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Defense & Security
The Red Sea Region with cargo and pirate ships. Suitable for concepts as red sea conflict, rise of tension between the USA and Iran,Houthi Attacks and Military Escalation

From Iraq to Africa: How the Gaza War Expanded the Houthis' Ambitions

by Igor Subbotin, Nezavisimaya Gazeta

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском A year into the Gaza conflict, the Houthi movement calls itself «Ansar Allah», once focused on defending Yemen’s sovereignty, has emerged as one of the most active members of the «Axis of Resistance» — a club of state and non-state actors loyal to Iran. The military-political platform has not only expanded the geography of its attacks to relatively remote arenas, but has also stepped up its global outreach, reaching out to audiences in South Asia, Europe, and the United States. The most significant development has been the Houthis' ability to enhance their diplomatic activity beyond their traditional sphere of interest. «Ansar Allah» increased coordination with members of the «Axis of Resistance» in Iraq to carry out strikes against Israel. Another notable direction was Africa, where, according to U.S. reports, Yemeni rebels initiated negotiations with the Somali group «Al-Shabaab» (recognized as a terrorist organization, banned in Russia) about the transfer of arms. A major diplomatic loss for the Yemeni movement was the weakening of trust with Syria. Thus, in the fall of 2023, the government of President Bashar al-Assad revoked the Houthis’ rights to diplomatic representation in Damascus and promised to hand it over to a rival faction, the central government of Yemen. However, from October 2023, the «Ansar Allah» movement, which actively demonstrated solidarity with Hamas, began to steadily evolve into a fully-fledged transnational entity capable of influencing security dynamics far beyond the Arabian Peninsula. A Breach in the «Axis of Resistance» In October 2023, just days after Hamas’s armed wing launched an attack on southern Israel, the Syrian government ordered the Houthis to be stripped of their diplomatic representation in Damascus. The Yemeni movement, which is informally affiliated with the Syrian government through its «Axis of Resistance» had its own embassy in the capital since 2015, when the Saudi-led Arab states began their official intervention in Yemen. It appears that this move was influenced by the Gulf countries, which are eager to reintegrate Syria into the Arab fold at any cost. Just three days before the expulsion of the «Ansar Allah» diplomats, the leaders of Syria and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had a phone conversation, with the situation in Gaza being the primary focus. According to some reports, Abu Dhabi sent a cautious warning to Damascus, advising it to refrain from direct involvement in the conflict between Israel and Hamas and to prevent loosely controlled paramilitary groups from turning its jurisdiction into a launching pad for attacks on Israel. An indirect indication that the changes surrounding the embassy occurred under the influence of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries is that the building, which had been taken away, was promised to representatives of the internationally recognized government of Yemen, which traditionally relies on the support of Saudi Arabia. However, some Arab experts have expressed doubt that the transfer of the diplomatic mission to another Yemeni faction necessarily carries a clearly articulated political message. According to Israeli think tanks, the Houthis still maintain a military presence in Syria, led by their military attaché, Sharaf al-Mawri. Reports indicate that the Syrian authorities continue to invite the military attaché to official events and allow him freedom of communication with local security apparatuses. Furthermore, Israeli analysts suggest that the «Ansar Allah» movement has a group of operatives in Syria, potentially numbering in the hundreds. Some of these fighters are believed to have expertise in operating combat drones and launching ballistic missiles. So the situation around the Damascus embassy did not lead to a complete collapse of ties between Syria and «Ansar Allah» although it was perceived by the Yemeni movement’s functionaries as an absolute tragedy. Iraqi Office In June 2024, the leadership of «Ansar Allah» announced plans to coordinate its attacks on Israel with the «Islamic Resistance in Iraq» — a coalition of several Shiite groups. The collaboration between these two forces was highlighted by coordinated attacks on critical infrastructure in Israeli port cities. Following the decision by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to target Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, the Houthis and the «Islamic Resistance in Iraq» escalated military pressure on Israel.  Amid the escalation around Lebanon in the summer of 2024, the Houthis opened their own office in Baghdad, following the example of the Hamas group. The leadership of «Ansar Allah» has been trying to strengthen ties with Iraq for the past decade. In 2015 the Yemeni movement sent a representative to Baghdad to expand bilateral political and defense relations. Moreover, there is a point of view that the «Ansar Allah» movement actively collaborated with the Shiite factions of Iraq when it launched a powerful combined attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil industry facilities in 2019: the launch of combat drones could have been carried out from the territory of the Republic.  Experts believe that now the nature of these contacts has changed qualitatively. According to their estimates, one of the key tasks of the Houthi representative office opened in Baghdad in the summer should be to obtain financial support from loyal circles in Iraq. Moreover, inside Yemen, Ansar Allah has been facing difficulties in managing financial flows since the beginning of this year. At the same time, Iraq appears to be a relatively comfortable place from the point of view of coordinating actions along the «Axis of Resistance»: representatives of the Iranian military and political leadership often visit the Republic. Cooperation between the Houthis and Iraqi groups has every chance of developing, especially against the backdrop of the irreconcilable desire of the Netanyahu government to suppress the military and command potential of its opponents «on seven fronts» at any cost. Apparently, the new Baghdad office of «Ansar Allah» plays the role of not only a financial center, but also a joint operations room for organizing strikes on Israel. A Window into Africa Western countries are increasingly concerned about «Ansar Allah’s» willingness to expand its influence into Africa. The U.S. intelligence community reports that the Yemeni movement is determined to establish effective ties with «Al-Shabaab» a militant group operating in the Horn of Africa, potentially to create a strategic threat to Western interests on the continent. Intelligence agencies suspect that, for now, the two groups are focusing primarily on arms deals. U.S. think tanks have noted that «Ansar Allah» (the Houthis) and «Al-Shabaab» already had indirect connections through local arms trading networks. However, Washington now believes that these two groups, despite being ideological antagonists, are currently engaged in direct dialogue. This dialogue is reportedly focused on the transfer of advanced warfare technologies to the Somali jihadists, including anti-aircraft missile systems and combat drones. US Africa Command has no doubt that «Al-Shabaab» will likely use Houthi-provided equipment to target US facilities and regular personnel. Washington has a direct hand in the Horn of Africa: US drones are constantly hunting for senior «Al-Shabaab» commanders and collecting intelligence in Somalia. But the situation may not be limited to Somalia. The Israeli intelligence community claims that the Houthis are planning to expand their presence in other parts of Africa, in order to project military power unhindered in the Eastern Mediterranean. For example, according to these reports, the Yemeni movement is looking for a tangible foothold in Sudan, Egypt and Morocco, allegedly hoping to transfer groups of its operatives there. This year, the Houthis have promised to harm Israeli interests in the Mediterranean, and the Jewish state believes that this threat is not illusory.  Farewell to the «Proxy» Image During the 12 months of destructive military actions in the Gaza Strip, the «Ansar Allah» movement has established itself as one of the strongest links in the «Axis of Resistance». This has given it the opportunity to become an attractive partner for players who build their policies in the Middle East on the antithesis of the influence of the United States and its allies. It is quite clear that the Houthis' foreign policy capital has only grown in the wake of the U.S.-British operation launched against them on the night of January 12, 2024: the massive strikes from the sea not only failed to weaken the military potential of the Yemeni organization, but within the first few months also demonstrated the international community’s inability to provide military protection for critical maritime routes. If the reports about Ansar Allah deploying its fighters to Syria and North African Arab countries are close to the truth, this currently seems more like a political move than a tactical one, given how sensitive Israel is to the activities of Iran-aligned forces around its sphere of interests. Another question is that the transfer of even a symbolic number of fighters could give the government of Benjamin Netanyahu a formal pretext to resort to escalation scenarios. However, the Yemeni movement’s contacts with Somali jihadists have all the characteristics of a major strategic shift. If the practical level of their cooperation grants them the ability to exert pressure on the Gulf of Aden from different directions, this could strike a blow to the interests of global actors and exacerbate the negative impact of events surrounding Yemen on the global economy. The Houthis' attempt to transform into a transnational movement, which emerged as a response to Israel's military campaign in the Gaza Strip, has led to the expansion of their operational capabilities. On the one hand, this allows the Iranian-led «Axis of Resistance» to maintain the appearance of unity against the backdrop of the apathy of its Syrian partners and the paralysis that has gripped Hezbollah. But on the other hand, by diversifying their ties, the Houthis are neutralizing the image of a military-political entity that is totally dependent on Iran, a label they have been given since the intensification of hostilities in Yemen.

