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Diplomacy
Palestinian flag, on the background flags of China and the USA

China’s approach to the war in Gaza is not anti-Israel. It’s designed to contain the US

by Ahmed Aboudouh

China’s position on the war in Gaza is controversial and ambiguous to many observers. Beijing has criticized Israel’s blanket bombardment of civilians and condemned violations of international law. President Xi Jinping waited until after the Third Belt and Road Forum to comment on the crisis, reiterating China’s long-held position that a two-state solution should be implemented and calling for a humanitarian corridor to allow aid into the besieged Gaza Strip. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi went further, describing Israel’s bombardment of civilians in Gaza as actions that ‘have gone beyond the scope of self-defence’. At the same time, Beijing avoided condemning Hamas’s atrocities against civilians. As in Ukraine, China is positioning itself as a peace-seeking, ‘neutral’ great power, in contrast to the US, whose committed support for Israel is depicted by Beijing as a destabilizing, violent influence in the region. But China’s comments on the war, and its non-interventionist stance, mean it is unable to influence events – an uncomfortable position when its interests are directly threatened by the war. That may be why Beijing is increasingly aligning with Russia on the Palestinian issue, an unprecedented development that aims to guarantee a place at the negotiating table at minimal cost to both – and undermine US influence in the region. Familiar tactics It is now clear that China is adopting the Ukraine playbook on the Israel–Hamas war, seeking to publicly chart a different course from the US and its allies and their unconditional support for Israel. Chinese officials’ diplomatic interactions with the region are strictly adhering to Beijing’s policy of balancing between the Gulf States and Iran and between the regional main powers and Israel. The rhetoric from Beijing is carefully designed to focus on the broader context, such as implementing the two-state solution, addressing humanitarian issues and preventing the conflict from turning into a regional one. It has refrained from describing the Hamas incursion into Israel as a terrorist attack but has called Israel’s retaliation ‘collective punishment’ of Palestinian civilians – signalling its opposition to an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza. This is not simply the behaviour of a peace-loving, mercantilist giant. Rather, it is a structured, deliberate strategy to achieve China’s objectives in the region and beyond. ‘Anti-Western neutrality’ China does not aspire to replace the US position in the Middle East, but will undoubtedly be pleased to see the US again drawn into a conflict in the region. Chinese experts believe the more strategic non-East Asian theatres that require Washington’s attention, the more time and space China gains to assert its strategic domination in the Indo-Pacific. China has reaffirmed its historical affinity to the Palestinian cause (its policy since the time of Mao Zedong) and its policy of what might be called ‘anti-Western neutrality’ – that is, neutrality that stops short of condemning any country or force that undermines Western centrality in the global order (rather than explicitly lending support to Hamas). China also uses ‘Anti-Western neutrality’ to appeal to a densely populated and strategically important support base. Many Global South nations are sympathetic to Palestine, and the war is therefore an issue China can use to mobilize support for its leadership of developing countries. This in turn helps win backing for Chinese positions on core issues like Xinjiang and Taiwan – and for Xi’s vision of global governance, enshrined in his signature initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). China has also sought to consolidate regional unity, urging the Islamic World to ‘speak with one voice’ with China on Palestine, building on its initiative to mediate a diplomatic agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran last March – a big win for the GSI, which is based on regional countries independently taking the lead in ‘resolving regional security issues through solidarity and coordination.’ The war encouraged Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salaman and Iran’s President Ibrahim Raisi to speak on the phone for the first time, something China was pleased to see. By stressing its neutral stance and its role as a voice of the Global South, China wants to check the US’s moral standing and legitimize internationalization of the issue, calling for a global conference to initiate a peace process – thereby removing Washington from its decades-long position as the unchallenged arbiter in the conflict. The ultimate objective is to degrade the US’s global standing and win the ‘discourse power’ war by capitalizing on sympathy for Palestinians worldwide. A flawed policy However, beyond the short term, China’s policy is flawed and unsustainable. While the Biden administration has failed to speak in a balanced way on the war, instead unconditionally supporting Israel, it has mobilized US diplomatic might to influence Israel’s response – preventing the conflict from spreading outside Gaza and allowing aid to reach civilians. Its committed response to the war, in fact, may put to bed the idea that Washington has departed from the Middle East, strengthening its traditional regional role. Chinese ‘anti-Western neutrality’ meanwhile, has led Israel to retaliate diplomatically by joining the UK and 50 other countries at the UN to condemn China’s policies against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, saying they constitute ‘international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.’ Like the Ukraine war, the Israel–Hamas war shows that ambiguity and ‘anti-Western neutrality’ are complex acts. To be considered neutral, others must also believe it. Neutrality also prevents China from directly influencing these dangerous events in a way that favours its interests. China has significant economic connections to the region. It is the biggest trading partner with most MENA countries and almost half of its imported oil comes from the Gulf. China’s overall trade with the Arab world stood at more than $430 billion last year. These significant interests are vulnerable to regional wars and instability - but Chinese leaders can only watch events unfold from a distance. China should now understand that transactional de-escalation between regional rivals like Saudi Arabia and Iran does not necessarily constitute peace. One of the key lessons of the conflict is that Iranian proxies were ready to blow up the region to impede Saudi normalization with Israel. China-sponsored integration initiatives will be no more successful at preventing another similar episode. Possessing great power capabilities is one thing. Acting like a great power is another. The US has demonstrated its continuing commitment to Israel and ability to influence Israeli policy. China has confined itself to voicing objections and calling for peace. Alignment with Russia may amplify its voice in a peace settlement. But there is a long way to go before that becomes reality. China must understand that in these crucial days, lip service diplomacy is the last thing MENA people want.

Diplomacy
United States Secretary of State, Antony Blinken with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman

Saudi plans to ‘de-risk’ region have taken a hit with Gaza violence − but hitting pause on normalization with Israel will buy kingdom time

by Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

Saudi Arabia and Israel had seemingly been edging closer to a landmark deal to normalize their diplomatic relations – and then the Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023, happened. Since then, thousands have died in Gaza and in Israel. And fears of the conflict spreading across the region form the backdrop to frenzied diplomacy across the region, including a visit to Israel by U.S. President Joe Biden on Oct. 18. It also threatens to undermine a key pillar of Saudi Arabia’s foreign and domestic agenda: the “de-risking” of the region. With Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman set on implementing “Vision 2030” – an ambitious economic, social and cultural program – and developing the kingdom as a destination for tourism and investment, a renewal of regional instability is the last thing the crown prince needs. De-escalating tensions Certainly, the escalating violence in the Middle East presents a challenge to the shift toward de-escalation of tensions across much of the broader region in recent years. This has included the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, which established diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco. But it goes further, including multiple-state treaties that have healed rifts across the Gulf, culminating in the signing of a deal in March 2023 to restore Saudi-Iranian relations. These diplomatic breakthroughs opened up a space for greater regional cooperation through initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor unveiled at the G20 meeting in India in September 2023. The hope of officials across the region was that economic development could integrate the region and move discussion away from the failure to make progress on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The Palestinian question Violence in Israel and Gaza threatens to knock Gulf states off a delicate balancing act of supporting the Palestinian cause in front of their largely Muslim populations while also making overtures to Israel and the U.S. Qatar, for example, has long hosted the political leaders of Hamas while remaining on friendly terms with the U.S.. It will now likely face significant Israeli and U.S. pressure to expel Hamas leadership. The UAE and Bahrain both normalized relations with Israel in 2020, along with Morocco. But public support for the Abraham Accords across the region was always lukewarm at best and may now dwindle away. Meanwhile, Dubai, the UAE’s largest city, is gearing up to host COP28, the international climate change conference, starting Nov. 30. The UAE will not want the event overshadowed or put at risk by a new regional war. Reaching out to Israel But nowhere is the tightrope more delicate than in Saudi Arabia. This is by virtue of the kingdom’s religious standing in the Islamic world – it is custodian of the faith’s two most holy sites, Mecca and Medina – and the ambitious raft of economic reforms the kingdom has rolled out as part of Vision 2030. The campaign for Palestinian statehood has long been a cause célèbre in the Muslim world, and the current king of Saudi Arabia, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, has been a staunch supporter of Palestine all his life. But his son and heir, the crown prince, has increasingly shown an interest in dialogue with Israel. This has culminated in the talks to “normalize” relations between the two countries – something that would represent a historic breakthrough in Israel’s acceptance within the Arab and Islamic world. As recently as Sept. 20, Crown Prince Mohammed told Fox News that “every day, we get closer” to a deal. Indeed, a series of leaks to U.S. media in the days and weeks prior to the Hamas attack suggested that the outlines of an agreement were taking shape, driven by the Biden administration. Public shows, private diplomacy But the Hamas attack and Israel’s response have punctured this momentum. Saudi sources briefed the media on Oct. 13 that talks on normalization had been paused – but not abandoned. Such messaging is in line with Saudi attempts to balance domestic and external interests. An initial Saudi Foreign Ministry statement on Oct. 7 appealed to both the “Palestinian factions” and “Israeli occupation forces” to de-escalate. But at the first Friday prayer at the Grand Mosque in Mecca after the attacks, Saudi authorities were more forthcoming in taking sides, with the state-appointed cleric urging support for “our brothers in Palestine.” Behind the public shows of support for Palestinians, there is evidence that Saudis are trying to spearhead diplomatic efforts to prevent the war between Israel ad Hamas from developing into a wider conflagration that might bring in Lebanon, Iran and others. On Oct. 12, Crown Prince Mohammed discussed the unfolding developments in Israel and Gaza with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi – their first conversation since ties between the two countries were restored in March. Three days later, the crown prince received U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Riyadh amid media reports of differences between the Saudi and U.S. positions on the conflict and the need for de-escalation. Oil and foreign investment Such diplomatic moves fall in line with the crown prince’s desire to “de-risk” the region. He is eager to see that nothing jeopardizes a series of “giga-projects” – such as Neom, the futuristic new city on the Red Sea coastline – that have become synonymous with Vision 2030. The Saudi fear is that a prolonged or regional conflict will deter foreign investment in Vision 2030. Foreign investment was seen as key to the project’s success. But levels of foreign investment plunged after the detention by the Saudi authorities of dozens of senior Saudi business figures at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in 2017 over allegations of corruption. Investors took fright at the prospect that their business partners might suddenly disappear or be shaken down. As a result, the Saudis are having to shoulder a greater proportion of the costs of Vision 2030 themselves. This explains why Saudi officials have cooperated with their Russian counterparts in OPEC+ meetings to keep the price of oil at a level high enough to generate enough revenues to fund the projects. Vision 2030 has become so bound up with Crown Prince Mohammed’s pledge to transform Saudi Arabia that he cannot afford for it to fail – hence his determination to reduce sources of regional tension, including with Iran. Saudi officials also recently revised their plans to attract 100 million visitors a year by 2030 upward to 150 million and launched a bid to host the 2034 FIFA World Cup. Underlying these initiatives is the Saudis’ desire to diversify the kingdom’s economy away from an overdependence on oil, turning the kingdom into a destination for capital and people alike. These ambitions would be endangered by another regional war in the Middle East – especially if it drew in Iran. Playing the ‘normalization’ card So where does the “normalization” of Saudi-Israeli relations go from here? Putting the process on ice – for now – fits Crown Prince Mohammed’s careful balancing act. Proceeding at full speed would have risked blowback from other Arab and Middle Eastern states, undermining the process of “de-risking” of the region. It also may provide Saudi Arabia with greater leverage – Israel and the U.S. will be keen that the current violence does not derail the process entirely. So pausing the process, I argue, now makes tactical sense for Saudi Arabia, given the outpouring of anger in the Islamic world at developments in Gaza – and it provides the Saudi leadership with an opportunity to control the next phase of what remains an extremely delicate endeavor.

