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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group” The ceasefire deal the U.S. has tabled represents the best – and perhaps last – hope for both ending the Gaza war and getting the hostages held in the strip back any time soon. Israeli and Hamas leaders should accept it. Efforts by Egyptian, Qatari and U.S. mediators to reach a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas have reached a decisive juncture. The proposal on the table comes closer than its predecessors to getting past the main sticking point regarding a permanent ceasefire, which Hamas demands and to which Israel refuses to commit. It envisages an immediate truce and partial hostage/prisoner exchange, with talks to follow on Gaza’s governance and security. Though the deal on offer fully satisfies neither side, no better one is likely to emerge any time soon that can both end the fighting that has devastated Gaza and secure the release of Israeli hostages held in the strip. Moreover, the longer the war continues, the graver the risk that tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border, or between the U.S. and Iran-backed groups elsewhere, set off a regional escalation that could further draw in Washington and Tehran. Israel and Hamas should embrace the deal on the table as a humanitarian imperative and because neither side can achieve strategic victory and each has long passed the point of diminishing returns. Continued war will neither destroy Hamas as Israel seeks nor strengthen Hamas’s hand, let alone improve prospects for Palestinians. It guarantees only greater suffering to a people who desperately need relief. Three Phases, Many Questions Full details of the deal on offer have yet to become public, but the rough outlines have been widely reported. They follow the model in the mediators’ previous proposal in early May, a draft of which Hamas accepted, albeit with caveats, and which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government then rejected. The new version, which U.S. President Joe Biden announced in a White House speech on 31 May, appears to leave key elements in place: a ceasefire in three phases, with each consisting of steps that together would end the war. In the first phase, of six weeks’ duration, Israel would withdraw its forces from all “populated areas” of Gaza. Hamas would release Israeli civilian, elderly and wounded hostages, as well as the remains of some deceased hostages, in exchange for Israel freeing an agreed-upon list of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. Israel would also allow displaced Palestinian civilians to return to their homes including in Gaza’s north and allow the entry and distribution of more goods and fuel into the strip. The transition from phase one to two would follow talks between Israel and Hamas. Critically, the proposal states that the ceasefire is to hold as long as the parties continue their negotiations even if these extend beyond the allotted six weeks. The deal’s second phase would see the release of all remaining hostages, including soldiers, and the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. At that point, the phase one ceasefire would turn into a permanent cessation of hostilities. In the third phase, Hamas would hand over the remains of the last of the deceased hostages. The import regime also would be relaxed, with Israel lifting its blockade to enable the movement of people and entry of goods as full reconstruction gets under way. The provision on a “permanent cessation of hostilities” in phase two is the most significant modification to the earlier proposal, which had referred merely to a “sustainable period of calm”. It seeks to bridge the gap that caused previous negotiations to break down, namely between Hamas’s demand that a ceasefire be permanent and Israel’s that it not. Since Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack, Israeli leaders have repeatedly stated that they are still committed to destroying Hamas (or at least its military and governance capability) in the long term. Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and Minister Benny Gantz within the war cabinet and the military establishment have been more willing to halt fighting, at least temporarily, to get the hostages back, though that position is hindered by the fact that Netanyahu has a personal interest in refusing to enter any ceasefire deal, as it would almost certainly mean he would lose power. Hamas, for its part, has been unwilling to hand over hostages, especially the military officers which it considers to be key bargaining chips, in exchange for anything less than explicit guarantees that a ceasefire be permanent. The Biden administration, with the new proposal, has attempted to mollify both sides. It posits an immediate cessation of hostilities; a mechanism to maintain that ceasefire in place if good-faith negotiations on implementation continue; and a permanent cessation of hostilities as the end point of the second phase. That sequence can be read from the Hamas side as achieving a permanent end to fighting. It can be read by Israel as preserving some room for manoeuvre to return to hostilities. By encouraging each side to tolerate the ambiguities that make the deal feasible for the other, Washington is signalling to Hamas that it will make sure the ceasefire holds if the movement embraces the deal while reassuring Israel that even should the deal hold and a permanent ceasefire take root, its military campaign has rendered Hamas incapable of reprising the kind of attack it staged on 7 October. Implicit in the U.S. approach is a belief that a functioning ceasefire will create incentives for both sides, generating momentum and raising the costs of breaking the agreement. Still, even if the two sides sign up, their mutually exclusive positions will make the agreement fragile and contingent. Achieving its primary purpose – stopping the bloodletting and getting the hostages home – will be subject to the completion of phase one and negotiations toward phase two. The absence of detail in the proposal regarding terms and mechanics, presumably even in the full unpublished text, is both its strength and its weakness. Mediators see the ambiguity as necessary for getting both sides to sign up and end a war that is devastating Gaza and its population, tanking Israel’s global standing and risking a wider regional escalation. But the lack of clarity on the most divisive disputes, in effect, punts those issues to talks in the first phase. Fraught negotiations loom. For example, what would constitute Israel’s “full withdrawal” from all “populated areas” of Gaza is open to interpretation, meaning details of even the deal’s initial phase are ambiguous. How will the areas from which Israel withdraws be delineated? Will Israel launch incursions into those areas, as military officials have said it would continue to do after the war? Who would they target in such operations? It is widely assumed that Israel will continue to go after Hamas’s senior leadership, but how widely that is interpreted will bear on the sustainability of a ceasefire. Getting to the second phase and beyond will require addressing the still more challenging questions of post-war governance and security in Gaza. Once even a temporary ceasefire is in place, humanitarian aid is supposed to ramp up and some reconstruction begin, though precisely what material Israel will allow in is unclear. The proposal does not address the political status of Gaza after hostilities end or whether Israel will maintain its systems of physical and administrative control of the strip. It does not address how Gaza would be governed after the war, much less who would govern it, nor the core question of Hamas’s future role. Nor does it lay out a process that could decide these questions. Trying to resolve those questions ahead of time, however, would rule out an immediate stop to the fighting. The focus now is on whether Washington’s assurances will convince the two adversaries to proceed. On Israel’s side, the U.S. president’s decision to make a public statement outlining the proposal, asserting that Israel had already accepted it, caught Netanyahu off guard and put him on the spot. U.S. officials reportedly notified Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Michael Herzog, Gallant and Gantz of the main points in Biden’s speech just an hour and a half before the president delivered it. Netanyahu’s initial comments seemed to hedge, not rejecting the proposal or denying that Israel had agreed to the wording, but offering his broad interpretation that it would allow Israel to keep pursuing its cardinal war objective of destroying Hamas and its governing capability in Gaza. Whether his statements aimed to manage domestic politics or undercut ongoing diplomacy, they have reinforced Hamas’s suspicions about Israeli intentions. The war cabinet has closely guarded the proposal’s full text – which reportedly runs four and a half pages – lest spoilers, especially to Netanyahu’s right, try to torpedo it. While Netanyahu appears to have the votes in the coalition to see the ceasefire deal approved, and polls suggest that a plurality of Israelis favour a hostage deal, two of his far-right ministers, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir, have threatened to leave the coalition government should he proceed, which could precipitate the government’s collapse, forcing Netanyahu to either form a temporary alternative coalition or leave office and hold elections. As for Hamas, for now it insists on an explicit, up-front guarantee of an end to hostilities and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as the final outcome of the staged process. It welcomed Biden’s statements, and has continued to do so, but said it would not agree to a text that diverges from them; asserting that the proposal, which Hamas called “the Israeli paper … does not guarantee a permanent ceasefire, but rather a temporary ceasefire, and it does not closely link the three stages stipulated”. Hamas also called on Biden to “ensure that the occupation government agrees to [his statements] and that they are reflected in the text of the agreement”. Hamas argues, based on past experience, that once it appears that the war is over, even if only provisionally, pressure on Israel and the Biden administration will abate, the process will bog down, and Gaza – already destroyed – again will be forgotten and Israeli military operations will resume. In addition, while recent Hamas statements have prioritised a complete Israeli withdrawal and permanent ceasefire, a senior movement official claimed that the latest proposal imposes unacceptable restrictions on the release of politically prominent prisoners and insists on sending many of them into exile. Time for a Deal By making the proposal’s outlines public, Biden has vested significant personal credibility in his administration’s ability to produce a ceasefire ahead of the November U.S. elections. He is unlikely to be able to use his own authority in another big push for an end to the war before the November vote. His objective appears to be to deny Israel and Hamas negotiating space, making it difficult for either to say no. To put muscle behind his move, the U.S. circulated a draft resolution on a ceasefire in the UN Security Council to mobilise international support for the initiative. Prime Minister Netanyahu should accept the Biden proposal – which the U.S. has gone to lengths to make ambiguous enough for him to work with and that the Israeli defence establishment supports – and avoid public statements to the contrary. For Israel, its eight-month assault has underlined the sobering reality that it has been unable to deal a decisive, strategic blow to Hamas. Nor is Israel’s war effort diminishing Hamas’s power as a political movement; to the contrary, its popularity has surged in the West Bank and beyond. Some vestige of Hamas’s power in Gaza will remain for the foreseeable future, to be diluted, if at all, primarily through politics. Continuing the war will bring further destruction of civilian infrastructure and further damage to Israel’s international standing, not the body blow it hopes to deliver Hamas. It would also mean the