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Defense & Security
Toronto, Canada - February 17 2024 Trump says he has spoken to Putin and agreed to negotiate Ukraine ceasefire

Ukrainian war: self-proclaimed winners and real losers

by Cyrille Bret

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Does the resolutely pro-Moscow approach of the new team in Washington mean that Russia is the big winner in the Ukrainian war at this stage? That Ukraine will have resisted for three years for (almost) nothing? That the United States will reap the long-term benefits of this strategic position in Europe? And will the EU be marginalized and reduced to a secondary role on its own continent? Visible success should not obscure the strategic setbacks of the self-proclaimed winners. Ever since the second Trump administration unilaterally opened direct and exclusive talks with Russia on the fate of Ukraine in Saudi Arabia on 18 February, MAGA communicators everywhere have heralded the end of the conflict. Even if a simple ceasefire now seems highly unlikely, the new American president proclaims that he will soon lead the "peace side" to victory, since he claims to be its leader. Who knows if he will have the courage to apply for the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize himself? After three years of war, if the terms of negotiation announced last week are confirmed, we must return to the essential question of victory and the corollary question of defeat: who can claim the title of victor in this armed conflict? And, conversely, who is to be condemned to the status of the vanquished? The war of narratives has long since doubled and intensified the military war: European geopolitics is now confronted with a viral narrative that portrays Russia and the United States as winners to relegate Europeans and Ukrainians to the status of "losers". But if geopolitics feed on narratives, narratives - especially propaganda narratives - do not exhaust the strategic situation. As Machiavelli noted in Chapter XVII of The Prince: "The politician knows how to create illusions, but when it comes to assessing the strengths and weaknesses of an enemy, he must avoid relying solely on his eyes (which judge appearances) and instead use his hands (which feel reality). Let us be clear: at this stage of Ukraine debate, the reality of victory and the irreversibility of defeat are still matters of narrative. Let us plunge into reality. Ukraine, now vilified and resilient According to the Trumpian narrative broadcast everywhere today, Ukraine and its president must be treated as losers, even defeated. Everything about the behaviour of the American president and his team is aimed at hastening and consecrating the country's defeat: After having been asked to surrender its rare earth resources at rock-bottom prices, Ukraine, like the vanquished in the two world wars, is being excluded from the negotiating table on its own destiny by its self-appointed protector; its legitimate government is being openly denigrated and its legitimacy undermined; it is even being threatened with "war sanctions" to compensate the United States for the financial effort it has made to support it in the face of an illegal invasion. Beneath the strategic shift and the military evasion lies a continuity: for the United States, Ukraine is not a participant but a stake. Ukraine's symbolic defeat - that of history - is obviously compounded by its real setbacks. In addition to the 80,000 to 120,000 soldiers killed on the battlefield, the country of forty-three million people has lost more than six million refugees and millions of citizens who have been incorporated into the Russian Federation. And more than 20% of its territory is now in danger of officially falling under Russian sovereignty. Deprived by the Trump administration of the prospect of NATO membership, it risks a demilitarization comparable to that imposed on Germany after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. At a time when symbolic defeat seems destined to go hand in hand with human and material misery, Ukraine can only save itself from despair by remembering that it has manifested its national identity - so often denied - with arms in hand. The narrative is that of a failed, slaughtered state, while the strategic reality is that of a state that has repelled the total occupation of its territory. The Ukrainians may not be the winners, but they are not "losers" reduced to an international minority. The United States, strategically discredited Can Washington, for its part, claim the trophy of strategic victory in Ukraine? Is the second Trump administration not determining the destiny of the old continent just as the Biden administration claimed to do, but in a different direction? Can't the United States now, more than ever, claim to be Europe's arbiter? Nothing is less certain: Ukraine's policies over the past decade (the Obama, Trump 1, and Biden administrations) have indeed demonstrated the United States' refusal to play a leadership role in Europe. They encouraged Ukraine's inflexibility towards Russia but failed to prevent it from annexing Crimea in 2014, escalating tensions under the first Trump administration, and then invading in 2022. It then supported it for almost three years, only to disown it in a political transition. Washington has behaved not as a leader but as an arsonist in Ukraine, declaring on the one hand that Kyiv should be free to pursue its alliance policy but ruling out any concrete prospect of NATO membership on the other. One of the main lessons of Washington's Ukraine policy is that being one of the United States' "allies" is a risky business: not only does it leave you at the mercy of sudden shifts in alliances, but it also exposes you to constant admonishment and vilification on the international stage. The Europeans have paid the price: criticized by the Biden administration for their pacifism at the start of the war, they are now being criticized, along with the Ukrainians, for failing to bring the war to an end. The United States has made no major strategic gains in this war: it has undermined its own network of allies, damaged its largest military alliance in the world, NATO, and failed to dislodge its strategic regional rival, Russia. Trump's communication tricks will not change this: the United States has suffered undeniable structural strategic setbacks in this conflict. The long Ukrainian crisis, from the Orange Revolution to the current talks, via Euromaidan and the annexation of Crimea, is the opposite of a show of strength for US international strategy: it is a financially costly and strategically ruinous fiasco. The contamination effect on Asian alliances is likely to be massive and rapid: who will want to rely on the American umbrella against the People's Republic of China? Russia, permanently "de-Europeanized What about Russia? Is it the big winner in all this? After all, hasn't it received the promise of Ukraine's non-membership of NATO, its demilitarization, and its transformation into a rump state between Russian and EU territory? In addition to the 20% of Ukrainian territory (population and natural resources) it has seized, it wants to enjoy the prestige of being treated as a strategic peer by the United States. But is this a victory, even a Pyrrhic one? In historical terms, Moscow has lost in just a few years all the investment it made in its dialogue with the West between 1990 and 2000. It has deliberately squandered its relations with its natural economic outlet: Europe. Russia has been permanently de-Europeanized and will pay the price of this divorce in the form of lower growth potential (loss of markets, investors, assets) and in the form of a substantial defence effort that it will have to maintain in the long term throughout its western part, unless political forces favorable to it come to power simultaneously in the main EU countries, which seems unlikely. Again, we must measure this success with our hands, not our eyes: Russia has not achieved all its war aims, far from it. It did not make Ukraine disappear, and it did not make NATO retreat. Will this strategic hiatus - deliberately pursued by Russia in this war - be compensated for by a successful "pivot to Asia"? At best, the People's Republic of China could give Russia the role of "brilliant second" that Prussia gave Austria-Hungary. It is not so much a Pyrrhic victory as a strategic gamble that China has taken, the payoff of which is neither certain nor substantial. The EU faces up to its responsibilities Despite the condescending statements of the second Trump administration, can the EU claim to have made any strategic gains in this war? Again, the gains are meagre and the costs high: it has made great strides in terms of its capabilities but has not moved into a war economy; it is supporting the Ukrainian state at arm's length but has not forced its way to the negotiating table. If it proves reactive and creative, it can, in the medium term, take advantage of the gaping holes left by Russia and the United States on the European scene. As a result, it can no longer attract states to its side without the threat of arms. The Union must therefore quickly resume its enlargement efforts in order not to leave any space on its doorstep. On the other hand, the United States has openly renounced its status as Europe's protector: it wants to be its ideological dynamo, its industrial and technological supplier, and its strategic dominator. If Europe does not want to be among the losers in the Ukrainian war, it must therefore resolutely take full responsibility for its own defence. The time has come.

Defense & Security
Unite State, Russia ,china and Ukraine on chessboard. High quality photo

