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Will the US-Iran ‘peace talks succeed or fail? Given the mix of personalities and national interests involved, we just don’t know. Success would likely be a short-term, mutually face-saving compromise, leaving many major bilateral and regional issues still to be resolved. Failure is likely to lead to a US-initiated war with chaotic outcomes and perhaps no real winners. What does President Donald Trump want? In the short term, he wants a “peace deal” comprising multiple components. While not all details are public, the first and foremost goal is nuclear. Iran must not have the capability to make a nuclear weapon. While some reports suggest the US demands that Iran close down its whole nuclear program, most reporting claims US demands are limited to Iran ceasing the production of and giving up all enriched uranium beyond that needed for its domestic nuclear energy needs. US demands also include Iranian agreement to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections to verify they comply with this commitment. Other demands include limiting the range of all ballistic missiles to some 500 km (compared to some 2000 km at present), the cessation of all hostilities toward both regional countries, and support for other nations or proxies engaged in such hostilities. These terms would put all of Israel out of range and discourage further attacks from Iran on Israel, despite the term “hostilities” being left vague. It is difficult to see Iran agreeing to the former. A deal on the latter might be possible. One formula could be through recognizing Israel’s right to exit (as does the Palestine Authority - PA) and ceasing hostilities and support to proxies in the context of progress towards a two-state solution. Trump’s aim is ‘maximum pressure’, precipitating ‘regime change’— that is, the end of Iran’s conservative mullah-led autocracy and its military guardians, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This is a longer-term goal, but one he would pursue opportunistically in the short term if circumstances permit, such as in the event of an outbreak of war. Denials and Tricky Negotiations Iran has always denied its intention to develop nuclear weapons; most recently, this week, by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi. The international community generally believes Iran knows how to make a nuclear weapon and would do so if it could; however, Iran won’t because it could not hide the process, and external intervention in response could be horrendous. Therefore, Iran is willing to negotiate the nuclear issue. It did so before, as part of negotiations between Iran and the US, resulting in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 during the presidency of Barack Obama. The difference between Obama and Trump is that Obama understood the subtleties of negotiating with Iran, i.e. build trust through the JCPOA before moving on to missiles and issues of regional hostilities. Trump 1.0 trashed the JCPOA in 2018, remarking it was “the worst deal in history.” Although Iran continued to comply with its conditions for a further 12 months. President Joe Biden dropped the ball on this issue, and Trump 2.0, upon re-election, continued where he left off in 2021. The Iranians are certainly not easy to negotiate with. Relevant “subtilties” include being a proud, fiercely independent, well-educated people who seek to own/control their own resources (e.g., oil) and, to the extent possible, be self-sufficient. They do not like being bullied, and trust is a key part of relationships. They claim Trump has consistently bullied them with his threats and actions, and all trust has long gone, dating back to Trump 1.0. Iranian officials have argued privately that the policies and actions of both Trump 1.0 and Biden, including the heavy economic sanctions, forced Iran into the “axis of evil” for basic survival reasons. They claim they want their independence, and have no particular affinity for the Russians, Chinese and North Koreans. One conclusion from that any negotiations with the US will occur in an atmosphere of tension and distrust. So, who does Iran trust? Violence on the Streets of Tehran: Regime Change and Civil Unrest On the issue of regime change, US (and Israeli) exploitation of last month’s widespread demonstrations throughout Iran was both an opportunity and a challenge. But the regime survived. There are four basic criteria for the successful change of any regime: leadership, the reason for change, the will of the majority of the people, and the support of a significant element of the armed forces and security forces to facilitate and sustain change Discontent with the Iranian government has been evident among different groups in the country for some time. Mostly, this has been political, but this time the driver was economic, driven principally by the hard squeeze of external sanctions, coupled with mismanagement and corruption. The outreach of hardship and dissent was much broader than before. And despite targeted input from outside Iran, the regime did not topple. Demonstrators were strongly suppressed by the government, and Trump’s threat to help demonstrators did not eventuate. Would his military intervention have been the tipping point? We can only guess. But here was no apparent split within the armed or security forces – given their deep involvement in the economy, there were strong self-interest motives not to – and no leadership figure, civilian or military, emerged. Attempts to promote Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s son, who was deposed in 1979, as a rallying figure, if only temporarily, failed. I doubt he has much appeal in-country due to the heavy suppression and corruption of his father. But the message was loud: there is disaffection, political and especially economic, which could ignite if the fuse is right. What to Expect Will Trump be tempted to use military force to try to facilitate regime change if he doesn’t get his way at the next round of nuclear negotiations, now due to be held in Oman late this week? He has the fleet in place, and comprehensive planning will be well underway, building on lessons learned from the Israeli-US 12-day war last June and recently in Venezuela. The planning focuses on key kinetic and non-kinetic targets, especially those requiring a preemptive strike. Israel will be part of this, with its own targets, which presumably will include key leadership, military and other persons. Iran will have done its planning also around its own lessons learned. Iranian early warning of an attack, even if measured in only minutes, will be critical in determining how quickly events unfold within and outside Iran, and how devastating they are. However, if this does force regime change, who will take over? Without the mullahs and lacking any civilian opposition infrastructure, the military (minus the IRGC?) would have to be the backbone of any new government. Civilian leadership is an unknown, though talented politicians and technocrats exist. Iran could become very fragmented and unstable as it sorts itself out. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

I. Introduction In late December 2025, mass protests erupted across Iran, driven by public anger over the deepening economic crisis. Initially led by bazaar merchants and shopkeepers in Tehran, the demonstrations quickly spread to universities and major cities such as Isfahan, Shiraz, and Mashhad, becoming the largest unrest since the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. Over time, the movement expanded beyond economic demands to include calls for freedom and, in some cases, the overthrow of the regime. Protesters chanted anti-government slogans such as “Death to the Dictator”. [1] In response, since late December 2025 Iranian state security forces have engaged in massacres of dissidents. The Iranian government has also cut off internet access and telephone services in an attempt to prevent protesters from organizing. The Iranian government has accused the United States and Israel of fueling the protests, which analysts suggest may be a tactic to increase security forces’ willingness to kill protesters. A Sunday Times report, based on information from doctors in Iran, said more than 16,500 people were killed and more than 330,000 injured during the unrest. The Interior Ministry in Iran verified 3,117 people had been killed in protests. [2] The Iranian protests, the largest in the Islamic republic’s 46-year history, appear to have subsided for now in the face of a violent government crackdown. US President Donald Trump has threatened to “hit very hard” if the situation in Iran escalates, reigniting concerns about possible American intervention in the region. Even Trump called Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “sick man” in an interview with