Subscribe to our weekly newsletters for free

Subscribe to an email

If you want to subscribe to World & New World Newsletter, please enter
your e-mail

Energy & Economics
Chinese yuan on the map of South America. Trading between China and Latin American countries, economy and investment

China-Latin America Green Cooperation and the Global Development Initiative

by Cao Ting

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract The global development initiative proposed by China aims to promote global sustainable development and has received support from many Latin American countries. At present, green cooperation between China and Latin America has achieved positive results in multiple fields such as clean energy, green agriculture, and green transportation. Latin American countries can become important partners for China to promote the Global Development Initiatives. However, in terms of green cooperation, China and Latin America also face some challenges. Both sides must strengthen consensus and achieve coordinated development in various fields. Sustainable Development and the Global Development Initiative The current international situation is turbulent and constantly changing, with a global economy that remains stagnant, while challenges such as geopolitical conflicts, climate change, and the food crisis are becoming increasingly intertwined and exacerbated. In this context, all countries around the world face the important task of promoting sustainable development and maintaining healthy economic and social growth. On September 21, 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping officially launched the Global Development Initiative at the United Nations, outlining a path toward a new stage of global development that is balanced, coordinated, and inclusive (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2021). The Global Development Initiative is aligned with the 2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and places climate change and sustainable development as key areas of cooperation, emphasizing the idea of harmonious coexistence between humanity and nature. Its goal is to promote stronger, more sustainable, and healthier global development, and to build a global community for development. The 33 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are a fundamental part of the Global South and, in general, place great importance on sustainable development, which has allowed them to achieve notable successes in the field of sustainable cooperation. In a context of great power competition and ongoing regional conflicts, the strengthening of sustainable cooperation between China and Latin American countries presents numerous opportunities, creating ample space to jointly advance in sustainable development. The concept of a sustainable economy evolved from the idea of sustainable development, with harmony between humanity and nature at its core and the goal of achieving long-term sustainability. This approach maintains that economic growth is not an unlimited or uncontrolled process but rather must be conditioned by the ecological environment’s capacities and the resource carrying capacity. The concept of a sustainable economy emerged in the late 1980s when British environmental economist David Pearce introduced it in his work “Blueprint for a Green Economy”, published in 1989. However, it was not until the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, that the sustainable economy began to receive greater attention and became a central concept in global development strategies. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), a sustainable economy is driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, improve energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystems. A sustainable economy has always promoted development goals that integrate economic, social, and environmental aspects. This respect for the environment and nature is closely linked to traditional Chinese worldviews. Since ancient times, the Chinese have developed ideas about following the laws of nature and protecting the ecological environment. In the classical text “Yi Zhou Shu Ju Pian”, it is recorded: "During the three months of spring, no axes are used in the mountains and forests, to allow plants to grow; during the three months of summer, no nets are placed in rivers and lakes." These ideas have been a fundamental part of the spiritual thought and culture of the Chinese people for over five thousand years, and through them, they have envisioned humanity and nature as an organic and indivisible whole. They represent the basic understanding of the relationship between humans and nature in ancient Chinese agricultural society, where coexistence and mutual promotion between people and the ecological environment reflected a dialectical relationship of unity. These ideas, full of deep wisdom, constitute an essential component of China’s rich cultural tradition. Consensus Base for Green Cooperation In 2021, the Global Development Initiative, aligned with the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda, established eight key areas of cooperation: poverty reduction, food security, industrialization, connectivity, pandemic response, development financing, climate change, and the digital economy. It also proposed key principles such as “prioritizing development,” “people-centered focus,” “universal inclusion,” “innovation-driven efforts,” “harmony between humanity and nature,” and “action-oriented approaches.” Latin American countries also place great importance on sustainable development and share numerous points of consensus with China on these principles. Currently, several countries in the region, including Peru and Colombia, have joined the “Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative.” This shared commitment to sustainable development between China and Latin America provides an important foundation for advancing sustainable cooperation. Particularly, China and Latin American countries have broad consensus in the following areas: 1. Prioritizing national development. Both China and many Latin American countries are developing nations and consider the promotion of sustainable development a crucial goal. President Xi Jinping emphasized in the report presented at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC): “The fundamental fact that our country is still and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism has not changed; our international status as the largest developing country in the world has not changed.” (Xi, 2017) China’s fundamental national situation determines that its main task is to advance along the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and to focus its efforts on socialist construction. The Global Development Initiative also highlights “prioritizing development” as one of its core pillars. Latin America, for its part, faces the challenge of progressing in development. Although it was one of the regions in the Global South to achieve national independence and begin economic development relatively early, some Latin American countries have experienced stagnation in their economic transformation and have not managed to overcome the so-called “middle-income trap.” Affected by factors such as low global economic growth, fiscal constraints, and limited policy space, Latin America’s economy has shown a weak recovery in recent years, with some countries facing serious inflation and debt problems. Therefore, promoting sustainable development has become a top priority for governments in the region. In 2016, Latin American countries promoted the creation of the Forum of the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean on Sustainable Development, as a regional mechanism for implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (ECLAC, 2016). By the end of 2023, six successful conferences had been held, and the Latin America and the Caribbean Sustainable Development Report had been published annually to assess the region’s progress in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 2. Addressing welfare issues as a central task Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the Party’s central leadership, led by Xi Jinping, has promoted a people-centered development approach, insisting that everything should be done for the people and depend on the people, always placing them in the highest position. During the centennial celebration of the CPC’s founding, General Secretary Xi emphasized: “To learn from history and forge the future, we must unite and lead the Chinese people in a tireless struggle for a better life.” In contrast, Latin America is one of the most unequal regions in the world. The unequal distribution of wealth, along with gender and racial discrimination, are persistent issues that have been worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic slowdown. According to data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in 2023 the region’s poverty rate was 29.1%, and extreme poverty was 11.4%, both slightly higher than in 2022 (29% and 11.2%, respectively) (France24, 2023). As a response, many Latin American governments — such as those in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Cuba — have incorporated attention to welfare issues and improving their citizens’ quality of life as key pillars in their public policy agendas. 3. Embracing inclusion and shared benefits as a guiding principle Following the end of the Cold War, the world experienced a trend toward multipolarity and continued economic globalization. However, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of protectionism in various forms, accompanied by a rise in unilateralism and hegemonic policies. These “deglobalization” practices not only fail to resolve internal problems, but also disrupt global supply chains, hinder healthy economic development, and harm the interests of countries. In response, developing nations such as China and Latin American countries advocate for multipolar development and oppose unilateralism and power politics. In December 2023, China’s Central Conference on Foreign Affairs Work emphasized the importance of inclusive and mutually beneficial economic globalization. Similarly, Latin America has maintained a diversified foreign policy and has worked toward building a new, fair, and equitable international political and economic order. Amid rising tensions among major powers, most Latin American countries have chosen not to take sides, maintaining a non-aligned policy. Moreover, countries in Latin America are increasingly focused on inclusive development both within their nations and across the region, striving to address internal development imbalances. In 2010, the Andean Development Corporation (predecessor to the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean) released the “Latin America Vision Plan 2040”, which highlighted the need to strengthen economic inclusion in order to achieve truly sustainable growth (CAF, 2010). In January 2023, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit in Argentina approved the “Buenos Aires Declaration,” which stressed the importance of promoting inclusive development in the region and fostering inclusive dialogue with other regions (CELAC, 2023). 4. Embracing innovation as a key driver Marx pointed out that “science is also part of the productive forces” and that “the development of fixed capital shows the extent to which the general knowledge of society has become a direct productive force.” In 1988, at the National Science Conference, Deng Xiaoping declared, “science and technology are the primary productive forces.” Since the 18th CPC Congress, China has firmly pursued innovation-led development. It launched the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy, issued the Medium- to Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (2021–2035), and rolled out the Technological Innovation Blueprint under the 14th Five-Year Plan. Thanks to this framework, China has made significant progress in accelerating emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data, quantum communication, and blockchain. Latin American countries are also intensifying their focus on technological innovation. In 2023, CELAC’s Buenos Aires Declaration underscored the importance of innovation for enhancing regional competitiveness and job quality, while encouraging scientific exchanges among nations and subregional organizations. Furthermore, the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, committed to increasing investment in technological development. To that end, he announced at the 28th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change an investment of approximately 21 billion reais (around 4.28 billion U.S. dollars) in sustainable economy, innovative technologies, and low-carbon economy. In the 2023 Global Innovation Index, Brazil ranked 49th out of 132 countries, improving by five positions compared to the previous year. The President of Chile, Gabriel Boric, pledged to increase public funding for research and to finance the work of universities and research institutions. In 2019, the Colombian government established the “International Mission of Wise People,” a body composed of 46 national and international academic experts to promote production diversification and automation, with the goal of doubling the share of manufacturing and agriculture in the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2030. The current president of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, has committed to transforming the country into a “knowledge society” and to continuing this initiative. 5. Making harmony between humans and nature a central goal Developing countries — including China and Latin American nations — prioritize climate issues and actively contribute to global climate governance. Since ancient China during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, philosophical schools such as Confucianism and Taoism had already proposed concepts about the “unity between Heaven and humankind.” Similarly, Indigenous cultures in Latin America also share related cultural traditions. The Quechua peoples of Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia promote the concept of “’Buen Vivir’” (“Good Living”), which emphasizes harmony between human society and nature. The Aymara of Peru and Bolivia, the Guaraní of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia, the Shuar of Ecuador, and the Mapuche of Chile all have similar philosophical expressions. So far in the 21st century, China and Latin American countries have intensified their focus on sustainable development. In August 2005, during a visit to Anji in China’s Zhejiang Province, Xi Jinping, then Secretary of the Communist Party of China in Zhejiang, put forward the principle that “lucid waters and lush mountains are as valuable as mountains of gold and silver,” highlighting the idea that economic growth should not be achieved at the expense of the environment. China’s Global Development Initiative includes climate change and sustainable development as key cooperation areas, aiming for stronger, healthier global progress. Simultaneously, Latin American countries value sustainability highly. Ten nations in the region have officially submitted carbon-neutrality timelines and developed emissions-reduction plans. Several governments have taken significant measures to accelerate energy transition, restore ecosystems, and enhance international cooperation. Notably, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay have made substantial strides in renewable energy: in Q1 2023, more than 90 % of Brazil’s energy came from renewables — the highest level since 2011. Progress of Green Cooperation between China and Latin America 1. High-level design for sustainable cooperation between China and Latin American countries has been continuously strengthenedAs comprehensive cooperation between China and Latin America progresses, sustainable collaboration has also become integrated into the strategic high-level planning. At the third Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in 2021, the "Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas between China and CELAC Member States (2022–2024)" was adopted. This plan emphasizes the continuation of cooperation in areas such as renewable energy, new energy, civil nuclear energy, energy technology equipment, electric vehicles and their components, as well as energy-related geological and mineral resources. It also outlines the expansion of cooperation in emerging industries related to clean energy resources, support for technology transfer between companies, and the respect and protection of the natural environment. Joint declarations between China and countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina on establishing and deepening comprehensive strategic partnerships mention strengthening cooperation in areas such as climate change and clean energy. During the sixth meeting of the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Commission for Coordination and Cooperation in May 2022, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Brazilian Ministry of Economy agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Promoting Investment Cooperation for Sustainable Development, aimed at promoting investment in clean and low-carbon technologies in both countries. In April 2023, during Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's visit to China, the two countries issued the “China-Brazil Joint Declaration on Combating Climate Change” and signed several cooperation agreements related to the sustainable economy. For example, Article 3 mentions “expanding cooperation in new fields such as environmental protection, combating climate change, the low-carbon economy, and the digital economy,” while Article 10 notes the aim to “strengthen cooperation on environmental protection, climate change, and biodiversity loss, promote sustainable development, and accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy.” In the same month, the “China-Brazil Joint Declaration on Combating Climate Change,” the “Memorandum of Understanding on Research and Innovation Cooperation between the Ministries of Science and Technology of China and Brazil,” and the “Memorandum of Understanding on Promoting Investment and Industrial Cooperation between China and Brazil” identified key areas of future cooperation, including sustainable infrastructure, the development of sustainable industries, renewable energy, electric vehicles, sustainable technological innovation, and green financing. 2. Clean energy cooperation has deepened The development and use of clean energy are essential means for achieving green development. In recent years, clean energy cooperation between China and Latin America has shown the following main characteristics. The scope of clean energy cooperation is becoming increasingly broad. Currently, cooperation between China and Latin America in the fields of clean energy — such as hydropower, solar energy, wind power, nuclear energy, biomass energy, and lithium batteries — has reached a certain level of breadth and depth. At the same time, both sides have also initiated cooperation efforts in emerging areas such as green hydrogen and smart energy storage. China is constantly diversifying its target countries and modes of investment in clean energy in Latin America. In 2015, China began increasing its investment in the renewable energy sector in the region. Between 2005 and 2020, China’s main investment targets in renewable energy in Latin America included countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia. Investments in projects, mergers and acquisitions, and greenfield investments have gone hand in hand. 3. Green cooperation in the transportation sector has yielded outstanding results. Chinese companies continue to cooperate with Latin American countries in the field of public transportation infrastructure and electric vehicles, promoting the low-carbon development of the transport sector in Latin America. First, cooperation in public transportation infrastructure is advancing. In recent years, Chinese companies have actively participated in the construction of public infrastructure such as railways, roads, and bridges in Latin American countries, aiming to promote interconnectivity and green travel across the region. Bogotá Metro Line 1, in the capital of Colombia, currently under construction with Chinese investment, is to date the largest public-private partnership (PPP) project in individual transportation infrastructure in Latin America. Second, trade in electric vehicles is developing rapidly. China’s electric vehicle industry has extensive experience in large-scale production and a relatively complete industrial supply chain, making it a new growth area in China–Latin America trade. Electric buses and cars from independent Chinese brands such as BYD, JAC, and Dongfeng are favored in Latin America due to their good quality and low price. Third, cooperation in battery and tram production is also improving. China and Latin America have also begun bold attempts in green capacity cooperation within the manufacturing sector. Currently, BYD is carrying out a range of production activities in Brazil, including the assembly of bus chassis and the production of photovoltaic modules and batteries. 4. Green agricultural cooperation is on the rise. Latin America has vast and fertile land, and agricultural cooperation is an important component of China–Latin America trade. In recent years, Chinese companies have paid increasing attention to using advanced technologies to strengthen environmental protection and actively promote the green transformation of agricultural cooperation. COFCO (‘China National Cereal, Oil & Foodstuff Corporation’) and its Brazilian partners conducted risk assessments of more than 1,700 soybean suppliers in the Amazon and Cerrado ecological zones, and mapped over 1.1 million hectares of soybean fields using remote sensing satellites, which has raised farmers' awareness of sustainable development. By the end of 2021, COFCO had achieved 100% traceability for all direct soybean purchases in Matopiba, a major soybean-producing region in Brazil. At the same time, China and several Latin American countries are promoting cooperation in green agricultural research and development. The Chinese Academy of Tropical Agricultural Sciences has established cooperative relationships with nine Latin American countries, including Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, and Costa Rica. It has achieved progress in exchange and cooperation in areas such as the innovative use and protection of germplasm resources, efficient transformation and comprehensive utilization of biomass energy, green pest and disease prevention and control technologies, and efficient cultivation techniques. 5. Cooperation on green financing plays an important bridging role. The Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund and the China-United Nations Peace and Development Fund are key financial platforms through which China supports project cooperation under the Global Development Initiative. In addition to the above-mentioned platforms, current green financial instruments between China and Latin America include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the China–Latin America Cooperation Fund, the China–Latin America Development Finance Cooperation Mechanism, and subsidies provided by China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Currently, all three financing projects of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in Brazil are related to the green economy. Challenges facing Sino–Latin American green cooperation Although green cooperation between China and Latin America has gradually achieved results and presents many development opportunities, the risks and challenges of cooperation should not be ignored. Most Latin Americans expect that foreign cooperation will promote social well-being, eliminate poverty, and reduce inequality in their countries. They place great importance on the social benefits of projects and pay close attention to the environmental impact of projects on local ecosystems. Currently, the process of extracting lithium from brine places high demands on water resources and carries the risk of air and water pollution. As a result, lithium mining has also faced opposition from Indigenous communities in some Latin American countries. In 2023, Indigenous peoples from Argentina’s Jujuy Province staged several protests against the exploitation of a lithium mine (Reventós, 2023). To reduce pollution in lithium extraction, further scientific and technological research is needed. The integration of Chinese companies into Latin America also faces many obstacles. The official languages of most Latin American countries are Spanish and Portuguese, which are deeply influenced by European and U.S. cultures. In addition to geographical distance, there is limited mutual understanding between the peoples of China and Latin America, and transportation and logistics costs are high. Most Chinese companies lack personnel fluent in Spanish or Portuguese and familiar with local laws and regulations. Currently, the U.S. government continues to view China as a strategic competitor. Latin America has also become a battleground for strategic competition between China and the United States. The U.S. has increasingly turned its attention to China’s cooperation with Latin American countries. In 2019, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs published an article stating that “China’s green investment in Latin America cannot offset local environmental damage” (Cote-Muñoz, 2019). In general, green cooperation between China and Latin America will face a more complex environment in the future. Final considerations In recent years, China has put forward the Global Development Initiative to promote international cooperation for sustainable development. Latin America, one of the regions with the most developing countries in the world, actively promotes the implementation of the Sustainable Development Agenda and has a solid green economic foundation. In this sense, the region can be an important partner for China in achieving the goals of the 2030 Agenda and building a shared future for humanity. China must continue to build consensus on development priorities with Latin American countries, plan key areas of cooperation according to their conditions and needs, promote connections between governments, businesses, universities, and media in China and Latin America, and jointly advance the green cooperation to a new level. China and Latin America have achieved multidisciplinary coverage in green cooperation. It is necessary to further improve the quality of cooperation in the future and achieve coordinated development across various sectors. For example, in the long term, the development of renewable energy will require greater energy storage capacity and wider electric grid coverage. Additionally, Chinese companies need to integrate more into local societies and generate greater social benefits while ensuring economic returns. They can strengthen cooperation with Latin American companies in order to quickly become familiar with local laws, regulations, and market conditions. Furthermore, more research — including environmental assessments and social consultations — should be conducted before launching projects. References CAF (2010). "Corporación Andina de Fomento, Visión para América Latina 2040 Hacia una sociedad más incluyente y próspera". https://scioteca.caf.com/bitstream/handle/123456789/496/latinamerica_2040_summary_esp.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=yCELAC (2023). "Declaración de Buenos Aires". https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/userfiles/prensa/declaracion_ de_buenos_aires_-_version_final.pdf CEPAL (2016). "El Foro de los Países de América Latina y el Caribe sobre el Desarrollo Sostenible y el Seguimiento Regional de la Agenda 2030". https://www.cepal.org/es/temas/agenda-2030-desarrollo-sostenible/ foro-paises-america-latina-caribe-desarrollo-sostenible-seguimiento-regional-la-agenda-2030Cote-Muñoz, N. (2019). "China's Green Investments Won't Undo Its Environmental Damage to Latin America". Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-green-investments-wont-undo-its-environmental-damage-latin-americaFrance24 (2023). "Tasa de pobreza se mantiene en 29 % en América Latina en 2023". https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20231125-tasa-de-pobreza-se-mantiene-en-29-en-am%C3%A9rica-latina-en-2023-dice-cepalMinistry of Foreign Affairs of China (2021). "Global Development Initiative-Building on 2030 SDGs for Stronger, Greener and Healthier Global Development". https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/jj/GDI_140002/wj/202406/ P020240606606193448267.pdfReventós, B. y N. Fabre (2023). "Los grupos indígenas en Argentina que se oponen a la extracción del litio". BBC. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cevzgv0elp9o Cuadernos de Nuestra América. No. 014 | Nueva Época 2025, Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional (CIPI). Under CC BY-NC 4.0

Energy & Economics
Climate migration vector illustration word cloud isolated on a white background.