Opinion – Ukraine’s Future Is Not in Its Own Hands

by Mazlum Özkan

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine is no longer in control of its own war; great power politics have overtaken its struggle for sovereignty, as seen in its exclusion from key diplomatic negotiations and its increasing reliance on external military and economic aid. While Kyiv fights for survival, the U.S. and Russia pursue larger strategic goals, reshaping the global order. This is not a war of democracy versus autocracy—it is a battle over power and influence, with Ukraine caught in the middle. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022, the U.S. has framed the war as a defense of democracy, shaping public perception and policy decisions by justifying increased military aid and economic sanctions against Russia. This framing has also strengthened NATO cohesion and rallied Western support for Ukraine, though critics argue it oversimplifies the conflict’s geopolitical realities. But this narrative masks a deeper reality: a geopolitical contest over Eastern Europe’s balance of power. The U.S. strengthens NATO to contain Russia; Russia fights to keep Ukraine in its orbit. As a result, Ukraine’s ability to act independently is shrinking. At the core of the conflict is a long-standing power struggle between Washington and Moscow. The U.S. aims to maintain dominance over European security, while Russia seeks to dismantle the post-Cold War order that placed NATO on its borders. The Kremlin has repeatedly warned that Ukraine’s Western alignment is a red line, but U.S. policymakers have dismissed these concerns as revisionist grievances rather than legitimate security threats. This deadlock has turned Ukraine into the focal point of an escalating power struggle. For Russia, the war is not just about territory—it is about status. Vladimir Putin frames the conflict as a defense against Western encirclement, citing NATO’s expansion and U.S. military aid to Kyiv as provocations. Moscow’s broader goal is to force a realignment in European security, one that recognizes Russia’s sphere of influence and weakens U.S. hegemony. Under Joe Biden, the U.S. provided billions in military and economic aid to Ukraine, arguing that supporting Kyiv was essential for upholding the liberal order. However, as the war drags on and domestic concerns over foreign spending grow, this approach is being reassessed. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, U.S. policy has shifted toward a transactional approach, a shift that became evident when he excluded Ukraine from recent U.S.-Russia negotiations in Saudi Arabia, dismissal of NATO allies’ calls for a unified stance against Russia, and willingness to negotiate directly with Vladimir Putin—effectively sidelining Kyiv from key discussions that will determine its future. His strategy prioritizes economic agreements over direct military support, shifting U.S. engagement toward a pragmatic recalibration of interests. This shift was further highlighted during the recent confrontation between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House. The meeting, originally intended to finalize a U.S.-Ukraine rare-earth minerals deal, devolved into a heated exchange. Trump accused Zelenskyy of being “disrespectful” and “gambling with World War III,” revealing deep fractures in U.S.-Ukraine relations. The cancellation of a planned joint press conference underscored the breakdown in diplomatic relations, signaling that Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations with Washington is diminishing. The Trump administration’s treatment of Zelenskyy serves as a stark warning to smaller nations reliant on Western support. It highlights the precarious nature of alliances based on strategic convenience rather than genuine commitment to democratic values or sovereignty. Ukraine, once a symbol of Western resolve against Russian aggression, is now being subjected to political maneuvering that undermines its struggle for self-determination. The world is witnessing how great powers prioritize their own interests above the survival of their supposed allies, reinforcing the notion that smaller states can never fully trust the policies of global hegemons. This behavior is not just characteristic of Trump and his administration but is a fundamental aspect of how great powers operate. They perceive their own interests and ideological positions as superior to those of smaller nations, imposing their will under the guise of strategic necessity. The treatment of Ukraine illustrates this dynamic vividly—portraying Ukraine’s justified struggle for sovereignty as though it were a reckless endeavor rather than an existential fight against aggression. The U.S. and its allies, despite claiming to defend Ukraine, have manipulated its war effort for their own geopolitical advantage while simultaneously blaming Ukraine for the very crisis it was forced into. Trump recently emphasized this approach in a statement following a meeting with President Emmanuel Macron at the G7 Summit. He highlighted a proposed “Critical Minerals and Rare-Earths Deal” between the U.S. and Ukraine, describing it as an “Economic Partnership” aimed at recouping American investments while aiding Ukraine’s economic recovery. Simultaneously, he revealed discussions with President Vladimir Putin regarding an end to the war and potential U.S.-Russia economic cooperation, signaling a shift away from military support toward economic and diplomatic agreements. However, tensions flared when Trump and Vice President JD Vance berated Zelenskyy during his February 28 visit, accusing him of ingratitude and pressuring him into a peace deal on U.S. terms. The heated exchange led to the cancellation of a joint press conference and minerals deal signing ceremony. Zelenskyy left the White House abruptly, further deepening the rift between Ukraine and its supposed ally. The public fallout reinforced how great powers prioritize their own strategic interests over the sovereignty of smaller nations, leaving Ukraine increasingly sidelined in decisions that determine its fate. As global power struggles intensify, Ukraine finds itself increasingly excluded from decisions about its own future. Kyiv remains committed to its defense, but external actors—Washington and Moscow—are negotiating their interests over Ukraine’s fate. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s exclusion from key diplomatic discussions, such as the Saudi-hosted talks, underscores this reality. While Biden framed Ukraine as a vital partner in the West’s struggle against Russia, Trump’s approach suggests that Kyiv’s role may be reduced to a bargaining chip in a larger geopolitical realignment.  The Ukraine crisis illustrates the brutal calculus of great power politics, where smaller states become instruments of broader strategic struggles. The U.S.-Russia rivalry has dictated the war’s course, with shifting U.S. policies—from Biden’s interventionism to Trump’s pragmatism—reshaping its trajectory. As Washington and Moscow explore possible diplomatic realignments, Ukraine’s sovereignty risks becoming secondary to great power interests. Great powers dictate the terms of war and peace, leaving Ukraine with fewer choices of its own. The question is not whether Ukraine will survive, but under whose terms it will exist. The text of this work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.  For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

Defense & Security
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks at his annual press conference. Moscow, Russia 14.12.2023.

Russia’s shrinking world: The war in Ukraine and Moscow’s global reach

by Ronald H. Linden

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russia President Vladimir Putin sent a guarded message of congratulations to Donald Trump on inauguration day, but then held a long direct call with his “dear friend,” Chinese leader Xi Jinping. From Putin’s perspective, this makes sense. Russia gets billions of dollars from energy sales to China and technology from Beijing, but from Washington, until recently, mostly sanctions and suspicion. Moscow is hoping for a more positive relationship with the current White House occupant, who has made his desire for a “deal” to end the Ukraine war well known. But talk of exit scenarios from this 3-year-old conflict should not mask the fact that since the invasion began, Putin has overseen one of the worst periods in Russian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Transatlantic unity The war in Ukraine has foreclosed on options and blunted Russian action around the world. Unlike the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the 2022 invasion produced an unprecedented level of transatlantic unity, including the expansion of NATO and sanctions on Russian trade and finance. In the past year, both the U.S. and the European Union expanded their sanction packages. And for the first time, the EU banned the re-export of Russian liquefied natural gas and ended support for a Russian LNG project in the Arctic. EU-Russian trade, including European imports of energy, has dropped to a fraction of what it was before the war.   The two Nordstrom pipelines, designed to bring Russian gas to Germany without transiting East Europe, lie crippled and unused. Revenues from energy sales are roughly one-half of what they were two years ago.   At the same time, the West has sent billions in military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, enabling a level of resilience for which Russia was unprepared. Meanwhile, global companies and technical experts and intellectuals have fled Russia in droves. While Russia has evaded some restrictions with its “shadow fleet” – an aging group of tankers sailing under various administrative and technical evasions – the country’s main savior is now China. Trade between China and Russia has grown by nearly two-thirds since the end of 2021, and the U.S. cites Beijing as the main source of Russia’s “dual use” and other technologies needed to pursue its war. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has moved from an energy-for-manufactured-goods trade relationship with the West to one of vassalage with China, as one Russia analyst termed it. Hosting an October meeting of the BRICS countries – now counting 11 members, including the five original members: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – is unlikely to compensate for geopolitical losses elsewhere. Problems at home... The Russian economy is deeply distorted by increased military spending, which represents 40% of the budget and 25% of all spending. The government now needs the equivalent of US$20 billion annually in order to pay for new recruits. Russian leaders must find a way to keep at least some of the population satisfied, but persistent inflation and reserve currency shortages flowing directly from the war have made this task more difficult. On the battlefield, the war itself has killed or wounded more than 600,000 Russian soldiers. Operations during 2024 were particularly deadly, producing more than 1,500 Russian casualties a day. The leader who expected Kyiv’s capitulation in days now finds Russian territory around Kursk occupied, its naval forces in the Black Sea destroyed and withdrawn, and one of its own generals assassinated in Moscow. But probably the greatest humiliation is that this putative great power with a population of 144 million must resort to importing North Korean troops to help liberate its own land. ...and in its backyard Moscow’s dedication to the war has affected its ability to influence events elsewhere, even in its own neighborhood. In the Caucasus, for example, Russia had long sided with Armenia in its running battle with Azerbaijan over boundaries and population after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow has brokered ceasefires at various points. But intermittent attacks and territorial gains for Azerbaijan continued despite the presence of some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers sent to protect the remaining Armenian population in parts of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. In September 2023, Azerbaijan’s forces abruptly took control of the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh. More than 100,000 Armenians fled in the largest ethnic cleansing episode since the end of the Balkan Wars. The peacekeepers did not intervene and later withdrew. The Russian military, absorbed in the bloody campaigns in Ukraine, could not back up or reinforce them. The Azeris’ diplomatic and economic position has gained in recent years, aided by demand for its gas as a substitute for Russia’s and support from NATO member Turkey. Feeling betrayed by Russia, the Armenian government has for the first time extended feelers toward the West — which is happy to entertain such overtures. Losing influence and friends Russia’s loss in the Caucasus has been dwarfed by the damage to its military position and influence in the Middle East. Russia supported the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad against the uprisings of the Arab Spring in 2011 and saved it with direct military intervention beginning in 2015. Yet in December 2024, Assad was unexpectedly swept away by a mélange of rebel groups. The refuge extended to Assad by Moscow was the most it could provide with the war in Ukraine having drained Russia’s capacity to do more. Russia’s possible withdrawal from the Syrian naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Khmeimim would remove assets that allowed it to cooperate with Iran, its key strategic partner in the region. More recently, Russia’s reliability as an ally and reputation as an armory has been damaged by Israeli attacks not only on Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon and Syria, but on Iran itself. Russia’s position in Africa would also be damaged by the loss of the Syrian bases, which are key launch points for extending Russian power, and by Moscow’s evident inability to make a difference on the ground across the Sahel region in north-central Africa. Dirty tricks, diminishing returns Stalemate in Ukraine and Russian strategic losses in Syria and elsewhere have prompted Moscow to rely increasingly on a variety of other means to try to gain influence. Disinformation, election meddling and varied threats are not new and are part of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. But recent efforts in East Europe have not been very productive. Massive Russian funding and propaganda in Romania, for example, helped produce a narrow victory for an anti-NATO presidential candidate in December 2024, but the Romanian government moved quickly to expose these actions and the election was annulled. Nearby Moldova has long been subject to Russian propaganda and threats, especially during recent presidential elections and a referendum on stipulating a “European course” in the constitution. The tiny country moved to reduce its dependency on Russian gas but remains territorially fragmented by the breakaway region of Transnistria that, until recently, provided most of the country’s electricity. Despite these factors, the results were not what Moscow wanted. In both votes, a European direction was favored by the electorate. When the Transnistrian legislature in February 2024 appealed to Moscow for protection, none was forthcoming. When Moldova thumbs its nose at you, it’s fair to say your power ranking has fallen. Wounded but still dangerous Not all recent developments have been negative for Moscow. State control of the economy has allowed for rapid rebuilding of a depleted military and support for its technology industry in the short term. With Chinese help and evasion of sanctions, sufficient machinery and energy allow the war in Ukraine to continue. And the inauguration of Donald Trump is likely to favor Putin, despite some mixed signals. The U.S. president has threatened tariffs and more sanctions but also disbanded a Biden-era task force aimed a punishing Russian oligarchs who help Russia evade sanctions. In the White House now is someone who has openly admired Putin, expressed skepticism over U.S. support for Ukraine and rushed to bully America’s closest allies in Latin America, Canada and Europe. Most importantly, Trump’s eagerness to make good on his pledge to end the war may provide the Russian leader with a deal he can call a “victory.” The shrinking of Russia’s world has not necessarily made Russia less dangerous; it could be quite the opposite. Some Kremlin watchers argue that a more economically isolated Russia is less vulnerable to American economic pressure. A retreating Russia and an embattled Putin could also opt for even more reckless threats and actions – for example, on nuclear weapons – especially if reversing course in Ukraine would jeopardize his position. It is, after all, Putin’s war. All observers would be wise to note that the famous dictum “Russia is never as strong as she looks … nor as weak as she looks” has been ominously rephrased by Putin himself: “Russia was never so strong as it wants to be and never so weak as it is thought to be.”

