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We can talk about selective tariffs - but not about protective tariffs - Concerns about the effects of economic dependencies are increasingly overshadowing the benefits of open global trade. - In the current geopolitically charged situation, there may be situations in which trade policy dependencies - for example in the case of rare earths - can be mitigated by state intervention. - In such cases, selective tariffs are the best choice. Subsidies to build up own production capacities are significantly less efficient, more expensive and undermine the market principle. - Protective tariffs for industries whose products are sufficiently available on the global market, such as the automotive and steel industries, should be rejected. - The fundamental goal should be the preservation of rule-based world trade in accordance with WTO rules. Any kind of state intervention must be justified on the basis of solid data. Background During Chinese party leader Xi Jinping's visit to Europe in May, there was once again a lot of talk about economic dependencies. They are seen as a threat to the "economic security" of Germany and Europe. What often seems to fade into the background is that the arguments for a global division of labor remain valid: it enables general prosperity precisely because certain countries and regions concentrate on the production of individual goods and consequently do not produce others themselves. On the other hand, it is also true that the economic damage more than compensates for these advantages if a state such as China uses economic dependencies as political leverage and, in the worst case, stops supplying goods for which it has a monopoly. In principle, China has achieved such a monopoly for refined rare earths and some other smelted metals.1 However, this clearly does not apply to electric cars, steel or solar cells. The reason for such quasi-monopolies is simple: Chinese companies export the products in question so cheaply that production elsewhere in the world is not worthwhile. If this were solely due to the fact that Chinese companies produce better, the only correct response would be to roll up our sleeves and become better ourselves. In the case of rare earths from China, however, the advantage of Chinese manufacturers is largely due to direct and indirect subsidies. In such an environment, in which Chinese producers have massive cost advantages due to politically granted benefits, it is not worthwhile for private companies outside China to build up their own capacities for the production of rare earths, for example. Even if prices were to rise and economic production were possible, this would not be rational; state-supported Chinese companies can easily survive periods of low prices. The usual market mechanism, whereby companies with the most competitive solutions survive, does not apply here. Even technologically superior production methods do not prevail due to Chinese subsidies. Possible reactions The best economic solution is undoubtedly for the state not to react at all and to see the availability of very cheap products that are available for domestic consumption or for further processing as an advantage. The fact that the products in question have been made cheaper by Chinese taxpayers' money can be gratefully accepted. It would be a genuine and courageous system competition not to respond with the same instruments, but to maintain a market economy system and thus exploit the weaknesses of the counter-design. Shaping the economic framework conditions politically in such a way that innovations that provide alternatives to the use of the raw materials in question can be developed more easily would be a reaction that is still justifiable within the framework of the social market economy. This would be, for example, favorable recycling processes. In most cases, such innovations are possible. However, their introduction and application is significantly more expensive than importing standard products from China. If dependence on China is really not justifiable in individual cases,2 there are two possibilities for state intervention in the form of subsidies or tariffs, which may be justifiable in rare individual cases, but are not provided for within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Important indicators for the assessment of dependencies are, for example, the lack of substitutability of the imported good, the degree of concentration of supply in a country and the relevance of the good in question for the domestic economy. However, state intervention to protect domestic production sites, such as is being discussed for electric cars or steel, appears to be explicitly unjustifiable. There is a sufficiently diversified supply of such products on the global market and there is no dependency on just one country. Economic effects of tariffs and subsidies Tariffs and subsidies both aim to compensate for the price difference to cheaper foreign competitors. Tariffs make imports more expensive, while subsidies make domestic production cheaper through state subsidies. Both have a negative welfare effect, but the correlation is more harmful in the case of subsidies. Figure 1 uses a schematic example, which is not based on empirical data, to illustrate the effect if the costs of producing rare earths in Germany were reduced to the level of the import price from China (country 1) through subsidies.   With the subsidies, it is now economically viable for the subsidized companies to produce the rare earths from ore in Germany. The actually cheaper ways of importing rare earths from alternative countries or using other technical solutions remain more expensive and would hardly be used. The goal of reducing dependencies would therefore be achieved in a very expensive way. Large sums of taxpayers' money would be spent on this. In this example, the most expensive possible route is discussed in order to clearly demonstrate the negative consequences. In reality, however, it is very unlikely that the cheapest route in economic terms will be subsidized. This is because there are always many different providers and technical solutions, which means that all the options are often not even known or can only develop in the long term. It is therefore very unlikely that the optimal subsidy recipients will be selected. A benefit is created for a specific, relatively arbitrarily selected application, but not for others. The effectiveness of the market is thus distorted and the competitiveness of the location decreases as a result. As the subsidies compensate for a competitive disadvantage, it is unlikely that high additional tax revenues will be generated. The funds spent are no longer available for other state investments. The result is a loss of welfare on this scale. Only the subsidized companies benefit from this. The price at which rare earths can be purchased in Germany does not change. It is also possible to subsidize production abroad in order to reduce dependence on one country. Such models are being attempted via "raw material partnerships", for example. Such an approach can be significantly cheaper than subsidizing domestic production. In the example (Figure 1), only the significantly lower import price from country 2 would have to be subsidized. However, the other disadvantages of subsidies listed above also apply in this case. In particular, it is even more difficult to obtain all the necessary information for projects abroad and therefore even less likely to choose the most cost-effective option. The targeted tariffs discussed here are intended to respond to dependencies on supplies from a specific country. They are therefore only imposed on imports from this country. Other imports are not affected. To stay with the example, the importer pays a surcharge on the imported rare earths. This makes his product, for which he processes rare earths, more expensive domestically. Manufacturers abroad who are not affected by the duty become more competitive in comparison.    If the tariff rate were set in the same way as above so that the competitive disadvantage for the most expensive option - metal processing in Germany - is compensated for in terms of price, the tariff rate on imports from China would be very high. However, consumers of rare earths in Germany would still have access to the significantly cheaper other options. Metal processing in Germany would therefore remain unprofitable, while imports - now no longer from China, but from country 2 - would continue to be significantly cheaper. However, the price difference to the cheapest processing variant in Germany, in the example (Figure 2) recycling, would no longer be so great, so that this variant would be easier to make economically viable by scaling up or using innovative technical solutions. In reality, the introduction of customs duties would not divert all procurement to a single country; there is no capacity for this anywhere. The result would be a mix of different suppliers, which would make it more worthwhile to drive innovation in Germany. Changes in the price structure between the different providers and processes over time can be tracked by customers in this model - the best process (or the second best, if the best is used in China) then prevails on the market. The welfare loss here arises from the fact that consumption or further processing of the imported products becomes more expensive by at least the difference to the second cheapest source of supply. However, the volume of the welfare loss is significantly lower than in the case of subsidies. It can be argued that tariffs make the prices of downstream products in the supply chain more expensive, whereas subsidies do not. While this is true, it overlooks the fact that the much larger group of companies and consumers who are not directly affected do not suffer any direct additional costs in the case of tariffs, but bear the costs of subsidies through their taxes. Political effects of tariffs and subsidies In terms of their political and structural consequences, subsidies are more harmful than targeted tariffs. This is simply due to the procedure at the end of which individual companies receive a subsidy decision. An "objective" allocation is hardly possible here. On the contrary: the procedure is susceptible to personal relationships, political influence and direct corruption. Furthermore, subsidies that are only granted in one country of the European Union jeopardize the integrity of the European Single Market. Similar problems can arise with customs duties. This happens when they are used to protect certain domestic industries. In the case of targeted, selective tariffs, which are based on clearly defined, objective categories, such as the degree of dependence on a product from a country, there is little scope for political influence once the criteria have been established. Tariffs cannot harm the European single market either, as they can only be imposed at European level anyway. WTO conformity The reduction of tariffs and subsidies within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the predecessor agreement GATT are a central reason for the reduction of global poverty in recent decades and one of the cornerstones of Germany's prosperity. It is therefore self-evident that tariffs and subsidies not only contradict the idea of the WTO. They also contradict its two basic principles: Subsidies for domestic production contradict the non-discrimination principle3, tariffs against individual countries violate the Most Favorite Nation Clause4. There are exceptions for both in the WTO rules. For example, WTO members must notify subsidies so that they can be examined and other countries can object to them if necessary. In principle, subsidies are only intended - and within a narrow framework - for developing countries, which still includes China. However, the notification of subsidies to the WTO hardly works any more. For example, 64 countries (around a third of members) have not even notified their subsidies for 20175. Nevertheless, some of China's subsidies may indeed be legal according to the letter of the WTO rules. But they are certainly not legitimate, as the aim of the WTO is to liberalize world trade and not to cement the opposite. And even if subsidies are known, the WTO cannot take legally binding action against them due to the dispute settlement mechanism blocked by the USA. Consequently, the USA has not reacted to the unresolved problem of China's subsidies within the WTO framework. Although tariffs have been imposed on some Chinese imports, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a huge subsidy program. If the dispute settlement mechanism were to work, the IRA would almost certainly have to be declared WTO-incompatible. However, as this path is blocked, many countries and regions of the world - including Germany and the EU at the forefront - are reacting with their own openly WTO-incompatible subsidy programs. The current subsidy race is constantly creating new reasons to impose subsidies in response to the subsidies of others. This will further damage the multilateral trading system, which has been very successful for Germany in particular. Targeted tariffs, on the other hand, which can be used to eliminate competitive disadvantages caused by subsidies and which are therefore only levied on goods from the subsidizing country, are in principle in line with the basic idea of the WTO. This is because it balances out a distortion of the world market created by subsidies. Therefore, tariffs are generally permitted as a reaction to dumping and subsidies6. A reaction to subsidies via tariffs within the strict WTO framework is currently hardly possible for the reasons mentioned above. In this situation, it should be actively communicated that in an unsatisfactory legal situation, the path of the least evil will be taken with tariffs. At the same time, serious efforts should be made to reform the WTO. Conclusion The argument: "We want to have the production of certain things in Germany because we believe that we would no longer be supplied with them in crisis situations" is not an economic argument. Production for strategic reasons is always a financially subsidized business. Because if there was money to be made, the private sector would do it. Politically, this line of argument is perfectly legitimate - as is the attempt to steer the economy directly in a politically acceptable direction through subsidies. However, this has nothing to do with a social market economy, but rather the opposite. However, if Germany and Europe are to remain committed to the social market economy and open multilateral trade, the only economically sensible response to problematic dependencies from abroad (if one has to respond at all) is to impose targeted, selective tariffs - but certainly not protective tariffs for domestic production sites. The German government should work within the EU to set a clear framework for this and at the same time work on a reform at WTO level to finally reduce the rampant subsidies. Because these - and not tariffs - are currently the biggest threat to the open global trading system that is so important to us. References 1 Vgl. etwa die Darstellung der Abhängigkeiten von für die Energiewende nötigen Metallen in Cernicky (2022): https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/16166715/Energiewende+und+Protektionismus+-+Wie+gehen+wir+pragmatisch+mit+China+um.pdf/442ba770-d504-43cc-25f1-eaf7d970dfc1, genaue Zahlen vgl. etwa die Auflistung des BDI: https://bdi.eu/publikation/news/analyse-bestehender-abhaengigkeiten-und-handlungsempfehlungen/ 2 Zum Versuch einer entsprechenden Bewertung vgl. etwa die von der KAS und dem Ifo-Institut durchgeführte Studie zu Abhängigkeiten in Lieferketten, Flach et al (2021): https://www.kas.de/de/analysen-und-argumente/detail/-/content/globale-wertschoepfungsketten 3 Art. III GATT 4 Art. I GATT/ WTO 5 WTO | 2023 News items - Members reiterate concerns on lack of transparency with subsidy notifications: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news23_e/scm_02may23_e.htm 6 GATT Art VI, Dumping und Ausgleichzölle Publisher: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., 2024, Berlin Design: yellow too, Pasiek Horntrich GbR Produced with the financial support of the Federal Republic of Germany. This publication of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. is for information purposes only. It may not be used by political parties or election campaigners or helpers for the purpose of election advertising. This applies to federal, state and local elections as well as elections to the European Parliament. The text of this work is licensed under the terms of "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 international", CC BY-SA 4.0 (available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de).

Poland ranks seventh in Europe and 12th worldwide among the least business-friendly countries. It also performed the worst in this regard compared to neighboring countries, including war-torn Ukraine. Greece is the most challenging country to conduct business in. These conclusions come from the eleventh edition of the annual Global Business Complexity Index report by TMF Group, a leading provider of compliance and administrative services. The authors of the TMF Global Complexity Index 2023 examined 79 jurisdictions, accounting for 93% of the world’s GDP and 88% of net foreign direct investment. They compared 292 annually monitored indicators regarding key aspects of business operations, administrative regulations, and legal compliance for entrepreneurs planning to conduct business in a selected market. For the first time, Saudi Arabia appeared in the ranking, taking the 37th position. Poland, considering European countries, ranked seventh in the index, three places better than the previous two years. “We observe progress in digitizing processes in Poland. This is a significant convenience for investors and businesses along the Vistula River. An example is the ability to perform all financial reporting activities in an IT service. Another example is the growing interest in the simplified joint-stock company (PSA), introduced just over two years ago, which requires only 1 PLN of capital and has straightforward management and liquidation rules. The turmoil related to the introduction of the Polish Deal has also passed, which is welcomed by businesses and improves sentiment.” – explains Joanna Romańczuk, Director of TMF Group for Central and Eastern Europe, highlighting positive changes in conducting business in Poland. At the same time, Poland performs the worst regarding ease of doing business compared to neighboring countries (excluding Belarus, not included in the ranking), including Ukraine. “The position of a country in the ranking is determined by the complexity of internal business rules and how other countries in the ranking handle such issues. While we see positive signals in Poland, our neighbors are better at facilitating business establishment and operation, even war-torn Ukraine. Ukraine has the status of a candidate country for the European Union. Therefore, the government is introducing many business facilitations, and the pace of reforms is very rapid. For example, no penalties are imposed for self-corrected tax returns. Additionally, attractive solutions for businesses, such as favorable tax conditions and automatic intellectual property protection, are being implemented in the IT sector.” – adds Joanna Romańczuk. TMF Group experts point out that entrepreneurs in Poland are burdened by the necessity of repeatedly reporting the same information to various institutions and the long-standing variability of regulations, such as the announcement of the National e-Invoice System (KSeF), followed by the postponement of its implementation, which caused significant costs for many large organizations to adapt to its introduction. Among the countries where it is most difficult to conduct business, European countries dominate – Greece, which swapped places with France for the top spot this year. They are followed by Colombia, Mexico, and Bolivia. In Europe, it is also more difficult to conduct business in Italy, Belgium, Spain, and Croatia than in Poland. The Cayman Islands (a British Overseas Territory), Curaçao (a Dutch Overseas Territory), Denmark, Hong Kong (a Special Administrative Region of China), and New Zealand are the best in the world at eliminating business obstacles. In Europe, besides Denmark, which has consistently held top positions in this category for years, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Malta, and Ireland are the most business-friendly countries. “Last year, I gave examples of Denmark, which has long been a global leader in business-friendliness, and the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Malta. This year, the Czech Republic also shows that Europe can be very business-friendly, competing even with the United States. No one doubts that it would be beneficial for Poland to join the ranks of leaders in this field in the coming years,” concludes Joanna Romańczuk. In addition to analyzing business conditions in 79 jurisdictions, the authors of the TMF Global Complexity Index 2024 (GBCI) also identify key topics shaping the global business landscape and regulatory environment: Impact of Global Regulatory Compliance on Foreign Investments The authors of this year’s GBCI emphasize that representatives of most jurisdictions expressed confidence in the stability of regulations over the next five years, continuing a trend of increased stability compared to previous years. For example, in 2020, representatives of only 35% of jurisdictions predicted no significant regulatory changes. This sense of stability has grown yearly, reaching 58% of jurisdictions in 2024. Experts suggest that the number or complexity of regulations is not the biggest challenge, but the speed of regulatory changes is the real difficulty. Geopolitical Factors and Bridge Economies Geopolitical instability has an obvious impact on the flow of trade and investment worldwide. While energy prices remain high, supply chain disruptions and trade barriers also pose significant challenges for global players. As a result, many companies are reevaluating their potential growth plans and long-term expansion goals. However, while geopolitical issues may disrupt supply chains or create trade barriers for some jurisdictions, others benefit from global shifts. Due to their neutrality on global issues, countries known as “bridge economies” can capitalize on their unique positions. For these countries, their newly established roles in the global supply chain have become a crucial way for international companies to manage their risks during periods of international instability. Uncertain Times and Success Strategies – Technology and Retaining Employees Although jurisdiction representatives cited various factors influencing growth, IT and technology topped the list as the most influential. Technology offers growth opportunities in multiple ways, providing development possibilities where countries have technological expertise in production and can increase market share through production. The use of technology to increase productivity has also been identified in terms of streamlining work. In many jurisdictions, including New Zealand and Hong Kong, companies automate office, basic, and part-time work using artificial intelligence to keep the workforce size low and focus on higher-value tasks. At the same time, the vast majority of jurisdictions face challenges in attracting and retaining talent (78%), with this figure even higher in the EMEA (90%) and APAC (79%) regions. The ability to respond effectively to demand in this area largely depends on two factors: local labor laws and the potential of regional talent. Jurisdictions with restrictive labor laws and a strong presence of trade unions – or those with a shortage of available talent – are naturally much less able to flexibly adjust employment levels.