continuation and possible escalation of the intensive war of attrition with Hizbollah on the Israel-Lebanon border, which could quickly spiral out of control and has already left tens of thousands of Israelis (and even more Lebanese) displaced. An end to the fighting in Gaza is necessary to halt these exchanges: Hizbollah will only stop rocket fire with such a ceasefire in place. The potential ensuing calm could allow residents on both sides of the border to return. As for Hamas, while the group may not set great store by the U.S.’s signalling that it supports a permanent ceasefire, it has shown that it can survive Israel’s onslaught but is unlikely to achieve anything more than small-scale tactical victories in territory it can neither protect nor fully control. Maintaining the current trajectory in the hope of extracting a higher price from Israel by killing and wounding its troops, draining its resources, undermining perceptions of its military prowess, sullying its international reputation and straining its relationship with the U.S. is unlikely to yield a better deal, while inflicting more suffering and destruction on Gaza. The deal on offer includes an important concession from Israel, based on the communicated proposal – that the phase one ceasefire will be extended as long as negotiations continue in good faith. It is an opportunity for a prolonged cessation of hostilities that many Palestinians would blame Hamas for wasting. Further, if Hamas rejects the current proposal, the Biden administration will almost certainly also blame the group for the collapse of talks and, as November approaches, would be more likely to throw up its hands and let Israel follow its own war logic. The two sides’ acceptance of the ceasefire deal would be just the start of difficult talks, requiring concerted diplomacy from the U.S., Egypt, Qatar and pressure and support from others, to bridge what for now seem almost unsurmountable differences and sustain negotiations. But a rejection of the proposed plan will make arrangements for the day after more complex than they already are. Far better to stop fighting now and seriously discuss what should happen next than to put off what is an inevitable reckoning yet again while, in the meantime, thousands more Palestinian civilians are killed, starved, displaced and further immiserated, and hope of getting the hostages out alive fades.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском After his visit to France, which is taking place these days, a crucial NATO summit, scheduled in Washington from July 9 to 11, awaits the American president, who, soon to end his term, must face the sad record of his foreign policy. Obviously, if we compare him to Trump, who was nothing but chaos and incompetence, there is no comparison. Nevertheless, if we are somewhat honest, we must recognize that the Biden years, as far as international affairs are concerned, will have been cruel. Cruel for America, which will have seen its influence diminish even more, and for the Western bloc in general, dragged along by it, to which the global South has ceased to give credit, in particular because of the double standards practiced in Gaza and Ukraine. The first major error was to condition the return of the United States to the Iranian nuclear agreement on Iran's strict compliance with the terms of 2015 and on new negotiations on ballistic missiles. While it was the United States that unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Vienna nuclear deal with Iran, under the Trump administration in 2018, leading Iran to increase its uranium enrichment and reduce its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it would have been more adroit for the Biden administration to make a gesture of goodwill towards Tehran by first returning to the agreement before making its legitimate demands. This would have changed nothing in substance, but everything in form, and we might not be here today. As imperfect as the agreement wanted by Obama was, and as unpleasant as the Mullahs' regime is, the JCPOA at least had the merit of having stabilized the region somewhat. Joe Biden's second mistake in international policy, this one of historic magnitude, of course concerns Ukraine. Readers of these correspondences know that, as the son of a Ukrainian woman and with family not far from the front line of the Minsk agreements, I condemned the illegal invasion led by Putin, a mafia president if ever there was one, on February 24, 2022. They may also remember that I pleaded, at the beginning of the war, for a “muscular” response from NATO, namely the creation of a no-fly zone over Ukraine, as Zelensky had requested. This was, in my opinion, the only way to calm things down and bring the Russian president, whose army had proven incapable of reaching kyiv, to the negotiating table. This is not the option that Washington has chosen. Instead, it has decided to arm the Ukrainian forces and push them to continue and continue a war that they will probably, and unfortunately, not be able to win, neither in the short term nor in the medium term – the long term does not exist since they will probably be abandoned by America by then –, due to a lack of sufficient men and equipment. Since we knew that without the risky deployment of allied troops on Ukrainian soil, which would probably have led to a new world war, the battle was lost in advance, it was irresponsible not to invite Volodymyr Zelensky to negotiate when, in the fall of 2022, Ukraine found itself, if not in a position of strength, at least in a favorable position in the Donbass. A missed opportunity that may not come again. The Ukrainian defeat that seems to be looming would therefore not only be that of Kiev, but also that of the policy of an American president trapped in the prism of the Cold War. This policy, devoid of strategy, will have consisted largely of waging a proxy war with Russia, without any precise objective, other than that of pushing Ukraine to fight until an improbable “final victory”. Finally, third and fourth significant errors: the visionless approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, adopted by the 46th President of the United States throughout his term, who has never really tried to relaunch the peace process and the two-state solution, as well as his lack of consistency in his relationship with Benjamin Netanyahu, whom he nevertheless detests. A lack of consistency that led Joe Biden and his entourage to condemn the massacres committed by the IDF in the Gaza Strip while providing it with the weapons necessary to perpetrate them and which forced the United States to build an artificial port at more than 320 million dollars in order to deliver humanitarian aid to the Gazans, because Israel subjects land access points to drastic controls. Other inconsistencies in current American diplomacy could be noted, such as the sanctions against Cuba, decided by Trump and maintained by his successor, who, however, when he was vice-president, had been at the origin of the resumption of relations with Havana. But the image that will remain indelibly attached to Biden's international policy, and which will have set the tone for the majority of Americans, is the debacle in Kabul in August 2021. Biden is obviously not responsible for the Afghan disaster as a whole, but this unprecedented rout of American power is his work and bears his signature. While nothing was forcing the United States into haste, it was he who stubbornly clung to the August 31 date to conclude the American withdrawal negotiated by his predecessor. This chaotic end was then perceived as a humiliating defeat, revealing the failure of American foreign policy and the mismanagement of conflicts. Paralyzed in front of their screens, the American people saw their military power, a power that they were told was unparalleled in human history, thwarted by "peasants armed with Kalashnikovs and riding mopeds," to quote a television commentator. Joe Biden is a sincere man, full of good intentions, but a man who is definitely a prisoner of the past and therefore overwhelmed by the geopolitical challenges of today's world. In the Ukrainian crisis, he has led America and its allies into a deadlock, while his adversaries have consolidated a Sino-Russian bloc, allied with North Korea and Iran, and supported by South Africa, as well as many other states around the world, perhaps even India. The November election will obviously not be played out on the international stage, but this theme will nevertheless be present in the debates. Joe Biden will then find himself confronted with a record that few of his predecessors suffered while campaigning for re-election. To find a similar situation, we have to go back to the time of Jimmy Carter.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, paid a visit to Pyongyang this week and signed a defence pact with reclusive North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, as he looks for new allies who can help him increase Russia’s supply of munitions for the war in Ukraine. As part of this mutual aid deal, the two leaders promised that each country will come to the defence of the other if attacked. Kim also promised North Korea’s full support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. What’s interesting about the entire Russia-North Korea showy display of camaraderie is China’s response: silence. China has misgivings about how things are unfolding, which reports suggest prompted Chinese president Xi Jinping’s call to Putin to call off the latter’s visit to Pyongyang. Obviously, Putin didn’t heed Xi’s request. Why would Beijing be so rattled by the Russian-North Korea defence treaty? After all, China has its own defensive pact with North Korea, which was inked in 1961 and renewed in 2021. Beijing also has a “no limits” partnership with Russia. Logically, if China could sign its own defence treaty with North Korea, so can Russia. But the pact made by Putin and Kim severely threatens Chinese security. China was already worried that whatever control it has over North Korea was weakened when Pyongyang reportedly supplied almost 7,000 containers worth of weapons to Moscow. And this is why, in April, the Middle Kingdom sent its third most senior leader within the Chinese Communist party hierarchy, Zhao Leji, to assure the North Korean strongman that Beijing was still a strong ally. Now the defensive pact that draws Moscow and Pyongyang closer threatens to further diminish China’s influence over Kim. The Kremlin knows that one of Beijing’s greatest fears is that a renegade North Korea may one day point its weapons at China. And this is a key reason behind Putin’s peace treaty with Pyongyang. China and North Korea’s turbulent past For decades, China had tried to maintain its influence over Pyongyang by being the mediator between North Korea and the rest of the world. This included attempting to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Beijing does so to safeguard its own safety and survival, and probably believes that as long as North Korea remains dependent on China, it wouldn’t bite the hand that feeds it. China also remains North Korea’s biggest trade partner. This all sounds awfully bizarre, since China’s mutual defence pact with North Korea suggests that both nations are close allies. But North Korea has a tradition of defying China, and this deal with Russia might embolden it further – and that will be worrying Beijing. In 2017, for instance, Kim Jong-un, in clear defiance of China, ordered the assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, in Malaysia. And when China retaliated by halting all coal imports from North Korea into China, North Korea not only condemned Beijing for “dancing to the tune of the United States”, but also vented its anger by firing missiles in the direction of Japan. But where the missiles originated from in North Korea and the distance that it covered towards the direction of Japan provided China with a rather grim check on reality: North Korea’s weapon capabilities extend to major Chinese cities. The Sino-Korean animosity dates back centuries and took shape when Korea was a vassal state of imperial China. Unfortunately, this animosity extended to modern times when Mao Zedong decided to station Chinese troops in North