Pathways to respond to climate change, forced displacement, and conflict challenges

by Edoardo Borgomeo , Anders Jägerskog

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract The collision of climate impacts with forced displacement and conflict renders efforts to promote peace and development particularly challenging. Most of the academic literature to date has focused on exploring and predicting causal links between climate change, conflict, and forced displacement. Much less attention has been paid to the need to inform actual policy interventions and responses, particularly to support climate-resilient development. Here, we address this gap and develop a decision framework to inform long-term climate responses in contexts affected by conflict and forced displacement. Building upon previous World Bank policy reports and the authors’ professional experience, we suggest that a focus on decision pathways can help inform a long-term, development response to conflict, forced displacement, and climate challenges. Pathways capture the sequence of interventions that are required to reduce climate risks in contexts affected by conflict and forced displacement. They also offer an opportunity for aligning climate change adaptation interventions, such as water storage or flood embankments, with peacebuilding and stabilization initiatives. Case studies from Lebanon and South Sudan are discussed to illustrate the pathways approach to climate adaptation in contexts affected by conflict and forced displacement. 1. Introduction Research and policy analysis on climate change, migration, and conflict have expanded significantly in recent years (Swain et al., 2023; Von Uexkull and Buhaug, 2021). Attention has been mostly devoted to answering questions of causality, trying to unpack the complex causal linkages between these issues (e.g., Abel et al., 2019), and viewing climate as a “driver” of security risks. While research on causality has yielded important insights into some of the potential channels through which climate change might affect human mobility and conflict, it has also been criticized for its lack of nuance and context sensitivity (Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016). Moreover, it has led to some statements about conflict–climate relationships, especially in the context of the Syrian civil war, that largely fail to account for broader political economy considerations and are, as such, unhelpful from a policy perspective and unwarranted from a scientific perspective (Daoudy, 2020; de Châtel, 2014; Fröhlich, 2016). Here, we argue that rather than attempting to quantify and model causal linkages between climate, migration, and conflict, research should focus more on questions of policy and intervention design. This will address urgent needs to anticipate people’s movements and to find lasting solutions to displacement caused by conflict- and climate-related factors (African Union and International Organisation for Migration, 2024). A focus on solutions and policy design will also support governments in conflict-affected areas in adopting a position on climate security and in prioritizing scarce development resources to address climate security risks (International Crisis Group, 2025). A focus on policy and intervention design requires understanding two sets of interactions. First, the impacts of climate risks—encompassing hazard, exposure, and vulnerability—on efforts to address protracted conflict and migration. For example, there is little knowledge of the drought and flood hazards faced by forcibly displaced populations living in refugee camps under high-end climate change scenarios, or of the effects that short-term humanitarian responses to flood hazards might have on exacerbating long-term flood exposure in conflict-affected areas. Second, the impacts of efforts to advance climate change adaptation or mitigation on forced displacement and conflict risks. For example, there is little knowledge of the potential conflict and forced displacement risks arising from investments in climate infrastructure (e.g., flood embankments, irrigation) in certain contexts. This perspective focuses on these interactions and presents a decision framework for evaluating options to address forced displacement and conflict challenges while not exacerbating the climate risks faced by populations. The perspective specifically focuses on the role of water development interventions in influencing interactions between forced displacement responses and climate risks. Forced displacement is interpreted as situations where individuals or communities leave or flee their homes due to conflict, violence, persecution, and human rights violations. 2. Promoting climate-resilient development in situations of protracted forced displacement2.1. Decision points and path dependencies shape success in development responses When responding to protracted forced displacement situations, policymakers will likely face trade-offs between short-term uncoordinated measures to respond to immediate risks (e.g., lack of drinking water supplies, temporary flood embankments) and long-term measures needed to address structural issues (e.g., provision of sustainable water services, land-use zoning to reduce flood exposure) (Borgomeo et al. 2021). These trade-offs are time-specific, meaning that they can create path dependencies and lock-in, thus influencing countries’ ability to achieve stability and climate-resilient development over the long term. Hence, at different stages of a protracted forced displacement crisis, policymakers need to be cognizant that their efforts can undermine or support long-term policy objectives such as climate resilience and peace. Building upon Borgomeo et al. (2021), we propose a framework (Figure 1) that identifies three decision points at which specific trade-offs shape future development and climate resilience paths: • Prevention and pre-crisis coordination and planning• Responding to protracted forced displacement• Preparing for recovery and return  Figure 1. Decision points and impact of climate and water-related events at various stages of conflict and forced displacement cycle. Adapted from Lund (1996). The framework adapts Lund’s peace and conflict cycle (Lund, 1996) to the specific case of climate change, conflict, and forced displacement responses. The bell-shaped curve in Figure 1 is a stylized representation of the potential course of a complex forced displacement and conflict crisis, with the vertical axis representing the intensity of the crisis, and the horizontal axis representing time. Different conflict and forced displacement crises will follow different curves: responses can prevent or reduce the risks of the crisis escalating further. Moreover, climate-related events might make addressing the crisis more challenging, exacerbating risks of armed violence, or perpetuating forced displacement cycles. At each of the decision points in Figure 1, policymakers need to explore trade-offs between addressing short-term needs and achieving longer-term development. Policymakers confront a series of choices through time; their choices will determine a “pathway” and the type of outcomes they can achieve. Figure 2 shows three examples of pathways that emerge (from left to right) depending on choices made at each of the three decision points. While timing and responses will be context-specific, these decision points are likely to arise in any protracted forced displacement situation, making the framework shown in Figures 1 and 2 generally applicable in different contexts.  Figure 2. Decision points shape three example pathways to respond to climate change, forced displacement, and conflict challenges. Prevention and pre-crisis coordination and planning At Decision point 1, in a situation where the crisis has not yet materialized, building preparedness through coordination between development, humanitarian, and security actors is essential. Development actors have access to ministries and service providers and should ensure that these public sector entities that are tasked with providing climate-related information (e.g., hydrometeorological services), managing water, and delivering services establish functional links with humanitarian and security actors (World Bank, ICRC and UNICEF 2021). Development actors should promote and support data collection and information-sharing protocols to build a common understanding across parties involved in climate-related sectors in fragile contexts. For example, a joint understanding of water resource availability and safe deployable outputs (i.e., the quantity of water that can be consumed without compromising it through depletion or salinization) and of water governance structures can ensure that humanitarian actors have a better understanding of when and where water resources might be compromised or depleted during a crisis. This joint understanding also involves mapping critical interconnected infrastructure systems, notably energy, digital, and water infrastructure, and ensuring that there are no single points of failure that—if targeted—can bring down the entire system (Weinthal and Sowers, 2020). Similarly, joint understanding should be developed in the area of flood and drought hazards, to prevent any potential crisis responses from further exacerbating exposure to climate impacts, for example, by locating refugee camps in flood-prone areas. Response to protracted forced displacement During a protracted forced displacement crisis, policymakers face significant trade-offs between short-term responses to meet immediate needs and long-term measures that address underlying sector weaknesses (Figure 2, decision point 2). Overreliance on temporary solutions provided by humanitarian actors and private sector providers can undermine long-term institutional ability to provide sector oversight, understand climate risks, and deliver services. Moreover, it might paradoxically exacerbate vulnerability and exposure to climate hazards leading to lock-in, where temporary responses perpetuate, delay, or prevent a transition to more sustainable and long-term adaptation to climate shocks (Pathway 1 in Figure 2). Two examples help elucidate the type of trade-offs that might emerge at decision point 2. In the case of water service delivery, private water vendors might be interested in maintaining control of water distribution even after the crisis ends, complicating the transition to a sustainable and affordable water delivery model. They might also avoid protecting water sources from pollution and overexploitation or promote the drilling of new wells, contributing to an uncontrolled expansion of unlicensed users and exacerbating vulnerability to droughts under climate change. This pathway has been observed in Yemen, for example, where most urban residents are supplied by privately operated tanker trucks, with ensuing issues for affordability, public health, sustainability of water use, and long-term resilience to drought (Abu-Lohom et al. 2018). In the case of flood risk management for forcibly displaced communities, short-term responses can have profound implications for future climate resilience and vulnerability. Forcibly displaced communities often relocate to marginal lands exposed to water-related hazards, such as landslides and floods. This pattern has been observed in several contexts, such as Colombia (Few et al., 2021), Sierra Leone (Gbanie et al., 2018), and South Sudan (Borgomeo et al., 2023). Once the forced displacement crisis and conflict end, these communities are likely to experience heightened climate impacts because they settle in areas highly exposed to floods and landslides. These communities might also receive inequitable benefits from recovery efforts, as settlements on marginal lands are often considered illegal and therefore not serviced by infrastructure. In turn, this might make historical grievances resurge, heightening the risk of relapse into conflict and hindering efforts to build government legitimacy and trust. Although sustainability of use, resource protection, and land use planning might not seem like priorities in the short term, they are key tenets of a development approach to the forced displacement crisis at decision point 2. Often, short-term responses, such as drilling a well, can have long-term impacts on the sustainability of both short- and long-term interventions by inevitably depleting or contaminating water resources. Similarly, short-term responses to settlement issues can also aggravate exposure to climate impacts. A development approach focused on addressing urgent needs while responding to structural challenges is better able to achieve long-term climate resilience and stability outcomes. In the context of water service delivery, this approach entails rationalizing the use of existing water resources and prioritizing demand-side solutions (e.g., reducing water use) to avoid placing additional pressures on already strained supplies (Borgomeo et al. 2021). In the context of flood risk management, this entails using integrated gray and green solutions to respond to flood risks and adopting floodplain zoning strategies. A longer-term approach might also combine short-term humanitarian actions with interventions that support the business continuity of water service providers and water resource management agencies with one-off capital injections or specific staff support programs to prevent brain drain. Although a development approach helps to address water sector issues in host countries, it might be challenging to adopt in practice. In already politically fragile and financially stretched contexts, governments might not be willing or able to provide water services or protection to forcibly displaced communities. In turn, this leaves humanitarian actors or unregulated private vendors to meet the immediate needs of vulnerable populations. However, these short-term responses might be counterproductive in the long run because they might create patterns of inclusion and exclusion between host communities and forcibly displaced populations, making integration and cohesion harder to achieve (Pathway 2 in Figure 2). When host communities perceive that forcibly displaced populations are receiving better services through humanitarian actors, this can fuel grievances against the forcibly displaced populations and the state. While temporary solutions might offer a relatively easier way to respond to forced displacement, they can also lead to lock-in and foreclose alternatives in the long term for host countries. The different responses to the Syrian refugee crisis observed in Jordan, Lebanon, and Türkiye demonstrate this problem: the water security of forcibly displaced populations and their host communities varies significantly depending on host countries’ willingness and ability to adopt a long-term development approach to the crisis rather than short-term temporary solutions. Preparation for recovery and return A third decision point relates to a post-conflict situation of recovery, peacebuilding, and potential return of the forcibly displaced. At this point, water- and climate-related interventions need to be integrated within broader plans for reconciliation and for extending basic services to camps and informal settlements, rehabilitating infrastructure, and expanding the capacity of existing urban water systems to respond to higher demand (Pathway 3 in Figure 2). For example, a higher presence of refugees in urban areas can increase water demands, highlighting the need to upgrade and in some cases increase the capacity of existing supply and sanitation infrastructure. This demand growth is different from normal surges in demand for water services, which are typically short-lived increases in demand in response to weather conditions or public health measures (e.g., COVID-19 lockdowns). In contrast to these demand surges, forced displacement causes long-lasting increases in service demand, thus requiring a master plan and long-term response. For water utilities and service providers, restoring and expanding services will be an opportunity to improve service quality for their constituents and customers while avoiding the promotion of exclusionary practices that benefit factional interests and that can contribute to fragility (Sadoff et al 2017). A development approach to recovery and return should also consider a regional perspective. Following a protracted forced displacement crisis, new economic realities and incentives might arise. In some situations, the forcibly displaced populations might not intend to go back to their place of origin (as reported by some Syrian refugees) (IPA, 2020). In this case, it might make more economic sense for development actors to prioritize the use of scarce financial resources to support the expansion of water infrastructure in the host country rather than to rebuild infrastructure in the place of origin. A regional perspective also helps to identify opportunities to share benefits from transboundary waters and identify regionally beneficial approaches to water management. 3. Insights from balancing and sequencing development interventions to respond to climate, conflict, and forced displacement challengesLebanon: addressing the needs of the forcibly displaced and their host communities in situations of crisis At the height of the Syrian crisis in 2014, the Lebanese authorities estimated that around 1.5 million Syrian refugees had entered Lebanon, causing the country’s population to increase by almost 25% (World Bank 2018). Lebanon chose not to establish refugee camps, and the majority of the Syrians settled amid Lebanese communities in urban and rural areas. The sudden increase in demand for services placed significant pressure upon already limited and poorly performing infrastructure. In 2014, the Ministry of Environment estimated that domestic water demand had increased by 43 million m3 to 70 million m3 a year, which corresponds to an increase in overall national water demand of between 8% and 12% (Ministry of Environment of Lebanon 2014). This crisis took place against a backdrop of growing water-related hazards including increasing drought hazards because of climate change, and also chronic water scarcity caused by decades of underinvestment in water systems and soaring water demands (World Bank 2017). Faced with this situation of crisis (decision point 2 above), the Republic of Lebanon, with support from the World Bank, adopted a long-term response strategy that intervened in host communities in a way that benefited both hosts and refugees. Rather than creating a parallel system of assistance only for the forcibly displaced, the Lebanon Municipal Services Emergency Project targeted both the host community and Syrian refugees through infrastructure and social interventions (World Bank 2018). Community social interventions were urgent and indispensable to complement water and energy service delivery as well as to support the long-term objective of enhancing social cohesion and living conditions. Based on consultations, communities prioritized 12 social interventions around five themes—environmental awareness, employment training, skills training, health, and social cohesion—for both Lebanese and Syrians, with a focus on women, youth, and children (World Bank 2018). Infrastructure interventions addressed urgent community priorities which were also identified through community consultations involving both forcibly displaced and host communities. This included installing solar pumps to improve the reliability of water supplies and improve the ability to meet growing water demand. This had the additional advantage of reducing electricity costs for the financially weak water utility. South Sudan: water as an enabler of durable solutions for the forcibly displaced South Sudan is the main source of refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa and hosts one of the world’s largest internally displaced populations (IDPs) (UNHCR, 2025). The country presents a multilayered mix of IDPs, asylum seekers, refugees, returnees, stateless persons, and persons at risk of statelessness. South Sudan is also among the most vulnerable countries to climate change, ranking as the second most vulnerable country to natural hazards such as floods and droughts in the world, according to the 2024 INFORM Risk Index. Forced displacement was traditionally associated with armed conflict, but in recent years water-related disasters, notably floods, have triggered large-scale internal and cross-border displacement (UNHCR, 2021). These sobering statistics position South Sudan as one of the global hotspots where urgent responses at the nexus of climate change, forced displacement, and conflict are needed. At the time of writing, South Sudan confronts a situation of relative stability and an urgent need to address the needs of IDPs and returnees (decision point 3). Since 2018, the country has faced unprecedented floods, which have contributed to protracted cycles of displacement. These floods are directly linked to rainfall patterns in the African Great Lakes region, where the Bahr el Jebel (White Nile) originates, and in the Ethiopian Highlands. Because of South Sudan’s very flat landscape and impermeable soils, flooding persists for a long time, posing long-term challenges for climate adaptation. The country also faces a water supply and sanitation crisis, with about 60% of the population using unimproved sources at risk from contamination (Borgomeo et al., 2023). Decision-makers face stark trade-offs between temporary fixes and long-term, durable solutions that lay the foundation for sustainable service delivery and flood risk management over the long term. In the context of South Sudan, the provision of water services is an area where the Government has identified the importance of transitioning towards long-term solutions instead of just relying on temporary humanitarian actions. This provides an example of how responses to decision point 3 can help countries gradually improve climate resilience and water security while addressing the urgent needs of the forcibly displaced. The provision of clean drinking water in areas of return or local integration is one of the Six Priority Areas under the South Sudan 2021 Durable Solutions Strategy, highlighting that water availability is a governing factor in the government’s response to forced displacement. The strategy recognizes that without access to water supply and sanitation services, local integration processes, voluntary returns, and relocations cannot materialize. Durable solutions are achieved when individuals no longer have specific assistance or protection needs linked to displacement and represent the closure of the displacement cycle. The Government of South Sudan and a range of humanitarian partners developed a WASH Transition Strategy for Former Protection of Civilian (PoC) Sites, to ensure that the responsibility for maintaining and operating WASH facilities is progressively transferred to local populations and the responsible local authorities. The WASH Transition Strategy for Former PoC Sites, through the WASH exPoC Task Force, is contributing to building the capacity of the responsible local authorities who should become responsible and accountable for ensuring regular services to eventually promote suitable solutions for IDPs by creating service conditions conducive to durable solutions (returns and local integration) (WASH Cluster South Sudan, 2021). In several locations, multisectoral plans are being developed at the site level, including transition plans for security, services, and community engagement (WASH Cluster South Sudan, 2022). The challenge of providing durable solutions to forced displacement in South Sudan is extremely complex: because the security conditions in multiple parts of the country remain fragile and the impacts of climate change are increasing. The country’s efforts to advance durable solutions in terms of water services show that it is indeed possible to take a long-term view of forced displacement as one that is complementary to humanitarian efforts; focuses on medium-term socioeconomic aspects; is government-led and places particular attention on institutions and policies. While water service delivery has been included in the Government’s durable solutions plan, the issue of flood risks under climate change remains largely unaddressed, posing significant challenges to break the forced displacement cycle and build climate resilience in the country. The scale of the flood challenge and the risk of regional spillovers call for more regional and international attention to climate security risks in South Sudan (International Crisis Group, 2025). Research and policy should focus on identifying opportunities to link climate adaptation interventions to broader reconciliation and stabilization efforts at local and national levels. 4. Discussion and conclusions This perspective focuses on the design of interventions to respond to complex challenges at the nexus of climate change, migration, and conflict. It suggests that sequencing and trade-offs need to be considered when implementing humanitarian interventions, to avoid perpetuating existing vulnerabilities or delaying opportunities to pursue climate-resilient development. This perspective also highlights that development and humanitarian actors should work more closely together to align perspectives and create a level of readiness for when a crisis occurs. The perspective identifies three specific decision points that can help focus planning and interactions among the different stakeholders from the humanitarian, security, and development sectors involved in crisis response. Frameworks based on pathways and decision points, such as the one presented here, have been found valuable in guiding decision-making and design of interventions in the field of water security (Garrick and Hall, 2014) and climate adaptation under uncertainty (Haasnoot et al., 2024). However, their application for intervention design and implementation at the humanitarian-development nexus is limited and likely to be affected by stakeholder cultures and objectives. Moreover, a focus on decision points and pathways requires capabilities to conduct monitoring and options identification and assessment which are often absent in contexts characterized by fragility and conflict. Moving forward, research should focus on developing models and frameworks that can help design and monitor effective policy responses at the climate change, migration, and conflict nexus. First, research should attempt to develop typologies of climate adaptation and water interventions to address conflict and forced migration challenges, including an assessment of their potential to increase risks of conflict and violence (see Gilmore and Buhaug, 2021 for an example in relation to climate mitigation policies). Typologies will help design interventions and compare experiences across different geographies and settings. Second, research should focus less on ex-post analysis or future predictions and concentrate more on careful monitoring and evaluation of ongoing climate change adaptation and conflict-resolution and peacebuilding interventions. This will help inform the early stages of policy implementation (including options assessment and monitoring strategies mentioned above), support learning, and help with early identification of risks of relapse into conflict. Finally, analysts have highlighted several challenges related to access to climate finance in contexts affected by conflict and forced displacement (Cao et al., 2021; Meijer and Ahmad 2024). Research should examine opportunities for climate finance to support the transition from humanitarian to long-term development approaches in a context characterized by fragility and conflict. This includes creating frameworks to evaluate project contributions to financiers’ objectives, as well as improved evidence on the need for urgent climate adaptation among conflict and forcibly displaced communities worldwide. Acknowledgments Findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent, or of the Global Water Security and Sanitation Partnership. Funding The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This article is partly derived from Chapter 4 of the World Bank report Ebb and Flow, Volume 2: Water in the Shadow of Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. As such, it benefited from funding from the World Bank and the Global Water Security and Sanitation Partnership. Data availability statement This article is not based on any new data and it contains practitioner insights based on the authors’ experience. References Abel G. J., Brottrager M., Cuaresma J. C., Muttarak R. (2019). Climate, conflict and forced migration. Global Environmental Change, 54, 239–249.Abu-Lohom N. M., Konishi Y., Mumssen Y., Zabara B., Moore S. M. (2018). Water supply in a war zone: A preliminary analysis of two urban water tanker supply systems in the Republic of Yemen. World Bank Publications.African Union and International Organisation for Migration. (2024). Africa Migration Report. Second Edition. PUB2023/132/R. African Union.Borgomeo E., Chase C., Godoy N. S., Kwadwo V. O. (2023). Rising from the depths: Water security and fragility in South Sudan. World Bank Publications.Borgomeo E., Jägerskog A., Zaveri E., Russ J., Khan A., Damania R. (2021). Ebb and flow: Volume 2. Water in the shadow of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. World Bank Publications.Brzoska M., Fröhlich C. (2016). Climate change, migration and violent conflict: vulnerabilities, pathways and adaptation strategies. Migration and Development, 5(2), 190–210.Cao Y., Alcayna T., Quevedo A., Jarvie J. (2021). Exploring the conflict blind spots in climate adaptation finance. Synthesis Report. London: Overseas Development Institute. Enable Finance for Climate-Change Adaptation in Conflict Settings. London. Retrieved December 12, 2023, from www.odi.org/en/publications/exploring-the-conflict-blind-spots-in-climate-adaptationfinance/Daoudy M. (2020). The origins of the Syrian conflict: Climate change and human security. Cambridge University Press.de Châtel F. (2014). The role of drought and climate change in the Syrian uprising: Untangling the triggers of the revolution. Middle Eastern Studies, 50(4): 521–535.Few R., Ramírez V., Armijos M. T., Hernández L. A. Z., Marsh H. (2021). Moving with risk: Forced displacement and vulnerability to hazards in Colombia. World Development, 144, 105482.Fröhlich C. J. (2016). Climate migrants as protestors? Dispelling misconceptions about global environmental change in pre-revolutionary Syria. Contemporary Levant, 1(1), 38–50.Garrick D., Hall J. W. (2014). Water security and society: Risks, metrics, and pathways. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 39(1), 611–639.Gbanie S. P., Griffin A. L., Thornton A. (2018). Impacts on the urban environment: Land cover change trajectories and landscape fragmentation in post-war Western Area, Sierra Leone. Remote Sensing, 10(1), 129.Gilmore E. A., Buhaug H. (2021). Climate mitigation policies and the potential pathways to conflict: Outlining a research agenda. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 12(5), e722.Haasnoot M., Di Fant V., Kwakkel J., Lawrence J. (2024). Lessons from a decade of adaptive pathways studies for climate adaptation. Global Environmental Change, 88, 102907.International Crisis Group. (2025). Eight priorities for the African Union in 2025. Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°205. International Crisis Group.IPA (Innovations for Poverty Action). (2020). “Returning home? Conditions in Syria, not Lebanon, drive the return intentions of Syrian refugees.” Policy brief. https://www.poverty-action.org/publication/returning-home-conditions-syria-not-lebanon-drive-return-intentions-syrian-refugees.Lund Michael S. (1996)., “Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy.” In Crocker CA, Hampson FO, Aall P (Eds.), Managing global chaos: sources of and responses to international conflict (pp. 379–402). U.S. Institute of Peace.Meijer K., Ahmad A. S. (2024). Unveiling challenges and gaps in climate finance in conflict areas. SIPRI.Ministry of Environment of Lebanon. (2014). Lebanon environmental assessment of the Syrian conflict and priority interventions. MOE/EU/UNDP Report, Beirut. https://goo.gl/5c9DQa.Sadoff C. W., Borgomeo E., De Waal D. (2017). Turbulent waters: Pursuing water security in fragile contexts. World Bank Publications.Swain A., Bruch C., Ide T., Lujala P., Matthew R., Weinthal E. (2023). Environment and security in the 21st century. Environment and Security, 1(1-2), 3–9.UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2021). Mid-year trends. UNHCR.UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2025). South Sudan. Global appeal 2025 situation overview. UNHCR.Von Uexkull N., Buhaug H. (2021). Security implications of climate change: A decade of scientific progress. Journal of Peace Research, 58(1), 3–17.WASH Cluster South Sudan (2021) WASH transition strategy for former POC/IDP sites in South Sudan. WASH cluster South Sudan, Juba.WASH Cluster South Sudan (2022) South Sudan WASH cluster strategy 2022–2023. WASH Cluster South Sudan, Juba.Weinthal E., Sowers J. (2020). The water-energy nexus in the Middle East: Infrastructure, development, and conflict. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water, 7(4), e1437.World Bank (2017) Beyond scarcity: Water security in the Middle East and North Africa. World Bank.World Bank (2018) Lebanon—Municipal services emergency project. Implementation completion report. ICR4600. World Bank Publications.World Bank, ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) and UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) (2021) Joining forces to combat protracted crises: humanitarian and development support for water and sanitation providers in the Middle East and North Africa. World Bank.