Defense & Security
London, United Kingdom - April 29th 2023: Sudanese Protesters Outside Downing Street Protesting against the war in Sudan between the Military and the RSF.

Is peace possible between Sudan’s warring parties?

by Moses Chrispus Okello

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Achieving lasting peace requires parties to negotiate with adversaries – no matter how difficult this may be. Ever since conflict erupted in Sudan on 15 April 2023, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been engaged in an attritional war, with support from various armed allies and proxy actors. The war is complicated by power struggles and ideological differences at both domestic and international levels, and has ethnic undertones. Can multiparty negotiations resolve the conflict that has killed an estimated 16 000 people and displaced millions ? And how feasible would talks be, given the zero-sum stakes involved? The SAF and RSF have numerous armed and unarmed allies that can become significant forces in their own right. The two are also proxies for a network of international actors, such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States (US), and Russia. These groups’ and Sudanese interests in continuing the conflict or resolving it aren’t always aligned. Amid this, the civilian group Taqaddum is positioning itself as an alternative and interlocutor between the RSF and SAF.   When the conflict started, multiple mediation channels were opened. The initial attempt was the May 2023 Saudi-US mediation process, which led to unsuccessful negotiations in Geneva in August 2024. The African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Quartet, Egyptian initiative, and United Nations Envoy are also engaged in separate but supposedly coordinated processes. These efforts have been ineffective due to the SAF’s preconditions, the RSF’s battlefield successes, and a lack of mutual acknowledgement by all factions. Additionally, the mediation entities have recently been competing with one another or taking sides with the factions. All processes appear to lack the leverage required to facilitate dialogue between the parties. Although these factors contribute to prolonging conflict, they’re not the main barriers preventing the factions from resolving their disagreements. The numerous unsuccessful negotiations suggest that the parties have different preferences for mediation formats and strongly oppose each other. Power struggles and ideological differences at domestic and international levels complicate Sudan’s war Furthermore, the various mediators’ strategies follow a predictable incremental logic, starting with a humanitarian ceasefire and aiming for a power-sharing arrangement. All parties can anticipate the steps in this process and are hesitant to engage in processes that could result in outcomes similar to the failed pre-conflict setup. More importantly, Sudan’s various factions have different visions for the country’s future.   The RSF’s unwillingness to integrate into the national army, as stipulated by the political Framework Agreement, indicated their suspicion of National Congress Party (NCP) members who hold high-ranking positions in the SAF. This mistrust sparked the conflict. Since then, their ambitions have evolved, principally due to the SAF’s inept diplomacy, and now encompass acquiring political power and radically altering Sudan’s political landscape. The RSF’s vision for Sudan excludes NCP members and purported Islamists, whose fusion of state and religion is partially blamed for the country’s misrule. On the other hand, SAF members who are remnants of the NCP and Islamists perceive the RSF as their protégés, amateur soldiers, and even traitors who are undeserving of leadership roles. In contrast to the SAF’s lower ranks, the NCP holds deep resentment towards the RSF and believes military action is a fitting response to what they view as a betrayal. Similarly, the SAF is displeased with the RSF for failing to implement Jeddah agreement commitments. It also seems the SAF is more inclined to break apart than to share power with Taqaddum, who are believed to be internationally influential but insignificant in domestic politics. Despite professing impartiality, Taqaddum’s antipathy towards the Islamists and NCP has resulted in their association with the RSF, despite their denial of any formal ties. However, Taqaddum competes for influence with offshoots of the Forces of Freedom and Change, Democratic Bloc, and Resistance Committees, making it hard to assert leadership in a fragmented civilian landscape. These perspectives are shaped by ideological differences among the parties involved, making a swift resolution improbable. Parties are hesitant to engage in processes that could result in outcomes similar to the failed pre-conflict setup The NCP and Islamists present a singular challenge for Taqaddum and the RSF. The RSF, which includes ethnic groups linked to the NCP and Islamists, must engage in negotiations with an opponent whose fundamental beliefs challenge its very existence. In contrast, a secular government in post-conflict Sudan is an unnegotiable demand for many Darfur armed movements. This position is acceptable to Taqaddum and the RSF – but it is a red line for the Islamists and NCP. Negotiating with the RSF poses significant legal and ethical challenges for all parties, given its checkered history of human rights abuses dating back to the 2003 Darfur conflict and its continuing transgressions. Despite this, the RSF’s control over almost half of Sudan’s landmass makes its participation indispensable in any peace process. While the full extent of Taqaddum’s ambitions remains uncertain, one could speculate that their end goal is to gain political power. To achieve this, they must either ally with one of the armed factions, openly or secretly, or enhance their standing among civilian groups. Nonetheless, partnering with the SAF or RSF comes with political risks. Despite this, some consider the RSF a more dependable choice than the SAF, owing to its perceived history of reliability. The inflexibility of all parties is transforming Sudan into a hybrid of Libya and Somalia, with implications for the broader Horn of Africa. Taqaddum’s equivocation at July’s Cairo Conference of Political and Civil Forces and the AU preparatory Inter-Sudanese dialogue meeting weakened both processes. The RSF’s control over almost half of Sudan’s landmass makes its participation indispensable in any peace process By declining to join the January IGAD summit and the Geneva discussions in August, and pulling out of the less publicised but more practical Manama talks, the SAF enabled the RSF to present itself as more open to peaceful resolution. Nevertheless, this shouldn’t be interpreted as a genuine willingness on the RSF’s part to engage in negotiations. It’s also been hesitant to implement the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan, even though doing so would remove the SAF’s primary reason for not participating in many processes. Despite opposing parties’ sharp differences, achieving peace requires engaging in negotiations with adversaries, regardless of how reprehensible they may be. This approach is consistent with the recommendations of IGAD, AU, and UN for an ‘all-inclusive’ process. If the parties insist on a ‘most-inclusive’ solution, they’ll exclude key factions, leading to inevitable post-conflict relapse and the real possibility of disintegrating Sudan. Sudan’s parties can learn from their own past experiences and those of countries like South Africa, Columbia and former Yugoslavia with multi-level and multimodal negotiations. These involved antagonistic actors and issues but led to outcomes that helped alleviate armed conflict. By addressing core issues first, they can realistically tackle the interests of secondary actors such as the UAE, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, US and Russia, which are increasingly overshadowing internal Sudanese disagreement and dominating the conflict. The article was publilshed by ISS Today. Original article here (please add the link to ISS Today website https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-peace-possible-between-sudan-s-warring-parties)