Politico on January 17th, 2026, and said, “It’s time to look for new leadership in Iran.” It appeared to be the first time Trump had called for the end of Khamenei’s rule in Iran. [3] Despite having repeatedly threatened to attack Iran if the regime were to start killing protesters, Trump has held off on any immediate military action against the Islamic Republic. While the US reportedly sent the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group to the Middle East on January 15th, 2026, President Trump has not specified what he might do. However, on January 28th, 2026, Trump posted on social media: “A massive Armada is heading to Iran... It is a larger fleet, headed by the great Aircraft Carrier Abraham Lincoln, than that sent to Venezuela. Like with Venezuela, it is, ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary.” Saying that time is running out, Trump demanded that Iran immediately negotiate a nuclear deal. He also suggested his country’s next attack on Iran could be worse than last year’s. However, US allies in the Gulf are known to oppose such US attacks on Iran. On January 14th, 2026, the New York Times’s headline “Trump’s Gulf allies don’t want him to bomb Iran” caught people’s attention. Earlier, The Wall Street Journal also reported the previous day that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman are lobbying the Trump administration against attacking Iran. Those Sunni Muslim countries have long felt threatened by Shiite Iran. Particularly, Saudi Arabia is the leading country of Sunni Islam and has long competed with Iran, the leading nation of Shia Islam, for regional dominance in the Middle East. Then a question arises: Why Sunni Arab countries, which do not feel favorable toward Iran, oppose US military strikes against Iran? This paper deals with this puzzle. It first explains the relationship between Shiite Iran and Suni Arab countries and then examines why Suni Arab countries are against US military strikes on Shiite Iran. II. The relationships between Shiite Iran and Suni Arab countries Sunni and Shia Muslims have lived peacefully together for centuries. In many countries it has become common for members of the two sects to intermarry and pray at the same mosques. They share faith in the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed’s sayings and perform similar prayers, although they differ in rituals and interpretation of Islamic law. Shia identity is rooted in victimhood over the killing of Husayn, the Prophet Mohammed’s grandson, in the seventh century, and a long history of marginalization by the Islam’s dominant sect of Sunni majority, As Figure 1 shows, the Sunni majority, which approximately make up 85 percent of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims, viewed Shia Islam with suspicion, and extremist Sunnis have portrayed Shias as heretics and apostates. Figure 1: Branches of Islam (source: CFR) Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 gave Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini the opportunity to implement his vision for an Islamic government ruled by the “guardianship of the jurist”, a controversial concept among Shia scholars that is opposed by Sunnis, who have historically differentiated between religious scholarship and political leadership. Shia ayatollahs have always been the guardians of the faith. Khomeini claimed that clerics had to rule to properly perform their function: implementing Islam as God intended, through the mandate of the Shia Imams. [4] Under Khomeini, Iran began an experiment in Islamic rule. Khomeini tried to inspire further Islamic revival, preaching Muslim unity, but supported armed groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Afghanistan, and Pakistan that had specific Shia agendas. Sunni Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, admired Khomeini’s success, but they did not accept his leadership, underscoring the depth of sectarian suspicions. The relationship between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries is largely defined by geopolitical rivalry and sectarian competition, primarily between Iran and Saudi Arabia, playing out in proxy conflicts (Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq) and political influence, fueled by the 1979 Iranian Revolution and historical Sunni-Shia Islamic differences. This rivalry exploits religious narratives to gain regional hegemony, supporting opposing sides in regional conflicts and influencing domestic politics in countries such as Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain. For example, Saudi Arabia and Iran have deployed considerable resources to proxy battles, particularly in Syria, where the stakes are highest. Saudi Arabia closely monitors potential restlessness in its oil-rich eastern provinces, home to its Shia minority, and deployed its military forces, along with other Gulf countries, to suppress a largely Shia uprising in Bahrain. It also assembled a coalition of ten Sunni countries, backed by the US, to fight Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen. The war, fought mostly from the air, has exacted a high civilian toll. Saudi Arabia had provided hundreds of millions of dollars in financial support to the predominantly Sunni rebels in Syria, while Iran had allocated billions of dollars in aid and loans to prop up Shia Assad government in Syria and had trained and equipped Shia militants from Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan to fight in Syria. [5] The relationship between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries is summarized as follows: A. Key players of Shia and Sunni Muslim world are as follows :  Iran (Shia): As a Shia-majority theocracy, Iran seeks regional influence.  Saudi Arabia (Sunni): As a key US ally and the leading Sunni nation, Saudi Arabia promotes Wahhabism.  Other Sunni nations: Egypt, UAE, and Jordan generally align with Saudi Arabia against Iran. B. Key drivers of tensions between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries are below:  Geopolitical struggle for dominance: Both Iran and Saudi Arabia vie for leadership in the Middle East, seeing the other as a main threat.  Religious divide (Sunni vs Shia): Iran’s Shia theocracy challenges Sunni-led countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as the leader of the Sunni Muslim world.  The Iranian Revolution in 1979: The Iranian revolution created a revolutionary Shia nation, alarming conservative Sunni monarchies and intensifying regional power struggles. C. The rivalry is expressed as follows:  Proxy wars: Iran supports Shia military groups (e.g., Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon), while Saudi Arabia backs Sunni factions and governments, leading to conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.  Sectarian polarization: Both Iran and Saudi Arabia use sectarian narratives to mobilize support, while Saudi Arabia marginalizes Shia minorities in Sunni countries and exacerbates internal conflicts.  Regional alliances: Sunni countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, facing a mutual threat from Iran, have increasingly normalized ties with Israel by signing the Abraham Accords for regional security. III. Why Sunni Muslim nations, which do not feel favorable toward Iran, oppose US military strikes against Iran? Sunni Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, oppose US military strikes against Iran due to fear of potential retaliatory attacks on their own soil by Iran and economic fallout & disruption, regional instability, and concerns about expanding Israeli influence. Despite geopolitical rivalry between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries, these Sunni countries prioritize national security, avoiding a full-scale conflict that could devastate the Gulf region. 