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In the chilling expanse of the Arctic, where ice and ocean frame the edges of the known world, a geopolitical drama has quietly gathered momentum. The world’s strategic gaze is no longer fixed solely on the traditional theatres of diplomacy in Europe, the Middle East, or the Indo-Pacific. Instead, the High North — and particularly Greenland, the vast Arctic territory within the Kingdom of Denmark — has emerged as a critical arena where great-power competition, national security priorities, global trade dynamics, and climate change converge. This transformation did not occur overnight. For decades, military planners, geographers, and strategic thinkers recognized the Arctic’s latent importance. Yet only in recent years have those projections translated into urgent geopolitical reality. At the center of this shift stands the United States’ National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025), unveiled in late 2025, which redefines American priorities in a world shaped by renewed great-power rivalry. While the strategy addresses multiple global theatres, its emphasis on territorial security, critical resources, strategic geography, and adversarial competition underscores why Greenland has moved from the periphery to the heart of international geopolitics. Greenland today sits at the intersection of U.S. homeland defense, NATO cohesion, Arctic militarization, global trade transformation, and the accelerating race for critical minerals. The tensions surrounding the island reveal not only disputes among allies but also deeper structural changes in the international system. This article argues that Greenland is no longer a remote outpost but a strategic fulcrum of the Arctic, whose future will shape the balance of power in the High North and beyond. America’s Strategic Recalibration in the 2025 National Security Strategy The NSS 2025 marks a clear departure from post-Cold War doctrines centered on expansive multilateralism and global institution-building. Instead, it reflects a return to strategic realism, prioritizing the protection of core national interests, territorial security, and the prevention of adversarial dominance in critical regions. The strategy defines the United States’ primary objective as “the continued survival and safety of the United States as an independent, sovereign republic,” coupled with maintaining decisive military, technological, and economic power. Although the Indo-Pacific remains central, the strategy elevates the Western Hemisphere and adjacent strategic regions, emphasizing the need to prevent hostile encroachment on areas vital to U.S. security and economic resilience. Supply chains, critical minerals, missile defense, and strategic geography feature prominently throughout the document. Within this framework, Greenland has transitioned from a peripheral Arctic territory to a linchpin of U.S. strategic defense and resource security. While the NSS does not outline a standalone Arctic doctrine, its underlying logic — securing access to essential materials, protecting strategic approaches to the homeland, and denying adversaries positional advantages — aligns directly with the intensifying focus on Greenland. Latest developments: US position over Greenland. As already mentioned, the release of the NSS 2025 made one thing clear: US foreign policy is now defined by an assertive approach towards the entire Western Hemisphere – where Greenland is part of –. Moreover, this implies that the US might claim the right to intervene in other countries’ domestic affairs in order to guarantee its strategic and corporate interests. Therefore, after Venezuela – in addition to its rhetoric towards Cuba and Mexico – Greenland has become a hot topic, due its geopolitical, economical and strategical position and of course as part of the US “national security” and interest. The interest from the US over Greenland is not new, during Trump’s first administration an attempt to buy Greenland occurred and even at the beginning of his second administration there were comments to obtain the island. Next are presented the developments that occurred until January 22nd: - The US-Greenland-NATO crisis escalated when Trump’s desire to have Greenland either “by hook or by crook” sparked the global debate, while Europeans, Greenlanders and Danish rejected his ideas and showed support for Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark itself. - A later diplomatic meeting between Danish, Greenlandic and US officials in Washington ended up in a “fundamental disagreement” over the sovereignty of the island on January 14th. - A joint statement of several European countries supporting the idea that “Greenland belongs to its people, and only Denmark and Greenland can decide on matters concerning their relations” was released on January 18th. - Launch of “Operation Arctic Endurance” and the initial deployment of a small number of troops from the European allies plus Danish soldiers. By January 18th there were over 100 troops in Nuuk and another 100 in Kangerlussuaq. (numbers could be increased in a short time). - Worries within Europe and the NATO allies. In addition, China urged the US to stop using the so-called “China threat” as a pretext for pursuing its own interest. - General concern for Greenlanders and several protest in Denmark, and Greenland against the US actions. - The imposition of 10% tariffs from the US over Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, Finland, the UK and the Netherlands that would increase by 25% on June 1st if there is no deal reached. After Trump’s speech in the World Economic Forum, he confirmed that tariffs threats were off the table as there was a “framework of a future deal” for Greenland. In summary, in January 2026, Washington’s posture toward Greenland has sharpened into a high-profile mix of strategic urgency and political brinkmanship, framed publicly as an Arctic and homeland-security imperative. Recent reporting describes President Donald Trump repeatedly arguing the U.S. “needs” Greenland for security, while also signaling limits on how far he would go — saying at the World Economic Forum in Davos that he would not use military force to acquire it. At the same time, the episode has clearly strained allied politics: coverage indicates Denmark has insisted Greenland’s sovereignty is not negotiable even as the U.S. debate escalated, and Greenland’s own authorities have taken the moment seriously enough to urge practical preparedness at home. The most concrete “near-term” direction emerging in January 2026 is not annexation but a NATO – and alliance-linked security bargain. Multiple outlets report Trump backing away from threatened tariffs after announcing a “framework” tied to future Arctic security cooperation with NATO leadership — suggesting the administration is trying to convert its Greenland pressure campaign into expanded defense access, posture, or burden-sharing rather than an immediate territorial transfer. Even where details remain vague, the logic is consistent: Greenland’s geography — especially its role in Arctic air/sea lanes and missile-warning architecture — makes it a leverage point for U.S. deterrence and homeland defense planning, and U.S. officials appear to be testing what they can gain diplomatically inside the alliance system when outright sovereignty change is off the table. This posture also lines up with the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), which elevates the Western Hemisphere as the top priority region and argues the U.S. will “deny non-Hemispheric competitors” the ability to “own or control strategically vital assets” in the hemisphere, while calling for readjusting military presence and “establishing or expanding access in strategically important locations.” While the NSS text excerpt does not name Greenland in the lines above, its framework — reasserting hemispheric primacy, blocking external footholds, and expanding access — maps neatly onto a Greenland approach that treats the island as a critical node in Arctic security competition and infrastructure control. European Parliament analysis likewise characterizes the NSS as a “pivot” toward a Monroe Doctrine–style sphere-of-interest logic in the Western Hemisphere, reinforcing the idea that Greenland is being handled less as a narrow Denmark dispute and more as part of a broader hemispheric strategy. Greenland’s Geographic Centrality: The broader US security interest of the Island. Figure 1: Arctic states, counties and other administrative regions with capitals. Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Credit for the border data: Runfola, D. et al. (2020) geoBoundaries: A global database of political administrative boundaries. PLoS ONE 15(4): e0231866. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231866e. Figure 2: Arctic Population Centers. Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. When viewed from a polar perspective, the Arctic is not a distant fringe but the shortest connective space between North America, Europe, and Eurasia. The Arctic as seen in Figure 1 is composed of several administrative areas, including Canada, Alaska (USA), Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Greenland (Denmark). The latter can be said to be located at the center between North America and Europe and Eurasia, underscoring its geopolitical importance. In other words, Greenland occupies the central Atlantic–Arctic axis, the shortest air and missile trajectories between Russia and North America and a pivotal position between the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and the Russian Arctic coast. This geography carries deep strategic implications. First, Greenland is part of the so-called GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) Gap, a crucial corridor for monitoring naval and air activity in the North Atlantic. The GIUK Gap played an important role during the Second World War and the Cold War and nowadays it has become crucial in securing air and sea surveillance through radar stations, while securing the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) as well as supply lines making them uninterrupted between NATO’s European members and the USA. The GIUK Gap can assist in ensuring maritime visibility and assist anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in case of conflicts. The presence of Russian submarines in the Arctic is a central pillar of Russia’s military strategy and nuclear deterrence, making the region one of the most militarized maritime spaces in the world. Russia views the Arctic as both a strategic sanctuary and a launch platform. In consequence, its Northern Fleet – headquartered on the Kola Peninsula –, is the most powerful of Russia’s fleets and operates a large share of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), such as the Borei and Delta IV classes. These submarines carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and are designed to remain hidden under Arctic ice, ensuring a second-strike capability in the event of a nuclear conflict. The ice cover, combined with Russia’s familiarity with Arctic waters, provides concealment and operational depth. In addition to SSBNs, Russia deploys nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) in the Arctic. These vessels conduct intelligence gathering, protect ballistic missile submarines, and pose threats to NATO naval forces and undersea infrastructure, including communication cables. Russian submarines regularly transit through key chokepoints such as the GIUK Gap, bringing them into strategic relevance for Greenland, Iceland, and NATO’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) posture. In addition, the Arctic also supports Russia’s broader bastion defense concept, which seeks to create heavily defended maritime zones where submarines can operate safely. Air defenses, surface ships, icebreakers, and coastal missile systems complement submarine operations. As climate change reduces sea ice and increases accessibility, Russian submarine activity in the Arctic is expected to remain intense, reinforcing the region’s importance for NATO surveillance, early warning systems, and transatlantic security — especially for locations like Greenland that sit astride critical Arctic–Atlantic routes. Second, Greenland’s high latitude makes it an ideal place for early detection of long-range missile launches. Russia has long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), if ever launched from Russia toward the United States, the total flight time would be roughly between 25 to 35 minutes – depending on the launch location and target. But because of the Earth’s curvature, the shortest path from Russia to the continental US goes over the Arctic which is why Greenland is so strategically important for early detection and missile defense. In practical terms, US decision-makers would have only minutes to assess the threat and respond after a launch is detected. Establishments such as the U.S. Pituffik Space Base underscore how Greenland functions as a first line of surveillance against possible ballistic missile threats from the Eurasian landmass. Therefore, Greenland is indispensable to early-warning and missile-defense systems. Sensors, radars, and space-tracking infrastructure based on the island form a crucial layer of “U.S. homeland defense”. Finally, Greenland is the only large Arctic landmass under Western democratic control outside Eurasia. Russia dominates the Eurasian Arctic coastline, while Alaska and Canada anchor North America. Greenland bridges these spaces, serving as a keystone for transatlantic Arctic security. Its isolation does not diminish its importance; rather, it magnifies it. – making Greenland a linchpin of US homeland defense and NATO’s northern security architecture. Greenland and NATO: The Fragile Architecture of Arctic Security Figure 3: NATO’s and Russia’s militarization in the Arctic. Figure 3 exposes a stark asymmetry in the Arctic militarization between NATO and Russian. The latter maintains a dense, continuous network of military bases stretching from the Kola Peninsula to the Bering Strait. These installations support air defense, naval operations, missile forces, and surveillance — forming an integrated arc of control along Russia’s northern frontier. On the other hand, NATO’s Arctic posture is fundamentally different. It relies on discrete strategic nodes rather than territorial saturation, interoperability over mass and coordination among multiple sovereign states. Within this fragmented architecture, Greenland is NATO’s most critical node. Nonetheless, the US has presence in Greenland, specifically with the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), which is located in northwest Greenland. This base – as mentioned before – is indispensable for early missile warning, space surveillance and tracking adversary launches across the polar region. While the UK has presence in Norway in the logistic Camp Viking site. Without Greenland, NATO’s Arctic posture would fracture into disconnected segments — North America on one side, Scandinavia on the other — with no central anchor. This reality explains the sharp European response in 2025–2026 to U.S. rhetoric suggesting unilateral action or coercive pressure regarding Greenland. The deployment of European troops under Operation Arctic Endurance was not merely symbolic; it was an assertion that Greenland is a collective NATO concern, not a bilateral bargaining chip. Greenland’s Resources: Strategic Minerals in a Fragmenting World Beyond military geography, Greenland’s subsoil wealth significantly enhances its geopolitical importance. The island holds substantial deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), lithium, graphite, niobium, titanium, uranium and zinc. As it is well known these strategic materials are indispensable and critical for renewable energy systems, electric vehicles, advanced electronics, missile guidance and radar technologies and space and defense infrastructure. Last but not least there is also oil and gas, but the conditions and viability to extract them make them an economic challenge. In the context of the control of natural resources, the NSS 2025 repeatedly stresses the need to reduce U.S. dependence on adversarial supply chains — an implicit reference to China’s dominance in rare-earth processing. Therefore, US eyes are on Greenland, as it represents one of the few politically aligned alternatives with large-scale potential reserves – ironically not under Chinese or Russian influence, but under US “allies” control. Yet resource abundance does not automatically translate into strategic advantage. Mining in Greenland faces severe challenges: extreme climate conditions, environmental risks, limited infrastructure, and strong local opposition to environmentally destructive projects. As a result, Greenland’s mineral wealth is strategically valuable but politically sensitive. Its development requires local consent and long-term cooperation, not coercion — a fact often overlooked in external strategic calculations. The Arctic Trade Revolution: Melting Ice, Shifting Routes Figure 4: Arctic Seaways (Northern Sea Route, Northwest Passage and Transpolar Sea Route). Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Climate change is transforming the Arctic faster than any other region on Earth. As sea ice recedes, new maritime routes are becoming seasonally viable, with potentially transformative consequences for global trade. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s Arctic coast already reduces transit times between Europe and Asia by up to 40%, even though some parts are free of ice for some months per year. On the other hand, a future transpolar route, cutting directly across the Arctic Ocean, could bypass traditional chokepoints such as: The Suez Canal, The Panama Canal or The Strait of Malacca. Therefore, Greenland importance relies on its geographic position that places it adjacent to these emerging corridors. Potential roles for the island include: the search-and-rescue hubs, refueling and logistics points, maritime surveillance and communications infrastructure. This elevates Greenland from a military asset to a potential gatekeeper of future Arctic trade, linking regional security directly to global economic flows. Icebreakers and Power Projection: Mobility as Sovereignty Figure 5: Major Icebreakers and Ice-Capable Patrol Ships highlight a decisive but underappreciated imbalance. Source: generated with Chat GPT using Routers Nov 2022 data. The transit in the Arctic can be defined by the possibility to move freely without any inconvenience due its extreme conditions – or at least with the least inconveniences. In consequence major ice breakers and ice-capable patrol ships became very important assets for the countries in the region. In a simple comparison, Russia possesses more icebreakers than NATO combined, as shown in Figure 5, including nuclear-powered vessels capable of year-round Arctic operations. These ships are instruments of sovereignty, enabling continuous military presence, escort of commercial shipping, enforcement of Arctic regulations and rapid crisis responses. By contrast, the United States has long underinvested in icebreaking capacity. NATO relies on a patchwork of national fleets, with Finland and Sweden contributing significantly but still lagging behind Russia’s scale. The strategic implication is clear: Russia controls mobility while NATO controls nodes. In such an environment, fixed strategic anchors like Greenland become even more critical. Competing Arctic Visions Russia Russia views the Arctic as a core strategic and economic priority, central to its national identity, security, and long-term development. Its Arctic vision emphasizes sovereignty, military security, and the exploitation of vast natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons and minerals. Moscow sees the Northern Sea Route as a critical shipping corridor that can enhance Russia’s control over Arctic navigation and generate economic revenues. To support this vision, Russia has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, icebreaker fleets, and military modernization, positioning itself as the dominant Arctic power and framing the region as vital to its great-power status. The Arctic is not an extension of Russian power; it is central to it. Figure 6: Cargo volume in Russia’s Northern Sea Route (1933-2023) China China approaches the Arctic as a “near-Arctic state,” framing its vision around scientific research, economic opportunity, and global governance. Beijing emphasizes participation in Arctic affairs through international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and promotes cooperation rather than territorial claims. Its strategy emphasizes long-term access to resources, influence over Arctic governance norms, and participation in future trade routes. Its concept of a “Polar Silk Road” reflects an interest in future shipping routes, energy projects, and digital connectivity, linking the Arctic to China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative. Even though China presents its Arctic engagement as peaceful and mutually beneficial, while gradually expanding its strategic and economic footprint in the region, it also has interest in Greenland’s mining sector, for example, which has heightened concerns about strategic leverage rather than direct control. Figure 7: Map of China’s Polar Silk Road. Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. United States The U.S. approach, as reflected in the NSS 2025, is reactive but intensifying. Greenland crystallizes American concerns about strategic vulnerability, supply-chain dependence, and alliance credibility. Yet pressure tactics risk undermining the very alliances that make Arctic stability possible. The United States views the Arctic as an increasingly important region for national security, environmental stewardship, and economic opportunities. At the same time, it recognizes the strategic implications of growing Russian and Chinese activity in the region. Arctic States The European Arctic states emphasize sustainability, human security, and regional cooperation as the foundation of their Arctic vision. Their policies prioritize environmental protection, responsible resource management, and the rights and livelihoods of Indigenous peoples, while balancing economic development in sectors such as fisheries, renewable energy, and limited resource extraction. These states strongly support multilateral governance through institutions like the Arctic Council and stress adherence to international law. Collectively, they view the Arctic as a region where stability, cooperation, and climate leadership are essential, especially amid rising geopolitical tensions and accelerating environmental change. Canada Canada’s Arctic vision centers on sovereignty, Indigenous partnership, and sustainable development, reflecting the region’s importance to national identity and security. Ottawa emphasizes the protection of its northern territories and views the Northwest Passage as internal waters, while supporting a rules-based Arctic order. A core pillar of Canada’s approach is its collaboration with Indigenous peoples, recognizing their rights, knowledge, and role in governance and stewardship. Canada also prioritizes climate change adaptation, environmental protection, and responsible economic development, seeking to ensure that increased Arctic activity benefits northern communities while maintaining peace and stability in the region. India India’s Arctic vision is primarily science-driven and climate-focused, reflecting its broader emphasis on environmental security and multilateral cooperation. Through its Arctic research station, Himadri, and active participation in the Arctic Council as an observer, India seeks to understand the Arctic’s impact on global climate systems, particularly the Indian monsoon. New Delhi also recognizes the long-term economic and geopolitical significance of the Arctic but approaches the region cautiously, prioritizing sustainable development, international collaboration, and respect for Arctic states’ sovereignty. Strategic Futures: Cooperation or Fragmentation The future of Greenland and the Arctic more broadly will hinge on whether the region evolves toward structured cooperation or strategic fragmentation. In a cooperative scenario, Greenland becomes a stabilizing anchor within a renewed Arctic security framework, where the United States, Denmark, and NATO align their defense priorities with Greenlandic self-determination and environmental safeguards. Such an approach would emphasize multilateral governance, transparency in resource development, confidence-building military measures, and shared investment in infrastructure, search-and-rescue capabilities, and climate resilience. Cooperation would not eliminate competition, particularly with Russia and China, but it would establish rules, norms, and mechanisms to prevent escalation and miscalculation in an increasingly accessible Arctic. By contrast, a fragmented Arctic would be characterized by unilateral actions, coercive diplomacy, and the erosion of trust among allies. Pressure tactics aimed at securing access, influence, or control over Greenland could weaken NATO cohesion, fuel local resistance, and open political space for external actors to exploit divisions. In such a scenario, the Arctic risks becoming a patchwork of contested zones rather than a managed strategic commons. Therefore, fragmentation would increase the likelihood of militarization without coordination, resource development without legitimacy, and crisis dynamics without effective communication channels — conditions that historically precede instability rather than security. Conclusion Greenland’s transformation from a remote Arctic territory into a strategic fulcrum reflects deeper shifts in the international system. The United States’ National Security Strategy 2025 captures a world defined by renewed great-power rivalry, supply-chain vulnerability, and the reassertion of geography as destiny. In this context, Greenland sits at the intersection of homeland defense, NATO credibility, critical resource security, and emerging Arctic trade routes. Its importance is not a product of any single factor, but of the convergence of military, economic, and environmental dynamics reshaping the High North. Yet Greenland’s strategic value does not grant external powers unlimited leverage. Geography may confer importance, but legitimacy, consent, and alliance cohesion determine whether that importance translates into durable influence. Attempts to treat Greenland as a transactional asset risk undermining NATO unity, destabilizing Arctic governance, and alienating the very population whose cooperation is essential for security and development. The Arctic’s future must not be decided solely by military deployments or mineral deposits, but by the political relationships that sustain them. Ultimately, Greenland illustrates the central paradox of the new Arctic geopolitics: the region’s growing accessibility increases both opportunity and risk. Stability will depend not on dominance, but on restraint, not on unilateralism, but on partnership. Whether the Arctic becomes a zone of managed competition or strategic fragmentation will shape not only the balance of power in the High North, but the credibility of international order adapting to a rapidly changing world. Also, it is important to highlight Greenland’s voice – referring to sovereignty and identity. Usually under great-power maneuvering, Greenland’s own population has often been sidelined. Yet Greenland is not merely an object of strategy; it is a political community with a strong Indigenous identity, environmental concerns, and aspirations for greater autonomy. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind its constitutional status within the Kingdom of Denmark, their principle of self-determination and the political costs of alienating local consent. Paradoxically, the more external powers push, the more Greenlandic society resists — complicating both security arrangements and resource development. Finally, the Arctic is not only Greenland, the US or the NATO, there are other authors involved, Russia for instance appears as the main one, while, China and India are increasing their interests in the region Moreover, climate change seems to be game changer as new Arctic seaways gain importance in terms of trade and mobility, which in consequence are and will redefine sovereignty. 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China urges U.S. to stop using so-called "China threat" as pretext for pursuing selfish gains. Retrieved from Xinhua: https://english.news.cn/20260119/57899ee8d43345ddbfa222828ec1d0a4/c.html Jakes, L., Tankersley, J., & Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2026, January 22). Trump Touts Greenland Framework as NATO Mulls U.S. Sovereignty Over Bases. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/01/21/us/trump-davos-greenland-news Karjee, M. (2025, August 20). Russia’s Arctic Corridor: Between Ice and Isolation. Retrieved from E-International Relations: https://www.e-ir.info/2025/08/20/russias-arctic-corridor-between-ice-and-isolation/ Katila, A. (2026, January 15). As US and Denmark fight, Greenland’s voices are being excluded once again. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/as-us-and-denmark-fight-greenlands-voices-are-being-excluded-once-again-273131 Kennedy-Pipe, C. (2026, January 14). Whether or not US acquires Greenland, the island will be at the centre of a massive military build-up in the Arctic. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/whether-or-not-us-acquires-greenland-the-island-will-be-at-the-centre-of-a-massive-military-build-up-in-the-arctic-273301 Khanna, M. (2025, March 19). China and the Arctic: An Overview. Retrieved from ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-and-the-arctic-an-overview Kirby, P. (2026, January 16). European military personnel arrive in Greenland as Trump says US needs island. Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd0ydjvxpejo Kotak, S. (2025, September 08). Leveraging India’s Arctic Observer Status: Scientific Diplomacy as a Lever for Climate, Resource and Security Advancement. Retrieved from World & New World Journal: https://worldandnewworld.com/india-arctic-observer-status/ Kottasová, I., & Edwards, C. (2026, Enero 19). Trump le dice a Noruega que ya no se siente obligado a "pensar únicamente en la paz" en carta sobre el Nobel y Groenlandia. Retrieved from CNN Español: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2026/01/19/eeuu/trump-paz-noruega-nobel-reux Kumar, A., & Haldar, S. (2024, October 2024). An evolving partnership in the Arctic between China and Russia. Retrieved from ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/an-evolving-partnership-in-the-arctic-between-china-and-russia L. Montgomery, S. (2026, January 14). 4 reasons why the US might want to buy Greenland – if it were for sale, which it isn’t. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/4-reasons-why-the-us-might-want-to-buy-greenland-if-it-were-for-sale-which-it-isnt-246955 Lebowitz, M. (2026, January 18). Treasury secretary defends Greenland tariffs: 'The national emergency is avoiding the national emergency'. Retrieved from NBC News: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/treasury-secretary-bessent-tariffs-national-emergency-greenland-eu-rcna254650 Levison, J., & Russell, L. (2026, January 19). Why Trump says the US 'needs' Greenland - and what the fallout could be. Retrieved from Sky news: https://news.sky.com/story/why-trump-says-the-us-needs-greenland-and-what-the-fallout-could-be-13285350 Lubold, G., Kube, C., Williams, A., & Alba, M. (2026, January 14). Buying Greenland could cost as much as $700 billion. Retrieved from NBC News: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/buying-greenland-cost-much-700-billion-rcna253921 Manners, I. (2026, January 09). Four ways to understand what’s going on with the US, Denmark and Greenland. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/four-ways-to-understand-whats-going-on-with-the-us-denmark-and-greenland-272873 Nicholas, P., & Smith, A. (2026, January 20). Trump won't say whether he would use force to seize Greenland. Retrieved from NBC News: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/trump-greenland-use-of-force-nobel-norway-europe-tariffs-ukraine-rcna254786 Passi, R. (2018, February 21). One belt, one road, and now one circle. Retrieved from ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/one-belt-one-road-and-now-one-circle Paul, J. (2026, January 08). Greenland is rich in natural resources – a geologist explains why. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/greenland-is-rich-in-natural-resources-a-geologist-explains-why-273022 Reuters. (2021, July 16). Greenland ends unsuccessful 50-year bid to produce oil. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/greenland-puts-an-end-unsuccessful-oil-adventure-2021-07-16/#:~:text=Naaja%20Nathanielsen%2C%20Greenland's%20minister%20of,profits%20or%20make%20a%20loss Rønberg, N., Gjerding Nielson, E., & Haugaard, M. (2026, January 06). Kampen om Grønlands fremtid. Retrieved from Nyheder: https://nyheder.tv2.dk/live/2025-01-06-kampen-om-groenlands-fremtid/over-200-soldater-i-groenland-lige-nu?entry=c342b2d3-e01d-4f60-b1dc-8df98fdac85b Sergunin, A., & Konyshev, V. (2025, April 21). The Arctic Great Game: The Need for Cautious Optimism. Retrieved from ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-arctic-great-game-the-need-for-cautious-optimism Sheftalovich, Z., & Jack, V. (2026, January 07). How Trump gets Greenland in 4 easy steps. Retrieved from Politico: https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-greenland-easy-steps-nato-policy-deal-military/ Shetty, K. (2023, June 06). The Northern Sea route: A gamechanger or a road to hegemony? Retrieved from ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-northern-sea-route Slothuus, L. (2026, January 12). Why Greenland’s vast natural resources won’t necessarily translate into huge profits. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/why-greenlands-vast-natural-resources-wont-necessarily-translate-into-huge-profits-273137 Soufi Burridge, T., Gardiner, C., & Pereira, I. (2026, January 16). France, other NATO countries send troops to Greenland for exercises after meeting with Vance and Rubio. Retrieved from ABC News: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/france-nato-countries-send-troops-greenland-exercises-after/story?id=129241103 Talmazan, Y. (2026, January 15). European troops arrive in Greenland as Trump throws another curveball. Retrieved from NBC News: https://www.nbcnews.com/world/greenland/european-troops-arrive-greenland-trump-throws-curveball-rcna254166 Tanno, S., & Waldenberg, S. (2026, Enero 10). Trump dice que Estados Unidos tomará Groenlandia "por las malas" sino puede hacerlo por las buenas. Retrieved from CNN Español: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2026/01/10/eeuu/trump-groenlandia-malas-trax Testoni, M. (2026, January 16). US-Greenland negotiations have hit a wall. Here are three ways the crisis could end. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/us-greenland-negotiations-have-hit-a-wall-here-are-three-ways-the-crisis-could-end-273629 tg24. (2026, January 16). Groenlandia, scattata la missione "Arctic Endurance": cosa sapere. Retrieved from tg24: https://tg24.sky.it/mondo/2026/01/16/groenlandia-arctic-endurance-esercitazione-militare The White House. (2025, November). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Retrieved from The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

Abstract This is the second part of the analysis regarding the realist interpretation of the ongoing war in Ukraine. (The first part is available here). This paper examines the ongoing war in Ukraine through the lens of realism, challenging optimistic Western narratives and highlighting Russia's strategic gains despite extensive sanctions. Since 2022, the EU has imposed 19 sanctions packages targeting Russia's economy, yet Russia has adapted and continued military offensives across multiple fronts, making significant territorial advances, particularly in Donetsk Oblast. The strategic importance of Odessa, Ukraine's largest deep-water port, is underscored due to its economic, military, and geopolitical value, with Russian experts openly discussing its potential capture. The conflict has also driven modernisation in Russia's military-industrial complex, introducing advanced missile systems and hypersonic weapons that challenge NATO defences. Post-war territorial changes remain uncertain, with diplomatic options constrained by Ukraine's constitution and international law. European public opinion is divided on war readiness, reflecting broader societal hesitations. Key Words: Realism, War, Ukraine Reality on the ground – the territorial losses and military developments Following the super optimistic narrative and the consequent groupthink, as evidenced in the first part of this paper, the EU has so far imposed no fewer than 19 sanctions packages.[1] The latest package adopted on October 23, 2025, focuses on intensifying pressure on Russia's war economy by targeting key sectors, including energy, finance, military capabilities, transportation, and professional services, while also enhancing anti-circumvention measures. [2] Source: Sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. (2025, October 29). European Commission. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine_en In the meantime, Russia seems to have accepted any adverse consequences of the sanctions and learned to live with them. Source: Grok – prompt: Latest macroeconomic indicators for the Russian Federation economy available at: https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=1998598998345814522 Militarily speaking, though, Russia (which is in fact fighting several NATO countries alongside Ukraine) seems to be not only advancing in the field. As of December 10, 2025, Russian forces have continued offensive operations across multiple fronts in eastern and southern Ukraine. These advances are part of a broader push amid ongoing heavy fighting, with Russian officials claiming momentum along the entire line of contact. Examples include: Pokrovsk Direction (Donetsk Oblast), Kupiansk/Kharkiv Direction, Lyman Direction (Donetsk Oblast), Siversk Direction (Donetsk Oblast), Zaporizhia/Southern Direction. On top of that, the media reports advances on multiple fronts, including Borova, Novopavlivka, and the eastern areas; the liberation of Rovnoye and Petropavlovka; the encirclement and liquidation of Ukrainian forces; and the fall of Dimitrov — widespread strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure.[3] Source: Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Ukraine_with_Cities.png Importantly, Russian experts and military advisors openly debate the possibility of seizing control of Odessa.[4] Let us make no mistake here. Odessa is strategically important. Economically, Odessa is Ukraine's largest and only deep-water port, handling around 65% of the country's sea-based imports and exports, which account for 70% of Ukraine's total trade.[5] For Russia, controlling or disrupting this port serves to cripple Ukraine's economy while bolstering Russia's own position in global markets. First: Ukraine is a major global grain exporter, and Odessa is central to shipping these commodities. Russian attacks on the port, such as those following the withdrawal from the U.N.-backed grain deal in 2023, aim to prevent Ukrainian shipments, allowing Russia to dominate markets in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond. Russia's Black Sea ports (e.g., Novorossiysk) handle its own $43 billion in annual grain exports, and undermining Odessa helps Russia create global reliance on its foodstuffs amid food insecurity.[6] Second, the port processes petroleum, natural gas, minerals, and even high-purity neon gas for semiconductors. Russia has targeted oil facilities near Odessa to disrupt fuel logistics, and control here would secure routes for Caspian Sea and Middle Eastern energy flows, aligning with Russia's strategy to diversify exports as hydrocarbon revenues decline.[7] Losing Odessa would be a "massive strategic blow" to Ukraine, akin to Britain losing Dover. Militarily, as a major Black Sea hub, Odessa enables Russia to project power and maintain dominance in the region. First, Russia's Black Sea Fleet, based in Crimea, can blockade Ukrainian coasts from Odessa, preventing resupplies and conducting amphibious operations — though these are high-risk due to Ukrainian defenses like mined waters.[8] The fleet supports expeditionary missions (e.g., the 2015 Syrian intervention) and hosts significant missile capabilities, with the capacity to deploy 80 long-range missiles in the area.[9] Second, even without full capture, Russia can harass shipping through mining or interdiction, extending tactics used in the Sea of Azov since 2014. This obstructs Ukrainian trade in the long term, potentially even in ceasefire scenarios, while facilitating Russian oil shipments (22% of which pass through the Black Sea).[10] Geopolitically, Odessa's location amplifies Russia's regional influence. First, capturing Odessa would create a land bridge to Transnistria, a pro-Russian breakaway region in Moldova just 35 miles away, allowing Russia to intimidate Moldova and potentially expand conflict there.[11] This aligns with broader aims to control Ukraine's entire Black Sea coast, threatening neighbours like Romania.[12] Second, dominating the northern Black Sea coast from Odessa would weaken Ukraine's security, block NATO reinforcements, and provide Russia with leverage in negotiations. It's seen as more critical to Russia's objectives than other Ukrainian regions, such as Kharkiv. President Putin has indicated in fact that the coastal area "rightfully belongs to Russia" as war spoils.[13] Finally, Odessa was founded in 1794 by Russian Empress Catherine the Great on former Ottoman territory, and it became one of the Russian Empire's largest cities and ports.[14] Arguably, the harbour city has a large Russian-speaking population (Russians are the second-largest ethnic group in Odessa Oblast), and Kremlin officials assert it has "nothing in common with the Kiev regime," viewing it as inherently Russian.[15] More interestingly, it appears that the Russian Military Industrial Complex (MIC) has been using the war, as MICs always do, as a perfect opportunity to modernize its military equipment. Consequently, Russia has advanced missile systems that NATO countries find a real challenge. Examples include: - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) RS-28 Sarmat, Russia's newest heavy ICBM, operational since 2023, with a range exceeding 18,000 km (up to 35,000 km in sub-orbital flight), a payload of over 10 tons including up to 16 nuclear warheads or hypersonic glide vehicles, and advanced countermeasures against missile defenses.[16] It's considered the world's longest-range and most powerful ICBM in service. - Hypersonic Systems Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV), deployed on ICBMs like the Sarmat, can reach speeds up to Mach 27 (about 20,700 mph), perform unpredictable manoeuvres at high altitudes, and generate immense kinetic energy (equivalent to over two megatons of TNT). It's designed to evade all known missile defence systems.[17] Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, an air-launched hypersonic missile with a range of over 2,000 km and speeds up to Mach 10. It can manoeuvre mid-flight, carry nuclear or conventional warheads, and has been used operationally in conflicts like Ukraine.[18] 3M22 Zircon, a scramjet-powered hypersonic cruise missile reaching Mach 9, with a range of about 1,000 km. It's primarily anti-ship, launched from ships or submarines, and has demonstrated hits on maritime targets in exercises like Zapad 2025.[19] - Air and Missile Defence Systems S-500 Prometheus, an advanced surface-to-air missile system capable of intercepting targets at 600 km, tracking up to 300 simultaneously, and engaging hypersonic weapons, ICBMs, and stealth aircraft. It's integrated with multiple radars for resilience against jamming.[20] - Emerging or Experimental Systems 9M370 Burevestnik (SSC-X-09 Skyfall), a nuclear-powered cruise missile with theoretically unlimited range due to its onboard reactor. It underwent a successful test flight in October 2025 but remains in development, with concerns about safety and reliability.[21] Poseidon (Status-6), an unmanned, nuclear-powered underwater drone (torpedo-like) capable of carrying megaton-class warheads over intercontinental distances. It's designed for coastal targets and was tested alongside Burevestnik in 2025, though full operational status is unclear.[22] Oreshnik, a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with hypersonic capabilities, is evading Western defences. Russia plans deployments in Belarus by late 2025, enhancing strike options in Europe.[23] Last but not least, the media reports on a new, potentially game-changing technology: the TOS-1A Solntsepyok, a heavy multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) designed primarily to deliver thermobaric (fuel-air explosive) and incendiary munitions. It is mounted on a modified T-72 tank chassis for mobility and protection in combat zones, and it serves as a short-range area-denial weapon, often used to target fortified positions, infantry, and light armoured vehicles by creating massive blast waves and high temperatures.[24] Possible Territorial Changes after the War? As of early 2026, Russia continues to make territorial gains (capturing over 5,600 square kilometers, mainly in Donetsk Oblast). According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) (a non-partisan, non-profit American think tank), German intelligence sources claim that “Germany expects Russia to target German energy and defence infrastructure early, given Germany’s role as a NATO hub for moving and sustaining forces and forecasts that Russia will see Germany as a priority target for long range missile strikes, armed drones, and special forces after an open armed attack on NATO’s eastern flank”[25] Consequently, according to ISW, Russia would likely be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than many Western estimates, particularly in the event of a future ceasefire in Ukraine that would free up Russian forces and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute.   Against this backdrop, any post-war territorial options generally involve compromises due to military realities, though complete restoration of Ukraine's 2014 borders is seen as improbable without major shifts. These options are shaped by Ukraine's constitution (which prohibits ceding territory without a nationwide referendum or amendments), international law against forced border changes, and Russia's demands for recognition of annexed areas such as Crimea, the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk), Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia.[26] Russia's battlefield advantages and confidence reduce incentives for concessions, while Ukraine seeks security guarantees (e.g., EU integration or European military presence) in exchange for any deals.[27] Below, the reader will find a summary of some of the options discussed by diplomats: Source: Grok - https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=2008833222403387754 In addition to territorial change options, any deal will most likely include non-territorial elements such as Ukraine's neutrality (no NATO), demilitarisation caps, the return of abducted children, and economic reintegration of Russia (e.g., sanctions relief). Experts warn that rushed agreements could lead to renewed conflict, emphasising sustainable security for Ukraine (e.g., European troops or arms build-up).[28] Outcomes in 2026 hinge on battlefield shifts, US pressure, and European unity, with diplomacy intensifying but no breakthroughs yet. Conclusion On 11 December, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned in a speech in Germany that Russia is escalating its war campaign against Europe, not just Ukraine. “We must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents or great-grandparents endured,” he said.[29] On the very same day, the EU made the bold move of indefinitely immobilising frozen Russian assets worth €210 billion; €185 billion held at Belgium’s Euroclear, and €25 billion held in banks across other member states. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen hailed the move that day, sending a strong signal to Russia that "as long as this brutal war of aggression continues, Russia's costs will continue to rise. […] This is a powerful message to Ukraine: We want to make sure that our brave neighbour becomes even stronger on the battlefield and at the negotiating table,” von der Leyen added. There is one problem that most EU leaders overlook. Namely, European societies are deeply divided, with large sections unwilling to go to war with Russia. Numerous polls evidence this. A recent ECFP Poll (June) was conducted by YouGov, Datapraxis, and Norstat across 12 countries (Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, UK). It focused on readiness for potential war, including amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine and U.S. policy shifts. Key findings suggest: 50% overall support increasing defence spending (highest in Poland and Denmark at 70%); majorities in France (62%), Germany (53%), and Poland (51%) favour reintroducing mandatory military service; 59% support continuing military aid to Ukraine even without U.S. involvement; 54% back a European nuclear deterrent independent of the U.S. All of this seems to reflect acceptance of preparation for conflict, though not direct personal willingness to fight.[30] According to John Mearsheimer, a leading realist scholar, Russia's decision to invade Ukraine was primarily a rational response to the changing material realities of the international system, particularly the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union (EU), which Russia perceived as a direct threat to its core strategic interests and great power status. Mearsheimer contends that the anarchic international system compels states, especially great powers, to maximise their power to ensure survival. Thus, Russia acted to prevent Ukraine from becoming a Western stronghold on its border, viewing the West's policies as provocative and threatening to its security. This perspective emphasises the structural pressures and incentives created by anarchy and power competition, suggesting that the imperative drove Russia's actions to survive and maintain regional dominance amid Western encroachment.[31] Admittedly, Mearsheimer’s views are much criticised by Western scholars and media experts. And yet, with the recent actions of the United States against Venezuela (the kinetic attack against the state and the kidnapping of its president and his wife – all against the most sacred principles of international law), one wonders why the cold-blooded, objective analysis has been forgone in favour of wishful thinking. References [1] Sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. (2025, October 29). European Commission. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine_en [2] Fisch, E. J., Junck, R. D., Sève, M., Albrecht vom Kolke, M., Benson, J., Lainé, W., Mueller, P., Seidner, G., & Vianesi, G. (2025, November 12). EU Adopts 19th Russia Sanctions Package Alongside New Sanctions Being Imposed by US and UK. Skadden. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2025/11/eu-adopts-19th-sanctions-package [3] Grok: What are the latest advances of Russian troops in Ukraine? [4] Каминский, А. (2025, October 2). «СВО закончится взятием Одессы». НАТО готовит румын и французов. Что в планах у Минобороны России? RuNews24. https://runews24.ru/articles/02/10/2025/svo-zakonchitsya-vzyatiem-odessyi-nato-gotovit-rumyin-i-franczuzov-chto-v-planax-u-minoboronyi-rossii also Крылова, А. (2025, December 3). Названы сроки, в которые Российская армия сможет дойти до Одессы. Абзац. https://absatz.media/news/143321-nazvany-sroki-v-kotorye-rossijskaya-armiya-smozhet-dojti-do-odessy or Елистратов, А. (2025, November 20). Эксперт: русским нет смысла соглашаться на план Трампа, они и так дойдут до Одессы. Репортёр. https://topcor.ru/66186-jekspert-russkim-net-smysla-soglashatsja-na-plan-trampa-oni-i-tak-dojdut-do-odessy.html [5] Costea, C. A. (2022, March 25). The strategic importance of the port of Odessa. Romanian Centre for Russian Studies. https://russianstudiesromania.eu/2022/03/25/the-strategic-importance-of-the-port-of-odessa/ [6] Black, E., & Kaushal, S. (2025, April 14). Black Sea Significance to European Security. Romanian Centre for Russian Studies. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/black-sea-significance-european-security [7] Ozberk, T. (2022, April 5). Why is Odessa important for Russia? Defence Procurement International. https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/sea/why-is-odessa-important-for-russia [8] Ibidem. [9] Black, E., & Kaushal, S. (2025, April 14). Black Sea Significance to European Security. Romanian Centre for Russian Studies. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/black-sea-significance-european-security [10] Mathers, J. (2025, September 8). Russia has provided fresh evidence of its territorial ambitions in Ukraine. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/russia-has-provided-fresh-evidence-of-its-territorial-ambitions-in-ukraine-264592 [11] Akage, A. (2022, May 20). Is Odessa Next? Putin Sees A Gateway To Moldova — And Chance For Revenge. Worldcrunch. https://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/why-odessa-is-important/ [12] Boyse, M. (2024, March 21). Operation Odesa: Russia Wants the Entire Ukrainian Black Sea Coast. Hudson Institute. https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/operation-odesa-russia-wants-entire-ukrainian-black-sea-coast-matthew-boyse [13] Mathers, J. (2025, September 8). Russia has provided fresh evidence of its territorial ambitions in Ukraine. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/russia-has-provided-fresh-evidence-of-its-territorial-ambitions-in-ukraine-264592 [14] Santora, M. (2023, July 19). Why Odesa Is So Important to Ukraine in the War With Russia. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/19/world/europe/odesa-ukraine-war-russia.html [15] Ozberk, T. (2022, April 5). Why is Odessa important for Russia? Defence Procurement International. https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/sea/why-is-odessa-important-for-russia [16] Ali, I. A. (2025, December 2). From Sarmat to Avangard: 10 most technologically advanced Russian weapon systems. WION. https://www.wionews.com/photos/from-sarmat-to-avangard-10-most-technologically-advanced-russian-weapon-systems-1764678135158/1764678135159 [17] Ibidem. [18] See more at: https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/russia/ [19] Charpentreau, C. (2025, September 15). Russia uses Zapad 2025 for ‘hypersonic posturing’ with Zircon, Kinzhal drills. AeroTime. https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/zapad-2025-russia-hypersonic-posture-zircon-kinzhal [20] Ali, I. A. (2025, December 2). From Sarmat to Avangard: 10 most technologically advanced Russian weapon systems. WION. https://www.wionews.com/photos/from-sarmat-to-avangard-10-most-technologically-advanced-russian-weapon-systems-1764678135158/1764678135159 [21] Gwadera, Z. (2025, November 20). Russia’s Burevestnik and Poseidon tests. IISS. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/11/russias-burevestnik-and-poseidon-tests/ [22] Ibidem. [23] See more at: https://youtu.be/D22JNoLzj9E?si=BtZ3NMCs7KoUk7ue [24] See more at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/tos-1a.htm [25] Young, J., Harward, C., Simanovskyy, M., Mappes, G., Nasreddine, D., & Barros, G. (2026, January 6). Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2026. Institute for the Study of War. https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2026/ [26] Yurchuk, V. (2025, August 12). Ceding land to Russia not only unpopular in Ukraine, but also illegal. PBS NEWS. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ceding-land-to-russia-not-only-unpopular-in-ukraine-but-also-illegal [27] Harding, E. (2025, November 24). What Is the Strategy in the Ukraine-Russia Peace Negotiations? Centre for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-strategy-ukraine-russia-peace-negotiations [28] Wright, T. (2025, August 18). The Only Plausible Path to End the War in Ukraine. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/08/trump-ukraine-russia-peace/683907/ [29] Kiorri, E., & Cabanas, L. B. (2025, December 30). Would you fight for the EU’s borders? Take our poll. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/12/30/would-you-fight-for-the-eus-borders-take-our-poll?fbclid=IwT01FWAPFTrZleHRuA2FlbQIxMABzcnRjBmFwcF9pZAwzNTA2ODU1MzE3MjgAAR4KLt3FfIaCbSxjUO8ldmbDys6WPnLeZaNIpZuhAApKVUs073MB4vZj8DKbOA_aem_lLTRWqCcGPL3F9z5-SX65g [30] https://www.eureporter.co/world/2025/06/26/most-eu-citizens-are-ready-for-war-new-poll/ [31] Smith, N. R., & Dawson, G. (2022). Mearsheimer, realism, and the Ukraine war. Analyse & Kritik, 44(2), 175–200. https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2022-2023

Great to be here and to see so many people I know so well. And of course, Teri, who will lead us later in the debate. And of course, you, Madam President, dear Valérie, thank you for your very warm welcome. And let me start by saying that it is always a pleasure to be on this side of town, to be at the European Parliament. This is my first public speaking engagement this year, and it is very meaningful to have this conversation with you – with the members of parliament. At the NATO Summit in The Hague last summer, we decided to make our deterrence and defence a priority. We agreed a plan, as you know, to invest 5% of GDP annually in defence by 2035 – with 3.5% on core defence, and 1.5% on defence- and security-related issues. Yes, that is a lot of money, but it is what is required to build our armed forces and buy the capabilities those forces need to protect us. And here we are talking about battle tanks, fighter jets, ships, long range missiles, and ammunition, but also artificial intelligence, cyber-defence, space capabilities, and of course, much more. In The Hague, we also agreed to speed up defence production and innovation. And this is of course about re-energising our industries across Europe and North America so that they step up supply. There are certainly business opportunities for our industries. But it’s more than that: there are real benefits for all of us. Because when supply goes up, the result is more security, more economic growth, and also many more jobs – the defence dividend. The defence dividend is real. I know – and you all know – that getting to this famous 5% and accelerating production requires hard work and tough decisions from all of us – all our nations and all your constituents. But we need to do it. And we need to do it basically for two reasons. One, because the security situation demands it. We need to be honest: the dangers we face are real, and the dangers we face are lasting. Russia remains our most significant threat. Putin’s war machine is churning out military equipment around the clock. And Moscow is testing us through cyber-attacks, sabotage and more. And there is no reason to believe Russia’s pattern of aggressive and reckless actions will change any time soon. On the contrary, Russia is seeking long-term confrontation. And it is not alone. Russia is working with China, with Iran, and North Korea. And these countries fuel Moscow’s war against Ukraine. And together, they are attempting to undermine our stability and security. At the same time, the threat from terrorism persists, and instability remains rampant in NATO’s southern neighbourhood. The second reason why we need to deliver on the 5% is that the time when we conveniently let the United States carry the burden for our security is over. The US is absolutely committed to NATO. But this commitment comes with a clear and long-standing expectation: that Europe and Canada take more responsibility for their own security. And I believe that is only fair. So 5% must be the direction of travel. There’s basically no time to waste. Ensuring Allies step up and speed up efforts on defence will remain my – and NATO’s – absolute priority as we prepare for the next Summit, which will take place in Ankara, in Türkiye, in July. Then Ukraine, which clearly is still a huge priority. Because, as we all know, our security is inextricably linked to Ukraine’s security. Just last week, I was at the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Paris, where leaders discussed how we can support and secure the future for Ukraine. It was a constructive meeting, where we had concrete discussions on robust security guarantees for Ukraine, and where Europe and the US affirmed their readiness to provide such guarantees to secure Ukraine after a peace deal with Russia. Meanwhile, NATO continues to support Ukraine every day, and we do that in various ways, including through the PURL initiative, which supplies vital US equipment, including air defence – which is particularly vital these days – for Ukraine to protect its people and hold the front line, paid for by Allies. Regardless of when this war ends, our support to Ukraine will continue to be important to ensure a lasting peace. After all, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will remain the first line of defence. Supporting Ukraine and keeping our own people safe is not a job that NATO does alone. It is a team effort. And the European Union is an essential player. The partnership between NATO and the EU is growing stronger every day. And that is exactly what we need. Because, when we combine our strength, of NATO and the EU, we can more effectively tackle the many challenges we face. And as you know, 23 nations, members of the EU, are also Allies in NATO. And working together, we keep Ukraine strong today and able to defend itself against any aggression in the future. And working together, we can produce more defence capabilities, and we can produce them faster. We can innovate better and outsmart our competitors. Now is not the time to go alone. And it’s not the time to create barriers between us that would increase costs, complicate production, and hamper innovation. Instead, we need to leverage our respective strengths even more. NATO is strong at standard setting and capability targets that are informed by our defence plans. NATO has a strong command and control force structure. And the European Union has all the tools of the internal market at its disposal, and of course the convening power to bring together the Member States in the EU, so to make sure that the money is there to invest in defence. So, we complement each other. And yes, it is undeniable that Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are aligning more and more. And they’re challenging us. But they are only starting to understand what partnership really means. We are miles ahead. We can build on decades of friendship between our organisations and between our nations on both sides of the Atlantic. And we can build on growing partnerships with countries around the world. And that is an incredible advantage. Let’s ensure we retain it. I’ll certainly play my part. And I count on you – and I know I can – to play yours. So, thank you very much, and I look forward to our discussions.

Introduction Artificial intelligence has become a critical technology in the 21st century, with applications spanning healthcare, commerce, and scientific research. However, the same algorithms that enable medical diagnostics can guide autonomous weapons, and the same machine learning systems that power recommendation engines can identify military targets. This dual-use nature, where technologies developed for civilian purposes can be repurposed for military applications, has positioned AI as a central element in evolving global security dynamics. The strategic implications are substantial. China views AI as essential for military modernization, with the People's Liberation Army planning to deploy "algorithmic warfare" and "network-centric warfare" capabilities by 2030 (Department of Defense, 2024). Concurrently, military conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza have demonstrated the operational deployment of AI-driven targeting systems. As nations allocate significant resources to military AI development, a critical question emerges: whether the security benefits of dual-use AI technologies can be realized without generating severe humanitarian consequences. The Reversal Commercial Innovation Driving Military Modernization Historically, military research and development drove technological innovation, with civilian applications emerging as secondary benefits, a phenomenon termed "spin-off." The internet, GPS, and microwave ovens all originated in defense laboratories. This dynamic has reversed. Commercially developed technologies now increasingly "spin into" the defense sector, with militaries dependent on technologies initially developed for commercial markets. This reversal carries significant implications for global security. Unlike the Cold War era, when the United States and Soviet Union controlled nuclear weapons development through state programs, AI innovation occurs primarily in private sector companies, technology firms, and university research institutions. Organizations like DARPA influence global emerging technology development, with their projects often establishing benchmarks for research and development efforts worldwide (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 2024). This diffusion of technological capacity complicates traditional arms control frameworks based on state-controlled military production. The scale of investment is considerable. The U.S. Department of Defense's unclassified AI investments increased from approximately $600 million in 2016 to about $1.8 billion in 2024, with more than 685 active AI projects underway (Defense One, 2024). China's spending may exceed this figure, though exact data remains unavailable due to the opacity of Chinese defense budgeting. Europe is pursuing comparable investments, with the EU committing €1.5 billion to defense-related research and development through initiatives like the European Defence Fund. Dual-Use Applications in Contemporary Warfare AI's military applications span the spectrum of warfare, from strategic planning to tactical execution. Current deployments include: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): AI systems process large volumes of sensor data, satellite imagery, and signals intelligence to identify patterns beyond human analytical capacity. In 2024, "China's commercial and academic AI sectors made progress on large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based reasoning models, which has narrowed the performance gap between China's models and the U.S. models currently leading the field," enabling more sophisticated intelligence analysis (Department of Defense, 2024). Autonomous Weapons Systems: Autonomous weapons can identify, track, and engage targets with minimal human oversight. In the Russia-Ukraine war, drones now account for approximately 70-80% of battlefield casualties (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025). Ukrainian officials predicted that AI-operated first person view drones could achieve hit rates of around 80%, compared to 30-50% for manually piloted systems (Reuters, 2024). Predictive Maintenance and Logistics: The U.S. Air Force employs AI in its Condition-Based Maintenance Plus program for F-35 fighters, analyzing sensor data to predict system failures before occurrence, reducing downtime and operational costs. Command and Control: AI assists military commanders in processing battlefield information and evaluating options at speeds exceeding human capacity. Project Convergence integrates AI, advanced networking, sensors, and automation across all warfare domains (land, air, sea, cyber, and space) to enable synchronized, real-time decision-making. Cyber Operations: AI powers both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, from automated vulnerability discovery to malware detection and sophisticated social engineering campaigns. Gaza and Ukraine: AI in Contemporary Conflict Recent conflicts have provided operational demonstrations of AI's military applications and associated humanitarian costs. Israel's Lavender system reportedly identified up to 37,000 potential Hamas-linked targets, with sources claiming error rates near 10 percent (972 Magazine, 2024). An Israeli intelligence officer stated that "the IDF bombed targets in homes without hesitation, as a first option. It's much easier to bomb a family's home" (972 Magazine, 2024). The system accelerated airstrikes but also contributed to civilian casualties, raising questions about algorithmic accountability. The system's design involved explicit tradeoffs: prioritizing speed and scale over accuracy. According to sources interviewed by 972 Magazine, the army authorized the killing of up to 15 or 20 civilians for every junior Hamas operative that Lavender marked, while in some cases more than 100 civilians were authorized to be killed to assassinate a single senior commander (972 Magazine, 2024). Foundation models trained on commercial data lack the reasoning capacity humans possess, yet when applied to military targeting, false positives result in civilian deaths. Data sourced from WhatsApp metadata, Google Photos, and other commercial platforms created targeting profiles based on patterns that may not correspond to combatant status. Ukraine has implemented different approaches, using AI to coordinate drone swarms and enhance defensive capabilities against a numerically superior adversary. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Kateryna Chernohorenko stated that "there are currently several dozen solutions on the market from Ukrainian manufacturers" for AI-augmented drone systems being delivered to armed forces (Reuters, 2024). Ukraine produced approximately 2 million drones in 2024, with AI-enabled systems achieving engagement success rates of 70 to 80 percent compared to 10 to 20 percent for manually controlled drones (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025). Both sides in the conflict have developed AI-powered targeting systems, creating operational arms race dynamics with immediate battlefield consequences. Civilian Harm: Technical and Legal Limitarions The integration of AI into lethal military systems raises humanitarian concerns extending beyond technical reliability. AI's inability to uphold the principle of distinction, which requires protecting civilians by distinguishing them from combatants in compliance with international humanitarian law, presents fundamental challenges. Current AI systems lack several capabilities essential for legal warfare:  Contextual Understanding: AI cannot comprehend the complex social, cultural, and situational factors that determine combatant status. A person carrying a weapon might be a combatant, a civilian defending their home, or a shepherd protecting livestock.  Proportionality Assessments: International humanitarian law requires that military attacks not cause disproportionate civilian damage. Human Rights Watch noted that it is doubtful whether robotic systems can make such nuanced assessments (Human Rights Watch, 2024).  Moral Judgment: Machines lack the capacity for compassion, mercy, or understanding of human dignity, qualities that have historically provided safeguards against wartime atrocities.  Accountability: With autonomous weapon systems, responsibility is distributed among programmers, manufacturers, and operators, making individual accountability difficult to establish. As one expert observed, "when AI, machine learning and human reasoning form a tight ecosystem, the capacity for human control is limited. Humans have a tendency to trust whatever computers say, especially when they move too fast for us to follow" (The Conversation, 2024). The risks extend to specific populations. Autonomous weapons systems trained on data predominantly consisting of male combatants in historical records could create algorithmic bias. In the case of Lavender, analysis suggests "one of the key equations was 'male equals militant,'" echoing the Obama administration's approach during drone warfare operations (The Conversation, 2024). Communities of color and Muslim populations face heightened risks given historical patterns of discriminatory force deployment. Export Controls and Technology Transfer Challenges Recognizing AI's strategic importance, governments have implemented export control regimes. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security now requires licenses for exports of advanced computing chips and AI model weights, imposing security conditions to safeguard storage of the most advanced models. These controls face inherent tensions. Overly broad restrictions risk hampering legitimate research and commercial innovation. Analysis suggests that if AI technology is too extensively controlled, American universities may face difficulties performing AI research, resulting in a less robust U.S. AI ecosystem. Insufficient controls enable adversaries to acquire cutting-edge capabilities. The effectiveness of export controls remains uncertain. In 2024, hundreds of thousands of chips, totaling millions of dollars, were smuggled into China through shell companies, varying distributors, and mislabeling techniques (Oxford Analytica, 2025). China's DeepSeek models, which achieved performance approaching U.S. systems, were reportedly trained on chips that circumvented export restrictions. International Governance: Fragmentation and Competing Frameworks The international community has struggled to develop coherent governance frameworks for dual-use AI. Rather than a cohesive global regulatory approach, what has emerged is a collection of national policies, multilateral agreements, high-level summits, declarations, frameworks, and voluntary commitments. Multiple international forums have addressed AI governance: ● The UN Secretary-General created an AI Advisory Board and called for a legally binding treaty to prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems without human control, to be concluded by 2026 ● The Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems has held discussions under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons since 2013, with limited concrete progress ● NATO released a revised AI strategy in 2024, establishing standards for responsible use and accelerated adoption in military operations ● The EU's AI Act, adopted in 2023, explicitly excludes military applications and national security from its scope This fragmented landscape reflects geopolitical divisions. The perceived centrality of AI for competition has led the U.S. to position itself as leader of ideologically aligned countries in opposition to China, including for security purposes. China promotes its own governance vision through initiatives like the Belt and Road, exporting technology standards alongside infrastructure. Strategic Stability Implications AI creates strategic stability challenges. Autonomous weapons enable substitution of machines for human soldiers in many battlefield roles, reducing the human cost and thus political cost of waging offensive war. This could increase the frequency of conflicts between peer adversaries, each believing they can prevail without significant domestic casualties. For conflicts between non-peer adversaries, reduced casualties further diminish domestic opposition to wars of aggression. The implications extend beyond conventional warfare. Armed, fully-autonomous drone swarms could combine mass harm with lack of human control, potentially becoming weapons of mass destruction comparable to low-scale nuclear devices. The technical barriers to such systems are declining as components become commercially available. AI also complicates nuclear stability. Advances in AI-enhanced sensors and data processing could undermine second-strike capabilities by improving detection of mobile missile launchers and submarines. This erosion of assured retaliation could incentivize first strikes during crises. Simultaneously, AI systems managing nuclear command and control create risks of accidents, miscalculations, or unauthorized launches. Ethical Framework Limitations The integration of AI into warfare strains traditional ethical frameworks. Just War Theory requires that combatants maintain moral responsibility for their actions, possess the capacity to distinguish combatants from civilians, and apply proportionate force. Automation bias and technological mediation weaken moral agency among operators of AI-enabled targeting systems, diminishing their capacity for ethical decision-making. When operators interact with targeting through screens displaying algorithmic recommendations rather than direct observation, psychological distance increases. This mediation risks transforming killing into a bureaucratic process. The operator becomes less a moral agent making decisions and more a technician approving or rejecting algorithmic suggestions. Furthermore, industry dynamics, particularly venture capital funding, shape discourses surrounding military AI, influencing perceptions of responsible AI use in warfare. When commercial incentives align with military applications, the boundaries between responsible innovation and reckless proliferation become unclear. Companies developing AI for civilian markets face pressure to expand into defense contracting, often with insufficient ethical deliberation. Conclusion Dual-use AI technologies present both opportunities and risks for international security. One trajectory leads toward normalized algorithmic warfare at scale, arms races in autonomous weapons that erode strategic stability, and inadequate international governance resulting in civilian harm. An alternative trajectory involves international cooperation that constrains the most dangerous applications while permitting beneficial uses. The timeframe for establishing governance frameworks is limited. AI capabilities are advancing rapidly, and widespread proliferation of autonomous weapons will make policy reversal substantially more difficult. The challenge resembles nuclear non-proliferation but unfolds at greater speed, driven by commercial incentives rather than state-controlled programs. Because AI is a dual-use technology, technical advances can provide economic and security benefits. This reality means unilateral restraint by democratic nations would cede advantages to authoritarian competitors. However, uncontrolled competition risks adverse outcomes for all parties. Concrete action is required from multiple actors. States must strengthen multilateral agreements through forums like the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to establish binding restrictions on autonomous weapons without meaningful human control. NATO and regional security alliances should harmonize AI ethics standards and create verification mechanisms for military AI deployments. Military institutions must implement mandatory human-in-the-loop requirements for lethal autonomous systems and establish clear chains of accountability for AI-driven targeting decisions. Technology companies developing dual-use AI systems bear responsibility for implementing ethical safeguards and conducting thorough threat modeling before commercial release. Industry alliances should establish transparency standards for military AI applications and create independent audit mechanisms. Universities and research institutions must integrate AI ethics and international humanitarian law into technical training programs. Export control regimes require coordination between the United States, EU, and allied nations to prevent regulatory arbitrage while avoiding overreach that stifles legitimate research. Democratic governments should lead by demonstrating that military AI can be developed within strict ethical and legal constraints, setting standards that distinguish legitimate security applications from destabilizing weapons proliferation. As Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg observed, this represents the Oppenheimer moment of the current generation, recognizing that dual-use AI, like nuclear weapons, represents a technology whose military applications demand collective restraint. The policy choices made in the next few years will have long-term consequences. They will determine whether AI becomes a tool for human advancement or an instrument of algorithmic warfare. The technology exists; the policy framework remains to be established. The actors are identified; the question is whether they possess the political will to act before proliferation becomes irreversible. 