Defense & Security
Red Sea - IMG_0150.JPG

Navigating the Red Sea: Addressing threats and harnessing potential

by Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga , Farea Al-Muslimi , Lisa Boström , Veera Tuomala

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Photo credit: Flickr/Sailing Nomad - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/ Ambassador Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga, Farea Al-Muslimi, Lisa Boström and Veera Tuomala In recent months, the Red Sea has drawn global attention, particularly due to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the deal between Ethiopia and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland on access to the Gulf of Aden, which sparked a dispute with Somalia. The rising tensions and increasing military responses risk worsening conflicts in a highly volatile region. The renewed focus on the Red Sea, however, also provides an opportunity to redouble commitment to multilateralism and enhance the collective action needed to address threats facing the region. This blog post gives an overview of current issues in the region and possible ways to address them, building on the outcomes of a panel discussion at the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. Geopolitical competition in the Red Sea region The Red Sea has become a major flashpoint for global and regional contestation, with local, regional and global conflict dynamics deeply intertwined. Regional and global powers are constructing naval bases and military installations around the Red Sea to enhance their power projection, fuelling existing tensions and exacerbating ongoing conflicts. This has aggravated already dire humanitarian conditions, contributing to fragility across the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and North Africa. In Sudan, competition between Gulf states is widely considered a driving factor behind the civil war. In Somalia and Yemen, external influences have fuelled internal disputes and aggravated tensions, undermining state-building efforts and incurring particularly devastating consequences in Yemen. Climate change and a scramble for scarce natural resources and critical commodities, including water, agricultural land and food supplies, may reinforce this dynamic. Gulf states, in particular, have invested billions in agriculture and manufacturing in the Horn of Africa in recent years to secure food production and tap into the region’s burgeoning labour markets. Regional insecurity escalates Insecurity in the Red Sea region reached a critical point in early 2024 when the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in response to the ongoing conflict in Gaza, further threatening regional and international stability, upending trade and disrupting global markets. In response, the United States and the United Kingdom carried out airstrikes against targets in Yemen, while the European Union took a more defensive approach with the launch of Operation ASPIDES to protect vessels. This escalation delayed peace negotiations in Yemen, weakening the fragile trust needed to agree on an extended ceasefire and a roadmap to peace. The Houthi attacks also further compounded humanitarian challenges, disrupting the flow of essential goods and humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region more widely, thus worsening shortages and human suffering. In Sudan around 26 million people, more than half the population, are suffering acute food insecurity. In Yemen, around 22 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, with about 17 million facing acute food insecurity. Instability on both coasts has also increased migration across the Red Sea. The number of migrants from the Horn of Africa arriving in Yemen has nearly tripled in recent years, with tens of thousands making the dangerous crossing annually in search of better economic opportunities. Additionally, the rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia has exacerbated regional insecurity, with reports of coordination between the Houthis and the Al-Shabaab armed group in the Horn, increasing the risk of human trafficking and forced migration. Opportunities to strengthen multilateralism, cooperation and collective action The barriers to effective cooperation in the Red Sea region are significant but not insurmountable. Historical rivalries and political instability have eroded trust among countries in the region, and the diverse priorities and strategic interests of these countries complicate collaboration. Despite these challenges, the region holds immense potential for growth and development. The strategic location and resources of countries on both shores, if harnessed constructively and collectively, could spur economic prosperity and regional stability. However, the region can realize its potential and accelerate socio-economic development only through inclusive growth, innovation and addressing long-standing developmental challenges. In this regard, prioritizing economic and regional integration is critical to unlocking the region’s vast potential. Indeed, the geographical proximity between the Horn of Africa and Yemen across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has brought about initiatives such as the Bridge of the Horns, proposed in 2007 between Djibouti and Yemen, which represented a bold vision for a more integrated, peaceful and prosperous region. While the project did not materialize, it is symbolic of the potential for deep and mutually beneficial economic, cultural and political ties across the Red Sea. While there are currently no operational overarching mechanisms or forums for multilateral cooperation around the region, the establishment in 2020 of the Red Sea Council—formally the Council of Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden—could fill this gap. Once operational, it could help to mitigate tensions and foster cooperation towards a shared vision for the region. Moving forward There are several areas where enhanced cooperation is achievable and could benefit the Red Sea region as a whole. For example, establishing joint coastal patrols and information-sharing mechanisms could significantly enhance maritime security and combat piracy, smuggling and terrorism along the vital maritime corridor. Developing regional trade agreements and infrastructure projects could boost economic growth and interdependence, reducing the likelihood of conflict. Collaborative efforts to address climate change, manage shared water resources and protect marine ecosystems could promote sustainability and reduce resource-related tensions. Coordinating humanitarian responses and development programmes could address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, food insecurity, and poor access to education and healthcare. Finally, establishing platforms for dialogue and mediation could help to resolve disputes peacefully, preventing the escalation of conflicts. By focusing on these areas, the countries of the Red Sea region could move towards a more cooperative, stable and prosperous future. Strengthening cooperation through robust multilateral frameworks is vital to addressing the factors that underpin regional insecurity as well as to promoting sustainable development. Regional solutions should be led by the region, rather than relying on external entities whose priorities and resources are currently focused elsewhere. Countries on both coasts of the Red Sea need to view each other as partners for common goals and stability, prioritizing cooperation to connect their needs and interests effectively. As United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres notes in the New Agenda for Peace, rebuilding consensus around shared norms and developing new ways for states to act cooperatively is crucial to addressing collective challenges and meeting shared objectives. SIPRI is pleased to share a series of guest blog posts from partners of the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. This blog builds on a panel discussion at the Forum on the topic ‘Red Sea Security in a Time of Disorder’, which was organized by CMI–Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation.

Energy & Economics
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

China promises to expand cooperation with Africa and invest US$ 51,4 billion by 2027