Korea even after the conclusion of the Korean war, and when Beijing did not aid Pyongyang in its nuclear ambitions. It didn’t help either that the founding leader of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, was suspected of espionage and was nearly executed by the Chinese Communist party in the 1930s. All this history plays a part in what decisions and alliances are being made today, and why. It would be a serious mistake to think that the Russians, even in desperation, would believe that making North Korea an ally would turn the tide of the Ukrainian-Russian war in Russia’s favour. But this move, and his recent trip to Vietnam, shows Putin’s desperation. Even if Pyongyang continues to supply Russia with much-needed ammunition and weapons, Moscow will need greater technology and firepower to win against a Ukraine that uses weapons supplied by the US and Europe. Putin’s agenda This fact is not lost to Putin, and he knows that for Russia to stand a winning chance in the war that he started in 2022, requires its partner of “no limits” to stand firmly by Russia’s side. But beyond supplying Russia with the dual-use technology (which could be used for civilian or military purposes) to fuel Russia’s industrial war complex, China appears to have fallen short of supplying actual weapons to Russia. Even if China wanted to provide weapons to Russia it can’t. This is because it fears further antagonising the west, and triggering economic sanctions would prove lethal for an already ailing Chinese economy. China knows that it needs a strong Russia so that the west doesn’t consolidate its resources to deal with the perceived Chinese threat. But on the other hand, helping Moscow may prove too much for Beijing to stomach since that would harm China’s economy. So, Putin needs to force Beijing’s hand, and the peace treaty that he just signed with North Korea might just do the trick.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском While the flurry over Vladimir Putin’s visit with Xi Jinping last May caused a gush among many media outlets, the public declarations of an enduring alliance is more of the same old bluster rather than a serious démarche. A longer view of Sino-Russo relations tells a far more serpentine story. Future historians will be amused by the irony of how quickly, in world historical time, China and Russia changed places. In 1949, China was the Soviet Russian empire’s vassal, a victorious Communist state that tried to emulate all things Soviet. By 2024, a mere 75 years later, Russia had become China’s vassal, a stale dictatorship hoping to survive a pointless war it had initiated a year before. Rising from the misery of World War II and its own civil war, China entered the succeeding era adrift. Its economy was in ruins, its military vulnerable. As leader of the Communist bloc, the USSR appeared as the natural strategic big brother. The mutual benefits were obvious. China was in desperate need of assistance. The USSR required access to Chinese rail links and ports in the Far East. Moscow felt it needed to defend its interests against potential armed attacks from Japan, while China was wheeling toward international isolation. Both countries feared the growing dominance of the United States. Since that time, relations between Soviet Union/Russia and China have undergone a unique push and pull. The interplay has shift from patron/client state to a formal military alliance (1950-59), schism (1960s), open conflict (1969), détente (1970s), rapprochement (1980s) and, normalisation (after the collapse of the Soviet Union). Now, the war in Ukraine has set loose a new politesse between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—a “no limits” partnership. Or so the Russians would like to believe. The Chinese disagree: their EU ambassador Fu Cong characterised the partnership in 2023 as “nothing but rhetoric.” To be sure, Russia’s need of a market for its natural resource wealth and China’s energy intensive growth have certainly impelled them to seek a mutually beneficial arrangement. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have met 40 times since 2012. Both men share a similar family story as well as similar views about civilisational wars, the decline of the West, color revolutions, and the threat posed by the United States and NATO. However, despite these personal, philosophical, and trade complementarities, the PRC and Russia are moving on diverse tracks. Fu Cong’s dismissive attitude is on the mark. To start, the economic synergy is exaggerated. Russia is fourteenth among China’s largest trading partners. Its trade with Russia is relatively inconsequential. Each is more dependent on third countries than on the other. Russia needs the EU. China relies on other Asian countries and the United States. Further, despite its economic heft, China cannot match Europe’s potential as a driver of industrial and commercial modernisation for Russia. Secondly, due to its monopsonistic position, China forces Russia to sell oil, natural gas, and coal at heavily discounted prices. These discounts are so deep that Russian gas exports to China often do not cover the operational costs of their extraction and transportation. Additionally, the PRC makes payments to Russia in Chinese renminbi and uses these transactions to leverage its position over non-Russian suppliers. Unsurprisingly, direct Chinese investment in Russia has almost exclusively focused on the energy and other extraction industries. Sectors with the greatest potential for productivity gains, such as high-tech manufacturing, utilities, construction, financial services et al, go undeveloped. In addition to trade priorities, another reason for this neglect is that the Chinese have found that doing business in Russia is as daunting for them as it is for western investors. The infrastructure in Russia’s Far East is so underdeveloped that the PRC has had to make substantial investments to get access to the resources it wants. By all reports, these investments have underperformed. Further, the lack of rule of law and the absence of a business-friendly ecosystem leave even the Chinese frustrated and grumbling. Russia wants investments but not investors—a common refrain often directed at the PRC. The Russian economy has long been beset by structural problems: low diversification, a faltering industrial base, uncontrolled corruption, the absence of an entrepreneurial class and now, inflation. The mounting costs of the war in Ukraine exacerbates existing matters and will probably prolong the economic dysfunctionality far into the future. In short, Putin’s hunger to reconstitute the Soviet empire is “making Russia a smaller, worse-educated and poorer country.” China’s own economy has its challenges, too. Rising corporate debt, labour shortages and, poor investment efficiency are driving it into stagnation. In 2012, the PRC launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in order to link its economy with under-developed regions from Central Asia, Africa, and Europe. The dream was to provide its export-oriented economy with markets. There have been several major defaults, and recipients of Chinese loans are subject to falling into debt traps. In light of the current pressures on the economy, the risk is even more intense. By most analyses, the PRC will need cooperation from the West if the scheme has any hope of success. In Central Asia, a confrontation with Russia may be percolating. China’s Belt and Road could compete with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). From the beginning, the Eurasian Union was a token attempt at economic regionalism and a veiled instrument of Russian geopolitics. Many contend it survives as merely another façade to reconstitute the Soviet Union. While it offers little incentive in the way of any real political or market institutions, it represents Russia’s bid to bolster its influence in the region and beyond. Although its threat to the BRI is not significant, it has prompted one regional expert to conclude China may fear a Russian victory in Ukraine because it could strengthen Moscow’s influence in Central Asia. In a move that diminishes Russian energy policy as a source of political influence, Chinese companies have taken stakes in Central Asian oil and gas fields and have built a network of pipelines. Beijing also abandoned its interest in investing in the Power of Siberia II pipeline. Additionally, the China-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) froze lending to Russia and Belarus in 2023. As a vassal state, there is little Moscow can offer Beijing except for its agency as a counterbalance against the United States. The fundamental difference is that Xi wants to reform the global economy, while Putin wants to upend it. As one Chinese analyst puts it, “Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war, whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully.” Russia’s war against Ukraine has troubled the Chinese. The global economy on which China depends so greatly is being disrupted. Indeed, Beijing may be preparing for a Russian defeat. A recent analysis by Beijing University’s Feng Yujun is worth quoting at length for what it surely reveals about the current Chinese leadership’s views of Moscow: “Russia’s eventual defeat [is] inevitable. In time it will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea…. Ukraine may yet rise from the ashes. When the war ends, it can look forward to the possibility of joining the European Union and NATO. “The war is a turning-point for Russia. It has consigned Mr. Putin’s regime to broad international isolation. He has also had to deal with difficult domestic political undercurrents, … Mr. Putin may recently have been re-elected, but he faces all kinds of possible black-swan events.” At some point the Kremlin will become a liability for Beijing. Putin and his circle can bray at the moon about the constant state of siege between nations and societies, invoke other nuggets of Leninist doctrine, and even claim how Poland attacked Nazi Germany and, thus, began World War II. But when the time comes, Xi, rather than conjure up Lenin, will take counsel from another source – Sun Tzu: “There is no instance of a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare.” When that moment finally arrives is uncertain. However, the sway China holds over Russia and the tide of events suggest it is approaching.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Publication credits to AS/COA and Chase Harrison.Nicólas Maduro keeps stacking the deck to win come July 28, but polls favor opposition candidate Edmundo González. The big question for Venezuela’s July 28 elections may not be who voters prefer but whether their preference will be respected. The previous presidential election, which took place in 2018, was marked by irregularities. The reelection of Nicólas Maduro was considered illegitimate by the EU and countries around the world. Now, Maduro is seeking to extend his already decade-long reign with another six-year term. But will this race be free and fair? The fact that Venezuelans will even have the chance to go to the polls was not a given just a few months ago. The framework for this election was established in through the Barbados Accords, signed in October 2023 by the Maduro government and an alliance of opposition parties known as the Unitary Platform. The agreement set out conditions for the election, including that it must take place in the second half of this year, electoral reforms must be made, and international observation must be allowed. It also covered guarantees for the opposition’s participation and primary election process. The United States, which was not party to the accords, agreed to drop some sanctions to get Maduro to stick to his Barbados pledges. A few conditions have been met. The opposition did have its primary in October 2023. And, Maduro set the date for July 28—his deceased predecessor Hugo Chávez’s birthday, marking a date that is early but within the promised range. But other promises have been violated, with one key example being the January disqualification of presidential candidate Maria Corina Machado, who won the opposition primary with 93 percent of the vote. This prompted international outcry and the resumption of some