooperation proved to be viable for the future and opened the way for further initiatives towards closer cooperation between the four Indo-Pacific states.3 First foundation and dissolution of QUAD It was the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who, as part of his new foreign and defense policy, called for a value-based dialogue between Japan, India, Australia, the USA, and other like-minded countries on common interests in the Indo-Pacific at the end of 2006. On May 25, 2007, representatives of the four countries met officially for the first time at an informal Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila.4 In September 2007, the maritime military exercise "Malabar" in the Indian Ocean, which had previously only been held bilaterally between the USA and India, was expanded to include participants from Japan, Australia and Singapore. This led to strong reactions from China, which sent official protest notes to the governments of the participating countries. Beijing portrayed QUAD as an anti-China initiative, while critics described the grouping as the nucleus of a future "Asian NATO "5. China's harsh criticism of the QUAD initiative and political changes in some of the four participating countries led to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue being dissolved after a brief time. Australia, where there was a change of government in December 2007, wanted to avoid a confrontation with its most important trading partner China and therefore announced its withdrawal from QUAD in February 2008. In Japan, the most important promoter of QUAD, Shinzo Abe, was forced to resign as Prime Minister at the end of 2007 after losing the elections. There was also increasing criticism of the purpose of QUAD in India and the USA, so that in 2008 the four countries ceased their activities in the direction of quadrilateral security cooperation.6 However, taking China into consideration did not lead to the hoped-for easing of tensions. On the contrary: China's massive military build-up, its territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, its threatening gestures towards Taiwan and the use of economic pressure to achieve foreign policy goals7 have further increased geopolitical tensions in the region. In the meantime, contacts and cooperation between the four QUAD states have continued and intensified at bilateral and minilateral level. In 2011, the first meeting at the level of state secretaries took place between the governments of Japan, India, and the USA. A similar trilateral cooperation meeting was established in 2015 between Japan, India, and Australia. India and the United States signed a Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2015 and a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016.8 These agreements are a prerequisite for the interoperability of the armed forces of both countries. Since October 2015, Japan has been a regular participant in the annual naval exercise "Malabar" alongside India and the USA. And in 2017, Indian armed forces took part in the Australian naval exercise AUSINDEX for the first time, and two years later also in the air force exercise Pitch Black. Australia has been involved in the Malabar exercises again since 2020.9 Revival of the QUAD Shinzo Abe, who returned to the office of Japanese Prime Minister in 2012, put the concept of a quadrilateral security alliance (Democratic Security Diamond) in the Indo-Pacific back on the political agenda. He succeeded in convincing the new US President Donald Trump of the idea, leading to the first meeting of high-ranking representatives from the USA, Japan, India, and Australia on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila in the Philippines in November 2017. The QUAD was revived.10 In June 2018, representatives of the four countries met on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting in Singapore and again in November of the same year at the East Asia Summit, also in Singapore. On May 31, 2018, the first official meeting of the foreign ministers of the four QUAD states finally took place on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. Since then, the four foreign ministers have met once a year to discuss regional strategic challenges and priorities.11 The Biden administration has upgraded the Quadrilateral Dialogue to an important instrument for the implementation of its Indo-Pacific policy. On March 12, 2021, the first summit of QUAD heads of state and government took place, still in virtual form due to the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of the summit, a joint final declaration, The Spirit of the QUAD,12 was published, which lists the key objectives and principles of the quadripartite dialog. On September 24, 2021, the QUAD heads of government met in person for the first time in Washington. Six permanent working groups were formed to deal with the policy areas of health, climate change and clean energy, critical and modern technologies, infrastructure, space, and cybersecurity.13 On March 4, 2022, the four heads of government of the QUAD states convened for a virtual summit to discuss the impact of Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine and to reaffirm the commitment of the four dialog partners to the Indo-Pacific region. The fourth QUAD Leaders’ Summit took place in Tokyo on May 24, 2022. The follow-up meeting planned for May 2023 in Sydney was canceled as US President Biden had to remain in Washington due to the domestic budget crisis. Instead, the heads of state and government met on May 20, 2023, on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Hiroshima. Prior to this, the foreign ministers of the QUAD met in India in March, where it was decided to establish a working group on combating terrorism.14 In 2024, there was one meeting at foreign minister level (July 29 in Tokyo, Japan) and one summit meeting of QUAD leaders (September 21, 2024, in Wilmington, USA). On September 20, 2024, one day before the summit in Wilmington, a bipartisan group of representatives and senators, the QUAD Caucus, was formed in the US Congress to promote cooperation between the USA and the other QUAD members (Japan, India, and Australia). In doing so, Congress is underlining the bipartisan recognition of the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific for the USA and strengthening the institutional anchoring of the QUAD partnership in the US political system.15 What concrete results has QUAD achieved since its revival in 2017? The six QUAD working groups established in 2021 cover the most important policy areas of quadrilateral cooperation: 1. Health Security Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the QUAD Group committed to producing one billion vaccine doses by the end of 2022 and making them available to countries in the Indo-Pacific. The USA, Japan and Australia supported the expansion of production capacities for coronavirus vaccines in India. Together, the four QUAD members donated over 400 million vaccine doses to Indo-Pacific countries in 2021 and 2022 and almost 800 million worldwide. In addition, the group of four supported the COVAX initiative with 5.6 billion US dollars. In September 2024, the "QUAD Cancer Moonshot" initiative was announced, which aims to reduce the number of cancer deaths in the Indo-Pacific, particularly through measures to prevent and treat uterine cancer16. 2. Climate Change The countries of the Indo-Pacific are particularly affected by climate change. The QUAD agenda aims to accelerate decarbonization, promote renewable energy and protect the maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific. This includes the expansion of clean hydrogen technologies, climate information services and early warning systems as well as the diversification of supply chains. 3 Critical and Emerging Technologies The QUAD countries are committed to the responsible and safe use of technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and 5G. Specifically, for example, the establishment of an Open Radio Access Network (RAN) in Palau, Micronesia, is being promoted, which will later be extended to other Pacific island states. 4. Space All four QUAD nations have their own space programs, which are linked by a large number of bilateral and minilateral cooperation projects. The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative, launched in 2022, aims to strengthen maritime security and transparency in the Indo-Pacific. It will provide countries in the region with real-time maritime surveillance information, primarily data from satellites, sensors, and other surveillance technologies. This will enable small and medium-sized coastal states in the Indo-Pacific to gain a better overview of maritime activities in their exclusive economic zones, such as illegal fishing, smuggling and piracy. 5. Cyber Security In 2022, the QUAD Cybersecurity Partnership was established to combat threats from cybercrime and state-sponsored attacks. The partnership is divided into four sectors, with each member of QUAD taking the lead in one sector to address cyber vulnerabilities. The sectors include critical infrastructure protection, supply chain resilience, skills training, and software security standards.17 6. Infrastructure QUAD countries are promoting the development of sustainable port infrastructure and announcing major investments in submarine cable projects to improve digital connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In 2022, the goal was set to invest up to USD 50 billion in infrastructure projects in the region within five years. Launched in 2023, the QUAD Infrastructure Fellowship will provide over 1,800 fellowships, exchanges and other program opportunities for government officials and infrastructure professionals in the region to share best practices in infrastructure management. Outside of these six main themes, the QUAD group also collaborates in other areas: The QUAD Fellowship Program provides scholarships for master's and doctoral students in the fields of mathematics, computer science, natural sciences and technology (STEM) in the US, and since 2024, applicants from the ten ASEAN countries have also been admitted18. The Counterterrorism Working Group was founded in 2023. Other areas of cooperation mentioned in the QUAD plans are sustainable, transparent, and fair lending and financing practices, nuclear stability, and critical minerals. Conclusion The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue QUAD has proven to be a stable and effective security policy dialog platform in recent years. QUAD has the potential to transform the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific by creating a strategic balance in the face of challenges such as China's rising power and territorial expansion. The QUAD promotes cooperation between the US, India, Japan, and Australia, the four most influential democracies in the region. Cooperation is based on shared values such as freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and adherence to international rules. QUAD is not a formal security alliance, there is no mutual defense commitment. It is a flexible, informal coalition forum that focuses on a wide range of issues, including broader security, the economy, infrastructure, technology, and climate change. QUAD has no institutional structures. There are annual summits of heads of state and government and foreign ministers, and the decisions of the summits are implemented by the state apparatuses of the member countries. The naval exercise "Malabar" is not an official part of QUAD but serves as a platform to strengthen military interoperability and is seen as an operational extension of QUAD's security objectives, particularly in the maritime domain. India plays a special role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. It contributes not only its geographical and geopolitical importance in the Indo-Pacific, but also a perspective characterized by strategic autonomy and multipolar diplomacy. India is regarded as an important representative of the so-called Global South and is seen as a counterweight to China in this group of states.19 On the other hand, India avoids presenting QUAD as an explicitly anti-Chinese alliance in order to avoid putting too much strain on its own sensitive relationship with China. The EU and Germany should adopt a strategically balanced position towards QUAD that considers both the geopolitical realities in the Indo-Pacific and their own economic and security interests. The EU and Germany share with the QUAD states the goal of preserving a rules-based order, particularly regarding international maritime law (UNCLOS). To exert greater influence on the region, Germany and the EU should strengthen bilateral partnerships with the QUAD states to promote common interests such as infrastructure development, new and critical technologies, climate protection and maritime security. Joint infrastructure development projects in the Indo-Pacific could offer a sustainable alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Information This publication of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. is for information purposes only. It may not be used by political parties or by campaigners or campaign helpers for the purpose of election advertising. This applies to federal, state, and local elections as well as elections to the European Parliament. The text of this work is licensed under the terms of "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 international", CC BY-SA 4.0 (available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de) References 1 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/2 Earthquake in the Indian Ocean 2004, https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erdbeben_im_Indischen_Ozean_2004  3 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/ 4 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue5 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/  6 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue 7 Feigenbaum, Eva A., „Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?”, MarcoPolo, Paulson Institute, 25. Juli 2017, https://macropolo.org/analysis/is-coercion-the-new-normal-in-chinas-economic-statecraft/?rp=m  8 Panda, Jagannath, „India and the ‘Quad Plus’ Dialogue”, 12. June 2020, RUSI, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/india-and-quad-plus-dialogue 9 Parker, Jennifer, „Not just another naval exercise: Malabar’s vital messaging”, 10. August 2023, The Strategist, ASPI, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/not-just-another-naval-exercise-malabars-vital-messaging/ 10 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue 11 Samir Saran, Satu Limaye, Vivek Mishra, Lilah Connell, Amy Namur, Robin McCoy, and Aryan D’Rozario, East-West Center, „Two Decades of the QUAD: Diplomacy & Cooperation in the Indopacific”, 14. June 2024,  https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/two-decades-quad-diplomacy-cooperation-indo-pacific/  12 The White House, 12. March 2021, Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: „The Spirit of the QUAD”, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/ 13 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, „The QUAD”, last visit 02.12.2024, in https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad 14 Ebd. 15 U.S. Representative Ami Bera, M.D. (D-CA), Press Release, 20. September 2024, https://bera.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=400409 16 Samir Saran, Satu Limaye, Vivek Mishra, Lilah Connell, Amy Namur, Robin McCoy, and Aryan D’Rozario, East-West Center, „Two Decades of the QUAD: Diplomacy & Cooperation in the Indopacific”, 14. June 2024, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/two-decades-quad-diplomacy-cooperation-indo-pacific/ 17 Ebd. 18 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Kooperation international, „QUAD-Fellowship-Programm auf ASEAN-Staaten ausgeweitet“, zuletzt gelesen am 02.12.2024 in https://www.kooperation-international.de/aktuelles/nachrichten/detail/info/quad-fellowship-programm-auf-asean-staaten-ausgeweitet  19 Heiduk, Felix; Wirth, Christian: „The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) between Australia, India, Japan and the USA “, SWP-Aktuell, Nr. 35, June 2023, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023A35/ 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This short analysis is based on the Security Complex theorem. Its departure point is the definition of the term, as introduced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver.  The author then briefly introduces the historical background of the Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and their relationships with Russia and suggests further readings for those willing to consult the existing scientific literature. The central part of the analysis focuses on five distinct components of the Caucasus Security Complex, which include interconnected security concerns, a distinctiveness as a geographical region, anarchical structure, shared security dynamics and Social construction of threats. The paper concludes by examining the geopolitical importance of the Caucasus region for the two Great powers, Russia and the United States of America, and the reference for the European Union. The introduction I will start by briefly explaining the notion of a Security Complex for the reader's convenience. The term "security complex" was introduced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver in their 1998 book Security: A New Framework for Analysis.  This refers to a distinct geographical region in which security concerns are interconnected. In other words, the security of one state in a complex is inextricably linked to that of others, creating a dynamic and often volatile environment. The key elements of this notion include: a) interconnected security concerns - a security complex is characterised by a web of security interdependencies where a threat to one state is perceived as a threat to others, leading to a shared sense of vulnerability and a need for collective security arrangements. b) Distinct geographical region - security complexes are geographically defined. They are typically regional in scope, although they sometimes encompass more significant areas. The geographical proximity of the states within a complex contributes to the interconnectedness of security concerns. c) Anarchical structure - just like the international system, security complexes operate within an anarchical structure. There is no overarching authority to enforce rules or resolve disputes that can lead to heightened tension and conflict. d)  States within a security complex share typical security dynamics, such as arms races, alliance formation, and conflict spirals. These dynamics create a self-reinforcing cycle of insecurity. e) Social construction of threats – the concept of security complex recognises that security threats are not objective realities but are socially constructed. States within a complex share a common understanding of what constitutes a threat, which shapes their behaviour and interactions. At the same time, it would be wise not to confuse the meaning of Security Complex with the notions of Security Community (shared sense of identity and trust among its members) or Security Regime (a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations). This short analysis will focus on three countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and explore their geopolitical situation at the beginning of 2025 from the perspective of a security complex theorem, particularly their relationships with Russia. Historical introduction The Caucasus, a region nestled between the Black and Caspian Seas, has a rich and tumultuous modern history. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, each with distinct cultural and historical trajectories, have navigated a complex landscape of imperial collapse, nation-building, and conflict. Armenia In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Armenians, then part of the Russian Empire, faced increasing tensions with their neighbours, particularly the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian Genocide, perpetrated by the Ottoman government during World War I, resulted in the systematic extermination of 1.5 million Armenians. Following the collapse of the Russian Empire, Armenia briefly experienced independence before being incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1922.    In 1988, the country was devastated by an earthquake and rising tensions with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to Armenia's renewed independence but also to the First Nagorno-Karabakh War with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan Azerbaijan, also part of the Russian Empire, declared independence in 1918, establishing the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. This short-lived independence ended in 1920 with incorporation into the Soviet Union. Similar to Armenia, Azerbaijan regained independence in 1991. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict dominated much of Azerbaijan's post-Soviet history, resulting in significant displacement and ongoing tensions.  Georgia Georgia, too, declared independence following the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. This independence was short-lived, as Georgia was invaded by the Red Army in 1921 and became part of the Soviet Union.  The country regained its independence in 1991. The post-Soviet period has been marked by internal conflicts, including the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and efforts to establish democratic institutions and closer ties with the West. The Security Complex of South Caucasus Regional Dynamics and Conflicts – Major issues The Caucasus region has been plagued by ethno-territorial conflicts, particularly the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This conflict, rooted in historical territorial claims and ethnic tensions, has resulted in significant human suffering and remains a major obstacle to regional stability. Readers interested in in-depth analysis performed by scholars researching the region are advised to consult Jansiz & Khojaste. Their thought-provoking paper discusses the history of the Caucasus crisis and its impact on regional security.  Börzel & Pamuk examine the challenges of Europeanization and fighting corruption in the Southern Caucasus. The region's geopolitical significance, located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, has also led to great power involvement, further complicating regional dynamics.   The following part of the analysis will look at the region through the lens of the Security Complex theorem to analyse its dynamics of security interrelationship. This will, in turn, allow us to understand the role of the Caucasus for the Great Powers and the European Union. Interconnected security concerns  A security complex is characterised by a web of security interdependencies where a threat to one state is perceived as a threat to others, leading to a shared sense of vulnerability and a need for collective security arrangements. According to Natalie Tavadze, “It is important to understand that Eurasianinism and Moscow’s approaches toward the Caucasus correspond to each other. In this regard, the Central Caucasus is considered as Russia’s backyard. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, the Black Sea, and the Caspian Sea constitute strategic dimensions for Russia. The latter is determined to dominate the region and uses the “ethnic card” to keep the countries of the Central Caucasus off balance. From the Russian standpoint, any foreign influence in its “near abroad” is seen through the prism of its national security. Such a menace should be thwarted by any means, as Moscow made clear more than once that it does not entertain any notion of conceding territories of its utmost geopolitical interests.”  This extended but thought-provoking quote from one of the local experts pretty well sketches the region's security dynamics. Now, let us look at its geographical dynamics. Distinct geographical region. Security complexes are geographically defined. They are typically regional in scope, although they sometimes encompass more significant areas. The geographical proximity of the states within a complex contributes to the interconnectedness of security concerns.  Geographically, the Caucasus is defined by the Caucasus Mountains, a formidable range dividing the region into the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus. The Greater Caucasus, the main range, boasts towering peaks like Mount Elbrus, the highest peak in Europe. This rugged terrain has historically isolated communities, leading to the development of a rich mosaic of languages and cultures. The Lesser Caucasus, located south of the Kura-Aras Lowland, further adds to the region's geographical complexity. This varied topography, ranging from high-altitude glaciers to fertile valleys and semi-desert landscapes, supports a remarkable biodiversity. The Caucasus's location at the crossroads of continents has made it a historical battleground and a corridor for trade and migration. This strategic importance has left its mark on the region's cultural landscape. The Caucasus is home to many ethnic groups, each with its distinct language, traditions, and history. This diversity, while enriching, has also been a source of conflict and tension. Throughout its history, the region has witnessed numerous internal and external power struggles. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Caucasus Anarchical structureLike the international system, security complexes operate within an anarchical structure. There is no overarching authority to enforce rules or resolve disputes that can lead to heightened tension and conflict. As Cornell and Starr adequately observe, “Many states in the Caucasus struggle with weak governance structures. This weakness is characterised by a lack of effective state control over territories, which undermines the rule of law and the provision of public services. The failure to establish strong, sovereign states based on the rule of law leads to corruption and mismanagement, further complicating governance.”  At the same time, Russia's role is significant. Russian policies have often destabilised the region, as Moscow's interventions and attempts to maintain dominance can exacerbate local conflicts and governance issues. The reliance on coercive diplomacy and military presence has undermined the sovereignty of local governments and complicated efforts toward conflict resolution.Shared security dynamicsStates within a security complex share typical security dynamics, such as arms races, alliance formation, and conflict spirals. These dynamics create a self-reinforcing cycle of insecurity. The region has been plagued by unresolved armed conflicts, which create a persistent security deficit. These conflicts destabilise the affected areas and have broader implications for regional peace and security. The ongoing hostilities hinder effective governance and contribute to widespread instability. Partly as a consequence of this, the region has seen a rise in organised crime and radical ideologies, particularly in the North Caucasus, where poverty and unemployment create fertile ground for extremist groups. The intertwining of criminality and political violence poses a significant threat to governance and societal stability.On top of that, one continues to observe ethnic and national tensions. The presence of various ethnic groups with competing national aspirations exacerbates tensions. This situation is further complicated by external influences and historical grievances, leading to a complex landscape of inter-ethnic relations that can quickly escalate into violence.Finally, there are serious socio-economic problems. Economic collapse and high poverty levels across the region contribute to governance challenges. The lack of economic opportunities fuels discontent and can lead to social unrest, making governance even more difficult.The social construction of threatsThe concept of security complex recognises that security threats are not objective realities but are socially constructed. States within a complex share a common understanding of what constitutes a threat, which shapes their behaviour and interactions. In the case of the Caucasus, it is easy to identify a number of threats and challenges that are typical for this security complex. Regional Destabilization -  the aftermath of the Chechen war and ongoing frozen conflicts in regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh create instability. These conflicts may still have the potential for spill-over effects and have been exploited by international terrorist networks. Authoritarian Governance - there is a trend of growing authoritarianism in the region, with Soviet-era power structures maintaining control. Political opposition is often suppressed, leading to a lack of democratic reforms and deteriorating living standards.Ecological Issues - the region faces significant ecological challenges, such as the deterioration of the Aral Sea and limited agricultural land, which contribute to instability and can exacerbate existing tensions.Militant and Radical Islam - the rise of militant Islamic groups, partly due to the exclusionary tactics of local regimes, poses a security threat, although it is currently considered a lesser factor compared to issues like drug trafficking.The remaining part of the article will focus on the Caucasus region's geopolitical importance for Russia, the USA, and the EU.Geopolitical ImportanceFor RussiaRussian Federation has been a significant power in the region for many years. "Retying the Caucasian Knot: Russia’s Evolving Approach to the South Caucasus" by Neil Melvin (published by Royal United Services Institute) explores Russia's changing role in the South Caucasus amid shifting geopolitical dynamics. Historically, Russia has viewed the region as a buffer against Western influence and as integral to its ambitions in the Black Sea and the Middle East. However, the emergence of multipolarity and the involvement of new international actors, such as Turkey, Iran, and China, have challenged Russia's dominance. The 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts further shifted the balance of power, diminishing Russia's leverage, particularly with Armenia. In response, Russia is reconfiguring its strategy, emphasising economic and transport ties while maintaining a security presence. The document argues that Russia seeks to reassert its influence by fostering relationships with regional powers and adapting to the new geopolitical landscape. The Euro-Atlantic community faces challenges in countering Russia's efforts as regional states pursue multi-alignment policies, and the prospect of NATO and EU integration diminishes. Ultimately, the paper highlights the need for the West to recalibrate its approaches to effectively engage with the evolving realities of the South Caucasus.Additionally, the South Caucasus is significant for Russia for several reasons. Firstly, Russian troops in the South Caucasus allow Russia to project military power and influence regional security dynamics. Following the Second Karabakh War, Russia positioned peacekeepers in Azerbaijan and has military bases in Armenia, reinforcing its role as a key security provider in the area. Economically, the South Caucasus is strategically important for energy transit routes. Russia aims to maintain control over energy supplies and infrastructure that pass through the region, ensuring its leverage over energy distribution to Europe and other markets. Finally, Russia's involvement in mediating conflicts, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, allows it to assert its role as a key player in regional stability. By doing so, Russia can prevent conflicts from escalating that might threaten its interests or lead to Western intervention. For the USAIn 2017, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published an interesting analysis by Rumer Sokolsky and Stronsky. According to the authors, the importance of the South Caucasus region for the U.S. is undisputable and rests on several arguments. According to the document, the main interests of the U.S. in the South Caucasus include: preserving regional stability (preventing the resumption of frozen conflicts and promoting a peaceful environment among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), supporting democratic change and governance (the U.S. seeks to support democratic transformations and better governance in the South Caucasus states, facilitating their integration into the international community), economic development (the U.S. is interested in fostering economic growth and development within the South Caucasus, recognizing that economic prosperity can contribute to stability), energy security (although the significance of Caspian energy resources is noted, allegedly the U.S. interest in energy from the region has become less vital due to changes in global energy markets) and finally, countering illicit activities (the U.S. is concerned with combating transnational crime and illegal trafficking, which poses risks to regional stability and security).  According to James Carafano (Vice President of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and the E. W. Richardson Fellow Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation), the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, which started in February 2022, caused the United States to reconsider its global interests and responsibilities diametrically.  