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In a complex new multipolar world, a country’s allies and friends will determine the global pecking order. Despite its large population, Africa is a small global player. Its combined economy is less than 3% of the world economy, and Africa’s political heterogeneity makes it difficult to stand united on contentious issues such as China’s claim over Taiwan or the war in Ukraine. Although most African countries aren’t part of global value chains, external economic challenges and tensions affect them deeply. Africa’s most violent period since independence was in the years before the Berlin Wall collapse in 1989. At the time, tensions between the United States (US) and former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) led to intense proxy wars in the Horn of Africa and Angola. Based on that experience, a new era of competition between the US and China doesn’t augur well for the continent. At its peak, the USSR’s economy was only half that of the US, whereas the US and China will be roughly equivalent in the next decade. China is already larger when using purchasing power parity. By 2050, the Chinese economy will be almost 30% bigger. China is the world’s factory, manufacturing cheaper and more than anyone else. It has flooded the world with affordable solar and wind products to fuel the green transition. China is the global trade destination for many and it builds much of Africa’s infrastructure. China and surrounding Asian countries are emerging as the most important source of economic growth globally. According to an in-depth study by The Economist in May 2022, ‘No other country comes near the breadth and depth of China’s engagement in Africa.’ In contrast, US trade and investment with Africa is declining. If the US wants to maintain its influence on the continent, it should find ways to collaborate rather than compete with China. The bill proposed in April by a bipartisan group of senators to renew the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for another 16 years shows that influential US groups are willing to engage with Africa for the long haul. With its low levels of trade reciprocity, the AGOA trade model is well suited to Africa’s needs. The US should use AGOA as a carrot to boost Africa’s exports, not a stick for economic coercion to achieve political objectives. The rise of China in a crowded world means the future will be quite different to previous periods of competition and cohabitation. Many of Africa’s ruling elites cast longing eyes towards China’s autocratic development model as a means to reduce poverty. Democracy and the free market haven’t delivered development, they argue. There is a sense of restlessness in Africa, where the median age is only 19. The youth bulge is expanding with limited prospects for formal employment, a healthy life or meaningful education. To analyse the impact of various global futures on Africa’s development, the Institute for Security Studies’ African Futures and Innovation programme has examined recent and likely global power shifts. For the past century, the US has been the most powerful country in the world. It has successfully presented a narrative that equates global development, stability and progress with American interests and values. Many Africans look to the US, given its freedoms and opportunities – although positive views of the US are dropping in number. The image of a violent mob descending on the Capitol in January 2021 shattered the myth of American exceptionalism, exposing a country torn asunder by its political divisions. Rural America’s reaction to globalisation and the rise of domestic populism detracts from US soft power. At the same time, its declining ability to deter others is on display in the Middle East, which is on a knife edge. Instead of oil from Africa, the next commodities boom for the continent will come from minerals needed for the renewable energy transition. This is reflected in a recent United States Institute of Peace report exploring Africa’s role in diversifying US critical mineral supply chains and strengthening the rule of law, transparency and environmental and labour standards. The US faces an uphill struggle since China has already secured much of Africa's known supply of critical minerals. China’s dominant position regarding these resources reflects the extent to which it is in a different league to the former USSR. Instead of confronting China in Africa, the US must find ways to collaborate with it. Africa cannot again serve as an arena for proxy conflicts and competition, this time between the US and China. Plus, it is Russia, not China, that is now the spoiler in Africa. The extent to which Sahelian countries are experiencing a resurgence of military coups with regime protection provided by Russia’s Africa Corps (previously Wagner) augurs poorly for the continent’s future. The more significant challenge is that the West faces a much larger and more powerful cohort of detractors, perhaps most readily depicted as the G7 versus BRICS+. The impunity that the West has provided to Israel for its war in Gaza and further afield reinforces global south views that different standards apply to them compared to the developed north. Current indications point to China becoming more influential in Africa, with many countries turning eastward. Rather than a new unipolar or even bipolar order, the trend is towards a complex, multipolar global power configuration where one’s allies and friends will determine the international pecking order. Learning to rely on them will be a new experience for the US. This article was first published in Africa Tomorrow, the African Futures and Innovation blog. Exclusive rights to re-publish ISS Today articles have been given to Daily Maverick in South Africa and Premium Times in Nigeria. For media based outside South Africa and Nigeria that want to re-publish articles, or for queries about our re-publishing policy, email us.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Summary • Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has made strengthening energy sovereignty – its own and that of its eastern neighbours – a strategic priority. • Along with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU has created an elaborate legal and institutional framework that provides a platform for energy cooperation. • Through this framework and other measures, the EU and member states have helped significantly strengthen the energy sovereignty of Moldova and Ukraine, in particular helping them to diversify away from Russian fossil fuels and synchronising their electricity grids with that of the EU. • But when it comes to the cleanness and efficiency of their energy, Moldova and Ukraine are still underperforming, despite their potential for green energy generation. Improving the cleanness of their energy would also help strengthen the EU’s energy sovereignty, increasing the mutual benefits of closer energy cooperation. • Ukraine’s vast gas reserves and extensive gas infrastructure, along with its potential for green hydrogen production and the significant development of renewable energy sources in both countries offer opportunities for cooperation with the EU, which could enhance both its energy security and decarbonisation efforts. Introduction Since the beginning of Russia’s war on Ukraine, strengthening energy sovereignty has become one of the most strategic foreign policy goals of the European Union, its member states, and many other countries. Before the war, Russia was the EU’s largest source of imports of crude oil and petroleum products and in 2021 the state-owned energy corporation Gazprom accounted for 41 per cent of the EU’s gas imports. In the aftermath of the invasion, the EU and member states scrambled to reduce their dependency on Moscow for energy supplies, diversifying their suppliers of oil and gas. In 2023, Gazprom’s share of the EU’s gas imports fell to just 8 per cent. But the EU also has a clear interest in strengthening the energy sovereignty of its neighbouring countries, especially of Ukraine and Moldova on its eastern border. The stable functioning of the energy systems of neighbouring countries is one of the cornerstones of their security, and therefore the stability and security of the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. The European Commission has thus identified supporting Ukraine and other countries that are directly or indirectly affected by Russian aggression through long-term international partnerships as among the most important objectives of the EU’s external energy policy. Energy cooperation is also a powerful tool for integration. Energy sovereignty should not be equated with state energy autonomy or autarky; international cooperation within alliances or integration relationships such as the EU is an important component. Political allies can be reliable and secure suppliers of energy resources to import-dependent countries – the United States and Norway, for example, play such a role for many EU countries. The development of energy infrastructure links for gas or electricity between partner states, such as the EU and its eastern neighbours, would enable them to provide mutual support in times of crisis. The EU’s desire to strengthen energy sovereignty throughout its neighbourhood is first and foremost related to the need to reduce dependency on Russia and aid the integration of its neighbours. But strengthening energy sovereignty will also require a reduction in fossil fuel consumption, and is therefore closely linked to achieving one of the EU’s other major strategic goals of climate neutrality by 2050. The diversification of fossil fuel supply sources, while important, is not a long-term solution to the problem of energy sovereignty. Amid the current geopolitical uncertainties and the growing threat of climate change, decision-makers in the EU and in neighbouring countries need to now consider green energy and efficient energy use for a comprehensive approach to energy sovereignty. By strengthening its and its eastern neighbours’ renewable energy potential and optimising energy consumption, the EU can reduce the overall dependence on external suppliers of fossil fuels. The commission’s external energy policy combines these two goals, stating that the EU’s actions should be oriented towards meeting both short-term needs and long-term goals regarding the implementation of the European Green Deal. For this reason, I propose a broader approach to assessing energy sovereignty, which goes beyond the typical prism of security of supply to encompass four elements: • The level of dependence on energy imports, both fossil fuels and electricity; • The cleanness of the energy sector, determined by the importance of renewable energy in a country’s energy mix and the level of decarbonisation of the energy sector; • The level of energy efficiency; • The energy sovereignty narrative used by the state authorities in policy documents, which reflects the strategic direction of the state’s energy sector. This policy brief uses these criteria to analyse the progress that the EU and its eastern neighbours have made towards strengthening each other’s energy sovereignty so far, and sets out the next steps that they should take. It finds that, to date, the EU and its member states have played an important role in strengthening the energy sovereignty of its eastern neighbours by increasing their energy independence, but that Ukraine and Moldova still underperform when it comes to cleanness and efficiency, despite the direction implied by the states’ energy narratives – in part due to setbacks related to the war. Strategic cooperation formats between the EU and its eastern neighbours Over the last decade, the EU has developed a legal framework for cooperation with Moldova and Ukraine, which enables closer cooperation in various spheres, including energy. This approach fits into the EU’s so-called Team Europe external action policy for the two countries, which means that both EU and member state structures and European financial institutions, including the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), are involved in the process. In total, the EBRD has committed to investing $3 billion in 2022 and 2023 to address the Ukrainian economy’s challenges following Russia’s invasion. Both countries are also associated states of the EU, and their bilateral relations with the bloc, including on energy, are governed by the association agreements, which came into force in July 2016 for Moldova and in September 2017 for Ukraine. The European Council’s decision in 2023 to grant both countries EU candidate status and start accession negotiations has further strengthened the relationship. The EU also invited Moldova and Ukraine to join the Energy Community in 2010 and 2011 respectively. The Energy Community’s main objective is to extend the principles and rules of the EU’s internal energy market to the countries of eastern Europe, the Black Sea region, and the Western Balkans, effectively integrating these countries into the EU’s energy market. Members of the Energy Community are obliged to implement EU energy regulations into their own national legal systems and to strengthen energy cooperation with EU countries. Both Moldova and Ukraine have already adopted several important pieces of legislation on the functioning of the gas and electricity markets. Ukraine has successfully implemented regulations liberalising its energy markets, including certifying independent system operators in the gas and electricity markets, and an independent gas storage operator. Furthermore, at the beginning of 2024, the country’s certified electricity operator Ukrenergo joined the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Meanwhile Moldova completed the certification of its electricity transmission system operator Moldelectrica as an independent system operator in July 2023 and has taken steps to certify the independent system operator of its gas market. Both Ukraine and Moldova have also adopted the EU’s Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency, which prohibits insider trading and the abuse of market power. In December 2023, Moldova also amended the Law on Natural Gas to help strengthen security of gas supply and storage, further aligning it with the EU’s energy acquis. Towards energy independence The deepening of Ukraine’s and Moldova’s integration with the EU has helped to strengthen their energy sovereignty, helping them in particular to reduce their dependency on Russia. Ukraine and, to an even greater extent, Moldova are dependent on energy imports. In April 2020, Ukraine was able to meet about 65 per cent of its energy needs on its own, while Moldova could only meet about 20 per cent. Although Moldova’s situation has not changed significantly in recent years, Ukraine’s dependence on energy imports fell to 23 per cent in 2022 as a consequence of the decline in the country’s energy consumption due to the war.  Gas Both Moldova and Ukraine have significantly strengthened their energy independence in the gas sector, including through cooperation with the EU and member states. This is particularly the case for Ukraine, whose own gas production now accounts for more than 90 per cent of domestic demand. (As recently as 2010, Kyiv’s dependence on gas imports was over 70 per cent, amounting to 34 billion cubic metres (bcm), which it imported almost entirely from Russia.) According to the 2023 annual data, Ukraine’s gas consumption has fallen by 30 per cent since the start of the war and it now imports gas mainly through Slovakia, but also Hungary, Poland, and Romania (transiting through Moldova). Ukraine’s journey towards independence from Russian gas supplies was, on the one hand, a consequence of political decisions taken by the new authorities in Kyiv, which came to power in 2014 after former president Viktor Yanukovych was overthrown and, in autumn 2015, stopped buying Russian gas. On the other hand, it was made possible by the support provided by EU member states and European financial institutions, which became particularly important following Russia’s full-scale invasion. In the summer of 2022, for example, the EBRD opened a $300m credit line to Ukraine’s national oil and gas company Naftogaz for emergency gas purchases. It also began to cooperate with the Energy Community to provide regular support to Ukraine, including an agreement in June 2023 to guarantee €600m in support for Ukrainian companies operating in the gas, electricity, and hydropower sectors. Unlike Ukraine, Moldova does not produce gas, has no gas storage facilities, and has only trace reserves of its own gas (about 1 bcm as of 31 December 2022), making it completely dependent on gas imports. Chisinau’s success in strengthening its energy sovereignty has nonetheless been impressive: it has significantly diversified its supply sources and achieved complete independence from gas purchases from Russia in December 2022. The EU, European financial institutions, and select member states have played an important role in this regard. The EIB has been financially supporting projects in Moldova since 2008, including those to strengthen energy sovereignty, such as the construction of the Ungheni-Chisinau gas interconnector. But in view of the energy crisis occurring in Europe from 2021 onwards, the EU initiated anti-crisis formats with Moldova as well. For example, the EU-Moldova High Level Energy Dialogue was set up to provide support to Moldova to guarantee the supply of energy resources (especially natural gas) and electricity during the energy crisis, but also to implement long-term energy projects. So far, five rounds of consultations have taken place between the EU and Moldova under this format, through which the partners have discussed crisis support, energy sector reforms, and long-term projects. In October 2021, Poland began supplying gas to Moldova, marking Moldova’s first imports of non-Russian gas in history. In addition to imports from Poland, Moldova managed to launch reverse gas supplies from Slovakia, as well as via the Trans-Balkan pipeline from Romania, and gained access to Ukrainian gas storage facilities, where it could store about 200m cubic metres (m3) of gas. Chisinau’s diversification efforts are continuing, as illustrated by its gas supply agreements with the Greek company DEPA in 2023. Financial support from European institutions, including the EBRD, and member states has also helped to facilitate these diversification efforts by enabling Moldova to finance purchases of gas or electricity from alternative suppliers. In 2022, the EBRD offered a loan of €300m to Moldova, and in October 2023 an agreement was reached for it to provide a further €165m in gas support to the country in the form of loans, with Norway promising an additional €34m gas grant. In addition, in November 2022, the Energy Community Secretariat launched the Energy Community Rescue Scheme initiative to ensure that donors’ financial assistance for Moldova was channelled towards helping the country face the harsh winter ahead. Meanwhile, the Energy Vulnerability Fund, which was established in 2022 by the Moldovan government with support from the EU, Slovakia, and the United Nations Development Programme, played an important role in neutralising the effects of rising gas, electricity, and heating bills in Moldova. Support for Moldova under this mechanism was provided by several European countries including the Czech Republic, Sweden, Italy, and Switzerland. Finally, in 2022 the EU created the energy platform for member states and countries such as Moldova and Ukraine, which is supposed to combine demand, coordinate the use of infrastructure, and facilitate negotiations with international partners for joint purchases of gas and hydrogen. Through this initiative, Ukraine and Moldova have taken part in tenders organised by the European Commission and received 100 per cent and 80 per cent respectively of the volumes requested after the first round of purchases. Oil When it comes to oil, both Moldova and Ukraine are highly dependent on imports, but EU countries have gradually replaced Belarus and Russia as their main suppliers since February 2022, thereby helping to strengthen their energy sovereignty. Moldova is 100 per cent dependent on imports of oil and petroleum products from third countries, with Romania now mainly supplying it with oil products. As a result of the war and Russia’s continued attacks on critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure, including storage facilities for petroleum products and oil, Ukraine has not been able to produce petroleum products on its own – its last operating refinery was closed in April 2022. These products are particularly sensitive for Ukraine, not just for civilian use, but for military needs. Despite its consumption of petrol, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas falling by 25 per cent, 30 per cent, and 40 per cent respectively from 2021 to 2022, Ukraine has become more dependent on imports – 93 per cent dependent in 2022 compared with 77 per cent in 2021.