Defense & Security
Paris Hosted a Trilateral Meeting Between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Trump on 7 December 2024

Unpacking Trump’s Proposals for Ukraine

by Andrey Kortunov

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Finally, after many leaks, hints, intimations and procrastinations, US President Donald Trump might have come up with something a bit more specific than his initial general promises to put an end to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 24 hours. For the first time a draft of his peace plan is on the table. The plan was revealed by various Ukrainian and European media last week and though it has never been officially confirmed by the White House or the State Department, there are reasons to believe that we indeed observe a gradual shaping of the new Administration’s position on arguably the most destructive and dangerous military conflict of our times. However, the devil is always in details. Let us have a closer look at what Trump has or may have in mind. Ceasefire According to the plan, the peace process should start with Presidents Putin and Zelensky having an urgent phone call followed by a face-to-face meeting no later than in the end of February or in the beginning of March. A complete ceasefire along the present line of contact should be in place by the day of 2025 Christian Easter (April 20) and European peacekeeping units will be asked to police a demilitarized zone separating the two sides (American troops will not have their boots on the ground). Shortly after that, by the time of the 80-year anniversary of the V-day in Europe (May 9), a comprehensive peace agreement should be signed and, if needed, ratified by the parties to the conflict. This is an exceptionally bold and ambitious time-table, but is it nonetheless realistic? First, it would be quite a challenge even to make Putin and Zelensky directly talk to each other. In fall of 2022, the Ukrainian President signed a special executive order forbidding himself engaging in any direct negotiations with his Russian counterpart. On the Russian side, there are serious doubts about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian leader since his term in power already expired in May of 2024 and no national elections have been held after that. More importantly, it would be very hard to enforce the ceasefire, if and when such a ceasefire is reached. The experience of the Minsk Agreement implementation and international monitoring is not very reassuring, and the line of contact today is much longer than it was back in 2015. To put together a well-trained and properly equipped international monitoring mission of tens of thousands uniformed men and women would be next to impossible, at least within the time framework suggested by the US Administration. Needless to say, Russia would hardly accept a EU/NATO peacekeeping mission on its territory. Territorial compromises Trump apparently suggests that both sides should stick to the territories that they now have under their control. This idea logically implies a demand for Kyiv to accept Russian sovereignty on the parts of the four former Ukrainian regions as well as on the Crimean Peninsula that was reunited with the Russian Federation eleven years ago after the referendum of March, 2014. The Ukrainian side should also withdraw from the Russian territories in the Kursk region that it currently occupies. In exchange Russia should stop its ongoing offensive in Donbass and limit its territorial acquisitions to what it already has in its possession. This proposal is clearly not exactly what either Kyiv or Moscow would like to see as the final peace settlement. In Ukraine, they still hope that at some point thy will be in a position to restore the territorial integrity of the country including what they lost back in 2014—namely, parts of Eastern Donbass and Crimea. The Russian leadership, in its turn, intends to capture at least all the remaining territories of the four regions that it does not fully control now (Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye) and maybe even to advance further West. (Kharkov, Odessa and so on). To reach a compromise between these two positions would be truly a formidable task. Future status of Ukraine According to Donald Trump, Ukraine should not become a NATO member—at least, in the foreseeable future. He remains skeptical about a possible Ukrainian contribution to the Alliance security, he does not want to enlarge the NATO’s zone of responsibility, and he does not want to cross Moscow’s red line on this very issue. However, Ukraine may still aspire to join the European Union before too long, and the United States is ready to assist Kyiv in meeting its European aspirations. A neutral status for Ukraine is something that many in Kyiv would lament and consider a serious setback, while many in Moscow would definitely appreciate and support. However, how can this neutrality be secured in the long term? After all, Ukraine has already been neutral; this status was explicitly stated in the very first declaration on Ukrainian sovereignty approved by the Ukrainian Parliament even before the Soviet disintegration and later on incorporated into the Ukrainian Constitution. And yet, since at least 2008 Kyiv was contentiously drifting away from this initial position; finally, the national Constitution was revised and the pro-Western Ukrainian political leadership started actively seeking membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. What would prevent future Ukraine from changing its mind once again in five or ten or twenty years from now, when neither Trump, nor Putin is around to stop it from moving in the NATO membership direction? Security guarantees Instead of offering Kyiv prompt NATO membership, Trump is ready to provide US security guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for getting for the US business a preferential access to valuable Ukrainian mineral resources—including natural gas, lithium, titanium and graphite. The United States will continue to assist Ukraine with military hardware deliveries till at least 2030, but these deliveries will no longer take form of charity—they should generate appropriate profits for the US defence sector and create jobs for American workers. This part of Trump‘s proposals remains highly ambiguous and unclear. What kind of security guarantees is the United States willing to offer Ukraine? Are we going to see US military bases on the Ukrainian soil or any other manifestations of the US military presence there? Is Trump ready to turn Ukraine into another Israel or another Japan? If this is the case, then does such an arrangement really differ a lot from a Ukrainian membership to NATO? Would Moscow easily accept a not-so-symbolic US military presence so close to its borders? The proposed US access to Ukraine’s natural resources also raises many questions. Ukraine indeed has repositories of valuable minerals (arguably amounting to USD 15 trillion of total value), but most of these repositories are located on the territories that are now controlled by Russia. Sanctions As an additional incentive for Moscow to demonstrate the needed flexibility, Trump offers Russia to lift economic sanctions as a part of the overall peace arrangement. He argues that the Western sanctions have a profound negative impact on the Russian economy, slow down Russia’s modernization and prevent the country from taking its rightful place within the international economic system. The prospect of lifting sanctions should therefore motivate the Kremlin to go for a reasonable compromise in order to put an end to the fratricidal conflict. This idea sounds great, but it seems that Trump offers more than he can deliver. First, Russia suffers more from the EU sanctions than from the US sanctions; the Russia-EU trade has always been significantly larger than the Russia-US trade. No US President can simply ‘order’ the European allies of the United States to completely reverse their current policy towards Moscow, even if the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is miraculously stopped. The odds are that the EU sanctions imposed on Moscow will be in place for a long time, even if the US sanctions are lifted. Second, even on the US sanctions lifting, Donald Trump is not that omnipotent. Some of these sanctions have been approved by the US Congress and have become national laws. To recall or even to ease them, one should pass an appropriate legislative decision on the Capitol Hill, which might turn out to be extremely complicated and protracted. Reconstruction of Ukraine Like in many other cases, Trump has absolutely no intention to spend large amounts of US taxpayer’s money on reconstructing such a distant land as Ukraine. Instead, the US President would like to impose this heavy burden on the European Union (exactly like he intends to impose the financial burden of Gaza reconstruction on the Arab Gulf states). The price tag of Ukraine’s reconstruction might amount to USD 500 billion, and EU should be prepared to annually allocate up to USD 50 billion for ten years. A part of the funding, however, can come from special duties imposed on Russia’s energy exports in exchange for lifting Western sanctions on the Russian hydrocarbons production. This part of Trump’s proposals is based on a number of arbitrary assumptions, which are hard to assess at this point. Nobody really knows how much the Ukrainian reconstruction will ultimately cost and how long time it will take. The actual financial capabilities of the European Union might turn out to be more modest than Trump apparently expects, especially given the fact that the US Administration’s wish list for Europe is not limited to supporting Ukraine only, but also includes more generous contributions to NATO, multiple trade concessions, more economic engagement in the Middle East and so on. Ukraine’s absorption capacity might turn out to be limited as well, given the present state of economic and administrative reforms, rampant corruption and the exodus of a large part of the county’s population to Europe. Finally, it is hard to imagine how Trump will convince Putin to pay duties on Russia’s energy exports, particularly when Trump remains committed to bringing the global energy prices down to the extent possible. European security So far, the Trump Administration has not been very prolific on how the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict should affect a more general problem of the European security. Still, this dimension of a potential agreement has to be kept in mind, if the idea is to provide for a lasting peace in the Euroatlantic space. Russian officials have stated more than once that the ongoing conflict is not just a clash between Russia and Ukraine, but rather a standstill between Russia and the ‘collective West’. That implies that any settlement should include a broader range of arrangements on the future European security architecture, such as multilateral confidence building measures, mil-to-mil contacts at various levels and even some forms of conventional arms control in Europe. The problem is that Trump has never been particularly interested in any meaningful forms of multilateralism including multilateral arms control or confidence building measures. Moreover, he has always been skeptical of any arms control, bilateral including, regarding it as an unnecessary and potentially even harmful way to limit the US abilities to outspend and to outperform all its adversaries and rivals. This is why during his first term in power Trump decided to abandon the US-Soviet INF Treaty, was not eager to extend the New START Agreement and decided to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. It is not clear how with such an attitude Donald Trump is planning to ensure that there will be no other dangerous crisis in Europe soon after a settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is reached. To sum up, it is definitely good news that Donald Trump has finally come with some kind of a peace plane for Ukraine. To have something to consider and to discuss is undoubtedly better than to have nothing and to speculate about what the White House may or may not offer. Still, the Trump plan in its current form is only half-baked. It might be the right first step, not much more than the very first step. A lot will now depend on the US Administration commitment, stamina, patience and its attention span. Peace talks are different from business negotiations that Trump is so used to. In business negotiation, you can accept failures to reach a good deal and you can move on to other opportunities, which you will always find around in plenty. In peace talks, failure is not an acceptable outcome. First published in the Guacha.

Defense & Security
Istanbul, Turkey - February, 24, 2022: Ukraine, Russia, NATO flag ripped paper grunge background. Abstract Ukraine Russia politics conflicts, war concept texture background.

