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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Failed Martial Law Bid Shows Need to Protect Human Rights, Rule of Law (Seoul) – The South Korean National Assembly’s 204 to 85 vote to impeach President Yoon Suk-yeol on December 14, 2024 after his rejected imposition of martial law has reinforced democratic rule and checks and balances in South Korea, Human Rights Watch said today.  All 300 National Assembly lawmakers participated in the vote, with 204 votes in favor, 85 against, three abstentions, and eight invalid votes. The National Assembly charged the president with directing the military and police to obstruct the assembly from voting to overturn his decree; attempting to take over the National Election Committee; and arresting political leaders, current and former judges, journalists, and members of civil society. “Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment reflects the broad support among South Koreans for the rule of law and democracy,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Yoon’s impeachment should encourage South Korea’s political leaders to recommit to democratic institutions and upholding human rights and civil liberties.” The National Assembly impeached Yoon in response to his short-lived declaration of martial law on the evening of December 3, during which he attempted to ban all political activities and suspend due process rights and freedoms of speech and assembly. Yoon sent soldiers into the National Assembly to arrest political leaders and to stop lawmakers from voting to lift the decree.  In announcing martial law, Yoon contended that it was justified because of opposition efforts to impeach members of his cabinet and obstruct the budget, and due to unspecified threats from North Korean communist forces. Yoon repeated these claims in a televised speech on December 11, saying that his decree was a legitimate exercise of his constitutional powers, akin to conducting foreign policy, and so did not amount to insurrection.  The South Korean constitution allows a president to declare martial law only during “war, armed conflict, or similar national emergency.”  In his December 11 speech, Yoon stated that he had not intended to stop the National Assembly from lifting martial law under article 77 of the constitution – a critical check on potential abuses of power that it exercised on the night of December 3. But testimony by military officers ordered to carry out his decree contradicted his claim. In a news conference on December 12, an army special forces commander, Col. Kim Hyun-tae, who led the special forces team that stormed the National Assembly on December 3, said he had received orders from senior military commanders to prevent more than 150 National Assembly members – the number required to repeal martial law – from gathering. The head of South Korea’s police agency, Cho Ji-ho, testified in the National Assembly on December 9 that on the evening of December 3 the armed forces asked the police to help them locate and detain 15 people, including the leaders of the biggest political parties. He also said that several hours before declaring martial law, Yoon ordered him to occupy the newsrooms of several media organizations, including MBC, one of South Korea’s largest broadcasters and a repeated target of criminal defamation charges by Yoon and his allies.  The former deputy director of South Korea’s National Intelligence Service testified that he was ordered to arrest a broadcaster and a union official, as well as several political leaders, including a sitting judge who had ruled in favor of Yoon’s political opponent, a former chief justice of the Constitutional Court, and other political leaders. Martial law troops also occupied the National Election Commission’s offices and confiscated the phones of five election officials. On December 8, a special police investigation team arrested Yoon’s former defense minister, Kim Yong-hyun, on charges of insurrection. On December 11, the team arrested Cho on the same charge, along with another senior police official.  South Korean law defines insurrection as any attempt to “overthrow government organs established by the Constitution or to make the exercise of their functions impossible by using force.”  As investigations into the events of December 3 continue, the Constitutional Court will now decide whether to uphold the impeachment vote. A police raid on the president’s office on December 11 suggests he may also be charged with insurrection. The proceedings should be fair and impartial and ensure due process, Human Rights Watch said.  Yoon’s actions reflect a culmination of his administration’s assault on the country’s democratic institutions and human rights, Human Rights Watch said. In 2022, Yoon campaigned for president on an anti-feminist platform, rejected the existence of systematic gender discrimination, and pledged to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. Once in office, his administration eroded human rights protections for women and girls; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people; racial minorities; migrants; older people; and people with disabilities.  While in office, Yoon also directed police and prosecutors to attack political opponents, unions, and journalists, eroding the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly that his martial law decree nearly suspended. “Events in South Korea since December 3 have highlighted the crucial role democratic institutions play in preventing abuses of power and protecting the rule of law,” Pearson said.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Who could have predicted that after nearly 14 years of civil war and five years of stalemate, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria would collapse in just a week? With Assad’s departure, the pressing question now is what lies ahead for Syria’s immediate future. When opposition fighters led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized the major city of Aleppo in late November with minimal resistance, commentators widely believed it marked the beginning of the Assad regime’s downfall. Many anticipated a bitter fight to the end. Assad was caught off guard, and his forces were clearly unprepared. He withdrew his remaining troops from Aleppo to regroup and gain time for reinforcements to arrive from Russia and Iran, and hope the opposition fighters would stop there. It wasn’t to be. Emboldened by their swift success in Aleppo, HTS fighters wasted no time and advanced on Hama, capturing it with ease. They quickly followed up by seizing Homs, the next major city to the south. Russia provided limited air support to Assad. But Iran, having depleted its forces in Hezbollah’s defence against Israel in Lebanon, was unable to offer significant assistance and withdrew its remaining personnel from Syria. Meanwhile, Assad’s frantic calls for support from Iraq did not go anywhere. Seeing the writing on the wall, the morale of Assad’s forces and leadership plummeted. Fearing retribution in the event of the regime’s collapse, defections began en masse, further accelerating Assad’s downfall. And on the last day, Assad fled the country, and his prime minister officially handed over power to HTS and its leadership. It marked the end of 54 years of Assad family rule in Syria. The Assad legacy The Assad family, including Bashar al-Assad and his father, Hafez al-Assad, will likely be remembered by the majority of Syrians as brutal dictators. The modern state of Syria was established in 1920 following the Sykes-Picot Agreement in the aftermath of the first world war. Syria became a League of Nations mandate under French control, only gaining independence in 1944. Following a tumultuous period, including a failed unification with Egypt, the Ba'ath Party seized control in 1963 through a coup that involved Hafez al-Assad. In 1966, Hafez al-Assad led another coup alongside other officers from the Alawite minority. This ultimately resulted in a civilian regime, with Hafez al-Assad becoming president in 1970. Hafez al-Assad established himself as an authoritarian dictator, concentrating power, the military and the economy in the hands of his relatives and the Alawite community. Meanwhile, the Sunni majority was largely marginalised and excluded from positions of power and influence. Hafez al-Assad is most infamously remembered for his brutal suppression of the opposition in 1982. The uprising, led by the Islamic Front, saw the opposition capture the city of Hama. In response, the Syrian army razed the city, leaving an estimated 10,000 to 40,000 civilians dead or disappeared and decisively crushing the rebellion. Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, and, the least likely candidate, his younger son, Bashar al-Assad, assumed the presidency. Having been educated in the West to become a doctor, Bashar al-Assad projected a moderate and modern image, raising hopes he might usher in a new era of progress and democracy in Syria. However, Bashar al-Assad soon found himself navigating a turbulent regional landscape following the September 11 2001 terror attacks and the US invasion of Iraq. In 2004, after the United States imposed sanctions on Syria, Assad sought closer ties with Turkey. He and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became friends, removing visa requirements between their countries and making plans to establish economic zones to boost trade. Erdoğan and Assad then had a falling out during a series of events in 2011, a year that marked a turning point for Syria. The Arab Spring revolts swept into the country, presenting Assad with a critical choice: to pursue a democratic path or crush the opposition as his father had done in 1982. He chose the latter, missing a historic opportunity to peacefully transform Syria. The consequences were catastrophic. A devastating civil war broke out, resulting in more than 300,000 deaths (some estimates are higher), 5.4 million refugees, and 6.9 million people internally displaced. This will be Assad’s legacy. Syria’s immediate challenges Syria now has a new force in power: HTS and its leadership, spearheaded by the militant leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. They will face immediate challenges and four key priorities: 1) Consolidating power. The new leadership will now try to ensure there are no armed groups capable of contesting their rule, particularly remnants of the old Assad regime and smaller factions that were not part of the opposition forces. Critically, they will also need to discuss how power will be shared among the coalition of opposition groups. Al-Jolani is likely to become the founding president of the new Syria, but how the rest of the power will be distributed remains uncertain. It seems the opposition was not prepared to take over the country so quickly, and they may not have a power-sharing agreement. This will need to be negotiated and worked out quickly. The new government will likely recognise the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the territories it controls as an autonomous region within Syria. An independent Kurdish state, however, will be strongly opposed by Turkey, the main external backer of the opposition. Yet, history seems to be moving in favour of the Kurds. There is now the eventual possibility of an independent Kurdish state, potentially combining northern Iraq and northeastern Syria into a single entity. 