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Director-General, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, Dear Friends, Young and Old, This week, as we have gathered here at the World Food Forum in the headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations in Rome to discuss the necessary transformation of our agri-food systems, we must not only be conscious of targets missed or imperfectly achieved, but of the need for courage, and to generate new capacity to move to new models of better connection between economy, social protection, social justice and ecology. We are confronted with a climate and biodiversity emergency that cannot be handled by the tools that produced it or by the architecture of how we made decisions before. We are called upon to, once and for all, tackle with alternatives and sustained effort and innovation, the vicious circle of global poverty and inequality, global hunger, debt and climate change, our interacting crises. That is the context in which sustainable food systems must be achieved. I ask you all gathered today to respond in the most meaningful way within your capacity, within your generation, in a way that includes all generations, to the challenge set out by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres in his recent statements: This is how the Secretary-General put it: “The Sustainable Development Goals aren’t just a list of goals. They carry the hopes, dreams, rights and expectations of people everywhere. In our world of plenty, hunger is a shocking stain on humanity and an epic human rights violation. It is an indictment of every one of us that millions of people are starving in this day and age.” It can be put right but we must change and there is work involved in upskilling in such a way that we can not only identify and critique assumptions of failing models but be able to put the alternative models in place. We have had so many broken promises. Only 15 percent of some 140 specific targets to achieve the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals are on track to be achieved. Many targets are going in the wrong direction at the present rate, and not a single one is expected to be achieved in the next seven years. However, we have some reasons to be hopeful. When I look around this room today, I see so many engaged and committed people, including young people who have the enthusiasm, energy and creativity needed to tackle the serious structural causes of food insecurity and global hunger. But it is important to acknowledge that young people are not alone in seeking authenticity of words delivered into actions that have an ethical outcome. There are those who have spent their lives seeking a fairer world, one in which hunger would be eliminated – as it can be. We must recognise their efforts. We must work together to harness this collective energy and creativity into strong movements that will deliver, finally, a food-secure world for all. This will require, I suggest, moving to a new culture of sharing information, experiences, insights. As the cuts have taken effect, we must take the opportunity of developing a view, post-silo culture, of sharing insights, and I see FAO as uniquely positioned for this. As Glenn Denning, Peter Timmer and other food experts have stated, achieving food security is not an easy task given how food hunger is “deeply entwined with the organisation of economic activities and their regulation through public policies”, given, too, how governments and markets must work together, how the private, public and third sectors must work together. All of our efforts must have the character of inclusivity. Each of us as global citizens has a responsibility to respond. To ignore it would be a dereliction of our duty of care to our shared planet and its life-forms including our fellow humans and future generations. The Secretary-General’s pleas in relation to the consequences of climate change are given a further terrible reality in the increased and spreading threat of hunger, a food insecurity which is directly affected by the impact of climate change. For example, figures published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations show that 26.2 percent of Africa’s population experienced severe food insecurity in 2021, with 9.8 percent of the total global population suffering from undernourishment the same year. It is time for us all, as leaders and global citizens, to take stock of how words are leading to actions, to increase the urgency of our response to what is a grave existential threat and to achieve change. It is clear, as the Secretary-General’s powerful statement shows, that we need to begin the work of reform in our international institutional architecture, such as UN reform at the highest level, including the Security Council and the Bretton Woods institutions, if we are to achieve what the Secretary-General has suggested is the challenge to “turn a year of burning heat into a year of burning ambition”. Let us commit then to sharing purposes, projects, resources, seeking a new culture for sustenance solutions. Those of us who have spent much of our lives advocating UN reform believe that its best prospects are in the growing acknowledgement of the importance of the vulnerabilities and frustrated capacity of the largest and growing populations of the world being represented, not only nominally but effectively, through a reform that includes reform of the Bretton-Woods Institutions. As Secretary-General Guterres has said on a number of occasions, it is time to reform what are 1945 institutions, including the Security Council and Bretton Woods, in order to align with the “realities of today’s world”. We have to acknowledge too that the development models of the 1950s and 1960s were part of the assumptions that brought us to the crises through which we are living. New models are needed and the good news is that a new epistemology, our way of looking at the world, of sufficiency and sustainability, is emerging. We are seeing good work already occurring. Good development scholarship is available to us. I reference, for example Pádraig Carmody’s recent book, Development Theory and Practice in a Changing World. Such work builds important bridges from the intellectual work that is so badly needed and is welcome at the centre of our discourse on all aspects of interacting crises, including global hunger, and the need to link economy, ecology and a global ethics. What we must launch now is a globalisation from below. Replacing the globalisation from above that has given us a burning planet and threatened democracy itself, with a globalisation from below of the fullest participation, we can establish and indeed extend democracy, offering accountability and transparency of our work together. Writers such as Pádraig Carmody are not alone in suggesting that achieving the Sustainable Development Goals provides the opportunity for moving past the worst contradictions of failed models and dangerous undeclared assumptions. The demise of hegemonic development theory and practice may be a result of several factors, such as the rise of ultra-nationalism around the world, the increasing importance of securitisation where the most powerful insulate their lives from the actions of the excluded, and the existential threat posed by the climate crisis. Such research adds to the growing body of development literature that argues for a pro-active, structural-focused, tailored approach to development. The Hand-in-Hand Initiative of the FAO, details of which were discussed at this week’s parallel session, is a most welcome initiative, one that aims to raise incomes, improve the nutritional status and well-being of poor and vulnerable populations, and strengthen resilience to climate change. It heralds a belated recognition too of the insufficiency of a reactive emergency response to famine and hunger crises. It suggests a move towards one that tackles the underlying structural causes of hunger. Young people will need patience and to dig sufficiently deep to achieve these necessary changes. They are right in seeking to be partners, so much more than being allowed as attendees. Hand-in-Hand recognises the importance of tailor-made interventions to food security, using the best available evidence in the form of spatial data, validated on the ground through local diagnostics and policy processes, to target the most food insecure, the most hungry, the poorest. It recognises that context-specific employment and labour market policies are part of the sustainability challenge. I believe that evidence from below is crucial to achieving globalisation from below and that it can be achieved by a reintroduction of new re-casted anthropology guided by, among others, the new African scholars now available, whose work is empirical and peer-tested, can be invaluable in giving transparency on projects and investments – a strategy for fact-gathering for empowerment of rural people so like the 1955 fact-gathering with rural people of the FAO – first published in 1955 and used by me in 1969! Young people must be about upskilling to be able to critique all of the assumptions guiding the policies on to their lives. A key objective for us now must be to strengthen institutional capacity on the ground, not only at the strategic level, but also fundamentally, so that the public, farmers, and other stakeholders’ institutions are enabled to participate in territories-based agri-food systems. Such a move is fundamental to a successful food security strategy. Our institutional architecture and the multilateral bodies within it, must be made fit for purpose if we are to tackle effectively and meaningfully our contemporary food insecurity crisis which is worsening according to the 2023 Global Report on Food Crises, with 258 million people across 58 countries suffering acute food insecurity. Perhaps most crucially, we must acknowledge, as United Nations Programmes such as the Hand-in-Hand Initiative does, the critical importance of partnership and collaboration in addressing global hunger. We must do everything we can to ensure cross-sectoral co-ordination, foster coherent development actions, under a common, shared vision. We must end all wasteful competitive silo behaviours, create a culture of openness and co-operation. The FAO is well positioned to lead on this with its new invigorated partnerships with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Co-operation in the development and implementation of new models will be key to the achieving of any targets that seek to be sustainable and inclusive. For example, I suggest it will achieve best results if funders, such as the African Development Bank, are enabled and funded to work closely with research institutes, both at the national and international level, but particularly take account of field studies conducted over time at local level in the new anthropology so as to ensure that findings from the latest research feed into the design and implementation of any financial supports and investments. By providing a platform, a shared interactive transparent space for national authorities and producers, national and global businesses, multilateral development banks and donors to discuss and advance ways and means to finance the supported national food programmes, initiatives such as Hand-in-Hand are proving to be an effective flagship programme of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. Co-operation must work both ways. For example, the parts of the so-called ‘developed’ world suffering from problems of high levels of obesity and food wastage must learn from the deep knowledge and wisdom existing in the most populated continents, as well as the science, which points to a new ecological revolution, one in which agroecology – the bringing of ecological principles to develop new management approaches in agroecosystems – can play a fundamental role, especially for the poorest of our global citizens. We have seen the destructive impact of colonial models of agronomy promoting an over-reliance on a small number of commodity crops, herders incentivised to become less mobile and store less grain in order to maximise commodity crop production, and increasing imports in conditions of near monopoly of seeds, pesticides and fertilisers. This had the deadly effect of opening up farmers not only to the full force of extended droughts, the ravages of variable climate conditions, and a reliance on non-indigenous inputs, but also to global spaces where they have insufficient influence. We must retreat from these dysfunctional food systems model, with their related dependencies, with urgency and embrace models of sufficiency and effective local markets and see the value of making our way too that includes agro-ecological models that promote food security and development opportunities for the poorest people on our fragile planet. Adaptation and responding to the already changing climate is crucial for all of us, and especially in the most food-insecure nations. We must restore degraded ecosystems, introduce drought-resistant crops, ensure accessible digital services for smallholder farms, while creating new, sustainable green jobs for young people so that we may forge a smart, sustainable, climate-resilient development path for the continent. This week we have to acknowledge the many challenges we face including, inter alia, the energy, climate and biodiversity crises, war and conflict which exacerbate food insecurity, ensuring enabling policy environments, and reaching the long-term goal of sustainable food system transformation. Any agri-food initiative, be it for Africa, the Middle-East, Central or South America, or other food-insecure regions, must place inclusivity at its core. Specifically, more vulnerable, smallholder farmers must be targeted for inclusion as programme beneficiaries, not just large-scale, industrial level farmers and ever-expanding commercial plantations. Research has shown that irresponsible agri-business deals are sometimes falsely legitimated by the promotion of alleged achievement of Sustainable Development Goal Number 2 at any cost, without care as to consequence, ignoring the reality that smallholders need enabling policies to enhance their role in food production; that food insecurity is linked to rights, processes, and unequal access to land resources; and that dispossession disproportionately affects women farmers. On this latter issue of gender, achieving zero hunger requires gender-inclusive land and labour policies. Actions must prioritise the inclusion of women and girls who are more food insecure than men in every region of the world. Women must have a right to land recognised and enshrined. The gender gap in food security has grown exponentially in recent years, and will only deteriorate further in the absence of targeted intervention. Women are obviously the most impacted victims of the food crisis, thus they must be a part of the solution. Women produce up to 80 percent of foodstuffs. Empowering women farmers can thus serve as a transformative tool for food security. However, female farmers have, research tell us, limited access to physical inputs, such as seeds and fertiliser, to markets, to storage facilities and this must be addressed. Climate change, and our response to it, addressing global hunger and global poverty, exposing and breaking dependency is a core theme of my Presidency. It is the most pressing existential crisis that our vulnerable planet and its global citizens face. Throughout the world, young people and the youth sector have been at the vanguard of efforts to tackle climate change. Young people have demonstrated, time and again, how well-informed and acutely aware they are of the threat that climate change poses, as well as its uneven and unequal impacts. May I suggest to all of you that, as young innovators and future leaders in your respective fields, you will be at your best, achieve the greatest fulfilment for yourself and others, when you locate your contribution within a commitment to be concerned and contributing global citizens. Take time to ask how is my energy in the tasks of hand and brain being delivered and for whose benefit. May I suggest, too, that you will be remembered and appreciated all the more if you work to ensure that the results of science, technology are shared and that all human endeavours are allowed to flow across borders for the human benefit of all and with a commitment to ecological responsibility and inclusivity. Offer your efforts where they can have the best effect for all. Locate yourselves in the heart of the populated world, as Nobel Laureate William Campbell did with his research on river blindness. Changing our food systems is, however, let us not forget, an intergenerational challenge that requires an inter-generational approach. We must now empower youth to be in the driver’s seat to build a new, better, transparent model of food security in a variety of different settings. Let us endeavour, together, in our diverse world, to seek to build a co-operative, caring and non-exploitative global civilisation free from hunger, a shared planet, a global family at peace with nature and neighbours, resilient to the climate change that is already occurring, one based on foundations of respect for each nation’s own institutions, traditions, experiences and wisdoms, founded on a recognition of the transcendent solidarity that might bind us together as humans, and reveal a recognition of the responsibility we share for our vulnerable planet and the fundamental dignity of all those who dwell on it. Thank you. Beir beannacht.

China’s silence towards the European Union’s electric vehicle probe could mean that a more harmful retaliation is on its way During her State of the Union address on 13 September, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the European Union would undertake an anti-subsidy probe against the Chinese electric vehicle (EV) sector. This signalled a major step in the EU’s shift to a more aggressive trade defence against China and raises the question of how China will react, given the importance of the Chinese market to key sectors of the European economy (including the auto and luxury sectors), and also given China’s crucial role in providing goods to the EU for the green transition? An EU-China High Economic and Trade dialogue on 25 September in Beijing, between EU Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis and his Chinese counterparts, may have given a glimpse into China’s mindset. There were fears Chinese officials would respond aggressively to von der Leyen’s announcement during Dombrovskis’s visit but this was not the case. Nevertheless, the silence may be deceptive. Three main factors should be taken into account when considering potential Chinese retaliation. Subtle but harmful retaliation First, China might file its own anti-subsidy investigation at the World Trade Organisation against key European sectors. This would not be difficult since Europe has ramped up its subsidies massively since the pandemic, and more recently has attempted to gain more ‘strategic autonomy’ in sectors including semiconductors. There is very little the EU can do about this potential retaliation, which would be costly for the sectors targeted and for the EU’s image as a free-trade and WTO champion. Second, China could try to persuade EU governments that the Commission-led investigation should be withdrawn. A similar probe happened in early 2014, when the EU launched an anti-subsidy investigation into solar panels produced in China. President Xi Jinping visited then Chancellor Angela Merkel right after the anti-subsidy investigation was announced. Subsequently, the issue was settled quickly, with the Commission withdrawing the case from the WTO. Based on this previous experience, China might prefer to take up the issue bilaterally, possibly with Germany again, rather than enter discussions with the Commission. But a major difference this time is the relative importance of the auto sector in the EU compared to solar power. The auto sector accounts for 14 million jobs in Europe and a good part of the EU’s exports. Exports of cars and components are heavily concentrated in a few EU countries, especially Germany. These exports to China have plummeted in 2023, with a close to 30% drop, and Chinese competition in third markets and even the EU market, has become much more intense. Third, also unlike the solar-panel probe, it is the Commission and not the sector being harmed that has filed the case. It will be harder for the Commission to withdraw the investigation because it would lose credibility. Merkel decided to accommodate Xi Jinping’s request in 2014 because she wanted to save the auto sector, even at the cost of hurting a smaller part of the German economy – the solar panel companies. The new investigation aims to protect the automotive sector. There could be consequences for major European auto companies producing electric vehicles in China, but jobs in Europe are now more important than the future of those companies in China. In any case, the future of European manufacturers is bleak; they seem to have already lost the EV race to their Chinese competitors. China will find it much harder to move the EU away from its decision to pursue an anti-subsidy investigation, differently to what happened in 2014. Lessons to learn There might be a lesson for Europe in what happened to Apple in China in September. Days before Apple’s launch of its new iPhone 15, Huawei launched its Mate 60 with upgraded functionalities which require high-end semiconductors. Beyond raising doubts about the effectiveness of US-led export controls on advanced semiconductors, this announcement constituted a direct challenge to Apple’s phone sales in China. Chinese officials were also prohibited from using iPhones and rumours spread in Chinese media in advance of the Apple launch about the underwhelming quality of the iPhone 15. Investors dumped Apple stock globally and the company lost about 6% of its value in a few days. China’s retaliation against the Commission’s anti-subsidy investigation might not be as direct and transparent, but it will still be harmful and might offer less room for the EU to respond. Europe’s strategic dependence on China is greater than in 2014 and this probe has the potential to cause a bigger fall-out for the EU. China has strengthened its position as a global power and uncompetitive behaviour could hit European core sectors harder because China has more power to retaliate. On the flip side, the stakes are higher for the EU given the importance of the auto sector in terms of jobs and exports. For that reason, China may not manage to deter the EU’s investigation as easily as it did in the past. But this may prompt China to threaten even larger retaliation.