Diplomacy
IDF soldiers on Palestinian lands

Even if Israel can completely eliminate Hamas, does it have a long-term plan for Gaza?

by Ian Parmeter

Not counting periodic cross-border skirmishes, Israel has fought three major wars against Hamas since withdrawing its forces from Gaza in 2005 – in 2008, 2014 and 2021. Each involved limited ground incursions, with Israeli soldiers in Gaza for about a fortnight. In the past couple weeks, Israel has put together a huge force to mount another ground invasion in retaliation for the Hamas cross-border attacks that killed around 1,400 Israelis on October 7. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have called up their entire armoured corps – more than 1,000 tanks. Around 360,000 reservists will also join the force’s full-time personnel of about 170,000. The operation is shaping up to be Israel’s biggest since its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which was aimed at driving the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from its base there. The Israelis succeeded in that objective. But an unforeseen consequence of that war was the development of the Shia militant organisation Hezbollah. With Iran’s support and tutelage, Hezbollah has become a far stronger enemy for Israel than the PLO had ever been. It’s a truism that wars have unintended consequences. And in the current conflict with Hamas, it’s not clear what the end game might be for Israel. Why a ground invasion is so risky The difficulties of a Gaza ground assault are clear enough. Fighting street to street in a confined, highly urbanised environment will be hideously difficult for Israel’s forces. Hamas also has the advantage of an extensive tunnel network estimated at up to 500 kilometres in length, enabling its militants to attack and then disappear. Israel can counter these challenges to some extent with the use of robots and drones. But night vision technology will be ineffective in the total darkness of tunnels, as these devices require faint ambient light to work. Israel has also warned the roughly 1.1 million civilians in the northern half of Gaza to move to the southern half. Altogether, the United Nations says some 1.4 million people in Gaza have been displaced so far in the conflict, with nearly 580,000 sheltering in UN shelters. It’s unclear how many people are still in the north. Israel has warned that those who remain could be classed as sympathisers with “a terrorist organisation”.  Inevitably, there will be appalling civilian casualties. Not all will necessarily be the IDF’s fault, but the default position of the region and those in the global community opposed to Israel’s action will be to blame Israel. Another challenge is the estimated 200 hostages taken by Hamas during its raid into Israel. Hamas says it has spread them around Gaza. Almost certainly, some will be in the northern war zone. Hamas claims 22 have already been killed by Israeli bombs. Some relatives of the hostages are criticising the Netanyahu government for not giving sufficient priority to freeing their loved ones. When the fighting stops: no good options What Israel intends to do if and when it has secured the northern half of Gaza is not clear. The coastal strip is already facing a “catastrophic” humanitarian situation, according to the UN. And in terms of administering the territory, there are few good options. 1) A military reoccupation of Gaza, as Israel did from 1967 to 2005. This would constitute a huge military burden and expose IDF personnel to violence and kidnapping. US President Joe Biden has warned reoccupation would be a big mistake. 2) Eliminate Hamas’ senior leadership, declare victory, then leave. Such a victory would almost certainly be short-term. Other low-level members of Hamas would take pride in coming forward to reconstitute the group. Or another group, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, might fill the vacuum. Israel would not be able to control who or what that entity might be. 3) Call on the secular Fatah party that now controls the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to take control in Gaza. That is scarcely viable. Fatah lost a civil war to Hamas in 2007 and there’s no indication the Palestinian Authority’s return would be acceptable to Palestinians there. Moreover, the authority’s leader, Mahmoud Abbas, was elected to a four-year term in 2005 – and is still in charge. As such, he lacks legitimacy, even in the West Bank. 4) Administration of Gaza by non-aligned local leaders. This is a pipe dream. Even if such figures could be found, Gazans would almost certainly see them as collaborators with the Israelis, given their role would be to keep the strip’s hardliners under control. 5) Administration of Gaza by a non-Palestinian Arab force. Again, this is not feasible. The leaders of potential Arab contributors to such a force, such as Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, would not want to be seen as policing Palestinians on behalf of Israel. 6) Administration of Gaza by a non-Arab or United Nations force. Given the enormous risks, it’s very hard to see any non-Arab countries embracing this idea. A UN peacekeeping force would require not only Israeli approval, but a UN Security Council resolution at a time when Russia and China rarely agree with the three Western permanent members. Israel also contends Hezbollah has impeded the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon from carrying out its mandate, preventing it from stopping militant attacks. After the Hamas attacks, Israel would be unlikely to entrust its security to peacekeepers with little incentive to put their lives on the line for its sake. ‘Mowing the grass’ For too long, Israel has believed the Gaza imbroglio could be contained. However, the population has grown so large, this is no longer the case. With a growth rate of just over 2% per year, its population is expected to be three million by 2030. Gaza is also incredibly young, with a median age of 19.6, compared with the global average of 30.5. Almost half the adult population is unemployed, and Palestinians in Gaza are four times more likely to be living in poverty than those in the West Bank. This is a recipe for social upheaval and radicalisation. As two Israeli journalists, Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, noted in a perceptive analysis of Israel’s 2014 Gaza war, the Israeli military describes its assaults on Gaza as “mowing the grass” – acting to punish Hamas severely for its aggressive behaviour and degrading its military capabilities. The aim was to achieve realistic and, therefore, limited political and military goals. It was part of a long-term strategy of attrition, which would have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along the border. Eliminating Hamas altogether, the authors said, was not an “attainable military objective”. From a humanitarian perspective, this phrase is objectionable. The question, now, is whether Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu will attempt a different strategy this time. We’ll find out in the coming weeks.

Diplomacy
Prime Minister Netanyah with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz

Prime Minister Netanyahu Meets with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz

by Benjamin Netanyahu

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, today, at the Kirya in Tel Aviv, held a private meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The leaders then issued statements to the media. Prime Minister Netanyahu: "Chancellor Scholz, thank you for coming to Israel. Thank you for your solidarity with Israel, you, the government of Germany, the people of Germany, in these trying times. Eighty years ago, our people experienced the worst savagery in the history of humanity with the Nazi crimes against the Jewish people on the soil of Germany and Europe. I must tell you, my friend, that the savagery we witnessed perpetrated by the Hamas murderers coming out of Gaza were the worst crimes committed against Jews since the Holocaust: the decapitation of people, the shooting of little children with bound hands, the murder of children in front of their parents, the murder of parents in front of their children, the hiding of babies in the attic and the murderers who came to the attic to murder the babies, the rape and murder of women, the abduction of families, the tearing of grandmothers and Holocaust survivors into captivity, the death pits that remind of us of Babi Yar where jeeps surround the depression in the ground where they crowd young people in and they shoot them with machine guns. This is the savagery that we only remember from the Nazi crimes from the Holocaust. Hamas are the new Nazis. Hamas is ISIS and in some instances, worse than ISIS. And just as the world united to defeat the Nazis, just as the world united to defeat ISIS, the world has to stand united behind Israel to defeat Hamas. This is a part of an axis of evil: of Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Their goal, open goal, is to eradicate the State of Israel. The open goal of Hamas is to kill as many Jews as they could and the only difference is they would have killed every last one of us, murdered every last one of us if they could, they just don’t have the capacity, but they murdered an extraordinary 1,300 citizens which in American terms is many, many, many 9/11s. So obviously we must take action to defeat Hamas to ensure that this doesn’t happen again. But this is not only our battle, it is our common battle. The battle of civilization against barbarism. And if it’s not stopped here, this savagery will reach you very soon and reach the entire world. We have a vested interest, an abiding interest, to make sure that doesn’t happen and it can only be achieved with the solidarity of the civilized world. I hope and I believe that many, many around the world see ISIS for what it is and see Hamas for what it is, which is a reincarnation of ISIS. We appreciate the fact that you came here to stand with us in this battle for the future of civilization. Thank you, Chancellor." The Prime Minister added: "Thank you, Chancellor. I appreciate all your statements, including your last reference to protecting the Jewish community. We discussed this in our conversation as well. The question of the safety of civilians is something that is raised by Hamas' actions. Hamas is committing a double war crime. Not only is it targeting civilians with unprecedented savagery, it’s hiding by civilians, their own civilians. We are calling on the civilians to leave Gaza, go south to safe zones and Hamas is preventing them often at gunpoint from doing so. Hamas wants to keep them there as a human shield and prevent the people from leaving and getting out of harm’s way. It’s important that the entire world understands this. The responsibility for the civilians who are there, both the abducted people and both the people who are kept there at force, the citizens of our country, and the citizens of dozens of countries and the Palestinian civilians themselves, that responsibility sits squarely on the shoulders of the Hamas war criminals. They’re committing a double war crime: attacking civilians, hiding behind civilians as human shields. The entire world should condemn it and should support Israel in its just war. Thank you very much, Chancellor."