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I. Introduction Relations between Japan and China entered a state of crisis on November 7th, 2025, after Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi said in the Japanese parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan potentially constituted an “existential crisis” under the Legislation for Peace and Security, allowing Japan to take military action in collective self-defense [1]. Following Takaichi’s remarks, the Chinese general consul in Osaka, Xue Jian, made threatening comments against Takaichi on X, triggering a diplomatic row between the two countries. Both sides protested the other’s remarks. In response to questions from the members of Japanese parliament, Takaichi refused to withdraw her remarks, claiming that they were consistent with the Japanese government’s existing position on the issue. Japan requested that China take “appropriate measures” against Xue. China refused the Japanese request and instead demanded Takaichi retract her statements. Then the Chinese government issued numerous retaliatory measures against Japan, including restricting travel and cultural exchanges, issuing a travel advisory, and cutting off seafood imports from the country. Moreover, On November 15th, the China Maritime Safety Administration announced that the People’s Liberation Army would conduct live-fire exercises in the central Yellow Sea from November 17th to 19th, and that navigation in this area would be prohibited during this period. The notice drew criticism from Taiwan, which accused China of saber-rattling in Japan for political gain [2]. On November 16th, the China Coast Guard announced that a formation of its ships carried out a patrol within the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, a territory disputed between Japan, China, and Taiwan. On December 2nd, Chinese and Japanese coastguard vessels engaged in a standoff over the islands. China said that it had implemented “necessary control measures” and driven a Japanese fishing boat away from the islands. On the other hand, Japan stated that it had intercepted and driven away two Chinese coastguard vessels, which approached the Japanese fishing boat. [3] From December 6th to 7th, Chinese Liaoning aircraft carrier transited through the Miyako Strait between the islands of Okinawa and Miyakojima and began takeoff and landing drills with Shenyang J-15 jets; aircraft took off from and landed on the aircraft carrier roughly 100 times in two days. [4] On December 7th, Japanese defense minister Shinjirō Koizumi accused China of two incidents on December 6th in which Shenyang J-15 jets from the Liaoning aircraft carrier at locking their fire-control radar at Japanese F-15 jets near the Miyako Strait. The Japanese government strongly protested to China. Takaichi also called the incident “extremely disappointing.” Japanese vice foreign minister Takehiro Funakoshi summoned Chinese ambassador Wu Jianghao over the incident. [5] In response, the PLA Navy spokesperson Wang Xuemeng accused Japan of a “slander and smear campaign,” saying that the Liaoning was carrying “routine carrier-based fighter jet flight training. [6]” In addition, he said that Japan Self-Defense Forces' aircraft had repeatedly approached and disrupted its fighter jet training. Japanese officials later said that their Chinese counterparts didn’t answer the hot line during the incident. Japanese defense minister Koizumi also said that while notified, Japan “did not receive sufficient information” regarding the military exercises, while Kihara said Japanese jets were far away from the Chinese jets while training. [7] The US criticized the radar targeting of Japanese aircraft and strengthened the US alliance with Japan. A US State Department spokesperson also said that “China’s actions do not contribute to regional peace and stability.” [8] The Liaoning aircraft carrier group traveled northeast from their position east of Kikai Island following the incident. A Chinese naval Type 054 frigate also sailed through the Miyako Strait on December 8th, while another traveled through the Osumi Strait. On December 9th, two Russian Tupolev Tu-95 bombers, four Chinese Shenyang J-16 fighter jets, and two Chinese Xi’an H-6 bombers flew through the Miyako Strait into the Pacific Ocean as part of joint military drills. On December 10th, two US B-52 bombers flew together with three Japanese F-15 jets and three F-35 jets. The Japanese defense ministry said that the US and Japan “reaffirmed their strong resolve to prevent any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force.” [9] With this recent tension between China and Japan in the background, this paper explores the impacts of the China-Japan conflict on the global economy. This paper first explains major conflicts between China and Japan in the past and then examines the effects of the China-Japan conflict on the global economy. II. Past Conflicts between China and Japan The First Sino-Japanese War The First Sino-Japanese War (July 25th, 1894 – April 17th, 1895) was a conflict between the Qing dynasty of China and the Empire of Japan primarily for influence over Korea. [10] After more than six months of unbroken successes by Japanese naval and land forces and the loss of the ports of Lüshunkou (Port Arthur) and Weihaiwei, the Qing government sued for peace in February 1895 and signed the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan two months later, thereby ending the war. In the late 19th century, Korea remained one of the Qing tributary states, while Japan viewed Korea as a target of imperial expansion. In June 1894, the Qing government, at the request of the Korean emperor Gojong, sent 2,800 troops to aid in suppressing the Donghak Peasant Revolution. The Japanese government considered this a violation of the 1885 Convention of Tientsin and sent an expeditionary force of 8,000 troops to Korea. The Japanese force landed in Incheon. The Japanese army moved to Seoul, seized the Korean emperor, and set up a pro-Japanese government on July 23rd, 1894 in the occupation of Gyeongbokgung. The Qing government decided to withdraw its troops, but rejected recognition of the pro-Japanese government, which had granted the Imperial Japanese Army the right to expel the Qing’s Huai Army from Korea. However, approximately 3,000 Qing troops remained in Korea, and could be supplied only by sea; on July 25th, the Japanese Navy won the Battle of Pungdo over the Qing navy and sank the Qing’s steamer Kowshing, which was carrying 1,200 Qing reinforcements. Japan declared war against the Qing on August 1st. Following the Battle of Pyongyang on September 15th, Qing troops retreated to Manchuria, allowing the Japanese army to take over Korea. Two days later, the Qing’s Beiyang Fleet suffered a decisive defeat at the Battle of the Yalu River, with its surviving ships retreating to Port Arthur. In October 1894, the Japanese army invaded Manchuria, and captured Port Arthur on November 21st. Then Japan captured Weihaiwei on the Shandong Peninsula on February 12th, 1895. This gave the Japanese army control over the approaches to Beijing, and the Qing court began to negotiate with Japan in early March. The war concluded with the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17th, which required the Qing government to pay a massive indemnity and to cede the island of Taiwan to Japan. Japan gained a predominant position in the Korean peninsula. The war demonstrated the failure of the Qing dynasty’s attempts to modernize its military and fend off threats to its sovereignty, especially when compared with Japan’s successful Meiji Restoration. For the first time, regional hegemony in East Asia shifted from China to Japan; the prestige of the Qing dynasty, along with the classical tradition in China, suffered a major blow. [11] Inside China, the defeat was a catalyst for a series of political upheavals led by Sun Yat-sen and Kang Youwei, culminating in the 1911 Revolution and ultimate end of the Qing dynasty in China. The Second Sino-Japanese War The Second Sino-Japanese War was fought between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China and between 1937 and 1945, after a period of war localized to Manchuria that started in 1931. [12] It was the largest war in Asia in the 20th century. [13] On September 18th, 1931, the Japanese staged the Mukden incident, a false flag event fabricated to justify their invasion of Manchuria and establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. This is sometimes marked as the beginning of the war between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China. From 1931 to 1937, China and Japan engaged in skirmishes, including Shanghai, as well as in Northern China. The military forces of Nationalist and Chinese Communist Party, led by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong respectively, had fought each other in the Chinese Civil War since 1927. In late 1933, Chiang Kai-shek encircled the Chinese Communists in an attempt to finally destroy them, forcing the Communists into the Long March. The Communists lost almost 90% of their men. Although a Japanese invasion became imminent, Chiang still refused to form a united front with the Communists before he was placed under house arrest by his subordinates who forced him to form the Second United Front in late 1936 in order to resist the Japanese invasion together. [14] The full-scale war started on July 7th, 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge incident near Beijing, which prompted a full-scale Japanese invasion of the rest of China. The Japanese army captured the capital of Nanjing in 1937 and perpetrated the Nanjing Massacre. After failing to stop the Japanese capture of Wuhan (China’s de facto capital at that time) in 1938, the Nationalist government relocated to Chongqing in the Chinese interior. After the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Soviet aid bolstered the National Revolutionary Army and Air Force. By 1939, after Chinese victories at Changsha and with Japan’s lines of communications stretched deep into the interior, the war reached a stalemate. The Japanese forces could not defeat the Communist forces in Shaanxi, who waged a campaign of sabotage and guerrilla warfare. In November 1939, Nationalist forces carried out a large-scale winter offensive, and in August 1940, Communist forces launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive in central China. In April 1941, Soviet aid was halted with the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact. [15] In December 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and declared war on the US. The US increased its aid to China under the Lend-Lease Act, becoming its main financial and military supporter. With Burma cut off, the US Air Forces airlifted material over the Himalayas. In 1944, Japan launched Operation Ichi-Go, the invasion of Henan and Changsha. In 1945, the Chinese Expeditionary Force resumed its advance in Burma and completed the Ledo Road linking India to China. China launched large counter-offensives in South China, repulsed a failed Japanese invasion of West Hunan, and recaptured Japanese occupied regions of Guangxi. [16] Japan surrendered on September 2nd, 1945, after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US, Soviet declaration of war against Japan and subsequent invasions of Manchukuo and Korea. The war resulted in the deaths of approximately 20 million Chinese. China was recognized as one of the Big Four Allied powers in World War II and one of the “Four Policemen,” which formed the foundation of the UN. [17] It regained all lost territories and became one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The Chinese Civil War resumed in 1946, ending with a communist victory and the Proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The government of the Republic of China relocated to Taiwan. Senkaku Islands Dispute September 2010 Senkaku Boat Collision The Senkaku boat collision incident occurred on the morning of September 7th, 2010, when a Chinese trawler (Minjinyu 5179) collided with Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats near the Senkaku Islands. The Senkaku Islands are a group of five uninhabited islands and three islets located in the East China Sea, which are under the administrative control of Japan, but also claimed by China and Taiwan. The Senkaku Islands have both economic and military value. There are rich fishing grounds in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) surrounding the Senkaku islands, as well as significant oil and gas deposits. The islands are also of great geostrategic value, facilitating control over the East China Sea. [18] The Senkaku Islands are claimed by Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan). [19] In 2008 a sports fishing boat from Taiwan, Lien Ho, was rammed and sunk by Japanese Coast Guard patrol ships which led to an official apology and monetary compensation of NT$10 million paid by Japan. Multiple events involving Japanese Coast Guard and fishing boats from nearby Chinese provinces and Taiwan have occurred since 1972. From 2005 to the 2010 incident, however, bilateral relations between Japan and China had been positive.  [20] According to the Japanese Coast Guard, the patrol boat Mizuki of the 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters encountered Minjinyu 5179 at around 10:15 (JST) on September 7th, 2010. Mizuki ordered Minjinyu 5179 to stop for inspection since Minjinyu 5179 was traveling 12 km (7.5 mi) north-west of the Senkaku Islands, which is outside the agreed area for Chinese fishing, and within disputed Japanese territorial waters. Minjinyu 5179 refused to follow the order and attempted to flee from the scene. During the chase and interception, Minjinyu 5179 collided with Japanese Coast Guard patrol vessels. On September 8th, 2010, Japanese Coast Guard boarded the Chinese trawler and arrested its captain for obstruction of performance of public duty and illegal fishing. [21] The trawler, the captain, and 14 crew members were transported to Ishigaki Island of Japan for detention. A Japanese investigator told the press that he smelled alcohol on the arrested captain but apparently no alcohol test results were ever released. The collision and Japan’s subsequent detention of the captain, Zhan Qixiong resulted in a major diplomatic dispute between Japan and China. When China’s repeated demands for the release of the captain were refused and his detention extended for ten more days, the Chinese government canceled official meetings of the ministerial level and above. [22] In response to the arrest, the Chinese government made a series of diplomatic protests, demanding the immediate release of the trawler and all its crew. China summoned Uichiro Niwa, the Japanese ambassador to China in Beijing, six times, each time with an official of higher diplomatic rank, on one occasion after midnight. Moreover, China initiated a series of escalatory measures, including rhetorical threats, encouraging popular protests across China, the arrest of four Japanese citizens in China for allegedly photographing military targets and the implementation of an unofficial embargo on Rare Earth Elements (REE). These measures were implemented with various degrees of ambiguity and designed to exploit a number of Japanese vulnerabilities – including the Japanese government’s weakened domestic position and the Japanese economy’s high dependency on Chinese REE exports. [23] In the short-term, China attempted to force Japan to release the detained trawler captain immediately. In the long-term, however, China tried to demonstrate its ability to use a strong economic instrument which could be used as deterrent, and as coercive measure. The detained Chinese crew members were released without charge and were allowed to return home. In China, the overall event is perceived as a diplomatic victory, while the Japanese government’s “weak-kneed” handling of the issue was criticized in Japan, in particular by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. [24] One hundred Japanese conservative lawmakers signed a letter criticizing the release of the Chinese captain, and Japanese citizens took to the street to protest both China’s behavior and the “weakness” of the Japanese government. Video footage proving the deliberate nature of the boat ramming was only shown to Japanese lawmakers in a closed screening, but not released to the wider public, likely out of fear of further diplomatic clashes with China. The footage was eventually leaked online and led to increased criticism of the Japanese government for keeping details of the incident from the public. The crisis was resolved by the end of November 2010 when diplomatic dialogue between Japan and China was fully restored, and a significant de-escalation of measures took place. September 2012 Japanese Government’s Island Purchase The Senkaku Islands dispute in September 2012 was a major flare-up between Japan and China, triggered by Japan‘s purchase (from private owners) and nationalization of three of the uninhabited islands, which China claims as its territory. In April 2012, the governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, a right-wing nationalist, announced a plan for his municipal government to purchase three of the islands (Uotsuri, Minamikojima, and Kitakojima) from their private owner and build on them in order to assert Japanese sovereignty. In August 2012, Chinese activists from Hong Kong briefly landed on the islands, triggering a visit by Japanese activists in response. In September 2012, the Japanese government completed the purchase of the three islands from a private Japanese owner. This action triggered massive anti-Japanese protests across China, disruptions to Japanese businesses, boycotts of Japanese products, and increased patrols by Chinese vessels near the islands, thereby escalating tensions between China and Japan over sovereignty. This action also impacted trade between the two countries and tested the US-Japan security alliance. Consequences of the conflict were as follows: First, the dispute intensified nationalist feelings in both China and Japan, with demonstrations occurring in more than 100 Chinese cities, coinciding with the anniversary of the Mukden Incident. The Japanese embassy in Beijing was attacked. Major Japanese companies temporarily shut their factories and offices in China. Two more Japanese activists landed briefly on the islands. Secondly, Chinese Boycotts and business disruptions hit Japanese companies like Panasonic, Honda, and Canon, with significant drops in Japanese car sales and exports to China. Third, in response to Japan’s purchase of the three islands, China sent patrol boats to the area, challenging Japan’s administration and marking a new, more confrontational status quo. Later six Chinese ships sailed into the waters around the islands, staying for a short period of time to assert China’s territorial claim. Chinese maritime surveillance vessels made 12 forays into the waters close to the Islands after Japan bought the three islands in September 2012. Japan increased the number of coastguard vessels patrolling the island from three to thirty. Moreover, in December 2012, a Chinese maritime surveillance plane flied over the islands for the first time. Japan responded by scrambling eight F-15 fighter jets. The incident demonstrated that the dangers of an armed clash existed not only at sea, but also in the air. The dispute wasn’t resolved; instead, it marked a significant escalation, with Japan solidifying its de facto administrative control and China increasing its assertive presence. Fourth, since 2012, China has maintained a daily presence with its coast guard vessels near the islands, thereby creating the situations of confrontation with the Japanese navy. III. The Economic Effects of Conflicts between China and Japan 1. Evolution of China-Japan Conflict It is hard to predict what effects China-Japan conflicts will have on global economy, as well as the economy of both countries. Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies at University of Cambridge carried out research on this issue in June 2014 after Japanese government purchased three of the uninhabited Senkaku islands and then the conflict between China and Japan took place in September 2012. Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies categorizes China-Japan Conflict as a magnitude 3 conflict. Table 1: Magnitude scale of conflict (source: Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies) Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies provided three scenario for the China-Japan Conflict (S1, S2, and X1). Standard Scenario S1 consists of 9 months of conflict before stalemate occurs and intervention enables peace to be concluded. Scenario Variant S2 is similar to the standard scenario, but the conflict period lasts for 2 years, with trade disruption continuing for a further 3 years. An important aspect of the macroeconomic consequences is the duration of the disruption to international trade. Phase 4 in the scenario is prolonged, with double the economic losses and around 250,000 people dead. Scenario Variant X1 (Extreme 1) is the most severe variant considered in the impact analysis. Conventional weapons are still preferred but the conflict lasts more than 5 years, thereby causing over 3 times the losses and nearly 500,000 deaths. Such a variant plunges the whole world into a three-year recession after 90% of export trade is lost. According to Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies, the China-Japan Conflict evolves through Phase 1 through 7. Phase 1: escalating tensions Diplomatic posturing, Naval maneuvers, and large-scale war-games have defined recent tensions between Japan and China. Amid military modernization, increased Chinese nationalism, the legacy of conflict (Sino-Japanese wars) and an extreme thirst for natural resources, Japan and China have continued to clash over the Senkaku Islands. As Japan imports 90% of its energy, it is eager to maintain an open and free flow of maritime trade, but despite bilateral trade reaching US$ 345 billion, China has pursued a more assertive position, fueled by nationalism and a rise in anti-Japanese sentiment. [25] Since Japan’s nationalization of three of the disputed Senkaku islands in 2012, China has increased the frequency and scale of incursions. For example, Chinese aircraft have entered the disputed airspace, and Chinese frigates have engaged Japanese destroyers. Tensions have reached their highest level since the end of World War II in 1945. In a show of self-determination, Japan’s Diet (parliament) passed new laws that repealed limitations of the Constitution on use of military force to settle international disputes. There is a growing concern that the situation in the East China Sea will soon escalate beyond the disputes in the South China Sea, where the Chinese navy attacked commercial Vietnamese vessels over proximity to the Spratly Islands. [26] A Japanese fishing vessel is fired upon after straying into Chinese waters. Although the crew of the damaged boat are returned safely, angry diplomatic exchanges begin from the highest levels of both Japanese and Chinese governments. Japan acknowledges the error of the fishing boat and promises immediate action to prevent further incidents. [27] Although tight-lipped at first, details emerge that the Japanese government deployed naval engineers to install radar equipment on the disputed Senkaku islands to ‘help ships and boats navigate the area safely.’ The Chinese government and state-run media react angrily to the news, stating that the objective of ‘preventing marine accidents’ is a ‘thinly veiled attempt to disguise a notorious, unlawful and dangerous attempt to claim Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku islands.’ Phase 2: provocation and posturing Stocks tied to Japanese businesses suffer heavy losses on Chinese stock markets as tensions between Japan and China increased amid uncertainty over the Chinese response. Although expected to call for a UN Security Council meeting, the Chinese government bypass diplomatic protocols and issue a public condemnation and ultimatum, demanding that Japan remove immediately the radar and personnel within 72 hours. Failure to do so, the statement from the Chinese government continues, is considered “an unacceptable act of aggression against Chinese sovereignty.” Despite international calls for calm action and volatility in global stock markets, Japan refuses to remove the radar equipment, reiterating their “honest and responsible intent to protect all in the East China Sea.” After 24 hours, China orders an immediate cessation of all trade import agreements with Japan. China also issues a travel advisory, warning all Chinese citizens to leave Japan immediately. The US and several EU countries urge calm. The Dow Jones and FTSE100 are among many global markets that suffer heavy losses on fear of war and the implications for long-term economic growth. The world waits anxiously for the deadline. Rumors of negotiations excite the press and prop up the markets but the sudden and conspicuously coordinated departure of all non-essential personnel from the Chinese embassies and consulates in Japan creates widespread pessimism. Many international operations decide to withdraw executives from their offices in key cities in the region. Phase 3: military incidents Seventy-two hours after the ultimatum, a Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Lanzhou-class destroyer launches a C-602 cruise missile against the radar installation on the disputed islands. The missile destroys the radar along with a naval transportation unit, killing 18 members of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The Western countries condemn the Chinese missile attack with UK, US, and France calling an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council. Japanese citizens are outraged. The Japanese government publicly promises retaliation against China. The US government urges restraint on Japan and warns that any proactive Japanese actions to provoke China could compromise US ability to support them in future actions. Stock markets plunge as fear of war sets in, with commodity prices, in particular oil, increasing significantly. The following evening two Japanese Mitsubishi F2 fighter planes from Tsuiki Air Base in Fukuoka, armed with ASM-2 anti-ship missiles, destroy the Chinese ship responsible for the missile attack on Senkaku Islands. China state news agencies report 37 Chinese sailors killed in the attack, with the destroyer afloat in open water but damaged beyond repair. Protestors in China take to the streets, criticizing Japan’s attacks. Japanese citizens are jubilant, with nationalistic media coverage. The wider international community condemns the retaliation act. China instigates a full blockade of Japanese vessels traveling through the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, while promising safe passage for all non-Japan bound ships; China closes its airspace to airplanes coming to or from Japan. Japan reacts similarly, restricting movement of Chinese ships and airplanes. To prevent any attempt on the part of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force to access the islands, Chinese PLAN enacts a familiar mine warfare strategy to block access. The ‘Elfreida’, a commercial US$200m Ultra Large Container Vessel traveling from Busan in South Korea to Singapore, is lost at sea along with nearly 15,000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) of cargo. Although the cause is not confirmed, speculation mounts that the ship struck a Chinese mine that had drifted into open water. Japan is quick to label it as another Chinese act of recklessness, while China blames a Japanese submarine attack for the disaster. Amid the high level of tension, another civilian disaster occurs as a commercial aircraft carrying 400 passengers disappears. A 747-400 heading from Beijing to Sydney disappears from the radar over the East China Sea. Accident investigators cannot determine whether it was destroyed in an act of war. Aside from the human cost, insurance claims are expected of up to a billion dollars. The US, Australia, and India create a total blockade of the East China Sea. Ships traveling from Japan are forced to travel south of the Philippines, thereby increasing journey times by over 30%. South Korea’s trade routes with Asia and Europe are also severely affected, however, as it is summer, trade with Europe suffer less, as they can use Arctic-shipping lanes and actually reduce shipping times by almost one week. China’s imports and exports are hit hardest. Their cross-Pacific journeys are rendered almost impossible, severely hampering trade and diplomatic relations with the US. [28] Chinese citizens take to the streets in protest. Although protests are generally anti-Western, they focus on anti-Japanese protests. Japanese businesses are ransacked and burned, and Japanese commercially branded products destroyed on the street. A Japanese factory in Shanghai is stormed by an angry mob, killing Japanese managers. Dozens more Japanese workers are taken hostage by Chinese protestors. Phase 4: all-out conflict Japan’s Special Forces mount a clandestine operation to rescue the Shanghai hostages, bringing commandoes ashore and into the factory compound in central Shanghai, undetected by Chinese defense forces. The clandestine operation successfully extracts the Japanese hostages, and the Japanese Special Forces escape before the Chinese army react, but several Chinese protestors are killed. China responds with a subtle but devastating act. A cyber attack shuts down Japan’s Futtsu Power station, near Tokyo, the second largest gas power station in the world and key provider of energy to the Keihin and Keiyo Industrial Zones (the largest industrial region in Japan). The attack cripples Japan’s industrial sector and denies power to military bases in the region. Power shortages restrict industries to three-day weeks as Japan starves for energy. At the same time, Washington D.C. suffers a mysterious but temporary power outage. Despite China denying responsibility for computerized hacking of the US power grid, military commentators interpret it as ‘virtual shot across the bow’, to warn the US away from military intervention in the China-Japan conflict. Trading is suspended on global stock markets as fear of a world war triggers sharp falls. Panic strikes Japan as people begin to evacuate the major cities in Japan. Many foreign nationals have already left but those who remain struggle to find ways to exit Japan. A full diplomatic effort is launched to remove citizens from both China and Japan. Foreign governments provide a constant stream of flights to India, Singapore and Australia as fear of escalation spreads. After a short period of relative calm, Japan carries out a pre-dawn air strike against mainland China. Ship-launched cruise missiles and aircraft-launched air-to-ground missiles target the military bases and radar stations around Shanghai, Beijing, and the Hong Kong - Guanghzou region. It is the start of a major period of offensive action by Japanese military forces, which continues for nearly three months of nightly bombing. As the anti-aircraft defenses around the cities in China are degraded, air raids are launched targeting the major industrial and commercial centers, in a concerted action of strategic bombing to reduce the economic power of China and change the strategic balance of military power and global influence in the region after the conflict. Assembly plants, office buildings, factories, ports, trucking and rail facilities are destroyed in concerted waves, night after night. Chinese air defense is fierce, and Japanese aircraft suffer heavy losses. Despite the night timing of the attacks, and air raid warnings, tens of thousands of Chinese workers are reported killed in the first few weeks. The death toll mounts over the coming months. China’s retaliation is swift; carrying out similar airstrikes against industrial and commercial sites in Japan’s Sendai region, and commencing an intensive bombing campaign of Japan’s power plants, liquid petroleum gas plants and shipping terminals. Japan’s already restricted energy supply is further damaged, and China’s strategy is now to cripple Japan’s economic infrastructure and to place pressure on the Japanese government to back down. China launches waves of missile attacks against industrial sites in the Tokyo-Yokohama region. In addition to tens of thousands of casualties, Japan’s industrial capacity suffers severe damage. Phase 5: stalemate The hostilities between Japan and China provokes global condemnation and the international community suffers economically from the fallout of the war, but for some period of time nobody can prevent the conflict from continuing. China’s membership of the UN Security Council is suspended. The UN Security Council calls for an immediate ceasefire and de-militarization of the area, but is unable to get agreement to mandate trading sanctions against the belligerent nations. Shipping of gas and oil supplies to both Japan and China are severely curtailed and energy reserves in both countries are reported running low, but critically so in Japan. The US declares that it is not prepared to let the Japanese citizens run out of fuel, and soon will provide Japan with the gas and oil supplies it needs. Japan agrees to suspend military attacks against China. A US shipping convoy of oil tankers heads for Japan, and the US demands that China withdraws its naval blockade around Japan to let it pass. Aircraft carriers and supporting ships from the US Pacific fleet move into tactical positions around the South China Sea. The implication is clear. The US can not allow Japan to lose the conflict and now prepare to intervene militarily if necessary. Russia protests against the US action and hints that it will make its gas and oil available to China in reciprocation, but after diplomatic pressure Russia finally aligns with the international consensus to end the China-Japan conflict. The rest of the ‘democratic security diamond’- i.e. Australia and India, as well as the UK, France, Germany, and regional actors, Vietnam and the Philippines – shows public solidarity around the initiative to end the war. For weeks the US navy and Chinese navy face off at sea, circling and withdrawing, but no shots are fired. There are no further attacks on the Japanese mainland and there is a period of stalemate between the two countries. Phase 6: negotiated peace The US, along with Russia as a partner, calls for an immediate ceasefire, the removal of the weapons on the disputed islands, and the opportunity for both China and Japan to address the UN on the issue of each country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Chinese premier and the Japanese prime minister finally meet at peace talks in Singapore. After three days of negotiations, a peace treaty is signed, thereby guaranteeing the free flow of trade through the South and East China Sea and gestures towards the reconstruction of each other’s infrastructure. Global markets respond positively. Phase 7: aftermath China agrees to the conditions that any further attack would void all agreements, and that Pacific and South China Sea shipping lanes will be opened as soon as possible so that trade with the US and Canada can begin again. Japan also agrees to the ceasefire and to the US and Russia’s role in negotiating trade relations with China and restoring most of the US$ 345 billion agreement. The free flow of shipping routes returns within 3 months, causing an increase in global stock markets as some normality returned. It requires a large presence and deployment of US Naval forces, at significant cost to their economy. Commodity prices began to drop within hours of the agreement. Ownership of the Senkaku islands remains disputed, but after 9 months of conflict, 100,000 deaths, and billions of dollars in losses, neither side has the political will, energy supplies, the public support, or the money to continue the conflict. 2. Examination of the Effects of China-Japan Conflict on Global Economy To model the effects of a China-Japan conflict, Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies at University of Cambridge selected a number of key indicators. Shocks were chosen based on historical precedents that would be expected to occur during a China-Japan conflict. While the conflict may last for only a few months, most of the shocks applied in the model persist and generally last for a period of one year before returning to baseline over the next several years. Several of the variables were shocked for a longer period to represent the ongoing macroeconomic effects created by conflict. The effects of conflict. on some variables were very long lasting and have very high macroeconomic inertia in the system, thereby taking several years to return to pre-disaster levels. Such an example is the effect of conflict on global trade. The modeling by Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies was carried out in 2014, but the Cambridge Centre is interested in generic results for whenever a conflict might break out in future years. Variable descriptions The three independent scenarios (S1, S2, and X1) have been modeled using the Oxford Economics Global Economic Model. Following are the variables in the model to which the shocks were applied. Table 2 provides an overview of the input (parameter) variables applied. Table 2: Input (parameter) variables in macroeconomic modeling   Inward foreign direct investment is investment in business and capital. China has significant inflows of foreign direct investment and is therefore much more affected by a conflict shock to this variable than Japan. A 40% reduction of inward foreign direct investment represents a loss of approximately US$ 100 billion per year to the Chinese economy at its peak in year 2. In Japan, this represents a loss of about US$ 2.1 billion per year at its peak in year 2. Government consumption increases during the conflict to pay for military, ammunition and additional resources required for conflict. China spent 2% (US$ 166 billion) of GDP on defense in 2014, while Japan spent 1% (US$ 59.3 billion) of GDP on defense. In each of the three scenarios, government spending increased 7% in the first year and then returned to baseline levels by the end of the second year. This represents an increase in government spending of US$ 86 billion per year for China and US$ 70 billion per year for Japan. Exports and imports account for a significant share of GDP for both Japan and China. In China, exports account for 26% of GDP and in Japan, exports account for 18%. One of the largest economic effects that will occur as a result of this conflict will result from exports and imports being prevented to entering the East China Sea. Exports and imports are both shocked simultaneously and equally in each scenario. The peak of the shock to exports and imports occurs at the outbreak of conflict but takes a further six years to recover to pre-conflict levels. Capital destruction is defined as capital that can no longer be used as a productive resource and is an expected but unfortunate consequence of conflict. A declining capital base therefore has very serious consequences for economic growth and output. The level of capital destruction increases in each of the three scenarios from 2% of the capital stock in S1, 5% in S2 and 10% in X1. Share (stock) prices capture the market valuation of firms within an economy and incorporate the assets into a firm’s books and the expected value of future revenue and profit. Share prices therefore capture the level of confidence that the market has in the future profitability of a firm. Any firm that operates in a country that is in conflict will face increasing risks to its normal business operation and long-term strategic objectives. Increased uncertainty about future growth will have significant downward pressure on the market valuation of firms that operate in these areas. Share prices have been shocked 2% in S1, 5% in S2 and 10% in S3 compared to the baseline. Share prices are also expected to decline in other parts of the world as future global expectations are amended downward. These effects are modeled directly on neighboring Asian countries and the US stock market. In all three scenarios, however, share prices return to baseline by the end of second year after the conflict began. Capital flight occurs when assets and money rapidly move out of a country or region. Capital flight is most likely to occur when investment and business outlooks are uncertain, and investments are placed at risk. In Japan, capital flight is modeled as a devaluation of its exchange rate benchmarked against the US dollar. A 10% devaluation of the Japanese currency takes place in S1, 15% in S2 and 50% in X1. Modeling capital flight from China is more problematic. China has strict controls on capital, and the Yuan does not float on international currency markets. As a result, the exchange rate in China is fixed at present levels across all scenarios. Capital flight from China is therefore indirectly captured through a decline in investment funded by loans. This is represented by a shock of 40% in S1, 60% in S2 and 80% in X1 with recovery back to baseline projections taking six years. World oil prices typically rise during conflict due to increased demand for energy and heightened uncertainty around supply. This is modeled as a 20% increase in S1, 30% increase in S2 and 50% increase X1. The rise in oil prices lasts for 12 months during the conflict and then is allowed to return to base during the second year. Impact of China-Japan conflict on exports and imports A shock on exports and imports to Japan and China represents one of the most significant effects that will affect global economic output. Figures 1 and 2 show the international exports from Japan and China which are halted by the conflict. The biggest recipient of exports from Japan and China, apart from each other, is the US. Figure 1: China exports by value and type to different countries Figure 2: Japan exports by value and type to different countries. As a result of the conflict, total exports in China for the year 2 drop by 80% in the X1 scenario or approximately US$ 1.5 trillion. And for Japan exports decline by US$ 726 billion. Behind Japan and China, exports from the US are the most adversely affected international market dropping in traded value by over US$ 450 billion in the X1 scenario. Globally, the aggregate value of total exports declines by over US$ 6 trillion. A similar picture can be described for imports. Imports to the US reach a minimum in year 2 with a drop of US$ 165 billion, while the value of aggregate global imports drops by almost $4 trillion across all markets and sectors. Impact of China-Japan conflict on energy prices Brent crude spot price spikes at US$ 120 per barrel in scenario X1 and roughly US$ 110pb in each of the other two scenarios. This occurs despite downward pressure on global aggregate demand due to a decline in aggregate output, a substantial shock to global trade and a significant drop in market confidence. The biggest impact on global oil prices occurs 12 months after the conflict began with a steep decline in oil prices as the world recovers from the shock of conflict. There is then a period of two years of persistent decline in oil prices until the end of year 3. Global oil prices does not fully recover to pre-conflict levels by the end of the model period in year 7. Impact of China-Japan conflict on commodity prices A similar pattern will occur in the price of most other natural resources and commodities. Prices of raw commodities will initially rise as Japan and China increase demand for raw materials and resources in preparation for conflict. Coal, iron ore, natural gas and other rare earth metals will all spike in price as the threat of conflict looms. Once a long and protracted conflict between Japan and China looks unlikely and the international community is successful in getting the peace treaty signed, the price of natural resources will then decline rapidly as aggregate demand drops. By this point, the signs of a global recession are imminent. Aggregate demand is down, and trade between Japan and China has ceased. And market confidence will be at an all-time low. China, which was once the world’s largest exporter, struggles to attract foreign direct investment and cannot find sufficient buyers for its manufactured goods. This leads to lower demand for raw materials, which in turn leads to persistently low prices for raw commodities and resources for the next several years. Impact of China-Japan conflict on employment A drop in global aggregate demand leads to a rapid increase in unemployment caused primarily by a drop in exports and a loss in the value of share price. In both Japan and China, there is a rapid increase in unemployment as the economy adjusts in the post-conflict period between year 2 and year 7. Unemployment in Japan skyrockets after the end of the conflict and reaches a peak at 14% in year 5, 10% higher than baseline. In China, the effects of unemployment are much more acute, reaching a peak unemployment rate of 9% during the first year, 5% above baseline. Similarly, unemployment in the rest of the world is also adversely affected. Unemployment in the US reached 9.4% in year 3, 2 years after the conflict has started, 3.8% above baseline projections. Impact of China-Japan conflict on inflation Historically, one of the most devastating macroeconomic consequences in post-conflict periods is high and runaway inflation. Figure 3 shows the effects of the conflict on inflation in different countries in the scenario S1. Figure 3: Impact of the conflict on inflation in different countries, in scenario S1 In the conflict scenario, both Japan and China experience inflationary pressure and a rise in consumer prices precipitated by a combination of import inflation and cost-push inflation. Cost push inflation occurs because important resources and goods are diverted away from the real economy and used for the war effort. Manufacturing plants that once made goods for general consumption are now used to produce weapons required for conflict – this drives up the price of normal goods in the economy as there are limited supplies of alternatives. Import inflation will occur because the import of goods from international markets are blocked from coming through the South and East China Seas, with a limited supply of local substitutes, prices for these goods will also rise. In China, prices are down in line with a drop in aggregate demand, a direct result of a reduction in foreign direct investment. In the most extreme scenario X1, there is a short period of deflation in the Chinese economy, peaking at -1.5%, which is followed by increasing inflationary pressure after the conflict ends. Inflation reaches a peak at 9.6% in year 4 in the S1 scenario before declining to pre-conflict levels by year 7. In Japan, where FDI is quite small, inflationary pressure accompanies the start of the conflict. Scenario S1 peaks at 5% inflation in year 2 before going into deflation in year 6. In scenario X1, inflation reaches 20% in year 2 before plunging to negative levels (deflation) from year 5 onwards. The global economy experiences a similar pattern of inflation. During the conflict, inflation increases and reaches peaks in scenarios S2 and X1 before starting a long decline. Average global consumer prices then go down for 4 to 5 years before returning to positive growth rates from year 6. Impact of China-Japan conflict on government balance and reserves The scenario results in a significant decrease (compared to baseline) in foreign reserves for both Japan and China. In the X1 scenario, Japan and China will decrease their foreign reserve holdings by US$ 2.2 trillion and US$ 430 billion respectively when compared to baseline by year 7. In a similar way, gross government debt as a percentage of GDP will also increase. In China, the debt to GDP ratio approaches 45% in scenario X1 and a little over 30% in scenario S1 by year 7. In Japan, the debt to GDP ratio increases from 212% in year 0 to around 277% in year 7. Impact of China-Japan conflict on interest rates Interest rates are often used exogenously as a policy instrument to affect economic activity. Lowering interest rates gives the economy a boost and encourages borrowing, while raising interest rates has the effect of slowing down an economy that is overheating. In the scenario, interest rates are allowed to adjust endogenously (not through policy intervention) to reflect economic pressures that occur in the economy. For example, interest rates adjust to inflationary expectations and demand. When inflation is expected to go up in the future, borrowers need to compensate lenders for the expected drop in the value of money. Figure 4: Short-term interest rate impacts from the conflict, scenarios S1 and X1. Inflation in both Japan and China increases over the scenario period, contributing to a rise in the interest rates in both nations. Interest rates also increase because of increased risk. During and after the conflict both Japan and China experience increased exposure to risk, which places upward pressure on interest rates. Exchange rates represent the relative value of a nation’s currency and are closely correlated with a nation’s interest rates. In the scenario, Japanese exchange rates are free to adjust on currency markets, reflecting relative value of the Japanese Yen, while China controls its currency on international markets, depressing the value of the Yuan to favor its own exports. This different policy approaches to currency will result in different impacts on interest rates in both countries. In China, where exchange rates are fixed during the modeling period, short-term interest rates experience the highest increase in scenario S1, reaching a peak at a little over 12%. Because the Yuan is fixed and not allowed to devalue, the major forces acting on interest rates are dominated by inflation and the money supply. In Japan, where exchange rates are allowed to fluctuate on international markets, high interest rates are caused by an increase on the risk premium of US denominated debt and the lagged effects of the exchange rates affecting investment and consumption. In Japan, therefore, the highest interest rates will occur in scenario X1. Figure 5: Long-term interest rate impacts from the conflict, scenarios S1 and X1. As Figures 4 and 5 show, short-term interest rates increase over the medium term before steadily declining. In China, a small decline in short-term interest rates for a period of 18 to 24 months after the conflict began is caused by the drop in foreign direct investment and increase in capital flight. Short-term interest rates then start to rise above baseline projections two to three years after the conflict started due to rising inflation and an increase on the risk premium of US denominated debt. By contrast, Japan experiences an immediate increase in short- term interest rates caused by rising inflation and increased risk premiums. Interest rates in the rest of the world are represented by the US in Figure 5. Historically, UK and US interest rates behave very similarly. Short-term interest rates are shown to decrease and plateau at a little over 0% for four years after the conflict before rising again. In a similar way, long-term interest rates drop to a low of 0.5% and 1.5% in the UK and US respectively in year 6 before rising once again. Impact of China-Japan conflict on productivity and growth In all scenarios, both Japan and China go into recession in the first year of the conflict, year 1. In China, the recession lasts approximately 12 months, with negative growth reaching a peak at -10% in scenario X1 (see Figure 6). Figure 6: Result of the conflict on China GDP In Japan, the recession is much more protracted, lasting five years in scenario X1 (see Figure 7). Figure 7: Result of the conflict on Japan GDP Globally, the recession lasts 1.5 years in scenario S2 and 2 years in scenario X1 with negative growth peaking at -2%. The conflict is shown to have a significant effect in terms of lost output (see Figure 8). Figure 8: Result of the conflict on Global GDP Table 3 shows the cost of the conflict compared to baseline over a five-year period between the start of year 1 and the end of year 5 for different regional economies. It is notable that the global economic consequences of the conflict are almost as significant in the US and the EU as they are in Japan and China. Table 3: Lost output over 5 years from China-Japan Conflict scenario, ‘GDP@Risk’, US$ Trillions.   