Energy & Economics
Chinese yuan Renminbi money rolls 3d illustration. Camera over the RMB rolling banknotes. Concept of economy, crisis, finance, cash, business and recession in China.

Understanding China’s Renminbi Strategy: Strategic Integration over Monetary Supremacy

by Monique Taylor

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском China’s strategy to internationalise the renminbi (RMB) is about building resilience and influence through selective, state-managed global integration. Beijing is not seeking to elevate the RMB to the status of a global reserve currency on par with the dollar, nor is the strategy solely about insulating China from the geopolitical risks of dollar dependence, although this is an important component. Rather, it represents a pragmatic response to an increasingly fragmented global economy—one marked by rising geopolitical tensions, growing weaponisation of the dollar, and accelerating financial and technological innovation. China is pursuing a targeted, state-managed form of internationalisation that involves building an alternative web of financial relationships and infrastructures facilitating transactions outside the US-dominated system. These include currency swap lines with strategic partners, the establishment of RMB clearing banks, bilateral trade settlement mechanisms, and payment infrastructures such as the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), which serves as a partial alternative to SWIFT. While these efforts help reduce exposure to potential disruptions from dollar weaponisation, they are part of a broader strategy to embed the RMB in key transactional domains like trade, investment, and energy. In these spheres, China seeks to expand its influence and establish rules and mechanisms conducive to its own strategic and financial interests. Building functional alternatives to the US dollar China’s RMB internationalisation strategy is multi-layered, spanning bilateral currency swaps, RMB clearing arrangements, development finance, and payment system alternatives. Instruments such as RMB-denominated oil trades (referred to as the “petroyuan”) and the digital yuan illustrate this approach. The petroyuan enables sanctioned countries like Russia and Iran to settle oil trades in RMB, while China’s growing financial ties with Gulf states suggest that broader adoption may follow. Similarly, the digital yuan, though originally intended primarily for domestic use, is now being piloted for cross-border transactions, potentially laying the groundwork for an international digital payments network. Technological innovations are facilitating this shift by enabling the creation of central bank digital currencies, alternative financial messaging systems, and blockchain-based settlement tools—all of which can support secure transactions that operate outside traditional dollar-clearing infrastructure. In the long run, such developments could gradually reduce global reliance on the dollar. These initiatives are less about achieving global reach and more about securing strategic autonomy and expanding influence in key domains. China’s aim is to reduce vulnerability to US sanctions and dollar volatility, while gradually expanding the RMB’s role in trade, energy, and infrastructure finance, especially in the Global South, where demand for alternatives is growing. BRICS+, the BRI, and the strategic reach of the RMB Platforms like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and BRICS+ play an important role in China’s RMB internationalisation strategy. They provide the geopolitical and institutional scaffolding for RMB usage in trade and investment, particularly in politically aligned or dollar-constrained contexts. For instance, RMB settlements with BRI countries reached 5.42 trillion yuan in 2021, and China has concluded dozens of currency swap agreements with its partners. While the lion’s share of these transactions is still conducted in US dollars, RMB usage is growing steadily. These arrangements point to a shift toward a multipolar and domain-specific currency landscape—one where the RMB gains traction in selected spheres, even if it remains marginal in global reserves and FX markets. Currency swap agreements, RMB clearing banks, and trade invoicing in local currency are all being promoted among China’s partners, especially those looking to reduce reliance on Western financial systems. The result is a modest but growing network of RMB-based interaction shaped by political alignment and strategic institutional design, rather than spontaneous market demand. While dollar dominance persists, de-dollarisation gains momentum The US dollar still dominates global finance. It accounts for nearly 90 percent of FX transactions and more than half of global reserves. However, that dominance increasingly rests on geopolitical foundations that are showing signs of strain. Trump 2.0’s chaotic tariffs combined with the US’s aggressive use of financial sanctions in recent years have made allies and adversaries alike question the long-term reliability of the dollar-based system. For countries exposed to US foreign and economic policy swings, whether through sanctions, interest rate volatility, or trade frictions, China’s RMB-based alternatives offer a way to diversify. In this sense, de-dollarisation is not a revolution but a structural recalibration: a rebalancing of risk rather than a zero-sum rivalry with the dollar. What China offers is not a wholesale exit from the dollar system, but an incremental hedge—a monetary space in which RMB-denominated transactions gain traction in contexts where diversification and reducing dollar dependence are prioritised. This logic underpins a broader push within the BRICS+ grouping to reduce reliance on the dollar in trade and finance. The group has floated proposals for a shared reserve currency, possibly backed by a basket of member currencies or commodities like gold, as part of its effort to foster a more multipolar monetary system. While such proposals face significant practical challenges, they reflect a clear political intent to diversify away from dollar-dominated structures. China plays a central role in these efforts, not by promoting the RMB as a global hegemonic currency, but by embedding it in alternative financial arrangements. In doing so, China contributes to a monetary order where the dollar remains dominant but increasingly contested. Why RMB leadership is not only unlikely but unnecessary Despite growing cross-border use of the RMB, significant structural constraints remain. China’s capital account remains closed, its financial markets lack transparency and depth, and its central bank operates under the authority of the party-state and, as such, lacks institutional independence. Unlike the US, which issues dollars globally through persistent trade and capital account deficits, China runs a trade surplus. This further limits the global supply of RMB and restricts its viability as a reserve currency. Central banks are unlikely to adopt the RMB as a core reserve asset under such conditions, and China has little interest in changing that right now—Beijing’s RMB internationalisation strategy is designed to work within, not against, these constraints. Indeed, the party-state’s emphasis on control and stability sits uneasily with the financial liberalisation required for global monetary leadership. In Beijing’s view, this is not a contradiction. The goal is not to supplant the dollar, but to achieve selective integration: a system in which China and its partners can transact securely, predictably, and independently of Western pressure. This approach enables China to expand its influence within specific domains, without challenging the broader dollar-centric monetary order. Adapting to a divided global economy RMB internationalisation is neither a bid for currency supremacy nor a mere act of self-defence. It is a tool of pragmatic adaptation—part of China’s effort to build resilience and exert influence through selective financial integration and institutional alternatives. As the world moves further into geopolitical and economic uncertainty, especially with the return of a Trump administration bent on upending the global trade system, China’s efforts may accelerate. The RMB won’t displace the dollar anytime soon, but its growing role in alternative trade, finance, and payment systems signals the slow but significant emergence of a more layered, fragmented, and contested global monetary order. This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe coordination and support action 101079069–EUVIP–HORIZON-WIDERA-2021-ACCESS-03. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily re ect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Energy & Economics
Antipolo City, Philippines - June 1, 2020: RIder use motorcycle to deliver multiple tanks of LPG or liquified petroleum gas to a customer..

Philippines bets on natural gas to accelerate renewable energy

by Gaea Katreena Cabico

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Climate campaigners label law paving way for natural gas promotion an “insult” as fishers warn of environmental devastation Wilma Abanel is worried about falling fish numbers in the waters she has long relied upon for a living. The Verde Island Passage is a biodiversity hotspot off the coast of Luzon Island in the Philippines. Abanel attributes the decline in the passage to the growing number of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities, which she says are damaging marine sanctuaries. “In the past, before the plants were built, our catches were plentiful and we didn’t worry about our daily expenses. We also had no problems sending our children to school,” Abanel said. “But when these plants started to increase, we faced a big problem because it’s not just our livelihood and income that are affected here. More than anything, it’s the destruction of the environment and the impact on our health,” she added. LNG is a natural gas that has been cooled into a liquid that is easier and safer to store and transport over long distances. Once LNG arrives at import terminals, it is warmed up and converted back into gas. From there, the gas is sent through pipelines to homes or power plants, where it is burned to generate electricity. In early January, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr signed the Philippine Natural Gas Industry Development Act, to promote the development of the country’ natural gas as a “safe, efficient, and cost-effective” fuel for power plants and an “indispensable contributor” to energy security. The new law aims to promote natural gas as a “transition” fuel to intermittent renewable energy. Through the measure, the Philippines is not only positioning itself as a key LNG importer but also prioritising locally sourced gas to reduce reliance on foreign supply. Senator Pia Cayetano, who authored the law, explained that securing a steadier local supply would reduce the country’s vulnerability to price fluctuations caused by geopolitical conflicts like Russia’s war in Ukraine. She pointed out that natural gas exploration has declined significantly over the decades. More than 150 wells were drilled in the Philippines in the 1970s, but none have been since 2019, she said. The exploration efforts of Philippine petroleum company PXP Energy Corp, in Reed Bank, a resource-rich area in the West Philippine Sea, have been stalled for years due to a maritime dispute with China, which claims the area as its own. Since 2001, the Malampaya gas field off the western province of Palawan has been providing fuel to power plants that produce roughly a fifth of the country’s electricity. It is expected to run dry by 2027, forcing the Philippines to seek alternative energy sources.  “Malampaya was supposed to be the first of many producing gas fields in the Philippines, but it turned out to be the only one,” Cayetano said in a release. “The country needs more Malampayas: we barely have one left.” However, energy analysts and environmental advocates argue that doubling down on natural gas could still force the country to depend on fossil fuels and further delay the transition to clean energy. Krishna Ariola, an energy campaigner with the Center for Energy, Ecology, and Development, a Philippine think-tank, said: “The [law] is a clear indicator that this is a detour from what was committed by the president with regards to renewable-energy commitments in his previous State of the Nation Addresses. This just looks like a bridge to nowhere.” In his previous addresses, Marcos said the government is actively promoting renewable energy to help the Philippines reach its goal of increasing the share of clean energy in the power mix to 35% by 2030 and 50% by 2040. Problem, not solution The role of natural gas in powering the Philippines is “driving this idea that we need to quickly replace” domestically produced natural gas with LNG,” said Sam Reynolds, an energy finance analyst with the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). Although burning natural gas releases considerably less carbon dioxide than coal or oil, critics point out that it remains a major source of planet-warming emissions. It can also release methane, a greenhouse gas more than 10 times as potent as carbon dioxide over a 20-year period, during extraction, transport and processing. Relying on LNG can also lock nations into long-term fossil-fuel infrastructure like import terminals and gas-fired power plants. To limit warming to 1.5C, the world needs to rapidly phase out fossil fuels, including LNG, and fully transition to renewables, scientists stress. Verde Island Passage, where Abanel fishes, hosts five of the six operating gas plants in the Philippines, along with two LNG terminals, and over a dozen other proposed projects. The passage is situated in the Coral Triangle, a region spanning six countries in Southeast Asia and Melanesia that harbours 76% of the world’s known coral species and over 2,000 species of coral reef fish. There are 19 LNG terminals in the Coral Triangle. A report by US nonprofits Earth Insight and SkyTruth warned that expanding gas infrastructure increases the risk of harm from water pollution, heightened shipping traffic, and oil spills, all of which threaten marine ecosystems and local livelihoods. According to the report, over 100 offshore oil and gas blocks are currently producing in the Coral Triangle, with over 450 additional blocks being explored for future extraction. If all existing blocks were to go into production, approximately 16% of the biodiverse region would be directly impacted by oil and gas development. “The Philippines has the second-highest number of oil slicks from transiting vessels in the Coral Triangle. With a large amount of oil and gas blocks in the exploration phase, there is still an opportunity to change course and defend its many sensitive habitats,” the report noted. Under the new legislation, the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is ordered to establish national standards for methane emissions and other pollutants from the natural gas industry not regulated by existing laws. The DENR must also determine and monitor compliance with the environmental standards for the siting, construction, operation and maintenance, expansion, rehabilitation, decommissioning, and abandonment of natural gas facilities. The path from fossil fuels On the day he returned to the White House, Donald Trump lifted a freeze on processing export permits for new LNG projects. IEEFA’s Reynolds said the move’s impact on the Philippines would be minimal, but would add to the “volatility of LNG even more”. “We’re already seeing that play out with China. LNG becomes the target of trade bullying and retaliation, and it creates, overall, a much more uncertain environment,” said Reynolds. “I think that’s going to be very important for the Philippines to consider. Much of its LNG is coming from the United States but to what extent does Trump even exacerbate some of the challenges that the fuel was already facing?” he added. China is the world’s largest buyer of LNG, while the US is the largest exporter. But China has not imported any LNG from the US since February when Trump announced tariffs on the country, reports Nikkei Asia. Many US LNG contracts are set to begin in the coming years but much of this supply may not reach China due to the tariffs, said Reynolds. So Reynolds thinks China will resell increasing volumes of the US LNG they are contracted to buy. “I think that could drive a larger push into Southeast Asia on behalf of Chinese traders.” China National Offshore Oil Corp, the largest offshore oil and gas producer in China, is already supplying LNG to Filipino energy provider First Gen Corporation. As the world warms and the Philippines continues to face devastating climate disasters, gas should have no place in the country’s energy future, environmentalists and clean energy advocates argue. They say the Philippines, one of the most climate-vulnerable nations, must instead prioritise renewable energy. The timing of the law’s passage “can almost be interpreted as an insult to the many who have suffered and continue to suffer from recent climate disasters,” said Jefferson Chua, campaigner at Greenpeace Philippines, referring to the six consecutive tropical cyclones that hit the country in late October and November 2024. “The president must use his significant influence to reverse this decision and improve the policy and infrastructure environment for renewable energy. His administration must mandate a net-zero target that would ensure the phase out of coal, oil and gas and start enabling the transition of energy systems towards a massive uptake of renewables,” he added. CEED’s Ariola said renewable energy should be the country’s “exit plan” from fossil-fuel dependence. “Without the Philippine government tapping our massive potential for renewable energy, we will always be in a revolving door with fossil fuels,” she said. “The industry will keep going back between coal and gas and probably, in the future, other false solutions, unless we’re able to displace them. Unless we allow renewable energy to become dominant.” Abanel, the fisher from Batangas, could only plead for the gas infrastructures in her community to cease operation and for the government to protect Verde Island Passage. “The life of Verde Island Passage is intertwined with our survival. If it gets destroyed, we’ll have nothing left,” she said. This article was originally published on Dialogue Earth under the Creative Commons BY NC ND licence.