Diplomacy
President Ebrahim Raeisi with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the BRICS summit

Will BRICS membership recast Iran’s foreign policy?

by Mahmood Sariolghalam

A new identity or more security For a long time now, Iran has declared that its political identity is contrary to that of the Western world. Its leadership has articulated an interest in maintaining commercial and technological relations with Western countries, but when it comes to politics and culture, all decisions and operations are molded by local tradition and mired in inertia. Though conventional wisdom considers ideology as the root cause of this division, an alternative explanation is that it actually reflects security concerns that align with Beijing’s and Moscow’s own considerations. Political integration with the West, and particularly the United States, would undermine the state’s grasp on society, challenge the narratives of its elites, and hollow out its cultural traditions. Fear of overwhelming American and European soft power by the top echelons of such states is thus an essential factor in their decision to differentiate between commercial ­and non-commercial relations with Western countries. Consequently, to ensure a tighter grip on domestic control in China, Russia, and Iran, keeping the United States at bay is a priority for regime security. Iran’s reinvigorated relations with China and Russia over the last decade are far less about identity and more a reflection of short- to medium-term security concerns. The pivot to the East is therefore politically motivated. The pivot also cultivates the distance theory about the West, resonating with the policy of absolute sovereignty and economic self-sufficiency that many Asian and African countries pursued in the aftermath of decolonization in the 1960s. In a deeply integrated international order, this attitude is an anomaly. For example, India’s membership in BRICS (a grouping of emerging economies comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is intended to expand its hedging capabilities as well as its bargaining opportunities not only in security but also in commerce, technology, foreign direct investment (FDI), and trade. This calculation may well be applied to understand the decisions by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and other developing countries to join BRICS too. Given the fractured and factionalized nature of BRICS, Iran appears to belong to the camp that fears Western dominance. BRICS: A political temperament BRICS, like the SCO, seems to be more of a reflection of a political temperament than a structure for building consensus and collective action. Both organizations are fundamentally shaped by Chinese and Russian political motives to project power outside of America’s global reach, however ceremonial and ineffectual that may be. Neither organization enjoys internal harmony and commonality of purpose among its members. According to one assessment, while China and Russia pushed for Iran’s BRICS membership, India and Brazil were apprehensive about the move, worrying that the grouping might appear too anti-American. The most visible standoff within both organizations is between India and China. While a member of these China-led organizations, India is also a key participant in the American-led Quad that includes Japan and Australia. India is one of the four members of the I2U2 grouping as well, alongside Israel, the UAE, and the U.S. Both the Quad and I2U2 are comprised of like-minded members. One recent indication of the disharmony within BRICS was China's issuance of a condemnation of retired Indian military officials over a visit to Taiwan, complicating an already difficult relationship that dates back to the 1962 border clashes. It is inconceivable that BRICS could act as a counterweight to American-built institutions like the G7 and G20 given India’s and South Africa’s wide-ranging partnerships with the West and in particular with Washington. Over the years, the United States has been able to manage 52 military and political alliances in the international system. With India’s and South Africa’s overlapping commitments and vast opportunities for hedging and bargaining, the predictability of their behavior within BRICS will be opaque at a minimum. In other words, their close alignment with Europe and the United States means they do not have a free hand to converge with the anti-Western policies of Russia and China. Therefore, the heterogeneity of BRICS is sufficient proof of its political ineffectiveness. Aside from Russia, all of its members have deep interdependencies with the United States and cannot go too far in disrupting the American-led global order. Setting aside questions about its practicality, BRICS members do not have a consensus on de-dollarization. With Chinese capital controls and restrictions on currency convertibility, it is not clear that the renminbi can effectively serve as a medium for international foreign exchange transactions. One analyst even dubbed the U.S. dollar the “oxygen of the global economic system.” BRICS membership without relations with the West In this context, the main dilemma when it comes to Iran’s participation in these two organizations is that Tehran does not have normal relations with Western countries, particularly with the United States. Its membership underscores Tehran’s desire for political inclusion and its intention to dissuade those who argue Iran is an isolated country. Membership in the SCO and BRICS cannot alter Tehran’s economic woes as U.S. secondary sanctions place enormous limitations on Iran’s economic interactions with other states. The fact remains that Iran is not a signatory of the Foreign Action Task Force (FATF), and its international financial transactions do not and cannot operate according to global procedures and standards. Membership in BRICS will not change this. Short of normalization, Iran pursues a consistent policy of de-escalation with the United States and increasingly with its Arab neighbors. The fundamental motive for these changes is to overcome its economic malaise. Economic mismanagement compounded by U.S. sanctions results in formidable economic and social insecurity for the leadership. The recent unwritten modus vivendi with the United States can be interpreted exclusively as a function of Tehran’s economic and financial crises. This “understanding” is also in line with a consistent policy of the Islamic Republic regarding Washington: no normalization and no confrontation. No normalization because U.S. demands cannot be met since they will disrupt the status quo and power structure in Iran, and no confrontation because it is a losing strategy. Alternatively, as the foundation of regime security doctrine dictates, Middle Eastern proxies are cultivated as a deterrent force to keep the United States at bay. While addressing members of the Experts’ Council on March 10, 2022, Iran’s supreme leader established a correlation between regional presence on the one hand, and power and solidity of the polity (nezaam) on the other. Ultimately, transactional predispositions in Iran’s foreign policy aim to boost its foreign revenues to address economic problems like the shortage of funds, budget deficits, unrelenting government spending, and runaway inflation. In addition to the historical structural malfunctioning of Iran’s economic system, the country currently suffers from two acute difficulties: a shortage of foreign reserves and the almost non-existence of foreign investment. Both problems are exacerbated by U.S. sanctions. Given the current personalities and policy agenda, there are no prospects of a paradigm shift in the country’s foreign policy. Transactional approaches to problems have repeatedly been the solution to somewhat ease financial crises in the short to medium term. BRICS is no panacea for the underlying conundrums in Iran’s economy. Recent arrangements with Washington serve interests on both sides: Iran’s access to petrodollars expands, additional oil is supplied to global energy markets (through expanded Iranian and Venezuelan oil production), American prisoners are released, U.S. military forces in the region remain safe, Tehran’s nuclear program slows down with greater International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) digital surveillance, Arab-Iranian tensions are de-escalated, and Iran can be removed momentarily from the radar of American domestic politics. Of all of Iran’s regional sources of asymmetric leverage, Yemen is the least strategic. It is no wonder that Iran was willing to swap its influence in Yemen in return for reduced Saudi financial and logistical support for Iranian opposition groups. This is yet another example of Tehran’s transactional dealings. At this time, both sides are testing intentions and are involved in a process of verification, cascading implications, and potential positive spillover effects. A foreign policy without strategic partners Iran’s recent understanding with Saudi Arabia and the United States embodies an essential feature of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy — that it is a lonely state and for the moment is incapable of cementing strategic relations and alliances with other countries. This feature is both intentional and methodically framed and managed. Any type of strategic alliance, it is thought, will only result in dependencies that may eventually rein in the deep state’s ability to maneuver. Unless and until Tehran decides to engage in a foreign policy shift, the current complications and instabilities will endure. The causal relationship between Iran’s foreign policy and its economic crises is barely debated in the country. In neighboring Iraq, it took some 13 years for the United States to remove sanctions. In this context, membership in BRICS provides only psychological satisfaction for Iran’s leadership by enabling it to rub shoulders with great powers, providing photo-ops with leaders of other countries, and giving it a platform to project visibility and public relations in foreign policy. Iran may be under the delusion that through BRICS membership, it is contributing to a different world order that will disrupt Western hegemony. Furthermore, Iran may also think that Moscow and Beijing are somehow promoting “new thinking.” In reality, China, whose share of BRICS’ GDP is about 70%, is seeking an enlarged domain to exercise power and influence and a greater share of decision-making. Power prevails over ideas and ideology. If Beijing reaches its ambitious target of adding 18 members to BRICS, its share of the group’s output would be a hefty 47%, compared to America’s 58% in the G7. All members of BRICS can only prosper within the corridors of the contemporary international system. As The Economist put it recently, “It would mean [then] that although the BRICS could criticize the Western-led international order with a louder voice, they would struggle even more to articulate an alternative.” It is noteworthy that neither Moscow nor Beijing supports the other party’s proposals for reforms in the United Nations, implying that they prefer to preserve the current global hierarchy. One issue that Iran fails to pay attention to and can be understood as a form of cognitive dissonance is the reality that China operates within the international capitalist system and its second ranking in the global economy is indebted to the capitalist order. Iran’s membership in the SCO and BRICS resembles a football player who is always benched and never gets a chance to play. In this political context, Iran will have to watch from the sidelines how China, Russia, and the United States operate in the field. The accuracy of Iran’s claim that its membership in BRICS is a “historic achievement” can be gauged by how much FDI it receives from other members of the organization. Given massive European and American sanctions on Iran’s banking and economic institutions, it is unlikely that private or state enterprises would be willing to risk their operations in the Western world. Perhaps, Iran’s ultimate aim is to seek a supporting global political alternative like BRICS not to succumb to American power and the U.S. dollar. Yet, these ostentatious manifestations of its search for alternative sources of power and security provide no foundation for tangible economic benefits. Without normal relations with the West, Iran’s membership in BRICS cannot deliver benefits in the form of trade, FDI, higher economic growth rates, or technology transfer in key areas like artificial intelligence. As long as Iran’s foreign policy prioritizes security over national economic development, participation in organizations under an exclusive Russian and Chinese umbrella will only uphold the status quo in the country.