sanctions. Now, the Unitary Platform has a new candidate, former diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia, and polls suggest he has a commanding lead of as much as 50 points over Maduro. What is González proposing? And how might Maduro undercut his rivals? AS/COA Online covers the electoral context and the candidates. Electoral context Venezuela’s election is being overseen by the country’s Electoral Council (CNE). While the body once included members seen as part of the opposition, in June 2023, the government-controlled constituent assembly replaced all 15 members to create an unanimously pro-Maduro council. So far, the CNE has undertaken several moves that watchdogs and foreign observers view as anti-democratic, such as the disqualification of opposition parties and candidates. Under the Barbados Accords, the CNE was tasked with updating the electoral registry. Currently, the roll includes about 21.6 million of Venezuela’s 28.8 million citizens. Of the about 8 million Venezuelans who live outside the country, only about 228,000 are registered abroad. That’s because the rules for absentee voting in Venezuela are onerous, requiring voters to be registered at a foreign address for at least three years and living in that place legally. Those seeking refugee or asylum status are banned from participating. Moreover, registered voters must go to a consulate to cast their ballots. But in many countries, such as the United States, Venezuelan government buildings have been shuttered, leaving no available voting sites. Meanwhile, the October 2023 opposition primary, which was independently organized and had more relaxed registration rules, attracted 2.4 million voters from abroad. Even for those living in the country, registration remains difficult, as it must be performed at official buildings in state capitals. In 2023, it was estimated that there are 3.5 million potential new voters who remain unregistered in the country. The CNE is also in charge of facilitating the participation of international electoral observers. Under the Barbados Accords, the Maduro regime promised that missions from bodies like the EU, the UN, the African Union, and the Carter Center would be able to observe the election. However, the regime revoked the EU’s invitation in May. Other groups, like the Carter Center and the African Union, are still slated to observe with small missions. Aside from the CNE, the Venezuelan military plays a role in overseeing the elections. Historically, the military has been loyal to Maduro, helping him stay in power. However, the military might be key to guaranteeing that the will of the voters is respected. “They will see and they will know if a major fraud is committed,” explained AS/COA Senior Director Guillermo Zubillaga. “The military will be the deciding factor.” Machado has already called for the military to guarantee a democratic transition. Nicólas Maduro, United Social Party of Venezuela Maduro took over the reins of the country after the death of his mentor, Chávez, in 2013 and he has overseen the acceleration of the country’s democratic and economic collapse ever since. From 2014 to 2021, Venezuela’s GDP shrank nearly three-quarters. The country has seen a small amount of growth since then, but it remains bogged down by hyperinflation, a debt load of $154 billion, mass emigration, and a crippled oil sector. His career grew in Chávez’s shadow. After working as a bus driver and trade unionist, he was elected to the National Assembly in 2000. From there, he served as minister of foreign affairs (2006-2012), vice president (2012-2013), and acting president once Chávez passed. He declared himself victorious in a 2013 presidential special election with 1.6 percent more of the vote than his closest rival. The opposition protested against vote-rigging and Maduro’s unfair use of state resources to campaign. As president, Maduro’s ideological commitment to Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution has seen him stack institutions with allies, advance economic policies that maximize state control, and pursue a foreign policy agenda in opposition to the United States. In turn, Venezuela has sunk to the bottom of global indexes focused on freedom and democracy amid shrinking checks and balances; chavistas control the country’s judiciary and electoral courts. The opposition did control the National Assembly after 2015 elections but, in 2017, the country’s top court dissolved the legislature. That same year, Maduro called for the election of a constituent assembly in a contest boycotted by the opposition. The constituent assembly has now usurped the National Assembly to become the de facto legislating body. Maduro has used his control of the courts and the legislature to tilt the playing field in his favor in this year’s elections. He’s jailed more than 270 dissenting voices, stacked the members of the electoral court, and disqualified presidential candidates. Despite these maneuvers, Maduro polls with as little as 8 percent of the vote in the July elections. How might he still win? He’s hoping the strong chavista party structure can aid his campaign. He also might leverage clientelist networks. Already, Maduro has increased public spending by 80 percent from January to May and raised the monthly income for public workers. But waning enthusiasm and state resources might hamper the chavistas’ electoral abilities. “In the past, they’ve been able to mobilize the party members and loyalists, before and on the day of the election. This year, that ability is in question,” said Zubillaga. Maduro maintains a prolific media presence in the country, appearing across television and radio. Opposition figures, meanwhile, are barred from appearing on most radio and TV stations. And, Maduro is tapping into Tik Tok, expanding his use of social media to portray himself as charismatic, to appeal to youth voters. Polling shows that this group continues to be the most supportive of the opposition. Edmundo González, Unitary Platform The 73-year-old former diplomat and academic did not intend to become the presidential hopeful for the Venezuelan opposition. Originally a placeholder, González was affirmed as the official nominee after substitutes for Machado, like academic Corina Yoris, were disqualified. But even if he was not so well known a few months ago, González now leads polls and, alongside Machado, headlines large rallies across the country. Pitching himself as a reconciliation candidate, his platform articulates a transition back to a pluralistic democracy, touching on themes of amnesty for the Maduro regime and rebuilding institutions. Outside of a focus on facilitating a democratic transition, González defers to the political program of Machado, noting that she, not him, was the primary voters’ choice. She has championed stabilizing the country’s macroeconomics by developing its energy reserves, as well as promoting nearshoring, and investment in infrastructure. González also references his long tenure in Venezuela’s foreign service to divorce himself from any particular political ideology. He highlights that he served successive administrations during posts in Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, El Salvador, and the United States. In an interview with El Pais, he described himself “as a democrat, a moderate person, far from extreme positions.” Still, even if González is voters’ top choice, worries persist that he will be disqualified before or, should he win, after the election. Four members of his team have already been detained on charges of instigating hate and conspiracy. Other candidates Eight other candidates will appear on the ballot for president. While there was potential for some of these candidates to split opposition votes, so far none of them poll above 2 percent in the May 2024 Meganalisis poll. Still, they are muddling an already confusing ballot. Candidates appear under each party they represent, meaning there are 38 headshots even though there are ten candidates. Maduro appears in 13* places; Gónzalez just three times. Many of the other candidates—such as evangelical pastor Javier Bertucci, lawyer Antonio Ecarri, and comedian Benjamin Rauseo—are trying to present themselves as a third way, rebuking chavismo but criticizing the Unitary Platform for either its strategy or its policies. *Editor's note: The original version of this article stated that Maduro appears 14 times on the electoral ballot.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Australia and Indonesia have long had an uneasy relationship, over issues ranging from Timor-Leste’s independence to asylum seekers and bans on live cattle export to the aftermath of the Bali bombings. While the politics have long been challenging, there’s reason to believe a change may be coming. One of the fastest-growing economies in the world, Indonesia has long been powered by coal. Now, it’s endeavouring to go green through renewables, grid modernisation, electric vehicles and geothermal. That’s where Australia comes in. In March this year, the two nations formalised a climate partnership, named KINETIK. Through the agreement, Indonesia will secure supplies of lithium for EV batteries, and Australia will gain more export markets for its critical minerals, as well as potential access to the batteries’ industry supply chain. Why has the relationship been rocky? Since winning independence from the Dutch, Indonesia has focused heavily on keeping its many islands and ethnic groups united. But Australia’s role has sometimes been destabilising. During the Cold War, Australian agencies backed the Indonesian army’s bloody purges of communists. Australia also backed the cause of East Timorese secession. In 1998, Australian Prime Minister John Howard wrote to Indonesia’s President, B.J Habibie, pushing for East Timorese independence. A year later, over 5,500 Australian soldiers arrived as peacekeepers during a tense referendum over the region’s future. Many people in Indonesia saw Australia’s involvement as a threat to national unity and cohesion. Before Howard and Indonesia’s next president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, had time to restore the relationship, tensions ramped up again after the 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali which killed 88 Australians. Four years later, the Australian decision to grant temporary protection visas to 43 asylum seekers from Papua, which has long sought independence from Indonesia, led Indonesia’s ambassador to Canberra to be recalled. This diplomatic incident bore positive fruit, resulting in improved dialogue and, the same year, the signing of the Lombok Treaty, in which both countries promised not to interfere with the sovereignty of the other. Since then, Australia has been diplomatically silent on other Indonesian territorial issues, such as the separatist movement in Papua. Despite these efforts, many differences remain. Experts have often warned the relationship is tenuous. In 2019, the two nations signed a new Comprehensive Economic Partnership after a tortuous negotiation period. With a focus on climate change and energy transition, this paved the way for this year’s announcement. In a broader context, this partnership also illustrates Australia’s approach as a middle power nation to counterbalance China’s increasing economic dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. Could the green transition help the relationship? In 2022, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited Indonesia, where he promised A$200 million to kickstart climate and infrastructure projects. Now we have a formalised partnership. This is an important step, which should improve the political relationship. The two nations already trade $18 billion of goods and services yearly, centred on Australian coal and beef and Indonesian fertilisers and petrol. But there is room for much more growth. Indonesia’s population is young and large, with almost 280 million people. By 2030, estimates suggest it could be the world’s fifth-largest economy. If the KINETIK partnership works, it will be because it offers both nations what they need – Australia gets a new export market for green minerals, technology and know-how, and Indonesia starts to shift away from coal. The agreement builds