1. The first reason why Sunni Arab countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about potential retaliatory attacks on their own soil by Iran and economic fallout & disruption. A. Fear of Retaliation Sunni-majority nations fear that if the US attacks Iran, Iran will retaliate against them, damaging critical oil infrastructure and causing economic devastation. The Gulf states’ primary short-term concern is a potential Iranian retaliation targeting strategic infrastructure on their territory, including symbols of governance, oil and gas production facilities, desalination plants, and military bases, in particular those hosting US forces. Another major concern is Iranian action to disrupt shipping lines near the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately a quarter of global oil and gas traffic passes. [6] In addition, any harm to Iran would also affect the economies of the Gulf states that maintain trade relations with it, particularly the United Arab Emirates, Iran’s principal trading partner in the Middle East. The Iranian strike on Qatar in June 2025 was a reminder of the vulnerability of infrastructure in the Gulf, even though Iran reportedly provided advance warning. Indeed, reports indicated that Iran conveyed messages to its Gulf neighbors urging them to persuade the US to refrain from attacking Iran, while warning that such an attack would trigger retaliation against military bases on their territory. Moreover, Iran could also activate its regional proxies - by putting pressure on the Houthis not only to target Israel but also to renew disruptions to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and potentially even carry out strikes on the Gulf states themselves. [7] Unlike Israel, the Gulf states are geographically very close to Iran and have more limited military capabilities. Most of their population, economy, and infrastructure are concentrated along narrow coastal strips exposed to the Gulf shoreline. They experienced firsthand Iran’s drone and missile attack on Saudi Aramco oil facilities in 2019 and learn a simple lesson: Even a “limited” Iranian attack can be devastating. In line with this threat perception, several Gulf states reportedly are acting to prevent a US military strike on Iran through mediation and facilitation. [8] The Gulf states oppose a US strike on Iran not because they believe such a move is unjustified in principle but rather because they are convinced that they would bear the immediate cost. Their opposition may also reflect the concern that the attack plans would not, in their view, produce the desired results. Accordingly, behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia, together with Qatar and Oman, has led quiet efforts to persuade the US to avoid military intervention, warning that regime collapse or military escalation would shake oil markets and endanger their stability. Reports indicate that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman have focused on preventing the use of escalatory rhetoric and military steps that could lead to miscalculation and escalation. Strikes against the Gulf states using drones, missiles, maritime sabotage, or regional proxies are readily available and familiar options for Iran. For the Gulf states, an Iran-US confrontation constitutes a direct threat to their internal, economic, and security stability. Mediation, therefore, is a defensive tool from their perspective - an attempt to keep the battlefield away from Gulf territory, even if this does not resolve the root causes of the confrontation. It is also possible that reports about efforts to prevent a US strike are intended to allow time to improve defensive preparedness with US assistance, particularly against missile attacks. In any case, the image of the Gulf states as opposing a strike against Iran and seeking to prevent it serves their interest in reducing tensions between themselves and Iran. B. Economic fallout & disruption A violent confrontation between Iran and the Gulf states could prompt serious economic consequences. “If Iran decides to block trade routes, for example, this would have a significant effect on the economies of the Gulf states,” Pauline Raabe from the Middle East Minds think tank in Berlin said. [9] Iran could block passage in the Persian Gulf by closing the Strait of Hormuz. “We have already seen what this means to international shipping when the Houthi rebels, a proxy group of Iran, fired on vessels in the Red Sea,” she explained, referring to the attacks on shipping in what the Houthis claimed was in support of Hamas in Gaza. Such a development in the Persian Gulf would, of course, have enormous economic consequences “first for the Arab countries, but then for the global economy as a whole,” Raabe said. An economic shock wave with catastrophic global implications would have immediate impacts on the temporary or prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with global energy markets suffering the most from such repercussions, triggering a significant disruption in international gas and oil supplies worldwide. The economic damage would be especially significant for regional economies. As Figure 2 shows, the Gulf countries, whose economies heavily depend on gas and oil exports, would experience an immediate and significant decline in their main sources of income. As Figure 2 shows, in 2024, Saudi Arabia earned $237 billion in oil export revenue, while Iraq earned $110 billion, and the United Arab Emirates $98 billion. Figure 2: Net Oil Export Revenues 2024 Widespread economic contraction and hardship, severe budget deficits, and currency devaluations would be some of the immediate consequences of these revenue declines, potentially triggering widespread political and social instability. Ironically, Iran, the country most likely to consider such a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, would also suffer severe economic repercussions. As Figure 2 shows, in 2024, Iran earned $51 billion in oil export revenue. Its oil revenues, which are vital and driving forces for its fragile and struggling economy, would be halted, and its ability to import necessary goods, such as food and refined petroleum products, would be significantly restricted, thereby causing further instability for its regime. The top priority for the Arab Gulf states, without a doubt, is the uninterrupted export of their oil without the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf. Data from Kpler and Vortexa show that in recent months, Iran has accumulated about 166 million barrels of floating storage near Chinese waters. Even if Iran’s oil loadings were disrupted for a while, this stockpile could sustain sales to China for three to four months. By contrast, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or any attack on tankers in the Persian Gulf would be extremely damaging for Arab producers, particularly because Saudi Arabia and the UAE, even with alternative pipelines, can protect only about half of their export volumes, while Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain have no alternative export routes. Eckart Woertz, director of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs in Hamburg, also notes that the Gulf nations are keen to avoid any disruptions as they are currently focused on their economic transformation processes. “Saudi Arabia wants to reposition itself economically with its ‘Vision 2030’ and any unrest would be a major hindrance,” he told DW, a German television network. This also applies to more traditional industries, such as the extraction of natural resources, especially oil. “Any uncertainty is detrimental to these industries, as they depend on trust and functioning supply chains. Both are prerequisites for the economy in the Gulf states,” Woertz said. [10] 2. The second reason why Sunni Arab countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about regional instability and insecurity caused by US military strikes. A. Regional instability and insecurity: There is a strong preference for diplomatic solutions to avoid a chaotic, uncontrollable conflict that could engulf the entire Middle East. Just as an Iranian strike against targets in the Gulf states constitutes a tangible threat, the Gulf states also fear that a US campaign in Iran could precipitate a rapid collapse of the regime in Tehran. They do not view the swift fall of the Islamic Republic as a desirable outcome as it could trigger widespread instability, including succession struggles within Iran, the disintegration of governing institutions, the empowerment of extremist actors, potential waves of refugees, and, above all, the loss of a clear address for crisis management. Dr Karim Emile Bitar, a lecturer in Middle East Studies at Sciences Po Paris noted that the Saudi leadership is particularly apprehensive about chaos and fragmentation in Iran, whether from a sudden collapse of the Iranian Islamic Republic or US-led war-induced regime change. Officials in Saudi Arabia are especially concerned about domestic security, including the potential for unrest among Shia communities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. “Any escalation might empower radical groups, embolden opposition movements throughout the region, and exacerbate sectarian polarization,” added Dr Bitar. [11] Such turmoil also raises the specter of separatist movements in Iran’s peripheral areas that are home to the country’s minority ethnic groups with their own histories of secessionist drives, such as ethnic Arabs, Kurds, or Baluch people. Such developments would pose acute security risks for countries like Pakistan and Turkey. From this perspective, the danger lies not only in Iran’s internal fragmentation but in the wider regional contagion that would follow. In turn, the Gulf states have a vested interest in maintaining stability in the region even though authoritarian structures continue. Woertz, director