IV. Conclusion This paper examined the effects of China-Japan conflict on global economy through three scenarios. The conflict had negative effects on all aspects of global economy, including exports & imports and GDP. As the China-Japan conflict prolongs, the negative economic impacts of the conflict became bigger. Therefore, the negative economic impacts were largest in the scenario of X1. References [1] See Wikipedia, 2025 China-Japan diplomatic crisis. [2] Su, Yung-yao; Chin, Jonathan (16 November 2025). "Taipei slams Beijing for Yellow Sea live-fire drill". Taipei Times. [3] Wei, Alcott (2 December 2025). "Chinese and Japanese coastguard ships confront each other near disputed islands". South China Morning Post. [4] Kobara, Junnosuke (9 December 2025). "Japan says China didn't answer hotline during radar incident". Nikkei Asia. [5] Wang, Orange (8 December 2025). "Mid-air military stand-off triggers duelling protests in China-Japan row latest". South China Morning Post. [6] Hernández, Javier C. (7 December 2025). "Japan Says China Aimed Military Radar at Its Fighter Jets". The New York Times. [7] Murakami, Sakura; Gale, Alastair (10 December 2025). "Japan and China Remain at Odds Over Radar Use as US Weighs In". Bloomberg News. [8] Psaledakis, Daphne; Geddie, John (10 December 2025). "US backs Japan in dispute with China over radar incident". Reuters. [9] Kaneko, Kaori; Kelly, Tim (11 December 2025). "US bombers join Japanese jets in show of force after China-Russia drills, Tokyo says". Reuters. [10] Kim, Samuel S. (2006). The Two Koreas and the Great Powers. Cambridge University Press. p. 2. [11] The Defeat That Changed China's History -- Beijing Review". [12] China's War with Japan". Faculty of History, University of Oxford. Retrieved 13 July 2024. [13] Bix, Herbert P. (1992). "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility". Journal of Japanese Studies. 18 (2): 295–363. [14] Hotta, E. (25 December 2007). Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931–1945. Palgrave Macmillan. [15] See Wikipedia, the Second Sino-Japanese War [16] See Wikipedia, the Second Sino-Japanese War [17] Frank, Richard (2020). Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War: July 1937-May 1942. W. W. Norton & Company. [18] Lee, Seokwoo et al. (2002). Territorial disputes among Japan, Taiwan and China concerning the Senkaku Islands. [19] Lee, Seokwoo et al. (2002). Territorial disputes among Japan, Taiwan and China concerning the Senkaku Islands. [20] Unryu Suganuma (2000). Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations. University of Hawaii Press. [21] "High-seas collisions trigger Japan-China spat". Agence France-Presse. 7 September 2010. [22] Zhao, Suisheng (2023). The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. [23] Zhao, Suisheng (2023). The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press [24] Lee, Seokwoo et al. (2002). Territorial disputes among Japan, Taiwan and China concerning the Senkaku Islands. 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1. Introduction The relationship between China and Africa has become one of the most influential geopolitical dynamics of the 21st century. For China, Africa represents a strategic source of raw materials, an emerging market of 1.4 billion people, and a key partner for strengthening its political influence within international organizations. For Africa, China has represented an alternative to traditional Western financing, capable of offering infrastructure, investment, and trade openness without explicit political conditions. However, this relationship has also generated debates regarding economic dependency, debt risks, and the real balance between mutual benefit and power. 2. Theoretical Framework: Realism, Core–Periphery, and Interdependence 2.1 Realism From a realist perspective, China’s engagement can be interpreted as a strategy to strengthen state power, secure energy resources, increase its influence vis-à-vis the United States, and promote international recognition of the People’s Republic of China over Taiwan. 2.2 Core–Periphery Theory Following Wallerstein, the China–Africa relationship reflects a core–periphery dynamic: China, as an industrialized country with high technological capacity, occupies the core, while African states, as exporters of raw materials, occupy the periphery. However, China seeks to project a narrative of mutual benefit in order to differentiate itself from former European colonial powers. 2.3 Power Transition Theory China’s rise demonstrates how an emerging power can alter the international system. Examples include Deng Xiaoping’s economic opening (1978), accelerated industrialization, and strategic global integration through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 3. Historical Evolution of the China–Africa Relationship The formal relationship was consolidated in the 1960s, but it was significantly strengthened in the 21st century through mechanisms such as the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), established in 2000. This period has been characterized by billions of dollars in foreign direct investment and the integration of African ports into the New Silk Road. Africa came to view China as a non-colonial partner, while China found diplomatic support that enabled it to occupy China’s seat at the United Nations in 1971 as the “legitimate China.” 4. Key Data and Statistics of the China–Africa Economic Relationship From a realist perspective, the volume of China’s trade and investment in Africa does not respond solely to economic dynamics, but rather to a deliberate strategy of accumulating structural power. Secured access to oil, critical minerals, and strategic metals is essential for sustaining China’s industrial growth and reducing its vulnerability to external disruptions, particularly in a context of systemic competition with the United States. Likewise, from a core–periphery perspective, the composition of bilateral trade reproduces classic patterns of unequal exchange, in which Africa continues to export primary goods with low value added while importing manufactured goods and technology. Although China discursively distances itself from European colonialism, the data suggest that the structure of exchange maintains asymmetries that may limit the autonomous industrial development of the African continent. 4.1 Bilateral Trade Trade between China and Africa reached USD 282 billion in 2023, making China the continent’s largest trading partner. African exports to China consist of approximately 70% oil, minerals, and metals. China primarily exports machinery, textiles, electronics, and vehicles. 4.2 Investment and Infrastructure Projects Between 2013 and 2023, China financed more than 10,000 km of railways, 100,000 km of roads, and over 100 ports in Africa. China is responsible for approximately 31% of total infrastructure investment on the continent. 4.3 Debt Africa’s debt to China amounts to approximately USD 73 billion. In countries such as Angola and Kenya, Chinese debt accounts for more than 20% of their total external debt. 5. Country-Specific Examples The cases of Ethiopia, Kenya, Angola, and Zambia demonstrate that China’s cooperation is not homogeneous, but rather strategically differentiated according to each country’s geopolitical and economic importance. Ethiopia, as Africa’s diplomatic hub and host of the African Union, is key to China’s political projection on the continent. Kenya and Angola stand out for their logistical and energy value, respectively, while Zambia illustrates the financial limits of this model of cooperation. From the perspective of interdependence theory, these relationships generate mutual benefits, but in an asymmetric manner: China diversifies trade routes, secures resources, and expands its influence, while African countries obtain infrastructure, often at the cost of increased financial vulnerability. In this sense, Africa is not merely a passive recipient, but a central space in the architecture of China’s global rise. 5.1 Ethiopia: A Symbol of Cooperation Ethiopia is one of China’s main allies in Africa. The Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway represents an investment of approximately USD 4 billion, almost entirely financed by China. In 2022, Ethiopia exported more than USD 200 million in agricultural and mineral products to China. 5.2 Kenya: Infrastructure and Debt The Mombasa–Nairobi railway, valued at approximately USD 3.6 billion, is the most expensive infrastructure project in Kenya’s history. Kenya owes China around USD 6.3 billion, equivalent to nearly 20% of its external debt. 5.3 Angola: Oil as Collateral Angola is one of China’s main oil suppliers. A significant portion of Angola’s debt to China is repaid through oil shipments, creating a form of structural dependency. 5.4 Zambia: Risk of Over-Indebtedness Zambia was the first African country to fall into default in the post-pandemic period. China is its principal bilateral creditor, with more than USD 6 billion in outstanding loans. 6. The New Silk Road in Africa Africa’s incorporation into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) should be understood as an extension of China’s broader project to reconfigure the international system. Maritime and port corridors in East Africa not only facilitate trade, but also reduce China’s dependence on routes controlled by Western powers, thereby strengthening its strategic autonomy. East Africa is central to the maritime expansion of the BRI. It offers strategic ports in Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and South Africa, as well as new maritime corridors that allow China to connect Asia with the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. For African countries, this integration represents greater commercial connectivity, access to modern infrastructure, and regional logistical opportunities. From the perspective of power transition theory, the BRI in Africa constitutes a key instrument through which China consolidates its position as an emerging global power, gradually displacing the traditional influence of Europe and the United States on the continent. For Africa, this integration offers opportunities for connectivity and development, while simultaneously reinforcing its centrality as a space of global geopolitical competition. 7. Criticisms of China’s Role in African Debt 7.1 Accusations of “Debt-Trap Diplomacy” China is accused of using large-scale loans to obtain strategic influence, as illustrated by the case of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, although it lies outside the African continent. Similar concerns exist in Kenya regarding the port of Mombasa. Accusations of “debt-trap diplomacy” must be analyzed beyond normative discourse. While not all cases confirm a deliberate strategy of financial domination, the concentration of debt in a single creditor limits the room for maneuver of African states, especially in times of crisis. From a structural perspective, debt becomes a mechanism of indirect influence that can translate into political concessions, preferential access to resources, or diplomatic alignments favorable to China in international forums. Nevertheless, it is also true that responsibility lies partly with African governments, whose negotiation capacity and strategic planning are decisive in avoiding scenarios of prolonged dependency. 7.2 Lack of Transparency Loan contracts may include confidentiality clauses, resource-backed guarantees, and high penalties for renegotiation. 7.3 Long-Term Dependency For fragile states, the concentration of debt in a single creditor limits political and economic autonomy over the long term. 7.4 China’s Position China rejects these accusations and maintains that it has renegotiated and forgiven billions of dollars in debt. It argues that its loans are long-term, carry moderate interest rates, and that its cooperation is based on “mutual benefit” rather than imposition. 8. Conclusion The China–Africa relationship is complex, strategic, and multidimensional. It presents significant opportunities for African development, but also poses risks related to debt, economic dependency, and political influence. The challenge for Africa is to negotiate from a stronger position, diversify its partners, and ensure that agreements with China translate into sustainable long-term development. The core–periphery relationship between China and Africa constitutes one of the most relevant axes of the contemporary international system. Through trade, investment, infrastructure, and financing, China has consolidated itself as a central actor in African development while simultaneously strengthening its global projection as an emerging power. For African countries, this relationship offers real opportunities for growth, modernization, and integration into the global economy. However, these benefits will only be sustainable if accompanied by national strategies aimed at productive diversification, financial transparency, and collective negotiation vis-à-vis external actors. Looking toward the future of the international system, China–Africa cooperation reflects a transition toward a more multipolar order, in which emerging powers challenge traditional structures of power. Africa, far from being a peripheral actor, is emerging as a decisive space in the redefinition of global balances. The central challenge will be to transform this centrality into autonomy and sustainable development, avoiding the reproduction of old dependencies under renewed narratives. References - Castro, G. (2022). EL ASCENSO DE CHINA Y LAS TEORÍAS VERTICALES DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES: CONTRASTANDO LAS LECCIONES DE LAS TEORÍAS DE LA TRANSICIÓN DE PODER Y DEL CICLO DE PODER. Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, 19(1), 185–206. http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?pid=S1688-499X2010000100008&script=sci_arttext&tlng=en - Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com). (s. f.). China se apodera de Europa, Parte 1. DW.COM. Recuperado 2 de marzo de 2022, de https://www.dw.com/es/china-se-apodera-de-europa-la-nueva-ruta-de-la-seda-parte-1/a-56125389#:%7E:text=La%20Nueva%20Ruta%20de%20la%20Seda%20es%20el,de%20ferrocarril%20y%20carreteras%20en%20todo%20el%20mundo. - Gil, A. (2020, 15 abril). La teoría del Centro Periferia - Mapas de. El Orden Mundial - EOM. Recuperado 6 de abril de 2022, de https://elordenmundial.com/mapas-y-graficos/la-teoria-del-centro-periferia/#:%7E:text=Esta%20teor%C3%ADa%20viene%20a%20decir,que%20podemos%20ver%20hoy%20d%C3%ADa - Gonzalez Aspiazu, I. (2016, septiembre). La ayuda para el desarrollo de China en África. ¿Una alternativa a las relaciones de cooperación tradicionales? Universidad Complutense de Madrid Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología. Recuperado 2 de marzo de 2022, de https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/48098/1/21-2017-12-21-CT09_Iratxe%20Gonazalez.pdf - Iraxte González Aspiazu (2016). La ayuda para el desarrollo de China en África. ¿Una alternativa a las relaciones de cooperación tradicionales?. Cuadernos de Trabajo. Universidad Complutense de Madrid. https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/48098/1/21-2017-12-21-CT09_Iratxe%20Gonazalez.pdf - Lechini, G. T. (2013). China en África: discurso seductor, intenciones dudosas. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Popular China. (2021, 1 diciembre). La VIII Conferencia Ministerial del FOCAC ha sido un éxito rotundo. Recuperado 2 de marzo de 2022, de https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/esp/zxxx/202112/t20211202_10461234.html - Moral, P. (2019, 31 agosto). China en África: del beneficio mutuo a la hegemonía de Pekín. El Orden Mundial - EOM. Recuperado 6 de abril de 2022, de https://elordenmundial.com/china-en-africa/

The Israel-Hamas War has calmed down. The events that preceded it – including the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack against Israel and the taking of Israeli and other hostages – and that resulted from it will be remembered for decades to come, especially the dead and wounded, the trauma and pain, the destruction of dreams and property. If there is any lesson to be learnt, it is that better ways must be found to resolve conflict. There is deep concern now that the West Bank is increasingly reaching a critical point. The weak governing structure of the Palestinian Authority, the contraction of the Palestinian economy, settler violence, and much more are causing serious distress and instability. What is preventing conditions from spiraling out of control are Israel’s strict security measures and Palestinian fear that the West Bank will turn into Gaza, even though both regions are different. Years of diplomatic inertia have been counterproductive. The status quo is untenable. Much is at stake and indecision is costly for all concerned. Why continued conflict? Israelis and Palestinians have become victims of their own exclusive national narratives and are speaking past each other. Many on each side are unable to go beyond their zero-sum mentality. They selectively highlight the rightness of their own cause, accuse the other side of bad intentions or misconduct, and fail to realize how their own rhetoric and acts cause aggravating conditions. While the obstacles in the way of progress to peace are numerous and real – power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians, one state reality with Israel dominant over the Palestinians, hardening of attitudes in Israel and Palestine, relative weakness of the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps, Israeli settler radicalization, Palestinian anti-normalization stance, terrorism – these must not delay or prevent the search for opportunities and positive outcomes. In this regard, simple facts present themselves. First, Israelis and Palestinians are neighbors forever. Their present and future are intertwined whether they choose this reality or not. Second, the longer Israelis and Palestinians wait to negotiate, the more complicated the issues become and the less room there will be for an agreeable peaceful solution. Third, the core issues that separate Israelis and Palestinians – borders, the separation wall, security, Israeli settlements, Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, water – are well-known, thoroughly debated, and resolvable. The challenge is to initiate negotiations and negotiate in good faith. Fourth, Israelis and Palestinians have proved to be both incapable and unwilling to restart negotiations on their own. The United States thus must go beyond managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to taking the lead to resolve it. It is indispensable for the promotion and sustenance of peace negotiations, as was recently shown in the diplomatic intervention to stop the Israel-Hamas War. Fifth, the inclusion of regional and international actors becomes key as peace requires assurances, follow-up, and support to take root and grow. As Gershon Baskin argues, “Protracted conflicts in which there is little or no trust and confidence require external mechanisms to verify implementation of the agreements, to ensure compliance, and to offer external dispute resolution” (Baskin, 2025). The prerequisites for peacemaking (e.g., context and timing, leadership and political will, societal strength and resilience, process, and content and creativity) are known (Kurtzer, 2020). US diplomacy must be credible, intentional, sustained, and transformative. This comprises not only making peace a priority, but also acting accordingly. The situation on the ground must change. A realistic plan and process of peacemaking must be prioritized. Israelis and Palestinians must be held accountable for their actions and inactions. The vital policies of Arab countries that have signed the Abraham Accords (especially United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco) and others that mediated (that is, United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey) or attended the Gaza “peace conference” in October 2025 should impel them to motivate Palestinians to make hard decisions to end conflict and reach a peaceful settlement. Israel needs to reciprocate. Circumventing the Palestinian issue or wishing it away will not advance Israel’s strategic goals, especially in the long run. Initiating unilateral moves and thinking of the Palestinian issue as a security matter only without addressing its political and territorial dimensions will not enhance Israel’s defense. If anything, they will continue to rile the Palestinians, particularly the youth among them. The two-state solution, the official United States policy since 2002, has become increasingly less viable. This is at a time when 157 out of 193 Member States of the United Nations have already recognized the State of Palestine. On July 28-30, 2025, a High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution was held at the United Nations. The conference, co-chaired by France and Saudi Arabia, committed “not only to reaffirm international consensus on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine but [also] to catalyze concrete, timebound and coordinated international action toward the implementation of the two-state solution” (United Nations, 2025a). Follow-up work took place on September 22, and the commitment was made to continue the implementation of the conference’s outcomes. The US’s plan (Trump, 2025) to demilitarize the Gaza Strip and to reconstruct it for the benefit of its inhabitants is a good start, and the plan’s “Phase 2” was even endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025 (United Nations, 2025b). However, resolving all aspects of the Gaza issue will take years. Meantime, it is essential for the US to take a leading role in endorsing again the two-state solution, as it is in the best national interest of Israel, Palestine, and the US. Moreover, the US can facilitate the solution by urging Israel and the Palestinians to seriously consider the idea of confederation, which adjusts or introduces important modifications to the two-state solution. While there have been more than a dozen confederation models over the years – with some specific only to Israel and Palestine and others that encompass Jordan as well – a main goal of confederation, according to the proponents of the Holy Land Confederation (me included), is not to totally separate the Palestinians from the Israelis living in the Holy Land, i.e., “divorce,” but to empower them to “cohabitate” in the two respective sovereign states (Holy Land Confederation, 2025). This cohabitation would allow for greater cooperation and movement between them. “If properly implemented, confederation would enable Palestinians to advance their search for freedom, independence, and statehood without being anti-Israel, and it would enable Israelis to have their security and wellbeing without being anti-Palestinian” (Beilin and Sarsar, 2022). The Gaza crisis must be solved. However, the deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian relations must be broken as well. If past negotiations are any indication, there is middle ground between the positions of Israel and Palestine. The US possesses the vital capabilities to move both parties to take the necessary political risks by compromising and engaging in unavoidable tradeoffs on the path to peace. References - Baskin, Gershon. (2025) “Monitoring agreements and verifying implementation.” October 18, https://gershonbaskin.substack.com/p/monitoring-agreements-and-verifying. - Beilin, Yossi and Sarsar, Saliba. (2022) “Israeli-Palestinian confederation is a way forward for peace.” The Jerusalem Post, February 17, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-696830. - Holy Land Confederation. (2025) “The Holy Land Confederation as a Facilitator for the Two-State Solution.” Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, https://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_hlc. - Kurtzer, Daniel C. (2020) “The Ingredients of Palestinian-Israeli Peacemaking.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Spring): 5-16. - Trump, Donald J. [@RapidResponse47]. (2025, September 29). “President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict.” X. https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1972726021196562494. - United Nations. (2025a) “High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution,” July 28-30, https://www.un.org/unispal/high-level-conference-two-state-solution-july2025/. - United Nations. (2025b) United Nations Security Council, November 17, https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025).