on a memorandum of understanding on electric vehicles and another between Export Finance Australia and Indonesia’s State-owned Electricity Company last year. What are we likely to see as tangible outcomes? Indonesia perches on the Pacific Ring of Fire, with a number of active volcanoes and frequent earthquakes. This also means the archipelago nation has huge geothermal resources, estimated at 40% of the world’s total. Many geothermal plants are already running. But making the most of the resource faces many technological challenges. The best underground heat resources tend to be located in mountains or in isolated areas. The KINETIK partnership could help through connecting Australian mining expertise to Indonesia’s deep heat resources. Australia’s expertise in using renewables to power isolated communities will be vital to make exploration easier. And Australian investors will be allowed to own a majority share of Indonesian geothermal plants. The partnerships are expected to align with Indonesia’s National Energy Policy, which aims in part to shift from exporting raw energy resources and critical minerals to exporting value-added energy products through downstream projects such as EV and battery industries. Australia is home to the world’s largest hard-rock lithium mine, Greenbushes. The new partnership will open up options for Indonesian battery manufacturers to access this key metal. Indonesia, in turn, is rich in nickel, which will be needed in great quantities for green technologies. In fact, cheaper Indonesian nickel has pushed some Australian producers out of the market. Indonesia has already secured commercial deals with EV and battery manufacturers such as Hyundai and LG from South Korea, as well as Foxconn from Taiwan. Will this be enough? Politically, the relationship between Indonesia and Australia has long been thorny. A new focus on mutual advantageous investment could help, especially given the deal has strong political backing on both sides. Developing electric vehicles in Indonesia was also a key campaign issue for the newly elected Indonesian president, Prabowo Subianto. From the Australian side, the agreement bolsters the Albanese government’s push to make the nation a green energy superpower. Of course, many agreements stay on paper and don’t shape the real world. But this one has a better chance, given the alignment between Indonesia’s efforts to make itself part of the electric vehicle supply chain, and Australia’s dream of becoming a green superpower. Bilateral agreements like these also show how the world is changing. More and more, middle power cooperation is emerging as a counterbalance against the intensifying Chinese-American rivalry. It’s also a positive sign Australia has realised the need to more actively build alliances across the Indo-Pacific region.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Iran’s leadership crisis may have come at an important time for the US, amid an ongoing political slugfest at home in an election cycle and a litmus test for US relations with Israel. In the wake of the helicopter crash that tragically claimed the lives of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran finds itself at a critical juncture, grappling with both internal and external challenges. Foremost among them is its relationship with the US. Iran is in the middle of a tense regional competition with Israel over the latter’s war in Gaza with Hamas. Washington is invariably drawn into what constitutes a historically contested triad shaping stability and instability in broader West Asia. Iran’s leadership crisis may have come at an important time for the US, amid an ongoing political slugfest at home in an election cycle and a litmus test for US relations with Israel. Two factors, however, are likely to dampen any US expectations from Iran. Iran’s topmost leadership remains intact under the aegis of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the next president will be expected to meet the benchmarks set by previous leaders. For the US, the Iran challenge is likely to remain complex, both due to the leadership transition inside Iran and the growing regional power and influence projected by Tehran. If the Biden administration, despite its initial will, couldn’t bind Iran within the constraints of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a possible Trump presidency would be even less likely to succeed. Regional anti-American sentiments in West Asia, especially among Iran and its proxy groups, seem further entrenched. However, the Biden administration has an opportunity to mitigate regional hostilities by fostering a Saudi-US détente, which remains on the table but is heavily dependent on how much influence Washington can wield with Israel’s highly conservative cabinet in restraining its behaviour in Gaza. Iran’s regional outlook and relations with the US may not be poised for significant shifts, given the predictability associated with the regime, yet the challenge of nurturing inter-generational leaders looms large for Iran. Leadership succession in Iran’s internal politics has always been meticulously planned and nurtured over the years, undergoing a rigorous process to ensure continuity. Internally, Iran faces a crucial test of its leadership amid a situation it has not encountered in decades. However, there is solace in the fact that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei remains alive, poised to select the most suitable candidate. Internally, the vacuum left by the untimely demise of two top leaders presents a crisis as well as an opportunity. However, the socio-cultural divergence with the West, exemplified by the Iranian leadership’s lingering reluctance to embrace any change, may continue to strain the relationship. The crisis in leadership compounds this internal struggle, as no state wishes to appear leaderless during times of uncertainty. Externally, the challenges for Iran are manifold, particularly in filling the leadership void that has been growing since the death of General Qasem Soleimani in 2020 after a US-targeted strike. The new leadership in Iran will be tested in how it continues to project its regional influence and maintain the momentum of clandestine efforts it has propagated across its axis. Internationally, the Iranian leadership’s challenge will primarily be in its tussle with the West on the one hand and maintaining poise in its relationships with varied actors such as China, Russia, and India, all while avoiding Western sanctions. Iran, which has been persistently characteristic in its distinct political stance even in the face of sanctions and regional tensions, has found an alternative axis of support, most notably through partnerships with China and Russia. Besides, Iran has fostered a network of regional support through proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Kataib Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and others. This solidarity axis is now bolstered by a shared commitment to the Palestinian cause. However, the post-October 7, 2023, landscape has seen a nuanced shift in perceptions, including those of regional Arab leaders. As such, the current period is particularly tumultuous in West Asiawith the unabating Israel-Hamas conflict. The loss of key figures in Iran’s leadership couldn’t have come at a worse time, especially as Iran finds itself at a crossroads, balancing unfinished conflicts and shifting regional loyalties. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran is now enriching uranium to as much as 60% purity and possesses enough of this material that, if further enriched, could be sufficient for two nuclear weapons. Now that the ‘breakout’ time is close to zero, there are strong incentives for keeping Tehran engaged through the IAEA, if not bilaterally. Despite the seeming belligerence of Iran’s leadership, avoiding war and efforts towards regional peace and stability lie at the core of Tehran’s long-term regional vision. Just a week before the fatal crash, Iran’s foreign minister met with the IAEA chief, and Iran engaged with US officials through intermediaries in Oman on how to avoid the risks of a wider regional war. If anything, these efforts show that both the Biden administration and the Iranian leadership are still willing to sit at the table. That may not be bad inspiration for the next generation of leaders in Tehran to pick up from. This commentary originally appeared in Deccan Herald. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Iran, like other parties, was taken aback by the Hamas attack on 7/10/2023 in the Gaza Strip (GS) envelope. This occurred at a critical juncture for Iran, as it had recently finalized a prisoner exchange agreement with the United States (US), unlocking $6 billion of its frozen oil revenues in South Korea just two months prior. The attack coincided with Iran’s efforts to ease tensions in regional relations, exemplified by its landmark agreement with Saudi Arabia on 10/3/2024. This analysis delves into Iran’s response to Operation al-Aqsa Flood, examining the factors influencing its stance and actions. First: Determinants of the Iranian Position Iran has consistently backed the resistance since the war’s onset. However, its stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was marked by meticulous calculations and intricate balancing acts, aiming to safeguard and fortify gains while averting potential adverse repercussions. Key factors shaping Iran’s approach to Operation al-Aqsa Flood include: 1. Reiterating the pivotal role of Palestine in Iranian foreign policy, particularly in supporting Palestinian resistance and rejecting recognition of the Israeli regime. 2. Geopolitical considerations and Iran’s aspiration to bolster its regional presence and influence as a pivotal force, safeguarding significant gains achieved in preceding years. 3. Iran aims to uphold its strategic alliances with affiliated forces and movements in the region, particularly those aligned with the resistance front. This entails bolstering the strength and influence of these movements while ensuring their continued relevance in the regional landscape. 4. Iran seeks to fortify its regional deterrence capabilities, with a specific focus on managing relations with Israel. Accumulating strength is regarded as a pivotal Iranian strategic imperative in this regard. 5. Iran’s desire to steer clear of entanglement in a widespread regional conflict or direct confrontation with the US is evident. The swift dispatch of US warships to the region serves as a clear message aimed at dissuading Iran from direct participation in the standoff. 6. The challenges confronting the Iranian economy amidst ongoing international sanctions, soaring inflation rates and the depreciation of the Iranian currency. 7. Iran’s immediate focus on de-escalation with the US and European countries, alongside sustained engagement with influential regional stakeholders. Second: Aspects of Iran’s Position The key aspects of the Iranian stance regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood are as follows: 1. From the outset, Iran has been eager to disassociate itself from the October 7 attack orchestrated by Hamas. It has stressed that the operation was an independent decision made by Palestinian resistance factions based on their own assessments and considerations. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explicitly refuted any Iranian involvement, a position reaffirmed by the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations (UN). This denial was also echoed by the US administration, with President Joe Biden telling 60 Minutes in an interview, on 15/10/2023, that “there is no clear evidence” implicating Iran in the Hamas attack. 2. The Iranian leadership across all branches (including the Supreme Leader, the Presidency, the government, the military, the Revolutionary Guards, legislative bodies and the media…) has provided robust political backing to the Resistance. They have hosted prominent delegations from Hamas and resistance factions, notably welcoming Isma‘il Haniyyah, the leader of Hamas, on two occasions. Iran has consistently adopted and defended the resistance and its objectives in both regional and international forums. 