of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs, argues that “the leaders of the Gulf states apparently prefer to rely on the familiar old regime rather than getting involved with a new, potentially unknown faction,” although they still have strong reservations about the Iranian regime. [12] In simple words, most regional actors approach the prospect of escalation through a lens of risk aversion rather than ideological alignment. The prevailing judgment among leaders in most regional countries is that escalation is strategically irrational, while maintaining the status quo remains the least dangerous option. In recent years, the Gulf states have taken significant actions to improve relations with Iran as part of a policy of détente, which, in their view, has proven effective. “They don’t want to jeopardize that.” Woertz notes. From their perspective, “the devil they know” is preferable to the instability that could spill over into the Gulf, generate waves of refugees, and disrupt trade. The Arab Spring may also serve as a reference point, demonstrating that regime collapse does not necessarily bring clarity and stability but rather prolonged instability. [13] Iran is a known actor; its red lines, internal constraints, and regional patterns of behavior are familiar. By contrast, a post-Islamic Republic Iran-especially one emerging from a protest movement that is not monolithic-could be much less predictable. Moreover, the monarchies in the Gulf states fear a “contagion effect,” namely the possibility that the collapse of the Iranian regime and the emergence of a democratic-liberal political system in its place would inspire waves of protest in the region (as could have happened following the 2009 protests in Iran and the subsequent development of the Arab Spring). Finally, the collapse of the Iranian regime could also lead to a dramatic shift in the regional balance of power and a significant strengthening of Israel. Iranian hostility toward Israel, even at the rhetorical level, helps preserve a familiar equilibrium in the region. 3. The third reason why Sunni countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about expanding Israeli influence: If Iran collapses or weakens, US-backed Israel’s influence in the Middle East could rapidly increase, posing a threat to Arab countries in the region. Arab governments that once tolerated the idea of US-led regime change in Iran now urge restraint, recognizing that Israeli expansionism has become the region’s main threat. Only a few years ago, many Arab countries, particularly in the Gulf, may have viewed a US attack on Iran for regime change favorably. For decades, they regarded Iran with deep suspicion, often treating it as the region’s main threat. But now, as US President Donald Trump reportedly mulls exactly such an attack, Arab leaders, including Gulf rulers long at odds with Iran, are lobbying the US administration not to carry out military strikes on Iran. Even Gulf governments that have engaged in indirect conflict with Iran — such as Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia — do not support US military action there, according to analysts who study the region. That is partly because the monarchies of the Gulf worry that the ripple effects of escalating US-Iran tensions, or possible state failure in Iran, would harm their own security, undermining their reputation as regional safe havens for business and tourism. But it is also because some Gulf governments have come to see Israel, Iran’s archenemy, as a belligerent state seeking to dominate the Middle East. They believe that Israel could pose a greater threat to regional stability than an already weakened Iran does. In the wake of 7 October 2023 when the Hamas attacked Israel, Arab states have increasingly regarded Israel, not Iran, as the foremost threat to regional stability. “Ever since the US essentially lifted all restraints on Israel during the Biden administration, regional players have started to see Israel’s aggressive foreign policy as a direct and unmanageable threat. Israel has bombed seven countries in the region since 7 October 2023,” Dr Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told TNA. “Bombing Iran goes against the calculus and interests of the Arab Gulf States,” said Bader al-Saif, a history professor at Kuwait University. “Neutralizing the current regime, whether through regime change or internal leadership reconfiguration, can potentially translate into the unparalleled hegemony of Israel, which won’t serve the Gulf States.” Yasmine Farouk, the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula project director at the International Crisis Group, argues that Gulf countries are worried about “the chaos that a regime change in Iran would cause in the region” and how Israel might use “that vacuum.” For 27 months since 7 October 2023, Arab leaders have watched Israel’s rampage throughout the region, in pursuit of its “Greater Israel” project, an expansionist biblical vision for territory spanning from the Euphrates River in Iraq to the Nile River in Egypt. To this end, Israel has significantly expanded its illegal occupation of Arab lands. Not only has Israel carried out genocide in Gaza and indicated its plans to take the territory over, but it has also deepened its hold in the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon. Perhaps most alarming for Arab leaders, after months of Netanyahu openly declaring his expansionist ambitions, was Israel’s unprecedented assault on Qatar, a US ally, in September 2025. That escalation had been preceded only a few months earlier, in June 2025, by Israel convincing the US to bomb Iran in an assault aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and ensuring Israel remains the region’s sole nuclear power. The Israeli strike rattled Gulf governments not only because many have been courted by Israel as potential allies (signing the Abraham Accords) in recent years, but also because they, like Israel, had long regarded the US as their main security guarantor. “If the alliance with the US does not protect you from what these countries see as Israel’s designs for regional hegemony, then you will need a new coalition to balance against Israel,” Yasmine Farouk added. “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have moved in this direction. Soon after the Israeli attack on Qatar, Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, signed a security pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan. Though Iran is not officially part of this coalition, it does serve as a buffer against Israel. Chaos in Iran - or a pro-Israeli puppet being installed in Iran - is seen as a very dangerous blow to the effort to balance against Israel’s increasingly aggressive regional posture.” In short, Israel’s aim of absolute regional hegemony has never been clearer, and a US strike on Iran would represent both an extension of Israeli aggression and an expansion of its regional power. This is the structural shift at the heart of Arab opposition to a potential US attack on Iran. Moreover, it is also worth noting that Arab countries have themselves moved diplomatically closer to Iran in recent years, in part because of Israeli aggression and expansionism. The Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic relations in 2023 and moved closer after Israel’s attack on Qatar in September 2025. Iran’s relationship with Egypt has also improved. Recent events, and in particular Israel’s unchecked aggression and territorial expansion, have forced a structural shift in how Arab states assess regional threats. Gone, at least for now, are the days when Saudi Arabia viewed Iran as its foremost enemy, when Qatar saw Saudi Arabia as its principal threat, or when Egypt treated Qatar as the chief source of regional instability. Increasingly, Arab regimes, with perhaps the exception of the UAE, now view Israel as the region’s most destabilizing force. Israeli expansionism, its willingness to strike across borders without regard for accepted international norms, and its open pursuit of regional hegemony have fundamentally changed how Arab leaders assess risk. IV. The positions of major Gulf countries on US attack on Iran In early 2026, the strategic landscape of the Middle East is shaped by a striking convergence: while many regional governments deeply distrust Iran’s intentions and regional behaviors, there is a near-universal assessment that a US military intervention would be profoundly destabilizing. Across the Gulf, the Levant, and Turkey, leaders increasingly see war with Iran not as a solution to regional insecurity, but as a catalyst for economic shock, domestic unrest, and long-term strategic degradation. [14] The specific reason why a specific country opposes US military attacks on Iran is as follows. 1. Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia’s position reflects a decisive shift from confrontation toward risk management. Saudi Arabia has signaled a refusal to facilitate US strikes, including denying the use of its airspace, driven primarily by vulnerability rather than sympathy for Iran. Iran maintains the capability to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and to target Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure — most notably Abqaiq, Khurais, and Ras Tanura — with missiles and drones, as demonstrated in 2019. Even limited retaliation would disrupt global energy markets and severely undermine ‘Vision 2030’, which depends on foreign investment, tourism, and the perception of internal stability. Saudi leadership also assesses that a regional war would divert financial and political capital from other priorities, including regional diplomacy and post-Gaza reconstruction efforts that Saudi Arabia increasingly frames as part of its leadership role rather than a purely humanitarian endeavor. 2. Qatar For Qatar, the risks are existential. Qatar shares the world’s largest natural gas field with Iran, making sustained stability in the Gulf essential to its economic model. Any conflict that disrupts production, shipping, or joint field management would directly threaten state revenues. Compounding this exposure is Qatar’s hosting of Al Udeid Air Base, which would almost certainly be viewed by Iran as a legitimate retaliation target. Qatari strategy has long relied on diplomatic mediation as a form of deterrence; a US intervention would collapse this posture and force Doha into a conflict it has consistently sought to avoid. 3. United Arab Emirates (UAE) The UAE maintains a public stance of strategic neutrality, but this reflects calculated self-interest rather than ambiguity. Abu Dhabi’s leadership is acutely aware that its global financial hub status, logistics networks, and tourism economy are predicated on regional calm. A conflict with Iran would endanger shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, threaten port infrastructure, and likely trigger capital flight from Dubai. Despite ongoing tensions with Iran and security coordination with Israel, Emirati planners judge that the economic costs of war would far exceed any prospective strategic benefit from weakening Iran. 4. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman The smaller Gulf states such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman view US intervention in Iran primarily through the lens of exposure. Kuwait faces strong parliamentary and public resistance to involvement in another regional conflict. Bahrain, home to the US Fifth Fleet, recognizes that its territory would be among the first targets in any Iranian retaliation. Oman, which has long positioned itself as a neutral intermediary, sees military escalation as incompatible with its foreign policy identity and economic resilience. All three countries fear that war would inflame sectarian tensions, disrupt trade, and undermine already fragile domestic social contracts. 5. Egypt Egypt’s opposition is rooted in regime insecurity and economic fragility. The Suez Canal remains Egypt’s most critical source of foreign currency, and any regional conflict that disrupts Red Sea or Gulf shipping would have immediate fiscal consequences. Egyptian leaders also fear that war with Iran would energize domestic protest movements and Islamist networks, exploiting anti-US sentiment amid existing economic hardship. For Egypt, a US–Iran conflict represents a high-impact destabilizing event rather than a distant strategic concern. 6. Jordan Jordan’s position reflects chronic vulnerability. Jordan is already under severe economic strain and hosts a large refugee population relative to its size. Regional war could disrupt trade routes, risk spillover violence, and inflame public opposition to both Israel and the US. Jordanian authorities assess that even limited escalation could translate into disproportionate domestic instability, undermining the monarchy’s balancing act between internal legitimacy and external alignment. 7. Turkey Turkey’s concerns center on displacement and strategic autonomy. Turkey fears that conflict in Iran could generate large-scale refugee flows toward its eastern border, exacerbating domestic backlash against existing refugee populations. Turkey also relies on Iranian energy imports and has invested heavily in maintaining a flexible posture between Iran, NATO, and Russia. A US intervention would collapse this balancing strategy, impose economic costs, and complicate Ankara’s efforts to position itself as a regional diplomatic actor, including in post-Gaza reconstruction initiatives. 8. Israel Israel remains the sole regional actor publicly supportive of weakening or dismantling the Iranian regime. Privately, however, Israeli security assessments are more cautious. After prolonged military operations across multiple fronts, the Israeli Defense Force faces resource constraints, personnel fatigue, and growing concerns about air defense sustainability. Israeli planners increasingly judge that a US intervention would not be likely to produce rapid Iranian regime collapse and more likely to trigger a prolonged multi-front conflict involving Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and other Iranian-aligned actors. There is also recognition that external attack could consolidate Iranian domestic support for the regime rather than fracture it. V. Conclusion This paper explained the relationships between Shiite Iran and Suni Arab countries and why those Sunni Muslim nations, which do not feel favorable toward Iran, oppose US military strikes against Iran. This paper explained that Sunni Muslim nations oppose US military strikes against Iran for three reasons: The first reason why Sunni Arab countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about potential retaliatory attacks on their own soil by Iran and economic fallout and disruption. The second reason why Sunni countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about regional instability and insecurity caused by US military strikes. The third reason why Sunni countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about the Israeli influence expansion. References [1] Barin, Mohsen (31 December 2025). "Iran's economic crisis, political discontent threaten regime". DW News. [2] https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-president-warns-us-attack-on-supreme-leader-would-mean-full-scale-war/ [3] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/17/trump-to-politico-its-time-to-look-for-new-leadership-in-iran-00735528?_kx=LSFywwe4GSg_lcFWo5DyId8VKdphy2F0zhlZVneJnA97jKgVYFyty4cB80GJkTHR.U5D8ER&utm_id=01KF7GKF35MAAW8BRA143VFM9M&utm_medium=campaign&utm_source=Klaviyo [4] https://www.cfr.org/photo-essay/sunni-shia-divide#:~:text=Saudi%20Arabia%20has%20a%20sizable,to%20Saudi%20and%20Iranian%20sources. [5] https://www.cfr.org/photo-essay/sunni-shia-divide#:~:text=Saudi%20Arabia%20has%20a%20sizable,to%20Saudi%20and%20Iranian%20sources [6] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gulf-iran-usa/ [7] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gulf-iran-usa/ [8] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gulf-iran-usa/ [9] https://www.dw.com/en/why-the-gulf-states-are-wary-of-a-strike-on-iran/a-75593784 [10] https://www.dw.com/en/why-the-gulf-states-are-wary-of-a-strike-on-iran/a-75593784 [11] https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-middle-east-fears-us-israel-attack-iran [12] https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-middle-east-fears-us-israel-attack-iran [13] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gulf-iran-usa/ [14] https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/why-middle-eastern-states-oppose-us-military-inter vention-in-iran/