Make American shipbuilding great again (Masga) may sound like an effort by the US to bolster its economic strength and project power internationally, but Masga is not an American policy. It is a South Korean initiative that emerged following trade talks with the US in June. Rather than responding to the Trump administration’s tariff threats solely through trade negotiations, Korean officials saw an opportunity to show their American counterparts that South Korea deserved better treatment. They suggested that South Korea bring its shipbuilding prowess to the US. South Korea is perhaps most famous as an exporter of K-pop, cars and semiconductors. But it is also a global powerhouse in shipbuilding. The shipyard in the south-eastern Korean city of Ulsan alone produces roughly ten times more ships annually than the entire US shipbuilding industry. And as the US tries to counter China’s rapidly growing naval fleet, Korean assistance is something that is clearly needed. The US navy secretary, John Phelan, declared earlier in 2025 that US shipbuilding programmes “are a mess”. He added: “I think our best one is six months late and 57% over budget … That is the best one.” Masga was launched in August, with South Korean conglomerates HD Hyundai and Samsung Heavy Industries signing a US$150 billion (£112 billion) deal to modernise US shipbuilding capabilities. It is a clear example of a middle power, a term for countries that lack the dominance of great powers but matter because they possess distinctive industrial, resource or diplomatic capabilities, using economic statecraft to punch above its weight. Economic statecraft has largely been used to describe actions taken by great powers like the US and China to enable and restrict access to their consumer markets, investment coffers and production capabilities. The aim is to achieve foreign policy goals or national security objectives by inflicting damage on or beating the capabilities of a rival power. One classic example is the US government’s use of sanctions against Russia over its war in Ukraine and Iran over its nuclear programme. The overt linking of economic tools like sanctions and tariffs to defence objectives in Washington’s recent national security strategy is another striking illustration of this. Middle powers have traditionally not actively pursued economic statecraft to achieve their objectives. They have instead looked to secure a seat at key tables through cooperative participation in regional and multilateral forums. But some of these countries are now asserting their power more explicitly, through preemptive moves like Masga. Using economic statecraft Taiwan is perhaps the most obvious case of a middle power engaging in economic statecraft. The country has used its critical role in global semiconductor supply chains as leverage to protect itself against Chinese invasion. Former Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen referred to international reliance on the island’s chip industry as a “silicon shield” in 2021. Taipei imposes strict controls on tech sales and screens investment, particularly from China, to protect its position. And Taiwan’s industry-leading firms, such as TSMC, also invest heavily to maintain their technological edge. Vietnam offers another example. Consistent with its “bamboo diplomacy” foreign policy model, Hanoi hosts leaders from China, Russia and the US, seeking flexibility rather than rigid alignment. The aim is clear: to maximise Vietnam’s national interests pragmatically and with autonomy. With the world’s sixth-largest reserves of rare earths, Vietnam is now looking to use critical minerals as a tool of economic statecraft. The government voted to ban rare-earth exports on December 11, citing the need to reorient the sector towards domestic processing and higher-value manufacturing rather than merely the export of basic raw materials. Rare earths are essential components in numerous products that are central to our daily lives, including smartphones, semiconductors and electric vehicles. By restricting foreign access to these essential inputs, Vietnam is striving to secure its long-term position in the supply chains of highly in-demand resources. Together, these cases show how economic statecraft is not only the preserve of great powers. Middle power states are selectively granting and restricting access to their economic strengths to reshape markets and security relationships. Korea’s shipbuilding, Taiwan’s chip production and Vietnam’s rare earths illustrate this more assertive approach. They are no longer confined to reactive measures or behind-the-scenes diplomacy in regional forums or multilateral negotiations. These states are proposing economic and military partnerships, as seen in initiatives such as Masga and Tsai’s assertion that everyone needs to care about Taiwan, given how essential chips are to the world economy. Great powers are taking notice. In October, HD Hyundai and US defence contractor Huntington Ingalls Industries announced they are together building next-generation navy vessels. This marks the first time a South Korean firm will build a US navy ship. And Washington has also reportedly been courting Hanoi with elevated diplomatic status and promises of mining support. For other middle powers, the lesson is clear: identify and leverage the strategic economic strengths that other countries depend on.

Amidst US bombs and lies about Venezuelan drug trafficking as a pretext for regime change, the subordinated position of Caribbean states’ economies plays a role in U.S. aggression. It is no exaggeration to say that for over half a millennium, the Caribbean has been a stage for imperial incursions. In the past two months, the US has increased its military presence in the Caribbean Sea, including carrying out an airstrike campaign, while claiming that these operations are necessary to protect US citizens from illicit drug trafficking allegedly occurring off the coast of Venezuela. As of November 15th, the US military has launched eleven deadly air strikes on small boats in Caribbean waters and eleven on South America’s Pacific Coast, killing over eighty people. In these operations, the US Navy also raided a tuna fishing boat, detaining the fisherfolk on board for several hours before releasing them.[1] To date, the US government has not provided any proof of its claims that the people it publicly executed are trafficking drugs. These extrajudicial killings have struck fear into the hearts of millions of ordinary people across the region, especially the fisherfolk who depend upon traversing the sea for their livelihoods. Meanwhile, Caribbean countries have either blatantly come out in support of the imperial violence at their doorsteps or been hesitant to respond. When these attacks began, Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) as well as Guyana expressed enthusiastic support for US militaristic incursions and extrajudicial murders.[2] As tensions escalated, the Guyanese government attempted to backpedal from its original position. However, the T&T Prime Minister, Kamla Persad Bissessar, has maintained a pro-US stance. PM Persad Bissessar is on record saying, “I have no sympathy for traffickers, the US military should kill them all violently.”[3] This position by the T&T government was reiterated even after the US murdered two of its citizens, Chad Joseph and Rishi Samaroo, in these airstrike campaigns. T&T allowed the US warship, USS Gravely, a guided-missile destroyer, to dock in the country’s capital between October 26-30 and for US military agents to “address shared threats like transnational crime and build resilience through training, humanitarian missions, and security efforts” on T&T soil.[4] The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) - the intergovernmental regional organization - has dragged its feet to take a position, waiting a whole month on October 18, to release a presser wherein it reaffirmed the region as a “zone of peace,” with Trinidad and Tobago excepting itself from this stance. The foot dragging is sinister when it is known for a fact that the US propaganda of conducting “anti-narcotics” operations is/are a ruse. These hostile US military aggressions in the Caribbean Sea and on South America’s Pacific Coast are part of a broader US imperial geopolitical strategy aimed at toppling the government of Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro. The aim, as Trump has publicly intimated,[5] is to get the Venezuelan government to grant the US more beneficial access to Venezuela’s resources. One might ask: Why are governments, like Trinidad and Tobago, enabling US imperial terror in the region? And why have CARICOM governments not taken an unequivocal anti-imperialist position? The answer lies in the subordinated position of these states’ economies within the global economy. Caribbean states are historically structured to be neoliberal, pro-imperial, and anti-democratic – while political elites are beholden to enacting external interests. Moreover, internal political dynamics – in terms of racial and class struggles – are also a factor, influencing the timing and intensity of these Caribbean governments’ responses to present US imperial terror. Debunking the Myth of the Venezuela Narco State The first order of business is dispelling the myth that Venezuela is a ‘narco-state.’ US officials have framed the current operations — boat strikes, deployments of destroyers and aircraft — as counter-narcotics efforts designed to stem the flow of illicit drugs from Venezuela to the US. However, the Caribbean route is not among the primary conduits for major volumes of cocaine and methamphetamines into the US. Most trafficking flows of narcotics to the US are overland, through Central America and via Pacific routes.[6] It is no surprise therefore that the US government has not provided any proof of its claims that the people it has extrajudicially murdered in the Caribbean Sea or on South America’s coast are engaged in drug trafficking. Additionally, the scale and nature of force being used are far beyond what traditional interdiction operations require – with the Trump administration claiming that interdiction has not worked, hence deadly air strikes are necessary. In addition to the lack of evidence of a Venezuelan route being key to drug trafficking into the US, there is also no credible proof linking the Maduro government to organized drug trafficking, despite the Trump regime’s claims, which are parroted uncritically by many Caribbean media and politicians. Within the US’s own intelligence establishment, one report explicitly states: “the Maduro regime probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TDA [Tren de Agua] and is not directing TDA movement to and operations in the United States.”[7] The report goes on to say: “Venezuelan intelligence, military, and police services view TDA as a security threat and operate against it in ways that make it highly unlikely the two sides would cooperate in a strategic or consistent way.” These facts stand out, especially given the evidentiary long and sordid history of the US’s leading role in drug trafficking in the Americas, and the US as the #1 supplier of weapons to those involved in the global drug trade in the region. The US government’s real motive is to destabilize and topple the Maduro government in Venezuela, in favor of a regime that undermines Venezuela’s sovereignty. Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney and many others remind us that capitalist imperialism depends upon neocolonial puppet governments occupied by a predatory elite who facilitate accumulation by extractivism, dispossession, and exploitation. Positioned to usurp Maduro in Venezuela by imposition and not elections, is 2025 Nobel “Peace” Prize winner, María Corina Machado. Machado is a key US ally, Trump admirer, supporter of Israel and its bombing of Gaza, and an overall admirer of repressive regimes in Latin America – including El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele and Brazil’s former president, Jair Bolsonaro. Machado has been begging for foreign military intervention in Venezuela to remove the Maduro government while professing that her administration, if granted power through non-electoral means, intends to open up Venezuela’s doors to foreign exploiters. If the current iteration of US imperial antagonism in the region leads to regime change in Venezuela, the US is poised to have control over the resources in the southern Caribbean – namely Guyana and T&T – as well as on the South American Coast: again, namely Guyana and then Venezuela. This will give the US direct control over shipping routes in the region, as it prepares for a wider economic confrontation with China. Hence, these alleged “anti-narcotics” operations which have taken the lives of over eighty Caribbean and South American people, are just a smokescreen for deeper US geopolitical interests. Dependency and the Character of the State Caribbean states are disregarding the lives of the Venezuelan, Latin American, and their own Caribbean populations using external security narratives, largely because there is a true dictatorship of foreign capital in the region. As US Vice-President JD Vance let slip, places like the Caribbean countries were always intended to remain extractive workstations, not autonomous, functioning nations.…at all.[8] T&T, for example, has long been dependent on oil and gas extraction for the bulk of its national income. However, the country has been experiencing a decline in natural gas and crude oil production over the past decade and the country’s liquefaction complex and petrochemical plants producing ammonia, methanol, and other key exports – which depend upon gas input – have been suffering.[9] Combined with the collapse in energy prices in 2014, this situation has produced a decline in foreign exchange inflows and government revenues.[10] With the demand for US dollars far outstripping the supply, T&T is facing one of the most severe foreign exchange crises in the Caribbean, causing uproar across the working, middle, and upper classes of society alike.[11] As such, the T&T government is desperate for the resuscitation of its flailing oil and gas sector. The T&T government spent decades developing a “Dragon” gas deal, where Shell would lead operations that funnel gas located in Venezuelan waters to T&T, where it can be exported as LNG. This deal, considered by the T&T state to be the lifeline that would save the local economy from collapse, has become a weapon in Washington, DC’s arsenal against Venezuela. In the midst of the extra-judicial killings in the region, the US has revoked licenses approving the deal and re-approved them under new terms meant to ensure the involvement and profits of US companies. The continued structural dependency of T&T on foreign capital and imperial markets renders its misleaders susceptible to these coercive measures to ensure that Caribbean states align with US capitalist imperialist policies. Economic coercion is an important part of the context for Kamla Persad Bissessar’s support for imperialism, but her position cannot be traced to this alone. Persad Bissessar and the educated elite and comprador class she represents come out of some of the “best” primary, secondary, and tertiary educational institutions locally and internationally. Are these elites supposed to provide independent, critical thinkers who would decolonize “post” colonial societies? Are they only unwitting agents of imperialism or are they willing participants? From the time of many states' flag independence, foreign interventions have secured for the local Caribbean elites’ (or comprador classes) party longevity and/or political dominance, and/or visas and dual citizenships, and/or the ability to accumulate wealth for themselves by exploiting the people and land within their countries. As Frantz Fanon’s “Wretched of the Earth” and Walter Rodney’s “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa” detailed, these elites lack the sort of creativity and vitality to independently develop into an industrial bourgeoisie. They therefore turn to propping up foreign entities and dependent economic relations. Consequently, Caribbean state-making and the establishment of territorial statuses in the context of US and European imperialist capitalism has reproduced institutions that are unresponsive to Caribbean people. Whether through hopes of securing or acquiring foreign investment, or due to rank economic blackmail that threatens foreign investments elites through sanctions and other restrictions – many Caribbean states choose to serve US and Western imperialism as an almost “practical” strategy of economic “stability”. However, such imperial service only guarantees continued underdevelopment and economic beggary. Herein, T&T’s misleadership is positioning the country as a beggar to the US and reinforcing US sanctions on Venezuela, which makes it hard for Venezuela to sell its own oil and gas to states that need it, including T&T. Worse still, the US does not want China to remedy this situation between Venezuela and Trinidad. So not only are some Caribbean leaders and party supporters encouraging naked US imperialism cloaked in the deceptive language and rhetoric of “anti-drug trafficking” and “protecting the region,” they are also upholding a condition of dependency of the region on the US, advancing US attempts to subvert Chinese influence in the region, and in the process supporting direct attacks on states in the region’s right to self-determination and sovereignty. Moreover, local internal racial and class dynamics are also shaping the timing and intensity of Caribbean governments responses to US aggression in the region. In the post-WWII construction of party politics in T&T, middle-class parties carried forward the colonial divisions between the predominantly African and Indian segments of the population that multiracial worker movements had fought so hard to overcome. Kamla Persad Bissessar, as leader of the party popularly known as the one representing “Indian interests,” is advancing and exploiting this racial wedge to garner support for her pro-imperial policies. This party has actively engaged in criminalizing poor African communities as well as Venezuelan migrants, while downplaying the fact that the many poor and marginalized Indians are similarly caught in the net of US imperialism. Persad Bissessar and her party affiliates’ own ideas of “purity” mixed with class notions of entitlement merge with the supremacist foundations of US local and foreign politics. It’s bad enough that a Prime Minister — a lawyer — supports extra-judicial murders in violation of International Law, but how does one align with a political ideology that produced people like Senator James Reed, who, circa 1919, openly dismissed dealing with “a nigger from Liberia, a nigger from Honduras, a nigger from India…each (having) votes equal to that of the great United States.” Before one argues that this was long ago, consider what right-wing political commentator Ann Coulter told Vivek Ramaswamy why she’d never vote for him regardless of how his views match hers. We acknowledge that political leaders, seeking re-election, opt for the path of least resistance which in this case means not offending the mighty United States. But this cannot just be naïveté. It is in this context that Kamla Persad Bissessar has broken with even the basic understanding of what CARICOM is, and is astonishingly peddling the idea that each island seeking its own interest is somehow more progressive than banding together as one bloc! In other words, she and those who support her stance have embraced regional colonial divide-and-conquer tactics. The US has always stood in opposition to a unified body in the region. As then US diplomat Charles Whittaker put it: “A strongly federated West Indies might be detrimental to American interests.” As such, they undermined the West Indian Federation in the 1950s and sabotaged the New International Economic Order throughout the 1970s. The Caribbean misleaders proclaiming disunity as strength subscribe to political ideologies that interlock with a particular brand of politics in the West that has been openly Euro-nationalist and imperialist. Hence, at a time when many resource-rich countries are forming partnerships and alternative trading and security blocs, the political misleaders in the Caribbean calling for further fragmentation should warrant deeper investigation. Media, Political Misleadership, and How the State Weaponizes “Security” It is important to clarify that crime does exist in the Caribbean region, just as it exists elsewhere throughout the world. The size of Caribbean countries are also important to note, because though it is true that the amount of drugs flowing through the Caribbean are low relative to the global drug trade, the little that does pass through is indeed wreaking havoc, given the geographical and population sizes of these countries. The increase in guns and violent crime associated with the global drug trade in places like T&T has become a critical factor affecting everyday life for ordinary people there. This context has enabled the T&T government to justify and legitimate US military aggression in the name of “fighting” the drug trade in the region. Thus, most people cheering on the US military are simply desperate for a sense of safety. However, it is precisely this need for safety that is being weaponized — to increase unsafe conditions as new US-produced military weaponry and technologies become even more commonplace in the region. There is a direct and indirect connection between (geo)political and economic decisions made by successive generations of ruling elites in the Caribbean, and North American narratives of crime, which have – going back to the 19th century in some countries – allowed (and made space for) imperial aggression in the region. Over a number of decades, the United States has taken advantage of crises caused by rising violent crime to pursue its own security interests – even though rises in violent crime in the region is directly linked to US imported and manufactured weapons, and US consumer demands for items that the US state deems “illegal.” To establish and maintain US dominance — and the accompanying cheap labor[12] from the surplus populations which exist in a region notorious for high levels of unemployment and underemployment — the US has deployed constant applications of violence, packaged as maintaining “law and order” in the drive to “progress” and “catch up” with the West. It’s no coincidence that modern policing began in the Caribbean as militarized slave patrols in St Lucia.[13] Then, like now, the purpose is the same: protect wealth from the workers who created it. However, the real effectiveness lay in conditioning the exploited to adopt the values of the elites. To date, Western elite definitions of progress and development for the wider working people in the Caribbean region dominate, even as the dependent status of Caribbean economies make this impossible for the majority of the people in the region. Thus, US reliance on expanding its military apparatus for economic growth is justified through the construction of permanent threats that the US supposedly has to “defend” itself against. Another such narrative, like the need to “promote democracy” in Venezuela, is also within this vein of western imperialist propaganda. The US and western imperialists maintain that Venezuela is not a democracy, despite the presence of robust, active citizen’s assemblies and communes, as well as elections that occur under the presence of election observers – including from the US. Nonetheless, the western imperialist narrative maintains that Venezuela is not democratic and thus their people can be bombed for some purported “greater good.” Meanwhile, these same imperialist narratives call genocidal Israel a democracy deserving of “protection” and “defense,” as it exterminates Palestinians and decimates Palestinian land. This propaganda – not analysis based on any facts – readily frames western imperialism as “defensive,” “pro-security,” and “pro-safety” and those not in line with it as “aggressive” and “undemocratic.”