3. Iran has maintained its military and financial backing for the resistance as part of its longstanding policy, although specific details regarding the magnitude of this support and its delivery methods remain unclear. 4. While denying direct involvement in the October 7th attack, Iran has lauded the operation and reiterated its solidarity with the Palestinian resistance. This support was evident during Operation al-Aqsa Flood and in response to Israeli aggression in Gaza, where Iran endorsed the political and on-the-ground strategies pursued by the Palestinian resistance in managing the war. 5. Since the outset of the war, Iran has demonstrated a clear intention to swiftly conclude hostilities and secure a lasting ceasefire. Iranian diplomacy, spearheaded by Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, has diligently pursued this goal. 6. Despite its reluctance to engage directly in the war theater and to avert escalation into a broader regional conflict, Iran has encouraged its allied forces in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq to actively support the Palestinian resistance, tailoring its involvement to the specific circumstances of each theater. It is evident that Iran has played a significant yet undisclosed role in coordinating actions across the various theaters of the conflict. 7. When faced with the Israeli airstrike on its consulate in Damascus on 1/4/2024, Iran responded with meticulous caution and strategic calculations. Ensuring its retaliation on 13/4/2024 conveyed a powerful deterrent message to Israel. It carefully avoided escalating the conflict into a broader confrontation, when it intentionally announced its response beforehand, allowing Israel and its allies ample time to prepare for the launched rockets and drones. Furthermore, Iran selectively targeted military installations, refraining from unveiling any new strategic weaponry. According to Israeli military officials, “In the attack, 185 drones, 36 cruise missiles and 110 surface-to-surface missiles were fired toward Israel,” The New York Times newspaper reported. Regardless of the precise accuracy of these figures, the response was significant and expansive, serving as a demonstration of force and a bolstering of Iran’s regional standing. The objective seemed more focused on asserting deterrence rather than inflicting substantial damage. Following the Israeli response on 19/4/2024, which was notably restrained and targeted select Iranian sites without an official declaration, Iran demonstrated a commitment to crisis containment and a desire to prevent further escalation. 8. In terms of popular interaction, the Iranian street witnessed a wide mass movement in support of the resistance and the Palestinians in GS, similar to the ongoing state of popular sympathy in the Arab and Muslim world. Third: Ramifications and Projections: Iran’s stance during Operation al-Aqsa Flood has yielded both positive and negative repercussions, among the most significant being: 1. A resurgence of tension in Iranian-Western relations ensued, evidenced by the US House of Representatives’ decision on 30/11/2023 to reinstate the freeze on the $6 billion previously lifted on 10/8/2023 and deposited into Qatari banks, before being accessed by Iran. Subsequent to Iran’s assault on Israel on 13/4/2024, the US, along with several European countries, imposed additional sanctions on Iran. 2. Iran’s reputation and standing suffered a blow due to its reserved and cautious stance at the onset of the conflict. This approach failed to meet the expectations of Palestinian, Arab and Islamic public, given the promises and positions expressed in previous years. Many within these circles perceived Iran’s response as falling short during a critical moment when robust support, beyond mere political and media endorsements, was direly needed. However, Iran’s image and status experienced a notable enhancement following Hizbullah’s significant involvement on the northern front during the months of the confrontation. Additionally, the escalating role of the Yemeni Ansar Allah group in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, particularly in actions against Israeli shipping and vessels bound for Israeli ports, further contributed to this improvement. Moreover, the participation of the Iraqi resistance also played a role in bolstering Iran’s reputation and standing. In a late March 2024 Jordanian elite opinion poll, it was revealed that Iran’s reputation and influence in the Arab world saw a 42% increase due to its stance on the GS war. Additionally, 45% of respondents stated that Iran and its allies’ position contributed to the reduction of sectarian divisions in the region. 3. Iran successfully navigated the initial challenge of applying the slogan of Unity of the Arenas among the parties within the Axis of Resistance. The increased involvement of its allied forces in the conflict marks a tangible step forward, offering potential for further advancement in realizing the slogan. 4. The conflict has significantly impacted Israel’s strategic standing in the region, tarnishing its reputation as a regional stabilizer and a bastion of Western influence. It has also hindered progress in normalization efforts and fueled increased backing from Arab, Muslim and international public for Hamas and the resistance factions. This dynamic bolsters Iran’s political stance, particularly given the perceived inadequacy of Arab official interaction with the resistance and responses to the brutal Israeli aggression on GS. *** In the forthcoming period, Iran is expected to persist in navigating a cautious and balanced strategy concerning Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Palestine issue. Within this framework, Iran aims to bolster its backing for the Palestinian resistance and its regional footprint while sustaining a trend of improved relations across the region. Additionally, Iran is likely to pursue efforts to defuse tensions in its dealings with the US and Western nations. Political Insights: A periodic series that provides brief and condensed political analyses and position assessments, issued by Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of World & New World Journal.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Increasing geopolitical tensions and domestic political pressures have tested Fiji’s efforts to strike a balance in relations with its traditional partners and China. Its actions also illustrate that on questions of sovereignty, external pressure, undue influence, and interference extend beyond China. When the Coalition Government led by Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka was sworn into power in Fiji on Christmas Eve 2022 it marked an historic moment: the beginning of a peaceful transition of power, uninterrupted by coups or civil disturbance. But international attention was preoccupied not with whether Fiji had finally ended the coup cycle, but with what the new Government’s stance would be towards China. As a recently aired documentary by the Australian television program 60 Minutes makes clear, that preoccupation has fanned claims in Western media about China as a disruptive – if not predatory – actor in Fiji and the wider region. It is little wonder that the Fijian prime minister (who is also foreign minister) has repeatedly described the Pacific as being “at the centre of geopolitical tensions.” Major powers were, in his view, seeking to “polarize the Pacific into their own camps,” compelling countries to choose sides and further militarising the region. Like a number of other Pacific island countries, Fiji has long held the position of “friends to all, enemies to none.” In the Pacific islands context, this posture has been interpreted to mean being free to choose who to partner with; and not being told by others who they can or cannot be friends with. It is a form of non-alignment that does not preclude security agreements but seeks to avoid or resist being confined to spheres of influence. As former Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama declared in 2015: “We have no desire as a Pacific Small Island Developing State to be drawn into the conflicts of others.” This non-alignment principle has been qualified to some extent by the foreign policy orientation of the government of the day. During the early years of the Bainimarama era, there was a tilt towards China. This was primarily a response to the diplomatic isolation and sanctions imposed on the government by Western partners (including Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) after the coup of 2006, which had compelled Fiji to actively seek new friends and allies. After the return to elected government in 2014, relations were restored with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, and some foreign policy equilibrium was achieved. But it was not long before the Western partners, led by Australia, began publicly asserting the existence of a Chinese strategic threat to the region. Soon thereafter, these states launched a new campaign of “strategic denial” and, inter alia, escalated their engagement with Fiji. When Bainimarama’s regime was ousted by a coalition of parties dominated by Rabuka’s People’s Alliance Party in the 2022 general election, it was expected that the new government would be less friendly towards China and realign itself more with its “traditional” Western partners. Some saw signs of such a shift in Rabuka’s cancellation of a meeting with the visiting Chinese foreign minister in April 2023, the March reinstatement of the Taiwanese mission’s name to Trade Mission of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Fiji (after a 2018 downgrade), and promises of an end to Fiji’s longstanding police cooperation agreement with China. But Western optimism did not last. The diplomatic upgrade of the Taiwan Trade Office was reversed; Fiji withdrew its signature from the 51 country statement at the UN calling for an end to China’s persecution of its Uighur minority; and revised but did not terminate the policing agreement. Fiji also accepted a large Chinese grant for the construction of roads in Vanua Levu and, to great alarm among its Western partners, announced on the sidelines of APEC that China had agreed to help with port upgrades and with developing a shipbuilding industry. The Chinese government admitted that the quid pro quo for this infrastructure assistance to Fiji was that “China expects Fiji to continue providing firm support on issues concerning China’s core interests and major concerns.” The “core interests and major concerns” are the One China policy, China’s domestic sovereignty, and its rights in its territorial disputes with neighbouring states. Fiji’s governments are likely to continue to provide such support as long as there is no serious conflict with Fiji’s fundamental foreign policy interests. These include upholding the sanctity of the principles and rules embedded in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Moreover, Fiji benefits from Chinese development assistance, and does not view China’s regional presence as strategically threatening as do its Western partners. Rabuka’s continued engagement with China has had the effect of provoking these Western partners into seeking to outbid or delegitimise Chinese initiatives, especially in the security sector where China is suspected of attempting to extend its strategic reach. But, while his government would have anticipated and welcomed the Australian offer to replace China as its partner in upgrading Fiji’s ports and shipbuilding industry, Australia’s attempt to delegitimise the policing arrangement with China by associating it with official Chinese transnational drug promotion was not appreciated. As the Fiji government’s reaction to the latter suggests, its concerns about the effects on its sovereignty of external pressure, undue influence, and interference extend beyond China. That Western partners, and in particular Australia, have increasingly asserted their right to a say in regional and individual Pacific Island Countries foreign policy decisions has caused some dismay and discomfort. The Rabuka government may be attempting to maximise Fiji’s foreign policy independence, manoeuvrability, and leverage, or to strike a balance between its relations with its traditional partners and China. But it also may not yet have developed a settled foreign policy posture based on consultation and consensus within its foreign policy and security establishment. If there is some disagreement and a lack of direction and coordination, the recently initiated Foreign Policy White Paper drafting process should, if sufficiently inclusive, prove of great value. Sandra Tarte is Associate Professor and acting head, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of the South Pacific Pacific. Sandra specialises in the international politics of the Pacific Islands region with a particular interest in Fiji’s foreign policy. Nicola Baker lectures in the Diplomacy and International Affairs Program at the University of the South Pacific in Suva. Her research interests encompass various aspects of the region’s geopolitics.