[1] In 2021, Belarus accounted for about 43 per cent of Ukraine’s gasoline imports, and Belarus and Russia together accounted for about 62 per cent of its diesel imports.[2] In 2022, Ukraine significantly reduced imports from Belarus and Russia, and increased those from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria (these three countries covered 51 per cent of Ukraine’s diesel import needs in 2022), Turkey, Lithuania, Moldova, Greece, Hungary, and several other countries.[3] In 2023, Ukraine did not import petroleum products from either Belarus or Russia.[4]   Electricity Although Moldova and Ukraine are in completely different positions in their efforts to ensure a secure electricity supply, the synchronisation of the two countries’ power grids with the EU system in March 2022 significantly increased their energy sovereignty in this area. This was particularly important for Moldova, where 80 per cent of electricity needs are met by the Russian-owned Inter RAO gas-fired power plant located in the separatist region of Transnistria. In October 2022, following Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, Kyiv halted electricity exports to Moldova, leading to some blackouts. Electricity supplies from Transnistria were then completely terminated at the beginning of November. Moldova’s synchronisation with the EU grid allowed it to import electricity from Romania, which in November 2022, met 90 per cent of Moldova’s electricity demand. In June 2023, ENTSO-E increased the capacity of interconnectors connecting the EU with Moldova and Ukraine from 1050 to 1200 megawatts (MW). During the 2022-2023 heating season, around 900,000 households also received subsidies for their electricity bills through the Energy Vulnerability Fund. Although Moldova currently once more imports 70-80 per cent of its electricity from Transnistria, it does so mainly because it is cheaper than electricity from Romania or Ukraine. But the synchronisation of its grid ensures access to alternative sources of supply, minimising the risk of energy blackmail from Russia. In the long term, support from European financial institutions will be important in strengthening Moldova’s security of electricity supply. From 2023 to 2028, the priority of the EBRD’s financial support to Moldova will be fostering energy resilience, including funds for the modernisation of electricity grids. Although Ukraine is essentially self-sufficient in electricity supply, synchronisation with the EU grid has proven important for Kyiv too, enabling it to import electricity from EU countries in crisis situations related to Russian attacks. This has been especially helpful given that in March 2022 Russia captured the important Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, which was responsible for 44 per cent of Ukraine’s total generating capacity from nuclear power plants. In 2023, Ukraine also completed the modernisation of a power interconnector with Poland. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism, established back in 2001, proved to be an important crisis mechanism in the context of meeting Ukraine’s short-term energy needs, especially for electricity. As of 31 January 2024, more than 5,900 power generators have been sent to Ukraine via the mechanism, including 2,347 from the EU’s own rescEU reserve stockpiles. In addition to generators, the EU has been delivering other vital energy supplies to Ukraine including transformers, autotransformers, high-voltage equipment, and LED light bulbs. The EIB – which has supported various energy projects in Ukraine since 2007 – has played an important role since the outbreak of the war, funding energy grid projects and repairing the damage inflicted by Russia to energy infrastructure. In December 2023, for example, it provided €133m to enhance the reliability of hydroelectric power plants. Within the Energy Community, the Ukraine Energy Support Fund and the Ukraine Support Task Force have proven to be extremely important in ensuring Ukraine’s energy security during the war, with the Ukraine Energy Support Fund alone providing over €400m in support by December 2023. Under the Ukraine Support Task Force, as of October 2023, 22 EU countries had made nearly 100 deliveries to Ukraine, including power transformers, cables, generators, transportation vehicles, and other equipment crucial for supporting the electricity sector. The Energy Community has also launched the Ukraine Energy Market Observatory, which will closely follow and review all developments related to the broader energy market and corporate governance in Ukraine. Finally, in March 2023, the Energy Community Secretariat signed two memorandums of understanding with the Ukrainian authorities: one on increased cooperation in rebuilding Ukraine’s energy sector and another on the coordination of activities in the area of humanitarian aid for the district heating, water supply, and buildings sector of Ukraine. Green credentials With the help of the EU, member states, and financial institutions, Ukraine and Moldova have been able to dramatically strengthen their energy sovereignty in terms of energy independence. However, their progress towards energy cleanness and efficiency – two other important components of energy sovereignty – has been less impressive. Cleanness Both countries, but especially Moldova, perform poorly when it comes to the share of renewables in their electricity generation. In 2022, renewables accounted for only 15.8 per cent of Ukraine’s electricity generation and 7.1 per cent of Moldova’s electricity – far below the EU and world average of 38.4 per cent and around 30 per cent respectively in 2022. The share of renewables in Moldova and Ukraine also includes the production of electricity from large hydroelectric power plants, whose operation is not fully carbon neutral. However, the development of the renewable energy sources (RES) sector in Ukraine was beginning to gain momentum before the outbreak of the war. At the beginning of 2022, the total installed RES capacity (connected to the grid) reached 9.5 gigawatts (GW) – excluding 0.6GW of RES capacity located in the territories temporarily occupied by Russia before 24 February 2022. About $12 billion was invested in the Ukrainian RES sector between 2009 and 2021 from a variety of sources, including the EBRD, the Black Sea Bank for Trade and Development, and the American International Development Finance Corporation. But, during the first six months of the war, Russia destroyed between 80 and 90 per cent of the generating capacity of wind power plants and around 30 per cent of the capacity of solar power plants in the country, as well as around half of the transmission lines and facilities for the production of electricity in Ukraine. Ongoing military activities, including Russia’s continued attacks on energy infrastructure, are significantly hampering Ukraine’s ability to rebuild these capacities. In an attempt to address this, the G7+ Coordination Group – established in November 2022 and including the Energy Community as well as the EU and its member states – has established a Clean Energy Partnership with the Ukrainian government to support the sustainable recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, which was officially inaugurated at COP28 in December 2023. Its aim is to support the creation of a modern, secure, decentralised, and cleaner energy system in line with Net Zero in Ukraine and to better integrate the country into the EU. The parties are to support Ukraine in attracting private investors to develop projects to reduce Ukraine’s dependence on fossil fuels, in line with the EU’s energy and climate policy goals. In Moldova, the low share of RES in the energy mix results from a historic lack of interest in projects in this sphere on the part of the authorities. Under the pro-European government led by the Party of Action and Solidarity, which came to power in 2021, this situation has begun to change. The government has expressed interest in accelerating Moldova’s energy transition through the development of renewable projects and is gearing up to initiate the inaugural renewables auctions in the country (between April and June 2024), through which it aims to acquire 105MW of wind power and 60MW of solar projects.  When it comes to the levels of carbon in its electricity, Ukraine boasts much better results. In 2022 the carbon intensity of electricity generated in Ukraine was 271.4 grams of carbon dioxide-equivalents per kilowatt-hour of electricity (gCO2e per kWh), below the EU and global averages of 291.9 gCO2e per kWh and 490.1 gCO2e per kWh respectively. After two years of war, the carbon intensity in Ukraine has dropped further to 194.4 gCO2e per kWh. The large share of nuclear energy in Ukraine’s energy mix (60.5 per cent in 2023) – one of the largest shares globally – primarily accounts for the low carbon footprint of its energy sector. Moldova’s electricity has a much higher carbon intensity, 871.7 gCO2e per kWh in 2022, well above the EU and global averages. Moreover, the energy intensity (the amount of energy required to produce one unit of GDP) in Moldova is 3.4 times higher than the average in EU countries. Buildings account for 58 per cent of the total final energy consumption in Moldova, of which non-residential buildings account for 17 per cent. This makes improving energy efficiency in this sector of crucial importance.  Energy efficiency Both countries also face challenges to improve their energy efficiency, although Ukraine is doing much better than Moldova in this field. According to Energy Community reports, Ukraine’s primary energy consumption and final energy consumption in 2020 were below the targets set for 2030. In the case of Moldova, on the other hand, the 2021 statistics show that both primary and final energy consumption were just over 10 per cent above the 2030 targets. Ukraine’s good performance is largely a consequence of the war and the subsequent drop in electricity consumption of around one-third. Nonetheless, Ukraine is still struggling with high energy intensity in some sectors, notably related to residential buildings, 85 per cent of which date from the Soviet era. Before the invasion, the average level of energy consumption in households was two to three times higher than that in the EU. On top of this, gas plays a significant role in the heating sector, with around 80 per cent of households in Ukraine relying on heat supplies from gas-fired power stations. While the war makes it difficult for Ukraine to implement systemic measures to improve energy efficiency, Ukrainian authorities had integrated this aim into their energy strategy even before Russia’s invasion. In 2018, they established the Energy Efficiency Fund, in close cooperation with the EU and Germany. Since 2014, the EU has also allocated grants under the European Neighbourhood Instrument to support reforms in Ukraine, including those aimed at improving energy efficiency. Ukraine has made significant progress in fulfilling its obligations under the association agreement with the EU regarding the adoption of European energy efficiency legislation. For example, it has developed and enacted a legislative framework to support energy efficiency, including to establish energy-efficient practices across various sectors and reduce energy consumption in buildings. Ukraine is also aligning with European standards by promoting “nearly zero-energy buildings” through the adoption of the Concept and National Plan, which outlines the gradual implementation of regulations over the next five years, followed by new construction requirements after 2025. Moldova adopted an amendment to the energy efficiency law in May 2023, establishing a legal framework for comprehensive planning via the National Energy and Climate Plan. However, it is yet to implement energy efficiency measures, especially according to standards prepared by international institutions. For example, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) has prepared a special guide for the implementation of energy efficiency measures and the valorisation of renewable energy sources for public sector buildings. The Energy Community Secretariat has played an important role in the creation of further instruments for energy cooperation between EU member states and the EU’s neighbours which encompass energy efficiency. For instance, EU4Energy – an initiative created jointly with the Council of European Energy Regulators and the International Energy Agency and launched in 2016 – is focusing on Moldova and Ukraine, alongside Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia, in the current second phase of the programme (2021-2025). The initiative is designed to support the aspirations of focus countries to implement sustainable energy policies and foster cooperative regional development of the energy sector. The European Commission’s Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, which aims to bring together European local and regional authorities to voluntarily contribute to increasing energy efficiency and the use of RES, includes many cities and municipalities from Ukraine and Moldova. The EU and member states have also provided support within the framework of the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership fund, a programme set up on Sweden’s initiative in 2009. Of the total budget (€1,355m), €982m was allocated to 25 projects in Ukraine and €114m to seven projects in Moldova. Funds disbursed under the initiative are used, among other purposes, to improve the energy efficiency of healthcare buildings and other public facilities. Energy narratives The current authorities in both countries have shaped a dominant narrative around strengthening energy sovereignty. In March-April 2023, the European Council on Foreign Relations’ network of associate researchers conducted a survey in all EU member states and Ukraine and Moldova on decision-makers’ approach to energy sovereignty following the outbreak of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Questions included the conceptualisation of energy sovereignty, the main challenges and threats in this area, and the measures taken and planned to strengthen it. Our researchers found that the issue of energy sovereignty gained prominence in political circles and public discourse in both countries after the outbreak of the war. The authorities of both countries are taking a comprehensive and innovative approach to energy sovereignty, viewing it not only through the prism of security of supply of raw materials, but also energy efficiency and climate goals. According to statements made by the Ukrainian government, Ukraine plans to become a leading green energy hub in Europe, integrating energy production with green technology development. Ukraine’s minister of energy has underscored the role of renewable energy in enhancing energy security, citing Ukraine’s experience during the war and its contribution to European stability through the synchronisation of power systems. Although the Moldovan authorities have placed special emphasis on the need to find alternative sources of supply due to their longstanding heavy dependence on energy resources from Russia, in the long term they also see energy transition issues as an important component of strengthening energy sovereignty. The government plans to significantly increase the pace of RES projects, aiming to increase their share to 30 per cent of electricity consumption in Moldova by 2030. The elites of both countries also seem to see cooperation with third countries, including the EU and member states, as an important means of strengthening energy sovereignty, not just responding to crisis situations. This is evident in their long-term plans to cooperate with the EU and member states on further projects to strengthen their energy sovereignty. (This applies in particular to the expansion of infrastructure connections.) Moldova is currently focusing primarily on the construction of a high-voltage line from Vulcanesti to Chisinau. This connection is expected to allow the import of electricity from Romania to Moldova on the right bank of the river Dniester within the next few years. (The completion of the line is scheduled for 2025.) Moldova is also interested in the development of joint power generation projects with Romania and in increasing the capacity of the Ungheni-Chisinau gas interconnector. Ukraine is focused on establishing a hydrogen corridor connecting it with Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Germany. The corridor would enhance Ukraine’s energy security and integrate it into the European energy network, as well as stimulate the growth of Ukraine’s hydrogen industry and enable Ukrainian-produced hydrogen to seamlessly enter the European energy market. Furthermore, in 2024 both countries (along with Slovakia) joined the Vertical Corridor European gas transportation scheme, which brings together the gas transmission system operators of Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, and aims to enhance energy security and diversification by upgrading their networks to facilitate gas transport from south to north and vice versa. The mutual benefits of cooperation So far, the eastern neighbourhood countries have mainly benefited from the EU’s and member states’ actions in the context of strengthening their own energy sovereignty. However, they both – and especially Ukraine – have the potential to help strengthen the energy sovereignty of the EU and its member states, thanks to their raw materials, RES development, and infrastructure. Ukraine has great potential in the gas sector. Firstly, Ukraine is home to some of the largest proven natural gas reserves in Europe (after Norway), estimated at up to 1.1 trillion m3 in December 2020 (within the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine, that is, including Crimea and other areas occupied by Russia). Ukraine’s gas production is also the second-largest in Europe after Norway and, despite the war, remains at a relatively high level (18.5 bcm in 2022 and 18.7 bcm in 2023). Secondly, Ukraine hosts gas infrastructure that could be useful for the EU as it diversifies its sources of supply. Ukraine’s extensive gas network, which has already enabled the transit of Russian gas for European consumers, could transport gas from the Black Sea or Caspian region via the Trans-Balkan pipeline. This would especially be the case after the construction of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast – which has been under consideration for over a decade. Ukraine could also help Europe to store gas – the country has the largest gas storage system (30 bcm) in Europe and the third-largest by capacity in the world – behind only the US and Russia. This capacity not only ensures Ukraine’s energy security but could also potentially be used by European customers. Some EU companies are already doing this – at the beginning of 2024, around 2 bcm of gas in Ukrainian storage belonged to EU companies, but the potential for exploitation is much greater. Cooperation with Ukraine on hydrogen could further strengthen the EU’s energy sovereignty. According to Ukrainian researchers, with the appropriate development of wind power, Ukraine could produce up to 19.5m tonnes of green hydrogen per year, which would be twice as much as the EU’s annual production plans by 2030. The EU already considers Ukraine one of the three main potential green hydrogen import corridors (along with the North Sea region and the Mediterranean Sea), and in February 2023 signed a memorandum of understanding with Ukraine on a strategic partnership on biomethane, hydrogen, and other synthetic gases. Hydrogen projects that meet the EU’s safety standards can obtain the status of projects of mutual interest under the EU’s Trans-European Networks for Energy Regulation framework. The European Commission’s first list of projects of mutual interest published in November 2023 includes a generic corridor project aiming to transmit hydrogen from Ukraine to Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Germany. Both countries, and especially Ukraine, also have high potential for RES development, which could allow the production of clean energy not only for domestic consumption, but in the case of Ukraine also for export to the EU. Theoretically, Ukraine has the greatest RES potential among south-east European countries, although estimates vary. The Ukrainian government assesses the potential for wind energy development in Ukraine off the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov coasts to be 140GW. Ukrainian scholars, meanwhile, calculate that renewable energy sources in Ukraine could provide up to 874GW in total, including solar (83GW), onshore wind (438GW), and offshore wind (250GW). At a conference on the reconstruction of Ukraine organised in June 2023 in London, the Ukrainian ministry for energy presented plans for investments in the energy sector, showing that by 2050 Ukraine wants to have 230GW of solar and wind generation capacity, 38GW of energy storage capacity, and 69GW of electrolyser capacity to produce green hydrogen. Regardless of which of the above estimates is more realistic, it is clear that Ukraine has the ability to produce large amounts of clean energy. According to the UNECE, bioenergy, hydro, solar, and wind generation could account for almost 