Accordingly, the conflict has highlighted the need for energy diversification in Europe, leading to renewed interest in the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) and other regional partnerships. The SGC, which connects gas fields in Azerbaijan to Europe, is crucial for reducing reliance on Russian energy and enhancing European energy security. Next, regional integration. Projects like the modernization of ports in Georgia and Azerbaijan are vital for developing logistics and transport networks and promoting regional cooperation. Turkey is expected to play an increasingly significant role in the South Caucasus, supporting regional integration and security as Georgia seeks alternatives to NATO and EU membership.The remaining challenges from the perspective of the US include: geopolitical Tensions (Russia, China, and Iran continue to exert influence in the region, although their capacities may be overstretched due to the ongoing war and sanctions), economic viability (the middle corridor faces challenges such as customs and border control issues and the need for modern infrastructure. However, it presents an alternative logistical route that is gaining interest from various stakeholders); climate policy Implications (the ongoing energy crisis due to the war in Ukraine may prompt changes in climate policies, potentially favouring increased investments in oil and gas infrastructure). Last but not least, the path ahead requires the U.S. to consider military cooperation - enhanced US military support for Azerbaijan could signal a deeper commitment to regional stability, Three Seas Initiative (3SI) - success in expanding the 3SI could benefit the South Caucasus by fostering infrastructure development and regional integration, Black Sea security - NATO's evolving role in Black Sea security will be critical in linking to the middle corridor and ensuring regional stability and finally investment in energy resources - interest in the Transcaspian Gas Pipeline and other energy initiatives will be significant for Europe's efforts to diversify energy supplies.For Europe (The EU)The South Caucasus is essential for the EU for several reasons. Firstly as a geostrategic gateway. The region is a crucial gateway between Europe and Asia, making it significant for trade routes and connectivity. It is positioned at the intersection of major global trade routes, enhancing the EU's access to East and South markets. Secondly, in terms of energy supplies. The South Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, plays a vital role in the EU's energy strategy, especially as the EU seeks to diversify its energy supplies and reduce dependence on Russian energy. Azerbaijan is a key supplier of natural gas to the EU, which has become increasingly important following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.Thirdly geopolitically, the region's geopolitical landscape has shifted due to recent conflicts, including the war in Ukraine. The EU's engagement with South Caucasus countries is essential for maintaining stability and influencing regional dynamics, especially as these nations navigate their foreign policy options between the EU and Russia.Fourthly, as an economic partner. Strengthening ties with the South Caucasus countries can enhance economic collaboration, which is particularly important given the EU's interest in bolstering regional trade and investment. This can also increase economic growth and stability in the EU's neighbourhood.Finally, The South Caucasus is becoming increasingly significant in the context of EU sanctions against Russia, as it could serve as a transit route for goods. The EU's ability to monitor and influence trade flows through this region is critical for enforcing its sanctions.ConclusionThis short analysis proves the importance of the Caucasus (South Caucasus, to be more exact) for the international community and its potential to play the role of an essential geopolitical factor that could potentially tip the scale regarding the global balance of power. Recent political developments in Georgia (Georgian Protests 2024 – 2025), where the ruling party, Georgian Dream, won the majority of seats in parliament, were met with protests fueled by claims of the opposition parties that the elections were fraudulent.  The winning party has decided to suspend the talks with the European Union about the country’s accession to the EU until 2028.  The move is seen as anti-EU (ergo pro-Russian).  At the same time, pro-Russian commentators have claimed that the demonstrators have been supported by the CIA (a claim that has been put forward with regard to the Ukrainian Maidan of 2013 or even the HK protests of 2019). As it appears, the Southern Caucasus plays a crucial role on the geopolitical chessboard attended by the U.S.A., Russia, Turkey, Iran and the EU. All of them are, at least for the time being, interested in peace and stability, which means status quo, at least as long as the war in Ukraine is not decidedly over. The future depends, among others, on the outcome of the end of the Ukrainian war and the visions and actions of the 47th President of the U.S., who already stunned the world with his claims regarding the Panama Canal and Greenland.References1  Buzan, B and Wæver, O. 1998. “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.” Lynne Rienner Publishers.2  “Armenia.” 2018. https://armeniapedia.org/index.php?title=Armenia. 3  “აქართველო.” 2024. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Georgia_(country). 4  Jansiz, Ahmad, and Mohammad Reza Khojaste. 2015. “Conflicts in the Caucasus Region and Its Effects on Regional Security Approach.” Journal of Politics and Law. Canadian Center of Science and Education. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v8n1p83. 5  Börzel, Tanja A., and Yasemin Pamuk. 2011. “Pathologies of Europeanisation: Fighting Corruption in the Southern Caucasus.” West European Politics. Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.631315.  6  Tavadze, Natalie. 2024. “Geopolitics of the Central Caucasus.” Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-geopolitics-of-the-central-caucasus/ 7  Jansiz, Ahmad, and Mohammad Reza Khojaste. 2015. “Conflicts in the Caucasus Region and Its Effects on Regional Security Approach.” Journal of Politics and Law. Canadian Center of Science and Education. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v8n1p83. 8   Cornell, E. S and Starr, F.S. 2006. The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe. Silk Road Paper. Central Asia – Caucasus INstitutte Silk Road Studies Program. https://isdp.eu/wp-content/uploads/publications/2006_cornell-starr_the-caucasus-a-challenge-for-europe.pdf   9  Schmidt, Jürgen. "Security Challenges in the Caucasus and Central Asia - A German and European Perspective." Paper presented at the German-U.S. Conference, Conflicts in the Greater Middle East and the Transatlantic Relationship, Jena, February 28 - March 1, 2003. 10  Melvin, Neil. *Retying the Caucasian Knot: Russia’s Evolving Approach to the South Caucasus*. Occasional Paper. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2024. Accessed 30.1.2025. https://static.rusi.org/retying-the-caucasian-knot-russias-evolving-approach-to-the-south-caucasus.pdf 11  Neset, Siri, Mustafa Aydin, Ayça Ergun, Richard Giragosian, Kornely Kakachia, and Arne Strand. *Changing Geopolitics of the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War: Prospect for Regional Cooperation and/or Rivalry*. CMI Report, No. 4. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, September 2023. https://www.cmi.no/publications/8911-changing-geopolitics-of-the-south-caucasus-after-the-second-karabakh-war 12  Rumer, Eugene, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski. U.S. Policy Toward the South Caucasus: Take Three. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13079. 13  Carafano, James. "Future and Consequences of US Strategic Interest in the South Caucasus." *Caucasus Strategic Perspectives* 3, no. 2 (Winter 2022): 41-51. Caucasus Strategic Perspectives https://cspjournal.az/post/future-and-consequences-of-us-strategic-interest-in-the-south-caucasus-489. 14  Akhvlediani, Tinatin. "The EU and the South Caucasus: Geoeconomics at Play." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/the-eu-and-the-south-caucasus-geoeconomics-at-play?center=europe&lang=en 15  Human Rights Watch. "World Report 2024: Georgia." Last modified January 31, 2025. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/georgia. 16  Shamin, Sarah., 3 Dec. 2024. “Georgia protests: What’s behind them and what’s next?”. ALJAZEERA. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/3/georgia-protests-whats-behind-them-and-whats-next  17  DISINFO: Georgia protests are a planned CIA operation according to Maidan scenario. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/georgia-protests-are-a-planned-cia-operation-according-to-maidan-scenario/  see also: Kaltenberg, Kit., 6 Oct. 2023. “A Maidan 2.0 color revolution looms in Georgia”. https://thegrayzone.com/2023/10/06/maidan-color-revolution-georgia/ 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Conflict hotspots and democratic instability are the major challenges facing a continent that now everyone in the world wants to partner with. In these, which will be the first articles of the year, we aim to reflect on 2025, a key year to consolidate Africa's growing importance in global geopolitics, a trend that has been evident in the last two years. A key point: we are just days away from the inauguration of an unleashed Donald Trump* in international relations. It will be crucial to observe how he handles his ties with Africa and how African countries react in a world marked by populism, far-right politics, and the decline of multilateral organizations. This weakens global consensus and reduces the prominence of Human Rights in increasingly polarized international debates, marked by disinformation and noise. Today, I will address the main challenges and threats facing the continent, from a more security-oriented perspective, including the main active and potential conflicts. Next week, I will take a more positive approach, focusing on the opportunities, even in this uncertain global scenario. Sudan: The worst humanitarian catastrophe in the least mediated war Sudan is facing the worst humanitarian catastrophe today, with over 150,000 deaths, millions of displaced people and refugees since the civil war began in April 2023. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has left 24 million people facing food insecurity and triggered a cholera outbreak, accounting for 10% of the global humanitarian needs despite representing less than 1% of the world's population. In 2025, the outlook remains bleak. The supply of weapons and fuel by Russia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates fuels the conflict, while the lack of political will between the SAF and RSF blocks any progress toward peace. Without a drastic change in international intervention, Sudan will remain trapped in a cycle of war, hunger, and global neglect. The conflict in Sudan is so complex that it is impossible to clearly define who the aggressors and the victims are, unlike in Ukraine or Palestine. In a world of simplification and misinformation, these complexities are overlooked, which explains why Sudan receives so little attention. Sahel In 2025, Sahel faces growing political instability and jihadist violence. Coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have led to the formation of the Sahel Alliance (AES), an anti-Western military bloc seeking to consolidate its authority. However, it must gain legitimacy both with citizens and international institutions while managing crises in governance, development, and security. In this context, the region's stability and regional influence will depend on its relationship with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (it is expected that in the coming days or weeks, the definitive rupture and exit** of the three countries from this West African economic bloc will be official), the African Union (which is also undergoing elections and renewal of its leaders) and foreign powers. Russia's growing presence, especially through the previously known Wagner Group (now Africa Corps), further complicates the dynamics in the Sahel. Moscow has filled the void left by France's