by Mauro Ramos , Ana Paula Rocha

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Picture: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/ China now has strategic partnerships with 53 of the 54 African countries; investments range from industry to agriculture After holding bilateral meetings with 25 African heads of state in less than a week, China's President Xi Jinping announced on Thursday (5) the project to implement ten partnership actions with the continent that will be financed by the Chinese government to the value of 360 billion yuan (US$ 51,4 billion). According to the Chinese president, the projects should affect various areas of infrastructure and the transfers should be carried out by 2027. He has been meeting with presidents of African countries in Beijing since Monday (2), before and during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, in English), which began on Wednesday (4) and runs until Friday (6). In the current edition, China has decided to sign strategic partnerships with all the African countries with which it has diplomatic relations – or 53 of 54. Raising the level of partnerships is a growing practice in Chinese foreign policy to strengthen ties with countries, mainly in the so-called Global South. The total investment will be divided into a credit line of 210 billion yuan (around US$ 29,8 billion), 80 billion yuan (US$ 11,3 billion) in assistance, and 70 billion yuan (US$ 9,9 billion) of investment by Chinese companies in Africa. Regarding health cooperation, it was planned for the joint creation of an alliance of hospitals and medical centers. China has promised to send 2,000 health workers to the continent and launch 20 programs for health facilities and malaria treatment. According to the WHO, in 2022 Africa had 94% of the world's malaria cases (233 million) and 95% of the deaths caused by the disease (580,000). In agriculture and food, China will provide African countries with 1 billion yuan (around US$ 142,1 million) for emergency food assistance, the construction of standardized agricultural “demonstration areas” of more than 6,600 hectares, the sending of 500 agricultural experts and the creation of a “China-Africa agricultural scientific and technological innovation alliance.” In this sector, the Chinese president said that “two-way investments will be encouraged for new businesses of Chinese and African companies”, to help them gain added value and create at least 1 million local jobs. Common security is the tenth area of cooperation announced. Xi said China will offer 1 billion yuan to train 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 police officers, “and invite 500 young [African] military officers to visit China”. It also announced the creation of a digital technology cooperation center to start 20 digital projects and 30 infrastructure connectivity projects in Africa. This week, the presidents and heads of state of Libya, Mali, Comoros, Togo, Djibouti, the Seychelles, Chad, Malawi and Mauritania signed an agreement to upgrade diplomatic relations with China to the level of strategic partnership. Other countries, such as Nigeria and Cameroon, have adopted what is known as comprehensive strategic partnerships. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa signed a “new era comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” with the Asian giant, which is now the highest relationship with China among African countries. In addition, two documents were signed, the “Beijing Declaration on Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era” and the “Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027)” of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. The long name of this Beijing Declaration is part of the country’s diplomatic terminology and is the highest used for a partnership with an entire region. Right to modernization On Thursday (5), Wang Yi, China's foreign minister held a press conference with his counterpart from Senegal, Yassine Fall, and from the Republic of Congo, Jean-Claude Gakosso, to comment on the partnership, results and prospects. Wang Yi emphasized the need to build multilateralism with Africa. “We must always listen to Africa's voice [...] without being condescending.” The Beijing document argues that Africans “are qualified to serve as heads of international organizations and institutions.” African countries, in return, highlighted in the document their appreciation that China was the first country to support the African Union's entry into the G20. China welcomes the fact that more African countries are joining the BRICS, since in addition to South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia joined the group last year. At the press conference, Wang Yi also called for China and Africa to face together challenges such as “small gardens and high fences”, about the U.S. strategy of protectionism against China. Referring to cooperation with the continent, Wang Yi said the country does not want to “play geographical games, or confront blocs”. “We want to reach a consensus in the international community [...] everyone has the right to modernization.” For his part, Yassine Fall emphasized China's commitment to increasing the supply of exports from African countries to China, the elimination of customs barriers for the least developed countries – which include 33 African countries – and financial support for small and medium-sized enterprises. Translated from Portuguese to English by: Ana Paula Rocha

Energy & Economics
Power plant near Standerton in the South African province of Mpumalanga

Ghana is planning its first nuclear energy plant: what’s behind the decision

by Seth Kofi Debrah

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Ghana is considering bids from five companies for the construction of what would be its first nuclear power plant. The companies are: France’s EDF, US-based NuScale Power and Regnum Technology Group; China National Nuclear Corporation; South Korea’s Kepco and its subsidiary Korea Hydro Nuclear Power Corporation; and Russia’s Rosatom. The Conversation Africa’s Godfred Akoto Boafo interviewed Seth Kofi Debrah, director, Nuclear Power Institute, Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, on the pros and cons of adding nuclear power to the country’s power mix, and why Ghana needs to diversify and identify new energy sources. What makes the nuclear option attractive to Ghana? The country’s industrialisation ambitions, fuel constraints, limited resources, climate conditions and international commitments to climate change mitigation are among the factors driving Ghana to include nuclear power in the energy mix. Nuclear power is available all year round, making it reliable. The nuclear power plant is expected to operate as a baseload plant (the production facility used to meet some or all of an area’s continuous energy demand), with a capacity factor of about 92%. A conventional nuclear power plant typically operates for 92% of a calendar year as compared to 54% for natural gas power plants, 24% for solar and 34% for wind power plants. Demand for electricity is growing across the nation. Currently, 84% of the population have access to electricity but may not be connected to the electrical grid. This means the power is available in their area but they may be unconnected due to personal circumstances. Electricity demand is expected to grow rapidly on the back of electrification projects planned by successive governments, like the rural electrification project (which aims at supplying electricity to all communities with a population of 500 or greater) and industrialisation initiatives (such as developing the manufacturing, alumina and iron industries). Another reason for choosing nuclear power is that Ghana sees it as a way of supporting its industrial ambitions in the sub-region. For example, Ghana aims to become a net exporter of electricity in the region through the West African Power Pool, a specialised agency of the Economic Community of West African States. It covers 14 of the 15 Ecowas countries and is intended to supply them with reliable energy at a competitive cost. According to the World Bank, the average electrification rate in west Africa is about 42%, which means that almost half of the region’s population has no access to electricity. Ghana has an 84% electrification rate. Ghana believes nuclear power can help it achieve its industrial ambitions while fighting climate change. As a signatory to the Paris Agreement, Ghana has an international obligation to reduce greenhouse gas. Nuclear power does not produce any of the greenhouse gases. Ghana’s electricity sector is dominated by thermal plants that use natural gas – a fossil fuel. Fossil thermal plants make up 64% of the current energy mix. This is an over-dependence on a single fuel source. Natural gas has competing uses in different sectors, so there are frequent fuel shortages. And the price of natural gas is set by international markets, which leads to price volatility. Ghana has its own source of natural gas. But these reserves are expected to start declining by 2028. How dependable is the country’s current energy mix? Ghana’s current energy mix is made up of 1,584MW installed capacity of hydro, 3,758MW of thermal power plants (mostly powered by natural gas) and 112MW of solar generation. But the dependable capacity (the total amount of electricity that the facility can produce and deliver to the power grid) of renewables is non-existent since the source of their power generation is variable. The dependable capacity of the energy mix of a country matters a great deal. The energy mix must have strong baseload capacity (the minimum amount of electric power needed to be supplied to the electrical grid at any given time) before renewables are considered, to ensure reliability. No industralised nation developed its economy based on variable generation of electricity. They needed a reliable backbone that could be depended on at all times. European countries used natural gas, coal, hydro or nuclear as their baseload capacity and added on variable renewables. If Ghana wants to exploit its natural resources and become an industrial giant, it needs sustainable, reliable and affordable baseload electricity. That can be found in a source like nuclear. What’s the government’s case for nuclear? Ghana doesn’t have many other energy options. It has good sources of hydro but most have already been exploited. Potential small dams are being affected by climate change or variability and illegal mining. And the economic justification for more small hydro plants is in doubt. Ghana started its nuclear power journey as far back as the early 1960s but the idea was never realised. The nuclear power programme was restarted in 2007 under former president John Agyekum Kufuor. The programme has followed the International Atomic Energy Agency’s three-phase approach. Ghana is now at phase 2: vendor selection and site preparation. The plant, which is expected to be constructed along the coast of the country, is planned to come online in early 2030. Given Ghana’s financial constraints, is nuclear power a good idea? Nuclear power plants have proven to be among the cheapest sources of electricity around the world. Even though nuclear has a huge upfront financial burden, its long lifespan (over 60 years) and low running cost makes it one of the cheapest baseload sources of electricity. Around the world, advanced countries seek financial support for their nuclear projects. There are various models to finance nuclear power plant procurement, including the option of a public private partnership. How about nuclear waste and the cost of dealing with it? Ghana already operates one of the few radioactive waste storage facilities in Africa. This means that when Ghana builds a nuclear power plant it will already have capacity in nuclear waste management. Radioactive waste management, which deals with nuclear waste, is an issue that needs to be addressed in the early stages of planning a nuclear plant. This is evident in the International Atomic Energy Agency milestone approach which most countries follow to develop a nuclear programme. It shows all the 19 infrastructure issues that need to be addressed throughout the three-phased approach. It is the only power plant that is responsible in dealing with its waste after its lifetime. In effect, it is the only power plan that plans and pays for its waste management during operation and post operation with dedicated funds for waste management. The costs of managing nuclear waste and the nuclear power plant’s decommissioning at the end of its operating life are included in the nuclear power plant tariff. This is a safety requirement as enshrined in the International Atomic Energy Agency safety standards. Furthermore, the country of origin has strict regulations about decommissioning which have to be adhered to by nuclear power plant owners. One of the major concerns by the public is the treatment or storage of the high level spent fuel that is sometimes referred to as “waste”. High level spent fuel is the fuel that has been used up through irradiation. These used fuels usually have over 90% usable fuel that can be re-used through reprocessing.