80 per cent of Ukraine’s total energy generation by 2050. Moldova also has some potential for the development of RES projects, although significantly less than Ukraine. According to a 2017 report from the International Renewable Energy Agency, Moldova could expand its wind power to 21GW and total RES generation capacity to 27GW. From the perspective of the EU, while Moldova will not become a source of clean energy imports like Ukraine, the development of RES projects in Moldova would nonetheless be beneficial, reducing Moldova’s consumption of fossil fuels and thus also relieving the burden on the EU and member states of providing support to maintain Moldova’s gas supply during crises. Ukraine could also develop biomethane projects. According to the Ukrainian National Committee for Energy Regulation, the country could produce 22 bcm of biomethane per year, some of which could be exported to the EU. Indeed, Ukraine already has the necessary resources and infrastructure, including adequate transmission networks that would not require additional upgrades to transmit biomethane. Ukraine also has large feedstock resources and large areas of arable land to develop the potential for agricultural biomethane production. The EU plans to produce 35 bcm of biomethane per year by 2030 and it is estimated that Ukraine could meet up to 20 per cent of this demand. The EU could also benefit from access to Ukraine’s critical raw materials (CRMs), which are important for the EU’s own energy transition. Ukraine holds resources of most of the raw materials on the EU’s latest list of CRMs, including some that the EU recognises as CRMs of strategic importance. For example, Ukraine has the largest reserves of lithium in Europe, used, amongst other things in the production of batteries for electric cars. In 2021, Ukraine also accounted for around 7 per cent of global titanium production and was the world’s seventh-largest exporter of titanium ore. Titanium dioxide is a valuable chemical that can help to improve the efficiency of batteries by extending both their energy-storing capacity and their lifetime, and – alongside lithium – is one of the CRMs that the EU considers to be strategic. Moreover, Ukraine has some of Europe’s largest reserves of graphite, which is used in energy storage technologies like lithium-ion batteries, as well as deposits of nickel and cobalt, which are important in battery production. Its significant potential for green energy production and its status as the country with the largest nuclear generating capacity in Europe mean that Ukraine could also be a source of low-carbon electricity imports for EU member states. Over the last three decades, Ukraine has exported electricity, and continued to export small amounts to Moldova, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary even in the first year of the war. Due to Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, Kyiv was forced to suspend electricity exports in October 2022, but resumed exports of small amounts of electricity to Moldova and EU countries in April 2023. In the long term, especially when the war ends, the EU expects to be able to import clean electricity from Ukraine as part of its REPowerEU initiative. Finally, Ukraine can provide important insights into protecting energy infrastructure across Europe based on its experiences of Russian attacks, which could further strengthen the EU’s energy sovereignty. The security of the EU’s energy infrastructure has become an area of concern, particularly after the damage to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, the Baltic interconnector, and the cyber-attacks on Danish energy infrastructure. Hurdles ahead Several factors clearly favour closer energy cooperation between the EU and member states and their eastern neighbours, which would strengthen the energy sovereignty of all parties involved. Both the societies and the current authorities in Moldova and Ukraine are unequivocally in favour of the closest possible integration into Western structures, including the EU. In Ukraine, this has been the case since the victory of the “Revolution of Dignity” against the government’s growing ties to Russia and the ensuing fall of the Yanukovych administration in 2014, while Moldova began to take an unequivocally pro-European course in 2021. Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and aggressive policy towards Moldova have further embedded this trend and mean it will likely continue in the long term. The EU has also re-evaluated its strategic thinking, prompting a new focus on its own energy sovereignty and that of its eastern neighbourhood. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU worked rapidly to reduce its dependency on Russian energy supplies and to help its eastern neighbours do the same. However, the ongoing war in Ukraine is hampering the intensification of long-term energy cooperation. In the case of Ukraine, the key issue is the scale of the war damage and the estimated amount of money needed to rebuild Ukraine. The World Bank estimates the total cost of reconstruction at almost $486 billion, which is more than two times the size of Ukraine’s pre-war economy. According to the UN, rebuilding Ukraine’s energy sector alone, which has been seriously damaged by constant shelling, will require an outlay of approximately $47 billion. The EU has announced an additional €50 billion in support between 2024 and 2027 through a new financing instrument, the Ukraine Facility. However, these funds relate to investments in all spheres of state functioning, and it is unclear how much, if any, of this sum will be allocated to energy. Considering Kyiv’s plans regarding investments in green energy (RES and hydrogen) and the development of other sectors, including nuclear and gas, the Ukrainian authorities estimate that the country’s investment needs will reach $400 billion by 2050. Yet Moldova and Ukraine have relatively weak investment climates. Before the war, regulatory instability in Ukraine, including changes in taxation rules for the gas extraction sector, among other factors, made it difficult to attract investors. Moldova also finds it difficult to attract investment, particularly from private actors. And, although positive developments are taking place in Ukraine even during the war (for example, a law adopted in Ukraine introducing favourable conditions for investment in the biogas and biomethane sector, including exemption from income tax for five years, land tax, and VAT and customs duties when importing new equipment and components), it remains unclear how easy it will be to introduce and apply legal regulations after the war. Progress in the implementation of energy and climate policy will also be one of the fundamental challenges in the context of Ukraine’s integration with the EU. In addition to this, specific sectors face further challenges. Despite having great potential for hydrogen production, for example, Ukraine so far has neither a hydrogen strategy, nor a legal framework for the development of hydrogen projects, nor adequate infrastructure. The next steps To achieve the greatest possible synergy in the efforts of the EU and its eastern neighbours to mutually reinforce energy sovereignty, both sides will need to continue taking strategic steps in the coming years. For eastern neighbours Adopt a progressive approach to energy sovereignty Ukraine and Moldova need to translate their narratives about energy sovereignty into a determination to implement them in reality. The eastern neighbourhood countries should permanently change their approach to energy sovereignty and think of it not only in terms of security of supply – energy independence from Russia and diversification of supply sources – but also in terms of clean energy and energy efficiency. This applies especially to Moldova, which should aim to finally and permanently sever its energy relations with Russia not only in the electricity sector, but also in the gas sector, in particular by removing Gazprom from the ownership structure of its largest gas company Moldovagaz (in which Gazprom still holds 51 per cent of the shares). The EU and its eastern neighbours should make the improvement of energy efficiency one of their common strategic goals. Moldova and Ukraine should use the funds made available through the EIB and EBRD to implement steps to improve energy efficiency. In particular, they should exploit and expand the opportunities for projects under the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership. They should also strengthen bilateral cooperation with selected EU member states that have declared their willingness to share their experience in this field. On a bilateral level, France, Germany, Poland, and Sweden are implementing or planning cooperation with their eastern neighbours to improve energy efficiency. Meet Energy Community regulations Ukraine and Moldova should continue to implement reforms in the energy sector, including those stemming from their membership in the Energy Community or related to the process of deepening their integration with the EU. Following the end of the war in Ukraine, it will be important that the two countries take measures against the monopolisation of markets by fully liberalising the electricity and gas markets, ensuring OECD-appropriate governance standards for state-owned energy companies, and making further progress in tariff reforms and subsidy provision by phasing out public service obligations and replacing them with social support for vulnerable energy consumers. These measures will serve to deepen the integration of Moldova and Ukraine with the EU and, consequently, help to increase the resilience of their energy systems. Make infrastructure flexible Both Moldova and Ukraine should prepare for new uses of their transmission infrastructure under the new geopolitical conditions. This is particularly important for Ukraine, which for a decade has acted as a transit country for EU countries’ gas and oil imports from Russia. In December 2024, the transit agreements between Russia and Ukraine will expire, and Ukraine will need to find a new use for its significant gas pipeline network in order to maintain it. The Ukrainian gas pipeline network could be used to export Ukraine’s surplus gas production or to transit gas from other sources. For example, Azerbaijani gas exported via the Trans-Balkan pipeline could travel via Moldova and Ukraine to Slovakia or other EU countries. The Ukrainian government was already considering using it to transport imported gas via a potential LNG terminal on the Ukrainian Black Sea coast before the war. Ukraine and Moldova also need to modernise and expand their electricity grids. In the case of Ukraine, this is necessary due to the continuing destruction associated with Russia’s aggression. However, Moldova also needs grid investments, especially if it is to expand its RES potential in the future. Indeed, the expansion of RES potential requires a sufficiently developed grid capable of absorbing electricity produced by wind or photovoltaic installations into the system. Make use of international cooperation formats Given the multiplicity of cooperation formats in which the eastern neighbourhood countries are involved, it is important to build synergies between them. In addition to the formats already in use in relations with the EU, Kyiv and Chisinau should make use of other, supra-regional cooperation formats that have emerged in central and eastern Europe in the last decade, within which some countries have placed a very strong emphasis on strengthening sovereignty. An example of this is the Three Seas Initiative, a project initiated in 2015 by the presidents of Poland and Croatia that brings together 13 central European countries with the strategic aim of preserving and strengthening the unity of the EU and the Euro-Atlantic space through three pillars: transport, energy, and digital. Poland and Romania have already declared their interest and political will to cooperate with countries such as Moldova and Ukraine under the initiative. For this purpose, Ukraine and Moldova could also make use of the European Political Community, to which 47 European countries belong, including non-EU countries such as the United Kingdom and Turkey. For the EU Ensure comprehensive support to Moldova and Ukraine prior to accession In the dynamic geopolitical situation related to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the EU should be determined not only to pursue the EU integration process of Moldova and Ukraine consistently, but also to strengthen its own capacities to respond to Russia’s attempts to destabilise these eastern neighbours. Only the accession of Ukraine and Moldova to the EU can create a sustainable foundation for strengthening cooperation and using the full potential of all parties to strengthen energy sovereignty. The EU therefore needs to demonstrate its determination to meet this political commitment to Moldova and Ukraine. It should use all existing multilateral formats available to it to tighten political and economic (including energy) cooperation with its eastern neighbours. Individual member states should also look to strengthen their bilateral cooperation with their eastern neighbours. Poland can play a special role in this respect, above all because it is Ukraine’s largest neighbour and is interested in participating in the reconstruction of Ukraine and particularly committed to supporting Moldova’s reform. The new pro-European government formed in December 2023 could also build a coalition for energy cooperation with its eastern neighbours together with Germany or perhaps more broadly with Germany and France as part of the recently reactivated Weimer Triangle. Initiate joint energy projects The EU should plan further joint energy projects with its eastern neighbours. It is a major weakness that, apart from the hydrogen corridor with Ukraine, the list of projects of common and mutual interest published by the EU in November 2023 does not include others concerning the enhancement of infrastructure links between the EU and Ukraine and Moldova. These are notably lacking in the electricity sector. The implementation of these projects will be important for electricity trade between the EU and neighbouring countries, which could strengthen the energy sovereignty of both the EU and its eastern neighbours. At the same time, it is in the interest of the EU and member states that progressive integration, for example in the sphere of electricity markets, is carried out under fair competition conditions between EU players and companies from Ukraine and Moldova. Contribute to security of energy supply Although the EU’s own raw material potential is limited, some countries have resources that could be used to meet part of the needs of the eastern neighbourhood countries. Romania, which has among the most energy resources in Europe, could play a particularly important role in this context. Its gas resources on the Black Sea shelf are estimated at 80-200 billion m3, which would allow it to secure its own needs for about 20 years or, in the medium term, act as an alternative to Russian supplies to other countries in the region, such as Moldova. When it comes to electricity production, Romania boasts a diversified energy mix and a well-developed network of interconnections with neighbouring countries that can operate in two directions (for import and export purposes). Due to its location, Romania could also play the role of a transit country for the transmission of energy resources (for example, gas via the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline) or electricity from third countries. EU member states should support Ukraine in continuing to diversify its nuclear fuel supply sources. Those that have nuclear power in their own energy mixes, including Bulgaria, France, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden, can provide logistical support for the transport of nuclear fuel from alternative sources, and be partners for enhancing cooperation in the nuclear sphere after the end of the war. The so-called nuclear alliance that has emerged in the EU under the informal leadership of France could be useful in this regard, supporting partnerships with Ukraine to implement joint nuclear projects. Improve eastern neighbours’ energy efficiency In its external energy policy strategy, the EU calls for energy saving and energy efficiency to become priorities on a global scale. It should therefore support neighbouring countries to improve energy efficiency. As postulated, among others, by participants in the Green Deal Ukraine project, the EU and its member states should help their eastern neighbours to develop robust standards for energy efficiency and building materials for both new and renovated buildings, spanning residential and non-residential sectors and the entire construction process. These standards should include monitoring energy efficiency for components and the building process to align with evolving EU efficiency regulations, promoting sustainable practices and long-term decarbonisation goals. Increase investments in the region Energy should become one of the key areas of cooperation to strengthen Moldova’s and Ukraine’s sovereignty and thus their resistance to aggressive, destabilising actions by Russia. Although the EU has so far provided significant financial assistance to Ukraine and Moldova, both directly and in cooperation with European financial institutions, the scale of the needs (especially in Ukraine) requires further efforts in this area. Investment either directly by the EU or by companies from EU countries in Ukraine’s RES sector, the hydrogen corridor, or Ukraine’s gas infrastructure could strengthen EU energy sovereignty by ensuring a secure supply of clean electricity or gas supplies, which will still be needed by EU countries over at least the next decade. To this end, the EU should make use of and provide organisational and expert support for recently created instruments such as AidEnergy – an electronic platform established in March 2023, whereby the EBRD in partnership with other donors and international financial institutions and the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy create a centralised list of energy sector needs. The platform is intended not only to identify the current needs of the Ukrainian energy sector, but also more long-term needs. Considering the long-term investment needs of Ukraine’s energy sector, the EU could also provide support through financial guarantees for the most strategic projects. EU member states and institutions should also continue efforts to confiscate frozen Russian assets, which could be used for the reconstruction of Ukraine, including investments in the energy sector. The law adopted by the EU in February 2024 to set aside windfall profits made on frozen Russian central bank assets is a move in a right direction in this regard. Acknowledgments The author would like to thank experts and people working in the energy sector in institutions and companies in Poland, but also in Ukraine, Slovakia, and Germany, for discussions on the topic covered in this policy brief. Special thanks are also due to those who provided comments on the first version of the text, in particular Susi Dennison. The author would particularly like to thank Flora Bell for her pleasant and fruitful collaboration in editing the final version of the text, especially for her very valuable suggestions, questions, and comments. Thanks are also due to Nastassia Zenovich for the beautiful graphics included in the text. References [1] https://ecfr.eu/publication/energising-eastern-europe-how-the-eu-can-enhance-energy-sovereignty-through-cooperation-with-ukraine-and-moldova/#_ftnref1 Argus Eurasia Energy (https://www.argusmedia.com/en), weekly report, by subscription, 23 February 2023. [2] https://ecfr.eu/publication/energising-eastern-europe-how-the-eu-can-enhance-energy-sovereignty-through-cooperation-with-ukraine-and-moldova/#_ftnref2 Ibid. [3] https://ecfr.eu/publication/energising-eastern-europe-how-the-eu-can-enhance-energy-sovereignty-through-cooperation-with-ukraine-and-moldova/#_ftnref3 Ibid. [4] https://ecfr.eu/publication/energising-eastern-europe-how-the-eu-can-enhance-energy-sovereignty-through-cooperation-with-ukraine-and-moldova/#_ftnref4 Argus Eurasia Energy (https://www.argusmedia.com/en), weekly report, by subscription, 22 January 2024. This policy brief was first published on 11 March by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In October 2023, the EU Commission identified four technology fields as critical: advanced semiconductors; artificial intelligence (AI); quantum, and; biotechnologies.[1] All four areas are greatly impacted by the U.S.-China rivalry in technology, making it essential for Europeans to understand the Sino-American competition. This article examines this rivalry from the Chinese and U.S. perspectives. It recounts their prevailing attitudes, which are shaped by recent events, and that, in turn, mold Chinese and American strategic approaches. From the Chinese policymakers’ perspective, its geo-technological competition with the U.S. is novel and passively learned. During Xi Jinping’s first term, the Chinese government still positioned technology under the economic-oriented strategy of innovation-driven development. This stance followed the idea that ‘science and technology constitute a primary productive force’ and the ‘peaceful development’ principles set during Deng Xiaoping’s era. However, around 2018, two sanctions incidents that targeted Chinese telecommunications giants shifted Chinese leaders’ understanding of tech strategy into the geopolitical context. The first sanction incident involved ZTE, China’s second-largest communications equipment manufacturer. In 2016, the Barack Obama administration accused ZTE of selling telecom equipment containing American chip technology to Iran, which violated U.S. sanctions. In 2017, ZTE pleaded guilty and paid a fine of $1.2 billion. However, in 2018, Trump’s government stated that ZTE did not comply with the settlement agreement, coupling previous sanctions with export controls on ZTE in April 2018. The second incident involved Meng Wanzhou, then Vice-Chairwoman and CFO of the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, who was arrested in Vancouver, Canada, during a layover in December 2018. Her detention was at the extradition request of the Trump administration, which levied charges related to alleged violations of U.S. sanctions against Iran. These included bank and wire fraud and outright violations of U.S. sanctions via a subsidiary called Skycom Tech, which allegedly concealed Huawei’s activities in Iran. The necessity of a strategic adjustment These two incidents caused an uproar in the Chinese media, followed by a surge in public patriotic sentiment. However, for the Chinese government, the impact and significance of the two cases were quite different. The essence of the ZTE case was commercial sanctions, which meant that ZTE violated business norms and deserved economic punishment. The official Chinese government stance was that ‘this is just an individual case of corporate violation.’ Despite this position, the fact that the government was actively involved nonetheless politicized the incident within China. It was Xi Jinping himself who negotiated with Trump to save ZTE from bankruptcy after which ZTE became a state-owned enterprise with absolute state control—a move that ultimately resulted in ZTE gaining a greater domestic market share than Huawei. At the international level, the top-level nature of negotiations prevented the ZTE incident from overly politicizing then-ongoing trade frictions between the U.S. and China. While the ZTE episode was resolved with little rancor, Chinese senior officials became concerned about the impact that the U.S. might have on China’s strategic technology companies.[2] In November 2018, Tan Tieniu, then Deputy Secretary-General of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, reported to China’s top leaders that they should learn from the ZTE incident. They should avoid overreliance on imports of core electronic components and chips, and they should not repeat mistakes made by ZTE. In the same month, Xi Jinping mentioned in a speech that ‘internationally, advanced technology and key technology is more and more difficult to obtain… forcing us to travel the road of self-reliance.’ Terms like technological security, technology ‘chokepoints’ (卡脖子), and core technologies in key fields (关键核心技术) began to appear frequently in Chinese official discourse. These reflected Chinese leadership’s views about the ZTE incident that were in turn shaping strategic thoughts on the geopolitical technology competition with the United States. It was the Meng Wanzhou incident at the end of 2018 that for Chinese leaders confirmed the necessity of a strategic adjustment. As in the ZTE case, Huawei was involved in a business violation that from the Chinese perspective should have resulted in corporate punishment. Instead, a personal arrest warrant was issued for Meng, thereby escalating a commercial sanction into a political and diplomatic incident. Le Yucheng, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, urgently summoned the U.S. and Canadian ambassadors to China and issued a stern protest. The Chinese government also arrested two Canadian citizens in China, sentencing one to 11 years in prison. The Chinese Ambassador to Canada wrote that the Meng Wanzhou case was a ‘premeditated political act in which the United States wields its regime power to hunt a Chinese high-tech company out of political consideration.’ Chinese Defensive Deterrence These two episodes shaped and reinforced Chinese leaders’ strategic thinking about its geopolitical technology competition with the U.S. The 14th Five-Year Plan issued by the CCP in 2020 proposed ‘making technological self-reliance’ a strategic goal. Soon all official documents established a new tone for China’s technology strategy based on self-reliance. Previously, China pursued a reassurance strategy, a strategy that showed goodwill towards the U.S. and the system it led. Thus, in theory, China had two strategic options: reassurance and/or deterrence. The former strategy involves showing friendliness towards the U.S. and its allies, thereby releasing tension, and maybe re-joining the U.S.-led system. A reassurance strategy allowed China more time for stable development—the logic of ‘keeping a low profile’ of the Deng Xiaoping era. The Xi Jinping government picked the second option, deterrence, which is to show strength or use countermeasures to reduce the likelihood of further U.S. trade or coercive action. To make a deterrence strategy work, however, Xi further believed China needed to gain strong capacity in key tech fields. Therefore, Xi first mobilized domestic R&D resources and tried to acquire advanced technologies before using diplomatic countermeasures. The core logic underlying this geopolitical technology strategy is one of ‘defensive deterrence.’ A typical example of this strategy in play concerns the semiconductor industry. Facing export controls on semiconductor equipment from the U.S., the Netherlands, and Japan, the Chinese government first increased R&D investment in the sector, trying to overcome ‘chokepoint’ technologies. As a result, China’s investment in semiconductor R&D grew from $10 billion in 2018 to $25 billion in 2022, an increase of 150%. At the same time, the Chinese government increased investment in the production of key raw materials (silicon, gallium nitride, etc.) and semiconductor production bases. It also guided industries upstream while also pushing for downstream integration through policies to improve and strengthen supply-chain security. Chinese policy also moved to increase international supply-chain dependence on China through its comparative advantages in the semiconductor industry (and even other industries) in a hedging move against the U.S. and its allies. For example, in the automotive chip sector, in the supply of vital raw materials, and in the semiconductor equipment markets, China sought to utilize its significant comparative advantages. In August 2023, the Chinese government announced export controls on gallium and germanium, two key materials for manufacturing semiconductors. China Seeking More Regulatory Power But in addition to responding to what was perceived as U.S. containment policies in the area of technology, China’s strategic use of technology followed another approach, one led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). This third approach sought more regulatory power, for example, in the areas of civilian AI where China has huge potential.[3] Starting in 2018, the Chinese government showed a strong determination to introduce and study AI ethics and technical standards.[4] Based on these domestic framework policies, various diplomatic initiatives, and standards proposals, the MFA and MIIT expanded China’s regulatory influence in the field of AI. For example, the MFA proposed the ‘Global Data Security Initiative’ in 2020 and the ‘Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative’ in 2023. Minister Wang Yi explicitly stated ‘We hope to provide a blueprint for related international discussions and rule-making.’ The China Electronics Standardization Institute, affiliated with the MIIT, also actively participates in the formulation of international new technology standards. Selectively decoupling: U.S. Attitudes and Strategies When it comes to strategic technologies, the Joe Biden administration has generally maintained a stance toward China that aligns closely with the previous administration led by Donald J. Trump. This is especially the case concerning competitive technologies such as 5G/6G, the specialized processors designed to handle the computational demands of AI, quantum computing, and electric vehicles (EVs). Taking a page from U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s Cold War playbook of outspending the Soviet Union, president Biden initiated a $2.25 trillion infrastructure plan. This plan, not unlike China’s policy to increase domestic innovation and strength, allocated funds for sectors such as transportation, manufacturing, renewable energy, clean water, and high-speed broadband for both wired and wireless technologies. The justification for these investments, part of the Build Back Better Act (BBB) policy and later incorporated into the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act, was that they were a response to Xi Jinping’s ambitious goals of doubling China’s economy by 2035, intending to establish China as a global leader in biotechnology, green energy, and AI. In addition to a spending strategy to boost U.S. competitiveness in strategic technologies, the Biden administration continued with some of Trump’s punitive measures. For example, Biden maintained tariffs amounting to approximately $300 billion. He also continued action against Huawei, which has the potential to outcompete in 5G/6G mobile network technology. The Trump administration used the Bureau of Industry and Security to exclude Huawei from global semiconductor supply chains and it placed the company on the Commerce Department’s Entity List, thus requiring U.S. companies to obtain a license before exporting to Huawei. As discussed above, Trump’s executive branch also brought fraud allegations against Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer Meng. While Biden kept in place Trump-era prohibitions on sales of U.S. goods to companies like Huawei, as well as maintaining restrictions on exports of U.S. critical technology, he did quickly resolve the dispute over Meng. Within hours of the deal for her release, the two men caught up in the game of hostage diplomacy left China on a flight back to Canada. Highlighting the political nature of the incident, when Meng returned to China, senior local officials at the airport met her. Encourage Multilateralism to meet Global Challenges Along with strident measures, the Biden administration also sought a more nuanced stance. Indications that suggest a less hawkish approach to China include emphasizing a collaborative approach toward global challenges like climate change and future pandemics. Biden further pushed for engagement in high-level meetings with, for example, Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, and National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, who held talks with their Chinese counterparts, Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi, in Anchorage, Alaska, in March 2021. These talks were frostier than U.S. officials would have preferred but they got the two sides to engage in some dialogue. Similarly, Biden sought to engage with China in multilateral forums and organizations where both countries are members, such as the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that Biden hosted in November 2023. Even the choice of San Francisco as the venue was designed to be conciliatory as it has historic ties to Asia as well as a central role in global technology as the home of Silicon Valley. Still, one must keep in mind that in deciding on a strategy towards China, Biden must also contend with a Congress and public opinion that are growing increasingly skeptical of doing business with China, which they believe steals good jobs and sends balloons over American territory to spy on U.S. critical infrastructure. One primary shaper of U.S. attitudes towards China are the leaders of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, Republican Representative Mike Gallagher and Democratic Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi, who lead one of the last bastions of functioning bipartisanship in Washington, D.C. With their many investigations, subpoenas, and policy recommendations, the House China Committee has become the ‘beating heart’ of U.S. Congressional policy, which, with regards to technology, argues for selectively decoupling from China for national security reasons.[5] A way forward Faced with the U.S.’ decoupling or blunting strategies and China’s defensive deterrence strategy, what steps might European nations take to navigate through the choppy, contentious waters of strategic technologies? Are there also steps that Europeans can take to mitigate the impact on their own strategic technology vulnerability? First, recognizing the pivotal role of technology in the rapidly digitizing global economy, Europeans need to stress that it is in the collective interest of everyone to establish institutions, norms, and policies for effective global governance. Rather than engaging in reactive geopolitical maneuvers resembling a chess game, these institutions could concentrate on constructing a more cooperative foundation for crucial technology sectors. Second, along with this recognition, efforts could be directed toward the development of future institutions, policies, and norms that set standards for next-generation and sensitive technologies. Such efforts should take into account initiatives already made by the Chinese and the Americans. Such efforts could also coincide with a third approach of encouraging the Biden administration to adopt a comprehensive multilateral approach. The U.S. needs to push for collaboration beyond issues such as climate change and economic inequality to encompass the intensely competitive areas in technology like those discussed in this article. For one, Europeans could point out that U.S. blunting strategies are simply not working and may even be backfiring by accelerating Chinese technological advances. In September 2023, Huawei released the Mate 60 Pro smartphone equipped with a 7nm domestic chip, revealing that China has overcome some hurdles that U.S. bans were designed to stymie.[6] Since no one knows how long China’s defensive deterrence strategy will hold (and shift to what Chinese leaders believe is a more offensive deterrence), nor whether Trump or someone as equally anti-multilateral as Trump will be (re)elected, Europeans have many incentives to encourage a softer engagement between China and the U.S. Changing the narrative is a fourth important recommendation. It is essential to recognize that the essence of the Sino-American technology competition is more about narrative construction than a description of the current situation. One indication of this is that both sides believe that the other side started what has been described as the ‘new Cold War.’[7] It does not help that both sides have engaged in behavior that supports the other side’s narrative with some hawkish actors employing similar bash-the-other tactics to gain political advantage.[8] Typically, the factual basis for technological competition is grounded in industrial competition, corporate rivalry, or intellectual property disputes. However, the high-tech relationship between China and the United States has been one of complementarity as well as rivalry. Both China and the United States, as well as European stakeholders, need to be careful of the narratives they espouse, lest they become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This work has been funded by the REMIT project, funded from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 101094228 Footnotes [1] EU Commission Recommendation of 3.10.2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States. [2] Gregory C. Allen. 2023. ‘China’s New Strategy for Waging the Microchip Tech War.’ csis.org, May 3. [3] Jing Cheng and Jinghan Zeng. 2023. ‘Shaping AI’s Future? China in Global AI Governance.’ Journal of Contemporary China 32(143): 794-810. [4] See White Paper on AI Standardization, a Guide to the Building of a National Standard Framework for New Generation AI, a report on Ethical Norms for New Generation AI, a White Paper on Trustworthy AI as well as other regulatory documents. [5] Robbie Gramer. 2023. ‘The Masterminds: Washington wants to get tough on China, and the leaders of the House China Committee are in the driver’s seat.’ foreignpolicy.com, November 27. [6] Weiwen Wang. (2023). ‘China Breaks Through 7nm Chip Technology, Has the China-U.S. Tech War Entered Phase 2.0?’ (中国突破7纳米芯片技术 中美科技战进入2.0阶段？). Lianhe Zaobao (联合早报), September 17. Retrieved from https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20230917-1433739 [7] Patricia M. Kim, Matthew Turpin, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Jessica Chen Weiss, Eun A Jo, Ryan Hass, and Emilie Kimball. 2023. ‘Should the US pursue a new Cold War with China?’ Brookings.edu, September 1. [8] Roberta N. Haar. 2020. ‘Will China replace the U.S. as the world’s predominant power?’ Atlantisch Perspectief 44(3):9-13.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Political loyalty to PT-led governments has garnered support among the poorest. However, the Brazilian center-left has lost its hegemony over its social base. Can Bolsonaro return to power in 2026? Yes, he could. We must consider the existence of powerful objective and subjective factors to explain the resilience of the far right, even after the defeat of the semi-insurrection in January 2023. But, first of all, it is wise to recognize the international context of the phenomenon, in which the far right plays an instrumental role: (a) the turbulence in the system of states with the strengthening of China and the strategy of U.S. imperialism to preserve the supremacy of the Troika, for which a tougher protectionist orientation is useful; (b) the disputes caused by the emergence of the environmental crisis and the energy transition, which temporarily disadvantage those who decarbonize more quickly; (c) the shift of bourgeois factions towards the defense of authoritarian regimes that face popular protest and embrace a national-imperialist line; (d) the trend towards economic stagnation and the impoverishment and rightward shift of the middle classes; (e) the faltering crisis of the left, among others. But there are Brazilian peculiarities in the political fragmentation of the country. These are essentially five: (i) the hegemony among the military and the police; (ii) the gravitation of the vast majority of Pentecostal evangelicals towards the far right; (iii) the weight of the Bolsonarism in the most developed regions, the Southeast and South of the country, especially among the new middle-class property owners, or those with very high levels of education who hold executive positions in the private and public sectors; (iv) the leadership of the neo-fascist current within the far right; (v) the support base of the far right among the salaried middle classes with wages between three and five or even up to seven minimum wages. The first four peculiarities have been widely researched, but the last one less so. Studying it is strategic because it may be the only one possible to reverse in the context of a very unfavorable situation of still reactionary social power relations. There are objective factors that explain the distancing, division, or political separation between parts of the working class and the poorest, such as the inflation of private education and health plans, and the increase in income tax, which are threats to a model of consumption and living standard, and subjective factors, such as social resentment and moral-ideological rancor. Both are intertwined and may even be indivisible. But that was not the case when the final phase of the struggle against the dictatorship began, forty-five years ago. The PT was born, supported by metalworkers, public school teachers, oil workers, bankers, and other categories who, compared to the reality of the masses, had more education and better salaries. Lulism, or political loyalty to the experience of PT-led governments, allowed for support among the poorest. However, the left, although it maintains its positions, has lost hegemony over its original mass social base. This tragic reality, due to the fracture of the working class, requires that we analyze it from a historical perspective. The post-war period (1945-1981) of intense growth, during which GDP doubled every decade, and which favored absolute social mobility in Brazil, accompanying accelerated urbanization, seems to have irretrievably passed. Full employment and increased schooling, in a country where half of the active population was illiterate, were the two key factors in improving the lives of this layer of workers. But they no longer exert the same pressure as in the past. It is clear that in the last decade, Brazilian capitalism has lost momentum. It lost 7% of its GDP between 2015/17 and, after the Covid pandemic in 2020/21, it took three years to return to the 2019 levels. Despite all the anti-social counter-reforms - labor, social security - aimed at reducing production costs, the investment rate did not exceed 18% of GDP in 2023, despite the authorization of the Transitional Proposed Constitutional Amendment (PEC) to breach the Public Spending Ceiling. Brazil, the largest industrial park, and consumer market for durable goods in the periphery, has become a nation of slow growth. The increase in schooling has ceased to be such a powerful driving factor. Improving life has become much more difficult. The Brazil of 2024 is a less poor country than in the 20th century, but not less unjust. Of course, there is still a lot of poverty: tens of millions or even more continue suffering from food insecurity, despite the ‘Bolsa Familia’, depending on the economic cycle. But there has been a reduction in extreme poverty without a qualitative reduction in social inequality. The functional distribution of income between capital and labor has experienced variations in the margin. The personal income distribution improved between 2003 and 2014, but it has increased again since 2015/16, following the institutional coup against Dilma Rousseff's government. Extreme poverty has decreased, but half of the economically active population earns no more than two minimum wages. A third of wage earners earn between three and five minimum wages. Inequality has remained almost intact because, among other reasons, the position of middle-income wage earners with higher levels of education has stagnated with a downward bias. Numerous studies confirm that the increase in average schooling is not related to employability, and IBGE