NATO and the Russian Federation in Ukraine: The ongoing struggle

by Javier Fernando Luchetti

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction For some international analysts, the invasion by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, into the Republic of Ukraine, led by Volodymyr Zelensky, on February 24, 2022, was a surprise. This offensive was meant to conquer Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, and Kharkiv, the second-largest city in the country. However, the war that was expected to be quick and low-cost in terms of human lives, with an aura of liberation from the "neo-Nazi government" and the "Ukrainian oligarchy," turned into a much slower and bloodier conflict than the Kremlin anticipated. It is important to clarify that in 2014, the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula, which was part of the territory of Ukraine. Shortly after, pro-Russian rebels from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, supported by Moscow, began a popular uprising, leading to a civil war against Ukrainian troops. In 2019, when pro-Western President Volodymyr Zelensky came to power, clashes between both sides intensified. In February, before the invasion, Putin signed decrees recognizing the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine as independent states, accusing the United States (U.S.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of expanding eastward into Europe, pushing Ukraine’s membership in NATO, and threatening Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. During the first week of the war, the Ukrainian president ordered a general military mobilization to defend Ukrainian territory from the Russian advance, while both the U.S. and its European Union (EU) allies announced political and economic sanctions (energy, transport, finance) against the Russian Federation and the expulsion of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, which includes over 11,000 financial institutions from over 200 countries. This system, based in Brussels, Belgium, was created to facilitate fast and secure cross-border payments and relies on confidentiality, validity, and accessibility of information from participating members. Western multinationals sold their assets in Russia and canceled any partnerships with Russian firms. These measures took Putin by surprise, although thanks to his alliance with China for the sale of gas and oil, he was able to navigate the blockade. Price hikes hurt Russian workers, who saw their income decrease due to rising prices for essential goods. As stalled negotiations continued between the Russians and Ukrainians, Russian troops halted due to Ukrainian resistance, which received weapons and supplies from NATO. This work provides a brief description and analysis of the factors that led to the Russian Federation’s invasion of the Republic of Ukraine and its economic and political consequences for both countries, as well as the role of the U.S. and NATO in the conflict. This invasion is simply a continuation of the longstanding conflict between both countries, especially since the first decade of the 21st century due to territorial and geopolitical issues involving NATO, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Ukraine. In this regard, NATO expanded eastward after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), despite Putin’s warnings. 1. A crisis that began before 2022 In March 2014, a referendum against the opinion of Kyiv was held in Crimea and the autonomous city of Sevastopol, in which pro-Russian inhabitants, who were the majority, decided to join the Russian Federation. This referendum was not accepted by Ukraine, the U.S., and the EU, thus, Moscow incorporated Crimea into its territory, claiming that the peninsula had always been part of Russia. Meanwhile, in April, pro-Russian paramilitary groups took the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which are adjacent to Russia, with supplies and weapons from Moscow. By May, referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk declared the regions as independent republics, although they did not want to join the Russian Federation. The Minsk I Agreement, signed in 2014 between Russia and Ukraine under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), established a roadmap to end the civil conflict and normalize the status of both regions. It aimed for a permanent ceasefire, decentralization of power, the release of hostages, border monitoring with Russia, elections, improved health conditions, and the withdrawal of foreign fighters. The Minsk II agreement, signed in 2015, called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from both sides, pension payments to residents, the establishment of a sanitary zone, elections, prisoner exchanges, and the granting of autonomy to the region, allowing Ukraine to recover the border areas with Russia. Both agreements failed, and fighting resumed. Putin consistently claimed that Ukraine had no intention of implementing the agreements and had only signed them due to military losses, while for the U.S. and its allies, Putin always intended to recognize the independence of both regions, betting on the failure of the negotiations. 2. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Ukraine: The war between both countries Putin had warned months earlier that Western powers, led by the United States, should negotiate with him over the expansion of NATO eastward, which was affecting Russia’s security. Putin demanded that Ukraine not be forced to join NATO, arguing that such a move would not provide any security guarantees for Russia. However, the invasion was not unexpected, as weeks before there had been satellite images showing the deployment of Russian troops and armored vehicles: "Russia had also announced, albeit inconsistently and unclearly, that it would adopt ‘technical-military’ measures against Ukraine if its demands for security guarantees and neutrality regarding the Atlantic Alliance were not accepted" (Sanahuja, 2022, 42). Ukraine’s incorporation into NATO would mean that biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons could be stationed there, something the Russians deemed unjustified since the Warsaw Pact had disappeared in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR. What the Russian Federation sought, as the world’s second-largest military power, was to prevent missiles from pointing at its territory from Ukraine due to NATO’s expansion and U.S. militaristic intentions. The Russian Federation, as one of the key international actors, even as a state strategically involved across multiple continents, felt cornered and overwhelmed in its strategic interests. The Russians sought NATO guarantees to prevent further expansion and desired security at the old geopolitical style for their borders: "On other economic and strategic issues, the Russian state continues to control its vital areas. Corporations controlling hydrocarbons, aerospace, and infrastructure, among others, are state-owned" (Zamora, 2022). On the other hand, Russian nationalism, which considered Ukraine and Russia to be sister nations, has served as a justification for the invasion. Early in the century, Putin was closer to Western positions, but after seeing that his concerns about NATO’s expansion were ignored, he turned to Russian nationalism, seeking to create a ‘hinterland’ in the old Tsarist style, denying Ukraine’s status as an independent state and instead treating it as a historical product allied with Russia. Another reason for Putin to invade Ukraine was to defend the two “people's republics” in the Donbas region: Donetsk and Luhansk. The Russian Federation recognized both regions as "sovereign states" because they had never been granted autonomy. From Putin’s perspective, the invasion was based on the United Nations Charter, which stated that a country under a "genocide" by its government should receive help, as was happening in the two “sovereign states.” According to his view, the measures taken by the Russian Federation were related to Ukraine’s political indecision in controlling the paramilitary militias that were attacking the two independent republics. Due to the failure of the Minsk agreements, Russia was forced to intervene. Following this reasoning, before the Russian intervention, the U.S. and its allies had begun providing significant amounts of modern weapons, not only to rearm the Ukrainian military forces but also to give them the ability to invade Donbas. The Ukrainian army, along with intelligence services trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), constituted a risk for the pro-Russian population in Donbas, so despite Western warnings, the Russian Federation was compelled to intervene. To summarize, in the first phase, Moscow's objectives were to overthrow the “neo-Nazi” government of Kyiv (although this objective was sidelined later due to Ukrainian resistance and Western sanctions), prevent Ukraine from joining NATO to avoid missiles close to its borders, defend the pro-Russian population of Donbas, secure recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, and finally declare the independence of the republics of Luhansk and Donetsk, or, as happened later, hold referendums to annex these regions to the Russian Federation. However, the United Nations General Assembly thought differently from the Russian leader and approved in March the resolution 2022, A/RES/ES-11/1, for humanitarian aid in Ukraine, condemning “in the strongest terms the aggression committed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine” (article 2), demanding “that the Russian Federation immediately cease the use of force against Ukraine” (article 3), and calling for “the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” (article 4). At the same time, while reinforcing the military front, the Russian Federation economically cut gas supplies to Western European countries. What the war demonstrated was the adaptability of the Ukrainian military to fight under unfavorable conditions, using elastic attacks in different places with help from terrain knowledge, spies, and satellite images and drones provided by the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. aid approved by the government of Joseph Robinette Biden Jr. until 2023 reached 40 billion dollars through the Lend-Lease Act for the Defense of Democracy in Ukraine. (Sanahuja, 2022). On the contrary, on the Russian side, the underestimation of the resistance of Ukrainian armed forces, the "Special Military Operation," was compounded by the underestimation of Ukrainian national sentiment, combined with planning problems, tactical issues, supply and logistics challenges, and the low morale of soldiers who did not want to fight against Ukrainians, despite the Kremlin’s calls to battle the "oligarch and neo-Nazi cliques" running Kyiv’s government. Furthermore, ignoring the warnings from the West and Kyiv, Putin announced the annexation of the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, after the results of the referendums showed over 95% support for annexation to the Russian Federation. In response to the annexation, Ukrainian President Zelensky officially requested Ukraine's membership in NATO. This confirmed the definitive cutoff of gas supplies to Europe, causing concern in industries across various countries, especially in small and medium-sized enterprises. 3. The United States, NATO, and China Currently, China and India are the leading buyers of Russian gas, even more so than all of Europe, with discounts granted by the Russians. This demonstrates that the world is no longer unipolar, but multipolar, with the decline of Europe and the economic rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India. While the U.S. leads militarily and is economically stronger than Russia, it is less powerful than the PRC. Therefore, attacking a Chinese ally with nuclear weapons is weakening the PRC, which does not possess many nuclear weapons itself. The U.S. helped the disintegration of the USSR, and now it also seeks the disintegration of the Russian Federation, or at least a regime change, distancing Putin from power and ensuring that the new government is more friendly with the West. This is despite the initial intention of Putin during his first term to join NATO, a request that was denied, and the Russian help (accepting the installation of U.S. bases in Central Asian countries) that the U.S. received when it invaded Afghanistan, when both countries had the same enemies (the Taliban and Al-Qaeda). Although the Russian Federation has not been able to freely use its dollar reserves, as part of them were held in Western countries, it has also benefited from the rise in gas and oil prices, which it continued to export, particularly to the PRC, which has not joined the sanctions. These price hikes not only disrupted the global economy, generating inflation in NATO countries but also increased the prices of minerals and energy, harming capitalist countries and, paradoxically, benefiting the Russians as they sell these commodities. The Russian economy has resisted more than expected, and the ruble, which depreciated at the beginning of the conflict, has recovered. Those who suffered the consequences of the sanctions were the Europeans who import gas and oil. For the U.S. and its allies, the next enemy to defeat is China, as, according to them, global problems require global solutions. Additionally, China has been criticized for not sanctioning and condemning the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is considered a threat to peace by NATO because it seeks, through coercion and annexation, to establish a sphere of influence and direct control with conventional and cyber means, destabilizing Eastern and Southern European countries. If there was any semblance of autonomy by European countries towards the U.S., the crisis has shattered those efforts. Before the crisis, the U.S. complained that Europeans were not doing enough to maintain the alliance, specifically by increasing the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dedicated to defense. The Ukrainian situation has placed them under the U.S. wing, and that autonomy has vanished for the time being. With the election of Donald Trump as president, the situation in Ukraine enters a new phase. Although the Ukrainian president has stated that technical teams have been formed to address the issue of the war with the Russians, there is still no set date for a meeting. Trump also pointed out that Putin is destroying Russia after years of war, generating inflation and economic problems due to the lack of an agreement to end the conflict, although he did not provide specifics on a potential meeting with the Russian president. Trump has encountered a war whose resolution is clearly more complicated than he initially believed. However, from the Russian side, President Putin stated, “we listen to your statements about the need to do everything possible to avoid a Third World War. Of course, we welcome that spirit and congratulate the elected president of the U.S. on his inauguration,” which could be interpreted as an approach to the new administration (Infobae, 2025). The U.S. president, during his presidential campaign had announced that he would end the war in 24 hours, but then the deadline was extended to 100 days. However, now he is seeking a meeting with his Russian counterpart in the coming months, which has proven that the solution to the Russo-Ukrainian war is more complicated than it seemed. Trump has also threatened new sanctions on the Russian Federation if it does not sit at the negotiation table. He has also mentioned that he expects Chinese help to pressure Moscow to seek an end to the conflict. In summary, the U.S. president is more interested in solving internal issues like Latin American migration at the Mexican border than in addressing a war that has lasted almost three years. Final Comments The Republic of Ukraine has been used by Western powers to curb the anti-unipolar stance of the Russian Federation. To maintain Western predominance, the U.S. and allied countries have launched a struggle against the Russians, but through Ukraine, cooperating militarily, politically, and economically. The security policy developed by the U.S. in recent years has shown, on one hand, the growing military power with the maintenance of bases worldwide, from which they can attack or at least influence various countries to defend their interests. On the other hand, the use of this policy has led to the decline of the U.S. economy in the face of competition with the PRC, which has not only increased its GDP but also its productivity, foreign investments, and technological development. In other words, today, Russia is the main opponent, an ally of China, and later, it will be China. The U.S. foreign policy, which sought Ukraine’s membership in NATO, has led Putin to intervene militarily in an invasion in which he believed he would be received as a liberator but encountered fierce nationalist resistance, despite calling the Ukrainian leaders "neo-Nazis." The Russian response to NATO’s eastward expansion is related to security concerns. But they also point to the injustice committed by Western countries. According to the Russians, while they were sanctioned for the invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. was not sanctioned when it invaded Iraq, nor was NATO when it intervened in Libya. The U.S. considered the invasion as an attack on the international order and on American supremacy in the European continent, which is why they are intervening in Ukraine — to attack an invading power that seeks to recover its geopolitical role at both the regional and global levels, as it had during the USSR era. The outcome of the war remains uncertain, as the Ukrainians have invaded and occupied a large part of the Russian region of Kursk, where they have taken towns and prisoners to use as bargaining chips in future negotiations with Russia, while the destruction of infrastructure and the death toll continue to rise. References 1. -Infobae. (2022). Putin vuelve a jugar la carta nuclear y llama a falsos referendos para anexionar cuatro provincias de Ucrania. Buenos Aires. 21 de septiembre. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2022/09/21/putin-vuelve-a-jugar-la-carta-nuclear-y-llama-a-falsos-referendos-para-anexionar-cuatro-provincias-de-ucrania/2. -Infobae. (2022). Vladimir Putin anunció la anexión de las regiones ucranianas de Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson y Zaporizhzhia. Buenos Aires. 30 de septiembre. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2022/09/30/vladimir-putin-anuncio-la-anexion-de-las-regiones-ucranianas-donetsk-luhansk-kherson-y-zaporizhzhia/3. -Infobae. (2025). Trump dijo que Vladimir Putin está “destruyendo a Rusia” por no buscar un acuerdo de paz con Ucrania. Buenos Aires, 21 de enero. https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2025/01/21/trump-dijo-que-vladimir-putin-esta-destruyendo-a-rusia-por-no-buscar-un-acuerdo-de-paz-con-ucrania/4. -Luchetti, J. (2022). El papel de la Federación Rusa y Estados Unidos en la guerra ruso-ucraniana. 2° Congreso Regional de Relaciones Internacionales “(Re) Pensar las Relaciones Internacionales en un mundo en transformación”. Tandil. 28, 29 y 30 de Septiembre.5. -Luchetti, J. (2022). Rusia y la OTAN en Ucrania: la lucha por la supremacía en un país del viejo continente. XV Congreso Nacional y VIII Internacional sobre Democracia “¿Hacia un nuevo escenario internacional? Redistribución del poder, territorios y ciberespacio en disputa en un mundo inestable”. En, C. Pinillos (comp.). Memorias del XV Congreso Nacional y VIII Internacional sobre Democracia. Rosario. Universidad Nacional del Rosario, Facultad de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales, pp. 1098-1127. https://rephip.unr.edu.ar/handle/2133/260936. -Naciones Unidas. (2022). Asamblea General. Resolución A/RES/ES-11/1. Agresión contra Ucrania. New York. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n22/293/40/pdf/n2229340.pdf7. -Sanahuja, J. (2022). Guerras del interregno: la invasión rusa de Ucrania y el cambio de época europeo y global. Anuario CEIPAZ 2021-2022 Cambio de época y coyuntura crítica en la sociedad global. Madrid. Centro de Educación e Investigación para la paz, pp. 41-71. https://ceipaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/3.JoseAntonioSanahuja.pdf8. -Zamora, A. (2022). La multipolaridad contra el Imperialismo y la izquierda extraviada. Buenos Aires. Abril. https://observatoriocrisis.com/2022/04/23/la-multipolaridad-contra-el-imperialismo-y-al-izquierda-extraviada/