2) International recognition. Syria is a very complex and diverse place. As such, the new government can only be sustained if it gains international recognition. The key players in this process are Turkey, the European Union, the United States and Israel (through the US). It is likely all of these entities will recognise the new government on the condition it forms a moderate administration, refrains from fighting the Kurdish YPG, and does not support Hezbollah or Hamas. Given their unexpected success in toppling Assad so quickly, the opposition is likely to accept these conditions in exchange for aid and recognition. 3) Forming a new government. The question on everyone’s mind is what kind of political order the opposition forces will now establish. HTS and many of the groups in its coalition are Sunni Muslims, with HTS having origins linked to al-Qaeda. However, HTS broke away from the terror organisation in 2016 and shifted its focus exclusively to Syria as an opposition movement. Nevertheless, we should not expect a democratic secular rule. The new government is also unlikely to resemble the ultra-conservative theocratic rule of the Taliban. In his recent interview with CNN, al-Jolani made two key points. He indicated he and other leaders in the group have evolved in their outlook and Islamic understanding with age, suggesting the extreme views from their youth have moderated over time. He also emphasised the opposition would be tolerant of the freedoms and rights of religious and ethnic minority groups. The specifics of how this will manifest remain unclear. The expectation is HTS will form a conservative government in which Islam plays a dominant role in shaping social policies and lawmaking. On the economic and foreign policy fronts, the country’s new leaders are likely to be pragmatic, open to alliances with the regional and global powers that have supported them. 4) Rebuilding the country and maintaining unity. This is needed to prevent another civil war from erupting — this time among the winners. A recent statement from HTS’s Political Affairs Department said the new Syria will focus on construction, progress and reconciliation. The new government aims to create positive conditions for displaced Syrians to return to their country, establish constructive relations with neighbouring countries and prioritise rebuilding the economy. Syria and the broader Middle East have entered a new phase in their modern history. Time will tell how things will unfold, but one thing is certain: it will never be the same.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Special Keynote Address by HH Prince Faisal Bin Farhan Al SaudDelivered at the 20th Regional Security Summit The IISS Manama Dialogue on 7th of December 2024 in Bahrain. This text is a verbatim transcript of the speech (As Delivered) HH Prince Faisal bin Farhan al Saud, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: “In the name of God, all merciful, may you have a very blessed morning. Firstly, I would like to express my elation for joining the 20th Manama Dialogue while reiterating my thanks and appreciation for the Kingdom of Bahrain, two last decades, for hosting the most prominent Manama Dialogue, that is of increasing importance as a main dialogue platform, gathering officials from all over the world in order to discuss the most important issues that touch the security of the area at a time we need it, mostly towards security solutions, facing mutual solutions. Not to mention, I thank the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the chairman for so kindly inviting me. This is convened at a critical time that the global system is going through, an accelerating crisis and polarisation with increased mutual threats. Our area is not separated from the global arena, and vice versa is true, given the conflict that is crossing borders, affecting global security, creating risks for the global economy. Hence, the framework for the 20th Dialogue is leadership in the Middle East to create prosperity, which is increasing in importance – to attain prosperity, which is correlated to security and peace, that are based on permanent peace, that is sustainable and not on the basis of interests. For the Kingdom, it has forever been earnest in its political overcoming of crises, responding to economic development, not to mention that we have been committed to regional tolerance, cooperation and dialogue, a strengthening of partnerships and creation of new integration on the basis of economy. But the crises and the wars are deviating us towards a dangerous crossroad. Hence, it is upon us, in cooperation with the global community, to mutually mobilise ourselves effectively to correct the path, going back to tolerance and cohabitation in peace, ridding ourselves of wars [that are] leaving thousands of victims, void of attainment of strategic goals. Hence, our pivotal goal for political security is to focus on the challenges standing in the way of perpetrators towards a better future, not to mention that we have seen that this reality is achievable, but it calls for commitment and effort by everyone with a political will, even courage, steering away from personal or self-interest. Peace needs enabling to face all those standing in the way of achieving it and realising it, and above all, it needs earnest partners from all sides. Dear ladies and gentlemen, the continuity of war in Gaza is touching the region and global security and is standing in the way, as Israel has impunity and is getting away without punishment. One stand is important to preserve the peace and the global security. Otherwise, it will deteriorate all efforts to remedy the situation. Hence, the global community should intensify their efforts in order to have a ceasefire and entry of humanitarian aid to Gaza, release of all the detainees. We warn against speech of hatred that is feeding victims’ inclusive declarations, that are threatening Gaza settlements, and against the twostate solution.  When it comes to the Kingdom, the path to peace is clear but has obstacles. And if we look at the reality of crises, we find out that peace is a common denominator based on the two-state solution. Should the global community care to protect what credibility is left, they have to put their hands in the hands of the Kingdom and earnest countries in order to translate words into actions and realise the two-state solution based on responding to the needs and security. Everybody has to follow, including Israel. The Kingdom believes … the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is earnest to follow the peace followed by the Arab Peace summit and the two last summits. Not to mention, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with its alliance [inaudible] for the two-state solution, based on pragmatic steps to materialise the Palestinian state, ending occupation, based on the rights of selfdetermination by the Palestinian people void of any other obstacles from other parties. It is high time, in order for us to overcome the freeze of peace efforts, to move from speech to industry of peace. Not to mention, the Kingdom is going to continue its efforts in that way to have two states, Israel and Gaza, going back to the original borders, with Jerusalem as its capital. Dear ladies and gentlemen, the Kingdom reiterates, it is important to be earnest against acceleration and escalation to avoid bad results, hence welcoming ceasefire in Lebanon, hoping that international exerted efforts to meet the 701 Resolution of the United Nations to empower Lebanon, ridding them of humanitarian suffering. As the rest of the crises – in Sudan, Libya, etc. – calls for shunning violence and military action towards political solution, void of external intervention, towards sovereignty, void of accelerating humanitarian and risk of collapse of national systems. Dear ladies and gentlemen, the Kingdom’s vision is a cornerstone to support socio-economic development on a sustainable basis with a foreign policy reflecting the priority of the vision towards creating a brighter reality that will seep into the entire area, hence invested all efforts for regional stability and mutual security by empowering unity among the brothers based on dialogue among countries of the region while mediating peace efforts. The events today call for worry, yet the Kingdom looks at an interactive future of the Middle East given our ample resources, geographical proximity amid three continents, rich resources, reiterating that the area continues to have importance globally – not to mention the popular call for peace in order to realise economic integration while being sure that lack of security is not inevitable, but due to political feuds, calling for political solution and ridding ourselves of the zero formula that is not a win–win situation. We look forward to an alternative path [that] falls into interests that are wide-ended as opposed to self-interest, towards hope and a better future for the people of the area. Thank you very, very much.” As Delivered Disclaimer:This speech is published under the principles of press freedom, with no commercial intent, and solely for the purpose of informing interested individuals. The speech was publicly delivered by HH Prince Faisal Bin Farhan Al Saud at the 20th Regional Security Summit The IISS Manama Dialogue. This publication aims to provide access to the content for informational purposes and does not imply endorsement or official authorization by the event organizers. Public Information:This speech addresses critical global and regional security issues and is therefore of significant public interest. Its publication aims to make these important topics accessible to a broader audience, fostering awareness and understanding. Transparency and Accessibility:Providing the speech in written form enhances access to key political and security-related information, making it easier for readers to engage with the content.