Diplomacy
Black and white handshake on US flag background, agreement concept

'Deal of the Century' 2.0? On a New U.S. Middle East Peace Initiative

by Amicus Sharqi

Summary Periodically, initiatives are launched to address the Middle East peace process, including in connection with other simmering issues. Currently, an idea is being discussed that emanates from the Biden administration and is said to have as its goal the recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia. The U.S., whose representatives have previously spoken of a rocky road in this context, most recently denied having entered into any agreements. Away from the international interest focused on the Ukraine war, the region is once again on the move. In this regard, the ideas reported by the U.S. media, which are quite consistent with U.S. strategic interests, reflect a lack of understanding of the region. It would not be new. Analysis According to the Wall Street Journal, the Biden administration has launched a new initiative to kill two birds with one stone: Saudi Arabia's recognition of Israel and curbing China's influence over the regional middle power on the Arabian Peninsula. At the heart of the matter are possible concessions to Riyadh, subject to various conditions. After the Trump family's failed attempt at a 'Deal of the Century,' an improvement in the region's relational fabric with various conditions attached, the new strategy sounds like another 'stroke of genius.' Israeli media in particular are discussing the project; in the Arab world there is rather radio silence. There, the focus is on the first installation of a Saudi ambassador – as a secondary accreditation of the representative in Amman – in Palestine. Visits by U.S. National Security Advisor Sullivan in recent months are fuelling the speculation. The U.S. government already denied having entered into any agreements. After various offers to mediate in the peace process, including one by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the question arises as to the viability and impact of such initiatives.   According to the Wall Street Journal, in return for recognition of Israel, Saudi Arabia would receive support in building up its civilian nuclear energy program, promote the formation of a Palestinian state, and curb Beijing's economic and military influence. The idea includes a number of elements that, while understandably consistent with recent strategies of the Biden administration, each of which already has a clear degree of complexity.   Relations with Israel had already been the subject of discussion once before during a high-profile visit by the Saudi crown prince to the United States – still under the Trump administration. Following this, King Salman had apparently felt compelled to confirm the kingdom's official stance toward Israel and end the discussion. Mohammed bin Salman, according to U.S. officials, is now said to be ready for a 'deal' that does not, however, imply full diplomatic relations. No mention is made of the Wahhabi clergy as a decisive pillar of the royal family's position of power, which has already put the ruling family under pressure on various occasions in the past with its uncompromising interpretation of the Koran on relations with Judaism. With driving licenses for women, the opening of movie theatres, the hosting of cultural events, the dismantling of the religious police and other things, the young generation that Mohammed bin Salman represents is challenging this radical conservative ulama right now anyway. The rigorous crackdown on other parts of the family and the imposition of a succession plan favouring King Salman's descendants since 2015 are also likely to have caused rifts. The effects of dealing with relations with Israel in such a situation will be interesting to observe.   In return for various concessions, Riyadh is supposed to limit its relations with the People's Republic of China and, for example, not allow any Chin ese military installations, although it questions whether this is even a real scenario. The establishment of military bases on Saudi territory in the 1990s to deter Saddam Hussein from attacking Saudi Arabia, whose army was considered inferior, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, was a key trigger for Osama bin Laden to turn against the United States. In this, he was not alone, but was in line with Wahhabi preachers. The then-royalist Mufti Bin Baz had to perform significant contortions to justify the presence of 'non-believers' – including women who piloted aircraft and operated weapons. In Saudi Arabia – and especially within Wahhabi circles – this is not forgotten. What real-world value there is in accepting the establishment of a Chinese military base - run by 'communist atheists' (m/f) – in the Land of Two Holy Places will be interesting to observe, especially since Beijing already has a well-developed base on the opposite side of Bab al-Mandab in Djibouti, alongside the US and France, from which, for example, the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Sudan was operated.  Initiatives aimed at establishing a functioning Palestinian state remain completely out of touch with reality. Quite independently of the domestic political situation in Israel and the current influence of the settler movement, the various Palestinian groups – Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, Intifada movement, Dahlan supporters, etc. – do not appear to be in a position to do so. Although President Abbas and Haniye of Hamas have recently spoken to each other again in Egypt and Turkey, there is no overlap between the two, except for a desire to act against Israel in order to secure their own position of power, which is linked to economic interests, and their positioning with regard to a successor to Abbas. The question of a Palestinian state is therefore more a media concession to the Arab street, which still remembers the deeply buried Oslo Accords. The 'Deal of the Century' presented in the management style of global management consultancies by Trump's son-in-law was already a prime example of similar denial of reality, which thrived on each party hoping for an economic advantage for itself without wanting to make any real compromises and excluding various harsh realities in the region. It seemed more real at times that President Abbas would dissolve the presidential administration and hand over the remnants of government authority in the West Bank to Israel-at least he threatened to do so.  In recent years, the rapprochement between Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv has been sustained by the frontline position toward their common adversary Iran. While this has not disappeared, it has weakened noticeably in recent months – even if the Revolutionary Guards continue to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, negotiations with the Huthis in Yemen, and a reported slowdown in Iranian uranium enrichment have taken the Iran scenario somewhat out of the public eye and reduced the pressure to act.  It is obvious that U.S. influence in Saudi Arabia, as in the entire region, has declined in recent years. In a speech in Cairo, President Obama announced a policy shift toward the Arab world. The disappointment was all the greater when this did not materialize – and those former elites whose fall was passionately welcomed in Western states during the Arab Spring returned to power. President Trump reduced Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to a buyer of U.S. defense products at the White House. The Saudi visitor was reportedly uncomfortable with this. The current president began his term with tones clearly critical of Riyadh, which fell silent as oil prices rose.  With the proposal now described, the impression arises that it firstly serves interests of Israel, which seeks further normalization of foreign relations with states of the Arab world, secondly fits in with attempts to contain global Chinese influence, and thirdly is intended to counteract the loss of its own importance. Whether the sale of nuclear technology, which is advantageous for U.S. companies, is a high enough price for this will also be interesting to observe. In general, the assessment of relations between Saudi Arabia and the People's Republic of China, which are clearly marked by an increase in economic interests, overlooks subcutaneous differences. The ideological differences between China's secular party rule and the Saudi royalty, which is supported by a radical conservative clergy, are considerable. Both states have a tradition of not discussing critical issues in public; nevertheless, Riyadh's role in radicalizing individual Muslims in China has been a recurring theme. In recent years, both states have pursued a foreign policy strategy that has tended to rely less on camp-building and coalitions. Instead, there is a great deal of agreement on economic ventures. The People's Republic, with its large, unrivalled, state-subsidized state-owned enterprises, offers the expertise for the rapid, timely implementation of megaprojects necessary for Saudi economic restructuring, and Saudi Arabia pays from its bulging sovereign wealth funds. And China, like South Korea, also has nuclear power plants on offer. And in contrast to high-tech weapons systems, the People's Republic is a serious competitor in nuclear power. Whether this mutually advantageous situation can be undermined by politically motivated conditions remains to be seen. Moreover, Riyadh reacts irritably to paternalism. It does not have to fear this from Beijing. In this region, unrealistic proposals not only mean the superfluous use of working time – that would be bearable –; they can also trigger unintended developments. For radical Islamist groups, as well as for a considerable part of the radical clergy, the question of how to deal with Israel remains central. Without their attacks on Israel, hardly anyone would be interested in Hamas or Islamic Jihad. The renewed rise of very different violent groups in the region and demographic processes such as those in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, which harbour the danger of further radicalization of segments of the population, especially religious radicalization, pose a perceptible risk for the future. The economic situation in some states – first and foremost Egypt – requires significant efforts. Even 'rich' Saudi Arabia, whose ability to feed its growing population is diminishing, is not spared. A sense of proportion, impartiality and impartiality would be prerequisites for finding a good solution.     