Defense & Security
Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence during a two-day meeting of the alliance's Defence Ministers at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on February 14, 2023.

Where is the transatlantic relationship heading?

by Florentino Portero

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The social dimension of the Alliance The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the organization created by the signatory states of the Washington Treaty to achieve the goals set by the Alliance, is an institution characteristic of the democratic realm, where governments depend on their respective public opinions when trying to establish a security policy. The people matter – and this is something we must keep in mind – when reflecting on their future. The simplest and most logical answer to the question posed in the title of this conference, the one that responds to common sense, is wherever its member states want. And this is the core of the problem. Do the allies have a common vision? Do they share interests as they did in 1949? Do they still believe they are a community united by their commitment to democracy? Is it reasonable to consider that they form a “collective defense system”? Without clearly answering these questions, it becomes very difficult to move forward with this analysis. We would be venturing into speculative territory. On the other hand, we cannot ignore reality, and this leads us to acknowledge that it is unlikely we will receive clear answers due to a set of considerations characteristic of the present time. The first refers to the lack of reliability of the State because of the high fragmentation of public opinion. Globalization and the Digital Revolution are causing social and economic changes that have led the population to distrust their political elites. Traditional parties are disappearing or losing seats, while new political forces emerge, questioning many of the paradigms we have been working with for years. The societies of the member states no longer have as clear a sense of the purpose of the Alliance as they did a decade ago, because there is confusion about what the actual risks, challenges, and threats they face are. The second is the absence of prominent figures with the authority to exercise leadership at the heads of the allied governments. We cannot ignore that in times of uncertainty, leadership is more necessary than ever, because in its absence, it becomes extremely difficult to shape a sufficiently common position among the citizens. The third is the empirical realization that the Alliance has not been able to manage the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine in a competent and professional manner. In the first case, the European allies decided to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty even though it wasn’t necessary, but wanting to show their solidarity with the state that had guaranteed their security for decades. However, on the battlefield, the vast majority shield themselves behind their ‘rules of engagement’ to avoid complicated situations. The goal was to comply with the United States more than to commit to victory. For its part, the United States was unable to maintain consistent objectives and strategy over time, which led to a humiliating defeat. What was the point of the waste of lives and money if, in the end, the same people returned to power? What was the point of the Alliance's technological superiority if it was defeated by poorly armed militias? In the second case, we have observed that despite the obvious incompetence of its armed forces, its limited capabilities, and its dire economic situation, Russia has managed to consolidate its control over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and continues to advance. For the average citizen, it is incomprehensible that, having committed ourselves to reclaim all Ukrainian sovereign territory and being much wealthier, our strategy has led Ukraine to the unfortunate situation it finds itself in. Why didn’t we offer them the weapons they needed from the very beginning? Why have we deprived them of the victory we formally committed to? The fourth is a derivative of the previous one. In this context, does it make sense for the citizen to trust the Alliance? Isn’t it understandable that they try to seek refuge within the national framework and fear that the Alliance, in the hands of unqualified people, will drag them into scenarios that are not critical to their lives? Whether we like it or not, the citizen's distrust in NATO is as justified as their intuition that only NATO can guarantee their security, which includes both their freedom and their well-being. What is the Alliance today? In circumstances as complex as those we are currently experiencing, it is virtually impossible for an organization composed of thirty-two member states to be a community committed to the defense and promotion of democracy. The mere reference to Turkey, Hungary, or Spain is proof of how far there are nations within it that are heading in a different direction. The evolution of European political systems points to a worsening of the situation rather than the exceptional nature of the mentioned cases. The community, as well as the idea that it constitutes a "collective defense system," falls within the realm of aspirations. The Alliance has been a “collective defense system,” and I have no doubt that there are allies who continue to act consistently with this idea. However, putting aside formalities, I believe that when assessing the transatlantic relationship, we must focus on its strict condition as an alliance. NATO is an asset that no one wants to lose, even though in its current state, it leaves much to be desired. Its strength does not lie in the common perception of the threat, the solidarity of its members, the available capabilities, or in sharing a strategy, which is clearly nonexistent. What makes its members want to keep it alive is the accumulated legacy after 75 years of shared experiences and the deep sense of insecurity in the face of the dual realization of a world undergoing profound change and poorly prepared national defenses from any point of view. Outside the Alliance, it’s even colder. NATO provides us with a starting point to try to react collectively, knowing that, in reality, except for the United States, no member state has the critical size to act as a "strategic actor." We have a history, an institutional framework, civilian and military bodies, doctrines, resources... that allow us to try to adapt without having to start from scratch. The European Perspective In recent years, the European states that are members of the Alliance have experienced the contrast between the claim that the European Union should assume the role of a "strategic actor" and the harsh, relentless reality of its impotence to effectively and competently address the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. In parallel, they have shifted from contempt for the United States, due to its erratic foreign policy and its inability to successfully complete its foreign initiatives, to seeking shelter once again under its military strength, considering the evidence of their own inability to understand international politics and act accordingly. It seems beyond doubt that the dynamics of the European integration process are heading towards the establishment of a federation. The transfer of sovereignty represented by the single currency was a milestone, marking the creation of "political Europe" through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, we are moving toward a single fiscal policy, with banking union, European monetary fund... ultimately towards the consolidation of an economic and monetary policy. Such significant common economic interests demand both a shared legal framework and a unified foreign policy. However, the factor of time plays a fundamental role. The passing of generations has allowed us to make progress, overcoming nationalist prejudices. Despite the formidable progress made, which is easily reflected in the recognition by young people that we live in a common cultural environment, the reality is that we are still far from forming what Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón referred to decades ago as a "European people." One thing is to delegate certain public policies to European institutions, and another, undoubtedly very different, is the exercise of actions that are characteristically sovereign. History and geography matter, and we must acknowledge that we have not yet formed that continental identity that would allow us to credibly face the formidable challenge of establishing a common foreign policy. The advantages of planning together and having the same capabilities are obvious, but above all, what matters is its viability. The Union is still not in a position to replace American leadership. This humbling realization transforms into a flow of energy in favor of the Alliance, assuming as inevitable the implementation of changes that allow it to adapt to a new international environment. For years, we have been aware that the Washington Treaty, and especially its Article 5, are anachronistic. The emergence of new domains – space, cyber, and cognitive – and the development of hybrid strategies challenge some of its foundations. Even so, we try to adapt without facing a reform of the treaty, in an exercise of understandable but risky caution. We are aware that the European theater is no longer the same as it was in 1949, that globalization and the "competition among great powers" in the race to win the "Digital Revolution" have shaped a considerably different scenario that we must integrate into, but we feel dizzy at the thought of leaving our own geographic zone, when we are not even in a position to effectively address our own problems. The American Perspective Since the creation of the United States, American society has lived with the contradiction between its isolationist vocation and its dependence on foreign trade. It fears becoming involved in the affairs of others at a high cost. However, the commercial dimension of its economy demands freedom of navigation, legal security, access to raw materials, and the ability to penetrate other markets, conditions that lead to an international role. From the First and Second World Wars, they learned that it was impossible to turn their back on what was happening in other countries, that they had to commit to international security, trying to establish an order that would guarantee their national interests. After years of involvement in international conflicts that seemed to have no end, isolationist and nationalist sentiment has grown, as a classic pendulum effect. In this context, it is understandable that the public debate openly questions its presence in the Atlantic Alliance. Is NATO a guarantee of the security of the United States? In the years immediately preceding the Madrid Summit, it was evident that the Alliance lacked a threat to unite it, a strategy to guide its steps, and capabilities that would allow it to carry out combined activities. It should therefore come as no surprise that since the second term of the Bush Administration, statements from senior officials have been warning of the dangerous drift of the Organization or threatening its withdrawal. There has been much talk about the low defense spending by many of the European allies. It is evident that without investment, there is no modernization, and without it, there is a technological disconnect that prevents the joint action of the armed forces of the different member states. However, what is truly concerning is what this implies in terms of abuse and disregard towards the United States. Hence, the heated reactions we receive from the other side. It is indecent that we spend on welfare, reaching levels that are unattainable for the average American, while we let them bear the cost of our security, both in economic terms and in human lives. As grave as, or even more than, the lack of investment is the absence of a shared vision and strategy, but it is understandable that the debate has focused on investment, an instrumental element. For European allies, increasing defense spending under the current economic circumstances will be as difficult as it is painful, but it will not be any less difficult or painful to reach an agreement that gives meaning to NATO's existence in the coming years. One of the few consensuses in the Capitol is to consider China as its main rival, around which all its economic, foreign, and defense policies revolve. In the Strategic Concept