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Subsequent U.S. administrations, except for brief moments of relative calm, have persisted in demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) abandon its nuclear program and, moreover, have made extensive efforts to destabilize its political and economic system. Meanwhile, the successive leaders of the DPRK have persisted in advancing their defensive capabilities until reaching their preferred deterrent: nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, a guarantee of survival. This persistent situation reached an unprecedented moment when, during his previous presidency, Donald Trump made a surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK, temporarily unraveling, although without the expected results, the "Korean Gordian Knot." This led to successive summits in 2018 and 2019 (Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom) with Kim Jong Un, the leader of a state that, throughout its history, has maintained sharply confrontational relations with the United States. The world witnessed the transition from exchanges of insults and threats—Trump calling Kim "Little Rocket Man" and Kim referring to Trump as "old senile man"—and threatening the latter with "fire and fury" if the North Korean leader continued missile tests, to becoming "pen pals" and holding three unprecedented summits. No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK like Donald Trump did, and no North Korean leader in history has sat face-to-face, as equals, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did, which granted him prestige on the global stage. Due to reasons associated with its strategic ambiguity, the Biden Administration made no diplomatic progress with Pyongyang. Even though at the beginning of his term he committed to a "new strategy toward North Korea," over the past four years, his actions have only promoted sanctions in the Security Council, which have clashed dramatically with Russia's veto, struggled with the dissolution of the DPRK Expert Group in the Sanctions Committee, and observed the exponential increase in its arsenal of intercontinental, hypersonic, and short-range ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads capable of targeting the continental U.S. and U.S. military bases in the region. Furthermore, the DPRK has resumed uranium enrichment and reopened its nuclear test center. In the end, the outgoing president has been unable to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, much less contain it. So, one must ask: Will Trump's return to the White House mark continuity or a change from his previous term? An analysis of the future position of the Trump administration toward the DPRK should consider that, compared to his previous term, the circumstances have radically changed. 1. DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have made new and significant advances. At the same time, its foreign policy has undergone a reorientation due to the sustained increase in distrust toward Washington from Pyongyang.2. By order of its leader, the DPRK has severed all its ties and symbols of relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as the "main and unchanging enemy," and as it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the People's Armed Forces to accelerate preparations to "occupy, subjugate, and fully reclaim" South Korea, in response to the confrontational attitude and increasingly close military and intelligence ties between Washington and Seoul.3. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two summits between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, and Kim's description of Putin as the "closest comrade," have shown the high level of understanding and commitment between the two, which has materialized in the DPRK's unwavering support for Russia's special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures. This treaty includes a clause for "mutual military assistance," while Russia provides diplomatic and economic backing to the DPRK, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports, mainly oil, raw materials, and food, as well as assistance in various fields.4. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis is taking shape between China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies are labeling it the "new axis of evil." In this interconnected relationship, the DPRK holds significant advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. At least these four factors will significantly impact Donald Trump's decision to return, or not, to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, raising doubts about whether the former would be willing to revisit it. However, if he tries, it is unclear what Kim Jong Un's response would be, clearly more determined and militarily more powerful in the eyes of Washington, which at first glance seems unwilling to renew its offers related to denuclearization. The ironic jest by Trump at the 2024 Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, when he said that Kim Jong Un "missed him," that they "got along very well," and that "he misses me" and "wants me back in the White House" and "it's good to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons," was met with a response from North Korean media, stating that "they don't care" who assumes office in the U.S. This suggests that Pyongyang's official stance is that, regardless of what happens, it will not abandon its nuclear deterrent. Considering the visible changes in the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape that differ from those in 2018-2019, any type of negotiation aimed at reaching compromises between the parties on the denuclearization of North Korea will be even more challenging. Trump may seek alternative approaches to encourage the DPRK to freeze nuclear and missile tests, but he will need to weigh several options. These include: which side should take the first step toward engagement; whether it is necessary to "rattle sabers" to create influence; the possibility of "unilateral conciliatory gestures"; and whether he should stick to the goal of "complete denuclearization" (Chad O’Carroll and Shreyas Reddy, 2024). Donald Trump exhibits an unpredictable, egocentric personality and is a fan of diplomatic spectacle, with a penchant for reality shows. Given this, he might be tempted to revisit diplomacy, possibly considering the absence of John Bolton, who, alongside Michael Pompeo, led the Hanoi Summit to failure. Many agree with what was stated by Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University and former special advisor for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae In administration, when he admitted: "It is possible that, in his second term, Trump will prioritize solidifying his political legacy. His foreign policy would be heavily influenced by media attention and personal ego, as he cares about how history will remember him. Achieving a major deal with Pyongyang and contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula could serve to fulfill that ambition, potentially allowing him to win a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. While resolving the Ukraine war or the Gaza crisis could also improve his chances of receiving the prize, negotiations with Kim Jong Un are likely to be a key agenda for Trump. In that sense, Trump could actively engage with the North Korean leader, and might even consider a visit to Pyongyang for a summit, where he could make surprising offers. However, the success of such efforts ultimately depends on Kim's response" (Lee Hyo Jin, 2024). It is necessary to build some scenarios: 1. The influence of personal friendship could encourage Kim Jong Un to engage in communication with Trump, turning the page on the Hanoi failure and minimizing distrust toward the U.S.2. Recognition by the Trump Administration of the DPRK as a de facto nuclear power and easing of sanctions to promote progress toward the partial normalization of relations.3. Strong U.S. demands for denuclearization and the promotion of further sanctions, leading to increased tensions. Given Trump’s volatility and the unpredictability of the DPRK leadership, there are currently no conditions to determine the most likely scenario. The campaign team has not commented on whether Trump will seek new meetings with Kim Jong Un, but his statements prior to his victory suggest that he might seek to revive talks, possibly sooner rather than later. Now, it is unpredictable what roadmap Trump will implement, as his opinions during the campaign may differ from the decisions he makes officially when in office. It is not accurate to assume that his demeanor during the first term will be indicative of his future conduct. It is worth dedicating a brief space to the designated Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. As a staunch anti-communist, he is one of the promoters of the term "axis of evil," which includes the DPRK, and considers China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as aligned against the US. He has advocated concrete actions and plans against these states. It is expected that, initially, he will oppose any commitment from the incoming administration with the DPRK. As John Bolton and Michael Pompeo did at the time, Rubio could attempt to limit Donald Trump’s maneuvering room with Kim Jong Un. However, there is also the possibility that the next U.S. president’s assertive and authoritarian character, who, despite previous disagreements, appointed Rubio, will lead him to align with Trump’s decisions or, alternatively, suffer the same fate of being ousted with a “tweet and a punch,” as happened to Rex Tillerson and John Bolton. Regarding the Republic of Korea, it is important to specify that the most critical foreign policy issues for Donald Trump’s new administration will be its relationship with the European Union, the Middle East conflicts, the war in Ukraine, the China-Taiwan dispute, and relations with the DPRK. It is precisely the latter that concerns South Koreans the most, as their security largely depends on the presence of U.S. troops in their country and Washington’s support for South Korea’s defense against the imminent “North Korean threat.” The conservative