withdrawal and the diminished influence of the EU, offering military support to the juntas in exchange for expanding its geopolitical influence (while also taking large amounts of gold to finance its invasion of Ukraine). However, the activities of Russian soldiers have been linked to human rights abuses, which could exacerbate social tensions and the delegitimization of military governments. It is a complicated moment, with a context of reinforcing the anti-Western narrative in the region (Senegal and Ivory Coast have already joined the call for the French to withdraw their troops from the military bases they still maintain in those countries) while consolidating the military juntas' dependence on external actors, rather than strengthening their state capabilities. The rise of jihadist organizations and the resulting violence remain the biggest security challenge for the region. Factors such as poverty, corruption, and state weakness perpetuate the influence of these groups, which have shown a remarkable ability to adapt and fund themselves through the exploitation of local resources and illicit activities. The withdrawal of international forces has left a security vacuum that not only facilitates the expansion of their territorial and social control but also increases their recruitment capacity, as they become the only option for some young people to find a way to support themselves. We thus have a prolonged Sahel crisis ahead, with all the implications it holds for the migration scenario along the so-called Atlantic Route, now primarily driven by young Malians fleeing the instability caused by jihadism and government breakdown. At the same time, we must remain attentive to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, whose control should be a concern for us. Other conflicts We must not forget that there are other points on the African continent that we must remain constantly alert to. Here, telegraphically, we highlight the main ones: Somalia The humanitarian crisis in Somalia remains one of the most complex in the world, exacerbated by internal conflicts, clan violence, and recurring climate disasters. In 2024, more than 4.5 million people in 20 districts were affected by insecurity and clashes, including over seventy clashes between clans since June, which caused the displacement of nearly 395,000 people. Additionally, military operations against the jihadist group Al-Shabaab and protection incidents related to displacement, which exceeded 11,000 between January and October 2024, are worsening the situation. Climate change has increased the country's vulnerability, with devastating events such as the 2020-2023 drought and the 2023 Deyr floods, which caused damages estimated at $176.1 million in 16 districts. The combination of conflicts and climate crises continues to undermine the country's recovery and development efforts. Democratic Republic of the Congo The DRC faces a critical stage in 2025, marked by the intensification of armed conflicts and severe food insecurity. Tensions in North Kivu, due to the advance of the M23/AFC group, and the increased military presence in provinces such as Maniema and Mai-Ndombe, threaten to cause massive displacement of people. Additionally, the concerning projections from United Nations agencies (FAO and WFP) on acute food insecurity foresee a significant deterioration for the most vulnerable populations in the country. Ethiopia Following the war between the central Ethiopian government and the northern Tigray region, Ethiopia has not yet closed the chapter on active conflicts, as it remains embroiled in a violent internal conflict, this time led by militia groups from the Amhara and Oromia regions. There are also concerns about the return of political hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  —-*Article was written before Trump’s inauguration, which was on January 20, 2025**Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso formally exited ECOWAS on January 29, 2025.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction For some international analysts, the invasion by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, into the Republic of Ukraine, led by Volodymyr Zelensky, on February 24, 2022, was a surprise. This offensive was meant to conquer Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, and Kharkiv, the second-largest city in the country. However, the war that was expected to be quick and low-cost in terms of human lives, with an aura of liberation from the "neo-Nazi government" and the "Ukrainian oligarchy," turned into a much slower and bloodier conflict than the Kremlin anticipated. It is important to clarify that in 2014, the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula, which was part of the territory of Ukraine. Shortly after, pro-Russian rebels from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, supported by Moscow, began a popular uprising, leading to a civil war against Ukrainian troops. In 2019, when pro-Western President Volodymyr Zelensky came to power, clashes between both sides intensified. In February, before the invasion, Putin signed decrees recognizing the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine as independent states, accusing the United States (U.S.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of expanding eastward into Europe, pushing Ukraine’s membership in NATO, and threatening Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. During the first week of the war, the Ukrainian president ordered a general military mobilization to defend Ukrainian territory from the Russian advance, while both the U.S. and its European Union (EU) allies announced political and economic sanctions (energy, transport, finance) against the Russian Federation and the expulsion of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, which includes over 11,000 financial institutions from over 200 countries. This system, based in Brussels, Belgium, was created to facilitate fast and secure cross-border payments and relies on confidentiality, validity, and accessibility of information from participating members. Western multinationals sold their assets in Russia and canceled any partnerships with Russian firms. These measures took Putin by surprise, although thanks to his alliance with China for the sale of gas and oil, he was able to navigate the blockade. Price hikes hurt Russian workers, who saw their income decrease due to rising prices for essential goods. As stalled negotiations continued between the Russians and Ukrainians, Russian troops halted due to Ukrainian resistance, which received weapons and supplies from NATO. This work provides a brief description and analysis of the factors that led to the Russian Federation’s invasion of the Republic of Ukraine and its economic and political consequences for both countries, as well as the role of the U.S. and NATO in the conflict. This invasion is simply a continuation of the longstanding conflict between both countries, especially since the first decade of the 21st century due to territorial and geopolitical issues involving NATO, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Ukraine. In this regard, NATO expanded eastward after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), despite Putin’s warnings. 1. A crisis that began before 2022 In March 2014, a referendum against the opinion of Kyiv was held in Crimea and the autonomous city of Sevastopol, in which pro-Russian inhabitants, who were the majority, decided to join the Russian Federation. This referendum was not accepted by Ukraine, the U.S., and the EU, thus, Moscow incorporated Crimea into its territory, claiming that the peninsula had always been part of Russia. Meanwhile, in April, pro-Russian paramilitary groups took the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which are adjacent to Russia, with supplies and weapons from Moscow. By May, referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk declared the regions as independent republics, although they did not want to join the Russian Federation. The Minsk I Agreement, signed in 2014 between Russia and Ukraine under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), established a roadmap to end the civil conflict and normalize the status of both regions. It aimed for a permanent ceasefire, decentralization of power, the release of hostages, border monitoring with Russia, elections, improved health conditions, and the withdrawal of foreign fighters. The Minsk II agreement, signed in 2015, called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from both sides, pension payments to residents, the establishment of a sanitary zone, elections, prisoner exchanges, and the granting of autonomy to the region, allowing Ukraine to recover the border areas with Russia. Both agreements failed, and fighting resumed. Putin consistently claimed that Ukraine had no intention of implementing the agreements and had only signed them due to military losses, while for the U.S. and its allies, Putin always intended to recognize the independence of both regions, betting on the failure of the negotiations. 2. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Ukraine: The war between both countries Putin had warned months earlier that Western powers, led by the United States, should negotiate with him over the expansion of NATO eastward, which was affecting Russia’s security. Putin demanded that Ukraine not be forced to join NATO, arguing that such a move would not provide any security guarantees for Russia. However, the invasion was not unexpected, as weeks before there had been satellite images showing the deployment of Russian troops and armored vehicles: "Russia had also announced, albeit inconsistently and unclearly, that it would adopt ‘technical-military’ measures against Ukraine if its demands for security guarantees and neutrality regarding the Atlantic Alliance were not accepted" (Sanahuja, 2022, 42). Ukraine’s incorporation into NATO would mean that biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons could be stationed there, something the Russians deemed unjustified since the Warsaw Pact had disappeared in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR. What the Russian Federation sought, as the world’s second-largest military power, was to prevent missiles from pointing at its territory from Ukraine due to NATO’s expansion and U.S. militaristic intentions. The Russian Federation, as one of the key international actors, even as a state strategically involved across multiple continents, felt cornered and overwhelmed in its strategic interests. The Russians sought NATO guarantees to prevent further expansion and desired security at the old geopolitical style for their borders: "On other economic and strategic issues, the Russian state continues to control its vital areas. Corporations controlling hydrocarbons, aerospace, and infrastructure, among others, are state-owned" (Zamora, 2022). On the other hand, Russian nationalism, which considered Ukraine and Russia to be sister nations, has served as a justification for the invasion. Early in the century, Putin was closer to Western positions, but after seeing that his concerns about NATO’s expansion were ignored, he turned to Russian nationalism, seeking to create a ‘hinterland’ in the old Tsarist style, denying Ukraine’s status as an independent state and instead treating it as a historical product allied with Russia. Another reason for Putin to invade Ukraine was to defend the two “people's republics” in the