[14] In lockstep with imperialists, local political figures too have long used or encouraged the use of dehumanizing language when discussing criminalized people and communities. When the T&T Prime Minister, Police Commissioner, and other influential authority figures refer to human beings as “carcasses,”[15] “pests,” “fleas” or “cockroaches,” the message sent is that these are not citizens or members of society and therefore, not worthy of certain basic courtesies and legal obligations, including the right to life. When this sort of thinking is widespread, issues of social justice fall by the wayside. Instead, heavy, often murderous attacks on real or alleged drug runners who come from poor, precarious, vulnerable communities become justified while the power brokers, bankers and their institutions[16] that launder money do not get so much as a paper weight dropped on them. Likewise, the local and international media is playing a significant role in the unfolding crisis. Save for a few columnists, the local media has been disgraceful, little more than sycophantic stenographers for egregious narratives coming from Washington. Initially, the local media conducted little to no critical research into the many available sources discrediting[17] false allegations connecting the Maduro administration to drug cartels. They parroted language that criminalized the victims of the attacks without presenting any evidence proving that they were guilty of violating any laws. They were silent on the voluminous literature connecting the CIA and the US military to colonial land and resource grabs that violate international and local laws.[18] They also proliferated the myth that Nicolas Maduro “lost” or “rigged” elections in Venezuela, contrary to information provided by election observers. The lack of critical and independent journalism is a clear dereliction of duty, supporting imperialist narratives and providing cover for extrajudicial murder. Conclusion The neoliberal era shortly after many states’ independence extended the life of bourgeois colonial thought in the Caribbean, interpreting the human “firstly, [as] a figure that is homo economics, and, secondly, a figure that can only operate within the field of white supremacy and capitalism.”[19] In this environment, Caribbean resistance weakened, having to establish itself alongside the intensification of neoliberal processes – foremost amongst them being state repression and militarist aggression supported by the US hegemon – so that Caribbean peoples could be definitively integrated into a Western capitalist system as “bottom labor-exporting economies,” whose labor commodification was masked by discourses on ‘growth’ and ‘development.'[20] It is in analyzing the characteristics of Caribbean states and governance within them – including how they interpret “development” – that helps us to answer why so many states elect to do imperial service: Caribbean neocolonial (puppet) states are fundamentally anti-democratic with no real regard for Caribbean life within them. The T&T government’s deliberate facilitation of US imperial aggression in the region mirrors the position of several African states. The post-genocide Tutsi-dominated regime of Paul Kagame in Rwanda, leveraging its image as a victim of colonialism and genocide, justifies domestic repression of Hutus and expansionist military ventures in neighboring states, notably the Democratic Republic of Congo in close alliance with the United States, France, and Israel. In exchange for U.S. and western military, financial, and political backing, Rwanda facilitates imperial access to Congo’s mineral wealth — coltan, gold, and tin — channeling profits both to Western capital and Rwandan elites. Thus, Rwanda functions as a pro-U.S. imperial proxy, advancing the global system of resource extraction and accumulation on behalf of Western powers. In addition, Rwanda along with a growing list of African states, including Ghana, Eswatini, and South Sudan have accepted the terms of bilateral agreements with the US government to receive people who have been criminalized and deported under the Trump regime’s attack on communities racialized as non-white in the US.[21] By enlisting themselves to be locations for the outsourcing of US racist incarceration policies, they are enabling the geographical expansion of the US military industrial prison complex to more and more corners of the world. These Caribbean and African misleaders will go down in history as active enablers and facilitators of the very imperial greed, oppression, and exploitation that the masses have been resisting since the days of direct colonial domination. Only invigorated mass resistance that takes power away from Caribbean neocolonial (puppet) elites engaged in imperial service can rectify these conditions. Global Africans in the Caribbean and around the world must claim power and reclaim movement histories that fought back against capitalist imperialism. Originally published in Pambazuka News and republished in Black Agenda Report References [1] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/venezuela-says-u-s-warship-raided-a-… [2] https://www.caribbeanlife.com/trinidad-guyana-us-moves-venezuela/ [3] https://newsday.co.tt/2025/09/03/kamla-says-kill-all-traffickers-as-tru… [4] https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/26/world/us-warship-docks-trinidad-venezeul… [5] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/17/trump-maduro-venezuela [6] https://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2025.ht… [7] https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/32f71f10c36cc482/d9… [8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U1bd-D1PIZg&pp=ygUZIGogZCB2YW5jZSBnbG9i… [9] https://www.finance.gov.tt/2020/03/16/effect-of-the-oil-price-collapse-… [10] https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14271.pdf; https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2024/06/04/Trinidad-and-T…. [11] Chamber of Industry and Commerce 2025; University of the West Indies Campus News 2024. [12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BAJgGFtF44A [13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kavkiH9YHag&pp=ygUaanVsaWFuIGdvIHBvbGlj… [14] See, for example, the Trilateral Commission’s “The Crisis of Democracy” in which influential thinkers who shaped US policy complained that decolonising countries were exercising too much democracy, which needed to be contained, leading to the proliferation of NGOs all over the peripheralized world. [15] https://trinidadexpress.com/news/local/kamla-state-resources-won-t-be-wasted/article_5d0c61fd-d633-4dd3-8e3e-6995a454c774.html [16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcpZPGOksp0 [17] https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025NationalDrugThreatA…; https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/32f71f10c36cc482/d9… [18] https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/455652.Dark_Alliance; https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/1628-whiteout?srsltid=AfmBOor…; https://www.betterworldbooks.com/product/detail/the-politics-of-heroin-…; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxbW0CCuT7E [19] Bogues, Anthony. 2023. “Sylvia Wynter: Constructing Radical Caribbean Thought.” BIM: Arts for the 21st Century 11(1): 33–41, p.37. [20] Henry, Paget. 2000. “Caribbean Marxism: After the Neoliberal and Linguistic Turns.” In Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy, Africana Thought, New York: Routledge, 221-46, p.228. [21] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/more-african-nations-are-receiving-t…

Abstract This is the first part of an analysis examining the initial perceptions and evolving realities of the Russia-Ukraine war, which began in February 2022. Early Western media and political narratives were optimistic about Ukraine’s military resilience and potential victory, highlighting heroic resistance, Western support, and Russian operational failures. However, the reality has been more complex, as Ukraine faced significant challenges, including numerical and equipment inferiority, underfunding, limited combat brigades, and a lack of strategic reserves. Despite these hardships, Ukraine managed to resist Russia’s initial advances, as exemplified by symbolic events such as the defence of Snake Island. The article explores the human and economic costs of the ongoing war. Ukraine requires an estimated $524 billion in reconstruction funding, following a 30% drop in GDP in 2022 and ongoing economic hardships. Western aid has been substantial, exceeding €400 billion, but the conflict’s economic fallout also burdens donor countries, causing inflation and growth slowdowns. Key Words: Realism, War, Ukraine Introduction At the very beginning of the ‘Special Military Operation’ – an invasion of Ukraine by Russia - most academics, policymakers, political leaders, and media pundits were hugely impressed by Ukraine’s initial military response. Most were genuinely of the opinion that Russia was weak, economic sanctions would cripple its economy, President Putin had little to no public support, and that with enormous help from the U.S. as well as most EU Member states, Ukraine would not only resist the attack but ultimately win the war with Russia on its own territory and perhaps even facilitate the government change in Kremlin. Any skeptical views regarding the possible Ukrainian victory were swiftly silenced and dismissed as pro-Putin propaganda or even deliberate disinformation, therefore suggesting that any sceptics are more or less Putin’s agents. Let’s look at some media titles from March 2022 onward (the war started on 24 February, 2022). Overenthusiastic narrative At the outset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, many initial media reports and analyses were pessimistic, predicting a swift Russian victory based on military disparities. However, by March 2022, as Ukrainian forces demonstrated unexpected resilience — repelling advances on Kyiv and inflicting significant losses on Russian troops—some Western media outlets began publishing more enthusiastic and optimistic pieces about Ukraine's potential to prevail. These often-highlighted Ukrainian morale, Western support, and Russian operational failures. Below, the reader will find several examples from that early period, drawn from a range of sources including news articles and opinion pieces. Admittedly, media coverage of this topic is inherently biased, with Western outlets generally favouring Ukraine's perspective. In contrast, Russian state media promoted the opposite narrative (e.g., RIA Novosti's premature victory declaration on February 28, 2022, which was quickly retracted). One of the events that genuinely inspired the world at the very beginning of the war was the so-called Snake-Island Campaign. Snake Island is a tiny (0.17 km²) Ukrainian outpost in the Black Sea, about 48 km off the coast of Odesa. Despite its size, the island is geostrategically vital: it hosts radar stations, enables missile launches, and controls maritime routes for grain exports from Odesa. Russian control threatened Ukraine's southern coast and Black Sea shipping.[1] On the invasion's first day, the Russian cruiser Moskva (Black Sea Fleet flagship) radioed: "Snake Island, this is a Russian warship. I repeat: put down your arms... or you will be bombed." The 13 Ukrainian border guards replied: "Russian warship, go f… yourself." Russians captured the island via helicopter assault; defenders were taken POW but later exchanged and awarded Ukraine's Hero of Ukraine title. Consequently, legacy media began painting a rather rosy picture of the Ukrainian campaign. Below, the reader will find several examples: - The Atlantic - "Ukraine Is Winning. Don't Let Up Now." (March 28, 2022). This opinion piece by Eliot A. Cohen expressed strong optimism about Ukraine's battlefield performance, crediting heroic resistance and Western aid while critiquing Russia's weaknesses. Key quotes: "Truly magnificent Ukrainian resistance — heroic and clever at once — backed by Western arms and intelligence accounts for much of this." and "If Ukraine prevails, its example will be at least a partial deterrent to further adventures by Russia, and perhaps by China." The article urged continued support to secure a Ukrainian victory. [2] - The Washington Post - "Ukraine-Russia talks stir optimism, but West urges caution" (March 29, 2022). This news report highlighted positive developments from peace talks in Istanbul, where Russia pledged to reduce military operations around Kyiv, fostering hope for a resolution favourable to Ukraine. It noted enthusiasm around Ukraine's proposals for neutrality with security guarantees, though tempered by skepticism. A key optimistic element: The talks "stirred a glimmer of hope" amid Ukraine's successful defence, with Ukrainian negotiators pushing for international backing to end the conflict on terms that preserved sovereignty. [3] - Associated Press (AP) - "Russia says it will cut back operations near Ukraine capital" (March 29, 2022). This wire report conveyed optimism following Russia's announcement of scaling back assaults on Kyiv and Chernihiv, interpreting it as a sign of Ukrainian leverage in negotiations. Key quote: "Russia announced Tuesday it will significantly scale back military operations near Ukraine’s capital and a northern city, as the outlines of a possible deal to end the grinding war came into view at the latest round of talks." It portrayed this as a potential turning point, with Ukraine's delegation outlining a framework for neutrality backed by guarantor nations.[4] - Deutsche Welle (DW) - "Ukrainians have won the information war" (March 7, 2022). While primarily focused on the information domain, this article by historian Margaret MacMillan extended optimism to the broader conflict, arguing that Ukraine's narrative success bolstered its military position. Key quote: "The Ukrainians have won the information war... This is helping them win support around the world, which in turn is translating into real help on the ground." It emphasized global sympathy, fuelling aid that could tip the scales toward Ukrainian victory.[5] - In a rather absurd tone, the Polish media reported that a Kiev female resident destroyed a Russian military drone with a jar of pickles when enjoying a cigarette on her balcony.[6] Reality on the ground was somewhat different, however. In fact, as Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, rightly observed, before the invasion by Russia, the Armed Forces of Ukraine faced several significant challenges: 1. Numerical and Equipment Inferiority: As of the end of 2021, the Russian army was about five times larger than the Ukrainian army, with four times more tanks and armoured combat vehicles, 3.4 times more artillery, and 4.5 times more attack helicopters. The Ukrainian Navy was notably weaker, lacking aircraft carriers, destroyers, corvettes, or submarines.[7] 2. Underfunding and Stagnation: Despite politicians declaring that more than 5% of GDP was allocated to security and defence, less than half of the allocated budget went to the Ministry of Defence. There was no increase in funding for developing and procuring weapons and equipment, with most money going to financial support for the military personnel. This led to stagnation, with a lack of finances for development and combat readiness, personnel outflow, and understaffed military units. 3. Limited Combat Brigades: At the time of appointment of the author as Commander-in-Chief in August 2021, there were only 24 combat brigades in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with 12 already engaged in combat in the East and South. Only 12 combat brigades remained available for deployment in the event of aggression. 4. Insufficient Modern Weapons: Ukraine had very few modern weapons compared to Russia. The total need for funds to repel aggression, including replenishing missile and ammunition stocks, was estimated at hundreds of billions of hryvnias, which the Armed Forces did not have. 5. Lack of Strategic Reserves and Preparedness: The Armed Forces were unable to create sufficient strategic reserves, which are crucial in a strategy of defeat. Ukraine was significantly inferior in personnel, weapons, and military equipment, and lacked the preparation to meet the scale of the impending invasion. These challenges left Ukraine vulnerable and enabled Russia to pursue a strategy of defeat through swift, decisive military action. Reality on the ground – how much has the war cost so far? Russia's invasion has imposed staggering financial burdens on Ukraine and its Western allies through December 2025. Available reports evaluate these costs, encompassing direct damages, economic contractions, and international aid expenditures, drawing from economic assessments and aid trackers. Ukraine has endured profound economic devastation. According to the World Bank's February 2025 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, the country requires an estimated $524 billion for reconstruction over the next decade, reflecting cumulative physical damages from infrastructure destruction, housing losses, and disrupted industries.[8]     Source: UKRAINE FOURTH RAPID DAMAGE RDNA4 AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT. (2025, February). World Bank Group. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099022025114040022/pdf/P180174-ca39eccd-ea67-4bd8-b537-ff73a675a0a8.pdf The war has apparently obliterated key sectors: agriculture, energy, and manufacturing suffered massively, with export routes like Black Sea ports blocked, leading to a 30% GDP contraction in 2022 alone. By mid-2025, Ukraine's GDP remained 25-30% below pre-war levels, with annual losses projected at $40-50 billion due to reduced output and trade.[9] Military expenditures have surged, consuming over 50% of the national budget, totalling around $100 billion since 2022, funded partly through domestic borrowing and inflation, which peaked at 26% in 2022. [10] Humanitarian costs, including the displacement of 6 million refugees and internal migrants, add billions in social support.[11] Overall, projections estimate Ukraine's total war-related economic harm at $2.4 trillion by 2025, though this likely understates indirect effects like human capital loss and environmental damage.[12] Western nations, primarily the United States and European Union members, have shouldered high costs through aid and indirect economic repercussions. Total bilateral aid from Western donors exceeded €400 billion ($430 billion) by June 2025, including military, financial, and humanitarian support.[13] The U.S. has committed $175 billion in appropriations, with $130.6 billion spent by August 2025, including $66.9 billion in military assistance like weapons and training.[14] EU institutions and member states provided nearly $197 billion, encompassing $63.2 billion from EU budgets and refugee support for 8 million arrivals.[15] The UK itself pledged £12.8 billion, with £7.8 billion for the military.[16] Beyond aid, the war triggered economic shocks in the West. Energy prices soared due to sanctions on Russian oil and gas, contributing to EU inflation averaging 8-10% in 2022-2023 and to a 0.5-1% reduction in annual GDP growth.[17] The U.S. faced similar inflationary pressures, with global growth slowing to 3.1% in 2022, partly from supply disruptions.[18] Proximity to the conflict amplified costs for Eastern EU states, with cumulative GDP shortfalls estimated at €200-300 billion across Europe by 2025.[19] All in all, the war's financial toll surpasses $3 trillion combined for Ukraine and its supporters, straining budgets and exacerbating global inequalities.[20] Sustained aid is vital for Ukraine's resilience, but escalating costs underscore the need for diplomatic resolutions to mitigate further economic fallout. To be continued… References [1] Colibășanu, A., Crowther, A., Hickman, J., & Scutaru, G. (2022, September 27). The Strategic Importance of Snake Island. CEPA. https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/the-strategic-importance-of-snake-island/ [2] Cohen, E. A. (2022, March 28). Don’t Let Up Now. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/west-strategy-against-russia-ukraine-war/629387/ [3] Fahim, K., Stern, D. L., Lamothe, D., & Khurshudyan, I. (2022, March 29). Don’t Let Up Now. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/29/ukraine-russia-turkey-negotiations/ [4] Jones, T. (2022, March 30). Optimism, pessimism or skepticism? News outlets focus on the right thing in Russia-Ukraine coverage. Poynter. https://www.poynter.org/commentary/2022/optimism-pessimism-or-skepticism-news-outlets-focus-on-the-right-thing-in-russia-ukraine-coverage/ [5] Haas, B. (2022, March 7). Ukrainians have won the information war. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/ukrainians-have-won-the-information-war-historian-margaret-macmillan/a-61022603 [6] Wawrzusiszyn, D. (2022, March 8). To były pomidory, a nie ogórki. Znaleziono Ukrainkę, która strąciła drona słoikiem. Na:Temat. https://natemat.pl/400859,znaleziono-ukrainke-ktora-stracila-drona-sloikiem-z-ogorkami [7] Zaluzhnyi, V. (2025, November 29). Politics and War. Reality vs Expectations. LIGA.Net. https://www.liga.net/en/politics/opinion/politics-and-war-reality-vs-expectations#comment-list-4601543 [8] Ukraine. (2025, December 9). World Bank Group. https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/ukraine [9] Gorodnichenko, Y., & Vasudevan, V. (2025, July 27). The (projected) cost of Russian aggression. CEPR. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/projected-cost-russian-aggression [10] Samoiliuk, M. (2025, December 8). Ukraine War Economy Tracker. Centre For Economic Strategy. https://ces.org.ua/en/tracker-economy-during-the-war/ [11] Rogoff, K. (2025, December 9). The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2022/03/the-long-lasting-economic-shock-of-war [12] Gorodnichenko, Y., & Vasudevan, V. (2025, July 27). The (projected) cost of Russian aggression. CEPR. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/projected-cost-russian-aggression [13] Davis Jr., E., & Wolf, C. (2025, March 11). The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War. U.S.News. https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/these-countries-have-committed-the-most-aid-to-ukraine [14] U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine. (2025, March 12). U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/releases/2025/01/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine [15] EU Assistance to Ukraine (in U.S. Dollars). (2025, November 19). Delegation of the European Union to the United States of America. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-states-america/eu-assistance-ukraine-us-dollars_en?s=253 [16] Mills, C. (2025, July 17). Military assistance to Ukraine (February 2022 to January 2025). UK Parliament. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9477/ [17] The cost of EU Member States’ proximity to the war. (2025, November 17). European Commission. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/cost-eu-member-states-proximity-war_en [18] Jenkins, B. M. (2023, March 7). Consequences of the War in Ukraine: The Economic Fallout. European Commission. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-the-economic-fallout.html [19] The cost of EU Member States’ proximity to the war. (2025, November 17). European Commission. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/cost-eu-member-states-proximity-war_en [20] Rogoff, K. (2025, December 9). The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2022/03/the-long-lasting-economic-shock-of-war