Defense & Security
Map Countries where the Wagner Group has been active

The Wagner Group: Russia's Shadow Army and its Impact in Africa

by Isabella Currie

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The Wagner Group has maintained an active and controversial presence in Africa since 2017, where it has contributed to regional instability, countered Western influence, and exacerbated human rights abuses. Despite the death of its figurehead in 2023, the emergence of the Africa Corps indicates that Russia’s covert geopolitical strategies in the region will persist. The Wagner Group has gained significant attention since its involvement in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. As a paramilitary organisation with deep ties to the Russian government, Wagner’s operations blur the lines between state and non-state actions. This ambiguity challenges traditional frameworks of accountability and international law, complicating efforts to address its activities on the global stage. Ukraine is not the group’s only violent contribution to the destabilization of peaceful nations. Wagner has maintained an active presence across Africa since 2017, where it has been accused of numerous human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and targeting civilians. The bulk of these activities have unfolded in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali. The Wagner Group’s international impact is multifaceted, affecting strategic, economic, and humanitarian outcomes. Functioning as a tool for Russian geopolitical ambitions, the group has contributed to regional instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, countered Western influence by infiltrating anti-Western and anti-colonial movements and sentiments online, and raised significant concerns regarding human rights and international law. In many of its areas of operations, Wagner’s presence has served as a catalyst for conflict escalation, and regional instability. In CAR and Mali, for instance, the group’s presence has been linked to increased violence and human rights abuses and undermining international and regional efforts towards peace and stability. The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, known as “Putin’s Chef,” on 23 August 2023, came two months after his march on Moscow, sparked by dissatisfaction with the Russian Ministry of Defence’s actions in Ukraine. It is likely that many of the governments and regimes in Africa that “benefitted” from Wagner’s services were deeply concerned about Prigozhin’s death. At the same time, many may have been relieved, hoping that his death might change the brutal and terror-driven campaign of violence that had plagued the Sahel region at the group’s hands. Additionally, Wagner has provided Russia with a platform to pursue state interests through covert operations. Until the invasion of Ukraine, this allowed Putin to maintain plausible deniability regarding association with Wagner and its controversial activities. In addition to military engagements, Prigozhin orchestrated extensive propaganda and disinformation campaigns across Africa. These operations bolstered Russia’s influence in countries that Wagner operated in, while obscuring the ability for international bodies and states to accurately assess and address the allegations of human rights abuses that came alongside Wagner’s deployments. In CAR, the Wagner Group was deployed in 2018 to provide protection for mines, support the government, and offer personal protection for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. However, Wagner’s role in CAR far exceeded resource and government protection. The group actively engaged in military operations alongside members of the armed forces, leading to numerous accusations of serious human rights violations, including summary executions and sexual and gender-based violence. Despite these allegations, the group continued to receive support from the CAR government. The media outlet, Corbeau News, reported that President Touadéra had authorised Wagner’s sexual violence. This was evidenced in one of Wagner’s most extreme acts in CAR, which occurred in April 2022 when members of the group entered a military hospital in Bangui and sexually assaulted women and new mothers in the maternity ward. One source within the military administration of CAR stated that it was the third time members from the group had entered the maternity ward and assaulted women. In 2021, reports surfaced that Wagner would deploy to Mali to combat a rebel insurgency. This announcement sparked outrage from France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, who warned Mali against partnering with the group. Similar to its operations in CAR, Wagner’s presence in Mali has been marked by violence and instability. In April 2022, Human Rights Watch released a report detailing the massacre of 300 civilians during a joint military operation involving Malian armed forces and the Wagner Group from 27 March to 31. A key feature of Wagner’s presence has been countering Western influence in strategic regions. The provision of military support to governments and groups engaged in activities against Western-supported entities has been notably destructive. This dynamic was evident in Mali, where in 2022, an extensive disinformation campaign on social media, linked to Wagner, exploited anti-France and anti-imperialist sentiments to undermine the French presence. The campaign, along with “multiple obstructions” from Mali’s military junta led to France announcing the withdrawal of its military forces from Operation Barkhane in Mali in February 2022. Following the announcement, Malians celebrated in the capital, Bamako, and held signs stating, “Thanks Wagner” and “France is a terrorist nation.” Wagner-linked actors then continued their disinformation efforts, attempting to shift blame onto France following the discovery of a mass grave near a military base that French forces had recently vacated. Satellite imagery released by France later revealed Wagner Group mercenaries arranging the bodies in the mass grave. The bodies were believed to have come from a joint-military operation between the Malian armed forces and the Wagner Group in the same area in the days prior. In Africa, Wagner’s operations have been closely linked to the control and exploitation of natural resources. In countries such as CAR and Sudan, Wagner has secured access to valuable resources such as gold and diamonds. Recently, investigative efforts by groups like All Eyes on Wagner have revealed that the group has circumvented sanctions by exporting timber from CAR through Cameroon, in addition to operating an extensive blood diamond trading network. The Wagner Group’s involvement in these countries highlights the group’s role in bolstering autocratic regimes in exchange for strategic and economic benefits. Prigozhin’s march on Moscow in June 2023 had already fuelled significant speculation about the group’s future. Nonetheless, the group’s strategic plan to support autocratic governments, orchestrate foreign interference, and expand influence remains both politically and economically appealing to Moscow. The potential dissolution of the Wagner Group would pose a significant challenge and require the rebuilding of established relationships in countries where it has operated. The emergence of the Africa Corps, a new organisation seemingly poised to assume many of Wagner’s operations, emphasises the strategic and economic value these activities provide for Russia. With the announcement in January 2024 that 100 Russian soldiers from the Africa Corps would deploy to Burkina Faso, it is clear that the Wagner model is one that will continue.

Defense & Security
World geographic map made of metallic material with the African continent in the foreground.