Donbas region: Donetsk and Luhansk. The Russian Federation recognized both regions as "sovereign states" because they had never been granted autonomy. From Putin’s perspective, the invasion was based on the United Nations Charter, which stated that a country under a "genocide" by its government should receive help, as was happening in the two “sovereign states.” According to his view, the measures taken by the Russian Federation were related to Ukraine’s political indecision in controlling the paramilitary militias that were attacking the two independent republics. Due to the failure of the Minsk agreements, Russia was forced to intervene. Following this reasoning, before the Russian intervention, the U.S. and its allies had begun providing significant amounts of modern weapons, not only to rearm the Ukrainian military forces but also to give them the ability to invade Donbas. The Ukrainian army, along with intelligence services trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), constituted a risk for the pro-Russian population in Donbas, so despite Western warnings, the Russian Federation was compelled to intervene. To summarize, in the first phase, Moscow's objectives were to overthrow the “neo-Nazi” government of Kyiv (although this objective was sidelined later due to Ukrainian resistance and Western sanctions), prevent Ukraine from joining NATO to avoid missiles close to its borders, defend the pro-Russian population of Donbas, secure recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, and finally declare the independence of the republics of Luhansk and Donetsk, or, as happened later, hold referendums to annex these regions to the Russian Federation. However, the United Nations General Assembly thought differently from the Russian leader and approved in March the resolution 2022, A/RES/ES-11/1, for humanitarian aid in Ukraine, condemning “in the strongest terms the aggression committed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine” (article 2), demanding “that the Russian Federation immediately cease the use of force against Ukraine” (article 3), and calling for “the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” (article 4). At the same time, while reinforcing the military front, the Russian Federation economically cut gas supplies to Western European countries. What the war demonstrated was the adaptability of the Ukrainian military to fight under unfavorable conditions, using elastic attacks in different places with help from terrain knowledge, spies, and satellite images and drones provided by the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. aid approved by the government of Joseph Robinette Biden Jr. until 2023 reached 40 billion dollars through the Lend-Lease Act for the Defense of Democracy in Ukraine. (Sanahuja, 2022). On the contrary, on the Russian side, the underestimation of the resistance of Ukrainian armed forces, the "Special Military Operation," was compounded by the underestimation of Ukrainian national sentiment, combined with planning problems, tactical issues, supply and logistics challenges, and the low morale of soldiers who did not want to fight against Ukrainians, despite the Kremlin’s calls to battle the "oligarch and neo-Nazi cliques" running Kyiv’s government. Furthermore, ignoring the warnings from the West and Kyiv, Putin announced the annexation of the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, after the results of the referendums showed over 95% support for annexation to the Russian Federation. In response to the annexation, Ukrainian President Zelensky officially requested Ukraine's membership in NATO. This confirmed the definitive cutoff of gas supplies to Europe, causing concern in industries across various countries, especially in small and medium-sized enterprises. 3. The United States, NATO, and China Currently, China and India are the leading buyers of Russian gas, even more so than all of Europe, with discounts granted by the Russians. This demonstrates that the world is no longer unipolar, but multipolar, with the decline of Europe and the economic rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India. While the U.S. leads militarily and is economically stronger than Russia, it is less powerful than the PRC. Therefore, attacking a Chinese ally with nuclear weapons is weakening the PRC, which does not possess many nuclear weapons itself. The U.S. helped the disintegration of the USSR, and now it also seeks the disintegration of the Russian Federation, or at least a regime change, distancing Putin from power and ensuring that the new government is more friendly with the West. This is despite the initial intention of Putin during his first term to join NATO, a request that was denied, and the Russian help (accepting the installation of U.S. bases in Central Asian countries) that the U.S. received when it invaded Afghanistan, when both countries had the same enemies (the Taliban and Al-Qaeda). Although the Russian Federation has not been able to freely use its dollar reserves, as part of them were held in Western countries, it has also benefited from the rise in gas and oil prices, which it continued to export, particularly to the PRC, which has not joined the sanctions. These price hikes not only disrupted the global economy, generating inflation in NATO countries but also increased the prices of minerals and energy, harming capitalist countries and, paradoxically, benefiting the Russians as they sell these commodities. The Russian economy has resisted more than expected, and the ruble, which depreciated at the beginning of the conflict, has recovered. Those who suffered the consequences of the sanctions were the Europeans who import gas and oil. For the U.S. and its allies, the next enemy to defeat is China, as, according to them, global problems require global solutions. Additionally, China has been criticized for not sanctioning and condemning the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is considered a threat to peace by NATO because it seeks, through coercion and annexation, to establish a sphere of influence and direct control with conventional and cyber means, destabilizing Eastern and Southern European countries. If there was any semblance of autonomy by European countries towards the U.S., the crisis has shattered those efforts. Before the crisis, the U.S. complained that Europeans were not doing enough to maintain the alliance, specifically by increasing the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dedicated to defense. The Ukrainian situation has placed them under the U.S. wing, and that autonomy has vanished for the time being. With the election of Donald Trump as president, the situation in Ukraine enters a new phase. Although the Ukrainian president has stated that technical teams have been formed to address the issue of the war with the Russians, there is still no set date for a meeting. Trump also pointed out that Putin is destroying Russia after years of war, generating inflation and economic problems due to the lack of an agreement to end the conflict, although he did not provide specifics on a potential meeting with the Russian president. Trump has encountered a war whose resolution is clearly more complicated than he initially believed. However, from the Russian side, President Putin stated, “we listen to your statements about the need to do everything possible to avoid a Third World War. Of course, we welcome that spirit and congratulate the elected president of the U.S. on his inauguration,” which could be interpreted as an approach to the new administration (Infobae, 2025). The U.S. president, during his presidential campaign had announced that he would end the war in 24 hours, but then the deadline was extended to 100 days. However, now he is seeking a meeting with his Russian counterpart in the coming months, which has proven that the solution to the Russo-Ukrainian war is more complicated than it seemed. Trump has also threatened new sanctions on the Russian Federation if it does not sit at the negotiation table. He has also mentioned that he expects Chinese help to pressure Moscow to seek an end to the conflict. In summary, the U.S. president is more interested in solving internal issues like Latin American migration at the Mexican border than in addressing a war that has lasted almost three years. Final Comments The Republic of Ukraine has been used by Western powers to curb the anti-unipolar stance of the Russian Federation. To maintain Western predominance, the U.S. and allied countries have launched a struggle against the Russians, but through Ukraine, cooperating militarily, politically, and economically. The security policy developed by the U.S. in recent years has shown, on one hand, the growing military power with the maintenance of bases worldwide, from which they can attack or at least influence various countries to defend their interests. On the other hand, the use of this policy has led to the decline of the U.S. economy in the face of competition with the PRC, which has not only increased its GDP but also its productivity, foreign investments, and technological development. In other words, today, Russia is the main opponent, an ally of China, and later, it will be China. The U.S. foreign policy, which sought Ukraine’s membership in NATO, has led Putin to intervene militarily in an invasion in which he believed he would be received as a liberator but encountered fierce nationalist resistance, despite calling the Ukrainian leaders "neo-Nazis." The Russian response to NATO’s eastward expansion is related to security concerns. But they also point to the injustice committed by Western countries. According to the Russians, while they were sanctioned for the invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. was not sanctioned when it invaded Iraq, nor was NATO when it intervened in Libya. The U.S. considered the invasion as an attack on the international order and on American supremacy in the European continent, which is why they are intervening in Ukraine — to attack an invading power that seeks to recover its geopolitical role at both the regional and global levels, as it had during the USSR era. The outcome of the war remains uncertain, as the Ukrainians have invaded and occupied a large part of the Russian region of Kursk, where they have taken towns and prisoners to use as bargaining chips in future negotiations with Russia, while the destruction of infrastructure and the death toll continue to rise. References 1. -Infobae. (2022). Putin vuelve a jugar la carta nuclear y llama a falsos referendos para anexionar cuatro provincias de Ucrania. Buenos Aires. 21 de septiembre. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2022/09/21/putin-vuelve-a-jugar-la-carta-nuclear-y-llama-a-falsos-referendos-para-anexionar-cuatro-provincias-de-ucrania/2. -Infobae. (2022). Vladimir Putin anunció la anexión de las regiones ucranianas de Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson y Zaporizhzhia. Buenos Aires. 30 de septiembre. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2022/09/30/vladimir-putin-anuncio-la-anexion-de-las-regiones-ucranianas-donetsk-luhansk-kherson-y-zaporizhzhia/3. -Infobae. (2025). Trump dijo que Vladimir Putin está “destruyendo a Rusia” por no buscar un acuerdo de paz con Ucrania. Buenos Aires, 21 de enero. https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2025/01/21/trump-dijo-que-vladimir-putin-esta-destruyendo-a-rusia-por-no-buscar-un-acuerdo-de-paz-con-ucrania/4. -Luchetti, J. (2022). El papel de la Federación Rusa y Estados Unidos en la guerra ruso-ucraniana. 