Despite the Kremlin’s rhetoric on Russia’s economic stability and good fortune since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, several economic indicators belie this narrative and hint at potential domestic turmoil as the country’s economy falters. The legitimacy of President Vladimir Putin’s rule rests upon two pillars: economic wellbeing (the carrot) and political and civil repression (the stick). Putin and his regime consider themselves irreplaceable, boasting a narrative of internal stability contrasted against recent economic turmoil in the West. This propaganda extends to the Russian economy, as the government appears to prefer publishing numbers that it believes reflect favourably upon Russia while concealing more unsavoury statistics from the public. Ironically, however, even some data deemed palatable for publication hints at a difficult situation for Russia’s domestic economy. According to the statistics presented by the Russian authorities, Russia’s GDP only contracted by 1.9% in 2022, following an onslaught of Western sanctions and the war. Furthermore, Russia maintains a record-low unemployment rate of 3.2% as of May 2023, which is notably lower than the EU’s 5.9% and still better than the UK’s 4%. Russia’s 2023 inflation rate is 2.76%, below Western rates like the US’s 3.2%. These numbers, however, do not provide a comprehensive view of Russia’s economic situation. Russia's prioritisation of its wartime industries, rising emigration rates and over-employment all played a role in mitigating any sharp declines in GDP. Additionally, Russia’s economy relies on the sale of raw materials, particularly oil, to withstand sanctions on sophisticated goods. This keeps the country relatively insulated from economic restrictions imposed by its Western neighbours. Maintaining a perception of stability and wealth is crucial for Putin’s domestic legitimacy, and consumer goods are important for this purpose. Putin’s strategy is reminiscent of Leonid Brezhnev’s ‘social contract’, which relied on the relative welfare of citizens in exchange for their political apathy. Any weakening of this contract undermines the system’s ‘immunity’ and increases its vulnerability during a crisis. Parallel imports and the substitution of popular foreign brands with obscure Russian versions (for example, Vkusno i Tochka for McDonald’s and Stars Coffee for Starbucks) attempt to portray an unchanged society in which the ‘special operation’ in Ukraine has not adversely altered Russian life. However, trends in Russia’s automobile industry may disrupt this carefully constructed image. Grinding Gears The automobile industry plays a crucial role in Russia’s projection of a ‘business-as-usual’ economy. For years, Russia has presented its ‘import substitution’ programme as a series of successes towards achieving technological sovereignty. Therefore, when Western automobile manufacturers began pulling out of Russia, Russia attempted to fill the void with domestic replacements, with mixed results. Western automobiles have become scarce in Russian dealerships, which are mainly selling the remaining stock after the brands left Russia. Most Western automobiles now arrive in Russia through parallel imports via third countries. The reduction in the market is reflected not only in quantity but also quality. With limited competition in the market, products tend to be more expensive and lower quality. Producers become accustomed to the prevailing conditions and have less incentive to innovate. Additionally, shortages of spare parts lead to disruptions. For instance, the underwhelming Lada Granta Classic lacks crucial components found in modern automobiles, while the Lada Niva Legend has only very basic equipment. Both automobiles are already technologically outdated, yet they accounted for 35% of the Russian market in 2022. A particularly embarrassing incident occurred at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum when the premium Lada Aura failed to start during an exhibition – a reputational failure for an automobile costing well over RUB 2 million. Lower- and middle-class Russians have been particularly hit by the departure of Western auto manufacturers as the market becomes more exclusive. The average monthly salary in Russia reached almost RUB 73,000 in April 2023, putting most new automobiles outside the price range of an average-salaried citizen. The cheapest automobiles on the market, the Lada Granta and Lada Niva, now cost around RUB 700,000 and 821,000, respectively. The currency exchange rate for the Russian rouble may contribute to a further decline in the affordability of new automobiles, creating room for the growth of the second-hand market. However, with the rouble depreciating to RUB 91 per $1, imports of new automobiles are becoming more expensive. Turning East Nonetheless, Russia continues to search elsewhere for import opportunities. Despite announcements from Iranian and Indian producers about negotiations over automobile production in Russia, the only substitutes appear to have come from Chinese companies. As of July 2023, Chinese imports accounted for 49% of Russia's automobile market – a significant increase from June 2021’s 7% share. Additionally, Russian automobile brand officials tout cooperation with ‘Eastern partners’ when proclaiming the resilience of Russia’s domestic automobile industry in the face of Western sanctions, but these ‘Russian-produced cars’ are often heavily reliant on Chinese parts. Even Chinese producers and import substitution are as yet unable to fill the production gap left by Western companies shunning Russia. Before the invasion, new automobile sales reached approximately 1.66 million automobiles annually, but in 2022, new sales and production plummeted by 60% and 67%, respectively. These numbers still likely benefit from the fact that Western producers only began leaving Russia in 2022, and significant stocks of automobiles remained with dealers. In June 2023, Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade claimed that the Russian automobile market grew 6% from January to May 2023 compared to the same period in 2022. Nevertheless, this relative growth is primarily due to the low base of the previous year, when monthly production fell to 3,700 automobiles in May 2022. Stopping Short While parallel imports have partially lessened the supply–demand gap, they have not resolved all problems. As evidenced above, some recent figures suggest a partial market recovery, but growth is modest compared to low sales in 2022. Domestic Russian automobile production is anticipated to continue increasing, mainly through the assembly of Chinese automobiles. AvtoVAZ, part of the Rostec complex and a producer of Lada automobiles, intends to increase production to 400,000 automobiles in 2023. However, even if this plan is achieved, the production volume would still fall short of the necessary levels. Factories assembling Chinese automobiles will also increase production, with the Moskvich factory planning to produce 50,000 automobiles in 2023. While this surpasses previous production rates, it remains below the Renault factory’s production capacity of 190,000 automobiles annually. However, increasing the production of Russian-made automobiles will pose a challenge. Moscow is currently prioritising arms production within its manufacturing industry, and Russia may struggle to close the gap in the foreseeable future due to workforce issues. As a result, the delayed consumer demand will only continue to grow. Those who have refrained from purchasing a new automobile may continue to wait for now, but they will eventually demand new models. A Troubled Road Ahead Russia’s workforce is tied to the country’s economic structure; many entrepreneurial individuals have migrated in search of better opportunities in the West, and the remaining workforce is often specialised but has limited access to higher-paying employment opportunities. Russia’s internal market workforce is sufficient to meet military and economic needs, but there are no significant incentives for comparable development in manufacturing and services to that in the West. In the face of Western sanctions, Russia will continue trying to rely on countries hostile or indifferent to the preferences of Western countries. The economic situation in Russia, as reflected in the automobile market, is unlikely to directly threaten Putin’s regime. However, it does present a significant security concern. The automobile market in Russia is showing signs of a decline reminiscent of the Brezhnev era, characterised by technological backwardness and diminishing quality. Russian automobile producers lack the necessary technologies and expertise to manufacture their own vehicles; most new automobile models introduced recently are essentially Chinese automobiles assembled in Russia. As a result, Putin’s ambitions for ‘technological sovereignty’ are unlikely to be realised soon, and tensions may rise as consumer demand becomes impossible to meet. Domestic complacency with regard to Russia’s wanton belligerence in Ukraine, and indeed, towards Putin’s regime, may be in for a bumpy ride. The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of World and New World Journal or any other institution.

The Arctic is hot. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has resulted in suspended cooperation with Russia in the Arctic Council; Finnish and future Swedish membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) means that seven of the eight members of the Arctic Council will also be NATO member states; and a deepening of Chinese–Russian ties over the Arctic has increased security tensions in the region. At the same time, the Arctic is warming four times faster than the global average and is predicted to be ice-free at its summer minimum at least once before 2050 under all climate change scenarios. New resources and fish stocks, shorter shipping routes and unclaimed territory are becoming available as the ice melts. In addition, the Arctic holds 13–30 per cent of the world’s unexploited oil and gas. There are also large deposits of nickel, zinc and rare earth elements in the Arctic that are key to renewable energy and the green transition.  These changes in the Arctic are affecting the development aims of actors such as the European Union (EU). Recent changes in Kiruna, a Swedish mining town located approximately 200 kilometres north of the Arctic Circle, provides evidence of these aims. When Sweden assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU in January 2023, it held its first Swedish meeting there. Two key announcements relating to Kiruna were made at that time: confirmation of the largest deposit of rare earth elements in Europe, namely the Per Geijer deposit; and the inauguration of Spaceport Esrange, which will commence launches of small satellites in 2024. These developments are important for the EU and Sweden but, if not properly planned for, they could spill over into local social and environmental conflict and have long-term consequences. The case of the Arctic sheds light on the importance of balancing the trade-offs inherent in economic and development ambitions. This SIPRI Policy Brief first explores the EU’s growing interest in the Arctic and its efforts to reduce negative spillovers. It then takes Kiruna as an example of where interests linked to mining and space-related activities could lead to local controversy. The policy brief concludes with starting points for how to ensure more mutually beneficial outcomes moving forward.  THE EU’S GROWING INTEREST IN THE ARCTIC  The Arctic is becoming of strategic importance to the EU, including for its climate, energy, and space-related possibilities. The EU’s 2021 Arctic Policy promotes cooperation and sustainable development in the region, including through green and blue energy projects and the supply of critical materials that are key to implementing the European Green Deal (EGD), a package of policy initiatives aimed at achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The EU’s 2023 proposal for a Critical Raw Materials Act underpins the need for EU self-sufficiency, strengthened capacities for extraction and refining of raw materials, and diversified supply chains. Europe is currently almost entirely dependent on imports of critical materials, 70 per cent of which are sourced from Russia and China, but it has been set on reducing this dependency, especially given shortages in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic and the energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.  The Arctic is also important for expanding EU space capabilities. The EU’s 2023 Space Strategy for Security and Defence outlines the significance of its space assets and the need to defend them, especially given the augmented militarization of space and the increased use of dual-use space assets by Russia, China, the United States, and India. Space technologies can also promote Earth observation to support climate change and scientific monitoring. Polar orbiting satellites launched from the Arctic, for example, are uniquely placed for Earth observation. Since the Earth rotates while a satellite orbits, a satellite in polar orbit passes over both poles and travels directly overhead every point on Earth. Addressing the social and environmental implications  Although the Arctic can provide raw materials and expand space capabilities, the resulting social and environmental impacts can also be significant. Moreover, the economic benefits are not always equitably shared, and any new jobs created are not always compatible with local competences. The extraction of resources can also result in competing land and resource claims with Indigenous communities. A study of 53 socio-environmental conflicts related to the economic extraction of natural resources in the Arctic found that Indigenous people were involved in 64 per cent of them. For the Sami, the EU’s only Indigenous group, these challenges add to those already faced by climate change, which is reducing the availability of lichen used as a winter food source for their reindeer and grazing lands more generally. In Sweden, conflicts with the Sami are often related to mining and renewable energy projects. Nine of the 12 metal mines in Sweden are located on Sami lands. Sweden is dependent on hydropower for around 45 per cent of its electricity generation, and 80 per cent of this also takes place on these lands. Wind power generation through projects like the Markbygden Wind Farm, the largest worldwide with expected completion in 2025, has also reduced access to reindeer herding routes. Sweden is a signatory to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) but has not ratified the International Labour Organization’s Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which upholds rights to self-determination and control over land and resources.  The EU recognizes the need to address these local impacts. Its ‘Fit for 55’ package, which reduces net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 per cent by 2030 and supports implementation of the EGD, emphasizes a socially just and fair energy transition and protecting the Arctic from pollution. The EU’s 2021 Joint Communication on the Arctic reaffirms its responsibility to protect and minimize its environmental footprint there. The 2023 Kiruna Declaration notes the vulnerability of remote areas such as the Arctic to energy transitions and the importance of sustainable place-based development. In June 2023, the EU recognized that external interests in the Arctic are ‘increasing with multifaceted social, environmental, and economic con sequences. The EU also upholds Indigenous rights. The EU supported the adoption of UNDRIP in 2007, which also grants the right to free, prior, and informed consent, enabling Indigenous peoples to give or withhold their consent to projects. Article 3 of the Treaty of the EU protects European cultural heritage, which Sami reindeer husbandry is a part of. However, the EU does not have an internal Indigenous people’s policy, which could help to ensure that the negative impacts of conflicts linked to projects supporting the EGD in Europe are addressed internally within the EU’s framework and to uphold these rights. THE CASE OF KIRUNA   Kiruna is the northernmost city in Sweden, located in Swedish Lapland, around 200 km north of the Arctic Circle, with a population of around 23 000 people (see figure 1). It was built in 1900 to facilitate iron ore extrac tion from the mountain of Kirunavaara (meaning ‘Kiruna mine’), which is the largest and purest underground deposit in the world and the source of approximately 90 per cent of Europe’s iron ore. Kiruna is also home to the Sami and Tornedalian Indigenous peoples, who populated the lands long before the town was constructed. It has the highest concentration of Sami population in Sweden, with eight different Sami villages (known as ‘samebyar’) and around 2 500 people, constituting approximately 10 per cent of Kiruna’s population. In Kiruna, the two current issues of mining and space ambitions shed light on the importance of paying attention to the local impacts of development and economic ambitions.   Mining projects and stakeholder consultations  Mining in Kiruna points to the value of early stakeholder consultation.  Strict environmental and social standards, as well as skills-based and financial requirements, mean that it could be 15 years before the Per Geijer deposit of rare earth elements can be extracted. The state-owned Swedish mining company that discovered the deposit, Luossavaara-Kiirunavaara Aktiebolag (LKAB), has highlighted its importance for the EGD and the proposed Critical Raw Materials Act. If not properly planned, however, mining the deposit could have negative local impacts and lead to project delays and contestation later.  Kiruna has a history of Sami resistance against mining. The Kiruna mine is located within nationally recognized Sami reindeer herding grounds and inside the EU’s Natura 2000 protected areas network. It has cut off Sami reindeer routes and access to lakes previously used for fishing. To counter the increased risk of subsidence and accommodate additional layers of iron ore extraction by LKAB, in 2004 it was decided that Kiruna would relocate 3 km to the east. This relocation is expected to be completed in 2035. The Sami claim they were not properly consulted prior to projects for relocation being accepted and were denied compensation for the time spent in these consultations. The Swedish government has responded that the Sami villages of Gabna and Laevas did participate in research on how reindeer routes would be impacted by the relocation, and thus it had fulfilled its obligations under UNDRIP. Mining the Per Geijer deposit also faces pushback. A 2023 statement by the Saami Council criticizes the decision to mine the deposit for its anticipated impact on reindeer herding in Gabna and Laevas, arguing that: ‘The Saami lands are being disproportionately affected... [and] used to justify and greenwash the unsustainable consumption habits of the Western world.’ It accuses LKAB of not informing the Gabna village in advance of the public announcement. LKAB has countered the claim, saying it had already announced the presence of abundant rare earth elements in Kiruna and was in dialogue with the Sami villages to avoid or compensate for the impacts on local lands and reindeer husbandry. In return, LKAB hopes it will be able to move forward with its environmental permit application and eventually extract the deposit.  Space ambitions and precautionary approaches   Space ambitions in Kiruna demonstrate the importance of proceeding with caution and more information. The Esrange Space Center expects to launch its first satellites early in 2024 from its new spaceport. Esrange has previously only launched rockets and balloons but will now be able to support Earth observation to measure and mitigate the impacts of climate change, enhance maritime activities and search and rescue operations, and improve the tracking of military troops. However, its history also illustrates the need to understand stakeholder perspectives and value systems.  Esrange was established in Kiruna in 1966 because of its suitability for testing and launching rockets, easy transport access and proximity to the Kiruna Geophysical Observatory, and the vast and largely unpopulated area. For the population of Kiruna, Esrange provided the potential to develop local infrastructure and alternative employment to the mining and forestry sectors. A scientific and technical working group was tasked by the European Preparatory Commission for Space Research with approving the location and construction. It found that although Esrange would impact seasonal Sami reindeer herding routes, this would only occur for four months of the year. It identified no security or safety issues. However, the working group underestimated the significance of seasonal land use for reindeer herders. Safety zones, shelters and warning zones were set up for the protection of reindeer and herders, and compensation was paid for the disruption, but new administrative zones divided the land and herders lost their traditional, year-round access. What occurred in Esrange reflects a similar trend in space expansions in remote regions that are far from urban centres but inhabited by people whose heritage and livelihoods are attached to the land. In Hawaii, a plan by the Canadian Astronomical Society to build a Thirty Metre Telescope (TMT) at the peak of Mauna Kea resulted in pushback from the native Kanaka Maoli people, who regard the mountain as sacred and belonging to the gods. In 2014, supporters of the TMT accused protestors of being anti-science. The Indigenous communities responded that they were not against science as such, but rather protecting the cultural heritage of the mountain and their lands, which cannot be understood through conventional science alone. In 2022 an 11-member, state-appointed board, which includes representatives from astronomical observatories and native Hawaiian communities, was established to prepare to take stewardship of the mountain in 2028.  The social and environmental impacts of Arctic space infrastructures remain largely underexplored. Some experts fear that the expansion of launch sites or spaceports could harm habitats and have noise- and light related implications for wildlife, while failed launches would spread toxic materials and debris, and could cause wildfires. Although smaller satellites and reusable launch systems are more reliable and accessible, they could have a greater risk of failure and the scattering of debris and fuel. In 2018, European satellites for environmental monitoring launched by rockets in Russia raised concerns among Inuit people in Canada that the resulting debris could spread toxic fuel and impact wildlife as launchers fell back into Arctic waters, especially given the lack of prior studies conducted on these impacts. In Kiruna, the chair of the Sami village of Talma, who is also a reindeer herder, succeeding in blocking some of the expansion plans for Esrange in 2019 because of the expected impacts on his reindeer and herding routes; and now ‘his sights are set’ on tackling the predicted noise pollution.  STARTING POINTS FOR THE WAY FORWARD  The case of Kiruna demonstrates the importance of human-centred approaches that tap into different sources of knowledge. Mining in Kiruna highlights the need to ensure that stakeholders affected by the outcomes of projects are treated with respect and included throughout the entire process. This can help to distribute economic benefits more equitably and avoid the misreading of concerns. It can also facilitate exchanges between mining industries, environmentalists and communities, and lead to quicker, more inclusive, and fairer consent processes for projects. Space ambitions in Kiruna stress the importance of precautionary approaches that draw from different knowledge and value forms.   Human-centred approaches can help to intertwine development and economic aims with human security. The Saami Council’s 2019 Sámi Arctic Strategy encourages human-centred economic development that is respectful of the environment, co-designed and co-produced using Western and Indigenous knowledge, and rights-based. The strategy emphasizes the importance of human security, which for the Sami includes self determination, participation in decision making, control over their land and resources, and maintenance of their language and culture. Furthermore, human-centred approaches can encourage the co production of knowledge to inform more precautionary decisions. Indigen ous peoples have time-tested understanding of their Arctic environments and living sustainably, and their input can help to prevent unsustainable and conflictual projects. Their ecological knowledge can complement Western methods of environmental protection by introducing approaches that move beyond pure science and rationality. The 2017 EU Arctic Stakeholder Forum report recognized the importance of development based on local Arctic and Indigenous knowledge as a scientific basis. The Saami Council is also trying to bridge this knowledge gap and received funding in 2019 from the EU’s Interreg Nord programme to achieve this aim. In 2022 it organized the first EU–Sámi Week, with a thematic focus on ‘Art and Land’, and workshops to create greater awareness of Sami culture and climate justice through dance, art, music, and food. These initiatives can help to bring stakeholders together and support human-centred approaches to economic and development ambitions in the Arctic.

Guatemala’s politics has recently been shaken by the victory of anti-corruption crusader Bernardo Arévalo de León, which has brought fresh air of hope in a country ridden by high levels of poverty, corruption and criminal violence. The result fits with the wave of anti-incumbent victories in Latin America: it is the 16th country in the region where an opposition candidate has been elected president in the past five years, out of 17 elections. But like or even more than in other countries, the electoral results are being contested by an astounded political and economic establishment unwilling to give its power away. Vicious attempts by judicial authorities to prevent Arévalo and his party’s congressmembers from taking office have raised domestic and international concerns that Guatemala may also join the growing list of Latin American countries experiencing setbacks in their democratic standards. The Organization of American States (OAS), a virtually moribund regional body that has proven unable to solve political crises and has at times even exacerbated them, has come back to the fore as the political forum where to coordinate a regional response. Will the Guatemalan case revive the fortunes of the OAS and will international accompaniment be enough to safeguard democracy in the country?  An impunity-prone status quo Guatemala is the biggest country in Central America and with the largest economy. It is also, however, among the most unequal, with around half of the population below the poverty line and suffering from high rates of malnutrition, especially among indigenous people, which account for 40 per cent of its population. It also hosted one of the most successful anti-corruption experiments in Latin America – the United Nations-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG, 2007–2019) – which contributed to dismantling over 70 criminal networks encrusted in the country’s institutions involved in violence, drug trafficking and extortion activities. The zenith of this sweeping anti-corruption crusade was reached in 2015, when then-President Otto Pérez Molina eventually heeded the calls to resign by thousands of Guatemalans who protested in front of the presidential palace for months, after a CICIG-led investigation found him and his vice president involved in a large-scale corruption scheme involving the state customs. The lull, however, did not last long. Pérez Molina’s successor, Jimmy Morales, a former comedian, turned his back on the CICIG after the latter started investigating his brother and his son, and eventually shut it down in 2019. Since then, the country has experienced serious setbacks in its democratic institutions, as a coalition of political, economic and military elites (commonly dubbed as the Pact of Corrupts) scorched by CICIG-led investigations strived to re-establish an environment of impunity through the co-optation of the judiciary. The Attorney General Consuelo Porras, appointed by Morales and confirmed by his successor, the incumbent Alejandro Giammattei, turned out to be the most strenuous defender of these interests. Her office buried investigations into the president’s alleged acceptance of bribes by Russian contractors, and instead persecuted prosecutors, judges and journalists who had championed anti-corruption efforts, leading more than 30 of them to flee the country and jailing others on abuses of power charges. The boomerang effect of a tilted electoral game In the run-up to the 2023 election, growing popular disenchantment with the political class morphed into an anti-system sentiment. Authorities reacted by excluding from the race a number of well-polling candidates for alleged irregularities in their or their parties’ enrolment. However, this strategy boomeranged, and channelled the protest vote to the only remaining candidate that was perceived as external to the system: Bernardo Arévalo de León, running on an anti-corruption ticket for a tiny party called Semilla. Arévalo, who was polling below 3 per cent before the first electoral round, not only made it to the second round, but then obliterated the other run-off contender, former first-lady Sandra Torres from the UNE party, in a landslide victory on 20 August with an over 20 points lead. Arévalo’s party also obtained 23 seats in the upcoming legislature, more than three times its 2019 performance. Overall, the Guatemalan election results align with a regional trend of anti-incumbent victories in recent years, although in this case the winner is a progressive champion of democracy, instead of an anti-system populist, as had happened in El Salvador, Costa Rica and elsewhere in the region. The legal fightback against change Semilla’s unexpected result prompted the reaction of those same forces that had tried to channel the vote toward less dangerous candidates and that now put up a number of legal challenges to undermine the credibility of the election and disqualify the president-elect’s party. This strategy pivots around accusations of wrongdoings in the creation of Semilla that would erase its status as a legitimate party, and claims of fraud. Right after the first round, the Attorney General’s office opened investigations into alleged irregularities (fake signatures) upon Semilla’s creation, aiming to strip it of its legal status; this was coupled with accusations of abuse of power directed to Supreme Electoral Tribunal’s magistrates that certified the results. As a result, while Arévalo has been confirmed as president-elect, the Congress has already proceeded to strip the Semilla deputies elected in the 2019 elections – including Arévalo himself – of their seats. In parallel, nine parties obtained by the Supreme Court, allegedly close to the incumbent executive, a ruling in favour of a recount of the votes of the first round, questioning the findings of national and international observation missions, which did not report any broad irregularities. The recount ended with the officialisation of the results in mid-July, eventually assigning a few more votes to Semilla than originally reported. Yet, after the second round, Torres refused to concede and denounced a supposed fraud, despite the unequivocal margin separating her from Arévalo. Recently, the Attorney General’s office prosecutors even stormed the facilities where ballot boxes where stored, opening 160 of them, a move that electoral authorities considered illegal. After the prosecutors’ raid, Arévalo has eventually decided to halt the transition until the Attorney General resigns and ceases the political persecution. Domestic and international outcry The legal attempts to dismiss the will of change of Guatemalan voters have sparked a wave of public outcry in the country. It has also not gone unnoticed in the international arena. The electoral observation missions of the OAS and the European Union repeatedly expressed their rejection of any attempt to defy the electorate’s choice. The OAS Permanent Council discussed the situation in Guatemala and mandated the Secretary General to monitor the situation closely during the transition. The latter warned that the suspension of Semilla is a violation of the due process that Guatemala, being part of the Inter-American system, is mandated to respect. Strong public messaging also came from the US: government representatives, from President Biden to a bipartisan group of Congress members, have reiterated both privately and publicly their concerns and called on Guatemalan judicial authorities to stop undermining the country’s democracy. These domestic and international pressures may have contributed, together with the blatant arbitrariness of the judicial measures taken so far, to creating some fissures in the establishment. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal, an accomplice in the run-up to the election with the disqualification of candidates, has now turned into a strenuous defender of the election results and proceeded to officialise them despite the legal challenges and Torres’s party’s refusal to concede. At the political level, two ministers (Economy and Energy and Mining) resigned from their posts, while a few politicians from across the spectrum decried the obstructionism against Semilla. Most notably, a few private sector chambers and even the country’s largest business confederation, known as CACIF, issued public statements in defence of the integrity of the vote and calling on institutions to let the electoral process come to completion. Against this backdrop, President Giammattei is believed to be playing a double game. In public, he has opened the door to Arévalo for an orderly transition, inviting OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro to oversee the process. At the same time, however, he has remained silent on the apparent political persecution of Semilla by the judiciary and legislature. The need to keep Guatemala in the spotlight Notwithstanding, the remnants of the current political establishment appear to be eager to defy the public outcry within and without the country. The fate of Consuelo Porras, in particular, seems intrinsically linked to the preservation of the status quo by reducing as much as possible Arévalo’s margin of action. While Arévalo’s victory seems hard to overturn at this stage, this cannot be ruled out completely until all claims of fraud are dismissed and the transition to the new administration is completed in January 2024. This would be a dismal scenario, which would likely lead Guatemala into the abyss of a full-blown coup d’état, with unpredictable consequences in terms of social turmoil and international isolation. At the same time, however, the legal cases against Semilla are likely to advance, unless they are denounced as political persecution by the widest array of sectors in the country. The suspension of the party would affect Arévalo’s ability to set the legislative agenda, already quite limited from the start, having Semilla won only 23 out of the 160 seats. Constant engagement of regional governments and statements from political and economic sectors should help prevent this. The task is particularly delicate for the OAS, whose legitimacy has been tainted by its inability to craft a coordinated, principle-based response to some of the political and electoral crises that have affected the region in recent years, particularly Nicaragua, Venezuela and Bolivia. Critics have accused the body of approaching crises with an ideological bias: it has occasionally dismissed complaints of undemocratic moves in such countries as Brazil, El Salvador and Honduras when they were under conservative rule, while advancing allegations of fraud without solid evidence, which in turn fuelled tensions in Bolivia in 2019. Guatemala offers an opportunity for the OAS to wash away the perception of being politically biased and reposition itself as the most suitable regional forum to handle the crises arising from violations of the principles enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. To do so, however, concrete results are needed. Regional governments will have to agree on the reputational and diplomatic costs that the actors trying to overturn the election may encounter, and be prepared to enforce them. These may include scaling down cooperation with judicial authorities and, if Arévalo were eventually prevented from taking office, the activation of the democratic clause of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which may lead to the suspension of Guatemala from the OAS. Additionally, they should coordinate closely with the EU and other partners to maintain Guatemala in the spotlight and engage regularly with Guatemalan authorities to convey their commitment to the cause for democracy in the country. Intermittently monitoring the situation or simply paying lip service may not only keep judicial actions unscathed, thus setting a dangerous precedent in Guatemala’s hardly-fought democracy, but also embolden corrupt actors across the Western Hemisphere to follow Porras’s footsteps.