surveys paradoxically confirm that unemployment is higher as schooling increases. Most of the millions of jobs created since the end of the pandemic have been for people earning up to two minimum wages, with very low educational requirements. To assess the greater or lesser social cohesion of a country, two mobility rates are considered: absolute and relative. The absolute rate compares the occupation of the parent and the child, or the first activity of each one with their last job. The relative mobility rate checks to what extent the obstacles to accessing jobs - or opportunities for study - that favor social advancement could or could not be overcome by those in a lower social position. In Brazil, both the absolute and relative mobility rates were positive until the 1980s, but the former was more intense than the latter. In other words, we experienced intense social mobility in the post-war period due to the pressure of urbanization and internal migration, from the Northeast to the Southeast, and from the South to the Midwest. But this is no longer the case. This historical stage ended in the 1990s when the flow from the agrarian world was exhausted. Since then, poverty has decreased, but middle-class workers have experienced a more hostile reality. What explains this process is that the social mobility trajectories of the last twenty years have benefited millions of people who lived in extreme poverty, but very few have ascended significantly. Many have improved their lives, but they have only ascended to the step immediately above to the one occupied by their parents. Relative social mobility has remained very low because the material incentives to increase schooling have been lower in the last forty years than they were for the generation that reached adulthood in the fifties or sixties. The rewards that families receive for keeping their children out of work for at least twelve years until they finish high school have decreased compared to the previous generation, despite the greater ease of access. A country may start from a situation of great social inequality, but if social mobility is intense, social inequality should decrease, increasing social cohesion, as happened in post-war Italy. Conversely, a country that had low social inequality compared to its neighbors occupying a similar position in the world may see its situation deteriorate if social mobility becomes regressive, as is evident in present-day France. In Brazil, contrary to what is commonly thought, most of the new jobs in the last ten years have not benefited the most educated sector of the population. Studying more has not reduced the risk of unemployment. In the forty-five years since 1979, average schooling has increased from three to over eight years. But two transformations have occurred that have had a lasting impact on the consciousness of the working youth. The first is that Brazilian capitalism is no longer a society of full employment, as it had been for half a century. The second is that, even with the sacrifices made by families to keep their children studying and delaying their entry into the labor market, employability has concentrated in activities that require little schooling and offer low wages. For the first time in history, children have lost hope of living better than their parents. Unemployment among those with higher education is proportionally higher than among those with lower education, and if the inequality of personal incomes has decreased in the last fifteen years, it is because the average salary of those with middle and higher education has been decreasing. The dizzying expansion of uberization is not surprising. The monthly employment surveys by IBGE in the São Paulo metropolitan region indicate a very slow evolution that, at best, only approximates the recovery of inflation. Nearly forty years after the end of the military dictatorship, the economic and social balance of the liberal democracy regime is discouraging. The reforms carried out by the regime, such as expanding access to public education, implementing the SUS (Unified Health System), the ‘Bolsa Familia’ for the extremely poor, among others, were progressive but insufficient to reduce social inequality. The hypothesis that a more educated population would gradually change the political reality of the country, driving a sustainable cycle of economic growth and income distribution, has not been confirmed. One form of gradualist illusion in the perspective of social justice within the limits of capitalism was the hope that a more educated population would gradually change the social reality of the country. This brings us to the limits of the coalition governments led by the PT, which bet on conciliation with the ruling class to regulate “wild" capitalism. Although there are long-term correlations between schooling and economic growth, no direct effects that are incontrovertible have been identified, even less so if we include the variable of reducing social inequality, as confirmed by South Korea What is incontrovertible is that the Brazilian bourgeoisie was united in 2016 to overthrow the government of Dilma Rousseff, despite the moderation of the reforms carried out. It should not surprise us that the ruling class had no qualms about going to the extreme of manipulating the impeachment, subverting the rules of the regime to take power for their direct representatives, such as Michel Temer. The challenge is to explain why the working class was not willing to fight to defend it. At the beginning of the 1990s, wages represented more than half of the national wealth, and in the last thirty years, they fell to just over 40% in 1999. Despite the recovery between 2004 and 2010, they still remain below the 50% level of 2014. This variable is significant for an assessment of the evolution of social inequality because Brazil in 2024 is a society that has already completed the historical transition from rural to urban (86% of the population lives in cities), and the majority of those under contract, 38 million with labor contracts and 13 million civil servants, receive salaries. Another ten million have an employer but no contract. It is true that there are still 25 million Brazilians who live off self-employment, but they proportionally fewer than in the past [ii]. In summary, the functional distribution of income between capital and labor has not improved. The bourgeoisie has no reason to complain about the liberal regime. Nevertheless, a fraction of the bourgeoisie, such as agroindustry and others, supports neo-fascism and its authoritarian strategy. The data indicating that social inequality has decreased among wage earners is convincing. But not because injustice has decreased, although misery has. This process has occurred because there have been two opposing trends in the labor market. One is relatively new, and the other is older. The first was the rise in wage floors for less skilled and less organized sectors. The minimum wage has been increasing above devaluation slowly but steadily since 1994 with the introduction of the real, accelerating during the years of the Lula and Dilma Rousseff governments. This is a new phenomenon, as the opposite had occurred in the previous fifteen years. The minimum wage is a key economic variable because it is the floor for INSS pensions, which is why the bourgeoisie demands it to be delinked. The economic recovery favored by the global cycle of increased demand for commodities allowed unemployment to fall from the second half of 2005, culminating in 2014 in a situation of almost full employment. The widespread distribution of the ‘Bolsa Familia’ also appears to have exerted pressure on the remuneration of manual labor, especially in less industrialized regions. The second trend was the continued decline in the remuneration of jobs that require middle and higher education, a process that had been occurring since the 1980s. In conclusion, the available data suggest that increasing schooling is no longer a significant factor in social upward mobility, as it was in the past. The political loyalty of the popular masses to Lulism is an expression of the first phenomenon. The lives of the poorest improved during the years of PT governments. The division among wage earners earning more than two minimum wages expresses a social resentment that has been manipulated by Bolsonarism. If the left does not regain confidence in this sector of the workforce, the danger for 2026 is significant. Jacobinlat The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As Beijing’s investment approach to Latin America focuses on industries of strategic importance, the EU and US will need to contend with growing Chinese competition China is pouring less foreign direct investment (FDI) into Latin America. But while this may seem like a sign of Beijing’s disinterest in the region, data suggests that Chinese companies are simply recalibrating, not retreating. In doing so, they are becoming important players in sectors key to Western interests: critical minerals, fintech, electric vehicles, and green energy. While the European Union and the United States have long been top investors in Latin America, increased competition with Chinese investment now jeopardises their interests in the Latin American industries that will become most crucial to the digital and green transitions. The number of Chinese projects in Latin America grew by 33 per cent from 2018-2023, compared with the previous five-year period of 2013-2017, even as the total value declined. In other words, Chinese companies are making more investments in the region but are pursuing smaller-scale projects on average. These investments are also more focused on what China calls “new infrastructure“ (新基建), a term which encompasses telecommunications, fintech, renewable energy, and other innovation-related industries. In 2022, 60 per cent of China’s investments were in these frontier sectors, a key economic priority for the country. Beijing also views smaller projects in these industries as incurring less operational and reputational risk, especially compared to some of the large-scale infrastructure investment projects often associated with the Belt and Road initiative. Like China, the investment priorities of the G7 grouping – particularly the US and the EU – are centring on critical minerals, fintech, electric vehicles, and green energy as they aim to grow and reinforce existing economic and political partnerships in Latin America. However, both the US and the EU risk falling short of China’s investment strategy in the region. The US has signalled want for greater economic engagement with the region, especially in sectors of strategic interest. However, to date, US efforts to compete with China remain largely focused on building US domestic capacity in these strategic sectors, even as some US companies, such as Intel, are increasingly focused on including regional partners in their supply chains. Some see opportunity for Latin America in Joe Biden’s landmark legislation, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which is aimed at incentivising the energy transition while also de-risking critical supply chains. For example, certain countries in the region may benefit from preferential market access for their lithium or other key inputs to new energy and technology supply chains. However, the reach of the IRA – which remains a largely domestic policy – does not stretch as far as China’s current investment reshuffle. The Americas Act, announced by members of Congress in March could generate promising new investment opportunities for the region, as it encourages US companies and others to move their operations out of China, to which Latin America stands as a promising replacement. But Americas Act reshoring would primarily incentivise textiles and potentially medical equipment manufacturing, with less overall focus on the range of “new infrastructure” industries that China is prioritising. Chinese interests in information and communication technologies reveal a similar story. While the US has focused its policy on 5G equipment sales, China is undertaking a process of vertical integration in Latin American tech sectors that will dramatically boost its competitiveness. For instance, Chinese company Huawei is rapidly expanding its focus to include data centres, cloud computing, cybersecurity, and other services, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. (Computing accounted for a sizable 41 per cent of total Chinese information technology investment in the region between 2018 and the first half of 2023.) At the same time, Global Gateway, the EU’s proposal for a global investment initiative is yet to reach its potential in the region. Brussels is looking to be Latin America’s partner of choice by building local capacity for making batteries and final products like electric vehicles, as European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen noted last year. Yet even as the EU signals renewed commitment, China is becoming increasingly dominant in the electric vehicle market in Latin America and other regions. China surpassed the US in electric vehicle sales in 2023, with Chinese companies accounting for 45 per cent of total global sales and three times that of Germany’s. What is more, China has invested $11 billion in lithium extraction in the region since 2018, as part of a bid to control a third of global lithium-mine production capacity. Meanwhile the EU has secured some access to lithium as part of trade deals with Chile, alongside other nations, but this pales in comparison to what will be required to fuel the future of EU battery production. Latin America as a whole accounts for an estimated 60 per cent of the world’s lithium reserves. Based on its current levels of engagement in the region, the EU risks falling short of lithium, stalling its battery production and subsequently, its electric vehicle sales, just as China advances in this field. The window is closing for the EU, the US, and other partners looking to both maintain market share and compete with China in these Latin American industries, despite still-high rates of US and EU investment in and trade with the region. Indeed, US automakers increasingly see Chinese competition across the globe as an “extinction-level event.” Ensuring competitiveness in “new infrastructure” and related sectors will require a continuous commitment by partners to building and supporting project pipelines, and to delivering products and services at price points that can compete with China’s subsidised offerings. Both the EU and the US remain critical economic partners for Latin America and are contributing in ways that China is not. Still, complacency risks allowing China to take the lead in emerging industries in the region, some of which weigh heavily in the EU’s green and digital transformation. To protect their own future industries, the EU and the US need to first take a longer look at Latin America’s – especially as China vies for a dominant position.

Please note that this article is only available in English. Abstract: During the peak of the Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic, some states imposed export bans on medical goods to prevent their exportation during the emergency situation brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the manner in which this policy was applied caused much discontent especially between neighbouring countries and allies, particularly due to the confiscation of pre-ordered goods destined for countries also experiencing a crisis situation. This paper analyses the rise of inter-state tensions due to export bans at the peak of the pandemic and calls for the need to revise the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) export bans framework which currently contains a number of gaps exacerbating the problem and leaving a legal gap. The paper discusses those gaps in the WTO’s legal framework and highlights the areas in need of revision to avoid repeating the troubles of the past pandemic. Introduction Faced with political pressure and an extraordinary situation during the Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic, some countries resorted to the use of export bans as a tool to ensure that they have enough medical supplies for their population. However, their use of export bans also involved the confiscation of medical goods destined for delivery to their neighbours and allies. Such behaviour provoked discontent among those states expecting the delivery of their ordered medical supplies which were urgently needed as the death-toll from Covid-19 was sharply rising. This article starts by explaining the instances where confiscations using export bans occurred, namely between the United States and Germany, the US and Barbados as well as France and the United Kingdom. The paper also discusses the ‘near misses’ involving some European states where the export bans were initially used to confiscate the goods of other European countries, but then those goods were ultimately allowed to be delivered abroad to their delivery location. The discussion then shifts to the international legal framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) governing the use of export bans and then shows how this legal framework is flawed in certain areas as it contains some gaps that may be exploited for conducting unconstrained confiscation operations. An overview of existing studies on export bans then reveals that this policy is already harmful in several ways (Evenett 2020a; Bown 2020; Barichello 2020). The article then ends with a concluding discussion emphasising how export bans are particularly harmful when used in relation to pre-ordered goods and reiterating the need for a revised WTO legal framework on export bans. Incidents of confiscations using export bans The three incidents below all occurred during the peak of the covid pandemic in 2020 when countries faced life and death situations. The three cases also involved the use of export bans to justify the confiscation of medical goods pre-ordered by other states. US vs Germany This incident occurred on 3rd April 2020 involving the United States and Germany (Crump 2020). This particular event captured a lot of media attention and included the release of high-level statements from both sides, with accusations of “modern piracy” being directed towards the US (BBC 2020a). The main issue here was that approximately 200,000 N95 masks that Germany had ordered for its police force were diverted to the United States (Selinger 2020). The masks shipment dispatched from China from an American company was diverted to the US during a transfer between planes in Thailand (Selinger 2020). Germany stated that the masks were confiscated in Bangkok by American officials and that those masks were ordered from a US producer (Crump 2020; DW 2020). The next day, the US company 3M denied Germany’s claims and told a German news agency that it did not have any paperwork regarding a shipment for Germany (DW 2020). However, Germany had made it clear on 3rd April that it had ordered and paid for those urgently needed masks from a US company (Berlin 2020). In fact, Germany referred to earlier accusations made by French officials against the US for buying France’s masks in China and added that “the U.S. administration has obliged the American conglomerate 3M by law to supply the U.S. with as many N95 respiratory masks as possible, such as those used in hospitals” and that “the group also manufactures in China” (Berlin 2020a). Significantly, the media was already reporting how the American company 3M “has been prohibited from exporting its medical products to other countries under a Korean-War-era law invoked by President Donald Trump” (BBC 2020a). The BBC (2020a) added that “on Friday [3rd April], Mr Trump said he was using the Defence Production Act (DPA) to demand that US firms provide more medical supplies to meet domestic demand”. Zooming in on Trump’s official statements during the Coronavirus Task Force Press Briefing reveals significant information when he stated that:  I’m also signing a directive invoking the Defense Production Act to prohibit export of scarce health and medical supplies by unscrupulous actors and profiteers. The security and Secretary — the Secretary of Homeland Security will work with FEMA to prevent the export of N95 respirators, surgical masks, gloves, and other personal protective equipment. We need these items immediately for domestic use. We have to have them. […] We’ve already leveraged the DPA to stop the hoarding and price gouging of crucial supplies. Under that authority, this week, the Department of Health and Human Services, working with the Department of Justice, took custody of nearly 200,000 N95 respirators, 130,000 surgical masks, 600,000 gloves, as well as bottles — many, many, many bottles — and disinfectant sprays that were being hoarded (Whitehouse 2020, emphasis added).  Trump’s statements are important because they include the significant number of 200,000. Although Trump did not specify where those 200,000 N95 were confiscated from, the number remains important (BBC 2020a); it is the same number of masks that Germany reported. More importantly, the official statement also supports the fact that the DPA was used as a tool for confiscating goods. Trump’s statements describe these good as being ‘hoarded’ prior to their confiscation, however, the statements from Germany’s side indicate that those masks were intended for the German people. As significant as Trump’s statements were the ones made by Berlin’s Interior Senator who blamed the US for the confiscation of the N95 masks (DW 2020). In fact, he stated that:  We consider this an act of modern piracy. This is not how you deal with transatlantic partners. Even in times of global crisis, there should be no wild west methods. I urge the federal government to urge the United States to comply with international rules (Berlin 2020b; BBC 2020a).  