Diplomacy
Lithuania President Gitanas Nauseda, Prime Minister Alexander De Croo and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pictured during a head of states summit of the NATO

Erdoğan Seeks Better Relations with the West after His Reelection

by Salim Çevik

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to have changed course on his country’s foreign relations. At the last NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, he finally lifted his veto on Sweden’s proposed membership in the alliance; but his agreement is still incomplete as it requires the approval of the Turkish Parliament. And Erdoğan has apparently made parliamentary approval contingent on the US Congress approving his country’s purchase of F-16 fighter jets, which many assume may now be a done deal. Moreover, during the talks on Sweden’s accession, Erdoğan reiterated Turkey’s desire to join the European Union (EU) and hoped for a revival of the long-dead EU membership process. Prior to the Vilnius summit, Erdoğan further showcased his foreign policy outreach by hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Ankara, signaling support for Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia.  On the domestic front, Erdoğan has formed a new cabinet that signals better relations with the West, as the most ardent anti-western member of the previous cabinet, former Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu, has been left out. Additionally, the president aims to instill confidence in western markets by appointing respected figures like Mehmet Simsek as economy minister and Hafize Gaye Erkan as Central Bank governor. These appointments are seen as positive signals of an effort to strengthen economic ties with the West. This series of moves has triggered the hope, especially in western circles, that Turkey could return to the western fold and that Turkish-Russian relations will cool in parallel. However, pessimists, who see Turkey’s departure from the West as a done deal, disagree and are right to believe that Turkey’s relations with both the United States and European countries have fundamentally changed. It is no longer possible to go back to the early 2000s when Erdoğan was steering the country toward EU membership. The EU has no intention of admitting Turkey; but even if it did, the process would not be in Erdoğan’s favor. Nor is it possible to go back to the Cold War era, when Turkey was firmly embedded in the western geopolitical system. Turkey no longer sees Russia as a threat or an adversary in the sense that most western countries do. The fact that Turkey has resisted approving Sweden’s NATO membership for more than a year and that it will only do so in exchange for the delivery of F-16s shows how badly damaged Turkish-European and Turkish-American relations truly are. Therefore, pessimists point out that rather than signaling Turkey’s return to the West, the whole debacle proves how problematic and transactional Turkish-western relations have become. But these analysts overlook the fact that Erdoğan is pushing for a reorientation in foreign policy, and in his relations with the West in particular. This reorientation started long before the most recent presidential elections in May; but the president’s victory gave him a stronger hand to reboot his foreign policy, which is not aimed at bringing Turkey back into the West’s orbit, but rather at building better functioning relations with it. Turkey’s Departure from the West Turkey’s divergence from the West has taken place at the level of both political values and geopolitics. Over the last decade, Turkish democracy has been in serious decline. Especially after the transition to a hyper-presidential system in 2018, which eliminated all checks and balances in the political system, Turkey’s has become an increasingly autocratic regime. Turkish foreign policy has also become increasingly militarized, much to the chagrin of western capitals. Not only has Turkey used its military power in Syria, Iraq, and Libya but it has also deployed its navy to the Eastern Mediterranean, aggressively threatening the sovereignty of two EU countries: Greece and Cyprus. These aggressive policies were backed by an expansionist naval doctrine called Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland), whose ideology has disturbed western policymakers. The naval officers who created and developed the Blue Homeland concept never concealed their pro-Russian leanings and deliberately propagated an anti-American and anti-western narrative. These officers, and the political circles associated with them—dubbed Eurasianists in Turkey—have become an integral part of Turkey’s ruling coalition. Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia took place in such a context and represents the culmination of Turkish-American tensions. Turkey’s autocratic turn at home and its militarized foreign policy, which often work against the interests of its western allies, were simultaneous and mutually-reinforcing processes. But said foreign policy reached its limits toward the end of 2020. Turkey became regionally isolated with an overextended military, and its aggressive foreign policy, the rise of authoritarianism, and the subsequent decline of the rule of law plunged it into a protracted economic crisis. This economic downturn began to undermine Erdoğan’s meticulously-built power, as evidenced by his party’s defeat in the 2019 local elections. Unable to sustain autocratic rule, anti-westernism, and an aggressive foreign policy all at the same time, Erdoğan began to seek a new direction. The essence of the new approach is to maintain his authoritarian rule at home while becoming a less confrontational actor in foreign relations. Reorientation in Foreign Policy This reorientation began first in the Middle East, where Turkish authoritarianism was never going to be a cause for concern. Turkey began to mend fences with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, while at the same time aligning itself with the emerging Abraham Accords framework in the region. While accommodating western geopolitical interests, Turkey’s relations with Iran began to enter a more confrontational phase. One of the main motivations for this regional restructuring was economic: Turkey continues to receive significant form of foreign investment from Gulf states. Another motivation was geo-strategic: Turkey hoped that normalization with Israel, and to a lesser extent with supposedly pro-western Arab regimes, would help ease tensions with the United States. While reconciling with its Middle Eastern rivals, the Erdoğan administration was also looking for opportunities to curry favor with Washington and increase its own importance in the eyes of the Biden administration. One of the early opportunities came in the summer of 2021 after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan when Turkey immediately stepped in and offered to take over the protection of Kabul International Airport. This initiative earned Erdoğan his first personal meeting with Biden. However, the unprecedented rapid collapse of the Kabul government prevented Ankara from using the Afghanistan front as a base to build its relations with the United States. A second opportunity arose in February 2022 when the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. New Opportunities for Erdoğan The war in Ukraine has had contradictory effects on Turkey’s foreign policy and on Turkish-western relations. On the one hand, it increased Turkey’s strategic value and facilitated its reengagement with the West. On the other hand, it created additional difficulties as western countries demanded that Turkey sever its ties with Russia, a demand that Turkey rejected. Erdoğan ultimately managed to spread the idea that perhaps it would be better for everyone if Turkey remained relatively neutral. Erdoğan’s personal ties with Putin and the complex and highly interdependent Turkish-Russian relations placed Turkey in a special position among NATO countries. Turkey therefore tried to maintain a pro-Ukrainian line without being anti-Russian. So far, Erdoğan has managed to maintain this seemingly paradoxical position. Turkey has given full military support to Ukraine, and especially in the early days of the war Turkish drones were vital for Ukraine’s defense. To be sure, this support was better than that of many European countries. Politically, however, and while condemning Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory since 2014, it has not joined in imposing sanctions on Russia, and the two countries have maintained good diplomatic relations. Erdoğan clearly enjoyed his balancing role. His policies during the Ukraine war have earned the Turkish public’s respect and helped, at least indirectly, in his reelection as they contributed to his image as a world-renowned statesman. Turkey also enjoyed the economic benefits of its being Russia’s main economic outlet. Not only did Turkish-Russian trade increase, but Putin lent a helping hand in the run-up to the elections by agreeing to delay Turkey’s natural gas payments and depositing much-needed foreign currency in the Turkish Central Bank. Erdoğan justified this unique position by emphasizing his mediating role between Ukraine and Russia and between the latter and the West. In this context, securing the grain deal was a particularly important achievement that helped Erdoğan justify his balancing act. Now the deal appears to be in tatters, raising questions about his ability to maintain his role as mediator. The Turkish president has also raised eyebrows in Moscow by recently hosting President Zelenskyy and increasing his support for Ukraine’s NATO membership. He even tested the Kremlin’s nerve by allowing Azov fighters to return to Ukraine with Zelenskyy, an apparent violation of a prisoner swap deal brokered by Turkey. Despite all this, Erdoğan wants to stick to his original position and continue to play the role of mediator. He is counting on the fact that Putin currently cannot afford a falling-out. Erdoğan has already indicated that he expects to host Putin in Turkey in August for a one-on-one meeting, although so far the Russian side has not confirmed the visit. Russia’s reaction to Turkey’s recent moves, such as ratifying Sweden’s NATO membership and supporting Ukraine’s NATO membership, has also been rather mute. Therefore, Turkey’s pivot to the West does not mean that it will cool its relations with Russia. Erdoğan realizes that the longer he maintains his balancing role, the stronger his hand will be with both the West and Russia. A Revitalization of Turkey-EU Relations? If there is no going back to the Cold War era, there is also no returning to the early 2000s, when Turkey was pushing for EU membership. Despite surprising everyone by rekindling the dormant EU membership process ahead of the Vilnius summit, Erdoğan’s move is unlikely to breathe life into Turkey’s EU accession aspirations. This is primarily due to the fact that EU membership would not align with the president’s personal interests, as it would necessitate a higher standard of the rule of law that might curtail his currently unchecked and absolute authority in the country. The accession process revolves around aligning a nation’s internal standards with EU norms, known as the community acquis. Consequently, becoming an EU member would demand a transformation of Turkey’s domestic political system, which currently concentrates power in Erdoğan’s hands. Given this, how should Erdoğan’s statements on revitalizing the EU process be interpreted? Part of the explanation has to do with his transactional style of policymaking. A master of brinkmanship and bargaining, Erdoğan often raises demands and stakes just to get a better deal. This is why Turkey’s foreign policy disputes are often resolved at the 11th hour, as is still the case with Sweden’s NATO membership. But these tactical moves also reflect Erdoğan’s genuine desire to improve relations with the EU. It is important to note, however, that Erdoğan does not necessarily want Turkey to be inside the EU; he simply wants to do business with it. The EU remains Turkey’s primary economic partner, and Ankara has long been demanding a modernization of the Customs Union agreement with the bloc to boost its trade. Moreover, better relations with European countries are expected to be instrumental in attracting much-needed foreign investment. Gulf money has only carried Turkey so far, and to solve its deep economic problems it is necessary to attract the financial power of the West. Thus, Erdoğan wants more engagement with Europe on the economy, defense, security, and refugee issues, but not in the context of EU membership. In fact, the refugee deal signed between Turkey and the EU in 2016 was designed precisely around the idea that Turkey is not and will not be part of the EU. Accordingly, Turkey continues to block the movement of refugees toward Europe in exchange for financial assistance from the EU. The bloc has recently concluded similar agreements with North African countries, aiming to externalize its refugee problem. For this cooperation with Turkey to work, Turkey needs to be outside the EU, not inside it. Thus, Turkey’s desire to create better working conditions with the EU is emblematic of the nature of its reorientation toward the West. Furthermore, western capitals seem increasingly willing to respond positively to overtures made by the Turkish President. Western Reaction to Erdoğan’s Moves It is not only Erdoğan who has changed his position; the West has also changed its approach to him. Biden and other western leaders were distancing themselves from Erdoğan in anticipation of his loss in the presidential elections. Biden did not invite him to Washington and did not visit Ankara, despite Turkey’s growing importance in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Knowing how much Erdoğan values personal meetings, Biden used them as leverage to resolve stalemates like the one over Sweden’s NATO membership. Moreover, having learned Erdoğan’s style of politics over the years, western leaders successfully avoided becoming his punching bag ahead of the elections, as former German Chancellor Angela Merkel did during Turkey’s 2017 constitutional referendum. To achieve this, they followed a policy of ignoring rather than supporting Erdoğan. But when the elections were over and he was set to rule Turkey almost single-handedly for another five years, western leaders rushed to congratulate him. It is also becoming much easier for the West to work with Turkey on a geostrategic and security level. For the United States, Turkish-American security cooperation is shifting from the Middle East to the Black Sea. Turkish-American relations in the Middle East have inevitably taken on a more political and ideological character, with the two countries’ different threat perceptions and respective approaches to the Kurdish issue and to Kurdish actors in northern Syria remaining the biggest challenge in bilateral relations. In contrast, Turkey and the United States are more in agreement on the Black Sea. Moreover, within the Pentagon, EUROCOM’s approach to Turkey is much more friendly than CENTCOM’s, and has a better track record of cooperation. For Europe, Erdoğan’s commitment to the migration deal makes him a valuable partner, especially given the growing anti-immigration stance of the Turkish and European publics. Moreover, Erdoğan’s preference for working with the EU but for simultaneously not genuinely pushing for membership in it fits well with European policies. The EU and Erdoğan are more in agreement on their common desire to keep Turkey out but to simultaneously build better working relations. Overall, it seems clear that Erdoğan is eying a new reorientation in his foreign policy. At the moment he is at the height of his power at home and does not need to use the West as a punching bag for domestic political gains. Furthermore, economic conditions and regional developments are compelling him to lean more toward western powers. As a result, Turkish foreign policy is poised to take a new direction. Nevertheless, any improvement in relations will likely be limited to the geostrategic and economic realms and will not encompass a realignment of political values. Without common political values, the result will be significantly improved but will remain transactional between Turkey and its western partners. This paper was originally published by Arab Center Washington DC. Republished with permission. © Arab Center Washington DC, October 2023.