Look towards the south

by José Segura Clavell

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In a complex moment of geopolitical relations, marked by issues such as armed conflicts or climate change, it is more necessary than ever to pay attention to what is happening in the Sahel and Africa. In a world as turbulent as the one we live in, geopolitics returns to the front pages of newspapers with what is happening in Gaza, the potential consequences of the elections in the United States or France, or, in the Spanish context, the recent visit of our king, Felipe VI, to the Baltic Republics, with particular support and recognition for the Spanish military units serving there, all within the framework of tensions with Russia on the European eastern border. Despite the frequent discussions about the implications these issues have on our lives and our tendency to look beyond our borders for answers, what remains unchanged and continues to surprise me is the lack of interest that the African continent still generates among the public and experts, along with a vast ignorance of the geopolitical importance that the continent is acquiring. For these reasons, today I would like to talk to you about three issues that, from a geopolitical perspective, do not receive the attention and reflection they deserve. First, I would like to remind you that jihadism remains a major threat in many areas of the African continent, especially in the Sahel. In fact, there is barely any discussion about how the security crisis in this part of the world is spreading to the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea: Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, and Ghana. As they often do in Africa, jihadist groups are exploiting structural vulnerabilities, various frustrations, and resentments against states that do not always respond to their citizens' demands as they would like, to recruit young people who will swell their ranks. I recently read a republished article by Óscar Guijarro from the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE, in spanish) titled "The Expansion of Jihadism from the Sahel to the Coastal Countries of the Gulf of Guinea", which I found extremely interesting, especially for Spain. These coastal countries, which appear to have more stable political environments than those in the Sahel, are marked by significant inequalities and socioeconomic divisions in different areas (poor north versus richer south), as well as religious differences that jihadist groups exploit to gain influence. The strategic location of these countries and the presence of forest reserves that are used as resources and refuges facilitate the expansion of jihadism and organized crime, including arms and drug trafficking. While it is true that the European Union is providing support to confront the jihadist threat and that the affected countries are adopting military and cross-border security measures, I believe that at the very least, more attention needs to be paid to this part of the world. Being aware of the importance of jihadist movements' penetration in Africa and their impact on global geopolitics should be a priority. Thousands of people are dying and are being displaced in West Africa due to violence of all kinds, and it cannot be something we ignore. A friend of Casa África, a senior official at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, spoke in January before the United Nations Security Council on this matter. Ms. Théroux-Bénoni urged the international community not to ignore the Sahel and reminded that strategies to prevent terrorism must acknowledge the deep regional connections that allow extremist groups to recruit, fundraise, and manage their logistics across multiple countries. She asserted that the current situation in the region represents the worst possible scenario of violent extremism, coups d'état, and setbacks in regional integration, and called for international responses. From the ISS, they constantly remind us that the stability of West Africa is important to the global community for multiple reasons, some related to opportunities and socioeconomic development, and others related to terrorist threats, organized crime, and the illegal trafficking of all kinds of goods, from drugs and weapons to people. Regarding governance, Ms. Théroux-Bénoni stated that we must contribute to creating conditions that make coups d'état and political instability less likely. Another issue that I believe doesn't receive enough attention is what some analysts have already dubbed "new Russianism." Colonel and geopolitical analyst Ignacio Fuente Cobo, in articles published by the IEEE, uses this term to define Russia's neocolonial project to expand its influence in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region. While we focus on Ukraine and Europe's eastern flank, the truth is that we fail to fully grasp Russia's strategy of strengthening its presence in Africa. A quick glance at articles about the Sahel reveals that Russia is finding allies among the leaders of the region and a population that prefers Russian assistance over the help traditionally provided by France, for example, to solve their problems. Mr. Fuente Cobo discusses an alternative multipolar world order, whose reinforcement is evident, and Russia's interest in seizing natural resources and evading Western sanctions. The fact is that Russia has shown remarkable skill in exploiting the gaps in European cooperation in the Sahel and has managed to strengthen its position in some countries, particularly through the former Wagner group (now Africa Corps) and the military cooperation. The loss of European influence in the area should concern us and guide the design of our policy in the region, which I believe should always be based on mutual respect, attentive listening to our African partners and friends, and a mutually beneficial partnership that avoids paternalism and, especially, the geopolitical double standards that have discredited the West in the eyes of many countries, now more critical than ever of our decisions on the global stage. To conclude, I would like to highlight one of the many reasons why we depend on the African continent and should pay more attention to it: critical minerals, essential for the global energy and digital transition, a topic discussed by Mar Hidalgo García for the IEEE. In this area, Africa not only attracts Europe's attention. We face competition from other powers, such as the United States, Russia, India, Japan, and Australia. China, for instance, has established a strong presence in Africa, achieved through a long-term strategy that remains consistent regardless of the current leadership and involves more than just words. I believe it would be worthwhile to reconsider the focus on migration that seems to dominate the EU’s African strategy and to look beyond it by establishing strategic partnerships and developing infrastructure to negotiate access to African mineral resources, for example. Countless authors and analysts dedicate time to reflecting on the geopolitical implications of the changes occurring in our neighboring countries and to searching for formulas and strategies that can help us strengthen and improve our relations. What perhaps isn't emphasized enough, besides the need to look towards our southern neighbors and care about what happens to them, is that understanding and cooperating with them is the only way to progress and ensure that Europe remains relevant in the world. An equitable partnership based on mutual respect and a shared future is imperative. For the good of all. Article written by José Segura Clavell, Director General of Casa África, and published in Kiosco Insular, eldiario.es, and Canarias 7 on June 28 and 29, 2024.

Defense & Security
Disputed Claims In The South China Sea.