There is a major sticking point often overlooked in the ceasefire negotiations between Ukraine and Russia currently being held in Abu Dhabi. This relates to the fact that, as part of any agreement, Kyiv is being asked to give up the entire Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. If it does so, it will also be giving up the strategic positions that have prevented major advances by the Russian military for many months now. This is the significant line of defensive fortifications across the Donbas, known as the “Donbas line”. It’s Ukraine’s equivalent to the Maginot line of forts which were France’s main line of defence against Germany before the second world war. The “Anchorage formula” agreed by the US president, Donald Trump, and Russia president, Vladimir Putin, in Alaska late last year calls for Ukrainian forces to abandon the areas of western Donbas they currently hold. Washington is now talking up the idea of establishing a “free economic zone” or “de-militarised zone” which would cover the whole of the Donbas, including those portions currently occupied by Russian forces. This would mean Ukraine abandoning the Donbas line. The system integrates at least seven distinct defensive layers that any attacking force must penetrate sequentially to achieve effect. These include minefields, anti-tank ditches, anti-tank obstacles (“dragons’ teeth”), bunkers, trench lines and anti-drone defences. Such obstacles can either physically halt assaulting Russian forces or “canalise” them into swampy or otherwise impassible ground or into pre-arranged kill zones, wherein fires (mortar and artillery) can be used to destroy Russian formations. One of the most critical lines runs through the embattled town of Pokrovsk, which has been under constant Russian assault since early 2025. Lose Pokrovsk and the Ukrainians will then more than likely also lose the important city of Donetsk. Thus, Pokrovsk has been referred to as the “gateway to Donetsk”. The Donbas line took years to build and to perfect. It is very sophisticated. It would be a massive strategic blow for the Ukrainians if they were forced to give it up and pull back. In essence, the Russian demand that Ukrainian forces vacate the western Donbas can also be seen as a demand that they likewise give up, in the shape of this Donbas line, their one true means of protecting not only the western Donbas but also, arguably, the whole of the rest of Ukraine. Who can be trusted? If Kyiv were to accede to Russian demands and abandon the Donbas line, then this would only help bring about a lasting peace if, of course, trust could be placed in the Russians to keep their side of the bargain. They would need to cease all their assaults across Ukraine and themselves “de-militarise” the area of the eastern Donbas they currently control. But Putin has a history of reneging on deals. Anything agreed now by Kyiv in Abu Dhabi is likely, as respected Washington-based thinktank the Institute for the Study of War points out, to suffer the same fate. This seems to certainly be the view of many on the Ukrainian side. As Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, himself recently put it, “I don’t trust Putin”. He has good reason for doubting the Russian president’s bona fides. Russia was a signatory to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum alongside the US, UK and France by which those powers provided assurances for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for Kyiv giving up its arsenal of nuclear weapons. This didn’t stop Russia invading. Nor did the two Minsk accords in 2014 and 2015 which aimed to stop the fighting between Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian military in the Donbas region. In the event of any peace deal being struck between Moscow and Kyiv, Ukraine’s western allies have offered what they are calling “robust security guarantees”. These would be provided by a “coalition of the willing” made up of more than 30 countries, mainly from within Europe. What’s on the table In terms of what these promises might actually mean, there is a proposal for a three-tier mechanism. A Russian breach of the ceasefire would initially trigger a diplomatic warning, as well as allowing Ukraine to respond militarily. The second tier would be provided by the coalition of the willing, primarily the UK and France, which plan to send troops to Ukraine as part of the deal, but also many EU members plus Norway, Iceland and Turkey. The third tier would be a military response from the US. But it’s been reported that the US has made its participation in any security guarantees contingent on the agreement of a ceasefire deal which gives Russia control of the “entire Donbas region in eastern Ukraine”. A further issue here is that Moscow is unlikely to agree to the presence of any Nato troops as official security guarantors. Moscow has said as much, insisting that any foreign troops in Ukraine would be a “legitimate target”. Would western governments forces really commit their troops into a situation where they might become targets – leading perhaps to a wider war? The whole idea of Ukraine abandoning its Donbas line is fraught with difficulties. For this is not just a question of Ukraine trading land for peace. It is more fundamentally a question of trading land and significant defensive lines for the promise of peace. The original version of the Maginot line did not save France in 1940. It was bypassed by German forces moving through Belgium to outflank the Maginot fortifications. The danger for Ukraine is that its own Maginot line could itself be bypassed if it accedes to Russian demands at the negotiating table in Abu Dhabi. Can Zelensky really give up the Donbas line that is protecting his entire country, and can he really rely on security guarantees from western states that may yet prove equivocal? As one Ukrainian official told Reuters recently, to give up remaining positions in the Donbas region would be “suicide”.

On 3 January 2026, the US carried out a surprise military operation in Venezuela, capturing President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. The US has made little effort to cloak its operation in either solidarist language, such as appeals to democracy promotion, human rights, or liberal peacebuilding – or in pluralist rhetoric emphasizing the preservation of international order. Instead, Washington has presented the action in largely instrumental and strategic terms, signalling a willingness to sidestep both dominant justificatory traditions within international society. While Maduro and Flores are charged with narco-terrorism conspiracy and cocaine importation conspiracy, international debates focus on the future of Venezuela’s oil (Poque González 2026). On 7 January administration officials said the US plans to effectively assume control over the sale of Venezuela’s oil “indefinitely” (Sherman 2026) and President Donald Trump confirmed that he expected the US to run Venezuela, insisting that the country’s interim government was “giving us everything that we feel is necessary” (Sanger et al. 2026). Attention is fixed not only on Washington’s plans for Venezuela’s oil sector and control over its export revenues, but also on the replies from Moscow and Beijing, Maduro’s chief foreign backers and heavyweight players in energy politics. Consequently, this article asks two questions. First, to what extent does American control of Venezuelan oil threaten China’s and Russia’s energy interests? Second, what does the resulting US–China–Russia triangle imply for how energy security itself is being redefined? A constructivist perspective, recognizes that oil is an idea—valuable not only because it burns but because control over it symbolizes power and authority (Kuteleva 2021). Thus, when the US claims the right to supervise Venezuelan oil revenues, it is not only increasing leverage over barrels, but asserting the authority to define legitimate energy exchange itself. In this context, while the material threat is limited for China and already largely sunk for Russia, the symbolic, institutional and political threat is profound. A straightforward constructivist interpretation of the US–China–Russia triangle centres on status. China had cultivated Venezuela as an “all-weather strategic partnership” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2025b) and major debtor, only to watch Maduro captured days after senior Chinese officials visited Caracas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2025a). In constructivist terms, this is an obvious status injury: China appeared present but powerless. China’s energy diplomacy had functioned as proof of its global influence, and the nullification of China’s energy ties with Venezuela by US force undermines China’s narrative as a protective patron for the Global South. Beijing accused Washington of “hegemonic thinking” (Liu and Chen 2026), “bullying” (Global Times 2026a), and violating Venezuelan sovereignty and “the rights of the Venezuelan people” (Global Times 2026b). This strong pluralist language is not incidental—it is a bid to reclaim moral authority and redefine the event as norm-breaking rather than capability-revealing. Similarly, Russia’s involvement in Venezuela was never purely economic. Moscow saw the alliance with Venezuela as a way to advance its anti-American agenda and to signal that it could cultivate allies in Washington’s traditional backyard (Boersner Herrera and Haluani 2023; Gratius 2022; Herbst and Marczak 2019). It used Venezuela as leverage against the US, subsidised the regime during periods of domestic recession, and framed support as proof of great-power reliability. As senior Russian executives put it, “economic considerations took a back seat to political goals of taking swipes at the US” (Seddon and Stognei 2026). US control of Venezuelan oil thus removes a symbolic platform on which