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The announcement of Spain's recognition of the State of Palestine constitutes a significant step, but it is not accompanied by the adoption of other necessary measures for its effective consolidation. Already, 147 fully-fledged member states of the United Nations recognize the State of Palestine. With Norway's, Ireland's, and Spain's decisions, along with Slovenia's recent accession, three-quarters of the UN's 193 member states now uphold this commitment. Beyond the particular implications of this, it remains to be defined whether it will be accompanied by other necessary measures of broader scope to achieve full recognition and to act urgently for a permanent ceasefire, the end of Israeli occupation, and the massacre against the Palestinian people. According to the Ministry of Health, more than 37,000 people, including 12,000 children, have been killed in the Gaza Strip since the beginning of Israel's military offensive in early October last year. Among these actions are the reconsideration of diplomatic and trade relations with Israel, an arms embargo, support for South Africa's lawsuit in the International Court of Justice for the genocide in Gaza, and the involvement of the international community to effectively ensure a process of peace, security, and guarantees in the territory. The Dimension of Recognition May 28th, 2024. This was the day when the Council of Ministers approved the official recognition of the State of Palestine by Spain. This date also marked the change in the designation of Husni Abdel Wahed, who had been the representative of the Palestinian National Authority in Spain since March 2022, to now serve as the ambassador of the State of Palestine to Spain. "We are very grateful for a measure that holds significant political and legal importance in strengthening the bonds of brotherhood and friendship, where Spain is playing a crucial role in favor of a peaceful solution at a time when Israel is committing genocide with the support of the United States, Germany, and other countries," states Wahed, emphasizing the importance of opening a space of hope that recognizes the rights of the Palestinian people to live freely in their own state. The 1967 borderlines upon which this recognition is based, as well as its effectiveness, have been debated in recent days. According to Wahed, "If it were merely symbolic, Israel would not react with such hysteria, because they know this goes beyond symbolism and has practical effects because, when more countries join in recognizing Palestine, it constitutes pressure not only on Israel as the occupying power but also on its supporters, who are complicit in the genocide." The recognition itself is not the goal for the ambassador but rather a step on the path that needs to be continued. Ana Sánchez, member of the Solidarity Network Against the Occupation of Palestine, distinguishes in her assessment the dual nature of the measure as both a necessary but insufficient step, stating that "it does not meet the needs or guarantee the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people as a whole, nor will it have an impact on the daily lives of Palestinian individuals," for which she calls for more decisive measures against the apartheid and genocide being committed by Israel. It was September 2009 when the then Prime Minister of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, called for Palestinian recognition as a key element for peace in the Middle East in a speech at the United Nations headquarters. This commitment did not materialize until fifteen years later, about which, in addition to other related issues in the report, this media outlet sought to inquire from the current Secretary of State for Foreign and Global Affairs, Diego Martínez Belío. The response from the ministry's communication team was a refusal to grant an interview citing scheduling reasons. Regarding the delay in Palestinian recognition over time, Sánchez, from the RESCOP, recalls how governmental arguments pointed to the intention for recognition to be more coordinated with other EU member states, emphasizing the need to promote this process institutionally with the necessary conditions for effective implementation. On the other hand, Olga Rodríguez, a journalist specializing in international affairs and the Middle East, agrees with Sánchez on the positive direction of the recognition step, but also highlights that it comes late and is insufficient. This promise to recognize the Palestinian state by Spain "has not materialized until now due to political reasons and because there was no price to pay for not doing so." Rodríguez specifies in the historical and political context how not only did the trend of neglect towards Palestine continue, but also how the United States, first under Trump and then under Biden, pushed the Abraham Accords to formalize relations between several Arab countries and Israel as if the Palestinian issue did not exist. In fact, she recalls that when Hamas attacks occurred on October 7th, the United States had been promoting the signing of these agreements between Saudi Arabia and Israel for some time, following their signing by several Arab countries in recent years. According to her, the fundamental key lies in the fact that today the territory designated for the Palestinian state is not available to the Palestinian population because it has been illegally occupied by Israel since 1967, thereby violating several United Nations resolutions. "In recent years, especially in the last two decades, this occupation has tripled, and settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have expanded with the connivance and support of Europe and the United States, major powers dominating the region, which have maintained their preferential economic and trade alliances with Israel," she adds. What additional measures can be taken? The United Nations General Assembly's 1947 partition plan allocated 54% of the territory of historic Palestine to the Israeli state and the remaining 46% to the Palestinian state, despite the Palestinian population being numerically larger than the Jewish population at that time. The Zionist conception of a Jewish state was tied to a Jewish majority, leading to an ethnic cleansing known as the Nakba, which resulted in the expulsion of 750,000 Palestinian people from their homes. Israel, through Plan Dalet, occupied new territories that were not allocated in that partition and used the wartime scenario to annex up to 78% of historic Palestine. Therefore, as Rodríguez mentions, when discussing the allocation of a future Palestinian state, we are only talking about 22% of historic Palestine, which is also filled with checkpoints, settlements, and under Israel's military dominance. "The essential thing is to end the Israeli occupation. This issue often gets overlooked, even when discussing the recognition of the Palestinian State and the so-called two-state solution. Everything must be based on a starting point, which is the end of the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of troops from all Palestinian territory in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and East Jerusalem", proposes Wahed. The Ambassador of the State of Palestine to Spain emphasizes that without Israeli withdrawal and the end of the occupation, Israel's apartheid regime against the Palestinian people will continue. "The question is how long will the international community continue to be, in many cases, complicit in this?". Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territory since 1967, recently published the report called "Anatomy of a Genocide," in which she concludes that Israel is committing the crime of genocide against the Palestinian population in Gaza by "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, and imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group." Both, she and 52 other UN experts and rapporteurs, have called for sanctions and arms embargoes on Israel following the shocking Israeli attack on the refugee camp in Rafah. From the Solidarity Network Against the Occupation of Palestine, Sánchez believes that recognizing a State while maintaining relations with the State attempting to eliminate it is a double standard. "It is very hypocritical to say that dignity and hope are recognized shortly after the heartbreaking images from Rafah, and that alongside this recognition, there is no arms embargo on Israel, no severing of diplomatic, economic, commercial, military, academic, and sports relations with those perpetrating such crimes. I do not find this policy very coherent." Despite the Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union, and Cooperation, José Manuel Albares, stated that arms exports to Israel had been suspended since October 7th, military equipment worth over one million euros was exported from Spain to Israel in November and December 2023, according to a research conducted by the Centre Delàs. Sánchez reaffirms the above by arguing that Spain has not stopped buying or selling weapons to Israel, nor has it stopped allowing Spanish territory to be used as a transit space for weapons destined for the Zionist state. She demands more information and transparency regarding the role of the Rota base in recent months. "The demand for a military embargo is a historical request to the international community. This is not just about the current genocide in Gaza, but if Israel is capable of perpetrating this televised genocide, it's because they have been armed for decades," she explains. Rodríguez also agrees that without real pressure on Israel through political and economic measures at the level of nation-states, the European Union, and the United Nations, "nothing will change, as demonstrated by Israeli history in recent decades." Therefore, she contrasts the immediate mechanisms applied to Russia, while, except for some countries, there has been no suspension or rupture of diplomatic relations with Israel, protected by the United States and Europe. Furthermore, she highlights how these sanctions and arms embargoes have been requested for years because this did not start on October 7th, as Israel "has been violating international law, illegally occupying, implementing an apartheid system, torturing, killing, and discriminating for a long time." Therefore, she regrets that all this has continued to happen, even becoming more sophisticated, because nothing has been done due to geopolitical reasons, being in Europe and under its umbrella and within the American orbit, with all that this implies. "This is the impunity and the policy of Israeli fait accompli." Rodríguez believes there is a significant risk of collapse of the "fragile scaffolding" built upon the United Nations Charter and international law, as she considers that in recent months all red lines have been crossed with insults and breaches by Israel, but also with very concerning and serious challenges from the United States. She opines that the severity lies in transitioning to the law of the jungle, the law of the strongest, "at a time of devouring capitalism and resource depletion, where major powers will compete for the domination of wealth, with victory going to those who arrive first through war." Currently, there are two international courts investigating Israel. On one hand, there is the International Criminal Court's request for arrest warrants