approved in Madrid, we can read that China is a “systemic challenge” for all of us. What policy have we derived from this categorical statement? Is there an Atlantic vision on this? It is hard to imagine that the Alliance can have a future if the states on both sides of the Atlantic do not reach a common position on how to engage with the great Asian power. In the same document, we find the statement that Russia is a “threat,” which does not align with statements from American leaders of both parties, though more from the Republican side than the Democratic one. It is neither acceptable nor responsible that, after the approval of such an important document, just two and a half years later, the United States acts as if the problem is not theirs. Putting formal aspects aside, is Russia a threat to the United States? To what extent does the behavior of the Moscow government in Eastern Europe affect U.S. national interests? Does it make sense for the United States to get involved in the war in Ukraine? Was Biden's behavior a reflection of a Cold War veteran, detached from the international circumstances of today? The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance was not the result of U.S. leaders in the early postwar years being convinced that the Soviet Union posed a threat to their national interests. On the contrary, they were fully aware that it did not. What concerned them was the extreme weakness of the European states, ravaged by a brutal war, the absence of a democratic culture, the high risk of totalitarian currents feeding off misery and uncertainty, and leading the Old Continent to a Third World War. European governments felt Soviet pressure. The area occupied by the Red Army was experiencing the extermination of representative institutions, Germany was torn between neutrality and partition, communist parties were gaining parliamentary positions in significant countries like France and Italy, supported by the prestige earned in the Resistance. For U.S. analysts, the European perception of the Soviet threat was exaggerated, but its effects could be concerning. The United States chose to engage in European reconstruction to prevent its drift towards fragmentation and totalitarianism, as the consequences of this drift could directly affect their national interests. They established a comprehensive strategy based on two pillars, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance. NATO has been and continues to be an instrument to guarantee cohesion and democracy on the Old Continent. The second Trump administration must resolve the tension between the isolationist demand of the citizenry, the need to create jobs on domestic soil through the erection of tariff barriers, the necessity of securing supply and distribution chains, and the consolidation of alliances or understandings between different regional blocs in response to Chinese initiatives. It is a set of contradictory actions wrapped in the populist demagoguery characteristic of our time, but which will require decisions in times marked by a succession of crises. Time for decisions An organization inhabited by officials does not need meaning to continue functioning. From 9 AM to 5 PM, qualified staff will move papers from one office to another, showcasing their professionalism and operational efficiency. However, it is important not to confuse NATO with the Alliance. The latter does need meaning, which is now in question. Whether we like it or not, the coming years will be crucial for its future. We will witness how the decisions made regarding a set of circumstances and debates will ultimately determine it, as well as the link between the two shores of the Atlantic. As happened at its origin, that link will go far beyond security, which is instrumental in consolidating that community which was the original aspiration and is now marked by its absence. The war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the central issue in the transatlantic relationship, as it brings to the negotiation table many of the fundamental issues that question its very existence. We are facing a continental conflict that arises after a Russian diplomatic attempt to reach an agreement on a new balance of power. Moscow's proposal demanded the withdrawal of U.S. units from areas bordering its territory and the removal of its nuclear weapons stationed in the Old Continent. Putin’s government felt threatened by NATO and the European Union's eastward expansion and demanded compensation. When it was not granted, it launched its third campaign on Ukraine and its fifth on territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. This is not a campaign that can be understood in a bilateral Russia-Ukraine logic, but rather as part of an effort by a revived Russian imperialism to reconstitute its historical sphere of influence. This invasion is not the first, and unless the Alliance acts wisely, it will not be the last. The role played by the Europeans has been disappointing. Their response to previous aggressions – Moldova, Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas – was the perfect example of how supposedly educated elites learn nothing from history. The French, Germans, and Italians collectively made the same mistakes as Chamberlain in Munich, thinking that the aggressor would be satisfied by acknowledging their right to aggression, when, in reality, they were encouraging them to proceed and prepare for new expansionist ventures. This attitude provoked the logical irritation and distrust in the Slavic-Scandinavian space, which was never deceived by the ongoing process under the Russian government. These powers refused to believe U.S. intelligence warnings about Russia's willingness to invade and reacted too late and poorly. All this, combined with the old problem of lack of investment in defense, made European armed forces ineffective and their industry powerless in responding to a demand for military capabilities in a short period of time. If the Europeans do not take their defense seriously, if they have become accustomed to parasitizing U.S. leadership, the frustration of their elites with their European allies is understandable. The Biden administration tried to use the Ukraine War to reconstitute the Alliance, but the strategy of attrition applied, renouncing victory out of fear of its political and military consequences, has led to a very high number of Ukrainian casualties and to public fatigue, which, following the Russian plan, is pushing through new political formations from both the right and the left to reach an unfeasible understanding with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. In the new international scenario, characterized by competition among great powers to achieve technological hegemony within the framework of the Digital Revolution, the United States needs Europe as much as Europe needs the United States. Russia does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, but it has become a vassal of China and an instrument of Beijing to weaken the cohesion of the Western bloc. The Trump administration must not fall into the temptation of turning its back on its allies, no matter how irresponsible and incompetent they may be, as this would cede ground to the rival. An even more protectionist policy could push European states, if not the Union itself, to seek alternative markets in China. A policy of greater withdrawal would encourage both division among continental powers and the pursuit of a middle ground between the two superpowers. What is at stake is much more than tariffs or investment in defense. What we will decide soon is whether we are a community or not, whether we face the challenges of a new era together, or if we choose separation. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States has valuable allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the Slavic and Scandinavian blocs. Attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine War could mean a victory for Russia by recognizing its right to alter Europe's borders by force, and the loss of trust from these allies, who are aware that even Trump would have fallen into the Munich trap, and despite his brash rhetoric, he would have ended up playing Chamberlain’s role. This would be a grave mistake for the United States, which, on the contrary, should rely on these countries to contain Russian expansionism and send a very clear message to Beijing about its commitment to updating and maintaining the cohesion of the Western community. Such an update would require allies, this time for real, to commit to defense investment and be prepared to use their capabilities when necessary. The Alliance needs a strategy. The concept approved in Madrid was merely the political framework to develop it. It is up to the Trump administration to lead its development in order to ultimately agree on what to do about the "Russian threat" and the "systemic challenge" posed by China. The Middle East crisis is unfolding in a scenario defined by two fronts established after years of diplomatic work: the "Abraham Accords" and the Axis of Resistance. Hamas’ aggression towards Israel has materialized in a harsh military campaign in the Gaza Strip, which has severely damaged the political and military capabilities of the Islamist group, and has extended to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is also suffering a heavy blow. In addition, Iran has seen its defense industry, anti-aircraft artillery systems, and, more limitedly, its nuclear network has suffered significant damage, while its intelligence system has been humiliated and degraded. In this context, despite the damage suffered by the Gazan population, the block formed by the Abraham Accords has remained cohesive, aware of Hamas' blackmail and the cost of yielding to it. On the other hand, Europe has presented itself as divided, lacking a strategic vision, not understanding that this was not a problem between Israelis and Palestinians, but an instrumental conflict aimed at undermining the regimes of Arab countries not aligned with the Axis of Resistance. Its criticism of Israel for the effects of its military campaign on the Gazan population consciously ignored both Hamas’ responsibility in turning them into human shields and the cost that accepting Hamas' blackmail would have had for all of us — Arabs, Israelis, and Europeans — if the campaign had not continued. How is it possible that we have so easily forgotten how the Axis powers were defeated? What would have happened in Europe during WWII if we had followed the European Union's demands during the Gaza War? The Middle East is a critical space for the Atlantic Alliance. It is understandable that the United States is frustrated with many of its European allies who, once again, have acted in a frivolous and irresponsible manner, unable to think in strategic terms. Israel has long chosen to turn its back on Europe, in response to a behavior it associates with a new form of anti-Semitism. The Arab bloc appreciates the European sensitivity to the suffering of the Gazan or Lebanese people, but it seeks security under the umbrella of the United States and Israel in the face of the Axis of Resistance, which poses a challenge of internal subversion, asymmetric warfare, and nuclear threat. A renewed Alliance needs to establish a strategy for the MENA region focused on containing Islamism and consolidating moderate regimes. China and Russia are taking advantage of the instability to infiltrate and hinder our missions. For them, instability on our southern front is a strategic objective, one that would fuel migration and insecurity, and with them, division within the Alliance and the Union. The Arab-Israeli bloc distrusts the United States due to its inability to maintain a strategy over time and does not rely on the Europeans. Only a firm stance from the Alliance in favor of this group of countries and against the Axis of Resistance could overcome this situation and guarantee both the cohesion of the Alliance and its authority in the region. The circumstances that led to the creation of the Alliance are behind us. They are history. However, today the Alliance is more necessary than ever. The circumstances have changed, but the community of values and interests remains the same, even though not everyone may understand this. Dissolving this community would be a grave mistake that would only benefit those powers whose goal is nothing more than to "revise" our legacy. Reviving it will not be easy. It will require political awareness and high-level diplomacy. Challenges that are impossible to achieve without leadership that matches the times. 