government of Yoon Suk Yeol has marked a clear distinction from his predecessor Moon Jae In by significantly strengthening his alliance with the U.S., driven by his growing animosity towards the DPRK and his pro-American stance. This situation presents little likelihood of encouraging Trump to engage in talks with Kim Jong Un, especially without a clear indication from Pyongyang toward denuclearization. This is likely, as all signs point to Pyongyang not making significant concessions regarding its nuclear deterrent and showing a strong aversion towards the Republic of Korea. After Donald Trump's victory, the South Korean president had a phone conversation with him to extend his congratulations and quickly express his desire for the alliance to continue under his leadership. Although both agreed to hold a summit as soon as possible, the issue of the DPRK, which was already addressed in this initial dialogue, will certainly be on the agenda. It is said that Trump plans for his government to work with South Korea on several bilateral issues, but one of the key aspects will be South Korea’s contribution to Washington for hosting U.S. bases on its territory. Let's remember that during Trump's first term, this was a hot topic in his military relations. It is worth mentioning that due to Donald Trump's transactional approach to international relations, his perception that many of the U.S. allies are "taking advantage" of its military power, and the pressure he exerted on Seoul when he was in office, with Trump's victory, national security against the DPRK is placed at the forefront. Many are concerned that his return to the White House could mean that Washington will no longer be a reliable partner, making it necessary for South Korea to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Han Dong Hoon, leader of the ruling People Power Party, said at a seminar organized to discuss the future of South Korea's nuclear policy that Trump's victory had positive aspects. "Acquiring nuclear potential — meaning having the right to enrich and reprocess uranium — does not inherently equate to possessing nuclear weapons," he said, according to The Korea Herald. "But we would be able to move to that phase at any time if North Korea intensifies its nuclear threats," he added. "I believe we should be prepared for such a scenario amid the changing dynamics of global power and order." Meanwhile, retired Army General Han Ki Ho went a step further and suggested that South Korea may no longer have a choice. "Nuclear armament may be the only path left for South Korea's survival," he stated (Julian Ryall, 2024). However, whether the Republic of Korea acquires nuclear weapons will depend on how the Trump administration approaches the alliance and relations with North Korea, that is, whether it abandons or restricts the "extended deterrence" and whether it pursues an agreement with Pyongyang that halts its development of long-range missiles that could reach the continental United States in exchange for accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear power. This type of agreement would affect Seoul, located just 48 kilometers from the border, and therefore within the range of North Korea's short-range missiles. We are facing an uncertain situation, and therefore, expectant, where the expectations regarding Donald Trump's stance on DPRK are uncertain. Whether the denuclearization of DPRK is a priority for the Trump administration depends on the approach and methods with which the president and his team address an increasingly complex scenario. DPRK, in terms of its economic performance and national defense potential, is not the same as before, which gives Kim Jong Un greater effectiveness in his military deterrence and diplomatic maneuverability, especially when his reliable conduct with Moscow and the appropriate handling of relations with Beijing strengthen his position vis-à-vis the U.S. Trump will have to deal with these realities. And while he may intend to continue his legacy, he will necessarily have to reframe his policy towards DPRK, considering that DPRK is no longer the same, that its main contenders (Russia and China) are precisely the closest to DPRK, and that the country itself is no longer the same, either militarily or socioeconomically, as it was when he engaged in talks with Kim Jong Un in 2018-2019. References - Simone McCarthy (2024) Trump claims Kim Jong Un “isses him. But he faces a very different North Korea leader this time around. Disponible en: https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-intl-hnk/index.html- Keith Johnson (2024) Could Trump Rekindle Diplomacy With North Korea? Disponible en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/13/trump-north-korea-diplomacy-putin-russia/- Joel S. Wit (2024) Blame Donald Trump for North Korea´s sable-rattling. Disponible en: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/blame-donald-trump-for-north-koreas-sabre-rattling/- Rubén Criado (2024) Así afecta la victoria de Trump a Corea del Norte. Disponible en: https://as.com/actualidad/politica/asi-afecta-la-victoria-de-trump-a-corea-del-norte-n/- Josh Smith (2024) Donald Trump se enfrenta a un Kim Jong Un envalentonado, cercano a Rusia y con un arsenal de misiles más grande. Disponible en: https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2024/11/07/donald-trump-se-enfrentara-a-un-kim-jong-un-envalentonado-cercano-a-rusia-y-con-un-arsenal-de-misiles-mas-grande/- Julian Ryall (2024) Regreso de Trump atiza debate nuclear en Corea del Sur. Disponible en: https://amp.dw.com/es/el-regreso-de-trump-atiza-el-debate-nuclear-en-corea-del-sur/a70798786#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317231276140&csi=1&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com- Chad O´Carrol y Shreyas Reddy (2024) Why North Korean denuclearization will likely take backseat in second Trump term | NK Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/why-north-korean-denuclearization-will-likely-take-backseat-in-second-trump-term/- Miguel Jiménez (2024) Donald Trump planea elegir a marcos Rubio como secretario de Estado. Disponible en: https://elpais.com/internacional/elecciones-usa/2024-11-12/donald-trump-elige-a-marco-rubio-como-secretario-de-estado.html?outputType=amp#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317890370552&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Among Turkey’s political elite, the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election is inspiring confidence in a reboot of Turkish-American relations and a strengthening of Turkey’s status in international affairs. What are the prospects for an “upturn” in Turkish-American relations? Turkey remains an important NATO member because of its geographical position and its geopolitical ambitions to integrate the countries of the Turkic world. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s policy of strengthening national sovereignty and independence from the United States is, naturally, of considerable concern to Washington. Turkey has traditionally remained a difficult partner for the West (as well as the East) because it has never fully abandoned its imperial mentality, and because Turks continue to hope for the resuscitation of Ottomanism, albeit in a new form. It is the repeated declarations of the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism and Panturanism by Turkish politicians that are causing concern in the US and EU, as well as in Russia, Iran and China. Perhaps the only country with an interest the formation of a new Turanian Union under Turkish leadership is the UK. London’s goal is to promote British geo-economic and geopolitical interests deep into Eurasia to gain access to the rich mineral resources of the post-Soviet Turkic countries and to create a dividing corridor between Russia, on the one hand, and Iran and China on the other. The intensification of Turkey’s mutually beneficial ties with Russia (especially in the area of military-technical cooperation on the S-400 air defense system deal) was the formal reason for Ankara’s withdrawal from the US fifth-generation F-35 fighter program and a contract for the delivery of 40 upgraded F-16 fighters. Immediately following the conclusion of the deal, sanctions were imposed on some Turkish officials, and the process of Turkey’s integration with the EU was once again blocked. Subsequently, the Turkish economy plunged into a protracted financial crisis. Turkey began to develop its trade and economic relations with Russia following the beginning of Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine independently of US sanctions. The trade turnover between the two countries doubled in 2022, adding problems for Turkey’s relations with the US and resulting in threats from US financial institutions. During Joe Biden’s presidency, Erdoğan’s failed to make an official visit to the United States. As part of the 2023 presidential election process, Turkey engaged in pragmatic political horse-trading with the United States over its agreement to Finland and Sweden’s membership of NATO. This political deal laid the ground for a restart in Turkey’s strained relations with the United States, as part of which the US president agreed to a “military deal” on the fate of 40 F-16 fighter jets and the IMF agreed to provide financial support for the Turkish government. Erdoğan has included pro-American specialists, led by Finance and Treasury Minister Mehmet Şimşek, in his new government’s economic department. The victory of Republican candidate Donald Trump in the US presidential election has raised hopes among Turkey’s ruling political elite for a comprehensive restart in Turkish-American relations. In Ankara both politicians and experts have expressed confidence that as a result of Donald Trump’s policy of withdrawing the US from conflicts abroad, firstly, the US will stop supplying arms to Israel and stop the war in Gaza and Lebanon; secondly, that, with Turkish mediation, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict can be frozen; thirdly, that Turkey can once again participate in the F-35 fighter jet production program and address other issues necessary to ensure the strategic security of the state; fourthly, the process of Turkey’s integration can be stepped up, with Turkey continuing to strengthen its key logistical function of connecting the West with the East; fifthly, Turkey can continue its expansion into the vast Turan region (post-Soviet Central Asia) under the auspices of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Erdoğan