Diplomacy
Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu

PM Netanyahu's Remarks at an Event for US Independence Day at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem

by Benjamin Netanyahu

President Herzog, Mrs. Herzog, Ambassador Nides and Virginia,and Taylor, and Taylor's boyfriend,Senator Rick Scott,Speaker of the Knesset,Mayor of Jerusalem,and so many dear friends, Tom, you started your words by remembering an evocative moment, when you were 14 years old in Ein haShofet. Well, somewhat younger than that, I had an evocative moment right here, on this hill top. It was barren. There was no Israel Museum. There was the Monastery of the Cross, olive trees. A barren hilltop except one tree, a balut tree. And we, the Jerusalem kids, would band in the valley and we would try to reach, undetected, to the top, to the tree. Reach the target. I say that because right now, well, last night, Israeli soldiers tried to reach, undetected, the most legitimate target on the planet: people who would annihilate our country. And because this Fourth of July in this extraordinary place falls on an extraordinary moment, Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the Government and citizens of Israel, I wish to send my warmest greetings to President Biden and the American people as we join in celebrating their Independence Day. And as Prime Minister, I wish to express my deep appreciation and gratitude for America's enduring support for Israel. For 75 years, the United States has been our irreplaceable and indispensable ally. Irreplaceable. Indispensable. Eleven minutes after our birth, and at vital junctures throughout our history, America has provided Israel with moral and political backing against those committed to wiping us out, to wiping out the one and only Jewish state. No less important, for nearly half a century, America has given generous military assistance to Israel, helping provide us with the tools, the tools we need to defend ourselves by ourselves. Decade after decade, our two countries have moved closer together. I'm proud to say that today, security cooperation has never been better, intelligence sharing has never been deeper and our alliance has never been stronger. I have long said that Israel has no better ally than America, and I say to you, America has no better ally than Israel. I'm confident that Israel's importance to the United States will become even clearer in the years ahead, as we work together not only to protect our common security, but also to develop the most advanced technologies that will reshape the 21st century. They will decide who leads the world. And Israel is America's vital partner in that effort. Ladies and Gentlemen, on July Fourth, all democratic countries should remember that the decisive event that ensured the rise of freedom in modern times, has been the rise of the United States of America. Time and again, America defeated the forces of totalitarianism and terror. Yet we should also remember a basic truth: Freedom is precious, and it's never free. It often requires firm and decisive action against those seeking to spread terror and imperil free societies. I remember that truth every Fourth of July, because that is the day my brother Yoni fell, commanding the rescue force at Entebbe. Today, on the eve of another Fourth of July, Israel's soldiers, once again, find themselves fighting forces of terror. Late last night, the IDF launched a comprehensive action against terrorist strongholds in Jenin. In recent months, Jenin has become a safe haven for terrorists. From that safe haven, terrorists perpetrated savage attacks, murdering Israeli civilians, men, women and children, as many children as they could find. As I speak, our troops our battling the terrorists with unyielding resolve and fortitude, while doing everything, everything, to avoid civilian casualties. I have no doubt that as Israel exercises its inherent right of self-defense, the United States will stand firmly by our side. And I also believe that in the months ahead, Israel and America will work closely together to thwart the danger posed by Iran and seize the opportunity to expand the circle of peace. Ladies and gentlemen, tonight is also an opportunity to thank outgoing US Ambassador Tom Nides for his service and for his friendship towards Israel. Thank you Tom. During your tenure here, you've demonstrated that your support for Israel comes both from the head and from the heart. On a personal level, I will say I'll miss your candor, your wit, your humour and your friendship. No matter what you do, what you decide to do in the next chapter of your life, know that Israel will always be your home away from home. And as you've said many times, quoting President Biden, we are mishpuche. So on behalf of your Israeli family, let me wish you a happy Independence Day. Happy Independence Day America.  God bless America and God bless our valued and unshakable alliance. 