As such, this incident saw direct statements from the German side, indicating that Germany saw the US’ behavior as deviating from international rules. Yet despite Trump’s statements in the press briefing, he directly addressed the German incident, denying the claims by saying that “there has been no act of piracy” (Crump 2020). Similarly, the spokeswoman for the American embassy in Bangkok denied that the US had knowledge of the mask shipment bound for Germany (Tanakasempipat 2020). Despite the US’ constant denial of state involvement, it remains a fact that an order of 200,000 masks destined for Germany was never delivered. Moreover, at no point did the developments mention non-state entities, but rather, the discourse had remained solely at the inter-state level and the main issue for discussion was the US’ use of the Defence Production Act to secure vital medical goods. US vs Barbados On the 5th of April, Barbados was brought into the picture when 20 ventilators donated to Barbados by a Philanthropist where “barred from exportation” by the US government (Barbados Today 2020). Moreover, as stated by the Barbadian Health and Wellness minister, these ventilators were already “paid for” (Barbados Today 2020). In explaining this incident, the Health minister clarified that “it has to do with export restrictions being placed on certain items” (Connell 2020). Thus, the Barbados incident was another instance where export bans were used as the justification for confiscating important medical supplies that were destined for another country. As for the US’ response to this incident, The Miami Herald wrote that a State department spokesperson’s email response “seemed to suggest that some previous media reports about seized medical exports may not be accurate” (Charles 2020). However, given that this is an incident relating to a Caribbean Island whose relations with the US are far from hostile, it is unlikely that this confiscation incident was characterised by significant inaccuracies. France vs UK Another instance of confiscation via export bans was reported during the pandemic, but this time, the location was Europe. The incident happened in March 2020 and had the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) as the victim and France as the accused. France’s actions were reported by Euronews when it stated that:  France has forced a face mask manufacturer to cancel a major UK order as the coronavirus-inspired scramble for protective gear intensifies. The National Health Service ordered millions of masks from Valmy SAS near Lyon earlier this year as COVID-19 threatened. But amid a global shortage, France earlier this week ordered the requisition of all protective masks made in the country (Euronews 2020). France’s export ban placed the company in an uncomfortable situation as it was prohibited from fulfilling the NHS’ order. Indeed, the company director commented that "the requisition does not allow any wiggle room for us to deliver to the NHS, but it is complicated because the NHS was the first client to order and uses our masks all year long” (Euronews 2020). It is important to note that four months later, the Guardian revealed that Valmy had a contract with the NHS that was signed in 2017 where this company “was required to deliver almost 7m FFP3 respirator masks to the UK at 17p per mask in a pandemic situation as soon as the order was activated” (Davies and Garside 2020). The NHS did indeed activate the contract in early February, however, the French “sweeping requisition decree” ultimately meant that France seized the masks within its borders (Davies and Garside 2020). Near misses: tensions in Europe The incidents below can be described as “near misses" as the accused states initially confiscated other state’s products, but eventually gave them back to their neighbours. The cases here are particularly useful for showing how the misuse of export bans has the potential to harm diplomatic relations between neighbouring states and allies, especially when the ban is placed over other states’ pre-ordered goods. Germany vs neighbours One of such instances occurred between Germany and Switzerland, but this time Germany was the accused. The incident was reported on the 9th of March 2020 and caused a strain in Germany’s relationship with Switzerland during the pandemic. The “diplomatic spat” started a week after the German government banned exports on most protective medical goods (Dahinten and Wabl 2020). Switzerland was particularly angered when 240,000 masks travelling to it were blocked from crossing the German border to enter Switzerland (Dahinten and Wabl 2020). Switzerland then called the German ambassador for “an emergency meeting” regarding this issue amid a very tense situation, especially when it hardly manufactures protective equipment itself (The Local 2020). Eventually after a call was scheduled between the leaders of both countries, Germany modified the ban on the 12th of March, adding exemptions and then removed it completely the following week (Hall et al. 2020). Germany’s diplomatic relations were equally weakening with another neighbour, but this time, the neighbour was a European Union (EU) member. The point of conflict was of course the export ban on protective equipment. The Austrian Economy minister commented on this ban by stating that:  It can’t be that Germany is holding back products for Austria just because they happen to be stored in a German location […] these products are for the Austrian market, and unilateral moves by Germany are just causing problems in other countries (Dahinten and Wabl 2020).  Such statements indicate that placing export bans on other states’ goods seriously angers the importing states as such bans make them feel that their interests are being completely ignored by their counterparts. France vs neighbours France also got a share of the criticism in March when it seized the supplies of the Swedish company Mölnlycke located in France after announcing an export ban on masks and other medical goods (AP 2020; Marlowe 2020). The conflict erupted between France and Sweden when the French ban was placed over Mölnlycke’s Lyon Warehouse that is responsible for distributing personal protective equipment to Southern Europe as well as Belgium and the Netherlands (Marlowe 2020). Significantly, the seized stock was composed of 6 million masks, all of which “had been contracted for”, including a million masks each to Italy and Spain (Marlowe 2020). Eventually, France allowed the shipments to go to Italy and Spain despite initial reluctance to do so (AP 2020). However, the easing of the situation was mainly due to the “crucial efforts” of Sweden’s prime minister who was thanked by Mölnlycke on the 4th of April for his role in the removal of the French export ban on the Lyon Warehouse (Mölnlycke 2020). It is important to note that this instance also made its way to the European Parliament on the 3rd of April where the French export ban was questioned and criticised as “yet another demonstration of the lack of European solidarity” (EP 2020). Thus, this specific incident resonated across the whole of Europe, and not in a positive way. Export bans: the GATT framework The international law on export bans falls under the competence of the WTO, particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 which itself is mainly composed of the 1947 GATT agreement (GATT 1994). Significantly, article XI of the agreement titled ‘General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions’ prohibits the use of export bans when it states that:  No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party (GATT 1994).  However, the agreement leaves out certain exemptions where this prohibition does not apply, the relevant one here being “export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party” where the GATT clearly states that “the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extent to” it (GATT 1994, XI, 2(a)). The emphasis on the temporary application of such measures is important and is further clarified in the WTO’s timely report on “export prohibition and restrictions” issued at the peak of the Covid pandemic where it explained that:  The reference to a measure that is "temporarily applied" indicates that the carve-out applies to measures applied for a limited time, taken to bridge a "passing need". In turn, "critical shortage" refers to deficiencies in quantity that are crucial, that amount to a situation of decisive importance, or that reach a vitally important or decisive stage, or a turning point (WTO 2020, annex 1).  Of relevance to the export bans legal framework is also Article XX of the GATT (1994) titled “General Exceptions” that states how:  Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures […] (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.  Thus, here the GATT agreement allows countries to use export bans when it is necessary to protect lives. The WTO’s report confirms the relevance of this exception to the Covid-19 situation when it explains that:  In the context of COVID-19, Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 could be used to justify a ban or quantitative restriction on the exportation of goods, so long as such a measure would be necessary and effective in contributing to protecting the health of that country's citizens (WTO 2020, Annex 1).  Thus, in terms of international law, countries are allowed to make use of export bans when faced with exceptional circumstances. During the Covid pandemic, the WTO member states did indeed make use of the exceptions and exemptions codified in the GATT agreement while informing the WTO of their new policies (Pauwelyn 2020, 107). However, when life is back to normal, their use remains illegal. Thus, overall, the export bans legal situation can be described as residing in a ‘legal grey zone’ whereby their use, though normally prohibited, can be justified and permitted in serious situations requiring them (Pelc 2020, 349). Nonetheless, it is important to note that the international legal framework here does not provide clarification for situations where the export ban exemption is placed on pre-ordered or pre-paid-for goods supposed to go to other countries. Indeed, the current legal framework suffers from a number of ambiguities as explained below. The first ambiguity relates to the term “destined goods.” When prohibiting export bans, article XI speaks of “export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party”. Thus, clearly, countries cannot put their hands on goods going to other countries for this would be illegal. However, the carve-out intended to “prevent or relieve critical shortages” is not detailed enough as to clarify if this also applies to goods “destined” for other countries (GATT, article XI, 2(a)). Even if the “destined” statement is applied to the exemption, the ambiguity remains. Much of the ambiguity rests on how to interpret the term “destined” from the export prohibition paragraph: is the term “destined” applied here generally whereby a company in Country X is an exporter and thus it’s goods will naturally be “destined” for other countries, or does the term imply goods that are ready-to-travel to other countries who have already placed an order or paid for goods? Clearly, it’s the second interpretation when applied as an exemption that has been the cause of conflict between the states in the previous section. However, regardless of which interpretation is intended in the GATT, instances where countries confiscate orders destined for other countries is seen as politically and morally unacceptable by the latter; “modern piracy” was how Germany described it. Thus, whatever the world leaders had in mind when they agreed to this exemption, clearly it now needs a lot of clarification. Secondly, there is ambiguity over the situation regarding donated goods. This is an important question especially given the Barbados case. Here the goods sold in country X were already bought in Country X (from a philanthropist in Country X) to be sent to country Y. Thus, a transaction had already taken place and the goods now belong to the philanthropist who is kindly giving this order to Country Y. Does an export ban apply to this situation? Logically, there is little to no justification for its application in this scenario, but the GATT agreement still needs to confirm this. Thirdly, there is ambiguity over the situation of “guest” companies. Given the globalised world we live in, does this exemption apply to international companies geographically located in country X? This was the main cause of tension between Sweden and France when France imposed the export ban over the Swedish company’s Warehouse. A logical consideration of this situation would lead to a ‘no’ answer to this question, but it is also acknowledged that the company may be subject to the geographical jurisdiction and the laws of the country that it is located in. Thus, it is important that the relationship between the host country and the foreign company is clarified when it comes to export prohibitions. Fourthly, there is ambiguity over the timeline of enforcing an export ban policy. The Covid crisis saw quick decisions being taken and implemented. This was particularly the case with export bans and was to the detriment of the importing states. In the case of the US-Germany incident, the confiscation of the masks on their way to Germany occurred hours before the US president announced invoking the defence production Act. In fact, the US policy on export restrictions became official on the 7th of April after the Federal Emergency Management Agency published it (Bown 2020). Significantly, FEMA stated that “this rule is effective from April 7, 2020 until August 10, 2020” (FEMA 2020). Thus, the obvious question arises: on what basis were the masks going to Germany confiscated? Similarly, on what basis were the ventilators destined for Barbados blocked by the US on the 5th of April? If the WTO steps in to advise on the implementation of such export bans, the situation would be greatly improved. Finally, there is ambiguity over the extent to which one country may enforce its policy, particularly in other countries. The US-Germany case was sensationalised by an “international hunt” for masks in Bangkok; thus, here the US officials imposed the export ban on an American company in a foreign country outside their national jurisdiction. However, the question remains, is this permissible under the GATT? The GATT articles did not go that far, but it is important that the international legal framework answers this question. Overall, several unanswered questions resulting from the brevity of the GATT’s article on export bans require answers. Filling in those gaps in the GATT would greatly improve the legal framework on export bans and ease tensions between member states. The next section takes a closer look at export bans, particularly their discussion in the literature and their unwelcome effects. The effects of export bans The academic literature on export bans mainly focuses on their effects, either on several states or on specific case-studies. Prior to Covid-19, a number of studies were mainly concerned with the effects of export bans following the food price crisis in 2007-2008 when countries made use of export restrictions on agricultural commodities in an attempt to stabilise domestic markets (e.g. Liefert, Westcott, and Wainio 2012; Dorosh and Rashid 2013; Timmer 2010). However, following the coronavirus pandemic, some studies have focused on their use on medical goods and agricultural goods as well as on their effects (Koppenberg et al. 2020; Pelc 2020; Evenett 2020b). Nevertheless, what unites almost all the studies on export restrictions is that they mainly agree that such bans do more harm than good. The recent studies on export bans are important because they demonstrate how this policy results in negative effects. For example, Simon Evenett (2020a, 831) in his recent work argues that “export bans on masks, for example, erode the capability of trading partners to cope with the spread of COVID-19. Rather than beggar-thy-neighbour, export bans on medical supplies effectively sicken-thy-neighbour”. He further analyses the effect of the export ban from the perspective of the developing countries cut-off from receiving advanced medical equipment such as ventilators, and explains that whenever this policy is implemented, “a significant share of the world’s population” is prevented from accessing this vital equipment (Evenett 2020a, 832). Evenett (2020a, 833) therefore recommends that governments consider other alternatives to export bans that “do not impede foreign purchases”. Significantly, Evenett also discusses the effect of the export curbs on the exporting country itself and argues that this policy is counter-productive:  Whatever temporary gain there is in limiting shipments abroad, the loss of future export sales will discourage local firms from ramping up production and investing in new capacity, which is exactly what the WHO has called for. In practical terms, during a pandemic this mean that an export ban “secures” certain, currently available medical supplies at the expense of more locally produced supplies in the future (Evenett 2020a, 832).  Internationally, export bans have also been shown to have severe effects on several countries at once. Chad Bown’s (2020, 43) work on the Covid pandemic demonstrates how “taking supplies off the global market can lead to higher world prices and reduced quantities, harming hospital workers in need in other countries”. He also cautions that their use during the pandemic may invoke a “multiplier effect”, similar to the one observed during the sharp price increases of agricultural goods in the 2000s when “one country’s export restriction led to additional global shortages, further increasing world prices, putting pressure on other countries to impose even more export restrictions” (Bown, 2020, 44). Richard Barichello’s (2020, 223) study on Covid-19 and the agricultural sector also highlights the negative effect of export bans while observing how some countries have already imposed export restrictions on staple goods such as rice and cereal products during the pandemic. Barichello acknowledges that such export bans could have a positive effect on countries such as Canada if a consequence of such a ban increases the price of a commodity that it exports. However, he also explains the gravity of the adoption of export bans during current times when he writes that:  The distributional effects of adding export restrictions will, like the COVID-19 crisis itself, fall most heavily on the poor in importing countries by reducing trade, raising food prices, and reducing food security in all but the export countries of that commodity (Barichello 2020, 223). Export bans have also been shown to have “intangible” negative effects that are also significant. Hoekman, Firoini and Yildirim’s (2020) study focuses on export bans from an “international cooperation” perspective and emphasises the foreign policy damages resulting from export bans. The authors write that “in the case of the EU, the immediate policy responses of some member states may have damaged the European project by eroding trust among European partners” (Hoekman, Firoini and Yildirim 2020, 78). Simon Evenett (2020b, 54) adds that export restrictions are a “gift to those economic nationalists abroad that want to unwind or shorten international supply chains”; such nationalists can then claim that relying on the foreign market is unreliable. It is significant that the WTO itself discusses a similar point in its Covid-19 report on export restrictions when it lists the following as part of the “other possible consequences” of export bans:  An erosion of confidence in the multilateral trading system, in particular if restrictions negatively impact the most vulnerable, especially least-developed countries, whose healthcare systems are already strained. It would be difficult for importing members to trust a system that fails to produce tangible benefits in times of crisis and may lead to general calls to ensure that production of medical and other products only take place at the national level (WTO 2020, 9).  The WTO (2020, 9) also highlights how from a health-perspective, export bans may ultimately weaken the fight against the coronavirus when it states how: “given its global nature, if some countries are not able to combat the disease, this coronavirus, or mutated strains of it, will inevitably recirculate and contaminate the populations of all countries, including those imposing the export restrictions”. Thus, an export ban on medical goods is not the soundest policy to implemented during a pandemic. Effects of export ban confiscations & concluding thoughts It is important to consider the consequences of using export bans specifically as a confiscation technique. The points raised above are still of high relevance. However, there are three main disadvantages that are particularly prominent when countries place export bans on other states’ goods. Firstly, enforcing this policy on the goods of other states creates severe tensions between countries at different levels. The first one is at the diplomatic level whereby the officials of country Y express their discontent to officials of country X. Such tensions then easily transmit to other places. Indeed, at the citizenry level, these tensions take the foreground as the citizens in country Y read the news and frown at what their neighbouring states are doing to them in times of need. Thus, the misuse of export bans can be seen as a threat to diplomacy, international trade, and to the principles of establishing friendly relations between states and peoples. Secondly, shortages and stress are another effect of this policy when enforced on other states’ goods. When countries place orders, it is usually because they have a need for those orders. When those orders are then confiscated, those expecting the orders are left empty-handed and in a stressful situation. The stress is generated after the realisation that their plans for fighting the virus have been compromised; orders placed months or weeks ago will now not reach their borders despite those orders being just hours away from arrival. In the above cases, the German police and the NHS had to deal with the unpleasant news that their mask orders will not arrive. Such export bans create a difficult situation for the importing nations and for their institutions, as they then try to seek alternative suppliers at a very short notice. Finally, the implementation of this policy on other states’ orders sends worrying empirical signals. Scholars of IR when they first learn about international politics naturally ask whether the world we live in is a very “realist” world characterised by “survival of the fittest” instinct, or whether it is a world that accommodates international law and inter-state cooperation, despite anarchy. This is the essence of the classical debate between Realists and neo-Liberal Institutionalists (Mearsheimer 1994; Walt, 1997; Ikenberry 2011; Martin 1992). It is reassuring that in the previous discussion, the WTO still had a role to play. The European Commission also tried to solve the disputes arising between its members over the export bans (EC 2020). However, despite those interventions, it was clear that the cause of the problem was the unilateral export ban policy that was quickly being implemented at the discretion of the member states over what was destined for other states. As such, there is an urgent need for the WTO to revise its export ban legal framework to prevent the above scenarios from ever repeating in the future. 