was among the first to congratulate Trump on his election victory and invited him to visit Ankara. In summary, he is counting on a full restoration of Turkish-American relations. Turkey hopes to regain its status as the main mediator in the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, following Donald Trump’s reelection to the White House, reiterated his support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and his hopes for a ceasefire in the near future. The pragmatic Turks are aiming for the participation of their construction companies in the reconstruction of Ukraine. However, the Turkish Foreign Minister failed to specify under what conditions this peace should take place. And how can the territorial integrity of Ukraine be reconciled with the realities on the ground after two and a half years of fighting and successes on the Russian side? In a recent interview with the Turkish newspaper Hürriet, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed bewilderment at the fact of Turkey’s military and technical cooperation with the Kiev regime, because Turkish weapons allow the Armed Forces of Ukraine to kill Russian soldiers and civilians. Nevertheless, Sergey Lavrov thanked his Turkish counterparts for their active attempts to achieve peace and a political resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. However, he doubted the success of Turkey’s political mediation, given the obstructive approach of the head of the Kiev regime, Volodymyr Zelensky, who rejects constructive peace proposals from Moscow. What has changed since Turkey has repeatedly and insistently expressed its confidence in initiatives to secure peace between Russia and Ukraine? Obviously, with Donald Trump’s victory, the policy of the main sponsor of the Ukrainian conflict and of the Kiev regime may change. If Donald Trump stops providing financial, military-technical and political support to Kiev and wishes to restore Ukraine’s constitutional norms and change Zelensky’s regime, then it is hard to see how the military conflict can continue. But it should be kept in mind that Erdoğan, as part of his development of trade relations with Russia amid the Ukrainian crisis, has not neglected the supply of dual-use goods to the Russian Federation. In this regard, the Turkish side periodically cites financial and economic threats from the US in connection with the circumvention of US sanctions. In other words, Erdoğan has officially provided military assistance to the Kiev regime, in compliance with the concept of the strategic interoperability of NATO member states, and Russia has, in effect, allowed such tacit assistance as part of an independent and pragmatic policy that allows Turkey to maintain partnership ties with Moscow as well. Will there be an “Istanbul 2”? In reality, Turkey rather tends to support military conflict between brotherly Slavic peoples and states so that both states and their military might are weakened. Ankara demonstrates a diametrically opposed policy towards the ethnically kindred countries and peoples of the Turkic world, and, with the unambiguous support of the UK and the tacit consent of the US and the EU, it has established the Organization of Turkic States, and is establishing a place in the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions, and as a result, is displacing or weakening Russia’s presence in those regions. Since the late 18th century, Turkey has maintained a steady interest in resuscitating its dominance in the Crimean peninsula and the Black Sea basin as a whole. Under these conditions, Turkey expects that a reduction or cessation of US military assistance to Ukraine will reset the Istanbul platform for the resumption of Russian-Ukrainian peace talks. Whether Istanbul-2 will play out in the same way that Istanbul-1, time will tell. However, the status of Crimea and the liberated territories cannot be a subject for bargaining and compromise.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском During a whirlwind few hours in South Korean politics, President Yoon Suk Yeol placed the country under martial law on Dec. 3, 2024, only to lift it just a short while later. It marked the first time that a South Korean leader has imposed the emergency power since 1979. And although short-lived, the measure provoked concerns of the country backsliding into authoritarian rule. To explain what happened and what it means for South Korean democracy, The Conversation U.S. turned to Myunghee Lee, an expert on authoritarianism, democracy and South Korean politics at Michigan State University. How did all this unfold? It was a crazy few hours, and I’m still trying to get my head around it – and a lot is still unknown as to why President Yoon did this. But at around 9:30 p.m. Korean time on Dec. 3, rumors started circulating among journalists that Yoon was planning an emergency press conference. And then at 10:20-ish, Yoon gave a short speech in which he blamed certain pro-North Korean and anti-state forces in South Korea of trying to destabilize the country. In effect, he was pointing the finger at opposition parties who have been blocking his policies and trying to impeach some of his appointees. He declared the situation unacceptable and said there was no way for him to continue to smoothly run the county, and as such he was declaring emergency martial law to save the nation from pro-North Korean and anti-state forces. The minister of defense then held a meeting with major military personnel, set up a martial law headquarters, and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Park An-su was appointed as martial law commander. A martial law proclamation was then issued stating that all political activities were now banned – including the work of the South Korean parliament. This all took place within around one hour of Yoon’s declaration. Despite the proclamation, legislators headed to the National Assembly, where some were blocked from entering. But many did get in, and, at around 1 a.m. local time, legislators voted against the martial law – in effect forcing Yoon to repeal his declaration. He did this but not for another three and a half hours, during which the situation was very tense. He relented at around 4.30 a.m., held another press conference and announced that he was lifting the emergency measure. Why did he declare martial law now? That’s what many people – myself included – are trying to work out. This shocked a lot of people, and it appears many were taken unawares. Obviously some people were in the know, such as the defense minister and army general appointed martial law commander. But it appears even some in his own party were unaware that Yoon was planning to do this. For sure, some opposition politicians have been warning about something like this happening since September. And Yoon has become increasingly frustrated by both divisions in his own party and moves by the opposition in the National Assembly to block key parts of his agenda. Also Yoon is facing numerous influence-peddling scandals involving both himself and his wife. This wasn’t a declaration made from a position of strength then? Hardly. Yoon is in an incredibly weak position: His approval rating has been hovering around the 20% mark. He presides over a divided party, a gridlocked parliament and a population in which he has become very unpopular. So was this an act of desperation? I don’t think so, no. The suggestion that Yoon took this step before the opposition could impeach him? That doesn’t make sense to me. He was already facing calls for impeachment – but I’m not sure that before this episode there was appetite in the country for a second impeachment, following the 2016 impeachment of President Park Geun-hye over a corruption scandal. So on that front, despite the scandals and the political issues he faced, I don’t think this can be characterized as an act of desperation. Especially as those calls for impeachment and removal from power have only been intensified by his actions. I think Yoon declared martial law out of anger – he was angry, and resentful at the opposition blocking him repeatedly. But then again, I can’t read his mind. For many, it is regarded as a foolish move – he was in such a weak position politically, it would have seemed unlikely that this tactic would succeed. But he and some of the plotters must have calculated politically that this tactic would give them a chance to gain support from his core base. The real puzzle is what drove him to make that political calculation. Is Yoon known to be an authoritarian figure? People certainly have aired concern over his autocratic tendencies. Even before this martial law incident, some of his decisions have prompted concerns. He has ignored legal procedures and tried to circumvent the National Assembly. He has certainly shown an illiberal streak at home, attacking the media as “fake news” while smearing opponents as communists and North Korean sympathizers. But that’s not always the way he is perceived in the West. Since the Russian invasion, there have been attempts by foreign policy types to divide the world into two blocs – a liberal one and an illiberal one. Yoon, as a key ally to the U.S., is framed in Washington as a defender of democracy. At home, however, it’s a different story. With the declaration of martial law, his authoritarian tendencies have been amped up for the world to see, and it’s difficult to imagine that won’t be part of his legacy. But even before this decision, he was known for being authoritarian. How does that legacy fit into the political history of South Korea? South Korea has a long history with martial law and autocratic, even military, rule. This latest declaration of martial law is by some counts the 17th instance in Korean history. The last time it was declared was in 1979 following the assassination of Park Chung-hee, a dictator who ruled South Korea during the 1960s and 1970s. That period of martial law lasted until 1981, during which Chun Doo-hwan, another dictator, came to power through a coup and perpetrated a massacre in Gwangju. Martial law hasn’t been declared since the 1980s, but certainly many older Korean people can still remember that occasion, when troops brutally cracked down on protesters. But since becoming a democracy in 1987, there hadn’t been a declaration of martial law until now. Interestingly, in a straw poll of my family, age factored into the response to Yoon’s move. Older family members very much feared the declaration of martial law. For younger family members and friends, it was met not as a joke, but certainly as a foolish move that wouldn’t actually result in a prolonged period of martial law. What happens next? My guess would be President Yoon’s days are numbered – and that this episode will hasten his political demise. Before the events of Dec. 3, there were still many people in the parliament and the public at large resistant to the idea of another impeachment following the last one in 2016. But there appears to be a groundswell of opinion in the parliament that the president should be removed, and it is echoed by the public.