Energy & Economics
 March 28, 2018, the US and Chinese flags and texts at a studio in Seoul, Korea. An illustrative editorial. trade war

International trade war - Spice Road against Silk Road

by Joon Seok Oh

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском AbstractPurpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the international political economy of Korea and its effects due to geopolitical tension between China and the USA. Design/methodology/approach Economic war between China and the USA has prolonged longer than expected. Aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, reforming the supply chain has been the centre of economic tension between China and the USA. Quite recently, with the rapid expansion of Chinese e-commerce platforms, distribution channels come upon a new economic tension between the two. And now is the time to pivot its pattern of conflict from competition into cooperation. In this end, economic diplomacy could be a useful means to give a signal of cooperation. From the view of economic diplomacy, this paper tries to analyse the projected transition of economic war between China and the USA with its implication on the trade policy of Korea. Findings As an implementation of economic diplomacy, China suggested the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), enhancing trade logistics among related countries to gain competitiveness. In 2023, the Biden administration suggested the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor as a counter to BRI, which will be a threshold for changing trade policy from economic war into economic diplomacy. As a result, it is expected China and the USA will expand their economic diplomacy in a way to promote economic cooperation among allied states, while the distribution channel war would continue to accelerate the economic tension between China and the USA. Korea has to prepare for and provide measures handling this geopolitical location in its trade policy or economic diplomacy. Originality/value This research contributes to the awareness and understanding of trade environments from the perspective of economic diplomacy. 1. Introduction The advent of globalisation has led to widespread economic integration, creating global production networks and markets. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has acted as a significant setback to this trend. In the wake of COVID-19, an economic war has arisen between China and the USA, centred on the restructuring of global supply chains following widespread disruptions. International political economy (IPE) examines the power dynamics between states and the structures of influence within regional economies. Consequently, economic diplomacy has gained unprecedented attention. Economic diplomacy focuses on government actions regarding international economic issues, distinct from political diplomacy through its market-oriented approach in foreign policy. Putnam (1988) categorises economic diplomacy into two levels: unilateralism and bilateralism. Unilateral economic diplomacy (or unilateralism) often relies on hard power, involving decisions on trade liberalisation or market protection without negotiation. Bilateral economic diplomacy (or bilateralism) or multilateral economic diplomacy (or multilateralism), by contrast, involves negotiation among trade partners, resulting in agreements such as regional or global free trade agreements (FTAs). A vast range of state or non-state actors engage in economic diplomacy, navigating the complex interplay between international and domestic factors. Defining economic diplomacy is extremely challenging, but one useful definition is “the broad concept of economic statecraft, where economic measures are taken in the pursuit of political goals, including punitive actions such as sanctions” (Blanchard and Ripsman, 2008).  Figure 1 Recent trend of economic diplomacy To exert influence internationally, ministers and heads of government strive to demonstrate their capacity for national security through two primary approaches, as shown in Figure 1 (above): economic war (or competition) and economic diplomacy (or international cooperation). In the context of global supply chain restructuring, the economic conflict between China and the USA has intensified, marked by threats of supply chain disruptions. This has led to emerging strategies aimed at “crowding out” the USA from global supply chains (去美戰略) or excluding China through alliances such as the Allied Supply Chain and Chip 4. While economic war is inherently “temporary” due to its painstaking nature, economic diplomacy or international cooperation offer a more “long-term” approach because it is gains-taking. This paper analyses the factors contributing to the prolonged nature of this economic war and explores potential outcomes of the supply chain tensions between China and the USA from the perspectives of IPE or geo-economics. In conclusion, it highlights the importance of preparing for trade policy adjustments and strategic economic diplomacy. 2. International trade war and strategic items2.1 Supply chain The supply chain encompasses a network of interconnected suppliers involved in each stage of production, from raw materials and components to the finished goods or services. This network can include vendors, warehouses, retailers, freight stations and distribution centres. Effective supply chain management is a “crucial process because an optimised supply chain results in lower costs and a more efficient production cycle” [1]. Within the supply chain, a leading company typically holds governance power, enabling it to coordinate scheduling and exercise control across the interconnected suppliers, resulting in reduced costs and shorter production times (Gereffi et al., 2005) [2]. Since the 2000s, forward and backward integration have been key strategies for managing time, cost and uncertainty in supply chains. For example, Toyota’s Just-In-Time (JIT) system demonstrated the efficiency of locally concentrated supply chains until disruptions from the 2011 East Japan Earthquake and the Thailand flood. Following supply chain shutdowns in 2020, many businesses shifted from local to global supply chains, utilising advancements of the information technology (IT) and transportation technologies to geographically diversify operations. As the need for a systematically functioning global supply chain has grown, a leading nation, much like a leading company, often assumes governance power in international trade and investment, as illustrated in Figure 2 (below), by aligning with the leadership of a dominant market competitiveness, which makes this leadership valuable.  Figure 2 Supply chain The COVID-19 pandemic dealt a severe blow to the global supply chain, causing sudden lockdowns that led to widespread supply chain disruptions. To mitigate the risks of future global disruptions, supply chains have begun restructuring to operate on a more regionally segmented basis. In this shift toward regional supply chains, China and the USA are at the centre, drawing allied countries within their spheres of influence. This alignment helps explain why the economic war between China and the USA has lasted longer than anticipated. 2.2 Strategic items China has restricted exports of two rare metals, gallium and germanium, which are critical to semiconductor production. Kraljic (1983) highlighted the importance of managing “strategic items” within the framework of supply chain management, as shown in Figure 3. Kraljic emphasises the need to strengthen and diversify critical items. The Kraljic matrix provides a valuable tool for identifying essential items that require focused management within the supply chain.  Figure 3 Kraljic matrix Kraljic identified the importance of managing “bottleneck items” in strategic supply chain management – items that present high supply risk but have relatively low business value. Due to the potential costs associated with non-delivery or compromised quality of strategic items, these must be closely monitored and controlled. From a risk management perspective, establishing medium-term business relationships and collaboration with suppliers is essential. For example, South Korea imports over 90% of its urea for agricultural and industrial purposes from China [3]. Heavily dependent on China for urea supplies due to pricing factors, Korea faced challenges when China imposed export controls on urea, underscoring Korea’s vulnerability within China’s sphere of influence. The European Union (EU) also faces challenges with critical raw materials (CRMs). China remains the EU’s sole supplier of processed rare earth elements, while Chile supplies 79% of its lithium. In response, the EU introduced the CRM Act (CRMA) to support projects aimed at increasing “the EU’s capacity to extract, process, and recycle strategic raw materials and diversify supplies from the third countries” [4]. 2.3 Resilient supply chain alliance In contrast to China’s approach of leveraging supply disruptions to strengthen its influence, the Biden administration in the USA has adopted a cooperative approach focused on building resilient supply chains (Pillar 2) through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which includes 14 member countries [5]. The need for resilient supply chains has been further underscored by the Russia–Ukraine crisis. The IPEF aims to address supply chain vulnerabilities by fostering global efforts to reduce risks associated with concentrated, fragile supply chains [6].  Figure 4 Resilient supply chain alliance In Figure 4, the EU Commission presented the Single Market Emergency Instrument (SMEI) in September 2022, a crisis governance framework designed to ensure the availability of essential goods and services during future emergencies. The SMEI operates on three levels: contingency planning, vigilance and emergency. The contingency planning phase focuses on collaboration among member states to mitigate supply chain disruption and monitor incidents. The vigilance phase can be activated when a significant disruption is anticipated, enabling specific measures such as mapping and monitoring supply chains and production capacities. Finally, the emergency phase is activated in cases of severe disruption to the functioning of the single market [7]. Establishing a resilient supply chain through international cooperation may be appealing, yet the reality often falls short of the ambition. In South Korea, the IPEF took effect on 17 April 2024, after an extended negotiation process, marking the first multilateral agreement on supply chains. As a result, during non-crisis periods, the 14 member countries will collaborate to strengthen international trade, investment and trade logistics. In times of crisis, member countries will activate a “crisis response network”. Conversely, opportunities for negotiation with China, South Korea’s largest trading partner, are essential for building supply chain resilience [8]. China has pursued an industrial policy focused on enhancing its supply chain management capabilities. In the semiconductor sector, the decoupling between China and the USA has become increasingly evident. Contrary to expectations, China has adopted a policy of internalising its supply chains, returning to the integration strategies of the 2000s rather than furthering globalisation. A promising opportunity for transformation between the two countries has emerged recently. Since 2015, China and South Korea have maintained bilateral FTA, and with the second phase of FTA negotiations currently underway, there is an opportunity to strengthen trade and investment ties, fostering positive progress through international cooperation. 2.4 China manufacturing exodus During the COVID-19 pandemic, China imposed sudden lockdowns without prior notice or preparation, halting production and logistics cycles. This “zero COVID” policy may have triggered a shift towards “de-risking” China from supply chain disruptions. Although China still offers significant advantages as “the factory of the world,” with vast market potential, prolonged trade tensions with the USA, intensified during the Trump administration, have prompted global manufacturers with substantial USA market bases to relocate operations amid rising geopolitical uncertainties. For example, Nike and Adidas have shifted much of their footwear manufacturing to Vietnam, Apple has begun iPhone production at a Foxconn in Chennai, India, and AstraZeneca has contracted production with India’s Serum Institute. In the pre-globalised era, defining the Rule of Origin (ROO) was straightforward, as a product’s components were usually manufactured and assembled within a single country. However, with the complexity of global supply chains, particularly since 2012, determining ROO has become a time-consuming and subjective process. ROO are classified as either non-preferential or preferential. The USA applies non-preferential ROO to restrict imports from countries like Cuba, Iran and North Korea, while offering trade preference programmes for others. Preferential ROO are used to determine duty-free eligibility for imports from approved countries [9], whereas non-preferential ROO play a crucial role in “country of origin labelling, government procurement, enforcement of trade remedy actions, compilation of trade statistics, supply chain security issues.” [10] China manufacturing exodus may negatively impact capital inflows into Hong Kong, traditionally seen as the Gateway to China. In 2023, Hong Kong’s initial public offering volume fell to a 20-year low of $5.9bn [11]. While China-oriented business remains in Hong Kong, which returns fully to Chinese control in 2047, non-China-oriented businesses have migrated to Singapore. As the certainty of contract and ownership rights forms the foundation of capitalism, this capital flight from Hong Kong is likely to persist. 3. Trade logistics and economic corridors Globalisation has allowed supply chains to leverage interdependence and interconnectedness, maximising efficiency. However, while these efficiencies have been beneficial, they have also created a fertile ground for friction between trade partners due to a “survival of the fittest” mindset and the principle of “winner takes all.” This interdependence has also highlighted vulnerabilities; the global supply chain struggled to manage the disruptions caused by COVID-19, prompting a shift towards regional integration initiatives, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. As the global economy seeks stability, collaboration over competition has become increasingly essential, with economic diplomacy emerging as a priority. The prolonged economic war between China and the USA arguably needs to shift towards economic diplomacy. The global supply chain is restructuring into regional supply chains, building resilience by operating in regional segments that can withstand crises. Michael Porter introduced the concept of value chain as “a set of activities that a firm performs to deliver a valuable product or service to the market.” [12] Complex finished goods often depend on global value chains, traversing multiple countries. As shown in Figure 5, the value chain consists of supply chain and trade channel components. While the focus has traditionally been on which country holds lead status within a regional supply chain, the emphasis is now shifting to how these regional segments can be interconnected and relayed. In this context, the supply chain competition may evolve into a “channel war” in international trade, where trade logistics will centre on the internal flow of goods, standardising channel processes and establishing authority over these channels.  Figure 5 Supply chain v. trade channel 3.1 Trade logistics It is natural for governments to seek environments that enhance competitiveness within in their countries. In terms of trade, effective trade logistics are essential for maintaining competitive advantage. As a prerequisite, a strong IT management infrastructure is indispensable. As shown in Figure 6, trade logistics encompass the internal flow of goods to market, integrating physical infrastructure with operating software – such as transport hubs, warehouses, highways, ports, terminals, trains and shipping vessels. Key areas of conflict in trade logistics involve the standardisation of channel processes and determining who holds governance over operation of these logistics systems. This is equally relevant within the digital economy. Recently, Chinese e-commerce – often referred to as C-commerce – has aggressively sought to gain control over digital distribution channels, interconnected delivery networks and trade logistics via digital platforms. Chinese platforms such as Taobao, Temu and AliExpress are actively working to increase their monthly active users (MAUs), positing themselves as counterweights to USA-based platforms such as Amazon and eBay in digital trade [13].  Figure 6 Trade logistics When the agenda of establishing international trade logistics is introduced to relevant trade members across various countries, initial progress and effective responses are often achieved. However, efforts soon encounter obstacles related to standardising logistics processes and establishing operational governance. Greater reliance on international institutions could help resolve these issues (Bayne, 2017). Yet governments frequently prioritise domestic interests, and after prolonged negotiations, the risk of international agreements failing increases. Amid the economic war between China and the USA, China launched a trade logistics initiative known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or One Belt One Road, in 2013. Often referred to as the New Silk Road, the BRI aims to establish economic corridors for trade logistics. The World Bank estimates that the BRI could boost trade flows by 4.1% and reduce trade costs by 1.1% [14]. In response, the Biden administration proposed the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in September 2023 to strengthen transport and communication links between Europe and Asia as a countermeasure to China’s BRI. IMEC has been well received by participating countries, with expectations of fostering economic growth, enhancing connectivity and potentially rebalancing trade and economic relations between the EU and China [15]. Both BRI and IMEC are ambitious projects aimed at boosting international trade through substantial investments in trade logistics infrastructure. Each seeks to assert governance over international trade channels, signalling that the supply chain war may soon evolve into a trade channel war between China and the USA. 3.2 Economic corridors Economic corridors are transport networks designed to support and facilitate the movement of goods, services, people and information. These corridors often include integrated infrastructure, such as highways, railways and ports, linking cities or even countries (Octaviano and Trishia, 2014). They are typically established to connect manufacturing hubs, high-supply and high-demand areas, and producers of value-added goods. Economic corridors comprise both hard infrastructure – such as trade facilities – and soft infrastructure, including trade facilitation and capacity-building measures. The Asian Development Bank introduced the term “economic corridor” in 1998 to describe networks connecting various economic agents within a region [16]. Economic corridors are integrated trade logistics networks, providing essential infrastructure for connecting regional segments of supply chains. As supply chains increasingly operate in regional “chunks,” linking these segments becomes ever more important. Economic corridors typically include a network of transport infrastructure, such as highways, railways, terminals and ports. Initiatives like the BRI and IMEC use economic corridors as instruments of economic diplomacy, shifting strategies from hard power to soft power, as shown in Figure 7. Because less-developed or developing countries often lack sufficient funding to invest in trade logistics, they tend to welcome these initiatives from developed countries, which offer international collaboration and support. However, these initiatives usually come with the condition that participating countries must accept standardised trade processes and governance led by the sponsoring developed country.  Figure 7 Economic corridor initiatives as economic diplomacy To succeed, economic corridors must meet three key conditions [17]. First, government intervention is essential, as economic corridor initiatives primarily involve public infrastructure investments beyond the scope of the private sector. In realising these projects, governments must reconcile three tensions to ensure their policies are mutually supportive: tensions between politics and economics, between international and domestic pressures and between governments and other stakeholders. Second, intermediate outcomes should be measured and demonstrated as results of economic corridors, allowing participants to experience tangible benefits throughout these longer-term projects. Finally, economic corridors should deliver broader benefits. Participants need incentives to utilise the infrastructure sustainably. These benefits may extend beyond economic welfare, such as wages and income, to include social inclusion, equity and environmental gains, which support the long-term viability of the infrastructure. 4. BRI vs IMEC4.1 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - Silk Road The BRI can be a modern-day realisation of the Silk Road concept, connecting Europe as a market base with China as a production base. Unlike the ancient Silk Road, which connected trade routes across Eurasia, the BRI poses potential challenges due to its extensive connectivity. Firstly, there are social and environmental externalities, such as increased congestion and accidents from concentrating traffic flows through limited links and nodes within trade networks. Secondly, while the connectivity may benefit the production and market bases at either end, regions situated between these hubs, through which highways and railways pass, may gain minimal advantage. Thirdly, there is often a mismatch between where costs and benefits are realised. Transit regions that facilitate network traffic often see fewer direct benefits compared to high-density nodes within the network. 4.2 India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) - The Spice Road The ancient Spice Roads once connected the Middle East and Northeast Africa with Europe, facilitating the exchange of goods such as cinnamon, ginger, pepper and cassia, which, like silk, served as a form of currency. The IMEC proposes a modern route from India to Europe through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Israel and Greece. Since its announcement in September 2023, some regional experts have expressed reservations about its feasibility, particularly regarding the connection between the Middle East and Israel. The project has faced delays due to the Israel–Hamas war. Despite these challenges, IMEC holds potential to drive economic growth and strengthen connectivity, especially as countries like Vietnam and India emerge as alternative manufacturing bases for companies relocating from China. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, IMEC is not viewed as a challenge to China but rather as an opportunity to diversify their economies and solidify their roles within the Middle East region [18]. 5. Conclusion A new trade war between China and the USA has begun, with the Biden Administration’s introduction of IMEC as a counter to China’s BRI. This shift could soon transform the nature of economic war from a focus on supply chains to one on trade channels. The China manufacturing exodus was further accelerated by supply disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Amidst the economic tensions between China and the USA, the restructuring of global supply chains into regional networks has made significant progress. With China maintaining its stance on export controls for strategic items, South Korea must prepare for resilient supply chain management. In relation to China–Korea FTA, which is currently undergoing its second phase of negotiation, South Korea should seek clarity on the transparency of China’s strategic item controls. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) plays a key role in monitoring the quality of inbound investments; similarly, South Korea is experiencing increased inbound investment due to the manufacturing shift from China and should apply similar standards to evaluate investment quality. This emerging economic war between China and the USA is now marked by the competing initiatives of the BRI and IMEC. The BRI can be viewed as a modern Silk Road, linking China with Europe, while the IMEC seeks to establish a trade logistics corridor connecting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and Greece. The South Korean Government should take proactive steps to prepare for the evolving dynamics of the trade war between China and the USA. CitationOh, J.S. (2025), "International trade war - Spice Road against Silk Road", International Trade, Politics and Development, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 2-11. https://doi.org/10.1108/ITPD-06-2024-0031  Notes 1. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/supplychain.asp2. According to Gary Gereffi et al, 5 governance types of a lead company could be categorised as market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchy.3. Korea imports urea from 12 countries including Qatar, Vietnam, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, in addition to China.4. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/strategic-projects-under-crma_en5. IPEF was launched on May 23,2022 at Tokyo. 14 member countries are Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and the USA. 4 Pillar of IPEF are Trade (Pillar 1), Supply Chain (Pillar 2),Clean Economy (Pillar 3) and Fair Economy (Pillar 4).6. Critics say “lack of substantive actions and binding commitments, instead focusing on process-driven framework building.” https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/its-time-ipef-countries-take-action-supply-chain-resilience7. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_54438. As of 2023, the first-largest trade partner of Korea is China (Trade volume of $267.66bn), the second is the US ($186.96bn) and the third is Vietnam ($79.43bn)9. As preferential ROO contain the labour value content requirement in the USMCA, it could increase compliance costs for importers. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL3452410. USITC(1996), Country of Origin Marking: Review of Laws, Regulations and Practices, USITC Publication 2975, July, pp. 2–411. https://www.barrons.com/articles/hong-kong-financial-center-china-46ba5d3612. Porter identifies a value chain broken in five primary activities: inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and post-sale services. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/concepts_approaches_in_gvc_research_final_april_18.pdf13. MAU is a metric commonly used to identify the number of unique users who engage with apps and website. MAU is an important measurement to the level of platform competitiveness in the digital trade logistics or e-commerce industry.14. https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2019/12/china-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-global-chemical-industry.html15. https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2023/10/the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-prospects-and-challenges-for-us-businesses16. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), which first used the term in 1998, defines economic corridors as important networks or connections between economic agents along a defined geography, which link the supply and demand sides of markets. http://research.bworldonline.com/popular-economics/story.php?id=350&title=Economic-corridors-boost-markets,-living-conditions17. Legovini et al. (2020) comments traditional cross border agreements of transport investment focuses only on a narrow set of direct benefits and cost. However, economic corridors can entail much wider economic benefits and costs such as trade and economic activity, structural change, poverty reduction, pollution and deforestation.18. Arab Centre Washington D.C. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-geopolitics-of-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/ References Bayne, N. (2017), Challenge and Response in the New Economic Diplomacy, 4th ed., The New Economic Diplomacy, Routledge, London, p. 19.Blanchard, J.M.F. and Ripsman, N.M. (2008), “A political theory of economic statecraft”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 4, pp. 371-398, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00076.x.Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005), “The governance of value chain”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 78-104, doi: 10.1080/09692290500049805.Kraljic, P. (1983), “Purchasing must be supply management”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 61 No. 5, September.Legovini, A., Duhaut, A. and Bougna, T. (2020), “Economic corridors-transforming the growth potential of transport investments”, p. 10.Octaviano, B.Y. and Trishia, P. (2014), Economic Corridors Boost Markets, Living Conditions, Business World Research, Islamabad, October.United States International Trade Commission (USITC) (1996), “Country of origin marking: Review of Laws, Regulations, and Practices”, USITC Publication, Vol. 2975, July, pp. 2-4.Further readingPorter, M. (1985), Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, Free Press.Putman, R.D. (1988), “Diplomacy and domestic politics; the logic of two-level games”, International Organization, Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 427-600.USITC (2019), “Global value chain analysis: concepts and approaches”, Journal of International Commerce and Economics, April, pp. 1-29.