AbstractPurpose: The main objective was to review literature on the Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action with emphasis on how to solve Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia.  Methodology: The author reviewed credible secondary data of HDP case studies online as part of a systemic Critical review design. Only official organizational documents from the UN and its bodies, peer-reviewed published research, books, and mass-media outputs related to HDP nexus were admissible to guarantee validity of results and conclusion applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia.Results: Reviewed scoped evidence based on themes concluded that humanitarian -development peace nexus is intended to bridge collaborations among several development players in the humanitarian ecosystem. These collaborations are not limited only to funding and financial drivers, strategies such as resilience agenda pathways for societies, destabilizing the effects of environmental stress, etc. Tackling protracted environmental conflicts in Somalia ultimately leads to sustaining the peace humanitarian, development, and peace interventions agenda (OECD, 2017; FAO, 2018). Conclusion: The paper concluded that Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action had an impact on Protracted Environmental Conflicts in Somalia. Unique Contribution to Theory: The paper contributes to the existing literature by reviewing the HDP nexus in action, specifically on how it can solve protracted environmental conflicts in Somalia. It highlights the collaboration among several development players in the humanitarian ecosystem and the strategies that can be used to tackle environmental stress.Unique Contribution to Policy: The paper emphasizes the importance of the HDP nexus in sustaining peace interventions in conflict-affected areas like Somalia. It provides insights on how collaborations and strategies can be used to address protracted environmental conflicts in the country. Unique Contribution to Practice: The paper offers a systematic critical review design that can be used by humanitarian practitioners and stakeholders to evaluate the effectiveness of HDP nexus programs in addressing protracted environmental conflicts. It highlights the importance of using credible secondary data sources and collaboration among development players in the humanitarian ecosystem. Overall, the paper highlights the importance of the HDP nexus in addressing protracted environmental conflicts in Somalia and provides insights on how it can be operationalized in practice. The findings can inform the design and implementation of contextually appropriate and effective HDP nexus programs in conflict-affected areas. Keywords: Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus, Protracted Environmental Conflicts   1.0 Introduction Protracted Environmental Conflicts  , collaborative evidence (OECD, 2017; FAO, 2018; Oxfam, 2019) warns of the dynamic complexity of solving environmental problems based on their polarity (based on the fact that there is conflict and disconnect between home based strategies and generic strategies), and protracted nature of environmental conflicts (ICARDA, 2020) .Protracted in sense of  breadth of  variability  of environmental conflicts such as concerns on climate change, global warming desertification and ecology risks impact on quality of life compounded by the fact that these risks have not been solved for a long time despite their risk profiles.  Swiss Re Institute (2021) ties the protracted nature of environmental conflicts to economic, social, cultural, and peace outcomes to humanity that pose an antagonistic end result to humanitarian goals if the vagaries of nature are not professionally managed. This is in agreement with Hinga (2018) looks at the impeccable challenges of protracted environmental and their outcomes on societies and individuals specially to WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene).  The available evidence views of, impeccable and protracted ‘challenges is more akin to of ‘stakeholders need to realize that environmental problems in Somalia and elsewhere are recurring unless the stakeholders change methodology. Consequently, in this paper, the author argues that as environmental conflicts in Somalia conflicts grow increasingly protracted, climate-related shocks more intense, ecological conflicts pitting nature and man more execrated, the vulnerability cycle of fragility, vulnerability and the exacerbation of conflict becomes more established in Somalia (Oxfam, 2019).In this regard, Abel et al (2021) commends  that a framework that integrates a coherent humanitarian, development and peace interventions is needed to tackle protracted environmental conflicts in the globe and elsewhere. This paper will be thus anchored in the humanitarian -development peace nexus theory.  1.1 Problem  The key environmental challenges in Somalia are land deforestation, land degradation, aridity, desertification, pastoral conflicts, water unsustainability, climate change among others, climate change among others. Protracted environmental pressures have been associated with economic, political, social and cultural problems thus downgrading human resilience and ecological sustenance in the region (unisdr,2021). Consequently, it also appears that although evidence relating to climate, environmental risks exists, a disjointed perception exists especially viewed from the success and operationalization of international humanitarian programmes discourse. One of the common misconceptions to the misapplication of humanitarian -development peace rests on the assumption that environmental resilience competes against humanitarian security. These two problems surrounding humanitarian– development– peace nexus and environmental acuity in Somalia builds the problem to be addressed in this paper (Oxfam, 2019). 1.2 Objectives  An overview of Role of the Humanitarian – Development – Peace Nexus evidence in Tackling Protracted Environmental Conflicts theory and literature forms study purpose. Review Role of HDP Nexus Evidence in Theory and PracticeConfigure Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action evidence that is applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia1.3 Research QuestionsWhat are the elements of HDP nexus in context of Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in SomaliaWhat is the Role of HDP Nexus Evidence in Theory and Practice Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in SomaliaWhich Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action strategies is applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia 1.4 Value of research  This paper aims at improved interlinking of the various instruments within the HPD. The interlinking of humanitarian aid and long-term development cooperation had already started to be implemented in the 1990s through the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) approach. What is particularly new in terms of the triple nexus concept is the inclusion of the peace dimension. Humanitarians as well as development and peace actors are called upon to better coordinate their work in order to more effectively promote the transformation of crises and conflicts into sustainable peace. In the past, different mandates, approaches and funding logic as well as a lack of cooperation mechanisms among the stakeholders have led to the poor integration of interventions and often compromised efficiency and effectiveness as a result (OECD, 2017; FAO, 2018; Oxfam, 2019). This paper gives new insights on challenges: a broad strategy, lack of incentives and a poor mutual understanding of the HPD nexus. Despite the awareness of the relevance of the concept and initial successes, implementation still poses major challenges for the stakeholders involved. Effective and efficient cooperation beyond institutional borders requires an adjustment to internal structures, processes and procedures that have often evolved over decades. Within the institutions and the nexus system, there is also a lack of incentive structures to encourage cooperation. Furthermore, there is no in-depth understanding of the work and functioning of the other stakeholder groups. Last but not least, there is a lack of joint analysis and scenario planning to define the focus of coherent programmes that map all aspects of the HDP nexus. Despite OECD DAC recommendations, the rather broad concept leaves plenty of room for interpretation and leads to the various actors having a different understanding of how the actual implementation of the HDP nexus is to take place (Oxfam,201; Medinilla, Shiferaw and Veron, 2019; Abel et al. 20; Hinga, 2018). 1.5 Justification for Study  On the Possible solutions listed below: greater coordination, more changes of perspective and dedicated cooperation at all levels as follows are expected in Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus, Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia (OECD, 2017; FAO, 2018)).Leadership and governance: The HPD nexus should demonstrate commitment to accountability through feedback and openness integrated into environmental programs, monitoring and evaluation, staffing, stakeholder engagements, reporting etc.Transparency: provision of timely information on procedures structures and processes enabling informed decision makingFeedback: Actively engage affected populations to develop resilient policy and practice programming that customizes and responds to protection issues (environment.)Participation: Encourage community partnered participation models Design, Monitoring and Evaluation: Design, monitor and evaluate community conscious programs that are environment sensitive2.0 Critical review of Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action Critical review of Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action: Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia scopes literature based on following keywords is effected (Kroll,Warchold. and Pradhan,2019). These keywords encompass Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus, Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia as suggested by agents of humanitarian-development– peace nexus. These keywords capture the dynamism in the HDP landscape fueled by technology, globalization/commercialization, increased risks (financial/operational/ morbidity/mortality) , and evidence   points to sustained disruption in the otherwise unstable   environmental sector. A summary of HDP models is ascertained because these models converge HDP inputs ;( stakeholders), outputs;(participants and procedures) aimed at delivering short/long term outcomes (quality / cost efficient/ sustainable HPD) to society. Success of HDP projects/programs/health performance is a critical subject Moreso to the Somali government/ policy makers/practitioners /public (Sharma et al., 2019). Contextual keywords summarized included i.e.,’ humanitarian-development– peace nexus, r barriers of   the operationalization of the HDP, success factors to the operationalization of HDP, benefits of HDP – nexus efforts in tackling recurring environmental conflicts in Somalia, recommended a humanitarian-development– peace – nexus model in tackling desertification in Somalia. This sets the groundwork for the theoretical development, methodology Analysis and findings of the subsequent research content (Ashley 2018; Ekblad, 2017; Osa and Hanatani, 2018). The HDP theoretical precepts of this proposal aim to guide the integration of interlinkages in protracted issues of the humanitarian-development– peace nexus viewed through the lens of environmental sustenance, diminishing the adverse effects of environmental conflicts. Specifically, the humanitarian-development peace nexus intends to bridge collaborations among several development players in the humanitarian ecosystem. These collaborations are not limited only to funding and financial drivers, strategies such as resilience agenda pathways for societies, destabilizing the effects of environmental stress, etc. Tackling protracted environmental conflicts in Somalia ultimately sustains the peace HDP interventions agenda (OECD, 2017; FAO, 2018). Peace as a central component of HDP nexus has been championed from 2016. On the forefront is the UN who have placed peace as the banner of its operations. The UN argues that without peace, social developmental goals in public and private circumstances cannot exist. Peace is a human right that supports sustenance of any society, economy or political organization. (Webster and Paton, 2016). Based on this information, the HDP as a policy document cannot be ignored as a guiding document on the success of HDP. Kabia (2016) notes that achieving the optimal combination of humanitarian, development, and peace approaches, and integrating them, is crucial. A nexus approach should never be used as an excuse not to provide humanitarian aid promptly or to reduce development assistance. Many multi-mandated organizations, transforming the aid system, have become accustomed to recognizing and responding to these altering settings.  Khafagy's (2020) case study explores the nexus between FBOS's humanitarian and religious motives. To achieve this, the author argued that Humanitarian actions are socially constructed to the accountability of affected populations of a particular society in that populations' inherited socioeconomic and political aspects (traditions) are integrated into outcomes. The dissertation applies to this HDP nexus in Somalia because the HDP nexus will refer to employing power (resources and decision capabilities) by humanitarian stakeholders anchored with effective and meaningful programming that recognizes the social, cultural, and political independence of the Somali people. It is the protection function envisioned by the UNHCR whereby commitment to protecting human dignity is cherished. Barnett and Stein's (2012) case study of systematic reviews of why HDP fails is an allusion to the secularization of humanitarian outcomes as the process by which daily routines are delinked from a supernatural direction to a more humanistic attribution, thus challenging its roots of spiritual standing. The book is an apparent break from the religious philosophy of the humanitarian paradigm that has dominated the world.  In their premise, the book author's point to arising of the secular humanitarian approach, which justifies the need to have efficient systems of humanitarian delivery that are based beyond sacred roles DEMAC report (2021) arises from a five-year systematic review of the evidence of Diaspora Humanitarian response In Somalia. The report aimed to provide an integrated humanitarian ecosystem by evaluating the smallest peripheral interlocks of the Diaspora humanitarian stakeholders. They process different Humanitarian approaches, identifying gaps and recommending novelties for cross-fertilization of HDP, thus improving humanitarian outcomes. The report is very suitable in that DEMAC has piloted structures linking diaspora and institutional humanitarian players specifically in Somalia and, as such, provides quality first-hand information on this topic.3.0 Methodology The aim of this study, objectives, scope, hypothesis, data type,  converging in different data collection methods, diversified outcomes of the study, bias as well freedom of the researcher, among other factors, defined this study methodology problem in the sense that this study touched on various multidisciplinary settings that were incongruent, research was conducted in complex situational environments on top of research falling under contemporary social investigation which is not succinctly developed (Timans et al. 2019).An elaborate and concise elaboration of the research methodology problem that the researcher must be aware of is exhibited below;Validating the null hypothesis: The Role of the (HDP) Nexus evidence in Tackling Protracted Environmental Conflicts in Somalia based on the assumption that the HDP model is more resilient in mitigating HDP challenges is unknown (Ashley, 2018). The HDP model was chosen as the theoretical grounding for this dissertation because it argues that delivering a HDP('triple') nexus approach surpasses the Framework for Resilient Development and the One Programme Approach in that these two Frameworks leave out the structural elements of peace components. A significant benefit of HDP is that it will entail reconsidering funding channels, operations, required knowledge and thought on how to set criteria and define success in addressing environmental concerns. The HDP, in particular, is more purposeful and persistent in incorporating conflict sensitivity and improving local peace-making capacities. Problem: protracted issues in Somalia persist due to the lack of a feasible HDP environmental model relying on partnerships, promoting human resource’s function optimization, technology adoption, and use of local structure and strategy, among other novel concepts (Oxfam, 2019) Contextualizing the expected HDP model from theory to practice: systematically assembling HDP factors based on reviewing HDP evidence and identifying barriers and success factors is a tall order (Ashley, 2018). The latest document on HPD status released in 2021 i.e., the Somali humanitarian response plan, gives the newest revelation of the humanitarian situation in Somalia. The paper is a result of consolidation by OCHA on behalf of the humanitarian country team and partners. The dissertation provides a comprehensive understanding of the humanitarian crisis, challenges, and recommended strategies, for easing the Somalia humanitarian response plan (UNOCHA.ORG/,2022). 