2° Congreso Regional de Relaciones Internacionales “(Re) Pensar las Relaciones Internacionales en un mundo en transformación”. Tandil. 28, 29 y 30 de Septiembre.5. -Luchetti, J. (2022). Rusia y la OTAN en Ucrania: la lucha por la supremacía en un país del viejo continente. XV Congreso Nacional y VIII Internacional sobre Democracia “¿Hacia un nuevo escenario internacional? Redistribución del poder, territorios y ciberespacio en disputa en un mundo inestable”. En, C. Pinillos (comp.). Memorias del XV Congreso Nacional y VIII Internacional sobre Democracia. Rosario. Universidad Nacional del Rosario, Facultad de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales, pp. 1098-1127. https://rephip.unr.edu.ar/handle/2133/260936. -Naciones Unidas. (2022). Asamblea General. Resolución A/RES/ES-11/1. Agresión contra Ucrania. New York. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n22/293/40/pdf/n2229340.pdf7. -Sanahuja, J. (2022). Guerras del interregno: la invasión rusa de Ucrania y el cambio de época europeo y global. Anuario CEIPAZ 2021-2022 Cambio de época y coyuntura crítica en la sociedad global. Madrid. Centro de Educación e Investigación para la paz, pp. 41-71. https://ceipaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/3.JoseAntonioSanahuja.pdf8. -Zamora, A. (2022). La multipolaridad contra el Imperialismo y la izquierda extraviada. Buenos Aires. Abril. https://observatoriocrisis.com/2022/04/23/la-multipolaridad-contra-el-imperialismo-y-al-izquierda-extraviada/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The junta still holds a third of Myanmar, and two-thirds of the population, but misrule has left the regime broke. Myanmar’s military approaches the fourth anniversary of the coup d’etat that put them in power in terminal decline. The economy continues to atrophy, with even more pronounced energy shortages, less foreign exchange, and an even larger share of the budget allocated to the military. The battlefield losses are staggering, as the opposition has withstood Chinese pressure to stop their offensives, and continues to hand the over-stretched military defeat after defeat. Opposition forces now control two of the 14 military regional commands. According to the National Unity Government (NUG) Ministry of Defense, the opposition is in full control of 95 of 330 townships, while the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta calls itself, had full control over 107 townships. By the junta’s own admission, they are only able to conduct a census and safely organize elections in 161 of Myanmar’s 330 townships. Losses on all battlefronts Having taken 15 of 17 townships in Rakhine state, the Arakan Army is now in almost total control of the key western state. They’ve surrounded the Rakhine capital of Sittwe and come up to the border of Kyaukphyu where China’s special economic zone and port are located. Although the capture of Buthidaung and Ann were neither quick nor easy, the AA was able to sustain sieges of over a month at each, and in the case of the former, tunneled beneath the last military outpost in a stunning display of grit. Having captured the southern city of Gwa, the Arakan Army has now crossed into Ayeyarwaddy, taking the fight into the Bamar ethnic majority heartland. In the north, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has shrugged off extensive Chinese pressure, and taken the strategic junction town of Mansi, which will make the overland resupply of the besieged city of Bhamo from Mandalay very hard for the junta. Fighting is ongoing in Bhamo, Kachin’s second largest city. The KIA is now in control of well over half of Kachin, including most of the resource rich regions. Although they are known for fractiousness, Chin opposition forces are now in almost full control of that state that borders India and Bangladesh, holding five of nine townships, roughly 85% of the territory. In Shan state, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) temporarily succumbed to Chinese pressure to stop their offensive in November, but they’ve neither surrendered Lashio nor ceded territory, despite airstrikes. Citing a new military offensive in Naungcho township, the TNLA, which controls nine townships, announced an end to the ceasefire on Jan. 9. In eastern Myanmar, Karenni resistance have continued to battle, despite concerted military regime efforts and airstrikes, and their acknowledged ammunition shortages. The Karenni National Defense Force and allied People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) militias claim to control 80% of Kayah state. Further south, the Karen National Liberation Army and allied people’s defense forces (PDFs) are slowly taking pro-junta border guard posts along the frontier with Thailand. In Tanintharyi, local PDFs have increased their coordination and are pushing west from the Thai border towards the Andaman Sea coast, diminishing the scope of the military-controlled patchwork of terrain in Myanmar’s southernmost state. Some of the most intense fighting of late has been in the Bamar heartland, including Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay. The military has stepped up their bombings, artillery strikes, and arson, intentionally targeting civilians for their support of the opposition forces. A number of PDFs have expanded their operations into the dry zone. Mounting troubles The Myanmar military regime faces severe headwinds as the fourth anniversary of the Feb. 1, 2021 coup approaches. Prisoners of war from multiple fronts have recounted that the military’s ability to resupply and reinforce troops in the field has all but broken down. They have a limited number of heavy lift helicopters, including three new Mi-17s that entered service in December. But even those are vulnerable: Some six Mi-17s and two other helicopters have been lost since the coup. In some cases, the military has tried to parachute in supplies, but those often fall into the hands of the opposition forces. Nothing demoralizes troops more than the feeling that the headquarters has abandoned them. The military has always treated Myanmar as a country under occupation, with thousands of remote outposts scattered throughout the country. The NUG claims that opposition forces have captured 741 of these through 2024, and they continue to fall. The military is increasingly short of manpower. Over a thousand POWs have been taken in recent months, more have surrendered and others have deserted. The military has now taken in nine tranches of conscripts, amounting to roughly 45,000 troops, and is increasingly dragooning men. But they are deployed almost immediately and are untrained and poorly motivated, in sharp contrast with ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) and PDFs. That loss of manpower includes senior officers. The NUG claims that in 2024, 53 senior officers, ranked colonel to major general, were killed, captured or injured. The military is so broke that they recently announced that they would no longer pay death benefits to conscripts. At the same time, the military is often labeling their dead as “MIA”, rather than “KIA”, to avoid paying benefits. While the junta fumbles, the degree of tactical battlefield coordination between the legacy ethnic armies and the new PDFs is unprecedented. Every major offensive outside of Rakhine, entails cooperation between them, and even there, the AA was assisted by Chin PDFs who blocked the military’s resupply from Magway. The increased PDF operations have been made possible by increased assistance from EROs. The AA and Chin PDFs are pushing in from the west and assisting local PDFs in the Bamar heartland. The AA’s foray into Ayeyarwaddy was done in concert with local PDFs. The United Wa State Army appears to be defying China by arming and equipping the Mandalay PDF and others that are operating in Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing. In its favor, the military has finally caught up to the opposition and effectively employed unmanned aerial systems down to the tactical level. These include drones that can drop munitions, kamikaze drones, and those for intelligence gathering or for more accurate targeting of artillery. This has proven costly for the opposition and impeded some of their offensives. Nonetheless, their deployment of drones has been too little too late, and will not fundamentally alter the battlefield dynamics. The military continues to use air power. Indeed, they put their fifth and sixth SU-30 imported from Russia and three more FTC-2000Gs imported from China into service in December. It’s the economy But air power is primarily used as a punitive weapon against unarmed civilian targets, not in support of ground forces. For example, the Jan. 9 bombing in Rakhine’s Yanbye township that killed 52, wounded over 40 and destroyed 500 homes, had no military utility. Finally, the state of the economy is even more precarious given the loss of almost all border crossings. Although the SAC technically still controls Muse and Myawaddy, which links them to China and Thailand, respectively, opposition forces control much of the surrounding territory. While Karen forces have not made a bid to take Myawaddy, the main border crossing, they are pinching in along Asia Highway 1 to Yangon. On Jan. 11, some 500 reinforcements in 30 armored personnel carriers were deployed from Hpa-An to Kawkareik in Kayan state near the Thai border to keep the last main overland trade artery open. To sum it up, the junta is entering the fifth year of military rule with its power rapidly slipping away. Although they still control one-third of the country – land that holds two-thirds of the population – their mismanagement of the economy has left the military regime broke. Spread too thin across too many fronts simultaneously, it’s hard to see the SAC doing anything to arrest their terminal decline in 2025.   Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington DC 20036.