Defense & Security
8 November 2022 Vladimir Putin during a speech at the ceremony of signing agreements on the annexation of the DPR, LPR, Zaporozhye, and Kherson regions to Russia. Attribution to: Council.gov.ru (http://council.gov.ru/events/news/138807/)

Statement by the President of the Russian Federation

by Vladimir Putin

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President of Russia Vladimir Putin: I would like to inform the military personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, citizens of our country, our friends across the globe, and those who persist in the illusion that a strategic defeat can be inflicted upon Russia, about the events taking place today in the zone of the special military operation, specifically following the attacks by Western long-range weapons against our territory.The escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, instigated by the West, continues with the United States and its NATO allies previously announcing that they authorise the use of their long-range high-precision weapons for strikes inside the Russian Federation. Experts are well aware, and the Russian side has repeatedly highlighted it, that the use of such weapons is not possible without the direct involvement of military experts from the manufacturing nations.On November 19, six ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles produced by the United States, and on November 21, during a combined missile assault involving British Storm Shadow systems and HIMARS systems produced by the US, attacked military facilities inside the Russian Federation in the Bryansk and Kursk regions. From that point onward, as we have repeatedly emphasised in prior communications, the regional conflict in Ukraine provoked by the West has assumed elements of a global nature. Our air defence systems successfully counteracted these incursions, preventing the enemy from achieving their apparent objectives.The fire at the ammunition depot in the Bryansk Region, caused by the debris of ATACMS missiles, was extinguished without casualties or significant damage. In the Kursk Region, the attack targeted one of the command posts of our group North. Regrettably, the attack and the subsequent air defence battle resulted in casualties, both fatalities and injuries, among the perimeter security units and servicing staff. However, the command and operational staff of the control centre suffered no casualties and continues to manage effectively the operations of our forces to eliminate and push enemy units out of the Kursk Region.I wish to underscore once again that the use by the enemy of such weapons cannot affect the course of combat operations in the special military operation zone. Our forces are making successful advances along the entire line of contact, and all objectives we have set will be accomplished.In response to the deployment of American and British long-range weapons, on November 21, the Russian Armed Forces delivered a combined strike on a facility within Ukraine’s defence industrial complex. In field conditions, we also carried out tests of one of Russia’s latest medium-range missile systems – in this case, carrying a non-nuclear hypersonic ballistic missile that our engineers named Oreshnik. The tests were successful, achieving the intended objective of the launch. In the city of Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, one of the largest and most famous industrial complexes from the Soviet Union era, which continues to produce missiles and other armaments, was hit.We are developing intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in response to US plans to produce and deploy intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. We believe that the United States made a mistake by unilaterally destroying the INF Treaty in 2019 under a far-fetched pretext. Today, the United States is not only producing such equipment, but, as we can see, it has worked out ways to deploy its advanced missile systems to different regions of the world, including Europe, during training exercises for its troops. Moreover, in the course of these exercises, they are conducting training for using them.As a reminder, Russia has voluntarily and unilaterally committed not to deploy intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles until US weapons of this kind appear in any region of the world.To reiterate, we are conducting combat tests of the Oreshnik missile system in response to NATO’s aggressive actions against Russia. Our decision on further deployment of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles will depend on the actions of the United States and its satellites.We will determine the targets during further tests of our advanced missile systems based on the threats to the security of the Russian Federation. We consider ourselves entitled to use our weapons against military facilities of those countries that allow to use their weapons against our facilities, and in case of an escalation of aggressive actions, we will respond decisively and in mirror-like manner. I recommend that the ruling elites of the countries that are hatching plans to use their military contingents against Russia seriously consider this.It goes without saying that when choosing, if necessary and as a retaliatory measure, targets to be hit by systems such as Oreshnik on Ukrainian territory, we will in advance suggest that civilians and citizens of friendly countries residing in those areas leave danger zones. We will do so for humanitarian reasons, openly and publicly, without fear of counter-moves coming from the enemy, who will also be receiving this information.Why without fear? Because there are no means of countering such weapons today. Missiles attack targets at a speed of Mach 10, which is 2.5 to 3 kilometres per second. Air defence systems currently available in the world and missile defence systems being created by the Americans in Europe cannot intercept such missiles. It is impossible.I would like to emphasise once again that it was not Russia, but the United States that destroyed the international security system and, by continuing to fight, cling to its hegemony, they are pushing the whole world into a global conflict.We have always preferred and are ready now to resolve all disputes by peaceful means. But we are also ready for any turn of events.If anyone still doubts this, make no mistake: there will always be a response.

Defense & Security
japan,australia,usa and india friendship against china.Quad plus countries flags Quad plus countries flags over china flag.Quad plus countries. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Trump II and US Nuclear Assurances in the Indo-Pacific

by Liviu Horovitz , Elisabeth Suh

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.

Defense & Security
Paris, France, Europe, May 01, 2024, pro-Palestinian demonstrator at the Paris procession on May 1

Political Insights (8): European Positions on Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli War on Gaza Strip:

by Hossam Shaker

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Consistent with past behavior observed in previous instances of wars against Gaza Strip (GS), European capitals swiftly and predictably condemned the attack by Palestinian resistance forces on Israeli targets on 7/10/2023 in strong terms. This event was often portrayed with a clear bias towards Israel’s narrative, overlooking its background and context, and disregarding its military objectives, which primarily targeted Israeli occupation bases and barracks. Some European capitals took considerable time to reassess their positions and strive for a more balanced approach. Hasty Initial Positions In the first weeks of the war, political and media narratives in most European countries leaned towards portraying Israeli occupation as the victim, depicting the resistance’s actions as typical terrorist attacks akin to tragic events in Western countries. This narrative provided propaganda support to justify the brutal assault on GS. The aggression was justified by emphasizing “Israel’s right to self-defense,” echoing Israeli leadership’s claims of the resistance “using civilians as human shields,” all while neglecting international law and the safety of Palestinian civilians. Some European countries reacted vehemently during the genocidal war. They suspended aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for a period, then penalized the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) by withholding funding following Israel’s inflammatory accusations against the agency, only to later reverse these actions. Trends in European Positions Generally speaking, European positions during the GS war diverged along at least three lines, with relative differences in attitudes within each line: • Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other countries adopted an overwhelmingly pro-Israeli position that remained almost unchanged. • A trend that increasingly criticized the genocidal war and moved in a positive direction. This was evident in Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Malta, Norway and Slovenia. • A third trend avoided clear criticism without being at the forefront of partisanship, or vacillated in some positions, as in the case of France, which relatively modified its position in the second month of the war. These trends were evident in the positions on the ceasefire during the first months of the war, in voting behavior in international bodies, in taking punitive measures against the PA and UNRWA, and in the position on imposing sanctions on settlers. Implications of Positions on the European Union (EU) This divergence in positions has placed a burden on the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell to articulate a coherent position representing the Union during this war. Non-EU member states, such as Britain, have adopted positions aligned with the US, while Norway has expressed critical attitudes toward the war. The prolonged duration of the war, the exposure of its brutality, and the growing public and elite opposition to it have led to a weakening of support for the war within Europe and have encouraged the opposite front. The divergence in positions was evident in that the EU was only able to reach a joint resolution supporting a ceasefire in GS in March 2024. This came with great difficulty due to the intransigence of capitals overwhelmingly aligned with Israel, which obstructed this step for almost half a year of the war. European positions have been weakened and discredited due to their contradictions, particularly regarding the Ukraine war. Positions favoring a brutal genocidal war have severely tarnished the image of the concerned European countries. Germany was even brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after Nicaragua filed a lawsuit against it for “facilitating the commission of genocide” against Palestinians in GS via its arms exports to Israel. It is clear that the positions of many European countries are causing significant losses in terms of image, soft power and the privilege of moral guardianship that they once enjoyed as traditional defenders of “human rights” and “universal values.” These positions have also galvanized massive public protests within European countries, although these protests have not prompted significant political responses. Weaknesses in European positions have become apparent due to the lack of diplomatic initiatives from the EU or any of its member states, despite the active involvement of European actors across the region. Calls for a diplomatic solution, an end to the war or even statements advocating “restraint” have notably been missing from the primary European positions on the GS war. This omission can be attributed to the current alignment with the US administration and the influence of the prevailing support for the Israeli narrative of the war within Europe. Position on the Two-State Solution Merely expressing support for the “two-state solution,” pledging aid, and expressing concern for the humanitarian situation of Palestinians in Gaza Strip often serves as a superficial gesture, aligning more with the ongoing occupation and the devastating war on GS. These positions may also involve condemning Israeli “settler violence” in the West Bank (WB) and issuing threats of punitive actions against certain individuals, while simultaneously absolving the Israeli military of any accountability and deflecting criticism from the war on GS. The critical position toward Israel became evident through early voting behavior favoring a ceasefire in international forums, initiatives within EU bodies supporting this inclination, and the near-simultaneous recognition of the State of Palestine in Madrid, Dublin, Oslo and Ljubljana. This exerted pressure on other European countries, despite their customary declarations of support for the “two-state solution,” to reconsider their positions. However, major European capitals of influence, such as Berlin, Paris, London and Rome, still refrain from taking clear positions in pressuring Israel or recognizing the state of Palestine. Efforts to Contain War Expansion Since the war began, European capitals involved in decision-making have been eager to contain the war within GS. The prolonged duration of the war exerts pressure in this direction, particularly amidst concerns over potential escalation at the volatile Lebanese front and ongoing tensions and attacks near the Yemeni coasts and in the Red Sea region. European countries have taken noticeable steps in response, highlighted by French diplomatic efforts in Lebanon and the surrounding areas. Concurrently, European countries have refrained from participating in military maneuvers in the Red Sea, aligning themselves distinctively from US and British forces, thereby signaling a strategy to avoid direct entanglement in regional tensions. Western Strategic Polarization The positions of European decision-making centers have been notably influenced by the manifestations of Western strategic polarization in the wake of the Ukraine conflict, with Europe notably aligning with the US administration. Western powers seem to acknowledge the potential geopolitical ramifications of either losing the current war in GS or allowing it to escalate regionally. Moreover, the ongoing war serves as a significant test for the effectiveness of Western weapons, security and defense systems, particularly following the sudden blow on 7/10/2023. European parties’ concern for the strength of the Western alliance and transatlantic ties also motivates them to avoid weakening the position of President Joe Biden’s administration. Biden faces a challenging electoral test to renew his presidential term against Donald Trump, whose potential return to the White House raises concerns among Europeans. Conclusion Despite the mounting European criticisms of the Israeli occupation and the brutal genocidal war, the influential European position continues to refrain from imposing significant censure or punitive measures against Israel. Furthermore, it appears to align with the positions of its US ally on this matter, actively seeking harmony with them. However, Israel is increasingly posing a burden on Europe. While there is a gradual and hesitant shift towards greater recognition of the impossibility of Israel remaining above the law, along with an increased acknowledgment of the rights of the Palestinian people and the urgency to address them, this trend is becoming increasingly apparent. This is accompanied by waning confidence in the ability to overcome Palestinian resistance. Moreover, there is a growing unity among the Palestinian population in support of resistance, in the wake of the failure of the Oslo process and the pursuit of a peaceful solution.

Defense & Security
Russia versus the European Union, country confrontation concept, European Union flag versus Russian flag, conflict of interest concept

The new order will be with safeguards

by Timofey Bordachev

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском It is generally accepted that an international order is not the result of specific agreements, but the product of a common understanding of what can and cannot be done in relations between states. It is also generally accepted that all significant powers need to have relatively common ideas about why they recognize each other's right to exist and do not interfere in their internal affairs. In particular, the late Henry Kissinger wrote a lot about this, whose ideas were considered the standard of geostrategic thinking not only in the West, but also in our country. However, the coming times, apparently, will require a more creative approach to established views on how states can guarantee each other respect for basic interests and values. After all, it is the attack on them that always becomes the cause of conflict, as we are convinced by the example of the current military-political confrontation in Europe. In his speech at the UN Security Council, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that any agreement with the West on European security will have to contain "safeguards against unscrupulous interpretations." It is currently quite difficult to imagine what such safety catch might look like in physical terms, although the diplomats probably already have ideas on this topic. It can be guessed what the nature of such mechanisms should be. It is clear that the mechanisms should be aimed against the negative manifestations of the West's behavior. First, it is the West's desire to constantly create threats to others, as a central part of the global diplomatic game. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the physical ability to create such threats. The safety catches in this case are technical ways to ensure a situation where a state (or bloc) cannot change its behavior to hostile or take advantage of the omission in its selfish interests. Precisely cannot. Because "does not want" no longer works after, for example, Finland joined NATO. And the alliance itself simply trampled all the formal and informal principles on which they tried to build a security system in Europe after the Cold War. We see that not a single concluded then agreement works. The United States unilaterally withdrew from the main treaties on which the "rigid" framework of European security was based. NATO expansion to the east, in fact - the expansion of the territorial base of the American military presence in Europe - made all agreements in the field of conventional weapons meaningless. So, to come up with a new legal basis for peace in Europe is not a trivial task at all. And it remains to rely on the recognized skill of Russian diplomacy. A universal order that would suit everyone is unlikely now. It has always been relative before. However, in the century before last, there was at least a general idea among the leading powers about the principles on which the internal order in each of them should be based. Now it is difficult to think that Western countries will agree to recognize the right of Russia, China or other states to determine their own lives. First, any security order will inevitably be technical in nature, and not based on a common understanding of challenges and threats. This means that it will have little room for principles and a lot for specific parameters of how the West will not be able to threaten Russia's core interests. Russia's proposals at the end of 2021 already contained a fairly large number of such features of a functioning European security system. Apparently, they will have to return to them after the United States is ready to sit down at the table of serious negotiations. Much here will depend on how soon the understanding of the impossibility of continuing to pursue an irresponsible policy prevails in America itself. At least now, anxiety for the future of their country is heard in the statements of some American politicians. We will see to what extent their understanding that the reasons for the US difficulties relate to the internal situation can be translated into concrete decisions. Secondly, it is difficult to imagine that there will be a place for such a concept as trust in future agreements. Unfortunately, it is not available to all political systems without exception. We ourselves see how the Americans openly declare that any new administration can easily revise the agreements reached by the previous one. Continuity of policy is disappearing in the West – and this has always been the basis of stable diplomatic relations. Moreover, the modern world is extremely diverse. Trust is possible – as in the relations between Russia and China – in situations where both sides share a common understanding of the main threats. Russia and the West cannot have such a common understanding now. Simply because the entire surrounding world poses a threat to the United States and its satellites. And until Westerners can adapt to the new international reality, it will be quite difficult to take their words seriously. Therefore, trust in matters of European security should be based on the physical impossibility for the West to violate any agreements. And no one in Russia doubts that the desire to do so will periodically arise there. Thirdly, the legal basis for European security will most likely become broader. The situation in Europe has long ceased to be the business of the Europeans themselves. Especially since the positions of two powers with the largest nuclear weapons stockpiles in the world – Russia and the United States – directly touch here. Their indirect proximity is a concern for the entire world and has little to do with the affairs of Europe. It is no coincidence that the most adequate proposals for ending the armed confrontation in Ukraine are currently coming from China, India, Brazil, or even African countries. The Europeans, in turn, are not prepared to offer anything at all that would reflect objective reality. They are simply going with the flow. In other words, security in Europe is simultaneously a local and global problem. The broader international community itself must guarantee how the West will comply with its probable obligations. And finally, the technical aspects themselves could include things that have not been widely used in international practice before. For example, the complete or almost complete demilitarization of individual territories and entire states. Unfortunately, the practice of the last 30 years has shown that not all states can bear such a heavy burden as the right to independently determine the parameters of their defense policy. The Baltic republics of the former USSR, Finland or the same unfortunate Ukraine could live quite happily if their political elites were not tempted to use the conflict with Russia to retain power despite any economic difficulties. Then they would probably have to work better on internal development, fit into the world economy, and not turn into centers of instability. In other words, the countries that cannot play an independent role in determining regional security should be relieved of the physical ability to create problems for it. Perhaps such an experience will become more widespread in the future. At least because the risk of turning sovereign states into springboards for confrontation between great powers is too great. The main technical and legal parameters of the European security system have yet to be invented by diplomats and agreed upon by politicians. However, it is already clear from bitter experience that it is no longer possible to leave the situation here in a state of uncertainty – it is too threatening to universal peace and survival.