4.0 Discussion Summary   4.1 Discussion of relevant themes based on keywords  This paper used a positivist and pragmatic research philosophy to achieve its primary and secondary goals. Hence, both philosophies ensured that the research philosophy used was factual and that the choice of research philosophy was a function of this discourse research problem (Rowley, 2014). This also informed the study's design framework, methodology, and analytical ability., while qualitative would guide the formulation of the active part of the model (Fischer and Miller, 2017). 4.2 Summary  Role of HDP Nexus Evidence in Theory and PracticeTheory The first objective was Review literature on humanitarian-development–peace. The author reviewed credible secondary data of HDP case studies online. Only official organizational documents from the UN and its bodies, peer-reviewed published research, books, and mass-media outputs related to HDP nexus were admissible. Review scoping concluded that humanitarian -development peace nexus is intended to bridge collaborations among several development players in the humanitarian ecosystem. These collaborations are not limited only to funding and financial drivers, strategies such as resilience agenda pathways for societies, destabilizing the effects of environmental stress, etc. Tackling protracted environmental conflicts in Somalia ultimately leads to sustaining the peace humanitarian, development, and peace interventions agenda (OECD, 2017; FAO, 2018). Summary of tabulated results on respondents of the interview guide by selected sources   showed that stakeholders of HDP consisted of both genders, working in different capacities and roles under separate entities over various clusters of operations. This is affirmative to Medinilla et al. (2019), who argue that the HDP nexus intersects different inputs, outputs, and outcomes moderated by a risky environment. Empirical results on Familiarity and Experience with HDP Nexus show despite many respondents knowing HDP, experience, and uptake were low. This agrees with various studies showing that HDP nexus has not been adopted due to many challenges Ashley 2018; Ekblad, 2017; Osa and Hanatani, 2018). Case studies: Practice The HDP nexus theoretical precepts of this case studies are aimed at guiding the integration of interlinkages in protracted issues of the humanitarian-development– peace nexus viewed through the lens of environmental sustenance, diminishing the adverse effects of the ecological conflicts in Somalia ( Osa and Hanatani, 2018). Global case studies in volatile areas such as Nigeria, Yemen, Nigeria, and Somalia show that HDP seems to be moving beyond analysis and planning to practical, programmatic action with shared objectives. HDP success is not tied to Government desire, resources, or availability of resources to foster HDP outcomes. HDP success is evident in Ethiopia, Jordan, and Indonesia, whereby the government spearheads the implementation using state systems. HDP success is apparent in Chad and Somalia, whereby the government allows collaborations among various stakeholders. High volatility has required actors to hold the joint program in the face of the failure of the traditional peace system in areas such as Somalia, CAR, and S.Sudan. In Nigeria, governments have called for a strategy that capitalizes on a more immediate humanitarian response, thus building benefits for local communities (Hernaiz, 2020; Medinilla, Shiferaw and Veron,2019; Abel et al., 2021; Hinga, 2018). 4.3 Recommendations Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action strategy that is applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia Humanitarian-Development–Peace nexus in Action evidence that is applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia can be improved by interlinking of the various instruments within the HPD.For instance, The inclusion of the peace dimension is a very novel addition to the triple nexus notion. Humanitarians, as well as development and peace-building players, are being urged to better coordinate their efforts in order to facilitate the transformation of crises and conflicts into long-term peace. Different mandates, methodologies, and financial logic, as well as a lack of cooperation channels across stakeholders, have in the past resulted in inadequate intervention integration and, as a result, often undermined efficiency and effectiveness (Ashley 2018; Ekblad, 2017; Osa and Hanatani, 2018). A broad approach, a lack of incentives, and a lack of mutual understanding are among the challenges facing Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action evidence that is applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia. Despite widespread recognition of the concept's importance and early successes, implementation remains a substantial issue for the players involved. Cooperation across institutional boundaries that is effective and efficient necessitates changes to internal structures, processes, and procedures that have typically evolved over decades. There are also no incentive systems to foster cooperation between the institutions and the nexus system. Furthermore, there is no comprehensive awareness of the other stakeholder groups' work and operations. Finally, there is a dearth of combined analysis and scenario planning to determine the emphasis of coherent programs that map all components of the HDP nexus( Ashley 2018; Ekblad, 2017; Osa and Hanatani, 2018). On the Possible solutions of Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action evidence that is applicable to Protracted Environmental Conflicts   in Somalia: greater coordination, more changes of perspective and dedicated cooperation at all levels as follows;Leadership and governance: The HPD nexus should demonstrate commitment to accountability through feedback and openness integrated into environmental programs, monitoring and evaluation, staffing, stakeholder engagements, reporting etc. Transparency: provision of timely information on procedures, structures and processes enabling informed decision-making feedback actively to engage affected populations to develop resilient policy and practice programming that customizes and responds to protection issues (environment)(Ashley 2018; Ekblad, 2017;). Operationalization of HDP nexus opportunities leads to Allocatable benefits measurable by both quantitative and qualitative indicators. The study findings revealed that Benefits of HDP – Nexus  In Somalia could be auctioned by  impact evaluation of   ; No of refugee families with housing, no of people accessing Health services, no of people above the poverty   line, funding gap in dollars,no of IDPS formerly with no land rights returning to properties with secure land tenure, no of refugees able to access clean water, sanitation and hygiene, no of livelihoods support programs including women’s and youth empowerment; no of Solved tribal/clan conflicts (Weishaupt, 2020). Timko et al (2018) is of the opinion that Human security aims to build local solutions to local problems based on the argument that recurrent environmental crises are intertwined and adversely affect individual social and well-being. Human Security complements humanitarian efforts by recognizing that long-term solutions considering local capacities and resources are a prerequisite for achieving sustainable results and preventing crises from recurring (UNTFHS,2016). 4.4 Conclusions The paper concluded that Humanitarian-Development– Peace nexus in Action had an impact on Protracted Environmental Conflicts in Somalia. The HDP nexus theoretical precepts are aimed at guiding the integration of interlinkages that solves protracted issues of the humanitarian-development– peace nexus in Somalia viewed through the lens of environmental sustenance, diminishing the adverse effects of the ecological conflicts.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this afternoon, at the Presidential Palace in Nicosia, at the joint statement with Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis: "Since the founding of this Eastern Mediterranean partnership between our three democracies, our relations have flourished bilaterally and trilaterally in ways that people found hard to imagine. I found it hard to imagine that it wasn't the case, when we have three very—in some ways, very similar countries. Hundreds of thousands, by now millions, of Israelis have come here, both as entrepreneurs, as investors, as technologists, as tourists, as diplomats. That is very natural. The reason it's natural is that we feel very comfortable with the culture. I saw that last night when we were having dinner, the three of us, in here, in Limassol, on the seaside, and Israelis walked by and they said hello. And you could see the Cypriot counterparts do the same. It's a very comfortable, informal Mediterranean democratic culture that we have that has historic roots and modern manifestations. This people-to-people base is now obviously going, takes on a different capacity in three main areas that we discussed. They all have to do with energy. The first one is gas. The second one is electricity. The third one is fire. On gas, we're discussing the possibilities that we'll have to decide soon, about how Israel exports its gas. And the same decisions have to be made by Cyprus. And we're looking at the possibility of cooperating on this. Those decisions will be made I think in the next three to six months. Probably closer to three months. The second thing, on the electricity connector. Both Israel and Cyprus are islands. Crete, part of Greece, is an island. There is an electricity connector that is being organized right now from mainland Greece to Crete to Cyprus. We would like to have it connected obviously to Israel, and possibly to the east of Israel, so that we can use, we can optimize the use of electricity. We discussed now the mechanism of how to advance this. The third thing is fire. The world is getting hotter, not only because the warmth of our relationship. That's the good side, but because the climate getting more punitive, with the eruption of fires that are, truly endanger our countries. We have communicated, we've cooperated on firefighting planes. We're talking about going well beyond that into AI systems for early detection, and other things that we're developing separately. We're going to do it better together in a variety of ways that we agreed upon as well. On terror, we've had instances now of cooperation between Israel and Cyprus, and Israel and Greece, where our security forces cooperated to stop terror, Iranian-backed terror.  I have to say that I think there's something else that could develop, and we discuss it at great length. There is now the possibility that we might have the expansion of the Abraham Accords to normalization with Saudi Arabia. All three countries view that as a great possibility, but they also see that this could lead to a connection between India, the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and Europe. There is a natural, geographic connection, but it could be also something that would lead to many, many rewards for our peoples and for our countries. I think we all see eye-to-eye on that. I have to say that it's a pleasure to have, to receive your hospitality and to see my old friend, Kyriakos, here, and you as well, Nikos. We have a wonderful friendship and we look forward to seeing you, as we say, next year in Jerusalem." Prime Minister Netanyahu added: "We like your food. We like your dairy products. We like your yogurt. So as I told the leaders, and I'm telling you right now, we are going to soon open our dairy products market, which is long overdue. I think Israelis are going to be a lot happier, and your producers are going to be a lot happier. So be prepared for that. We can enjoy the benefits of each other's economies in the most direct sense. We intend to open the dairy market very soon to Greek and Cypriot—and other—imports. May the best yogurt win. You have a pretty good chance at winning."

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine imposed a sudden energy shock on Europe 18 months ago. Faced with the prospect of much less Russian gas, there were fears that Europe’s energy infrastructure would not cope with winter 2022-23, causing economies to crumble.  Yet a mild winter and the EU’s gradual rollout of a plan to reduce its energy consumption and buy more from alternative suppliers saw it emerge shaken but not beaten on the other side. Germany, Italy and other gas-reliant nations pivoted from Russian dependency without major electricity shortages. Since then, there has been more good news. Energy prices have fallen steadily in 2023, while Europe’s gas storage levels hit 90% capacity three months ahead of the November target and could even hit 100% in September.  According to politicians like the German energy minister, Robert Habeck, the worst of the energy crisis is over. Yet, as we shall see, it’s a little early to be so confident. New vulnerabilities The share of EU piped gas imports from Russia fell from 39% to just 17% between early 2022 and early 2023. To cope with this shift, the EU has become much more reliant on shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) than before. LNG’s total share of EU gas imports rose from 19% in 2021 to around 39% in 2022, amid a rapid upgrade to infrastructure that aims to have grown LNG capacity by one-third between 2021 and 2024. (Indeed, 13% of LNG imports into the EU actually still come from Russia, whose shipments have also significantly increased since the invasion). This LNG increase has made European countries vulnerable to volatility in that market – particularly as 70% of these imports are bought at short notice rather than using the long-term oil indexed contracts that prevail in Asia. For example, we’ve seen Europe’s benchmark gas price ticking upwards in recent weeks due to concerns over strikes at Australian LNG plants. This shows that supplies remain tight and that there are many potential disruptions in our highly interconnected world market. To synchronise demand for LNG, the European Commission has introduced initiatives like the EU Energy Platform, an IT platform that makes it easier for supplier companies in member states to jointly buy the fuel. However, it is uncertain what level of supplies can be channelled through this instrument as it remains untested. Additionally, the industry fears this kind of state intervention could backfire and undermine the functioning of the market. As for pipeline gas, Norway has overtaken Russia to become Europe’s leading supplier, providing 46% of the requirement in early 2023 (compared to 38% a year earlier). This extra load has strained Norway’s gas infrastructure. In May and June, delayed maintenance work caused sluggish flows that drove up prices, again showing how tight the European market is at present. Extended maintenance work in Norway leading to more obstructions in future looks distinctly possible. Meanwhile, the EU is still expected to have to buy around 22 bcm (billion cubic metres) from Russia this year. That’s the equivalent of around 11% of all the pipeline gas used by the bloc in 2022. A large proportion is coming through Ukraine, and with the current Russia-Ukraine transit agreement unlikely to be renewed after it expires in 2024, this supply route is in jeopardy. As part of the pivot away from Russia, the EU managed to reduce gas consumption by 13% in 2022, according to the International Energy Agency (against a target of 15%). In the months ahead, war-weary EU states may not do so well on this front. It will not help that prices have fallen, nor that some states didn’t pull their weight last winter. Only 14 out of 27 EU members introduced mandatory energy reduction policies, while eastern states like Poland, Romania and Bulgaria did little to reduce consumption. Should there be a physical shortage of gas in continental Europe this winter, this might undermine calls for solidarity. What comes next The harsh reality is that for at least another two or three winters, Europe will have to hope for mild weather across the northern hemisphere without major interruptions to global LNG supply if it is to avoid significant gas price spikes. Even as things stand, European gas prices remain around 50% above their pre-invasion long-run average, which is hurting both households and businesses. This is particularly important for Germany, the EU’s industrial powerhouse, with its energy-intensive automotive and chemical industries. There are growing concerns that continued high energy prices could promote de-industralisaton as energy-intensive industries move elsewhere. The good news is that pressure on gas should at least subside from the mid-2020s. Significant new supplies of LNG will come online in the US and Qatar and the market will re-balance. European gas demand should also get significantly lower – down 40% by 2030, according to the energy reduction plan. There is even talk of a supply glut by the end of the decade, depending on renewable energy deployment accelerating in Europe, and a new generation of nuclear power stations coming on stream. This would significantly reduce Europe’s need to import gas for good, but will only happen if the bloc coordinates effectively. We saw what can be achieved in the months after the invasion when France supplied gas to Germany to help reduce its dependence on Russia, then Germany later supplied more electricity to French cities to help with outages caused by nuclear reactor maintenance. The challenge is to take the same approach to decarbonisation. While France tries to gather support for nuclear modernisation both at home and elsewhere in Europe, it is facing opposition from the likes of the German-led “Friends of Renewals” group, which advocates building out only renewable energy. Divisions like these may prove a serious obstacle in achieving a more rapid energy transformation away from fossil fuels. So while Europe has managed to pivot away from Russia’s pipeline gas, it will remain exposed to the volatility of global gas markets unless it reduces its gas demand significantly in the coming years.