Energy & Economics
Press Conference by European Commission President Ursula von der LEYEN and Mario DRAGHI on the Report on the Future of EU Competitiveness in Brussels, Belgium on September 9, 2024.

European Competitiveness at Stake: Industrial and Technological Challenges

by Federico Castiglioni

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction  On 7 April 2025, the Italian Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Dutch Clingendael Institute co-hosted the fourth edition of the Van Wittel/Vanvitelli Roundtable, which is becoming a major recurring event in the policy dialogue between Italy and the Netherlands. The meeting, co-organized by the two policy institutes, took place at the Italian School of Public Administration in Caserta (NA, Italy), bringing together a broad array of stakeholders including experts from academia, think tanks, ministries and civil society.1 This year’s roundtable focused on the critical intersections between industrial innovation, technological sovereignty and (open) strategic autonomy, underlining the urgent need to strengthen linkages between these domains within the broader European framework. Held under the Chatham House Rule and by invitation only, the event created a space for frank and forwardlooking exchanges on how both Italy and the Netherlands can safeguard their national interests while contributing constructively to the collective resilience and strategic capacity of the European Union. One of the most relevant outcomes of this edition was the joint endorsement of a proposal to develop a bilateral policy paper aimed at strengthening collaboration between the two countries, while also feeding into ongoing EU-level initiatives.  1. Increasing security and reducing dependencies The dialogue began with a reflection on the pressing geopolitical challenges facing the European Union. Participants broadly acknowledged that escalating tensions between the United States and China, including an increasingly protectionist American posture – as seen during and potentially following the Trump administration – pose risks for Europe’s role in the international order. The possibility of a global trade war, alongside the gradual withdrawal of the US from traditional multilateralism, is both a threat and a wake-up call for Europe. In the last months, the challenge has become particularly serious, as the US administration threatened multiple times to impose high tariffs on EU products. Rather than becoming collateral damage in this global rivalry, Europe should take active steps to strengthen its strategic positioning and develop a strategy to counter and deter coercion from third countries. This goal, the participants argued, requires avoiding marginalisation through enhanced internal cohesion, greater autonomy from external suppliers, and the ability to act collectively on the world stage. In this light, there was widespread agreement that bilateral relationships such as the one between Italy and the Netherlands can serve as essential building blocks in shaping Europe’s capacity to act with strategic clarity and operational effectiveness.  In the event of a global trade war, another source of instability could come from China. If the US markets shut its doors, China would be faced with an overproduction capacity, due to the misplacement of all the goods destined to the US economy. In this scenario, the only option for Beijing would be to flow the same commodities to Europe, thereby saturating the market and curbing EU competitiveness. This scenario must be avoided. The solution can be only a tough but necessary negotiation with the US to avoid a dramatic fragmentation of global trade. The EU should act reasonably and try to persuade Washington of the existing nexus between global trade, wealth and political stability. The negotiation should start from the assumption that the transatlantic trade with the United States is much smaller than trade within the European Union. As a consequence, all the EU member states have a practical convenience in standing together and speaking with Washington with one voice. The formal and exclusive competence that the Commission holds in the commercial field, granted by the EU Treaties, should be therefore supported politically at the highest levels. At the same time, the Commission and the member states should focus on: 1) developing bilateral agreements with like-minded countries worldwide which believe in open and fair trade; 2) removing non-tariff barriers inside the internal market to boost competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The second point is particularly important, as the Commission needs to make the bloc more resilient to external shocks through a set of instruments aimed at enhancing strategic autonomy in a framework of necessary global interdependence.  Indeed, the recipe to achieve this goal has been already identified in the Letta and Draghi reports, which offer sound analyses and strategic directions for European industrial and economic policy. Despite these clear guidelines, the participants’ consensus was that implementation today remains inconsistent due to poor coordination among member states and institutional inertia. It was argued that meaningful progress depends on increased financial support, forward-looking strategic planning and, crucially, the formation of coalitions among like-minded EU member states – especially when the broader EU framework falls short. A recurring theme throughout the discussion was Europe’s evolving role as a global actor; if the ambitions of the bloc go beyond playing the role of an excellent regulatory power, the EU must position itself as a mediator and real broker in a multipolar world. Italy and the Netherlands, with their strong institutional, industrial and diplomatic assets, are natural complimentary partners in this effort, and can help the EU agenda in many respects. One dimension obviously pivotal for both the Union and its member states is the future of our economies. In this regard, participants insisted on the need to place industrial policy at the very heart of Europe’s strategic agenda. The capacity to maintain economic leadership, social cohesion and democratic vitality depends in no small part rests on the continent’s ability to manufacture, innovate and compete. A number of shared structural challenges – most prominently energy affordability, demographic change and the digital transition – must be tackled through integrated strategies that involve both public and private actors. The traditional rigid separation between public sector policy and private investment is therefore outdated and counterproductive. Today’s complex challenges require unified action driven by shared objectives. The Italy–Netherlands partnership, in this context, was identified as a potential nucleus for a new wave of EU-wide strategic thinking. These two countries already hold considerable influence in different sectors and can use their complementary strengths to demonstrate the added value of bilateral cooperation for the entire EU. By jointly addressing pressing infrastructure needs, advancing cooperation on research and innovation, and fostering deeper market integration, Italy and the Netherlands could set a precedent for other mid-sized EU member states. The panel was concluded by a call to action: to jointly draft a detailed position paper, developed in direct dialogue with the European Commission, to define shared priorities and propose concrete initiatives. This policy paper would focus on key areas such as advanced technologies, green innovation, the energy transition and the pursuit of strategic autonomy – laying the foundations for a resilient and forward-looking Europe. Italy and the Netherlands, as major industrial powerhouses, can give a significant contribution, as they already did in the past. 2. Innovation and strategic sectors: Agriculture, defence and semiconductors The second part of the discussion focused on innovation as a cornerstone of European competitiveness. While there was strong recognition of the EU’s ambition in this domain, participants pointed to significant structural weaknesses, particularly underinvestment in research and development and fragmented policy implementation. The Chips Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act were cited as important legislative efforts, but whose success will depend on coherent action across all member states and the mobilisation of private capital and expertise. Among the strategic sectors identified for both countries, agriculture stood out as a particularly relevant case. Agriculture in fact embodies both industrial potential and the need for open strategic autonomy – especially in the context of international trade developments, such as those stemming from EU-Mercosur negotiations and US demands to open European agricultural markets. Italy and the Netherlands are major players in this field. According to Eurostat data, the Netherlands is one of the top three agricultural exporters in the EU, while Italy ranks among the leaders in high-quality agricultural production and is a world leader in agri-food machinery. These comparative advantages create space for deep, complementary cooperation. Participants stressed the need to build a joint framework focused on food quality, innovation testing and the harmonisation of production systems. The Netherlands was recognised for its leadership in digitalisation and agri-tech innovation, while Italy’s sophisticated machinery sector was seen as critical for enabling largescale adoption of new technologies. Importantly, agricultural innovation was also viewed as essential for climate adaptation. With the increasing scarcity of water and the shrinking availability of arable land, Europe’s food systems must evolve to remain viable and resilient. The digital transformation of agriculture, through the adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) and data-driven solutions, presents opportunities to increase productivity and sustainability. However, it also raises challenges, including the need to ensure equitable access to vital semiconductors in order to build digital infrastructure and to address skills gaps in digital literacy. Semiconductors in particular, the hardware backbone of all digital systems, were identified as a cross-cutting capability essential not only to agriculture but to broader industrial policy. For Italy and the Netherlands, enhancing national capacity in this field aligns with the strategic goal of technological sovereignty. Another core issue raised was the generational transition in agriculture. As rural populations age, the sector should be made more appealing to younger, highly educated individuals. This requires a cultural shift: reframing agriculture as a highvalue and socially meaningful profession. The traditional image of the isolated farmer must give way to a narrative that resonates with environmentally conscious youth who see value in returning to the land. However, this shift requires careful policy design to reconcile environmental goals with economic sustainability. Specific strategies were discussed for supporting small farms, which often lack access to advanced technology, and for incentivising large-scale producers to integrate sustainable practices. Italy’s prominence in agricultural machinery offers a further avenue for international engagement. Expanding innovation to developing countries through machinery exports and technical cooperation could support global food security while reinforcing Europe’s leadership. In closing, participants linked these reflections back to the broader topic of European security and defence. The defence industry and the cybersecurity domain face similar issues of dependency and vulnerability. Strategic autonomy in these sectors is not only about accessing raw materials but about entire supply chains – from design and production to deployment. Both Italy and the Netherlands are well-positioned to lead within a broader European effort to secure these strategic infrastructures. Conclusions The roundtable concluded by reaffirming the centrality of the economic dimension to the future of Europe. A clear and robust industrial strategy must return to the forefront of EU policymaking. In the absence of an effective industrial policy framework, too much responsibility remains at the national level, creating disparities and inefficiencies. Europe must shift from aspirational rhetoric to operational pragmatism, investing decisively in sectors that underpin its long-term resilience. The cooperation between the public and private sectors is essential. Both Italy and the Netherlands are undergoing parallel transitions – digital, environmental and demographic. These must be tackled simultaneously, as none can be deprioritised. Change will require acknowledgment of systemic constraints. Among the most urgent priorities is the cost of energy, which undermines industrial competitiveness across Europe. Italy is particularly affected due to its structural vulnerabilities, but this is a shared European challenge. Energy prices must be drastically reduced, and a fully functioning internal (energy) market must be established. Demographic decline poses a new challenge. Unlike previous decades, the EU must now envision growth in a context of population shrinkage. The only answer to this unprecedented challenge lays in innovation, accessible energy and a revitalised industrial base. Hence, the call for new models and economic frameworks capable of adapting to shrinking labour markets while maintaining living standards. Ultimately, the Van Wittell/Vanvitelli Roundtable highlighted that the EU should engage proactively the US to avoid a global trade crisis and forge alliances with like-minded and complementary world players. With the contribution of two important actors such as Italy and the Netherlands, the EU can find new pathways to open strategic autonomy and long-term prosperity. *Updated 23 May 2025 Report of the fourth edition of the Van Wittel/Vanvitelli Roundtable organised at the Italian School of Public Administration in Caserta on 7 April 2025 by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Clingendael Institute. Paper produced in the framework of the project “Van Wittel/Vanvitelli Roundtable”. The project has benefited from the financial support of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Policy Planning Unit of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI) pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967, and the Compagnia di San Paolo Foundation. The views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. References 1 - A video of the closing remarks by Antonio Tajani, Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and Caspar Veldkamp, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, is available here: https://www.youtube.com/live/mqhfJfW-4s8.

Energy & Economics
Container ship in import export and business logistic, By crane, Trade Port, Shipping cargo to harbor, Aerial view from drone, International transportation, Business logistics concept

The ‘Phony War’: Tariffs as prelude to a US recession

by Dame DeAnne Julius

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The tariff war launched by US President Donald Trump has entered a phony war stage. But the next six months will reveal the true impact of a threatened trade war. The 8-month period in 1939–40 after Hitler’s invasion of Poland but before major Nazi attacks on the Allies was called the ‘phony war’. It was a time of high uncertainty but relative calm, with a hope in some quarters that the worst risks had been avoided. Today, the pace of the tariff war launched by US President Donald Trump on ‘Liberation Day’ seems to be following the same trajectory. The reaction of ‘shock and awe’ at the pace of action during Trump’s first hundred days culminated with the 2 April announcement of ‘reciprocal tariffs’ imposed on friends and foes alike. The president used executive orders as his legal tool, and Truth Social as his personal communications channel, to dominate the news and evade normal checks and balances. His new tariff regime threw financial markets into a panic and threatened complex global supply chains. A tit-for-tat escalation of tariffs on China added fuel to the fire. Then, within days, the phony war period began with the pausing of most threatened tariffs and the partial reductions negotiated with China. This buoyed the financial markets, reassuring some that the disruptions of President Trump’s first hundred days were part of a strategy that would settle into a pattern of more deals and less economic damage. The partial trade deal with the UK was reassuring, while the latest skirmish between the US and the EU keeps suspense high. But postponing the application of threatened tariffs is more of a ceasefire in Trump’s trade war, not a resolution. Much less a surrender. Positive signs, but backward looking Recent data provide some superficial reasons to be positive about the health of the US economy. US corporate earnings in the first quarter came in mostly on track. Share prices of big tech companies have regained much of the value they had lost in the wake of Liberation Day. US inflation fell slightly in April to an annual rate of 2.3 per cent, showing little sign of impact from tariffs. Even the unwelcome surprise of the 0.3 per cent fall in first quarter GDP (on an annual basis) was partly explained by a surge in imports as US companies built up their inventories to prepare for the tariff threat. All of this data, of course, is backward looking. There are early indications, and strong reasons to believe, that the real damage is yet to come and that the US is entering a period of stagflation that will lead to a recession by the end of this year. Inflation prospects First, consider inflation. While in May the Consumer Price Index (CPI) fell slightly compared to a year ago, it ticked up slightly in April compared to a month ago. That was a reversal in  the first monthly reading after the Liberation Day announcements. The widely watched survey of US consumer sentiment produced by the University of Michigan hit a near record low in May, sliding to 50.8 – just shy of the all-time low seen in June 2022. The survey pinpointed tariffs as leading to that decline in confidence, based on worries about a renewed surge of inflation.  The same survey of expected inflation 12 months ahead rose to an astonishing 7.3 per cent, up from 6.5 per cent expected in April. Were that to become reality it would be the US’s highest level since 1981. Businesses too are concerned. The chief executive of Walmart has warned that ‘even at reduced levels, the higher tariffs will result in higher prices.’ The Yale Budget Lab estimates that the overall US effective tariff rate is now 17.8 per cent compared to 2.5 per cent when President Trump took office in January. There can be little doubt that such a jump in tariffs will spur a rise in inflation in the coming months. A further risk will develop if the large tax cut  package under consideration by Congress results in a substantial rise in the government deficit, which is already running close to 7 per cent of GDP this year. Moody’s credit rating agency downgraded its AAA rating on US government debt in May.  The labour market is tight, with unemployment hovering around 4 per cent.  Fiscal stimulus applied to an economy that is near full employment is a classic recipe for higher inflation. While these risks remain, it is unlikely that the US Federal Reserve will be quick to cut interest rates. Indeed, in its May meeting, it voted to leave interest rates on hold, despite calls from President Trump to lower them. Fed Chair Jerome Powell said ‘We can move quickly when that’s appropriate, but we think right now the appropriate thing to do is wait and see how things evolve.’ This is the prudent policy when there are two-sided risks in a stagflationary environment. Growth prospects Now consider the prospects for growth, where expectations and international repercussions are especially important. The drop in consumer confidence has been cited above.  Many large companies declined to provide sales or earnings forecasts with their Q1 results due to the uncertain environment. The chief executive of Maersk, the global shipping giant, warned that world trade volumes could contract by up to 4 per cent this year – compared to their previous projection of 4 per cent growth. Exports account for 29 per cent of global GDP. A contraction in global trade would represent a global supply shock to growth, not only for the US but especially for trade-intensive countries and regions such as the EU. The end of the ‘phony war’ As July approaches and the tariff ceasefires are due to end, this ‘phony war’ period will evolve into a spreading recognition of the real economic consequences of a trade war. Between now and then, the US may sign a few more deals. But current negotiations with the EU have stalled, provoking new threats by the US and then an agreed deadline of 9 July for more negotiations. Even if a short-term EU–US deal can be agreed, it will still leave US tariffs on EU goods substantially higher than before. Anxiety will build, stockpiles of imported goods will be running down, and businesses will see profits fall. Meanwhile, the US debt ceiling of $36 trillion is fast approaching and a Congressional agreement will be needed sometime between mid–July and early October if the US is to avoid default, according to the Bipartisan Policy Center. The usual brinkmanship will roil financial markets. These next six months will reveal the true impact of the threatened trade war. Uncertainty will give way to damage limitation in the form of higher prices to reflect higher costs, lower consumer demand and postponed investment.  The likelihood of two or three more quarters of below zero growth in the US is high. The irony is that as long as the US consumes more than it produces, higher US tariffs will do little to shrink the US trade deficit. But a tariff-induced recession in the US probably will.  