Diplomacy
 Former President of Iran Hassan Rouhani with Vladimir Putin

Diagnosing Iran’s emerging pivot toward Russia and China

by Mahmood Sariolghalam

“The world is not just Europe and America,” Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson declared on April 10, 2023, implicitly echoing the views championed for years by the senior leadership of the Islamic Republic regarding the ostensible rise of China and Russia. Indeed, the moment when Iran shifted from a traditional balancing relationship between East and West to decisively embrace Russia and China occurred on May 8, 2018, when the Trump administration withdrew the United States from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The U.S.’s decision to abandon the nuclear deal deeply disillusioned the Iranian leadership about any possibility of a rapprochement with Washington. Tehran had initially agreed to sign the JCPOA with the Obama administration based on the expectations that its promises to substantially reduce its nuclear program would be recompensed by the lifting of a substantial portion of U.S. economic sanctions.  Consistent with its long-held objective of maintaining distance from Washington, Tehran was pleased that the JCPOA, as agreed, had permitted it to avoid normalizing relations with its adversary while still reaping the economic benefits by being able to resume oil exports and welcome foreign investment. Yet following the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal, Iran concluded that Washington’s policy toward Tehran is unreliable and the American political class could not be swayed. The Iranian leadership was further disillusioned by the Europeans’ limited ability or willingness to preserve the 2015 agreement. Moreover, the convergence of additional domestic factors — such as pressure from hardliners to bolster the country’s defensive and offensive military capabilities, the weakening state of the economy, and looming challenges to the continuity of the political system — led to intensive debates about the direction of Iran’s foreign policy. Though the foreign and defense policy bureaucracy made the decision to reorient Iranian relations more fully toward China and Russia as early as 2019, it had to wait until the Hassan Rouhani government completed its term in August 2021 before taking any concrete steps in this direction. A clear indication of that decision can be traced to the constant stalling tactics used by the Rouhani delegation during the talks with the U.S. and the broader international community on potentially reviving the JCPOA. The pivot to the East took on a more noticeable character following the inauguration of President Ebrahim Raisi on Aug. 5, 2021. The Raisi presidency led to higher levels of policy compatibility in the totality of the Iranian political system, but even more importantly, it resulted in the executive branch rank and file being staffed with devotees, loyal administrators, and 1970s-era revolutionaries. This was a necessary move following the Rouhani presidency, during which somewhat liberal administrators permeated the bureaucracy. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s legislative and judicial branches have consistently demonstrated their loyalty to the status quo. However, following each change of president, the executive branch has had the opportunity to fill some 11,000 administrative positions throughout the country with like-minded individuals. Now, with the inauguration of the more conservative Raisi government, all three branches are committed to maintaining the current inertia and coherence of the Islamic Republic. Iran is now pursuing a two-tiered foreign policy: a vigorous and determined shift toward Russia and China on the one hand, while, on the other hand, making incremental concessions on its nuclear program to give the impression that another deal can be struck to replace the JCPOA. The former approach is being implemented with almost zero fanfare and the latter with extensive publicity. Iran has been steadfast in its Eastward turn even though this shift does not enjoy the support of the general public or the professional and educated classes in particular. As such, all debate and discussions regarding the country’s foreign policy orientation have been restricted to tightly knit circles within the top ruling elite. Still, it is possible to deduce three broad reasons for Iran’s growing alliance with China and Russia: 1. A refusal to capitulate to or make vast concessions to the United States;2. The valuing of security concerns as more important than economic development needs; and3. The desire to see continuity of the political system.Avoiding capitulating to the United StatesIran has a long-standing policy of avoiding normalization with the United States. Throughout the post-revolutionary period, Tehran has deliberately avoided any moves toward rapprochement except in the face of imminent danger or a potential U.S. military operation against the Islamic Republic. The underlying calculus maintains that normalization with Washington would lead to profound consequences for the current Iranian political system, from disrupting its internal politics to overwhelming its economy and reshaping its culture. First of all, there is a deep-seated fear in Tehran that once American companies, educational institutions, and civil society organizations become active in the country, the Iranian leadership would gradually lose much of its grip on power. Anti-American sentiment also provides the revolutionary class with a common identity and keeps more internationally minded, moderate, or pragmatic groups out of positions of authority. Even following the JCPOA agreement and prior to the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump, the dominant perception in the Iranian capital was one of despair since most of the economic sanctions on the country remained intact. The ambiguous future of sanctions, combined with the possibility of spill-over effects on regional issues, created an atmosphere of uncertainty within the corridors of power in Iran. Another factor that dampens hopes for change in U.S.-Iranian relations is Washington’s long list of demands not only with regard to Iran’s foreign policy and nuclear program but also about the nature of its political system and internal conduct. A final facet standing in the way of improved bilateral relations — and closely related to the first — is the Iranian revolutionary class’s belief that rapprochement with the United States would inevitably result in undesired substantial changes in the political system. Any long-lasting improvement in the relationship would require not just policy change but also a redesign of state structures. In line with this thinking, concessions on the nuclear program would be inadequate; Iran would ultimately need to fully capitulate to the U.S., reviving bitter memories of the 1953 American-British coup d’état. The Farsi word for submission, tasleem, was, thus, widely used in the revolutionary state media and television to characterize Washington’s ostensible expectations from Tehran in the realization of the JCPOA. With its vast stake in the political and economic spheres of the state, Iran’s revolutionary class was not prepared to abandon power or open the political floodgates by making structural concessions to the U.S. and facilitating a possible takeover of the country by liberal presidential candidates. The disillusionment in the aftermath of the JCPOA agreement fostered a Raisi-type conservative presidency, an essential prerequisite to the consolidation and continuity of the revolutionary Iranian polity.Precedence of security concerns over economic developmentAt no point in its history has the Islamic Republic prioritized domestic economic development. Continued reliance on energy exports has furnished the state and its elites with a stream of income to maintain this system. Iran’s activist foreign policy antagonizes a large number of neighboring and external countries, yet the leadership considers it essential to protecting the state. For many decades, Iran’s national security doctrine has articulated a hedging strategy of relying on Shi’a and/or anti-Western enclaves in the Middle East to expand its territorial influence vis-à-vis major Arab countries, Israel, and the United States. Turkey is perhaps the only major country in the region with which Iran has been able to manage a stable relationship over the long term. In recent years, Tehran has additionally militarily aligned itself with a major outside power — Russia. Furthermore, Iran’s drone and missile capabilities as well as its geopolitical influence in much of the region have served as a dependable deterrence strategy. Such a conceptualization of national security, threat perceptions, and statecraft have left little room to pursue economic development in a globalized economy. This sharply contrasts with regional neighbors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates, which have deliberately been concentrating their energies on economic diversification, high-tech industries, renewable energy, and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). The economic rise of China and Russia’s military and political capabilities have provided a wide range of opportunities for numerous developing countries, including India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, and Mexico, to diversify their foreign and economic policies. However, while drawing on the support they can obtain from Beijing and Moscow, most still strive to maintain a balance between the West and the East. These countries benefit from European and American financial and technological sectors and earn sizeable profits by selling in their markets. But since national economic development is not a priority for the Iranian leadership, and it devotes a large proportion of its energies toward domestic and national security, even a complete political and economic pivot away from the West will not jeopardize Iranian state-owned industries nor affect the already-sidelined private sector and dwindling consumer markets. Indeed, Western companies and banks have also removed Iran as a potential market due to U.S. and European sanctions. Ultimately, Iran’s pivot toward the East will reduce its economy to selling fossil fuels to China and a few other Asian-Pacific countries in exchange for commodity imports. And it is unlikely that these consumers will turn around and invest in Iranian industries due to the sanctions restrictions currently in place. The only conceivable investment opportunities would perhaps be in the form of barter, wherein Iran might export petroleum in exchange for infrastructure development with no financial transactions involved. Furthermore, the timing of the Iranian leadership’s decision to reduce the country’s political and economic reliance on the West in general and Europe in particular was critical: Namely, that strategic choice was made ahead of the looming leadership transition at the top to avoid possible dissenting views when Iran’s third supreme leader takes over. Closer relations with Russia and China promise to not only de-risk Iran’s foreign economic relations but also help maintain an optimum level of progress on the nuclear program as a strategic component of the national security doctrine.Continuity of the political systemIran’s anti-Americanism is considered a highly treasured geostrategic asset in Moscow. In a sense, Iran is Russia’s southern Belarus. From a historical perspective, all permutations of the Russian state over the last two centuries, from the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation today, have pursued a similar policy of trying to keep Iran out of the Western orbit. But the Russian-Iranian military partnership that developed in Syria and solidified over Ukraine — specifically covering military hardware, cyber software, and digital surveillance tools that Iran has no hopes procuring through cooperation with the West — has also furthered Tehran’s leverage vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. Iran is expected to receive 24 Su-35 fighter aircraft from Russia in addition to S-400 air-defense systems. And the relationship is developing in both directions. Tehran has also supplied Moscow with low-cost drones and weapons systems. Additionally, the two countries are cooperating in the energy sector, with Russia reportedly having delivered 30,000 tons of diesel fuel to Iran in February and March 2023; yet given Russia’s technological limitations in the energy sector, it is not clear whether these projects will eventually and efficiently materialize. Though relations with Russia have undoubtedly expanded in the military domain since the invasion of Ukraine, one can also deduct other Iranian motives to further solidify relations with Moscow. There are at least two crucial reasons behind Iran’s desire to tighten its cooperation with Russia and move from a transactional to a strategic bilateral relationship. First is Tehran’s need to secure intelligence on Israeli and American operations against Iran. And second is the desire to draw on Moscow’s potential political and intelligence assistance during the transition period to the third supreme leader of Iran. Such expectations can be met with or without Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin since they fulfill fundamental Russian interests vis-à-vis Iran and the West. Iran has reached a point where it can no longer depend on increasing internal control and expanding regional deterrence to maintain a status quo conducive to preserving the political system. Israel’s traditional “periphery doctrine,” of reaching out to non-Arab countries to build security partnerships, has now expanded to the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions. Moreover, most Arab neighbors of Iran today maintain normal or at least not overtly antagonistic diplomatic relations with Israel, which has improved American leverage with regard to Tehran as a result. Facing limited foreign policy options, including diminishing hopes of reaching a modus vivendi with the United States through reviving the JCPOA and a lasting divergence in relations between Russia and the West, Tehran has had to succumb to Moscow. This was not only to procure new military hardware but also to secure its position in a shifting regional matrix, deter potential future threats to its internal security, and safeguard the continuity of the political system. In this evolving context, as long as Russian interests remain opposed to those of the West, Moscow will likely do whatever is necessary to protect the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unlike Russia’s more strategic and long-term calculus vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic, China confines itself to mostly political and commercial relations with Iran and appears to cautiously act in parallel to the U.S. in the Middle East rather than in opposition to it. Beijing has immense short-term and long-term commercial and technological interests in maintaining peace and cooperation with Israel as well as with major Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Moreover, petroleum imports from Iran can easily be substituted in a global glut. That said, Beijing’s mediation role between Iran and Saudi Arabia highlights that for China, good relations with the Islamic Republic provide useful political leverage when navigating the region as well as in its global rivalry with the United States.Challenges aheadThis article attempted to explain Iran’s calculations behind politically and economically pivoting toward Russia and China, founded upon the assumption that the deep state in Iran is prioritizing continuity and issues of succession in the political system. Almost all matters of state are overshadowed by these medium- to long-term concerns — a set of priorities that Iranian leaders have, in fact, held for centuries. The question facing the government today, however, is how the revolutionary domestic apparatus can strive to survive the myriad sources of domestic and foreign challenges, including the Islamic Republic’s stand-off against the Western world. In contrast to the United States and Europe, Russia and China are not concerned with Iran’s internal political system, constitutional structures, or governmental machinery. Of its three main adversaries, namely, the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia, Iran recently concluded that a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia is a possibility, having made a complete U-turn on this in March 2023, with the help of Chinese mediation. Iran had learned the hard way to compromise with the Saudis, given the latter’s instrumental political and financial role among Iranian minorities inside the country as well as Iranian opposition groups in Europe and the U.S. In order to mitigate this influence, Tehran apparently decided to make concessions on Yemen in return for reduced Saudi support for the Iranian opposition. Of all the points of leverage at Iran’s disposal in the Middle East, Yemen appears to be the least valued, especially compared to Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. Evidently, the Iranian leadership’s incremental moves toward China and Russia stem from an unwillingness to redefine the underpinnings of the country’s national security doctrine. Not only does Iran’s current foreign policy orientation not run in opposition to Beijing’s or Moscow’s overall international outlook, but in many ways, its anti-Western predisposition in a critical region of the world serves the two powers in their difficult relationships with the United States. By aligning with Russia and China in the security and commercial spheres, Iran feels it has acquired an insurance policy against any potential negative resolutions emanating from the United Nations Security Council. And even more consequentially, with an eye toward the potentially turbulent looming period of leadership transition and succession, Tehran may feel comfortable with relying on Moscow and Beijing for security, political, intelligence, and financial support. But a major challenge confronts the political system: Will the Iranian public, professional and intellectual groups, and the country’s slim private sector — all deeply accustomed to Western ideas, systems, and customs — be willing to embrace and adapt themselves to this Eastward shift that was formulated by Iran’s political and security elites? Perhaps the social and political atmospherics that emerge as the Islamic Republic’s third supreme leadership seeks to consolidate its power will reveal the durability of this unbalanced geopolitical reorientation.