Executive summary  The EU’s unprecedented support to Ukraine has included temporary trade-liberalisation measures and the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, which have strengthened the country’s export capacities and the resilience of Ukraine’s wartime economy. In reaction to Russia’s blockade of the Black Sea, the EU set up EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes as an alternative way for goods to leave Ukraine by rail, road, and inland waterways. These measures have helped Ukraine maintain a slight increase in its total merchandise exports to the EU compared to the pre-invasion level. In contrast, Ukraine’s exports to other markets declined substantially. As a result, many Ukrainian producers and exporters were able to maintain their operations during wartime, receive critically needed export revenues, and deepen their integration into EU supply chains.  However, the insufficient logistics capacity and lack of adequate coordination and cooperation during the operation of Solidarity Lanes led to tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours. Their unilateral import bans on a wide range of Ukrainian agri-food products in April 2023 violated EU Single Market legislation. As a result, Ukrainian export flows were immediately disrupted, given that Ukraine’s access to global markets remains limited. While a compromise of the European Commission and the Eastern European countries allowed the extension of temporary tradeliberalisation measures for Ukraine for a further year, resolving the immediate crisis, more is needed to ensure its smooth operation.  To prevent further crises and disruptions of transit flows, the EU should further increase investments in the transport and storage capacity of Solidarity Lanes and connectivity between EU neighbouring countries and Ukraine, enhance transparency and regular monitoring, data exchange, and coordination of transit flows, and conduct regular trilateral consultations between the European Commission, Eastern European countries, and Ukraine to avoid sudden and unjustified Solidarity Lane disruptions. Amid Russia’s new escalation and withdrawal from the Black Sea Initiative on 17 July, the international community should use all possible leverage to pressure Russia, double down on safeguarding Ukraine’s maritime export routes, and provide Ukraine with more defence capacity to protect its critical infrastructure in the Black Sea and the Danube. In addition, further trade liberalisation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU Single Market should be a priority on the EU-Ukraine agenda as soon as possible, in line with Ukraine’s accession path. Ukraine’s wartime trade losses and the need for further support  The economic burden of Russia’s war on Ukraine is enormous and only continues to increase. Ukraine’s economy contracted by about a third, while exports dropped by 35.1%, meaning that Ukraine received $24 billion less in foreign currency revenue in 2022 compared to 2021 (see Figure 1). The iron and steel industry was hit the hardest, leading to the largest reduction in export supplies - 67.5% or $9.4 billion, in 2022 vs 2021. Significant cuts were also witnessed in ore exports (-56.7% or $4 billion), chemicals (-54.3% or $1.5 billion), machinery, and electronic equipment (-29% or $1.5 billion).  At the same time, the reliance of Ukraine’s economy on agricultural and food exports increased during wartime - agricultural and food products generated more than half of all critically needed export revenues (53% in 2022 vs 40% in 2021). Yet, total agricultural and food exports declined by 15.5% or $4.3 billion in 2022.  Ukraine’s ability to trade has been significantly hampered by Russia’s blockade of key Black Sea ports, disrupting the country’s main export route for grain, vegetable oils, metals, and iron ore. For example, before the full-scale invasion, about 90% of grain and oilseeds were exported from Black Sea ports. In addition, export capacities were hit by the destruction of production facilities and critical infrastructure (especially transport and energy), particularly in the South and East of Ukraine. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, at least 426 large and medium-sized enterprises and thousands of small enterprises have been damaged or destroyed. Disruption of internal and external supply chains, shortages of critical imports, and surging production and logistics costs have become a big challenge for Ukrainian producers, undermining their profitability and competitiveness in global markets. In agriculture, significant losses were caused by Russia’s occupation of vast swathes of territory, mining, and physical damage to agricultural land, storage facilities, livestock, and agricultural machinery.  Many Ukrainian farmers have been driven to the edge of bankruptcy due to a sharp decline in export and domestic revenues and increased production and logistics costs (export costs for Ukrainian grain rose from $30-$40 per tonne pre-war to $140-$150 upon the invasion). The devastating destruction of the Kakhovka dam in Southern Ukraine on 6 June 2023 (leaving at least 500,000 hectares of farmland without access to irrigation water) has further undermined production and export potential. The Black Sea Grain Initiative and the importance of seaport routes Securing and unblocking Ukraine’s agricultural exports is vital for global food security. Ukraine is a major world exporter of maize, wheat, barley, rapeseed, and sunflower oil, supplying over 45 million tonnes of grain to the global market each year. Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian seaports is a major threat to global food security, especially for regions heavily reliant on shipments from Ukraine - North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. It placed huge pressure on food prices in global markets, which reached a record high after the invasion. The UN-Türkiye backed Black Sea Grain Initiative has allowed Ukraine to resume and significantly increase the volumes of its seaport agricultural exports to global markets since August 2022. However, only three Ukrainian Black Sea ports in Odesa were unblocked, and only for grain and oilseeds. Russia constantly threatened and sabotaged the implementation and prolongation of this deal, causing long queues of ships and making seaport shipments more expensive and complicated. Furthermore, export capacity under the deal was limited and unstable (2.9 million tonnes in January, 3.9 million tonnes in March, and 1.3 million tonnes in May 2023) due to Russia delaying the inspection of vessels in the Bosphorus and their registration for participation in the grain agreement. As a result, the workload of Ukrainian ports declined to 30-35% as of April 2023, and Ukrainian farmers were left with large stocks of grain, thereby facing uncertainty about export activities, and suffering significant losses.  According to the UN, almost 33 million tonnes of agricultural produce were exported through the Black Sea Grain corridor, about 50% of all exported grain and oilseeds since its application in August 2022. The agreements helped stabilise global food markets and reduce volatility, with global food prices gradually falling as of March 2022.  The major export destinations of Ukrainian grain through seaports included China, Spain, Türkiye, Italy, the Netherlands, Egypt, and Bangladesh (57% of all shipments under the agreement went to developing countries vs. 43% to developed countries). China was the largest buyer of Ukrainian grain, importing almost a third of all shipments under the grain agreement (mainly maize). By purchasing Ukrainian grain, China was diversifying its food supplies and enhancing its food security. At the same time, Turkish companies, for example, benefitted from re-exporting Ukrainian grain (both processed and unprocessed) to global markets. The grain deal was extended several times (last time– until 18 July). However, on each occasion, Russia usually intensified its pressure on Ukraine before negotiations for its further extension – by threatening to terminate the agreement unilaterally, blocking the work of the grain corridor, and demanding the removal of some Western sanctions. In May-July 2023, the capacity and effectiveness of the grain agreement declined as Russia significantly limited the registration of ships at Ukrainian ports required “to overcome obstacles to Russian grain and fertiliser exports” (see Figure 2). As a result, Ukraine has been reducing its reliance on the sea corridor over the last few months and shifting to alternative routes. However, the seaport corridor is important for Ukraine for its proximity, developed transport and storage infrastructure, and lower logistics costs.  The grain agreement has never been as important to Russia as it is to Ukraine, but rather a tool for pressuring Kyiv and the West. In an attempt to save the grain agreement, the UN suggested some compromises, including the connection of a subsidiary of the state agricultural bank to SWIFT. However, Russia refused, demanding that all of its demands be met, and withdrew from the agreement on 17 July. The subsequent attacks on Ukraine’s Odesa and Danube port infrastructure were clearly aimed at further hampering Ukraine’s export capacity and access to global markets, depriving Kyiv of a major source of foreign currency revenues (Ukraine received about $13 billion for its grain and oilseeds in 2022 in total), as well as increasing the reliance of developing countries on Russian food supplies. The suspension of the grain agreement also increases pressure on global grain prices (according to the IMF, they could rise by 10-15%), as well as make developing countries more reliant on Russian food supplies, thereby deepening their food insecurity. Alternative export routes for Ukraine via EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes Initiated in May 2022, the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provide alternative routes for Ukraine’s exports via Eastern European countries using land transport (trains and trucks) and Danube River ports to ship goods to global markets and EU member states (through seaports in Romania, Poland, and other EU countries). According to the European Commission, the Solidarity Lanes allowed Ukrainian exporters to partly compensate for the loss of sea routes and to unblock about 40 million tonnes as of the end of July 2023, which is more than 50% of Ukrainian grain and oilseed exports since the start of the invasion. In addition, the Solidarity Lanes have been the only option for Ukraine’s non-agricultural exports (metals, iron ore, chemicals) and the only option for Ukraine to import all the goods. The Solidarity Lanes have also helped export over 35 million tonnes of nonagricultural products from Ukraine. The capacity of Solidarity Lanes exceeded 3.5 million tonnes of grain and oilseeds in March 2023 (see Figure 2).  The Danube River, with the ports of Izmail, Reni, and others, has become the vital export route for Ukrainian grain and other products (it shipped about 30% of Ukrainian grain and oilseed exports after the invasion, about 40% in June 2023). Its capacity has been expanded to 2-2.2 million tonnes of grain per month, with volumes increasing. To alleviate obstacles to trade and increase the cargo flow via the Danube, Ukraine has been increasing the depth of the canals leading from the Danube ports to the Black Sea and creating infrastructure for grain storage and export. In particular, Ukraine has increased the depth of its Southwestern Bystre Canal on the Danube River from 3.9 to 6.5 metres and 7 metres in some parts of the canal. Rail and road export routes have handled about 1 million and 600-700,000 tonnes of produce per month, respectively. However, import restrictions against Ukrainian grain by five Eastern European countries reduced the flow of shipments in this direction during the last few months (to about 600,000 tonnes by rail and 200,000 tonnes by road).  Rail and road routes have also faced logistical bottlenecks, such as incompatible rail gauge widths between Ukraine and the EU, the limited transport and storage capacity of Eastern European countries, including shortages of appropriate trains and trucks, slow clearance procedures, and long waiting times at border crossing points. Logistics bottlenecks limit export volumes and raise the logistics costs of alternative routes, which have been considerably higher compared to seaport routes. There have also been organisational and coordination problems in implementing the Solidarity Lanes initiative. Ukraine, the European Commission, and EU member states have been implementing several infrastructure projects to alleviate existing logistical constraints, increase the capacity of the Solidarity Lanes and improve cross-border connections between Ukraine, Moldova, and the EU. The European Commission has mobilised one billion euros to fund the infrastructure developments of the Solidarity Lanes over 2022-2023, such as increasing the number of border crossing points for trucks, road improvements, rehabilitation of railway infrastructure and multimodal logistics in Romania and Moldova to Ukraine’s borders, etc. Additional funding opportunities have become available for Ukraine after its integration into the Connecting Europe Facility programme in June 2023, enabling Ukraine to apply for EU funding for projects in the transport, energy and digital realms.  The Solidarity Lanes have helped diversify and reduce Ukraine’s dependency on a single export route. Amid continued obstruction of seaports by Russia and the suspension of the grain deal, Ukraine needs to reorient its agri-food exports further, placing a larger burden on alternative routes via the Solidarity Lanes and risking new tensions with EU neighbours. Ukraine plans to export the major part of its expected grain and oilseed exports (up to 40 - 42 million tonnes from the expected 48 million tonnes of exports) across the three routes of Solidarity Lanes during the next season. Therefore, it is essential to ensure the smooth running and further expansion of the capacity of alternative export routes – deepening river canals, extending the rail network, and building transhipment terminals. The use of new routes and EU seaports, as offered by Croatia, the Baltic states, and Greece, can also help expand the capacity of transit routes. However, they imply longer distances and higher logistics costs, and require significant investments in rail, road, and storage infrastructure. EU trade-liberalisation measures for Ukraine during wartime EU-Ukraine trade relations were already significantly liberalised under the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Agreement (DCFTA), which has been provisionally applied since 1 January 2016. As of the beginning of 2022, most tariffs for industrial and agricultural products had already been abolished under the DCFTA. However, the EU still applied tariff measures to certain Ukrainian exports, the most restrictive of which were tariff rate quotas (TRQs).  TRQs allow for duty-free import of a product’s specified volume, while beyond-TRQ supplies are dutiable and subject to EU tariff rates for third countries. Ukrainian agri-food producers complained about the low and outdated volumes of the EU TRQs under the DCFTA that did not reflect the current level of Ukraine’s production and export capabilities and the level of EUUkraine trade relations.  Ukraine was utilising 31-32 out of 36 EU TRQs under the DCFTA during recent years, from which the following TRQs were usually fully exhausted: honey, processed tomatoes, apple and grape juices, processed cereal grains, sugar, starch, processed starch, eggs, corn, corn flour and pellets, poultry meat, etc. For many of them, Ukraine’s supplies usually exceeded TRQ volumes (e.g. total supplies of honey from Ukraine to the EU usually exceeded the volume of the relevant TRQ by 8-10 times). However, out-of-quota import tariff rates and TRQ administration costs still had a restrictive impact on Ukrainian exports. As Ukraine’s major trading partner (accounting for about 40% of Ukraine’s trade before the invasion), the EU has been supporting the resilience of Ukraine’s wartime economy by restoring Ukraine’s ability to trade and generate export revenues.  The EU has introduced temporary trade-liberalisation measures such as the Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs) since 4 June 2022 for one year (ATM Regulation 2022/870) including the complete removal of:   ●  The remaining import duties on industrial products; ●  All tariff rate quotas on agricultural and food products; ●  Entry prices on fruit and vegetables; ●  All trade defence measures (anti-dumping duties and safeguards mostly applied to steel products).   The EU also implemented other steps to facilitate transportation and border control for Ukraine’s exports. It has temporarily liberalised the transport of freight by road between the EU and Ukraine in relation to bilateral 8 operations and transit by abolishing the need for permits (the agreement was recently extended for one year - until 30 June 2024). Besides, in October 2022, Ukraine joined the Common Transit Convention which simplified customs transit procedures between the EU and Ukraine. EU-Ukraine trade dynamics after Russia’s invasion  After a significant decline in the first months of Russia’s invasion, Ukrainian exports to the EU even slightly exceeded pre-invasion levels by the end of 2022, while exports to other trade partners substantially declined. Consequently, the role of the EU as Ukraine’s main trading partner increased to 63% in 2022 from about 40% in 2021 (of $44.2 billion in Ukraine’s total exports of goods in 2022, about $28 billion were destined for the EU market).  The driving factor behind export recovery was the fast growth of agri-food exports to the EU - by more than $5.2 billion or by almost 70% year on year in value terms (including cereals – by 141.7%; vegetable oils – by 29.4%; oilseeds - by 96.5%). This helped to compensate for the significant drop in iron and steel exports (by 48.7%), iron ore (by 21.0%), and machinery equipment (by 10.0%) to the EU.  Increased agri-food exports to the EU in 2022 can be explained by several factors, including Ukrainian exporters reorienting to closer markets because of logistics problems and high freight and insurance costs, better access to the EU market due to EU trade liberalisation measures and new export routes, greater demand for imported grain in the EU as a result of a drought affecting many regions of Europe in 2022, as well as higher prices for many agricultural products in the EU due to Russia’s invasion.  Among all temporary trade-liberalisation measures, the suspension of TRQs has been the most impactful - in facilitating Ukraine’s exports to the EU. Namely, exports of sugars, apple juice, poultry meat, eggs, milk powder, starches, processed cereal grains, and cereals, earlier subject to TRQs, saw the greatest growth (see Table 1). The suspension of the over-quota import duties gave these Ukrainian products a competitive advantage in the EU market when compared to products from other third countries, as well as lower TRQ administrative costs for Ukrainian exporters due to the simplification of export procedures. In contrast, despite trade liberalisation, there was a drop in exports of some products such as honey and processed tomatoes. However, this can be explained by other factors (e.g. loss of production capacities due to the war). Unilateral measures of neighbouring EU countries against Ukraine’s imports Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria - the five neighbouring Eastern European countries (EEC) in the frontline of the Solidarity Lanes - became the major markets for the export of Ukrainian goods in the EU. Their joint share in Ukraine’s exports of goods to the EU increased from 32% in 2021 to 56% in 2022. Ukraine’s exports of goods to these countries increased by 54% y/y in 2022 - to $15.7 billion, with agri-food products accounting for the significant increase.  Agri-food exports to five neighbouring countries increased by 5.2 times to a record $7.2 billion in 2022, of which $2.4 billion were generated by grains and $1.9 billion by oilseeds. Five Eastern European countries, which are also large agricultural producers, accepted about 35% of four major agri-food exports from Ukraine to the EU in 2022 vs 1% in 2021 (See Figure 3). Both transit flows and sales of agri-food products to these countries have substantially increased after Russia’a invasion. Due to logistical problems related to the Solidarity Lanes (insufficient storage and transport infrastructure and high logistics costs), substantial transit flows of grain and oilseeds to EU ports and third markets were disrupted, and much of Ukraine’s produce was sold in local markets. According to EU statistics, the physical volumes of Ukrainian wheat, maize, rapeseed and sunflower seed imports doubled in 2022 – 19.3 million tonnes in 2022 vs 9.5 million tonnes in 2021. From this, about 8 million tonnes were sold to the five Eastern European countries in 2022 vs only 176,000 tonnes in 2021.  