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском What is behind the threats of Uyghur Islamists from Damascus? It has long been known that the foreign militant Islamists fighting in Syria include Uyghurs from northwest China. After the fall of the Assad regime, the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) issued a clear threat to China in December 2024. In a propaganda video, a masked spokesperson for the group declared: "Here in Syria, we are fighting for Allah in all cities, and we will do the same in Urumqi, Aqsu and Kashi." These cities are located in the Chinese region of Xinjiang, which the Islamist fighters refer to as "East Turkestan". This message marks an escalation in the propaganda of the TIP, which has been active in Syria for over a decade. It not only highlights its involvement in the fighting in the Syrian civil war but also emphasizes its goal of taking the conflict to China. But how serious is this threat really, and what challenges does it pose for Beijing? The controversial role of the TIP China observer Wolfgang Hirn is one of the few German-language authors to have dealt intensively with the latest developments in the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). "The party was founded in the 1990s. Its aim was to establish an Islamic state in Xinjiang and Central Asia. It had its bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan and was mainly recruited from Uyghurs who wanted to leave Xinjiang or had to leave due to Chinese persecution," explains Hirn.1 The Uyghur jihadists of the TIP pursue the goal of forcibly achieving the secession of the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang from the People's Republic of China and establishing an Islamic Republic of East Turkestan. While the TIP was primarily active in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the early years, it later increasingly expanded its activities to Syria. There it allied itself with other Islamist alliances of various militias, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Many of the Uyghur fighters and their families sought refuge in the Syrian rebel stronghold of Idlib. "The Chinese government does not use the name TIP, but ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement). It serves as a kind of collective term for all militant Uyghurs. The reason for this is probably that ETIM was listed as a terrorist organization by the USA between 2002 and 2020, which lent legitimacy to the official Chinese interpretation. The United Nations also has ETIM on a corresponding list," reports Björn Alpermann from the University of Würzburg on the LinkedIn platform.2 Background: ETIM was added to the US terror list as part of then US President George W. Bush's efforts to gain China as an ally in the US-led "War on Terror". Designated as a "terrorist organization" on this exclusion list, ETIM members and supporters were banned from entering the US.3 However, ETIM was removed from the US terror list again "because there has been no credible evidence for more than a decade that ETIM continues to exist", the US State Department announced in July 2020.4 Under pressure from the US and China, ETIM was also added to the UN Security Council's sanctions list in 2002, on which it is still listed. "China regularly blames the ETIM, also known as the Turkestan Islamic Party, for attacks and uses the group to justify its crackdown in the predominantly Muslim region of Xinjiang," Deutsche Welle reported in 2020.5 "Human rights groups estimate that hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Hui or members of other minorities in Xinjiang have been sent to re-education camps. China rejects the accusations and speaks of training centers," according to SPIEGEL.6 Beijing claims that the TIP was responsible for terrorist attacks in China between 2008 and 2015, including knife attacks in public places, car bombs and suicide attacks.7 But how strong is the TIP today and what role does it play? "The TIP has always maintained good relations with the HTS and has often acted as a mediator in disputes between the HTS and other rebel groups. It was once described on Syrian television as HTS's favorite ally. The TIP troops took part in many battles alongside the HTS, for example in the liberation of Latakia, Hama and Aleppo. They are considered to be well organized and experienced. The size of the force varies," reports Wolfgang Hirn.8 In 2017, the Syrian ambassador to China at the time, Imad Moustapha, stated that there were up to 5,000 Uyghur fighters in Syria.9 However, experts estimate the number to be lower and assume that there are between 1,500 and 4,500 fighters.10 Media: Irritated reactions from China At the end of last year, the TIP intensified its propaganda activities and published numerous images of its leaders posing with their uniformed troops and showing them fighting in Syria. On December 13, 2024, The Telegraph then published a video on YouTube that deals with the history of the TIP and shows various excerpts from its propaganda videos, accompanied by epochal music. To date, the four-minute video has had more than 2.6 million views.11 The South China Morning Post reacted with unusual irritation to this reporting. In an opinion piece, columnist Alex Lo described The Telegraph's video as a "documentary-like clip" that was "practically an advertisement for the TIP", while repeating all the Western anti-China narratives "as if to justify the group's promised terrorism against Chinese. "12 Thus, "the Western-constructed genocide in Xinjiang (...) also serves as a practical justification for the militant group". The extensive dissemination of the video only led to "the Chinese having to raise the alleged TIP threat at the United Nations. "13 However, this is a grotesque claim: in New York on 17 December 2024, Geng Shuang, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, had only made a rather coarse statement. In New York on December 17, 2024, Geng Shuang, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, merely made a rather sober statement, emphasizing that "Syrian territory must not be used to support terrorism or threaten the security of other countries. "14 The fight against the TIP was repeatedly described by Beijing's Foreign Ministry as "China's core concern in the fight against terrorism".15 Ultimately, Alex Lo's text should probably be understood as an - apparently rather emotional - appeal to "the West" not to portray or regard the TIP fighters as freedom fighters. Outlook: Strategic risks for Beijing "After the victory over Assad in Syria, the question arises as to whether the TIP fighters will remain in the region and organize their fight against China from there," says Wolfgang Hirn.16 So far, however, the TIP, which has been active in Syria for some time, has not been able to organize attacks in China from Syria. In addition to the geographical distance, the strict security precautions in China also play a role, making travel for such fighters very risky. Terrorism experts nevertheless see dangers, particularly from "online activities that lead to radicalization in China but could be organized from Syria. "17 "I sympathize with them, but their fight against China is not ours," Syria's new strongman Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of the Islamist HTS, recently said about his stance on the TIP.18 Nevertheless, the Uyghur fighters are apparently becoming increasingly powerful within Syria: Meanwhile, recent media reports that members of the TIP have been given high-ranking positions within the Syrian army are causing new concern in China. It is reported that Abdulaziz Dawood Khudaberdi, the commander of the TIP forces in Syria, has been appointed brigadier general.19 Two other Uyghur fighters are said to have been given the rank of colonel. However, a possible return of the TIP to its previous areas of retreat in Afghanistan and Pakistan is also likely to cause headaches for those in power in Beijing, as Afghanistan and Pakistan have become safe havens for terrorist groups such as ISIS-K, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in recent years, writes Yang Xiaotong from the Chinese think tank Grandview Institution in the Asia Times.20 The proximity to China's western borders and the weak control by the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the central government in Pakistan are exacerbating the situation. One thing is clear: China's investment in infrastructure projects and the sending of thousands of workers abroad, particularly to Pakistan, increase the country's vulnerability. In recent years, the number of attacks on Chinese citizens and assets has risen significantly, especially in Pakistan. Beijing suspects that these attacks are organized in collaboration between the TIP and ISIS, al-Qaeda and the BLA in order to undermine Chinese interests and investments.21 "Should battle-hardened TIP militants return to Pakistan and join forces with the TTP, BLA and other groups, it would pose a serious threat to China's strategic interests as its flagship project - the Belt and Road Initiative - runs through the country (...). The likelihood of this scenario has increased exponentially," warns Yang Xiaotong. The TIP is "still officially part of the global al-Qaeda network and, unlike HTS, has never broken away from al-Qaeda," explains terrorism expert Hans-Jakob Schindler from the Counter Extremism Project. "The fact that HTS accepts TIP in its coalition is one of the main arguments that call into question the ideological orientation of HTS. "22 There is no question that the future of TIP is closely linked to Syria's uncertain prospects. Information The text of this work is licensed under the terms of "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International", CC BY-SA 4.0 (available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de) References 1 Hirn, Wolfgang 2025: What is the Turkistan Islamic Party and what are its plans?: https://www.chinahirn.de/2025/01/05/politik-i-xinjiang-i-was-ist-die-turkistanislamic-party-und-was-hat-sie-vor/, last access: 12.01.2025.  2 Alpermann, Björn 2025: Post on LinkedIn from 8.01.2025, available at: Link to the post by Björn Aplermann https://www.linkedin.com/posts/bj%C3%B6rn-alpermann-1873b38_turkistan-islamic-party-uses-video-from-syria-activity-7282380785922281472-cNKy/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop3 DW 2020: US removes China-condemned group from terror list, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/us-removes-separatist-group-condemned-by-china-fromterror-list/a-55527586, last access: 12.01.2025.   4 Ebd. 5 Ebd.6 SPIEGEL 2021: EU extends sanctions against China, available at:  https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/uiguren-eu-verlaengert-sanktionen-gegen-china-umein-jahr-a-e45ffbf6-7727-4052-8512-eb01a958f781, last access: 12.01.2025.  7 Yang Xiaotong 2024: China has cause to be terrified of rebel-run Syria, available at: https://asiatimes.com/2024/12/china-has-cause-to-be-terrified-of-rebel-run-syria/, last access: 12.01.2025. 8 Hirn, Wolfgang 2025.  9 Yang Xiaotong 2024. 10 Hirn, Wolfgang 2025.  11 The Telegraph 2024: Uyghur fighters in Syria vow to come for China next, available at: https://youtu.be/8DRzaZiI8_Q?si=kYaGco2aEk6bw5vx, last access 12.01.2025.  12 Alex Lo 2024: Is Turkestan Islamic Party a foreign proxy force to destabilise Xinjiang?, SCMP, available at:  https://www.scmp.com/opinion/article/3291565/turkestanislamic-party-foreign-proxy-force-destabilisexinjiang?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article, last access 12.01.2025.  13 Ebd.  14 Zhao Ziwen 2024: Syria-Xinjiang link: China warns leaders in Damascus not to threaten security elsewhere, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3291393/syria-xinjiang-link-chinawarns-leaders-damascus-not-threaten-securityelsewhere?module=inline&pgtype=article, last access: 12.01.2025.  15 Global Times 2024: Combating ETIM is China's core concern in counter-terrorism and shared responsibility of intl community, available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202402/1306930.shtml, last access: 12.01.2025.  Combating ETIM is China's core concern in counter-terrorism and shared responsibility of intl community: FM, available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202402/1306930.shtml, last access: 12.01.2025.  16 Hirn, Wolfgang 2025.  17 Hauberg, Sven 2025: Allies of Syria's new rulers set their sights on China, available at:  https://www.fr.de/politik/verbuendete-von-syriens-neuenmachthabern-nehmen-china-ins-visier-zr-93509789.html, last access: 12.01.2025. 18 See also: Hauberg, Sven 2025.  19 SCMP 2025: Syria appoints foreign Islamist fighters, including Uygurs, to military: sources, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/3292859/syriaappoints-foreign-islamist-fighters-including-uygurs-militarysources?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection?module=inline&pgtype=article , last access: 12.01.2025.  20 Yang Xiaotong 2024. 21 Ebd.  22 Hauberg, Sven 2025.