Diplomacy
Annie Raja General Secretary of National Federation of Indian Women protesting against the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan

India-Taliban relations: A careful balancing act, driven by pragmatism

by Vinay Kaura

An ongoing power struggle for the position of ambassador at the Afghan embassy in New Delhi underlines India’s diplomatic quandary about the nature of its engagement with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has not issued any public statement regarding the dispute between representatives of the previous Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan over who should occupy the post, but reports suggest India has conveyed to both sides that they need to settle their internal issue on their own. However, the fact that the visa of Qadir Shah, the person appointed by the Afghan Taliban as chargé d’affaires in New Delhi, has reportedly expired further complicates the power struggle. If the Indian government decides to extend Shah’s visa, it would interpreted as India’s willingness to accept a Taliban-appointed diplomat in the Afghan embassy in New Delhi. Following its seizure of power in August 2021 after overthrowing the U.S.-backed Ashraf Ghani government, the Taliban regime has been seeking international diplomatic recognition along with Afghanistan’s seat at the United Nations. The Taliban regime has so far taken control of more than a dozen missions abroad, but India is yet to have a Taliban-appointed ambassador. In March, the Taliban regime’s spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, revealed that “efforts are underway to take charge of other diplomatic missions abroad. [...] Diplomats of the former government are continuing their activities in coordination with the [Taliban] Foreign Ministry.” Afghan embassies in Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and some other Arab and African countries are now working under Taliban-appointed diplomats. India’s involvement in Afghanistan The security, economic, and humanitarian vacuum left by the withdrawal of American troops has significant implications for India’s interests in Afghanistan. India has always required and worked for a relatively stable Afghanistan free from threats by terrorist groups. Without formally recognizing the Taliban regime, in its many recent official statements India has made clear that it recognizes the reality on the ground. While India has also underscored the need for the Taliban regime to reform its governance in terms of gender and ethnic inclusivity, such normative considerations are unlikely to influence the substance of the India-Taliban relationship insofar as they do not essentially affect regional stability. India has no history of military intervention or political interference in Afghanistan and New Delhi has focused on forging people-to-people connections and projecting soft power. That is why, despite setbacks due to the hasty exit of U.S. forces, India continues to maintain goodwill among ordinary Afghans and perhaps even a section of the Taliban leadership (such as Abbas Stanikzai, the Taliban’s deputy foreign minister, who is believed to have a soft spot for India). Next to the U.S., India was Afghanistan’s principal regional source of development assistance since the Taliban’s ouster in 2001. In fact, India’s engagement with Afghanistan offers a compelling example of the use of soft power. Beyond its geostrategic motives, New Delhi was determined to bolster Kabul to ensure that a radical Islamist regime beholden to Pakistan’s security establishment did not gain a foothold in the region. That India and the Taliban-led Afghanistan have gradually drawn together to the extent that they have is an example of pragmatism in foreign policy making at its best. For India, it makes sense to try to give some reason, in the form of diplomatic exchanges and developmental assistance, for the Taliban not to permit the export of terrorism from Afghan soil. For the Taliban, notwithstanding their ideological rigidity domestically, the dire need for development assistance means maintaining silence on India’s policies on the Kashmir Valley, which is predominantly Muslim.  The Taliban have sought India’s assistance in rebuilding their country. For a regime that has been diplomatically and financially isolated, its normal relationship with India also holds much pragmatic appeal, given New Delhi’s growing geopolitical influence and longstanding interest in accessing Central Asian markets via Afghanistan. New Delhi expands its presence and engagement In June last year, New Delhi decided to deploy a “technical team” at the Indian embassy in Kabul to re-establish its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan for the first time since the Taliban takeover. And soon after, when India delivered a consignment of medical supplies to Afghanistan as part of its humanitarian assistance, India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, characterized India as “a true first responder” in Afghanistan. India’s move to expand its diplomatic presence is also driven by a desire to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts. In order to avert a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, India supplied 40,000 metric tons (MT) of wheat overland via Pakistan in February 2022 and an additional 20,000 MT via Iran’s Chabahar port in March 2023 to be distributed through the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP), along with 45 tons of medical assistance in October 2022, including essential life-saving medicines, anti-TB medicines, 500,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccines, winter clothing, and tons of disaster relief material, among other supplies. In addition, India’s union budget for 2023-24 also made a special provision for a $25 million development aid package for Afghanistan, which has been welcomed by the Taliban. The Taliban have reportedly requested that India finish about 20 incomplete infrastructure development projects across the country. In April, during the signing of a memorandum of understanding with India for the dispatch of an additional 10,000 MT of wheat, the WFP assured India that it has the necessary infrastructure on the ground to quickly deliver the wheat to the most needy sections of the Afghan population. Recently, the MEA, under the aegis of the India Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC), invited Afghan government officials to attend a four-day virtual course on Indian legislation and business climate. In principle, India’s outreach to the Taliban is also conducive to achieving its counterterrorism objectives. However, there is a risk of over-expectation on the part of New Delhi that the Taliban would crack down on anti-India terrorists, as well as indications that the Taliban regime continues to maintain its deep links with Pakistan’s security establishment. It has been suggested by National Defense University Professor Hassan Abbas in his recently published book, The Return of the Taliban, that the Taliban regime consulted the Pakistani military before allowing India to reestablish its diplomatic presence in Kabul in June 2022. The Taliban’s ideological constraints India-Taliban relations could be hampered by the Taliban’s internal ideological positions, which the group has clung to rigidly even at the expense of its efforts to secure international recognition. The Taliban regime banned girls from educational institutions and prevented women from working in most fields of employment, including at non-governmental organizations. Women have also been ordered to cover themselves in public and are barred from many entertainment and sports venues. External pressure, including the imposition of sanctions, has not done much to convince the rigid hardliners within the Taliban regime to change their direction on human rights, gender equality, or ethnic representation in governance. This suggests that there are limits to what India can achieve through its interactions with the Taliban. The risks for India are heightened because some Pakistan-based terrorist groups would likely criticize the Taliban regime for seeking closer ties with India. Moreover, were Kabul’s cooperation with New Delhi to pose a threat to the Taliban’s own internal ideological legitimacy, this would also serve as a check on efforts to normalize relations. Regional dynamics and prospects for cooperation The Taliban regime is enthusiastically courting other regional powers as well, such as China, Russia, and Iran, each of which has its own regional interests. For instance, in contrast to India’s passive role and limited footprint in Afghanistan, China has been expanding its diplomatic and economic presence in the country. Recently, China discussed with the Taliban regime how to bring Afghanistan into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to boost investment in the crisis-hit country, while also pressing Kabul to deliver on its regional and international commitments to counter terror. In January of this year, Beijing signed a 25-year contract to extract oil from the Afghan Amu Darya Basin and is also negotiating other lucrative commercial deals with the Taliban regime. Central Asia has often been seen as a test case for Indian leadership. It is in Afghanistan that India has taken a notably more proactive approach to driving regional cooperation through connectivity initiatives. India has also used the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) platform for this purpose. With inclusion of Iran this year, membership in the Eurasian political, economic, and security organization now includes all of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors with the exception of Turkmenistan. Early this month in Goa, India, the foreign ministers of SCO countries called for the establishment of a representative government in Afghanistan as well as the protection of women’s rights. Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar remarked, “Our immediate priorities include providing humanitarian assistance, ensuring a truly inclusive and representative government, combating terrorism and drug trafficking, and preserving the rights of women, children, and minorities.” While the SCO might appear a viable platform for regional cooperation, there are certain limits to its effectiveness in dealing with Afghanistan due to the divergent political and security interests of some SCO members, particularly India and Pakistan. Moreover, given Russia’s reduced international stature and Beijing’s growing leverage over Moscow due to its brutal war against Ukraine, the SCO is now a China-led organization. China is a key participant in many important regional forums where Afghanistan remains a core security concern. Since India has a very uneasy relationship with China and supports U.S.-led geopolitical initiatives, primarily the Quadrilateral Security Initiative or Quad (comprising India, the U.S., Japan, and Australia), to counter China, there are practical constraints to what India can achieve through the SCO.   While the Taliban have not yet shown the traits required for recognition as a legitimate political organization responsible for governing Afghanistan, the non-recognition of their regime should not worsen the suffering of the Afghan people. India has a clear interest in a stable and well-governed Afghanistan, not least to prevent spillover into Kashmir. For now, India’s policy toward Afghanistan remains focused on building pragmatic, if not cooperative, relations with the Taliban. India is engaging the regime on its own terms and continues to highlight its commitment to Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities and women. India is equally careful that its interactions should not be viewed as a diplomatic embrace of the Taliban or its acceptance of their repugnant governance model.