Energy & Economics
New York City, New York, USA - January 18 2025: Sign with the words,

Donald Trump, the revolt of the lower middle class and the next phase of European integration

by Klaus Welle

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract The defining political shift of our era is the revolt of the lower middle class. Much more exposed than the better-off to the succession of crises in recent years—from the financial crisis to uncontrolled migration, from Covid-19 to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—the lower middle class is turning to the populist right and its promise of protection by closure. Unlike the US first-past-the-post system, the EU’s institutional framework emphasises compromise and cross-party cooperation and thus offers a critical buffer against this wave of disruption. But this is not enough to protect our post-1945 political order, which is based on parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and European integration, from both internal and external threats. The EU needs a bold agenda that focuses on competitiveness, growth, migration and defence, all of which are crucial to strengthening our continent. Introduction1 Once is an accident, twice the new normal. With his electoral success, Donald Trump is the new reality in the US, not just an aberration. Trump obviously understands his time better than anybody else, which ensured him his comeback as president of the US, elected by the people against seemingly overwhelming legal and political resistance. He is the new rule of the game, like it or not. The revolt of the lower middle classWhat is the new reality? The party political system in the US and Europe has been fundamentally transformed by the revolt of the lower middle class. Voter analyses in several European countries give a clear picture: in France, Marine Le Pen and the National Rally (Rassemblement National) represent the ‘défavorisés’ like no other party and have replaced in that function the traditional left. Le Pen is successful in the former Communist heartland and mining territory of northern France, where she also assured her own seat in parliament (Ipsos 2024). Similarly, Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) is electorally over-represented among workers and the unemployed and those with below average incomes and education (Moreau 2024a). And the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) rallies the workers too (Moreau 2024b). This should not come as a big surprise. Right-wing populist parties have been recognised in political science as unconventional workers’ parties for more than a decade (Rydgren 2013). And the transformation of the political space in Europe has been ongoing for more than a decade as well. European Parliament elections are an excellent monitor of the overall situation in Europe and the member states. The outcome of the 2024 European Parliament elections shows us a political space that is basically divided into three parts. One-third of the members now sit on the left, organised in the Green, Socialist and Left groups; a good third are in the centre, encompassing the Liberals and the Christian Democrat European People’s Party (EPP); and close to a third now belong to the populist and radical right (European Parliament 2024). In the US, Trump’s success was assured in 2016 through gains in the ‘rustbelt states’, formerly the Democrat Party’s heartland. In 2020 Joe Biden was able to narrowly turn the tide. With his credibility among workers—acquired over decades through close cooperation with the trade unions—he was able to achieve what presidential candidates from liberal New York and California, Hillary Clinton and Kamala Harris, could not. The Republican Party today is the Make America Great Again Party. It is the party of Donald Trump. The Republican Party of Ronald Reagan and George Bush does not exist anymore. The party that used to represent the highly skilled today represents and owes its electoral success to the lower-skilled working class. ‘National security Republicans’ have lost their political home. Why is the lower middle class revolting? The lower middle class can be identified as those whose economic situation is tense. In other words, they have no financial buffer and anything unexpected happening can push them over the edge. In the US, this group, known as those living ‘from paycheque to paycheque’, is considered to comprise 25% to 30% of the population. A single paycheque not arriving might force people belonging to this group to sell their car; several paycheques not arriving might oblige them to sell their house (Bank of America Institute 2024). Ever since the financial crisis that started in 2008, we have gone in Europe from crisis to crisis. The drawn-out financial crisis was followed by uncontrolled migration as a consequence of Russia’s bombardment of big cities in Syria, and this was followed by Covid-19 and then Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which caused major spikes in energy and food prices and another massive wave of migration. What we call a ‘crisis’ might equally be considered a lack in performance of the system overall and an indication of increasing loss of control. Russia is being aggressive militarily and in other ways because it believes it can do so and get away with it. External borders prove time and time again to be porous. After the Second World War, the German economy grew by an average of about 5% per year; but in the last five years, this has dropped to 0% and even into the negative. What can be weathered by the better-off is an existential challenge for the lower middle class. If you are not already on the housing ladder by luck of birth, it is increasingly difficult to get onto. The social elevator is stuttering. And while migration is perceived by the upper middle class as the promise of affordable personal services today and care in old age later, for the lower middle class it means competition for affordable housing and state services, and the risk of decreasing educational standards for children in their lower-income living areas. German sociologist Andreas Reckwitz (2020) describes the experience of the lower middle class as one of a double devaluation: economic and cultural. It is economic because formerly well-paid industrial workers are falling increasingly behind the new university-educated service class. And it is cultural because their system of traditional values is regarded as outdated and destined to be superseded. From a horizontal to a vertical understanding of the party political system The traditional horizontal classification of parties on a left to right axis is very misleading now. To understand what is happening, we need to replace the traditional horizontal classification with a vertical one based on social status, income and education. On the basis of the 2021 German federal election and data provided by the Bundestag (data no longer available online) and others (Focus online 2021), we can construct such a vertical system for Germany: 1. Greens and liberals represent younger voters, with a very good income in the case of the liberals and an average income, but outstanding level of education, when it comes to the greens, the new party of the Bildungsbürgertum (the very well-educated). These voters can together be considered the upper middle class and the most dynamic part of society.2. The traditional people’s parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, become more popular the older the cohort, with their popularity rocketing among those above 70 years old. The income levels of the voters of these parties are average, as is their education, and this voter base is shrinking. These parties represent the middle class.3. The Left (Die Linke) is over-represented among academics and the unemployed; its electorate has a below-average income. The extreme-right AfD is over-represented among workers, the unemployed and people of working age. The educational levels of these voters are low, and their household incomes are below average. The Left and the AfD both represent the lower middle class. The part of the lower middle class that is represented by the populist right is being promised protection by closure. Right-wing populism is therefore ‘social nationalism’. But it is not just about the programme. Bringing that new coalition of various social groups together is facilitated by charismatic leadership: Trump is a charismatic leader in the sense of Max Weber (1921); and he finds his European equivalents in the likes of Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, Marine Le Pen and Viktor Orbán. Moreover, the dominance of social media over the traditional media has dramatically decreased the cost of political organisation and provided a chance for newcomers to establish themselves. Social media have also normalised hate, which was banned from the traditional media for very good reasons after the dramatic experiences of racism, National Socialism and Communism in the twentieth century. Political parties based on portraying political adversaries as enemies in the tradition of Carl Schmitt (2007) are profiting more than any other from these new tools. What differentiates Europe from the US? Party political competition in the US If we are observing a revolt of the lower middle class in both the US and Europe, why has the impact been so different up to now? In the US the first-past-the-post system forces everybody to integrate into one of the two major political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans. Both parties therefore represent very large coalitions, which essentially serve an electoral purpose only and cannot be considered programme parties. The fight for content takes place mainly within, among the different caucuses organised in Congress. What you would find in the European Parliament in the EPP, the European Conservatives and Reformists, the Patriots and the Sovereigntists is, in the US, all assembled in one political family, the Republicans. Equally, what you would find in the liberal Renew group, the Socialists and Democrats, the Greens and the Left in Europe has to cohabit within the Democrat Party in the US. The Republican Party can be understood as a broad political coalition which has effectively fallen under the control and leadership of what in Europe might rather be considered the line of Viktor Orbán and the Patriots. The other tendencies are still there but marginalised. They can no longer determine the overall direction but might still be sufficiently strong in Congress to block decision-making or align with the other side when they regard policies as being against their core convictions, such as creating unsustainable debt levels, or on matters related to national security and defence.Europe and its national electoral systemsEuropean states are not immune either. The British, the French and the Hungarian electoral systems provide an oversized seat result for the relatively strongest party, and this increases the opportunities of the extremes. Brexit can be considered one outcome of this. The current political stalemate in France, where the extreme right and the extreme left are holding the system hostage, is another. In systems of pure proportional representation, by contrast, you need more than 50% of the votes for one party or a coalition of several parties to take effective political control. In a first-past-the-post system, as in the US, 20%–30% of the electorate is more than sufficient to take over one of the major political parties and, with that, to potentially run the country. Pure proportional systems therefore provide better protection against a right-wing or left-wing populist takeover. The EU political system On the federal level of the EU on the other hand, the incentives are there for cooperation across the political centre. Decisions in the Council need an oversized qualified majority; the election of a European Commission president by the European Parliament requires an absolute majority of the members elected to the house. These majorities can regularly be found only through cooperation across the aisle and by transcending the traditional left–right schism. The desire to hold important political offices in the EU, therefore, requires a willingness to compromise and forces political parties that are more on the right or on the left to look towards the centre. The final vote on the von der Leyen Commission was carried by a large cross-cutting alliance of the Christian Democrat EPP, the liberal Renew and the Socialists, complemented by the constructive right, centred on Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and the constructive left, led by the German Greens. The more radical elements of both the European Conservatives and Reformists and Green groups voted against. The institutional system has a strong impact on the political culture in the EU, which is a culture of cooperation. The political system favours the creation of unity—as the condition for stability on a historically, geographically and culturally divided continent—and therefore the centre. The absence of permanent coalitions and the lack of fixed roles of majority and minority in the division of power in the EU create the opportunity to integrate those on the very right and the very left who are not opposed to the system as such and whose primary aim is not to destroy it: the constructive right and the constructive left. Contrary to the US, where the destructive and anti-system elements can dominate the rest of their respective coalitions, inside the EU that destructive right and left find themselves isolated unless they stop being the system opposition. That is why Ursula von der Leyen was well advised to integrate Raffaele Fitto from Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) as vice-president of the European Commission and, at the same time, to continue a constructive dialogue with the co-leader of the Green group Terry Reincke on the importance of climate change policies and actions to preserve the rule of law. Brothers of Italy had not only supported the new asylum pact, in contrast to Viktor Orbán, but had also supported Ukraine in a steadfast fashion, including in the vote to ensure Ukraine profits from the interest on Russian assets. Brothers of Italy is part of the constructive right, stabilising the political system of the EU. Is the EU therefore safe? The EU is a federal union of citizens and states and therefore dependent on support in each and every member state. It is only as strong as its weakest link. Even though, on average, support for EU institutions is close to historical highs and well above the support levels for national institutions, that is not enough (EU 2024). Before Brexit the EU’s weakest link in terms of overall support was the UK. Nowadays its weakest link is France, which is paralysed by the combination of a destructive right, on the one hand, and on the other, a destructive left which, in the form of France Unbowed (La France Insoumise), is holding the socialists and greens hostage. And both extremes are cooperating in the destabilisation of the state. That smells like Weimar. What needs to be done? An agenda for the next phase of European integration An agenda for strength In the worlds of Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, strength is the only thing that counts. Internationally and geopolitically, we are back in the world of nineteenth-century power politics. The rules of the game have changed, and the quicker we understand this the better. We are threatened at the same time from the inside and from the outside. From the inside, by the destructive nationalist populist right and left that are trying to hollow out the political order, established after 1945, based on parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and European integration. From the outside, by aggressive nationalist power politics. And more often than not, these two are connected. The seatbelts need to be fastened. Defending ourselves from threats both inside and outside has to start with the recognition that we are confronted with real issues, not just imagined ones. Hyper-inflation was real and is still stored in today’s price levels. The accumulated inflation during Joe Biden’s four-year term was above 20% (US Bureau of Labour Statistics n.d., author’s calculations), and it will not have been very different in Europe. Growth rates are very low, while debt is rising, and with it the difficulty of states to intervene in times of absolute need. Uncontrolled mass immigration happened. Our capacity to defend our continent is seriously compromised. International respect comes from strength, not from weakness. This is not a case for mass psychotherapy, but political action: the political agenda has to change. The European Parliament nowadays plays a key role in setting the agenda for the upcoming legislative term. Ursula von der Leyen had to negotiate with all the political forces of good will about the programme for the next five years to have any chance of being elected by an absolute majority of the members of the house. The need for the Commission president to negotiate the programme also changes the role of the European political foundations. The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies has contributed hundreds of precise policy proposals to the process of reflection in a document entitled The 7Ds for Sustainability. This text centres on defence, debt, digitalisation, demography, democracy, decarbonisation and de-risking globalisation in order to enrich the debate and help set a new agenda (Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies n.d.). The outcomes of the European elections matter, as they should. With the Greens and the Liberals having together lost more than 50 seats and the so-called progressive majority between the Liberals, Greens, Socialists and the far left having disappeared, European Commission priorities for this legislature have markedly changed. Competitiveness and security, comprising both defence and migration, including border protection, have become the top two priorities. This is underpinned by the different composition of the European Commission and the European Council. With half of the members of both institutions coming from the EPP and the EPP occupying the centre space in the European Parliament as well, concerns about competitiveness, migration and defence, critical to strengthening our continent, which is being challenged from both within and without, now have a stronger voice. An agenda for growth: implementing the Draghi report Like every other policy paper, the Letta and Draghi reports can and are being discussed in detail. But no one can dispute the competence of Mario Draghi in matters monetary and economic. The Draghi report will therefore provide a most important reference point. His report comprises six basic truths that will inspire the legislative proposals of the European Commission in this term, even more so as it was requested by the European Commission president herself. Draghi brings everybody face to face with his or her responsibilities. From my personal reading, his report can be summarised as follows: • Investment is the precondition for future growth. Europe is lagging behind in high-tech investment and has largely lost the new digital economy race. This can be identified as the key reason for the difference in per capita growth between the US and the EU. Mid-tech–based industry, such as the car industry, which provides our current economic backbone, is coming under increasing competitive pressure from China.• Without investment, annual productivity growth falls behind. Europe could maintain and improve its living standard by considerably increasing female and older-age participation in the workplace. Worsening demographics make that quantitative input increase more difficult.• The EU has to return to the strategy of scaling through the development of its own internal market, especially in the less-integrated areas of the service sector.• The Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union are critical to assisting high-tech investors in their efforts to scale beyond national boundaries. Given that high-tech means not only high return but also high risk, venture capital is necessary to accompany that growth.• We have regulated for risk and not for opportunity, as is typical for ageing societies. The regulatory burden has to be reduced.• Common public debt has to come in as a residual answer, dependent in volume on the progress in the above-mentioned areas. Consensus on common European debt could be achieved in the area of defence, which could be considered a European public good. Common European financing would also contribute to more equal burden sharing. An agenda for migration Migration is at the core of right-wing populist parties’ growth. It brings together social and cultural challenges: social challenges in the form of competition for scarce public services and support, and cultural ones in the form of a challenge to traditional constructions of national and cultural identity. Here society is falling apart. What is a promise of improved personal services for the upper middle class and the liberal and green parties representing them is, for the lower middle class, a threat of lower salaries and increased competition for state services, including education. Experiences during the negotiations to form the current Swedish and Finnish governments showed that a tough policy on migration was the one area where populist parties were not ready to adapt or compromise. Preliminary voting analysis from the European Parliament demonstrates that while right-wing populist parties show some diverging views on economics, they clearly differentiate themselves from other political forces on the cultural axis of the political divide (Welle and Frantescu 2025). We have experienced a radicalisation of our political space following the events of mass migration, both in the Mediterranean and following Russia’s aggression in Syria and Ukraine. Russia even actively tries to destabilise its neighbours by transporting refugees to their common borders or via Belarus. Denmark is the only country in the EU that has managed to reduce established right-wing populist parties back to single digits. It has done so by establishing a consensus in society on a tough migration policy that is being continued by its current Social Democrat–led government. At the same time, Denmark represents a country with one of the highest standards of societal development. ‘Going to Denmark’ is even a reference in international development policy. Danish migration policy will therefore need to be studied in more detail so as to understand how far it can provide guidance for the EU as a whole or not. Speedier implementation of the migration pact voted on in the European Parliament in April 2024 therefore has to be a prime priority. But it cannot be the last step. Integration capacity has to become critical to migration policy. An agenda for defence Those who cannot defend themselves are inviting their stronger neighbours to aggress them. A look at maps of Russia over the last 500 years shows us that Russia has expanded continuously at the expense of its weaker neighbours—from basically the city territory of Moscow to becoming the largest state on earth. The military submission of its neighbours is the Russian business model. The peaceful and voluntary integration of the European space, based on the rule of law, is the business model of the EU. These concepts are now geographically colliding. And the grey zone in between, at the very least, is now in danger of Russian aggression and occupation, as demonstrated in Ukraine, where Russia is trying to reintroduce the logic of nineteenth-century empire to the European continent. The US will focus its own efforts increasingly on Asia and the attempt to contain China. Europe will therefore have to provide the lion’s share of its own conventional defence. This can only be effectively organised by making use of the possibilities provided by the EU. The Martens Centre has provided a plan in 10 steps—the European Defence Pyramid—on how to achieve a viable European defence under changed geopolitical circumstances. Starting with more basic ideas at the beginning, it has now been outlined in considerable detail with the help of external experts in The 7Ds for Sustainability – Defence Extended (Ciolan and Welle 2024). Progress is already visible. The Martens Centre suggested the creation of the office of a European defence commissioner and a standing defence committee in the European Parliament. Both are now reality. The proposed increase in financial support for military mobility has now been achieved through the decision of the European Commission to allow the use of regional funds for this purpose. And the new defence commissioner has suggested the creation of an ‘EU DARPA’2 for military research, as developed in the concept papers. Living in dangerous times Europe is being simultaneously challenged internally and externally: internally by right-wing populist parties, which have now conquered nearly 30% of the political space; externally by Russia, which is trying to reintroduce the nineteenth-century rules of empire through military aggression with at least the benevolent acceptance of China. These challenges are not unrelated. Some of the populist parties on the right and left openly make the case for China and Russia. Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has even been rewarded by China with massive investments and the status of an ‘all-weather partner’. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, we have been living in a world of cooperation. System competition between East and West was replaced by globalisation. System seemingly did not matter anymore. Production went wherever it was the cheapest. Communist China became the capitalists’ best friend in exchange for the transfer of superior technology. In analogy to Lenin, China sold the capitalists the rope with which to hang themselves. The price paradigm replaced the security paradigm. With China now so strong that it can and does challenge the US economically and politically for number-one status globally, and strongly on the rise militarily, this phase has ended. China is preparing for the military strangulation, if not occupation of Taiwan, as demonstrated by its ever more menacing sea exercises around the island every year. Russia waged a war against Ukraine only days after establishing a ‘no limits partnership’ with China, testing the global order established after 1945 when conquering and annexing the territory of a weaker neighbour was outlawed. The West is being challenged both in Asia and in Europe. To defend our European way of life we need to be strong economically and militarily. We need to close the rifts in our societies and constructively end the revolt of the lower middle class. System competition is back, and the security paradigm has replaced the price paradigm. Cite:  Welle, K. (2025). Donald Trump, the revolt of the lower middle class and the next phase of European integration. European View, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/17816858251345566 Footnotes 1. This article is a revised version of an article that originally appeared on the website of the research centre Groupe d’études géopolitiques on 19 March 2025 with the title ‘Trump and the next phase of European integration’. See https://geopolitique.eu/en/2025/03/19/after-trump-the-next-phase-of-european-integration/. Used by permission.2. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is a US Department of Defense agency focused on developing breakthrough technologies for national security. References Bank of America Institute. (2024). Paycheck to paycheck: What, who, where, why? 22 October. https://institute.bankofamerica.Com/content/dam/economic-insights/paycheck-to-paycheck-lower-income-households.pdf. Accessed 24 April 2025.Ciolan I. M., Welle K., eds. (2024). The 7Ds for sustainability – Defence extended. https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/the-7ds-defence-extended/. Accessed 24 April 2025.EU. (2024). Standard Eurobarometer 102 – Autumn 2024. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3215. Accessed 24 April 2025.European Parliament. (2024). European Parliament 2024–2029. Constitutive session. https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/european-results/2024-2029/. Accessed 24 April 2025.Focus online. (2021). Wer wählte wie? Die Analyse. Frauen und Rentner lassen Union abstürzen, die Jungen bestimmen die Kanzlermacher. 27 September. https://www.focus.De/politik/deutschland/bundestagswahl/analyse-der-bevoelkerungsgruppen-wer-waehlte-wie-akademiker-und-reiche-waehlen-gruen-renter-spd_id_24280744.html. Accessed 24 April 2025.Ipsos. (2024). Sociologie des électorats – Législatives 2024. 30 June. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2024-06/ipsos-talan-sociologie-electorats-legislatives-30-juin-rapport-complet.pdf. Accessed 24 April 2025.Moreau P. (2024a). AfD: The German far-right at a dead end. Fondapol, 6 November. https://www.fondapol.org/en/study/afd-the-german-far-right-at-a-dead-end/. Accessed 24 April 2025.Moreau P. (2024b). The FPÖ and the challenge of Europe: Ideological radicalism and electoral constraints in Austria. Fondapol, 29 October. https://www.fondapol.org/en/study/the-fpo-and-the-challenge-of-europe-ideological-radicalism-and-electoral-constraints-in-austria/. Accessed 24 April 2025.Reckwitz A. (2020). Society of singularities. Cambridge: Polity.Rydgren J., ed. (2013). Class politics and the radical right. London: Routledge.Schmitt C. (2007). The concept of the political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossrefUS Bureau of Labour Statistics. (n.d.). CPI inflation calculator. https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm. Accessed 24 April 2025.Weber M. (2010). Politik als Beruf [Politics as a vocation], 11th edn. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.Welle K., Frantescu D. (2025). (Forthcoming study on voting behaviour in the European Parliament in the 2019–24 legislature).Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (n.d.). Publications: The 7Ds. https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/#the-7ds. Accessed 24 April 2025.