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah entered a 60-day ceasefire on Nov. 26, 2024, a move aimed at reducing tensions in the region more than a year into a multifront conflict.Under the terms of the deal, Israel would gradually withdraw its forces from Lebanon, and Hezbollah would fully withdraw north of the Litani River. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Army would “deploy and take control over their own territory,” U.S. President Joe Biden said, adding that the United States, France and other allies have pledged to support the deal.But what does the deal mean for the parties involved and future prospects for a more permanent cessation of hostilities? The Conversation U.S. turned to Asher Kaufman, an expert of Lebanon and border conflicts in the Middle East, to explain why they reached a ceasefire now and what it means going forward. Why is the ceasefire deal happening now? The timing of this ceasefire is the result of a convergence of interests among the government in Israel, Hezbollah itself and that of its chief sponsor, Iran – but all for different reasons. For the Israeli government, domestic issues are at play. First off, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are exhausted after more than a year of war. This is particularly true for Israeli reservists, a growing number of whom are not turning up for duty. The Israeli general public, too, is tired of conflict, and a majority favors a ceasefire with Hezbollah. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also has internal issues in his government to contend with. He is facing pressure from the ruling coalition’s ultra-Orthodox partners to draw up laws exempting ultra-Orthodox Jews from the military draft. Reducing the need for active personnel by quieting the front with Lebanon will help in that regard. The secular and national-religious sectors of the society who do serve in the IDF and who are upset with the possibility of a formal draft-exemption law for ultra-Orthodox men may be more inclined to swallow this pill if the war with Hezbollah is over. From the Israeli army’s perspective, the war in Lebanon is coming to a point of diminishing returns. It has succeeded in weakening Hezbollah’s military standing but has been unable to wipe the militant group out entirely. This also factors into Hezbollah’s thinking. The group has been seriously debilitated in Lebanon; the war has eroded its military capabilities. Unlike its previous position – reiterated time and again over the past year by its now-dead leader, Hassan Nasrallah – that a ceasefire would only be possible if first it is reached between Hamas and Israel in Gaza, Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran are now willing to delink the two fronts. This leaves Hamas in a far weaker position as they are now left without the support of Iran’s main proxy “axis of resistance” group. Drawing Hezbollah, and other aligned groups in the region, into direct confrontation with Israel had been Hamas’ hope when it launched its attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Hezbollah and Lebanon’s other political factions also have strong domestic pressures to contend with. Lebanon has more than 1 million refugees as a result of the conflict – the vast majority of them Shia, the branch of Islam that Hezbollah is drawn from. The conditions in Lebanon have increased the risk of sectarian fighting between Shia and others factions in the country. For Hezbollah leaders, the time may seem right to cut their losses and prepare to regroup as a political and military body. Iran, too, is seeking to rehabilitate Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon as soon as possible. The deal comes as Tehran is bracing for a U.S. administration that could have a more hawkish position on Iran and its proxies in the region, of which Hezbollah is the most significant. With a new Iranian president, and a new U.S. administration, a ceasefire between Iran’s main proxy and Israel may be a first step to Tehran building a constructive dialogue with a Trump White House. What is the role of the US in the ceasefire? What is interesting for me is that despite the very clear position of the U.S. in favoring Israel during the past year of conflict, it still functions as an effective mediator. It is thanks to the U.S. that there is a ceasefire – and it comes despite the fact that Washington is far from neutral in this conflict, being a chief ally of Israel and its main provider of weapons. But the Lebanese government and Hezbollah see a U.S. role, too. And this is not new. The United States was the mediator in the 2022 landmark agreement that, for the first time, set out the maritime boundaries between Israel and Lebanon. The ceasefire deal benefits both the outgoing and incoming U.S. administrations. For President Joe Biden, it would represent a diplomatic success after a year in which the U.S. has failed to mediate any breakthrough in the conflict in Gaza, and it is an opportunity for Biden to finish his presidency on a positive foreign policy note. From the perspective of Trump, the ceasefire in Lebanon will represent one less problem for him to face. What might be the consequences for Lebanon and Israel? Lebanon has the most at stake in this ceasefire holding. The country was already in a perilous economic situation before the war, and months of fighting has only worsened the structural, economic and political crises in the country. It is as dire as it can get. Further, the war has reignited sectarian tension in Lebanon – talk of a return to civil war in the country is not far-fetched. Lebanon-Israel border: A zone of continued conflict The lower reaches of the Litani River, outlined in blue, are the northern edge of a U.N.-proposed buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon. The Golan Heights, which neighbors Syria, is also disputed territory in the region. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Palestinian territories that are governed by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority respectively, are also often areas of violent conflict.   But there is uncertainty over how the ceasefire will affect the various rival factions in Lebanese society. Hezbollah has been weakened and may well now look for a way to reassert its strength in Lebanon’s politics. The main question is how the other factions and parties respond to that. With a weak Hezbollah, other factions may challenge the militant organization in ways they haven’t before. Before being decimated by Israel, there were no rival groups in a position to challenge Hezbollah in Lebanon. But that has all changed: Hezbollah’s military power has been degraded and Nasrallah, the group’s leader, killed. And Nasrallah was not just the face and brains of Hezbollah, he was also the group’s most important link to Iran. There is concern among some Lebanon experts that the gap left by a weakened Hezbollah may see a struggle for power and further strife in the country. And I believe there should be no illusions that Hezbollah will try to reassert itself as a domestic force. Complicating matters is the fact that any realignment of political forces in Lebanon comes amid a political vacuum. There has been a caretaker government – and no president – for two years now since Hezbollah conditioned the appointment of a new president with the candidate being an ally of the group. Now, Lebanese politicians would need to agree on a new president who in turn would appoint a new prime minister and government. It remains to be seen how this will unfold with a weakened Hezbollah. For Israel, the ceasefire will provide an opportunity to reconstruct parts of the north that have been devastated by Hezbollah missiles and a possible return of the 60,000 Israelis who fled northern areas close to the Lebanon border. It will also allow the Israel Defense Forces to regroup, refresh and focus their resources in Gaza, rather than fighting on two fronts. Could the ceasefire lead to a permanent peace deal? I don’t see any permanent peace deal on the horizon, given the fact that the fundamental political goals of Israel, Hezbollah and Iran have not changed and that the Israel-Palestine conflict continues to fester. But I am hopeful that the ceasefire could lead to calm and stability between Israel and Lebanon for the foreseeable future. The details of the ceasefire agreement are not very different from U.N. Resolution 1701 that ended the last major war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. That agreement brought relative calm to the region for 18 years, even if Hezbollah, supported by Iran, used these years to build up its military capability and prepare for a potential ground invasion of northern Israel. In my view, there is a possibility for greater stability this time around given the fact that the ceasefire agreement also stipulates that, if and when it becomes permanent, the deal would serve as a basis for negotiations over the demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon territorial boundary. This would not be an easy task, particularly in the area of Shebaa Farms and the village of Ghajar. But with goodwill and good intentions, even difficult border disputes could be resolved.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Amid the Ukraine conflict, Central Asian states are leveraging a multi-vector foreign policy to balance historic ties with Russia and expanding partnerships with global powers. This strategic pivot highlights their resilience in navigating a complex and shifting geopolitical landscape. The impacts of the Russia-Ukraine conflict have stretched well beyond Europe, shifting global alliances and influencing regions like Central Asia in complex ways. Caught between longstanding ties to Russia and other great powers, Central Asian countries now face a delicate balancing act. While the region has traditionally relied on Russia for economic and security partnerships, the ongoing conflict has created new pressures and opportunities, pushing these nations to adopt a more confident, yet cautious foreign policy. Central Asian states have responded to the shifting geopolitical landscape in several ways: maintaining economic ties to Russia, cautiously refraining from direct criticism of Moscow, and expanding partnerships with other global powers such as China, the West, and Türkiye. These evolving dynamics reveal the region’s vulnerabilities and strategic resilience in navigating an increasingly complex world order.  Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union, Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—have undergone a challenging transition from a shared Soviet past to diverse paths of nation-building and economic liberalisation. The five Central Asian states are members of one or more of the Russian-led institutions, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). For Central Asian states, these organisations serve as platforms for regional security and economic collaboration with Russia, allowing Russia, in turn, to maintain a significant influence in Central Asia’s geopolitical landscape. However, participation in these institutions reflects a complex balancing act; Central Asian states must navigate their relationships with Russia while also exploring partnerships with other global powers.  Since the start of the war, the Central Asian states have been leading the so-called “multi-vector” foreign policy approach, aiming for balanced relations with Russia and other powers such as China, the Western world, and Türkiye. The states of the region did not recognise Russia’s newly annexed territories of Ukraine, and some of the states issued official statements in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the early days of the war in 2022. Yet these states did not officially criticise Vladimir Putin and his “Special Military Operation.” There are several reasons at play here: economic reliance and the factor of Central Asian migrants, and membership in the Russia-led institutions.    Russia is a key economic partner for which each Central Asian state relies on for trade. Although, more recently, China has become the top trade partner for most of them, Russia remains the second one after China for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Central Asian states export agricultural products, metal and minerals, cotton, and textile products. Another major factor keeping the region reliant on Putin’s regime is millions of migrants from the region, particularly from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—who work in Russia. According to Russian official statistics, there are about 6.1 million migrants in Russia and most come from the states in the region.   Most of the Central Asian migrants travel to Russia for low-level seasonal work, particularly in the construction industry. In 2021 remittances sent by the migrants in Russia accounted for 35 percent of Tajikistan’s GDP and 33 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP. For Uzbekistan, the remittances made up 13 percent of GDP. Such dependence constrains open criticism of Russia’s actions, as economic stability is tied to these remittances.   Further to economic factors, there are also security concerns and long-standing ties with Russia. Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Russian-led security block CSTO; Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Eurasian Economic Union; and all of the Central Asian states are members of CIS. These ties and economic elements require the states to maintain a balanced approach to safeguard relationships on all fronts.  With the war in Ukraine, there has been increased attention from the global community towards Central Asia. Regional states have been growing partnerships with other global players like China, the EU, the US and Türkiye. China held the first Central Asia Summit in May 2023 in Xi’an, where all leaders of the Central Asian states attended.     The US held its inaugural C5+1 platform summit on 19 September 2023, with President Joe Biden meeting with the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The event was described as “a historic moment, building on years of close cooperation.”   From the European perspective, Germany’s interest in the region has been on the rise; the country initiated the “Germany – Central Asia” platform and held its first summit on 29 September 2023 in Berlin. More recently, on 18 September 2024, Chancellor Olaf Scholz travelled to Astana where the second summit of the platform was held with all Central Asian states. Germany, additionally, recently signed a migration agreement with Uzbekistan with aims to simplify the legal migration of Uzbek skilled workers into Germany.   Meanwhile, Türkiye has strengthened its presence in the region through the platform of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The OTS was established in 2009 to enhance cooperation among Turkic-speaking nations across Central Asia, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan, with Turkmenistan and Hungary holding observer status. This cooperation has grown rapidly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It focuses on economic, energy, and transport collaboration among the member states. Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are key players in OTS initiatives. The organisation provides leverage for Türkiye via its cultural and linguistic ties, increasing its influence across the region.   These varying partnerships present viable economic and political alternatives to dependency on Russia. In the shifting geopolitical landscape, Central Asian states are seizing new opportunities to assert their independence and diversify their foreign relations. A key feature of this strategy is their adherence to a “multi-vector foreign policy,” enabling them to engage with various global powers while avoiding alignment with any single bloc. This approach has been strengthened by a renewed emphasis on regional integration, exemplified by the “Consultative Meetings of Central Asian States.” To date, six meetings have taken place, featuring participation from the presidents of each Central Asian country.   Their multi-vector foreign policy allows them to maintain economic and security links to Russia while exploring alternatives with powers such as China, the EU, Türkiye, and the United States. As the global focus on Central Asia intensifies, these countries are also showing renewed interest in regional integration, which may strengthen their collective voice and enhance stability in a volatile environment.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump, who won the US presidential election on November 5th, is appointing key officials for the new government that will be launched in January next year, and the content is very unconventional. In a word, they are young, reformist, and loyalists who have been breathing together with him. This is especially true for those who will lead foreign policy and security. The nominations include 40-year-old Senator James Vance as Vice President, 53-year-old Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, 44-year-old Fox News anchor Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, 50-year-old Representative Mike Walz as National Security Advisor, 43-year-old Representative Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 59-year-old former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe (59) as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 53-year-old South Dakota Governor Kristi Nome as Secretary of Homeland Security, and 67-year-old Suzy Wiles as Co-Chair of the White House Campaign Committee. Among these, the five key figures are the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, and Director of National Intelligence, with an average age of 46, and all of them are ‘hawkish conservative patriots.’ Vice President Vance, a Catholic, shares the same ideological stance as President-elect Trump, including his opposition to abortion and his denial of global warming, and served in Iraq as a Marine. Secretary of State nominee Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, has taken a hard-line stance on Chinese corporate infiltration of the United States and human rights in China while serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in 2020, he introduced the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. He also opposed the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and called North Korea a “criminal group” for its human rights abuses, nuclear and missile development, and criticized it as a “massive group of lunatics” immediately after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in 2017. He is also a pro-Korea figure who has visited the DMZ in South Korea several times. National Security Advisor nominee Walz, a retired colonel from the U.S. Army Special Forces and a veteran of the Middle East, has advocated for reducing dependence on China for key minerals and boycotting the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and in June criticized North Korea-Russia military cooperation as a “dangerous and evil alliance.” He also always visited the DMZ when he came to Korea. Secretary of Defense Haggis is also a veteran of the Middle East and a former US Army major. He later became a host for FOX News and developed a relationship with President-elect Trump. Director of National Intelligence Gabbard, who collects and analyzes information from intelligence agencies, is a reserve lieutenant colonel with experience in the Middle East. She became the youngest member of the House of Representatives in Hawaii at 21 and is the first female veteran of the war. As such, the five key figures in the diplomatic and security line are all young and reformist, and most of them are veterans of the Middle East. If we look at the ideological tendencies, passion, careers, and past words and actions of President-elect Trump and the nominees for the diplomatic and security line, we can predict many things. First, domestically, reforms will be attempted to fit Trump’s slogan of “Make America Great Again (MAGA),” such as reducing and streamlining government organizations, strengthening the US military, promoting growth-oriented economic policies, and protecting domestic companies through fair trade. Under the slogans of “political correctness (PC) and being woke (WOKE),” abortion, homosexuality in the military, and environmental policies that were spread are expected to decline. Externally, there will be a strong confrontation with the “axis of change” powers such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that are leading international conflicts in the new Cold War structure, and the US nuclear military power and nuclear doctrine are also expected to be strengthened and reinforced. In other words, the trend of nuclear reduction and conventional military reduction that has continued since the end of the Cold War will be reversed, and efforts will be made to develop tactical nuclear weapons, new ships, and aircraft. Regionally, it is expected that efforts will be made to check China’s expansionism and pressure the public economically, strengthen security cooperation with allies on fairer terms, strengthen support for Israel, and bring an early end to the Ukraine War.  