Transit disruptions and large quantities of Ukrainian crops exhausted storage and transport capacities raised logistics costs for local farmers and put downward pressure on purchase prices of local agri-food products. Additionally, world agricultural commodity prices declined from their early-2022 peaks due to better harvests in major grain-producing countries, improved crop conditions in the EU, and the implementation of the Black Sea grain agreement. Amid these developments, local farmers in these countries responded with protests demanding that they are protected from duty-free Ukraine’s imports. These tensions also caused delays in the adoption of the new regulation on the continuation of duty-free trade with Ukraine. The Eastern European countries blamed Brussels for insufficient help to support them. The EUR 56 million in subsidies allocated by the European Commission to the affected farmers in response to their protests in early April 2023 failed to satisfy them and their national governments. They called for additional EU funding to speed up the development of transit infrastructure, as well as the introduction of automatic compensation for farmers, the possibility for the rapid introduction of trade defence measures and the re-introduction of tariffs and tariff-rate quotas on imports from Ukraine, and the purchase of grain in the EU market for humanitarian purposes.  The lack of adequate coordination and cooperation between the Eastern European countries, the European Commission, and Ukraine related to the operation of the Solidarity Lanes led to a crisis, with EEC adopting controversial unilateral restrictions. On 15 April, Poland’s government unilaterally introduced a ban on imports and transit of Ukrainian agri-food products until 30 June (the transit ban was abolished on 21 April). Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria followed with import bans on certain Ukrainian products (without a transit ban), while Romania also considered taking similar steps.  As a result, Ukrainian exports were significantly restricted, becoming stuck at the Western borders for about two weeks, creating uncertainty and losses for Ukrainian exporters. Import restrictions in the EU neighbouring countries, as well as Russia’s increased pressure and sabotage of the Black Sea grain agreement, were the main factors of the decline in Ukraine’s exports of goods in April and May 2023 ($3 billion and $3.1 billion respectively) compared to March 2023 ($3.8 billion).  These national decisions raised a lot of criticism from Ukraine and the European Commission. A primary concern was their non-compliance with EU legislation, and international and bilateral commitments. Unilateral actions by member states are not allowed under EU law, given that trade policy is an exclusive EU competence. The safeguard clause of с 2022/870 on temporary trade liberalisation measures for Ukraine entitles the Commission to monitor and take necessary steps. The unilateral blocking of imports by one or several member states also undermines the principles of the EU Single Market, which provide for the freedom of movement of goods within common customs territory.  In addition, these decisions are not in line with the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules or the provisions of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement on freedom of transit and the use of import bans. Additionally, the bans were applied immediately and adopted without proper bilateral consultations with the Ukrainian side.  Another important aspect - the EEC’s decisions were not supported by solid analysis of the import dynamics of specific products and their impact on the EU market. The scope of the bans application was too wide, and the criteria for the inclusion of certain Ukrainian products into the list of banned products was unclear in many cases. For instance, the Polish list was the longest and included a wide range of agri-food products - grains, sugar, meat, fruits, vegetables, oilseeds, processed fruit and vegetable products, wines, milk and dairy products, eggs, honey and others. These products demonstrated different import dynamics after Russia’s invasion, influenced by different factors, each requiring separate detailed analysis.  While many of these products got duty-free access to the EU market following the start of Russia’s invasion under ATM Regulation 2022/870, not all witnessed a significant increase in imports to the EU in 2022 vs 2021 and 2020 (see Table 1). For example, import volumes of Ukraine’s honey and processed tomatoes to the EU even declined in 2022 (in the case of Poland, imports of honey from Ukraine dropped from 16.9 thousand tonnes in 2021 to 10.6 thousand tonnes in 2022). At the same time, some of the banned Ukrainian products, such as oilseeds, frozen fruits, and sunflower oil, were not subject to any TRQs or tariff measures in the EU before the invasion.  Moreover, although the imports of some products subject to TRQs before Russia’s invasion (e.g. milk powder, sugars, starches, poultry meat) considerably grew in 2022 as compared to the previous years, the increased volumes still did not constitute a significant part of the EU extraimports or the EU intra-trade (see Table 1). For instance, EU imports of milk powder from Ukraine (under TRQ 09.4601) grew more than five times in 2022 – from 2 000 to 11 300 tonnes. However, Ukraine’s share in the EU extra-imports of these products was about 9% in 2022, and in the EU intra-imports - less than 1%. Considerable part of these products was imported to Poland (about 45%). However Ukraine’s share in Poland’s total imports of these products was only about 3%.  In a broader context, Ukrainian agri-food imports helped ease the inflationary pressure on the EU food market amid lower grain production in the EU last year. The EEC countries expanded agri-food exports by re-exporting Ukrainian products to other EU countries and worldwide, as well as producing and selling abroad agri-food products processed from Ukrainian crops (such as sunflower oil, processed cereals, flour, meat and dairy products, etc.). For instance, Poland’s agri-food exports reached a record level of EUR 47.6 billion in 2022, and its positive agri-food trade balance amounted to EUR 15.5 billion, or 23% higher than in 2021.  The positions of national governments were also influenced by challenging domestic political contexts, especially considering the upcoming parliamentary elections in Poland and Slovakia in 2023. The Polish government’s narrative was primarily focused on local farmers, whose votes are crucial for the ruling party.46 Farm lobbies tried to use this opportunity to restrict access to their markets for a range of Ukrainian agri-food products disproportionately. It is important to recognise local farmers’ reservations about a significant increase in imports of some agricultural products from Ukraine and their rights to raise these concerns. Still, unilateral responses of these countries are seen as quite unconstructive and undermining the unity and cooperation of EU members. The immediate bans against Ukrainian products were not in line with the solidarity efforts undertaken by Poland and other EU neighbouring countries for Ukraine. This situation also exposed possible challenges the future of Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations and their support for greater EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU Single Market. A compromise solution between the Commission and the five EU countries  By adopting unilateral measures, the EEC put pressure on the Commission to agree on an urgent compromise: introduce exceptional and temporary preventive measures under Article 4(9) of the ATM Regulation 2022/870, namely a ban on imports of four Ukrainian products (wheat, maize, rapeseed and sunflower seeds, revealing the strongest effect on local markets) to five counties between 2 May - 5 June 2023, while the EEC countries agreed to abolish all their unilateral restrictions on all Ukrainian products. At the request of five EEC countries, these safeguards were prolonged until 15 September 2023. In addition, a further EUR 100 million will be allocated to support and alleviate the pressure on affected local farmers of grains and oilseeds in these countries. This decision allowed for more targeted restrictions compared to the earlier unilateral measures and ensured the free and unlimited transit of all Ukrainian products within the EU territory and their import to all EU countries except those bordering Ukraine. It has also allowed for the adoption of the new Autonomous Trade Measures Regulation (ATM Regulation 2023/1077) on the continuation of temporary trade liberalisation for Ukraine for a further year (until 6 June 2024).  Furthermore, the text of the ATM Regulation 2023/1077 has been amended to change the safeguard clause for the expedited reintroduction of the customs duties otherwise applicable under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (namely tariff-rate quotas and the entry-price system) on Ukrainian imports in case they adversely affect the EU market. In particular, member states have to provide sufficient prima facie evidence of the adverse effects of Ukrainian imports on the EU market to request the European Commission to initiate such an assessment, which must be concluded within three months of its launch. These amendments shorten the timelines of the safeguard procedure and better explain the requirements for launching an assessment, which should prevent unjustified claims for import restrictions from member states. The safeguard clause implies clear procedural rules with a prior evidence-based assessment before the adoption of any restriction.  In addition, the new regulation permits the Commission to implement immediate preventive measures under exceptional circumstances, as was the case with the ban on four Ukrainian products under the previous ATM Regulation 2022/870. The ATM Regulation does not define criteria for taking immediate preventive measures, nor the time limits for their possible application. However, since these measures are taken to address a situation requiring immediate action, they should be of an exceptional and temporary nature. The reached agreement and applied measures provided a short-term solution for a crisis. However, it still undermines the integrity of the EU Single Market and creates a precedent for further violations of EU law by allowing member states to bargain with the Commission to achieve additional support measures, thus weakening the enforcement of Single Market rules across EU countries. While the EU’s decisions signal its ongoing trade support for Ukraine, there are risks of prolongation or the introduction of new import restrictions in the EU. Poland and Hungary are again threatening to close their borders unless Brussels extends temporary restrictions against Ukrainian grain and oilseeds until at least the end of 2023 and ensure that none of the products remains in these countries. In addition, the Eastern European countries may request the Commission to impose preventive measures for other sensitive agri-food products from Ukraine such as poultry meat, sugar, eggs, honey, fruits, etc, under the current ATM Regulation. These risks create additional pressure and uncertainty for Ukrainian agri-food producers. Conclusions and recommendations  During the first year of Russia’s war on Ukraine, EU trade liberalisation measures and EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provided Ukraine with alternative export routes. They allowed the country to reorient part of its exports to the EU market, facilitating the gradual recovery of Ukraine’s exports after the first deep shock of the war.  The European Commission, EU member states, and the Ukrainian government should further intensify their dialogue and efforts to find a solution to the current trade dispute about import bans on Ukrainian grain and oilseeds, facilitate Ukraine’s trade flows and prevent sudden trade disruptions and restrictions. This has become critically important, especially after Russia’s withdrawal from the grain agreement and attacks on Ukraine’s port and export infrastructure.  At the same time, the crisis in the Eastern European countries also highlighted the existing logistics and connectivity bottlenecks between Ukraine and the EU. Their rapid resolution should be a priority of the EU, along with international financial support for Ukraine.  In addition, the precedent created by the application of unilateral measures in violation of the EU law revealed significant challenges with the enforcement of EU law by EU member states. This does not bode well for Ukraine’s future enlargement negotiations.  To address current challenges and prevent a repetition of this year’s crisis, the following next steps should be taken:  ● Enhance the strategic alignment and connectivity between Ukraine and the EU Ensuring smooth operation and increasing the capacity of the Solidarity Lanes is critically vital for the transit of Ukraine’s agricultural and non-agricultural exports to both the global markets and EU member states during wartime. This must include urgently increasing investment in EU-Ukraine road, rail, and river connections, deepening of river canals, increasing the available transport material, enhancing EU-Ukraine border infrastructure, building transhipment terminals, increasing grain and food storage facilities in the Eastern European countries, as well as further optimising customs operations and better coordinating transit across these countries. Although alternative routes cannot fully replace the Ukrainian seaports occupied by Russia, they have helped diversify Ukraine’s export routes, lowered Kyiv’s dependence on the grain agreement and seaport routes, and reduced Russia’s leverage on shipping Ukraine’s exports. After Russia’s withdrawal from the grain agreement, the significance of the Solidarity Lanes is increasingly critical for Ukraine’s trade.  Expanding Solidarity Lanes, extending European Transport Corridors (TEN-T) to the territory of Ukraine, and developing the Ukrainian part of the TEN-T network, improving connectivity and interoperability of transport systems in Ukraine and the EU is also important in view of Ukraine’s post-war recovery and further economic integration into the EU Single Market, and the involvement of Ukraine in European value chains. This will also enhance the performance and resilience of EU food supply chains and will work to the advantage of Ukraine, the EU and global food security.  ● Ensure security guarantees and increase the capacity of seaport corridorsThe importance of the Black Sea grain agreement and seaport exports for Ukraine and the world cannot be overestimated. Ukraine cannot reach the same export levels without functioning seaports, so any possibility and mechanisms to ensure free navigation in the Black Sea should be explored.  Ukraine needs greater support from the EU and international community in maintaining shipments through Black Sea ports, resurrecting the grain agreement and opening new sea corridors, purchasing Ukrainian grain in cooperation with the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) and transporting it to developing countries.  Major stakeholders, including the largest buyers of Ukrainian agri-food produce (China, Türkiye, the countries of the Middle East, as well as many African nations), should use their leverage and increase pressure on Moscow to resurrect the deal and safeguard seaport corridors. As Russia seeks to strengthen its position in Africa, strengthening dialogue with African countries is even more crucial in terms of their possible influence on Russia’s position about the blockade of Black Sea navigation and Ukraine’s access to global food markets by sea. Many African nations expressed disappointment about Russia pulling out of the deal at the Russia-Africa Summit. ● Enhance coordination and unity between the Commission, EU member states, and UkraineEU member states should avoid a violation of EU law and unity and should engage in “sincere cooperation as a cornerstone of the EU legal order”. Unilateral drastic actions do not facilitate unity and coordination between the Commission, member states, and Ukraine and undermine potential solutions.  The European Commission should ensure the consistent enforcement of EU law and prevent a possible repetition of cases using the same political tactics with unilateral measures that violate EU law. To avoid a repetition of crisis situations, efforts from all sides should be intensified to improve the operation of Solidarity Lanes, including data exchanges, notifications of trade volumes and policy changes, monitoring and supervision of transit flows, customs operations, and trading practices in Ukraine and the EU countries. In this respect, the recently established Joint Coordination Platform led by Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis should foster regular consultations and coordination between the Commission, Eastern European countries, and Ukraine to address the concerns of all sides. Strategic partners Ukraine and EU neighbouring countries should demonstrate willingness to coordinate stances and support each other in important areas. ● Avoid sudden and unjustified Solidarity Lanes disruptions The EU and its member states should avoid the application of sudden bans or other restrictions on Ukrainian imports or transit from Ukraine. Such actions are the most harmful for exporters, causing losses and uncertainty. This is particularly the case during wartime when Ukrainian producers are already suffer from production and logistics shocks.  The European Commission should ensure that all decisions are made after proper consultations with the Ukrainian side and be taken on evidence-based assessments of the impact of Ukrainian products in the EU market.  In June, the Commission extended immediate preventive measures in the form of import bans on four Ukrainian grain and oilseeds until 15 September. As immediate preventive measures are exceptional and temporary, they should be replaced by welljustified policy decisions and procedures. Considering the serious challenges faced by Ukraine and its EU neighbours due to Russian aggression, a compromise solution should be found between Ukraine and these countries. It can imply, for example, lifting import bans against Ukrainian products and, at the same time, taking commitments by Ukraine not to exceed the agreed amount of export volumes to EU neighbouring countries (based on the assessment of the market situation, storage capacities and harvest forecasts). At the same time, non-neighbouring EU members should also be prepared to absorb greater volumes of reoriented Ukraine’s agri-food flows.  To increase the transparency of this process as much as possible, the Commission should implement a comprehensive monitoring and analysis of transit flows, the state of storage and transport capacities, and prices based on evidence from all sides and stakeholders.  ● Protect critical port and export infrastructure from Russia’s attacks Russia’s attacks on the Black Sea and Danube port infrastructure and possible interruptions of this traffic may significantly undermine Ukraine’s export potential, and international grain supplies and global food security. Ukraine urgently needs more defence capacity to protect its critical infrastructure in the Black Sea and the Danube from Russia’s attacks.  ● Facilitate EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU Single Market  EU member states must continue to demonstrate consistent, robust solidarity with Ukraine, which has been reinforced following Ukraine receiving candidate country status. Their solidarity and support is also critically important for Ukraine’s trade and integration into the EU Single Market.  EU-Ukraine trade volumes and Ukraine’s integration into the EU supply chains are expected to increase further as Ukraine advances on its EU path. Thus, further trade liberalisation and gradual integration into the EU internal market is an inevitable part of this process. Even before the war and the temporary ATMs, further trade liberalisation was on the agenda of EUUkraine relations. In 2021, the EU and Ukraine started negotiations to further liberalise and increase duty-free bilateral trade from both sides, including revising the DCFTA TRQs (as of now, these negotiations are paused).  The possibility for further trade liberalisation is envisaged in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (Article 29). It is expected that after the termination of ATMs, Ukraine will initiate an overhaul of these negotiations to have EU-Ukraine trade more liberalised on a permanent basis - up to Ukraine’s accession to the EU. In this regard, Ukraine is interested in ensuring access to the EU Single Market for its processed agrifood products, increasing food processing capacities and integrating into EU food processing value chains.