Energy & Economics
Economic crisis impact of Russian invasion of Ukraine concept. Stacked coins, graph falling down and battle tank on wooden table background copy space. War effect to world economy.

The Economic Effects of the Gaza War on Palestine and Israel

by World & New World Journal Policy Team

I. Introduction Since October 7, 2023, when the Hamas attacked Israel, the Gaza war has entered its third year. Palestinians continue to endure an unprecedented level of violence, trauma, economic hardship, and uncertainty. The war has resulted in a staggering number of casualties and widespread displacement, in addition to massive destruction of physical assets in Gaza, significant reduction of economic output, increased violence in the West Bank, and widespread collapse of basic service provision across the entire Palestinian territories.  As of May 7, 2025, according to Wikipedia and Gaza’s Ministry of Health, 55000 fatalities (53,253 Palestinians and 1,706 Israelis) and more than 110,00 injuries have been reported in Gaza. More than half of the casualties are women, children, and the elderly. An estimated 1.9 million people, approximately 90 percent of Gaza’s population, are currently internally displaced. Seventy percent of Gaza’s Road network, more than 80 per cent of commercial facilities, and close to 90 percent of housing units in Gaza have either severely damaged or have been destroyed.  Since October 7, 2023, the UN has documented over 1,500 clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank, resulting in property damage, casualties, and displacement. Over 1,600 Palestinians, half of whom are children, have been displaced due to increased settlers’ violence and access restrictions. Additionally, existing fiscal constraints and growing security concerns have disrupted service provision in the West Bank.  On the macroeconomic front, the Gaza and West Bank face a collapse, which is unmatched in recent memory. The Palestine economy has faced significant contraction, evidenced by a reduced production, sharp decline in gross domestic product (GDP), and soaring unemployment rates. On the other hand, the Gaza war has had significant negative impacts on Israel. The economic and financial costs of war consist of the direct cost of military operations as well as the indirect losses that extend over the medium and long term. One of the most direct costs of the Gaza war was the recall of about 300,000 reservists in the early days, which meant that the Israeli government would bear the cost of conscription, and the Israeli economy would bear loss of output due to their absence from the workforce.Given these situations, this paper analyzes the economic effects of the Gaza war on Palestine and Israel. II. Literature on the Effects of Wars Wars have the potential to alter the parties and “transform the future” of belligerents (Ikle 1991) and they also bring about fundamental changes to the international system (Gilpin 1981).  Scholars in Economics have provided considerable analysis of the macroeconomic effects of a conflict across spatial levels: locally, nationally, regionally, and internationally. Some studies have examined the effects of specific wars such as the Syrian civil war (Kešeljević and Spruk, 2023) or the Iraq war (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). For example, an analysis estimated that the Russian invasion of Ukraine had an economic cost of 1% of global GDP in 2022 (Liadze et al. 2023) Others have examined the effects of war in general. For instance, Reuven Glick and Alan Taylor (2010) examine bilateral trade relations from 1870 to 1997 and find large and persistent negative impacts of wars on trade and hence on national and global economic welfare. Similarly, Vally Koubi (2005) investigates the effects of inter- and intrastate wars on a sample of countries and finds that the combined prewar, contemporaneous, and postwar effects on economic growth are negative.  A “war ruin” school emphasized that the destruction caused by wars is accompanied by higher inflation, unproductive resource spending on the military, and war debt (Chan 1985; Russett 1970). By contrast, a “war renewal” school argued that there can be longer-term positive economic effects from war because war can lead to increased efficiency in the economy by reducing the power of rent-seeking special interests, triggering technological innovation, and advancing human capital (Organski and Kugler 1980).  III. Economic Effects of the Gaza War1. Casualties  As Table 1 shows, since the Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, 55,000 people (as of May 7, 2025, 53,253 Palestinians and 1,706 Israelis) have been killed in the Gaza war according to the Gaza Health Ministry. Scholars have estimated that 80% of Palestinians killed are civilians. A study by OHCHR (The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) found that 70% of the Palestinians killed in residential buildings or similar housing were children and women.  The majority of casualties have been found in the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Health Ministry’s total casualty count is the number of deaths directly caused by the war.  The 7 October attacks of the Hamas on Israel killed 1,195 people, including 815 civilians. A further 806 Palestinians have been killed in the occupied West Bank (including East Jerusalem).  2. Economic Effects of the Gaza War on Palestine  As Figure 1-1 shows, since October 7, 2023, Palestine’s economy has significantly contracted as a result of continued warfare. As Figure 1-2 shows, economic downturn started from the fourth quarter of 2023. In 2024, Palestine's GDP contracted by 27% compared to the previous year. The decline was driven by a 27% drop in industrial output in the Gaza Strip due to the ongoing Israeli occupation and attack. Especially, economic contractions were recorded in construction (-14.5%), services (-11.0%), financial and insurance activities (-5.3%), information and communication (-3.2%). However, Palestine’s economy began to recover in the fourth quarter of 2024, although it still marked a negative growth.   Figure 1-1: Palestine economic growth rate  Figure 1-2: Palestine economic growth (quarterly) As Figure 2 shows, industrial production in Palestine significantly decreased in 2024 as war has continued between Israel and Hamas. Industrial production in Palestine has been low, averaging -7.62 percent from 2012 until 2025. However, it reached a record low of -29.77 percent in June of 2024. Then industrial production in Palestine increased to 2.1 percent in March of 2025 over the same month in the previous year.   Figure 2: Industrial production in Palestine As Figure 3 shows, inflation rate in Palestine has significantly increased in 2023 and 2024, reaching all time high of 88.93 percent in November of 2024. High inflation resulted from resource shortages as a result of continued warfare and significant production decline. And then inflation rate in Palestine dropped to 1.88 percent in March and -2.51 percent in February of 2025. Inflation rate in Palestine averaged 4.95 percent from 1998 until 2025.   Figure 3: Inflation rate in Palestine As Figure 4-1 shows, unemployment rate in Palestine significantly increased after October 7, 2023, as economy continued to shrink and industrial production fell. Unemployment rate in Palestine increased to 35.20 percent in the first quarter of 2024 from 24.1 percent in the third quarter of 2023. It then dropped to 31.1 percent in the second quarter of 2024 and 28.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024. Unemployment Rate in Palestine has been remarkably high, averaging 24.07 percent from 1995 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 35.60 percent in the third quarter of 2002 and a record low of 8.80 percent in the second quarter of 2000.    Figure 4-1: Unemployment rate in Palestine As Figure 4-2 shows, youth unemployment rate in Palestine increased from 38.40 percent in the first quarter of 2023 to 45.70 percent in the first quarter of 2024 and then slightly dropped to 42.60 percent in the third quarter of 2024 and 38.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024. Youth unemployment rate in Palestine has been remarkably high, averaging 41.85 percent from 2009 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 49.90 percent in the second quarter of 2018 and a record low of 32.90 percent in the first quarter of 2011.   Figure 4-2: Youth unemployment rate in Palestine As Figure 4-3 shows, full-time employment in Palestine plunged to 628000 persons in the first quarter of 2024 from 1143800 persons in the third quarter of 2023. Then it increased to 705700 persons in the fourth quarter of 2024. Full-time employment in Palestine averaged 888133 persons from 2010 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 1143800 persons in the third quarter of 2023 and a record low of 67900 persons in the first quarter of 2010.   Figure 4-3: Full-time employment in Palestine Despite the continued warfare in Gaza, as Figure 5 shows, exports in Palestine did not significantly decrease. On the contrary, exports in Palestine increased from 148.3 USD Million in August 2023 to 164.20 USD Million in December of 2024. Exports in Palestine averaged 68.15 USD Million from 2001 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 164.20 USD Million in December of 2024 and a record low of 15.92 USD Million in April of 2002. Exports in Palestine maintained pre-war level in 2025, recording 140.70 USD Million in January of 2025. Top exports of Palestine in 2023 were scrap iron ($68.6M), tropical fruits ($53.8M), pure olive oil ($10.9M), and building stone ($7.56M).  Figure 5: Exports in Palestine Figure 6 shows, imports in Palestine significantly dropped in 2024 as warfare continued in Gaza. Imports in Palestine decreased to 420.30 USD Million in April 2024 from 747.20 USD Million in August 2023. Imports in Palestine averaged 370.00 USD Million from 2001 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 750.60 USD Million in November of 2022 and a record low of 82.71 USD Million in April of 2002. According to media reports, there are severe food shortages in Gaza, but there is no information about the imports of food after 2023.   Figure 6: Imports in Palestine As Figure 7 shows, since October 7, 2023, government spending in Palestine has significantly declined in 2023 and early 2024, hitting a record low of 461.20 USD million in the first quarter of 2024. And then government spending in Palestine increased to 666.70 USD million in the fourth quarter of 2024 from 616.50 USD million in the third quarter of 2024. Government spending in Palestine averaged 797.95 USD million from 2011 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 974.90 USD million in the fourth quarter of 2016 and a record low of 461.20 USD million in the first quarter of 2024.   Figure 7: Government spending in Palestine 3. Economic Effects of the Gaza War on Israel  As Figure 8 shows, since October 7, 2023, when the Hamas attacked Israel, government spending in Israel significantly increased as Israel government conducted massive military operations against the Hamas. Government spending in Israel increased from 84100 ILS (Israel new shekel) Million in the third quarter of 2023 to 97973 ILS Million in the fourth quarter of 2023 and 97018 ILS Million in the fourth quarter of 2024. Government Spending in Israel averaged 58676 ILS Million from 1995 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 97973 ILS Million in the fourth quarter of 2023 and a record low of 39524 ILS Million in the third quarter of 1995.   Figure 8: Government spending in Israel As Figure 9 shows, as Israel government conducted massive military operations against the Hamas, military expenditure in Israel increased to 46505.30 USD Million in 2024 from 27498.50 USD Million in 2023. Military expenditure in Israel averaged 7742.87 USD Million from 1951 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 46505.30 USD Million in 2024 and a record low of 57.60 USD Million in 1954.   Figure 9: Military expenditure in Israel As Figure 10 shows, Israel recorded a government budget deficit of -33793.00 ILS Million in December of 2023 from 14100 ILS Million in January 2023 because government spending, in particular military expenditure significantly increased. Government budget value in Israel averaged -3405.71 ILS Million from 2005 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 22839.00 ILS Million in January of 2025 and a record low of -33793.00 ILS Million in December of 2023.   Figure 10: Budget Balance in Israel As Figure 11-1 & 11-2 show, Israel's economic growth plunged to -4.32 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 from 3.44% in the third quarter of 2023. Israel experienced consecutive negative growth until the third quarter of 2024 as the ongoing conflict with the Hamas had taken a significant toll on economic activity. This marked the weakest growth since 2020, when the covid-19 pandemic severely impacted the economy. However, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Israel expanded 5.46 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024 over the same quarter of the previous year. GDP annual growth rate in Israel averaged 3.73 percent from 1996 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 16.27 percent in the second quarter of 2021 and a record low of -8.37 percent in the second quarter of 2020.  Figure 11-1: Israel's economic growth rate  Figure 11-2: Israel's GDP growth (quarterly) As Figure 12 shows, industrial production in Israel decreased 7.4 percent in December of 2023 and 9.8 percent in March 2024 and then increased 15.9 percent in December 2024. Industrial production in Israel averaged 5.66 percent from 1960 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 62.70 percent in June of 1968 and a record low of -29.20 percent in June of 1967.   Figure 12: Industrial production in Israel As Figure 13 shows, unemployment rate in Israel decreased from 4.30 percent in January 2023 to 2.80 percent in November 2023 and 2.60 percent in December 2024. This decline seems to result from the fact that Israeli government called up tens of thousands of reservists to replace conscripts and active-duty soldiers. And then unemployment rate in Israel slightly increased to 2.9% in March 2025. Unemployment rate in Israel averaged 5.89 percent from 1992 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 11.40 percent in March of 1992 and a record low of 2.60 percent in August & December of 2024.  Figure 13: Unemployment Rate in Israel As Figure 14 shows, the number of unemployed persons in Israel decreased to 119200 in December of 2024 from 184000 in January 2023. Unemployed persons in Israel averaged 192800 from 1991 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 305400 in September of 2003 and a record low of 119200 in December of 2024.  Figure 14: The number of unemployed persons in Israel As Figure 15 shows, after October 2023, exports in Israel fluctuated between 4470 USD Million in October 2023, 5330 USD Million in March 2024, 4320 USD Million June 2024 and 5250 USD million in December 2024. Exports in Israel averaged 1836.30 USD Million from 1959 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 6276.70 USD Million in March of 2022 and a record low of 10.80 USD Million in July of 1959.   Figure 15: Exports in Israel As Figure 16 shows, imports in Israel fluctuated between 8090 USD Million in August 2023, 7590 USD Million in December 2023, 7010 USD Million in August 2024, and 8318.70 USD Million in March 2025. Imports in Israel averaged 2500.72 USD Million from 1959 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 10372.30 USD Million in May of 2022 and a record low of 33.10 USD Million in November of 1959.   Figure 16: Imports in Israel As Figure 17 shows, inflation rate in Israel decreased from 5.40 percent in January 2023 to 3.70 percent in October 2023 and 2.50 percent in February 2024. It then increased to 3.60 percent in August 2024 and 3.80 percent in January 2025. Inflation rate in Israel averaged 26.75 percent from 1952 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 486.20 percent in November of 1984 and a record low of -2.70 percent in March of 2004.   Figure 17: Inflation rate in Israel As Figure 18 shows, despite on-going warfare in Gaza, gasoline price in Israel did not rise significantly. It increased from 1.82 USD/Liter in September 2023 to 1.98 and 2.14 USD/Liter in January and May 2024, respectively and then dropped to 2.06 and 2.04 USD/Liter in August 2024 and February 2025, respectively. Gasoline prices in Israel averaged 1.78 USD/Liter from 1995 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 2.30 USD/Liter in June of 2022 and a record low of 0.73 USD/Liter in December of 1995.   Figure 18: Gasoline price in Israel IV. Conclusion The Gaza war has had negative impacts on both Palestine and Israel, but the negative effects were much bigger in Palestine than in Israel. The number of casualties was much higher in Palestine. Especially the war brought down Palestine economy, lowering economic growth, reducing industrial productions, and increasing inflation & unemployment in Palestine. The Israeli economy has also slowed down, and budget deficit increased. However, unemployment went down, and inflation has been stable between 2 and 5 percent. Trade has maintained a pre-war level, although there have been some difficulties. References Bilmes, Linda, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2006. The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Chan, Steve. 1985. “The Impact of Defense Spending on Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and Problems.” Orbis 29 (2): 403–434.CIA Factbook. 2024. “Ukraine.”Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.  Glick, Rouven and Alan Taylor. 2010. “Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 92(1): 102-127.Iklé, Fred C. 1991. Every War Must End. New York: Columbia University Press.Kešeljević, Aleksandar, and Rok Spruk. 2023. Estimating the Effects of Syrian Civil War. Empirical Economics.  Koumi, Valley. 2005. “War and Economic Performance.” Journal of Peace Research 42 (1): 67-82. Liadze, Iana, Corrado Macchiarelli, Paul Mortimer-Lee, and Patricia Sanchez Juanino. 2023. “Economic Costs of the Russia-Ukraine War.” The World Economy 46: 874–886.Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Russett, Bruce. 1970. What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Energy & Economics
Economical relationship between EU European union and India international trade of Europe, India, international trading, economics concept, investments, flags set on coin euros background

EU–India Free Trade Agreement and its Possible Economic and Geopolitical Ramifications.