Africa’s delicate diplomacy in the South China Sea dispute

by Samir Bhattacharya

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The ongoing skirmishes in the South China Sea between China and regional states represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting Africa. As China grows increasingly aggressive in its race for global hegemony and influence, and the United States (US) slowly plunges into the battle to prevent China’s rise, the world is watching the unfolding of this rivalry with unease. Although a few places have felt intense pressure from this alarming competition, the South China Sea (SCS) region is where a violent showdown looks increasingly probable. Unlike the war in Ukraine or Gaza, the US and China may start a direct war in the SCS. And amidst this multifaceted new Cold War 2.0, Africa remains cautious. The South China tinderbox On 23 April, another skirmish took place between China and the Philippines when two Filipino patrol boats approached the shallow turquoise waters of a disputed shoal around 194 km west of the Philippine Islands province of Palawan. The patrol boats were there for an underwater survey near the disputed shoal claimed by both China and the Philippines, thus prompting a Chinese response. A Chinese coast guard, via radio, instructed them to leave the area and threatened hostile measures. Following several radio exchanges, the Chinese coast guard damaged both the Philippine patrol boats by firing high-pressure water cannons at them. However, this was not the first time China’s assertion in this region has caused friction with other SCS neighbours, including Japan and South Korea. China has used an unconvincing U-shaped “nine-dash line” that crosses the exclusive economic zones, or EEZs, of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam to demonstrate its claim in the region. Despite their low intrinsic value, the region lies along a vital trade and supply corridor that supports over US$3 trillion in yearly shipborne commerce. Oil, gas, and fishing sources abound in the area. Beijing has declined to acknowledge a 2016 decision from the Permanent Court of Arbitration that ruled Beijing’s broad claims invalid based on historical grounds. China and the Philippines have already fought many times over the Second Thomas Shoal and the Bashi Channel. China has become increasingly aggressive in the region in the last few years, putting regional stability at high risk. So far, these skirmishes will likely remain regional without the risk of any full-scale war. However, there are risks of casualties or even the vessel capsizing. Making of Cold War 2.0 over the SCS Washington’s response to the upcoming crisis is still modest. US President Biden raised concerns about China’s actions in the SCS , including efforts to impede the Philippines from resupplying its forces on the fiercely disputed Second Thomas Shoal. The US has repeatedly warned China that it’s obligated to defend the Philippines, its oldest treaty ally in Asia, if Filipino forces, ships or aircraft come under an armed attack. The US also conducted Balikatan drills (‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ in Tagalog) with the Philippines with more than 16,000 American and Philippines military personnel. Indeed, its resources are thinly stretched, and Beijing seems to be moving ahead. To deter China by stepping up regional defence diplomacy, Washington is exploring the possibility of a security alliance with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, tentatively called SQUAD. This is in addition to two other existing groupings in the region, “Quad” and “AUKUS,” a defence pact among Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. While AUKUS is a defence pact, Quad is simply a dialogue platform. Africa’s tricky balancing act Even while the socioeconomic repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war have not yet wholly subsided in Africa, the ongoing skirmishes in the SCS represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting several African nations. Despite being geographically far, the conflict’s spillover effect would impact the continent’s food security in terms of both the availability and pricing of some food crops. In addition, the SCS region represents a crucial geographic sweet spot for Africa as a source of trade and investment, translating into growth and development for many African economies. The crisis can potentially fuel price rise, particularly for oil-importing countries. The prospect of a consequential price rise of essential commodities will have enormous ramifications for domestic stability in most African countries. Furthermore, many African economies heavily rely on trade, investment, and aid from South and Southeast Asia, the crisis will significantly hamper the development and growth of the continent. There are also strategic lessons for Africa to learn from the conflict. China’s principal interest in Africa consists of protecting its BRI investments and ensuring steady trade flow. Africa is also essential for China to fulfil its resource needs, maintaining industrial growth and energy security. Therefore, securing stability in countries where China has invested is in China’s interest, just like keeping a stable relationship with China is in the interest of those investment-starved countries. Further, since many investment projects in China are located in different African countries, these countries should be careful. China can become aggressively irredentist, even in Africa. Currently, China owns a naval base in Djibouti and a ballistic missile tracker Yuan Wang 5, off the coast of Durban. It has strong economic influence across the countries of Africa’s east coast thanks to its Belt Road Initiative (BRI). On the West Coast, China has many seaports financed or constructed by Chinese entities. If the national governments of these countries fail to pay, China would happily take control of these ports through lease as it did in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. In addition to Sri Lanka, other South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar also faced dire consequences due to the failure of their BRI debt payment, leading to economic crises, and sometimes even political crises. Therefore, caution would be expected from these African governments. Conclusion China’s increasingly aggressive posture over the SCS raises concerns about the stability of the region. As the current uneasy détente between the US and China bears remarkable similarities to the Cold War, questions are raised regarding the possibilities of a new Cold War 2.0. Questions are also raised concerning the possible reactions from different African countries vis-á-vis Chinese aggression in the region. Undoubtedly, any serious conflict between China and the Philippines would be dangerous. These frequent skirmishes may not lead to a direct war between the US and China. Yet, the risk of vessel capsizing and casualties is high. Any such event would ultimately spark a crisis in Africa. So far, Africa is cautious and continues to balance its great power relationships. Undoubtedly, it is increasingly concerned with the aggressive posture of the Chinese in the region. On the other hand, it needs China for economic purposes. Therefore, Africa will continue to walk the tightrope where it would want US involvement in de-escalating the situation without ruffling any feathers with China. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Defense & Security
Kanyarucinya

Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo: Continuing Humanitarian Action in One of the World’s Most Forgotten Crises

by Francine Kongolo

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском For almost three decades, North Kivu has been plagued by armed conflict, causing repeated displacement of thousands of residents. Despite humanitarian efforts, the needs of displaced people and host communities far exceed available resources, with many affected by ongoing violence and limited media coverage. In North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri, three provinces in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), years of conflict and armed violence have led to a deep and complex humanitarian crisis. Hundreds of thousands of people have been and are being displaced, often repeatedly. In places of refuge, camps for displaced people, and among host families, living conditions remain precarious. With growing insecurity and needs, it is increasingly difficult to provide a suitable humanitarian response. This is also due to the lack of funding dedicated to this crisis. According to the International Organization for Migration, the DRC reached almost 7 million displaced people in 2023–the highest number ever recorded in the country. Approximately 81 percent of these people live in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. Armed conflict remains the main cause of displacement. “The fighting was so fierce that we decided to leave our village of Shasha and seek refuge in Sake. Shortly after arriving, my son was injured by shrapnel from a bomb. He was hit in the head, leg and arm. Of course, we’re used to being displaced, but this time it’s awful, the violence is unheard of…” Esther (40, sits at her 11-year-old son’s bedside at the CBCA Ndosho hospital (supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]) in Goma, the capital of North Kivu Province. The two parties have been fighting in the North Kivu region for almost two years. From October 2023 to the beginning of 2024, the violence intensified greatly, causing an increasing number of casualties and injuries among both weapon bearers and civilians. Between 1 October 2023 and 29 February 2024, 540 wounded people were treated by the ICRC at CBCA Ndosho in connection with this conflict. North Kivu: More than two decades of violence North Kivu has been beset by armed violence for almost 30 years. In recent years, the province has seen various armed conflicts that continue to affect communities. “In 1996, we fled to Uganda when the AFDL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire) entered the DRC. Then, in 2008, when the CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People) war broke out, we were forced to leave our village and flee to Goma. The recent fighting linked to the M23 crisis meant that my nine children and I had to move twice in just one month. Whenever there’s fighting, we move and whenever we move, everything stops,” says Jean, a displaced person living in Kabaya in Rutshuru territory. Thousands of households have been forced to flee their homes. Many have been displaced several times, forced to leave everything behind. Crammed into collective centres or camps for displaced people, and lacking latrines or waste-disposal systems due to a lack of resources and the continuous arrival of new displaced people, they are at risk of epidemics, including cholera. In remote and isolated areas, families and communities who were once displaced themselves host other displaced people unable to reach a town due to distance, weather conditions or dangers they are exposed to during their displacement. Also affected by years of violence, these families and communities are forced to share their meagre resources, at the risk of falling into extreme poverty themselves. The same situation can be observed further north in the province, in Beni territory, where thousands of people are caught between local armed groups, attacks attributed to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (an armed group affiliated to the Islamic State group) and joint military operations against the ADF by the Congolese and Ugandan armies. Access to water, food, shelter, essential household goods, and health care remain critical for displaced people and members of host families. People’s needs, which are constantly growing, are exceeding the response capacity of humanitarian organisations. “As a Pygmy, I grew up in the forest, eating fruit and hunted animals for free. Because of the violence, armed men came and chased us out of the forest, killing my whole family, my four children and my wife. Now I’m a refugee here in Oicha. I’m finding it hard adapting to life outside the forest,” Pierre, 38, says sadly. He lives in one of Beni territory’s camps for displaced people. In the DRC, the ICRC is working to provide emergency assistance to displaced people. From January to December 2023, more than 247,000 people received food assistance and over 103,000 others received household items. Emergency response projects also provided more than 500,000 people with access to drinking water. In addition, under the mandate conferred on it by the states party to the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC strives to prevent human suffering by promoting and strengthening international humanitarian law. Working closely with the DRC Red Cross, the ICRC is helping people who have lost contact with their families to find them. In 2023, the ICRC helped reunite 465 families in the DRC and neighbouring countries. The ICRC also maintains a bilateral and confidential dialogue with armies and non-state armed groups to promote respect for civilians and persons hors de combat, particularly to prevent situations such as sexual violence or the recruitment and use of minors. Out of the spotlight, Ituri sinks deeper Military operations involving the ADF group in the north of North Kivu Province are also spreading into the neighbouring province of Ituri. Tensions over land rights in Ituri have exacerbated divisions between communities and are seen by some as a cause of the violence. Some conflicts and community tensions have led to serious acts of violence, causing the displacement of around 1.7 million people in the province. Attacks recorded against villages, hospitals, schools and even camps for displaced people have not received media coverage and have been met with general indifference. “The war tore away my foot and with it my soul. I won’t be able to return to my home village in this condition. Right now, we’re living off our host families’ charity,” confides Antoine, 50, a displaced person living in Dala, Djugu territory. At least 68 civilians lost their lives in Ituri during violence attributed to armed groups between mid-January and mid-February 2024, as reported by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Precarious situation in South Kivu Since the clashes between the Congolese army and the M23 intensified in January 2024, thousands of people fleeing neighbouring North Kivu have settled in Kalehe territory, South Kivu, adding to the number of people in need in this province. Having also received less attention, the crisis in South Kivu has persisted for several years. The security situation remains marked by the presence of approximately 20 armed groups. Constant clashes among ethnic armed groups, and between these groups and the Congolese army, are causing population displacement. On 31 December 2023, the United Nations estimated that there were 1.5 million internally displaced people. As in North Kivu and Ituri, these population movements are causing the loss of livelihoods. Entire communities, mainly farmers, often find themselves far from their fields and without the seeds to resume their farming activities in their place of refuge. “Being displaced is frustrating. It’s heartbreaking to be living on humanitarian aid while our fields have become scrublands,” laments Judith, who moved to the Mikenge camp for displaced people with her husband, daughter-in-law, and grandchildren. They were forced to abandon their village when armed group members burned it down. To help communities regain their livelihoods, the ICRC often distributes seeds to communities in need. In 2023, 261,552 people received support to help them resume their agricultural activities. More needs but less mobilisation Eastern DRC is said to contain around 100 armed groups. Against this backdrop of proliferating armed groups and subsequent military operations, the violence has, among other things, increased the vulnerability of civilian populations even further. The duration of the chronic crises in North and South Kivu, as well as in Ituri, has led to the “normalization” of their humanitarian consequences, and a low level of donor mobilisation. However, needs are constantly growing, as is insecurity. Of the 113.6 million total population of the DRC, the United Nations estimates that more than 25.4 million people will need aid in 2024.