Russia enacted its identity as an energy superpower and geopolitical spoiler. While Russia continues loud sovereignty talk, its demonstrated incapacity to protect partners pushes it toward opportunistic bargaining (“concert” deals, see Lemke 2023) rather than overt defense of UN-pluralist restraint. As such, Dmitry Medvedev (2026) bluntly claimed that the US special military operation in Venezuela all but justifies Russia’s own actions in Ukraine. Venezuela is not a core supplier for China in volumetric terms. In 2025, Venezuelan exports to China averaged roughly 395,000 barrels per day—about 4% of China’s seaborne crude imports, according to Kpler data cited by the FT (Leahy and Moore 2026). China has diversified routes, strategic reserves covering at least 96 days of imports, and strong purchasing power in global markets (Downs 2025). Hence, from a narrow supply perspective, the loss of Venezuelan oil is manageable. That said, around one-fifth of China’s crude imports come from suppliers under US or western sanctions, primarily Iran, Venezuela and Russia, much of it disguised via transshipment near Malaysia (Downs 2025). Independent “teapot” refiners (Downs 2017)—who account for about a quarter of China’s refining capacity—are structurally dependent on this discounted, politically risky oil. Consequently, Trump’s seizure of Maduro alarmed China not mainly because of Venezuela itself, but because it demonstrated Washington’s capacity to escalate from sanctions to physical control of an energy sector, and thus potentially to Iran. Here, constructivism reveals the problem: “sanctioned oil” is not simply cheaper crude; it is a political category—oil marked as illegitimate by a dominant legal-financial order. The US move signals that this stigma can be converted into coercive authority, turning commercial vulnerability into geopolitical dependence. This reclassification transforms Chinese domestic actors into security subjects. “Teapot” refiners are no longer just businesses; they become strategic vulnerabilities whose survival depends on US tolerance. Analysis warn that a cutoff of Iranian oil could force many to shut down entirely (Leahy and Moore 2026). In this context, US control of Venezuelan oil reshapes Chinese energy security discourse from one of diversification and market access to one of hierarchy and exposure to political permission. Russia’s oil interests in Venezuela were largely written down years earlier. In 2020, Rosneft had sold most formal assets after pouring around $800m into loans and projects that produced little return (The Economist 2020). Much of the remaining exposure consisted of debts and shadow ownership arrangements. More important is the damage to Russia’s sanctions-evasion architecture. Russia had become the leading marketer of Venezuelan oil by trading crude as debt repayment and using banks partly owned by sanctioned Russian institutions, creating what the 2019 Atlantic Council report described as “a counter financial system to the one dominated by the West” (Herbst and Marczak 2019). The recent reporting on the US tracking a tanker linked to Venezuela, Russia and Iran illustrates how this counter-order is being contested operationally (Sheppard et al. 2026). The vessel sailed under false flags, was sanctioned for carrying Iranian oil, later re-registered under Russian jurisdiction, and became vulnerable to boarding under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea because it was “without nationality.” Such episodes show that energy security is increasingly constituted by maritime law, insurance rules, and surveillance practices. US control over Venezuelan oil expands this regime of enforcement, making Russia’s informal trading networks less viable. A constructivist approach suggests that American control of Venezuelan oil is best understood not as a supply shock, but as an act of social stratification in the international system. Energy markets have always been hierarchical, but the hierarchy was largely implicit: reserve currencies, shipping insurance, futures exchanges, and contract law already privileged Western institutions. What is new is the explicit performance of hierarchy—the public demonstration that a great power can redefine ownership, legality, and access through coercion and administrative authority. This produces a stratified energy order: First, rule-makers – states whose legal systems, sanctions regimes, and corporate actors define what counts as legitimate oil (primarily the US and its allies). Second, rule-takers – states whose energy security depends on access to these institutions (most importers). And third, rule-evaders – states forced into informal networks (Russia, Iran, Venezuela) whose energy becomes socially “tainted.” China occupies an unstable middle category: economically powerful but institutionally dependent. Venezuela’s takeover publicly signals that material power is insufficient without normative control over legality. Referencias Boersner Herrera, Adriana, and Makram Haluani. 2023. ‘Domestic and International Factors of the Contemporary Russo–Venezuelan Bilateral Relationship’. Latin American Policy 14 (3): 366–87. Downs, Erica. 2017. The Rise of China’s Independent Refineries. Geopolitics. Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/rise-chinas-independent-refineries/. Downs, Erica. 2025. China’s Oil Demand, Imports and Supply Security. Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/chinas-oil-demand-imports-and-supply-security/. Global Times. 2026a. ‘China Condemns US Demands for Venezuela to Partner Exclusively on Oil Production as “Bullying,” Breaches of Intl Law: FM – Global Times’. Global Times, January 7. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202601/1352547.shtml. Global Times. 2026b. ‘China’s Legitimate Rights and Interests in Venezuela Must Be Safeguarded, Chinese FM Responds to Claim about US to Sell Venezuelan Sanctioned Oil – Global Times’. Global Times, January 7. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202601/1352555.shtml. Gratius, Susanne. 2022. ‘The West against the Rest? Democracy versus Autocracy Promotion in Venezuela’. Bulletin of Latin American Research 41 (1): 141–58. Herbst, John E., and Jason Marczak. 2019. Russia’s Intervention in Venezuela: What’s at Stake? Policy Brief. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russias-intervention-in-venezuela-whats-at-stake/. Kuteleva, Anna. 2021. China’s Energy Security and Relations with Petrostates: Oil as an Idea. Routledge. Leahy, Joe, and Malcolm Moore. 2026. ‘Donald Trump’s Venezuela Action Raises Threat for China’s Oil Supplies’. Oil. Financial Times, January 8. https://www.ft.com/content/f64826fa-5c36-4fb3-8621-ee0b9d9a1ff5. Lemke, Tobias. 2023. ‘International Relations and the 19th Century Concert System’. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. Liu, Xin, and Qingqing Chen. 2026. ‘US Reportedly Sets Demands for Venezuela to Pump More Oil; Experts Say “Anti-Drug” Claims a Pretext, Exposing Neo-Colonialism – Global Times’. The Global Times, January 7. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202601/1352544.shtml. Medvedev, Dmitry. 2026. ‘Год начался бурно’. Telegram, January 9. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/626. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. 2025a. ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on January 5, 2026’. January 5. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202601/t20260105_11806736.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. 2025b. ‘Xi Jinping Meets with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Moros’. May 10. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202505/t20250513_11619919.html. Poque González, Axel Bastián. 2026. ‘Energy Security and the Revival of US Hard Power in Latin America’. E-International Relations, January 12. https://www.e-ir.info/2026/01/12/energy-security-and-the-revival-of-us-hard-power-in-latin-america/. Sanger, David E., Tyler Pager, Karie Rogers, and Zolan Kanno-Youngs. 2026. ‘Trump Says U.S. Oversight of Venezuela Could Last for Years’. U.S. The New York Times, January 8. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/us/politics/trump-interview-venezuela.html. Seddon, Max, and Anastasia Stognei. 2026. ‘How Russia’s Venezuelan Oil Gambit Went Awry’. Venezuela. Financial Times, January 9. https://www.ft.com/content/e09a6030-325f-4be5-ace3-4d70121071cb. Sheppard, David, Chris Cook, and Jude Webber. 2026. ‘US Tracking Oil Tanker off UK Coast Linked to Venezuela, Russia and Iran’. Shipping. Financial Times, January 6. https://www.ft.com/content/a699169a-983a-4472-ab23-54bceb9dd2bd. The Economist. 2020. ‘Why Putin’s Favourite Oil Firm Dumped Its Venezuelan Assets’. The Economist, April 2. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/04/02/why-putins-favourite-oil-firm-dumped-its-venezuelan-assets.