The tentative merger agreement announced in June between the PGA Tour, DP World Tour, and LIV Golf sent shockwaves through the sporting world. The commercial operations of the three organizations are set to form a “new collectively owned” entity exclusively funded by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF). The PIF will reportedly acquire a significant minority stake in the yet-to-be-named for-profit company by injecting an estimated $3 billion into it.  The controversial merger deal, which some have described as “Saudi Arabia’s de facto takeover of professional golf,” has provoked two separate inquiries in the United States Senate and is seen as the latest effort by the kingdom to implement its ambitious tourism and investment strategy. In fact, sport is but one of 13 “strategic” sectors identified by Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF). Yet succumbing to the temptation to focus narrowly on how the kingdom’s PIF has upended the professional world of golf risks missing the bigger picture: Gulf ruling elites, like their counterparts across the globe, are leveraging their SWFs to proactively drive nation-building projects, fortify strategic international partnerships, and assume a more prominent role on the world stage. When the COVID-19 crisis struck, Gulf SWFs snapped up stakes in distressed Western companies, capitalizing on market gyrations. As the world struggles to exit from the worst of the pandemic, Gulf SWFs have entered a new phase of dealmaking. Benefiting from massive capital injections derived from higher oil revenue, they have been spending vast sums at home and abroad. The rise of Gulf SWFs The number of SWFs around the world has grown steadily over the past two decades, from 62 funds in 2000 to 176 in 2023. During that time, SWF assets under management (AUM) have ballooned from a mere $1 trillion to $11.36 trillion. Four regions dominate the landscape in terms of the number of SWFs and aggregate assets: Europe (specifically Norway and countries in Central and Eastern Europe), North America, Asia-Pacific (specifically China), and the Middle East, with the latter two regions accounting for four-fifths of global assets. For resource-rich countries such as Gulf oil and natural gas producers, SWFs have emerged as promising tools to save for future generations, mitigate the effects of outsized economic shocks, and/or be deployed as reserve investment and strategic development funds to spend on human, natural, social, and physical capital. The Gulf is currently home to about 20 SWFs, with at least one such fund originating from each of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The various Gulf SWFs differ in terms of the size of their AUMs, investment strategies, as well as approaches to diversification, mandates and objectives, and governance structures. However, they share at least two broad similarities. The first is that the primary source of their funding is surplus revenues generated from the export of commodities, namely oil and gas. Second, they operate under the guidance and oversight of the government or ruling family. Gulf SWFs have deep pockets — collectively, they manage around $3.7 trillion. According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, the region’s seven largest funds have combined assets of over $3.2 trillion, amounting to about 40% of global SWF assets (see Table 1). In most cases, Gulf SWFs are directly controlled by members of the ruling families. Since March 2015, for example, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has sat at the top of the PIF hierarchy. In March 2023, Reuters reported a reshuffling of wealth fund leadership, with UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan naming his brother Sheikh Tahnoun — head of ADQ, Abu Dhabi’s third-biggest investment fund — to chair the ADIA. Another brother, Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, leads Mubadala. In this way, Gulf monarchies can maintain close control over how resource wealth is spent and align that spending with their political, public, and personal objectives. Higher oil prices and ongoing market turmoil are the driving factors behind a windfall for Gulf oil and gas producers. To give just one example of the scale of the oil revenue bonanza, Saudi Aramco reported earnings of $161 billion in 2022, claiming the highest-ever recorded annual profit by a publicly listed company. The financial firepower generated by high oil prices has, among other things, translated into increased spending by the region’s SWFs. The top five funds — Abu Dhabi’s ADIA, ADQ, and Mubadala, along with Saudi Arabia’s PIF and Qatar’s QIA — deployed more than $73 billion in 2022 alone, according to online tracker Global SWF. Jihad Azour, the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) director for the Middle East and North Africa, maintains that Gulf producers could earn up to $1.3 trillion in additional revenue through 2026. Patterns and trends in Gulf SWF dealmaking The current wave of dealmaking by Gulf sovereign funds, which began with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, features several notable changes in both the pattern and the destination of investments. Gulf SWFs’ spending targets reflect a shift toward alternative assets and “industries of the future,” an acceleration of domestic investments, a growing appetite for global startups, a heightened emphasis on co-investment with private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) firms, and greater geographic breadth of focus. Diversifying into alternative assets and industries of the future Historically, Gulf SWFs have hunted for attractive opportunities in times of volatility and low valuations. However, Gulf wealth investors recently have shifted toward assets that yield returns and generate growth. Instead of parking wealth in low-risk, low-return assets, they have diversified their investments into more profitable areas such as PE and listed shares. Indeed, “alternative assets” constitute a large and increasing share of total assets from the region’s three largest funds. There is a concurrent shift underway in investment allocation. Gulf SWFs have shown a keen interest in investing in technology and innovation-driven companies, alongside high-priority sectors such as healthcare, logistics, renewables, broadband, and digital infrastructure. Accelerating domestic investments The number of strategic funds with a mission to attract foreign investment and co-invest in the domestic economy is increasing significantly. With the exception of ADIA, which solely invests abroad, Gulf SWFs are “flexible funds” that do both. Saudi Arabia’s PIF, one of the largest and fastest-growing sovereign financial investment vehicles, deploys most of its assets domestically, as is generally the case among Gulf SWFs. PIF is the driving force behind the development of the kingdom’s so-called “giga-projects,” most notably NEOM, the Red Sea Tourism Project, the Qidiyya entertainment city near Riyadh, and ROSHAN. The fund has investments across a wide range of industries, from Saudi Electricity to Saudi Arabian Mining and Saudi Telecom. Since 2017, PIF has established 79 companies across its 13 strategic sectors. PIF’s big domestic investment push began with the announcement in 2021 of a five-year strategy that aims to more than double the value of its AUM to $1.07 trillion and to commit $40 billion annually to develop Saudi Arabia’s economy until 2025. The fund now owns several strategic investments in the consumer goods and retail sector, such as Noon.com, Amazon’s Middle Eastern rival and the region’s leading online shopping platform. Recently, PIF agreed to purchase a 30% share of Tamimi Markets Co. in a bid to help transform the company into a national champion and major regional grocery and food supply chain. In February 2023, the fund invested $1.3 billion in four domestic contractors to improve local supply chains for projects in the country. The fund has set up dozens of fully owned subsidiaries to seek new investment opportunities and launch manufacturing facilities in the kingdom. The recently established Halal Products Development Company aims to localize the development of a wide range of halal products. The newly founded Aseer Investment Company will operate as the PIF’s investment arm, part of an ambitious effort to transform the southwestern region into a global tourist destination. Furthermore, in June of this year, PIF launched Lifera, a commercial-scale contract development and manufacturing organization, to boost biopharmaceutical industry growth. PIF has also taken steps to develop synergies between its investment holdings and build its global brand. For example, the player jerseys of Newcastle United F.C. — the English Premier League soccer club in which the PIF purchased an 80% stake — display the logo of sleeve sponsor Noon.com. Incubating new industries Gulf wealth funds have been increasingly active in the global startup scene, mainly in offshore markets. Sanabil, Saudi PIF’s private investment arm, has notably backed a lengthy roster of U.S. startups. At the same time, PIF and China’s Alibaba Group are raising funds to jointly back technology startups in Asia and the Middle East. QIA is leading a funding round for Builder.ai, a platform for businesses to create custom smartphone apps. It has also led and made a follow-on investment in the recent funding round of Singapore-based Insider Pte Ltd (Insider), an AI-enabled digital marketing platform. According to YourStory, a media tech company for startups, India has emerged as “an investment stronghold” for Gulf wealth funds. QIA has invested in Swiggy (a food ordering and delivery platform), Rebel Foods (an online restaurant chain), VerSe Innovation (a local language tech firm), and Flipkart (an e-commerce company). Abu Dhabi Development Holding Company has pumped millions into Byju (an ed-tech firm) and Spinny (a used car retailing outfit). Lastly, ADIA has purchased stakes in MobiKwik (digital financial services platform) and Jaipur-based DealShare (a social e-commerce startup). There also seems to be a slow but steady commitment by Gulf wealth funds to startups in the region. ADQ has invested in health-technology company Okadoc, while ADQ and Mubadala, together with the PIF-backed Riyad Taqnia Fund, have provided fresh financing to TruKKer, a startup focused on logistics in the land freight sector. PE rounds in 2022 included PIF’s investments in Almosafer, a travel services provider, and FOODICS, one of the largest cloud-based fintech platforms for restaurants in the Middle East. Expanding co-investment partnerships Gulf SWFs are teaming up with other wealth funds or financial investors through joint ventures (so-called sovereign-private partnerships, SPP). These collaborative strategies serve multiple aims, including cost saving, information sharing, and portfolio diversification. Importantly, by utilizing state funds, Gulf SWFs’ engagement in co-investment partnerships aims to bring companies to their shores to support domestic development plans. An increasing number of Gulf SWF investment partnerships have targeted Asian assets. QIA and ADIA are among the most active co-investors. ADIA, ramping up its exposure to Asia, has teamed up with Singapore’s SC Capital Partners to target data center investments across the Asia-Pacific region. In June, QIA joined a consortium led by Korea’s MBK Partners to invest $1.2 billion in SK On, an electric vehicle battery manufacturer. Mubadala, too, has formed strategic partnerships. These include forging an alliance with KKR Credit to tap into Asia’s growth potential, joining forces with BlackRock to fund Tata Power Renewable Energy’s aggressive growth plans, and co-leading a $315 million funding round for China’s Hasten Biopharmaceutic. PIF has teamed up with Bain & Company to develop an “India strategy” focused on the infrastructure sector, in particular on renewable energy, and it has joined with Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) to promote collaborative projects in decarbonization and digital transformation. PIF and Singapore’s SWF, the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), have partnered to invest a combined $986 million in South Korea’s Kakao Entertainment Corp. QIA has parlayed its investment in Indian Edtech firm Byju to set up its wholly owned subsidiary in Doha to focus on students from across the Middle East. Widening the geographic scope Gulf SWFs are not just bankrolling ambitious projects at home to support diversification efforts but plowing billions of dollars into assets regionally and globally. Bargain hunting in the West North American and European assets have long been mainstays of Gulf SWF portfolios. Even during the 2008-09 financial crisis, Gulf investors held onto their major Western stakes, taking advantage of their long-term investment horizons to ride out the downturn and seek out undervalued assets. In 2022, Gulf SWFs spent almost $89 billion on investments globally, double the previous year. According to Global SWF, an outsized $51.6 billion of that amount was deployed in Europe and North America. The same source also reported that, out of the 60 SWF investments announced in 2022 that were larger than $1 billion, of which 26 were made by Gulf funds, 17 were invested in North American or European assets. This includes ADIA’s joint ventures with Rockpoint and Landmark Properties in the United States as well as Greystar in the United Kingdom. Other examples include Mubadala’s investment in British broadband provider CityFibre and acquisition of a stake in Scandinavian-based communications company GlobalConnect along with the deal by PIF that made it the second-largest shareholder of the luxury carmaker Aston Martin. Building bridges with neighbors Although the West continues to be the preferred destination of petrodollars managed by Gulf SWFs, the region’s wealth funds have been moving to diversify their overseas exposure. The Gulf states have been building economic bridges with their poorer neighbors, some of which they once considered adversaries. Three key regional destinations are Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey. Capitalizing on the withdrawal of foreign portfolio investments from Egypt, Saudi PIF last year launched the Saudi Egyptian Investment Company (SEIC) as its leading investment vehicle for acquiring stakes in local companies, with a focus on infrastructure, real-estate development, healthcare, financial services, food and agriculture, and pharmaceuticals. Soon after its establishment, SEIC purchased minority stakes for $1.3 billion in four Egyptian companies. Around the same time, Qatar’s QIA transferred $1 billion to the Central Bank of Egypt as part of a deal to buy stakes in local firms. QIA is reportedly negotiating with Egypt to conclude what could be a landmark investment deal to acquire stakes in seven historic hotels. The UAE’s ADQ, which established an office in Cairo in December 2021, has also taken steps to ramp up its investments in Egypt and support co-investment with The Sovereign Fund of Egypt (TSFE). After a lengthy period of estrangement, a cautious rapprochement between the Gulf states and Iraq appears to be gaining momentum, with clear evidence that Gulf wealth funds are interested in investing there. For example, Qatar QIA has said it plans to invest $5 billion in various sectors in Iraq over the coming years. Additionally, Saudi PIF has created a new unit to target investments in a number of Iraqi industries. The newly formed Saudi-Iraqi Investment Company, with a capital of $3 billion and headquarters in the kingdom, reportedly will seek investment opportunities in infrastructure, mining, agriculture, real estate development, and financial services. Gulf wealth funds, led by ADIA and ADQ, have also been scouting for investment targets in Turkey, amid signs of a political thaw in relations between Abu Dhabi and Ankara. And Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is himself visiting the Gulf since July 17, partially in an effort to drum up investment in his country, having reportedly already secured a series of deals worth $50 billion with the UAE. The QIA last year bought a stake in the Eurasia Tunnel company in Istanbul and, more recently, partnered with Turkish firm Esas Private Equity to invest $105 million in Turkish artificial intelligence (AI)-powered marketing firm Insider. Pivoting to Asia Gulf SWFs are increasingly active in Asia, with China, India, and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the major beneficiaries. In addition to hiring specialist teams to study Asian markets, Gulf wealth funds have opened offices in the region — PIF has an office in Hong Kong, while Mubadala and QIA have set up shop in Singapore. The Private Equities Division (PED) of ADIA has deployed dedicated investment teams focused on “China and India-Southeast Asia.” As illustrated in Table 2, Gulf SWF spending targets in Asia span a wide range of sectors, including gaming and e-sports, agribusiness, renewables, and consumer tech and data services.  Recent deals in Asia map onto their overall investment strategies in interesting and important ways. PIF’s acquisitions in gaming and e-sports in Asia are complemented by its more than $3 billion worth of stock purchases in U.S. video game developers. These and other, similar investments aim to accelerate the growth of mobile e-sports, with a particular focus on the kingdom itself — a thriving market of 23.5 million gamers — and serve the broader objective of making Saudi Arabia a global industry hub. The purchase of a minority stake in Olam Agri by the PIF’s Agricultural and Livestock Investment Company (SALIC) serves the latter’s aim of achieving food security for the kingdom and follows other recent deals struck in the food industry, namely in Canada, Brazil, and India. QIA’s new venture, Bodhi Tree, is part of its big push to scale investments in sectors with deep consumer engagement — including media, healthcare, and education — in India and Southeast Asia. Gulf sovereign investors’ appetite for Chinese assets is strong. Yet it is also worth noting that Chinese venture capitalists and local officials are eager to access Gulf SWFs. Local officials from Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Chengdu as well as the province of Sichuan are seeking to attract Gulf wealth funds to sectors prioritized by Beijing, including semiconductors, biotechnology, new energy, high-tech manufacturing, and infrastructure. These developments signify, in the case of Sino-Saudi ties and China-Gulf relations more broadly, a progression from a trade partnership to a “core investment relationship.” Conclusion Gulf SWFs have accumulated massive assets, developed seasoned teams, and crafted sophisticated investment allocation strategies. Although the region’s funds vary in the size, variety, and scope of their investments, all have become more active and expanded their international footprint in recent years. Gulf SWFs nowadays are not just caretakers of national wealth. They have emerged as a crucial financial resource for present and future needs and are an increasingly important tool for exerting their countries’ political power, both at home and abroad. Gulf states are using the latest windfall to serve not one, but multiple purposes. These include investing in industries of the future, in some cases preparing for the global energy transition, as well as increasing visibility, strengthening cross-border partnerships, erecting local platforms in underdeveloped sectors, and building national champions. The current phase of Gulf SWF dealmaking is marked not only by the funds’ expanding global footprint and growing influence, but by their mounting responsibilities. Most of the Gulf’s wealth funds today are asked to perform financially as well as create jobs, propel the domestic economy, contribute to decarbonization goals, and more. Aside from these responsibilities, Gulf SWFs have lately been exhibiting an increasing appetite for risk. The risks they face should not be minimized, and they include a track record marred by several big bets that underperformed, growing protectionism that threatens to curb inward investment, and the risk of getting caught in the escalating tensions over technology between the U.S. and China. Nevertheless, the ability of Gulf SWFs to surmount these challenges should not be underestimated. For despite being associated with their most eye-catching gambits in sport, Gulf sovereign funds have become sophisticated and flexible investors.