by Krzysztof Sliwinski

Abstract The EU-India–Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, relaunched in 2022 after a nine-year hiatus, represent a significant step towards deepening economic and geopolitical ties between the European Union (EU) and India. The agreement, with its potential to eliminate tariffs, reduce non-tariff barriers, and enhance market access, particularly in services such as telecommunications, could substantially increase trade volume between the two entities, offering promising economic prospects. By creating a combined market of over 1.5 billion people, the FTA offers significant economic opportunities in sectors such as chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment. More importantly, it serves as a geopolitical tool aligned with the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, aiming to strengthen partnerships with like-minded democracies and potentially counterbalance China’s increasing influence, reassuring them about its geopolitical implications. Therefore, this study examines the potential economic and geopolitical opportunities and challenges associated with the EU-India FTA. It concludes that, perhaps unsurprisingly, much depends on the foreign and security policies of great powers such as the US, China, and Russia. Key Words: EU, India, Free Trade Area, Geopolitics Introduction Negotiations regarding the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) were initially launched in 2007. The talks were suspended in 2013 due to a gap in ambition and resumed after a nine-year pause with a formal relaunch on June 17, 2022, announced by Union Minister Piyush Goyal and European Commission Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis in Brussels.[i] This relaunch also included separate negotiations for an Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) and an Agreement on Geographical Indications (GIs), reflecting a broader agenda to enhance bilateral economic relations. The EU is India's largest trading partner, accounting for €124 billion in goods trade by 2023 (12.2% of the total Indian trade). India is the EU’s ninth-largest trading partner, representing 2.2% of the total trade in goods. Trade in services reached €59.7 billion in 2023, nearly double the 2020 level, with a significant portion being digital services, highlighting the growing economic interdependence.[ii]       *Data acquired from the European Commission at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en Negotiation Rounds and Progress Since the relaunch, ten rounds of negotiations have been conducted, with the following timeline detailing key developments:   ·         Acquired through Grok. Prompt: What is the latest on the EU – India FTA Negotiations? At: https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=1922705918707265888 (14 May 2025) What is so important regarding FTAs? Free Trade Areas (FTAs) have become the cornerstone of international trade policy by reshaping global economic landscapes and geopolitical dynamics. These agreements aim to reduce trade barriers and foster economic cooperation among member states; however, their implications extend far beyond mere economic exchanges. Economic Consequences of Free Trade Areas One of the primary economic consequences of FTAs is the creation of new trade opportunities among the member states. By reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, FTAs encourage specialisation and efficiency and increase trade volumes. For instance, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is expected to boost intra-African trade by creating a single market for goods and services that can unlock regional value chains and enhance economic integration.[i]  Similarly, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has expanded trade between Indonesia and China, although the benefits may be asymmetric, with Indonesia's imports growing faster than exports.[ii] However, FTAs can also lead to trade diversion, in which member states import goods at the expense of non-member countries. This phenomenon can harm non-members by reducing market access and undermining global trade liberalisation efforts.[iii] For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which never entered into force,[iv] and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which shared the same fate, were criticised for potentially marginalising non-member states and creating a fragmented global trade system.[v] FTAs often attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by creating more integrated markets. For instance, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has stimulated FDI inflows into member states such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, contributing to GDP growth.[vi] Similarly, establishing Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in China has promoted financial employment and industrial upgrading, particularly in the middle and western regions, balancing regional development.[vii] However, the benefits of FTAs are not always distributed evenly. Some studies suggest that while FTAs may boost economic growth for member states, non-members may experience adverse impacts such as reduced trade volumes and deteriorating terms of trade.[viii] Geopolitical Consequences of Free Trade Areas FTAs often serve as tools for geopolitical influence, allowing powerful states to shape their global economic order. For example, the TTIP and TPP were partly designed to counterbalance China's rising economic influence and establish new trade standards.[ix] Similarly, the RCEP has reinforced China's economic leadership in Asia, while the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) has allowed the United States to maintain its influence in North America.[x] For smaller countries like Vietnam, FTAs can enhance international recognition and strategic balancing between major powers, contribute to regional integration and stability, influence internal political legitimacy and power dynamics, and provide tools to manage geopolitical risks and external shocks. FTAs, especially New Generation Free Trade Agreements (NGFTAs) such as the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), act as economic instruments and geopolitical tools that shape Vietnam's global and regional order position.[xi] The geopolitical implications of FTAs are evident in their impact on international trade governance. The proliferation of mega-regional trade agreements has challenged the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO), creating a fragmented trade landscape.[xii] This shift has raised concerns about the marginalisation of developing countries and the erosion of global trade rules. FTAs can also mitigate interstate conflict by increasing war costs. For instance, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) catalyses regional peace, fostering economic interdependence and reducing the likelihood of conflict.[xiii] Similarly, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has strengthened economic ties between Indonesia and China, reducing potential geopolitical tensions in the region.[xiv] FTAs are not always effective in preventing conflict. In some cases, they may exacerbate tensions by creating unequal benefits or excluding certain states. For example, the TPP and TTIP have been criticised for their exclusionary nature, which may have contributed to trade tensions between member and non-member states.[xv] FTAs often serve as building blocks for broader regional integrations. For instance, the EU began a series of FTAs and customs unions before evolving into a deeply integrated economic and political bloc. Similarly, AfCFTA is part of a broader vision for African economic integration, aiming to create a single market and customs union. The proliferation of FTAs has also raised concerns regarding the future of multilateralism. The Doha Round of WTO negotiations has stalled, and the rise of mega-regional trade agreements has further fragmented the global trade system.[xvi] This has led to calls for a more inclusive and equitable approach to trade governance that ensures that developing countries are not left behind.Free trade has profound economic and geopolitical consequences. It shapes global trade patterns, influences regional stability, and affects the distribution of wealth and power. Although FTAs offer significant economic growth and integration opportunities, they also pose inequality, exclusion, and sustainability challenges. EU – India FTA Opportunities Economic The potential Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and India presents significant economic opportunities for the EU driven by eliminating trade barriers, increased market access, and deeper economic integration. First, the services sector is a critical area where the EU can benefit significantly from an FTA with India. The EU's services exports to India could more than double, while India's services exports to the EU would increase by approximately 50%.[xvii] This growth is attributed to reduced trade barriers and the liberalisation of sectors such as telecommunications, which has been identified as a key area for reform. Arguably, half of the predicted export expansion is driven by reforms to domestic regulations, particularly in the telecommunications sector, which could further enhance the EU's competitive position in the Indian market. The FTA is expected to eliminate tariffs and reduce non-tariff barriers, creating a more level-playing field for the EU businesses in India. The FTA of EU-Indian trade could approximately double, particularly in business services.[xviii] This liberalisation would increase trade volumes and lead to structural changes in both economies, with the EU potentially gaining a competitive advantage in high-value-added sectors. The FTA would create a combined market of over 1.5 billion people, enabling the EU and India to reap the benefits of economies of scale. This integration would be particularly beneficial for manufactured goods, such as chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment, where intra-industry trade could lead to efficiency gains and cost reductions. These economies of scale could also give the EU a competitive edge in global markets, helping to stimulate economic growth and job creation.[xix] Geopolitics and security The EU–India FTA is an economic arrangement and a geopolitical tool that aligns with the EU's broader objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU's geopolitical position and security interests are central to understanding the opportunities and challenges presented by the FTA. The EU's engagement with India through the FTA is deeply rooted in its Indo-Pacific strategy, formally launched in 2021. This reflects the EU's ambition to strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, an area increasingly characterised by multipolar competition, particularly between the United States and China. The EU's strategy is driven by recognising that the Indo-Pacific is the "pivotal region" of the 21st century, and its economic and security dynamics will shape global governance.[xx] While the EU's new strategy does not take a confrontational stance towards China, it reflects increased concerns about Beijing’s growing assertiveness and the implications of the US-China rivalry for Europe. The strategy advocates for a multifaceted engagement with China, encouraging cooperation and protecting EU interests and values. An FTA with India is a key component of the EU’s strategy. India's growing economic and political influence in the Indo-Pacific region makes it a critical partner for the EU. The EU views India as a like-minded democracy that shares concerns about China's assertiveness and the need for a rule-based international order. This alignment creates a unique opportunity for the EU to deepen its strategic partnership with India by leveraging economic cooperation to strengthen geopolitics.[xxi] The EU's engagement with India is part of its broader effort to strengthen security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU and India share concerns regarding maritime security, cybersecurity, and the challenges posed by China's growing influence in the region. The FTA can serve as a foundation for deeper collaboration on security issues such as counterterrorism, non-proliferation, and disaster management.[xxii] The EU's security strategy in the Indo-Pacific also emphasises the importance of upholding a rule-based international order. An FTA with India can help promote this objective by reinforcing shared norms and standards in trade, investment, and intellectual property rights. This alignment is critical in China's increasing assertiveness and need for like-minded partners to counterbalance its influence.[xxiii] The EU's approach to an FTA is also shaped by its identity as a normative power. The EU has historically sought to promote its values, such as human rights, environmental sustainability, and social justice, through trade agreements. The FTA with India allows for advancing these values by incorporating labour rights, environmental protection, and sustainable development clauses.[xxiv] However, its geopolitical and economic realities constrain the EU’s ability to promote its normative agenda. The EU must be pragmatic and balance its value-based approach with the need to secure concessions on market access and other economic interests. This tension is evident in EU trade policy, where strategic and economic interests often precede normative objectives.[xxv] EU – India FTA Challenges Existing literature on the challenges the EU–India FTA poses is sparse. Generally, scholars admit that FTA, especially those negotiated by the EU, can face varying degrees of politicisation and contestation from civil society, as seen with TTIP and CETA.[xxvi] This finding suggests the potential for public opposition to new FTAs. In addition, the EU often pursues ambitious agreements beyond tariff reductions, including behind-the-border measures and regulatory cooperation.[xxvii] While FTAs aim to boost trade, their impact can be uneven. Some agreements have failed to entirely realise the expected benefits of trade and investment flows.[xxviii] There are also concerns that FTAs may reduce policy space for developing country partners to pursue alternative development strategies.[xxix] Economic However, several economic challenges regarding the EU-India negotiated FTA can be easily identified. To begin, the talks were stuck for nearly two decades, mainly because the EU and India had different goals. The EU wants deeper integration, including investment and competition policies, whereas India prefers a more limited agreement. This has led to repeated delays, and little progress has been made. Specifically, market access has been a point of contention, especially in sensitive sectors such as agriculture and automobiles. India imposes high tariffs on EU cars (60-100%) compared to the EU's 6.5% on Indian cars, and it protects its agricultural sector, making it difficult for EU farmers to enter the market. The EU also wanted India to open up services such as accountancy and legal work, but India resisted due to fears of competition.[xxx] The EU has strict rules, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and sustainability directives, which India sees as overregulatory and burdensome. This creates friction, as India worries these rules could act as trade barriers. There are also issues with intellectual property rights, where the EU wants stronger protection, but India resists keeping generic drugs affordable.[xxxi] Finally, the EU has invested heavily in India, around €100 billion by 2020, but India's decision to end bilateral investment treaties in 2016 and stalled talks on investment protection since 2023 creates uncertainty. There is also a trust deficit, with India fearing EU regulatory overreach and the EU worrying about compliance.[xxxii] Geopolitics and security As mentioned above, the EU's engagement with India is part of its broader strategy to deepen ties with the Indo-Pacific region. This strategy is driven by the need to counterbalance rising powers like China and enhance its global influence. The EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Global Gateway Initiative reflect this ambition, emphasising the importance of strategic partnerships with like-minded actors such as India.[xxxiii] China's growing economic and military presence in the Indo-Pacific region poses a significant challenge for the EU and India. The EU has expressed concerns about China's assertive behaviour in the South China Sea and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is seen as a tool for expanding Chinese influence.[xxxiv] The EU and India share a common interest in promoting rules-based international order and countering China's increasing dominance. This alignment has been a key driver of their strategic partnership, with both sides seeking to enhance trade, technology, and security cooperation.[xxxv] The Russia-Ukraine war has further complicated the geopolitical landscape, with significant implications for EU-India relations. While the EU has strongly supported Ukraine, India has maintained a more neutral stance by prioritising its strategic partnership with Russia.[xxxvi] This divergence in approach has created tensions, particularly in terms of energy security and sanctions, which could impact FTA negotiations. The EU and India face various traditional security challenges that affect their strategic partnerships and FTA negotiations. China's military modernisation and assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region have heightened security concerns for the EU and India. The EU has expressed support for India's role in maintaining regional stability, particularly in China's actions in the South China Sea and along the India-China border.[xxxvii] The EU and India are also concerned about regional instability, including Myanmar and the Korean Peninsula. These issues underscore the need for enhanced security cooperation between the two partners.[xxxviii] As for non-traditional security challenges, climate change and energy security are key areas of cooperation between the EU and India. The EU has emphasised the importance of transitioning to renewable energy sources, while India has sought to balance its energy needs with environmental concerns.[xxxix] In addition, the increasing importance of digital technologies has highlighted the need for cooperation in cybersecurity and data protection areas. The EU and India are interested in collaborating with digital infrastructure and innovation.[xl] Conclusion According to the European Parliament, “India was among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community in 1962. With the formal establishment of the EU in 1993, India signed a Cooperation Agreement in 1994, which opened the door to broader political interaction between the two. […] The relationship was upgraded to a 'Strategic Partnership' during The Hague's 5th India-EU Summit in 2004. From 1980 to 2005, EU-India trade grew from €4.4 billion to €40 billion. The EU was India's largest trading partner at the time, accounting for 22.4% of Indian exports and 20.8% of imports”.[xli] Despite these incentives, India's historical emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance can sometimes clash with the EU's multilateral approach.[xlii] Further, India's complex relationship with Russia, particularly its continued reliance on Russian defence technology, presents a challenge for closer EU-India security cooperation.[xliii] Finally, although the EU and India share concerns about China's growing influence, their strategies for managing this challenge may differ. These issues, if left unaddressed, could limit the potential for a deeper and more strategic partnership between the EU and India.[xliv] Time will typically show how much the FTA between the EU and India will facilitate closer security and geopolitical links. Much depends on great powers' foreign and security policies, such as the US, China, and Russia. Their intricate games make the geopolitical chessboard fascinating, if not difficult to predict. REFERENCES  [1] EU and India kick-start ambitious trade agenda. (2022, June 17). Directorate-General for Trade and Economics. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-india-kick-start-ambitious-trade-agenda-2022-06-17_en[2] EU trade relations with India. Facts, figures and latest developments. (n.d.). European Commission. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en[3] Joseph, J. E. (2024). Critical factors to consider in the trade–security nexus of the African Continental Free Trade Area: A catalyst for establishing peace. African Security Review https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2024.2303459[4] Kurniawan, K. (2011). The Economic, Environmental, and Geopolitical Impacts of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) on Indonesia. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349858225_THE_IMPACT_OF_ASEAN-CHINA_FREE_TRADE_AREA_ACFTA_AGREEMENT_ON_INDONESIA'S_MAJOR_PLANTATION_EXPORT_COMMODITIES[5] Pasara, M. T., & Dunga, S. H. (2023). Impact of Regional Trade Agreements on Economic Growth: An Econometric Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30541-2_6[6] Following the U.S. withdrawal, the remaining 11 nations (without the U.S.) negotiated a revised agreement called the CPTPP, which is now in force.[7] Tellis, A. J. (2014). The geopolitics of the TTIP and the TPP. Adelphi Series. https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2014.1019720[8] Zhang, Q., & Wang, Q. (2024). Impact assessment of multilateral trade agreements on regional economic growth based on quantitative model optimization. Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences. https://doi.org/10.2478/amns-2024-2831[9] Chen, Y., & Wu, S. (2024). Can the Founding of Free Trade Zones Lead to Financial Employment Boom? --Based on Multi-period Double-difference model. Highlights in Business, Economics and Management. https://doi.org/10.54097/tfrq5c45[10] Zhang, Q., & Wang, Q. (2024). Impact assessment of multilateral trade agreements on regional economic growth based on quantitative model optimization. Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences. https://doi.org/10.2478/amns-2024-2831[11] Tellis, A. J. (2014). The geopolitics of the TTIP and the TPP. Adelphi Series. https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2014.1019720[12] Zhang, Q., & Wang, Q. (2024). Impact assessment of multilateral trade agreements on regional economic growth based on quantitative model optimization. Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences. https://doi.org/10.2478/amns-2024-2831[13] Boguszewski, M. (2022). Political economy of domestic influences of free trade agreements: A case study of the agricultural sector in Vietnam (Doctoral dissertation, The Education University of Hong Kong).[14] Palit, A. (2017). Mega-regional trade agreements and non-participating developing countries: Differential impacts, challenges and policy options: Competition and Change. https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529417729324[15] Joseph, J. E. (2024). Critical factors to consider in the trade–security nexus of the African Continental Free Trade Area: A catalyst for establishing peace. African Security Review. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2024.2303459[16] Kurniawan, K. (2011). The Economic, Environmental, and Geopolitical Impacts of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) on Indonesia.[17] Tellis, A. J. (2014). The geopolitics of the TTIP and the TPP. Adelphi Series. https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2014.1019720[18] Palit, A. (2017). Mega-regional trade agreements and non-participating developing countries: Differential impacts, challenges and policy options: Competition and Change. https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529417729324[19] Nordås, H. K. (2023). Services in the India-EU free trade agreement. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.inteco.2023.100460[20] Felbermayr, G., Mitra, D., Aichele, R., & Gröschl, J. K. (2017). Europe and India: Relaunching a Troubled Trade Relationship. Research Papers in Economics.[21] Khorana, S., Perdikis, N., & Kerr, W. A. (2015). Global economies of scale in the EU-India trade agreement: are they the key to a return to economic growth? Asia Europe Journal, 13(1), 41–55. https://doi.org/10.1007/S10308-014-0404-8[22] Carteny, A., & Tosti Di Stefano, E. (2024). The EU and the Indo-Pacific: The path towards a comprehensive strategy. In The European Union in the Asia-Pacific: Rethinking Europe’s strategies and policies (pp. 406–428). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003336143-25[23] Kaura, V., & Singh, P. (2022). European Union’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Policy Implications For India. Indian Journal of Public Administration, 68(4), 542–555. https://doi.org/10.1177/00195561221098175[24] Grgić, G. (2023). Ambition, meet reality: The European Union’s actorness in the Indo-Pacific. International Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231191275[25] Pugliese, G. (2024). The European Union and an “Indo-Pacific” Alignment. Asia-Pacific Review, 31(1), 17–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2024.2334182[26] Christou, A., & Damro, C. (2024). Frames and Issue Linkage: EU Trade Policy in the Geoeconomic Turn. Journal of Common Market Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13598[27] Leeg, T. (2014). Normative Power Europe? The European Union in the Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement with India. European Foreign Affairs Review, 19(3), 335–355. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4834907[28] De Bièvre, D., & Poletti, A. (2020). Towards Explaining Varying Degrees of Politicization of EU Trade Agreement Negotiations. Politics and Governance, 8(1), 243–253. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i1.2686[29] Lakatos, C., & Nilsson, L. (2016). The EU-Korea FTA: anticipation, trade policy uncertainty and impact. Review of World Economics, 153(1), 179–198. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-016-0261-1[30] Mazyrin, V. M. (2025). The EAEU – Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Expectations and Reality. Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law, 17(3), 128–148. https://doi.org/10.31249/kgt/2024.03.07[31] Hurt, S. R. (2012). The EU–SADC Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations: ‘locking in’ the neoliberal development model in southern Africa? Third World Quarterly, 33(3), 495–510. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.657486[32] Khorana, S. (n.d.). The FTA: a strategic call for the EU and India? European Council on Foreign Relations, India’s Foreign Policy. https://ecfr.eu/special/what_does_india_think/analysis/the_fta_a_strategic_call_for_the_eu_and_india[33] Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. (n.d.). European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union. https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en[34] Mishra, A. R. (2015). India cancels EU trade talks over pharma ban. Mint. https://www.livemint.com/Politics/JtJwcwhXDZz4c01D9DGk5I/Govt-cancels-trade-negotiatorlevel-meet-with-EU.html[35] Reiterer, M. (2023). The Indo-Pacific taking centre-stage for the EU’s security policy. EuZ – Zeitschrift Für Europarecht. https://doi.org/10.36862/eiz-euz022[36] Singh, M. (2021). India, Europe and Connectivity: From Shared Views on BRI to Mutual Cooperation? (pp. 133–159). Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4608-6_6[37] Kugiel, P. (2021). From Destroyer to Preserver? The Evolution of India’s Position Towards the Liberal International Order and Its Significance for the EU–India Strategic Partnership (pp. 253–273). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_12[38] Dominguez, R., & Sverdrup-Thygeson, B. (2021). The Role of External Powers in EU–Asia Security Relations (pp. 415–435). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69966-6_19[39] Reiterer, M. (2023). The Indo-Pacific taking centre-stage for the EU’s security policy. EuZ – Zeitschrift Für Europarecht. https://doi.org/10.36862/eiz-euz022[40] Kirchner, E. J. (2022). EU Security Alignments with the Asia-Pacific. Asian Affairs, 53(3), 542–560. https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2022.2082165[41] Singh, M. (2021). Multilateralism in a Changing Global Order: Prospects for India–EU Cooperation (pp. 275–290). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_13[42] Aspengren, H. C., & Nordenstam, A. (2021). What Strategies Can Do for Strategic Partnerships: Lessons from the EU’s Strategy on India (pp. 67–85). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_4[43] Delivorias, A., & Mácsai, G. (2024). EU-India free trade agreement. In BRIEFING International Agreements in Progress. European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/757588/EPRS_BRI(2024)757588_EN.pdf  [44] Sinha, Aseema, and Jon P. Dorschner. 2009. “India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations?” Polity 42 (1): 74. https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2009.19.[45] Chandrasekar, Anunita. 2025. “It’s Time to Upgrade the EU-India Relationship.” https://www.cer.eu/insights/its-time-upgrade-eu-india-relationship.[46] Gare, Frédéric and Reuter Manisha. “Here be dragons: India-China relations and their consequences for Europe”. 25 May 2023. https://ecfr.eu/article/here-be-dragons-india-china-relations-and-their-consequences-for-europe/