against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. Meanwhile, on the other hand, there is the genocide complaint regarding Gaza that South Africa filed against Israel in the International Court of Justice, the most prominent judicial body of the United Nations. Regarding the latter, Spain has joined the proceedings but has not taken a position to support the lawsuit. In response, Sánchez sees the accountability processes in international courts as a positive development, but she adds that it is more of a political and diplomatic message rather than something that will have practical application with consequences on the ground. Therefore, the next consistent and coherent step should be the implementation of other measures such as an arms embargo against Israel. Finally, Rodríguez believes that the way Minister Albares presented the initiative has watered it down because he has insisted that they will not take sides. "We will have to see the statement of intervention in the procedure when they send the request, but he has made it clear that they do not support South Africa's complaint and that they will limit themselves to supporting the provisional measures issued by the Court for compliance by Israel." Therefore, she emphasizes that this will not have effective capacity unless it is accompanied by political actions that push to achieve that goal. Camping and Academicide In the realm of demanding actions to be carried out, the academic sphere is also involved. The University Network for Palestine, which is present in over forty public universities in Spain, advocates several demands to university leadership teams, the Conference of Rectors of Spanish Universities, and the Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities. Specifically, these five points: condemning the destruction of universities in Palestine, demand for an immediate ceasefire allowing necessary humanitarian interventions, severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, non-collaboration with companies involved in genocide, and allocation of economic resources for hosting students and academic staff in Palestine and for the reconstruction of universities in Gaza. In the face of Israel's daily normalization of genocide against the Palestinian people, student encampments at universities highlighted the unacceptability of these actions and the need to defend human rights. The effect of these encampments expanded like what happened in 2011 in the city squares during the 15M movement. Within the network's common framework, each encampment operates autonomously. Specifically, the encampment in Madrid was formed through a coalition of university groups that had previously worked on Palestine-related issues. From there, the encampment was convened, attracting people beyond its original coalition. Oriol Erausquin, a Sociology Ph.D. student at the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) and the Complutense University of Madrid (UCM), who participated in the Palestine camp at the UCM, believes that the recognition, which has been promised on several occasions and could exert some pressure on Israel, "may seek to enhance the international projection of the Pedro Sánchez government, but the reality is that there is a genocide happening". Therefore, he asserts that it is essential to act with sanctions and an embargo on commercial activities with Israel, because "anything short of direct action on what is happening seems very limited, inadequate, and belated to us." The encampment in Madrid has directed its proposals to the public universities in Madrid. “We want to sit down with them and achieve agreements in a unified manner”, emphasizing the difficulty of this due to the refusal to negotiate by the Rectorate. “The pressure we are exerting, with some universities yielding to the demands and the international situation unfolding, may lead to the need to break a series of agreements that are whitewashing and legitimizing the Israeli regime, in addition to actively participating in its industry and war machinery”, Erausquin points out. So far, the universities in Madrid have not responded, while the universities of Barcelona, Seville, Jaén, Granada, Valencia, Salamanca, Cádiz, and Pablo de Olavide have fully embraced the points raised by the network and have suspended relations with Israeli institutions. In conjunction with the student block, the faculty has also mobilized. The Network of Teachers and Workers of Universities in the Community of Madrid for Palestine emerges within a broader national network that includes 44 universities across the country. Within this network, initiatives from faculty members of public universities in Madrid have arisen to unite and carry out more specific actions within the community since March of this year. These initiatives include organizing activities such as outdoor classes, roundtable discussions, and conferences that have enabled them to consolidate as a collective. One of their fundamental contributions is the quantification and visibility of what the term "academicide" entails. Through this, they seek to highlight the framework of the killings of over 230 teachers and 5,000 students in Palestine. Joan Pedro Carañana, a member of this network, explains that academicide consists of the systematic extermination of education and research: "It is scandalous that Israel has bombed all universities in Gaza, that it has killed thousands of people in the educational and scientific fields, and that more than 90,000 students cannot attend university." Academicide is therefore "a key vector of genocide that not only seeks to kill people associated with thought, but also to deprive an entire people of their right to knowledge, speech, and memory," he points out. Due to the difficulty in finding the people killed under the rubble, the number of victims will be higher than previously counted. The network considers various sources for this, such as the United Nations or Scholars Against the World in Palestine, among others. Additionally, according to the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate, at least 140 journalists have been killed since October 7th, 2023. Before that date, Carañana details how in January of the previous year, there were 902 crimes, violations, and punishments by Israeli occupation forces committed during 2022. "This is obviously about silencing the victim so they can't even protest and raise their voice to convey their point of view. It's part of the dehumanization that accompanies genocide," he concludes. The right to self-determination of the Palestinian people Netanyahu displayed a map at the United Nations Assembly two weeks before Hamas' attacks, showing Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights as part of Israel. In other words, he desires that territory, without Palestinians, as Rodríguez points out. Given the complexity of the so-called two-state solution, she recalls that some advocate for a more just and egalitarian idea of a single state with equality, rather than a state where rights are only for one ethnicity or religion. In fact, many Palestinian people who were expelled in 1948 and 1967 have the right, for whom the United Nations recognizes their right of return through a resolution to return to the homes they were born in, which were taken from them through the Absentees' Property Law. For Wahed, the self-determination of the Palestinian people is always present and is something they will not relinquish. "I want to remind you that this so-called two-state solution is not a Palestinian demand. It is a Western plan, initiated by George Bush, which was embraced as the solution by the international community. We have adopted it, but our original demand from Palestine is a democratic and secular state for all citizens." He adds that Palestinian people today live in a state where Israel occupies nearly 100% of historic Palestine, but with two systems: one of democracy for Jews and another of apartheid for Palestinians. That's why he argues that the issue goes beyond the Palestinian people and that it is necessary to invest in a culture of peace. He points out, for example, that in recent years, most of NATO countries have approved increasing military spending to at least 2% of GDP. The Palestinian ambassador to Spain suggests that part of this GDP should instead be allocated to promoting a culture of peace, as this is the solution to combating war with peace, poverty with investment in the future, or hunger by dedicating resources to combating climate change and land desertification. "This is the solution not only for Palestine but for all humanity." On the other hand, Carañana believes it would be worthwhile to pay attention to what the people of Palestine are saying, where they welcomed this recognition as a step forward but with the need to delve deeper and implement measures beyond this. The path, he estimates, involves discussing the borders of the recognized State and how the construction of that State will be made effective in a context of occupation by the Israeli army, in order to then, intensify pressure on Israel so that it is forced to agree to a ceasefire and promote a peace process. Recently, the Camp for Palestine in Madrid has decided to dismantle and leave the esplanade of the Complutense University where they were, but not before planting an olive tree for peace. They do this firmly believing that the struggle for human rights continues in other spaces, where, as Erausquin explains, they will have to mobilize all the strength that has been gathered to continue fighting for the Palestinian cause. Meanwhile, in the RESCOP, they emphasize the complexity of whether a Palestinian state with sovereignty can exist in the current situation. "The policy of fait accompli that Israel is developing in the occupied West Bank seriously questions whether this is indeed a process that has the minimum guarantees to succeed," declares Sánchez, highlighting that the present and future must be approached from a decolonial perspective in response to the colonial regime policies being carried out by Israel. To guarantee the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, Sánchez believes that there must first be a process of accountability for those who have systematically violated the rights of the Palestinian people as a whole. "If we want negotiations to take place, the parties must be on equal footing because right now it's like placing someone who has been suffering abuses for decades against someone who is perpetrating them." Thus, he explains that there should be two processes: on one hand, Israel must face international courts to be judged for war crimes, apartheid, and genocide committed against the Palestinian population; on the other hand, the Palestinian population should be asked how they want to manage this process of self-determination, to avoid imposing a colonial framework that prevents people who have to decide their own destiny. Finally, Rodríguez reminds us that the self-determination of the Palestinian people is a right that has been overwhelmingly ratified through a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. However, as she counters, the problem lies in the fact that the Israeli Parliament also recently voted overwhelmingly against the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. This is a chamber where there are barely any parliamentary representatives advocating for peace and an end to Israel's violations of international law. "We must build everything to promote a culture of peace," emphasizes Rodríguez. This would encompass educational programs from childhood that are reinforced in high schools and universities, incorporating elements that emphasize peace culture and human rights. It also involves replacing in the media the promotion of war culture, which often receives awards, with peace culture. Additionally, she advocates for a modification of the voting and veto systems in the United Nations to achieve fairer mechanisms of mutual respect among states, replacing imposition with multilateralism. In essence, it is a long-term task for defending the Palestinian population and human rights that must be activated across multiple fields such as politics, social issues, media, and law. The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).