Considering all these things, we can predict several things about Trump’s second term US policy toward North Korea. First, regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, unlike the ‘strategic patience’ shown by the Obama and Biden administrations, it is expected that they will actively respond. In line with this, they will likely actively oppose the restoration of the Russia-North Korea alliance, Russia-North Korea military cooperation, and the dispatch of North Korean troops to Ukraine, and they will likely be just as nervous as South Korea about Russia helping North Korea advance its nuclear program. They will also actively establish military operation plans against North Korea in case of an emergency, and South Korea-US joint training and South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation will also be strengthened. Criticism of North Korea’s human rights issues through the UN is also likely to intensify. Nevertheless, considering that all the key officials who will move the diplomatic and security line are patriots who value national interests, they may also show a pragmatic tendency. In other words, if North Korea comes to the nuclear negotiations with a genuine will to compromise, the US will also engage in sincere dialogue, and if North Korea makes a sincere proposal rather than stalling or tricking, it is possible that the US will make efforts for an unprecedented agreement. Therefore, as Trump’s second term approaches, North Korea will have to consider whether to stick to its reckless nuclear policies to date or adopt a more pragmatic stance in the face of an increasingly powerful United States. Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The implementation of yet another U.S. initiative may allow it to interfere in the information policy of ASEAN and control the cyberspace of all of Southeast Asia. Two sides of the same summit The annual summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States was held in Vientiane in October. Meetings in this format are routine for ASEAN and are held with each of the non-regional powers, i.e. the dialogue partners of the association. They discuss plans for cooperation and exchange views on international issues. This time, the U.S., represented by A. Blinken, again tried to use dialogue to impose its vision of global issues. The statements of the US Secretary of State were anti-Russian, anti-Chinese and anti-North Korean in nature, and were aimed at increasing tensions vis-à-vis the South China Sea and the internal political situation in Myanmar. The timing of the meeting was no accident; it took place before the East Asia Summit (EAS), which is a platform for multilateral negotiations between ASEAN countries and external partners. In this way, Washington hoped to force representatives of Southeast Asian states to reconsider the agenda of the EAS and planned to use the upcoming event to provoke regional conflicts and consolidate their role as the ‘chief gendarme’ of the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. However, as the EAS showed, the U.S. failed to do so: no one except U.S. allies supported the attempts to undermine the regional architecture of security and cooperation. Following the results of the US-ASEAN summit, the divergence of views was also notable. The parties did not adopt any joint document of a political nature. Such a result was natural; for ASEAN, any external imposition of views is traditionally unacceptable. In general, the ASEAN leaders’ talks with Anthony Blinken were held among other meetings with Russia, India, China etc., and they would not have attracted much attention if a very narrow joint statement (‘Statement on Promoting Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence’ (AI)) had not been adopted in the aftermaths. With good intention According to the terms of this statement, under the plausible pretext of ‘achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals’, the United States intends to implement a whole range of plans together with ASEAN. Thus, it is planned to ‘discuss the further development of ASEAN’s AI projects’ (although, why should ASEAN discuss its plans with someone?), ‘interaction with the ASEAN Working Group on AI Governance (again, a direct intention to enter the decision-making process in the association), ‘creating an ASEAN roadmap for responsible AI’ (and, thus, inclusion in the internal planning process of its activities). In addition, the parties will ‘cooperate on approaches and standards in the field of AI’ (these approaches and standards will be based on similar U.S. ones), ‘knowledge exchange, technology transfer’ (the saying about ‘free cheese in a mousetrap’ is involuntarily recalled), ‘strengthening the collective digital and cyber potential’ (again based on the United States and built according to their rules), ‘the expansion of education in the field of AI’ (also according to U.S. norms) and ‘the development of interrelated approaches to AI management’ (AI management is a serious issue and it must be understood that external participation equals a direct threat to national sovereignty). Even more ambitious tasks include ‘supporting the development of national digital and AI strategies, discussing its management and regulation’ (for the United States, gaining access to national strategies will provide new tools for interfering in the internal affairs of others), ‘implementing initiatives in cooperation with the ministries of digital development of ASEAN countries’, as well as ‘ensuring information security support for the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework’ (its adoption is planned in 2025; here the U.S. is again interfering in intra-ASEAN affairs). We were not snubbed of the traditional American demagoguery in the field of ‘human rights’. The statement supposes ‘ensuring human rights and protection from all forms of discrimination and prejudice when using AI’ and  ‘ensuring the inclusiveness and accessibility of AI’ in the near future. Whether the mass use of AI will be safe for the population is a question the authors of the document are not considering, instead occupying themselves with other tasks. Another component is ‘dealing with foreign manipulation of information, disinformation and training in the field of technologies to counter this’ (of course, the U.S. initiators do not doubt their right to assign labels to information sources). Finally, it is expected to ‘stimulate the improvement of the population’s digital literacy via the private sector’, although, it would seem, in such sensitive areas as AI, digital technologies and cyberspace, only the state can protect the interests of its citizens. The name of the game When analysing these agreements, it becomes clear that the United States is aiming to take control not only of the economy or technology, but of the information space of Southeast Asia and the information policy of both ASEAN as a whole and individual members countries and their national sectoral departments. Such a radical deepening of interaction includes direct interference in the affairs of the association – unprecedented in its arrogance and openness – and searching for opportunities to reduce the role of states in controlling AI and the cyber sphere, as well as access to scientific and technological work of Southeast Asian countries in the field of AI and monopolisation of the Southeast Asian media sphere, which is absolutely a colonial approach of deciding which information people from ASEAN are allowed to read and see and which is declared ‘foreign manipulation’. The U.S. has already demonstrated its seriousness. On November 1, Rumman Chowdhury, an AI specialist and the U.S. Special Representative for Science, flew to the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta to remind Southeast Asian countries of the need to implement the joint statement. Here it should be understood that U.S. sectoral cooperation with ASEAN will be executed by a system of highly specialised institutions that objectively does not depend on the change of the presidential administration. Agreements have been made, obligations have been established and the implementation mechanism has been launched. Moreover, the U.S. will have a separate and individual approach to each country in terms of fulfilling and implementing these agreements. It is planned to work with the sectoral ‘digital’ ministries of the Southeast Asian states, which is nothing more than the selection of loyal future agents of influence. However, the question is to what extent the political and expert circles in Southeast Asia understand the long-term risks of granting a foreign partner large-scale access to the sensitive cyber sphere – even one whose interests in the region have long been known to everyone: inciting conflicts, ‘dividing and ruling’, searching for and luring highly qualified specialists (brain drain), exclusively imposing their own view on international issues, linking countries and markets to their technologies with the transfer of all kinds of useful data to intelligence services. *  *  * It would seem that ASEAN has always opposed neo-colonialism and supported a multi-vector course, equidistant from any external interests of its dialogue partners. Most likely, the association could only allow the appearance of info-colonial encroachments from its U.S. counterpart due to hopes for disinterested financing of its development from the United States (which in itself sounds like an oxymoron) and counting on some kind of abstract technology transfer. However, the consequences of the adoption of U.S. policy by Southeast Asian countries (if they do not ‘hit the brakes’ on the commitments they have made) could be deplorable, disastrous for their digital sovereignty, technological development and their independent course in general.