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한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français When U.S. President Biden and Chinese President Xi met in November 2023, Biden remarked that the countries must “ensure that competition does not veer into conflict.” A recent ODI report Hedging belts, de-risking roads: Sinosure’s role in China’s overseas finance illustrates the scale of the competition and reveals how one of China’s less-known institutions – Sinosure – has been giving China the edge. This blog offers some thoughts about how the U.S., through its U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) can better compete. Competing requires resources, but really not as much as you think Competing credibly requires money, dedicated staff, and creativity. It requires studying the competition. Infrastructure development requires low-cost financing, capacity-building, and getting everyone aligned. As Sinosure has demonstrated again and again, deploying guarantees and insurance – particularly from official financing – can de-risk overseas investment, reducing costs of finance and mobilising commercial investment from the private sector. When it comes to infrastructure, China has a far more robust, albeit imperfect, track record when compared to others. The U.S. and its G7 partners have not been much of a match for China in financing infrastructure worldwide. The G7 could successfully compete with China, and doing so does not have to cost hundreds of billions of dollars. The U.S. Congress, despite its strong desire to counter BRI, has yet to appropriate the resources necessary to compete credibly in a battle of influence against China in developing countries. There’s been plenty of rhetoric, repurposing of existing programs and resources into initiatives like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) and the Global Gateway. Each time the U.S. launches a new overseas economic development initiative, however, it rarely dedicates sufficient resources to help it scale – examples include the Partnership for Growth, Power Africa, Prosper Africa, and PGII. When it was fully funded, Power Africa, which coordinated the efforts of 12 U.S. government agencies, helped 120 power projects in Africa get across the finish line in just a few years, building a strong brand for the U.S. in Africa for economic development for the first time in decades. Then the U.S. cut Power Africa’s budget by 75% because of political shifts. The initiative stalled in its progress on new infrastructure, while still helping 200 million Africans get access to more reliable electricity. PGII, which has no dedicated budget, involves a handful of smart people working hard to deliver on a G7 promise of $600 billion in global infrastructure by 2025. Other than the Lobito Corridor project, it has not been clear to date what PGII is able to deliver at scale in Africa without additional resources. That could be about to change, though. The State Department just requested another $4 billion from Congress to up its game against China, which should help tremendously if that funding is secured to support PGII. Why Sinosure has been such an effective tool for China, despite its low margins BRI has not been particularly innovative, but it’s been steady. Sinosure, along with other Chinese export credit agencies, offers highly favorable terms and longer-term finance – this approach has well suited Global South governments in advancing their development and political objectives. While some projects have been problematic, Chinese creditors have provided the low-cost, patient capital at scale that many countries need for long-term productive infrastructure investment. But as the report shows, this approach has challenged established regimes governing the use of public money (link to blog 2). Sinosure insurance covers non-payment up to 95% of the insured equity or debt for up to 20 years, but most OECD Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) only provide 85% coverage for up to 10 years – though this policy soon will soon change [link to blog 2] Sinosure can work anywhere, except where there’s a live conflict or in cases of repayment arrears. By contrast, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has a list of over 100 countries where it cannot do business. Sinosure’s premiums max out at 7% of the total debt servicing cost of a project, making it relatively cost-effective. In this aspect, it is surprisingly transparent. DFC’s fees and costs are numerous and opaque, with DFC passing some of its own costs on to its clients. By the end of 2022, Sinosure had provided over $1.3 trillion-worth of insurance on export and investment, with a quarter of this going only to BRI countries. In 2022 alone, it supported a total portfolio of $900 billion through its insurance for over 170,000 clients, of which $80bn went to overseas investment and long-term finance, which mostly supports projects in infrastructure such as power, transportation, construction, telecoms and shipping. It received a total net insurance premium of $1.9 billion and paid out $1.5 billion in insurance claims. Despite its significant payouts, however, Sinosure continues to earn a modest profit of $102 million – not much of a margin, but enough to propel China’s global leadership on trade and infrastructure development.     By contrast, DFC’s current total portfolio-wide exposure is $41 billion, with just over $9.3 billion committed in fiscal year 2023 for 132 transactions – of which only around $3.5bn of this was for guarantees and risk insurance. DFC has many of the same tools available to it as the Chinese government, and DFC is not even legally required to earn a return on its investments. Yet DFC has not made full use of its capital resources and has not deployed its capacity for risk-mitigation finance in the same way. An unleashed DFC could make the U.S. more competitive It’s not too late for the U.S. and others to compete. The U.S. has an opportunity to further change how it conducts business to compete with China, while promoting sustainable development. DFC is starting to flex its competitive muscles with its own insurance product, recently using political risk insurance to support a $1.6 billion debt-for-nature swap in Ecuador and another $500 million debt-for-nature swap in Gabon, which support broader debt relief efforts, as well as channelling money towards climate and conservation goals. Moreover, those deals come at a very low cost to the U.S. government given DFC’s pricing models. DFC is up for reauthorisation in 2025. It has both foreign policy and development mandates. In a previous blog, we laid out 10 recommendations about how DFC could be more effective in achieving its development mandate. Here are 9 recommendations to help DFC be more effective in competing with China and achieving its foreign policy mandate: 1. Spend some money and spend it right All it took for Sinosure’s expansion in the early 2010s was a capital injection of $3 billion. To make its financial institutions just as competitive, the U.S. only needs to commit a few extra billion dollars of appropriated resources per year, just as State Department has proposed, not hundreds of billions. Sinosure, with its somewhat loose investment criteria, still managed to earn over $100 million profit on a $900 billion portfolio in 2022. Even if DFC were to spend $1 billion/year of additional budgetary resources – for the purpose of leveling the playing field with China and providing developing countries with the type of inexpensive financing they need – that could be money well spent for the U.S. taxpayer. That money could cover legal fees that DFC currently passes on to clients. It could be deployed through innovative instruments: to take on some of the currency risk on strategic transactions, to cover first loss on strategic investments, or to provide technical assistance that does not need to get repaid–comparative advantages that Chinese financial institutions still sorely lack. That funding also could be used, simply, to reduce interest rates and fees, at a time when borrowing costs for lower-income countries have risen astronomically. 2. Structure deals to outcompete China Encourage DFC to structure transactions to use its funding to maximize competition with China in a way that promotes a more level playing field. DFC should not crowd out competitively tendered and transparent private sector investment, but where inexpensive or even concessional DFC co-financing might help the private sector out-compete opaque Chinese investment, DFC should be equipped to support those projects. 3. Don’t obsess over returns Even though DFC is not legally required to earn a return on a portfolio-wide basis, most members of Congress expect DFC to be revenue neutral to the U.S. Treasury. If members of Congress would adjust their return expectations even slightly, DFC could significantly advance its development and foreign policy goals. Effective development and foreign policy are not free – especially when competing with China. Even earning back $.95 on the dollar on a portfolio-wide basis would be a significant leverage of 1:20 of appropriated resources to private investment – giving DFC broad flexibility to structure deals that prioritise development impact and foreign policy. 4. Remove DFC’s limits Eliminate ceilings on DFC financing – including the $1 billion transaction limit, the $10 billion annual portfolio limit, and the $60 billion total portfolio exposure. It really doesn’t cost anything to do this. It’s like raising its credit card limit. 5. Let DFC work anywhere when necessary Give DFC the authority to determine the countries where it can do business on a case-by-case basis, depending on what the foreign policy and development priorities are. DFC should be required to continue to prioritize investments in low and lower-middle income countries, but it should have flexibility to respond quickly and selectively anywhere that doing so will credibly advance a compelling U.S. national security interest, such as financing a strategic port or lithium processing. To prevent DFC from sliding into becoming just a national security tool, abandoning its development mandate, DFC should be required to clearly articulate the compelling national security interests of projects and should provide a detailed report to Congress each year on its investments in upper-middle income and high-income countries to explain these interests (even classified, if necessary). 6. Empower DFC to support “nearshoring” DFC can help the U.S. diversify its supply chains and reduce dependencies on China. To encourage companies to move operations out of China and into the Americas (if operating in the U.S. is not commercially viable), give DFC broader authority to support strategic transactions in the region. 7. Make it easier for DFC to support equity investments in strategic infrastructure When DFC takes an equity position in a company or an investment fund, it gets a seat at the ownership table. That allows DFC to drive decisions regarding sourcing of goods and services (i.e., making sure contracts do not always go to Chinese companies). Investing in equity funds that develop and finance a portfolio of infrastructure projects is an effective way for DFC to increase and spread its strategic influence -- except that DFC often struggles to make these types of investments because U.S. legal requirements make DFC a slow and clunky, and hence, an unattractive investment partner. DFC needs flexibility to bypass some of these requirements. 8. Help DFC scale its risk insurance instrument For years, DFC has been hugely innovative in deploying its insurance products to leverage capital from others. DFC used its political risk insurance tool to crowd in private investment in Ukraine, and to catalyze pioneering debt-for-nature swaps worth hundreds of millions of dollars in Ecuador and Belize. But according to recent reports, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget has been threatening to start treating insurance investments like guarantee instruments from a budgeting standpoint. This will make it more expensive for DFC to deploy this tool. If it ain’t broke, why fix it? As we’ve shown, one of the main factors behind China’s competitiveness abroad is through Sinosure’s expansive use of its insurance tool: OMB’s changes will make it more expensive and difficult for the U.S. to scale its own. OMB needs to read the room. We’re not going to suddenly balance the U.S. budget by tinkering with a formula that has worked for decades. Let DFC do more of what it does well. 9. Help speed DFC up Before committing any transaction over $10 million, DFC is required to notify Congress in advance. This “Congressional notification” requirement provides a valuable extra level of oversight to ensure that DFC does not doing anything out-of-whack with Congressional priorities. But the process slows DFC down, when Chinese financiers are known for their speed. Even though DFC only is required to “notify” Congress of its deals, and not seek “approval,” practically and politically speaking nobody wants to run afoul of any one of the 535 members of Congress. Consequently, DFC rarely moves forward on a project until it can resolve the concerns of members of Congress. DFC needs to work with Congress to come up with a reasonable alternative to the Congressional notification process that balances speed with continued close collaboration with Congress. In addition, DFC’s Board can help speed things up by focusing its efforts on high level policy guidance instead of individual transactions. The Board should delegate more decision making on individual deals to DFC’s CEO. It makes no sense for the Secretary of State, who chairs DFC’s Board, to dig into a $20 million investment into a healthcare fund, not to mention the hundreds of State Department staff with little development finance experience who review the documentation before it goes to the Secretary with a recommendation for a vote. U.S. taxpayers probably would prefer to have the State Department focus on resolving the Middle East conflict. From the perspective of many Global South countries, this competition between the G7 countries and China is not inherently bad if it brings them more desperately needed resources and improves the quality of their infrastructure. The U.S. could be more competitive if it empowered its development finance professionals to use DFC’s tools the way they were designed to be used. DFC must be properly resourced with enough people and enough money to allow it to grow its portfolio. While development impact remains the key priority for DFC, delivering for the needs of partner countries is what also will deliver long-term influence. That is how the U.S. can compete – and all at relatively low cost to the U.S. taxpayer.

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français India, being the largest country by population, has a great responsibility and right to show global leadership. Having chaired the recent G20 summit successfully, and as a member of important global partnerships such as BRICS and Quad, India is strategically placed to play a crucial role in geopolitics in the coming decades. Being the world’s largest democracy places a responsibility on India to drive a global agenda that will foster democracy in other countries. As a member of the Quad, with three other democracies, India can play a key role in upholding a rules based international order. Today, we live in a world that is much different to the world that emerged in 1945, after the Second World War, or in 1991 when the Cold War ended. In both instances, the United States emerged as the dominant superpower. American power, relative to the rest of the world, is now in clear decline and therefore even a loose alliance of democracies that includes India shifts the tide against competing structures of governance. Economic Rise of India India is the fastest growing major economy in the world today and is set to be the third largest economy in the world by the end of this decade. Of course, an alternative way to assess India’s development may be to measure its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita which is relatively low at less than US$3,000. However, the sheer size of its overall GDP and growing population gives the overall economy serious importance. India’s large population and the steady expansion of its middle class positions India as a lucrative economic ally for many countries in the world, both as a market and supplier of goods and services. It also makes India an attractive market to invest in, particularly in the current climate of de-risking and diversifying supply chains. Many global corporate powerhouses such as Facebook, Google, Apple, and Saudi Aramco have invested in India. Economic cooperation also inevitably results in stronger political relations, and it is very likely that this trend will continue. Strategic Advantages of India India’s greatest asset in terms of geopolitics and economics will be its democratic system of governance. India presence in the Quad for instance has legitimising effect. All members are democracies, but India is by far the world’s largest democratic nation. Democracy will also help India on the economic front. All advanced economies, with the exception of a few oil rich nations and city states, are democracies. That is because, as argued in a piece for the IMF in 2022, economic growth needs innovation, and innovation is better fostered in a democracy where there is free thinking and creativity. Many nations can become middle-income nations without democracy, but to transition to an advanced economy, they need stronger democratic values. South Korea and Taiwan provide examples of middle-income nations that evolved into high-income economies after a stronger transition toward democracy. Democracy together with population diversty can be a major factor that pushes India to break through the middle-income trap. Meanwhile, the median age of India, which is 32 years, is around 10 years younger than China’s. This is a strategic advantage not only in economic terms but also politically in international relations for India. This will mean an increase in the workforce which can help produce India’s industrial and services goods. A younger population will also result in a larger consumer market and will, more importantly, drive greater inward foreign direct investment. Additionally, a younger population will also result in larger tax revenue for the Indian government which can be used for development. It also results in less financial resources being directed towards an ageing population. As countries such as China, Vietnam, and Bangladesh grow, with outsourced manufacturing playing a large role in their economic agendas, India, which is weaker on manufacturing, has the advantage when it comes to services exports, such as consulting, IT-BPM, and education. India is a center for services outsourced by Western companies, with services exports anticipated to hit US$2 trillion by 2030. English proficiency in India adds to the advantage, but many other factors also play major roles. India has a large skilled workforce especially in information technology, software development, and business process outsourcing. Technology hubs around the country, such as in Bangalore where large global tech companies and startups are based, and government support, add to the scale at which India can expand this critical export in the coming decades. The software services industry, for example, has matured, resulting in sector upscaling. Interestingly, 20 percent of the world’s semiconductor design engineers are employed in India. These aforementioned attributes position India as an ideal strategic partner for many countries. Countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, European nations, Japan, Australia, Canada, and South Korea consider India a natural ally. India is also building ties in its region with the Gulf nations to its west and with the ASEAN nations to its east. India’s neighbour to its south, Sri Lanka, recently went through its worst economic crisis since independence in 1948. After defaulting in April 2022, Sri Lanka came to a standstill with no fuel for 3 weeks, 12 hour power cuts, and food and medicine shortages. It was India that came to the rescue, with US$4 billion at its most vulnerable time, giving a clear message to the world that India is a partner that will stand up for them. Talal Rafi is an Economist and Expert Member of the World Economic Forum. He is currently a Consultant on Economic Policy at the Asian Development Bank, and also a Regular Columnist for the International Monetary Fund. His work has been published by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, World Economic Forum, London School of Economics, UNFCCC, Chatham House London, Deloitte and Forbes.