Defense & Security
Juba, South Sudan, February 2017. People with yellow jerrycans waiting for water at a borehole site. Salesian camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Sudan and the "ghost war"

by Alessia De Luca

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском A year after the start of the civil war, the country is overshadowed by violence and mass famine, amidst the silence and indifference of the world. After a year of civil war, Sudan is turning into a failed state. Humanitarian organizations on the ground are sounding the alarm on the first anniversary of the onset of violence. 'In the past year, I have seen my country descend into violence, madness, and destruction,' – said Elsadig Elnour, director of Islamic Relief for Sudan – 'amid the indifference of the rest of the world.' According to Doctors Without Borders, the country is facing a dramatic humanitarian crisis, with over 8.4 million people, about 16% of the population, including 2 million children under 5 years old, forced to flee within the country or across the border, and it is on the brink of mass famine. The conflict, a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitaries of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commanded by Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, a warlord known as Hemedti, has already caused more than 14,600 casualties, according to the United Nations. However, the humanitarian response has tragically remained inadequate: only 5% of the funds requested have been allocated, making an already critical situation desperate, where Sudanese authorities systematically block the delivery of aid in some areas, while the RSF loot health facilities and supplies. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has warned the international community of the likelihood of further escalation of violence 'as the parties to the conflict arm civilians' – he explained – ‘and more and more armed groups join the fighting'.    A wall of silence? Despite humanitarian alarms, Sudan remains almost entirely absent from the news and global debate, both focused on the wars in Gaza and Ukraine: so far, international donors have allocated almost a thousand times more aid to Kiev than to Khartoum. To break the 'wall of silence' and reverse this trend, France organized an international conference in Paris that raised two billion euros. But it was precisely from the French capital that the director of Save the Children, Dr. Arif Noor, highlighted the shortcomings of international commitment: 'In the first 100 days of 2024' – Noor said – 'the amount of money raised for the humanitarian crisis in Sudan was less than a fifth of the funds allocated in just two days to rebuild Notre Dame Cathedral’. Noor has defined it as 'shocking to note that, after a fire in which no one died, donors have been so generous in funding the restoration of the Cathedral, while 14 million children are left to fend for themselves as war rages in the country, hunger and diseases increase, and schools have been closed for over a year.' Noor and other operators have urged world leaders to work directly with the warring parties to ensure respect for international law, in the context of a conflict characterized by widespread and documented violations against the civilian population, mutilations, and rapes, especially of young people. The wars within the war? On April 15, 2023, after fighting erupted in the capital Khartoum and violence quickly spread to western Darfur, some observers still hoped that the conflict could be contained. Optimists hoped that, as in previous wars in Sudan, the two parties would quickly reach a stalemate and reach a power-sharing agreement. A year later, we can say that the war has taken a completely different turn, fracturing into a myriad of local conflicts affecting various of the 18 provinces into which the country is divided, and intertwining in the country's complex ethnic mosaic, ultimately involving various militias and rebel groups, along with their foreign supporters. Currently, weapons and militias pour into Sudan from the borders with Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic, and through the Red Sea. According to various sources, mercenaries from Russia and Ukraine now support one militia or another, while competition for access to land and underground resources fuels the violence. And since neither of the warring parties can deliver the decisive blow, both the SAF and the RSF have begun to 'lose pieces,' creating rebel subgroups that in turn operate according to different agendas and interests. In this scenario, no one currently seems capable of restoring control over the entire Sudanese territory. 'We are plunging towards a failed state', observes Tom Perriello, American special envoy for Sudan, while after a year of war, the country witnesses the massive militarization of local communities, a dynamic that is unlikely to be reversed in the short term. The risk of famine? The country engulfed in violence also faces the risk of famine: according to the latest report from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), acute malnutrition will affect most of the country by June, killing half a million people. In the 'extreme' scenario predicted by the Clingendael Institute, up to a million people could die. Due to the war, much of Sudan, especially Darfur, did not yield crops in 2023. Grain production has plummeted while the price of basic food items has increased by up to 88%. These forecasts are expected to worsen as the fighting has now reached the country's 'granary,' the State of Gezira, and although the UN has yet to officially declare famine, few doubt that it is already underway in some parts of Sudan. Further complicating the situation is the fact that, except for a few dozen trucks transported with great difficulty, humanitarian aid does not reach conflict zones. International organizations have reported multiple obstacles, as well as the armed groups' desire to control everything entering and leaving areas under their control by improperly appropriating supplies to resell them on the black market. Currently, hopes that something will intervene to save the country from the abyss it is sinking into are minimal and are directed towards Cairo, where ceasefire talks are ongoing. A separate negotiation, supported by the United States, is expected to resume soon in Saudi Arabia, but a date has not yet been announced. The comment by Lucia Ragazzi, ISPI Africa Program "After the initial weeks since its dramatic beginning in April 2023, the war in Sudan suffered from low priority in the international agenda. However, its consequences continued to manifest in the country and neighboring countries with dramatic intensity. On the one-year anniversary of the war's start, the international conference in Paris has rekindled attention on this serious conflict, taking a step forward to address the severe funding shortfall needed to address the crisis. Increased aid is crucial for a conflict that has already generated the most severe refugee and displacement crisis in the world, risking also becoming the largest food emergency. But, as highlighted by United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, 'beyond global support for aid, there is a need for concerted and global push for a ceasefire, followed by a peace process.'"