Thank you dear Prime Minister Modi, for welcoming us on this special occasion. We were privileged yesterday to be your Chief Guests for the Republic Day celebrations, such an impressive display of India’s capabilities and diversity. Today is a historic moment. We are opening a new chapter in our relations – on trade, on security, on people to people ties. I am the President of the European Council, but I am also an overseas Indian citizen. Then, as you can imagine, for me, it has a special meaning. I am very proud of my roots in Goa, where my father’s family came from. The connection between Europe and India is something personal to me. Also, because we conclude today our trade negotiations, we relaunched at the Leaders’ meeting that I had the pleasure to host, in May 2021, in my previous capacity. Our summit sends a clear message to the world: at a time when the global order is being fundamentally reshaped, the European Union and India stand together as strategic and reliable partners. Today, we are taking our partnership to the next level. As the two largest democracies in the world, we are working hand in hand: • to deliver concrete benefits for our citizens; and • to shape a resilient global order that underpins peace and stability, economic growth, and sustainable development. I would like to share three messages. First: the European Union and India must work together towards our shared prosperity and security. India is the world's fastest-growing major economy. Trade has flowed between our two continents for centuries. Trade is a crucial geopolitical stabilizer. And a fundamental source of economic growth. Trade agreements reinforce rules-based economic order and promote shared prosperity. That’s why today’s Free Trade Agreement is of historic importance. One of the most ambitious agreements ever concluded. Creating a market of two billion people. In a multipolar world, the European Union and India are working together to grow spheres of shared prosperity. But prosperity does not exist without security: • strengthening our cooperation to better protect our citizens and our shared interests; • working together to counter the full range of security threats we face, in the Indo-Pacific, in Europe and around the world; • reaching a new level of strategic trust between us. That is the significance of our agreement on a Security and Defence Partnership. The first such overarching defence and security framework between India and the European Union. And the first step towards even more ambitious cooperation in the future. This brings me to my second message: as the world's largest democracies and champions of multilateralism, the European Union and India share the responsibility of upholding international law, with the United Nations Charter at its core. Earlier this morning, we had the opportunity to pay tribute to Mahatma Gandhi. And I reflected upon his words which still hold true today: “Peace will not come out of a clash of arms but out of justice lived and done by unarmed nations in the face of odds.” Our summit reaffirmed our commitment to supporting efforts towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine. One that fully respects Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is a key moment. We are supporting all efforts to reach a just and sustainable peace. Ukraine has shown its readiness, including at the cost of difficult compromises. I know, dear Prime Minister, that we can count on you to help create the conditions for peace, through dialogue and diplomacy. And this is my final message: together we must show leadership on global issues. Cooperation between the European Union and India will help shape a more balanced, resilient, and inclusive global order. Just two examples: I am proud of the commitments we are making for greater cooperation on clean energy, green transition, and climate resilience. And our collaboration through the Global Gateway and on the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor is decisive for global connectivity. By implementing the ambitious Joint Comprehensive Strategic Agenda towards 2030, we will align our priorities with concrete actions for the next five years: delivering real benefits to our citizens. Today, we have tangible progress and set an example of cooperative leadership on global issues. With: • our Free Trade Agreement; • our Security and Defence Partnership; and • our Joint Strategic Agenda for 2030. These outcomes are a crucial milestone on a longer path. We look forward to continuing the journey. Together, as always. Thank you very much. Press statement by President António Costa following the EU–India Summit, 27 January 2026. © European Union / Council of the EU. Reproduced with permission; original meaning preserved.

The democratic collapse of Nicaragua has created the ideal conditions for China to consolidate a model of cooperation based on political control, trade dependence, and resource extraction. Throughout 2025, Nicaragua’s co-presidency under Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo has accelerated the consolidation of an authoritarian family state. Constitutional reforms in January eliminated the separation of powers, subordinating the judicial, legislative, and electoral branches to the executive, while subsequent legislation extended political terms and enabled the regime to weaponize electoral institutions against political opponents. Since 2018, the Ortega-Murillo government has imprisoned, exiled, or stripped citizenship from hundreds of critics and dismantled thousands of civil society organizations, hollowing out independent checks on power. These legal and institutional changes have transformed Nicaragua from a weakened democracy into a closed authoritarian system, heightening the risk of systematic human rights abuses and creating permissive conditions for opaque foreign economic engagement — particularly China — in strategic commercial and mineral sectors. Starting December 2021, President Ortega broke ties with Taiwan, establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, marking this “new era” by opening a Chinese embassy in Managua the same month. This decision followed weeks of the Organization of American States (OAS), United States, and European Union (EU) condemning the 2021 elections as illegitimate due to the months of repression and incarceration of 39 people, including civil society leaders and presidential candidates by President Ortega. Beijing took the opportunity to enter Managua seeking to ease the sense of intensifying international isolation for Ortega’s regime. As of 2023, Managua’s total exports to Beijing were valued at an estimated $27.3 million yet increased by almost 300 percent in 2024 to $82.1 million. Also in 2024, Beijing was the second largest exporter to Nicaragua, making up 14 percent of total imports, at $1.65 billion. Recently Beijing and Nicaragua have held over $1 billion trade deficit, acting as a lifeline of the regime’s desperate survival strategy with China as a primary benefactor. As Western pressure builds, Beijing provides capital, infrastructure, trade, and opportunities for the Ortega-Murillo regime through the commercial and mineral sector. Nicaragua has directly aided in the expansion of China’s economic development in the region and passed multiple pieces of legislation to pave a simple road for Beijing. For example, on October 30th, 2025, Nicaragua’s National Assembly unanimously passed a Special Economic Zone (ZEE) directly tying China’s Belt and Road Initiative effectively boosting influence through infrastructure and trade. The ZEE includes many perks for Beijing operations in Nicaragua, such as full exemptions from income tax, dividends, import duties for up to a decade, targeted industrial sectors for manufacturing, agroindustry, tech, and exports. The head of the ZEEs will be President Ortega’s son, Laureano Ortega Murillo with a renewed promise of jobs, poverty alleviation, and technology transfers. The President’s son heading the ZEEs reflects Nicaragua’s foreign policy focus on becoming a Pacific-Caribbean trade bridge. Moreover, since 2021, the Ortega-Murillo regime has quietly granted an estimated 300,000 hectares of land, or almost 2.36 percent of Nicaragua’s national territory to four PRC affiliated mining companies: Zhon Fu Development, Nicaragua XinXin Linze Mineria Group, Thomas Metal, and Brother Metal. These companies do not contain a track record in Nicaragua, connected to a known Chinese entity, or even have a website. Yet, they are conveniently tailored by the Ortega-Murillo regime as Nicaragua allows opaque shell companies with no track record to operate in critical infrastructure sectors. To aid Beijing’s mineral campaign, the Ortega-Murillo regime has been revoking concession rights and granting those same stripped mining concessions to these opaque Chinese affiliated shell entities. In 2022, the Sandinista National Assembly reformed Law 387 to allow concession transfers without public bidding, weaken social oversight mechanisms, and concentrate decision-making for the Ministry of Energy and Mines. This “reform” allows Nicaragua exclusive control over flipping ownership on mining concessions without warning. Separate from mining, Beijing has been manipulating Nicaragua’s commercial sector reliant on Chinas exports to Nicaragua. Currently, Nicaraguan merchants claim to face “unfair competition” as their sales dwindle, due to the explosion of Chinese nationals operating in the region. Chinese businesses have frozen the Nicaraguan market through selling inexpensive products easily accessed by Chinese nationals under the low-tariff agreements between Ortega-Murillo and Beijing. Reports reflect that China’s strategy is to exploit import benefits provided by the Nicaraguan government, allowing Chinese nationals to sell goods at “rock-bottom prices”. This strategy has allowed Beijing to completely undermine Nicaraguan businesses and take over the market. In May 2024, the Confidential reported Chinese businesses have slashed 70 percent of local merchant sales. Moreover, this increase of Chinese businesses by Chinese nationals directly translates to the growth of imports from the PRC, influencing a further expansion of the already tremendous trade deficit. This inability to produce goods appealing to Beijing markets will perpetuate further trends of high imports and minimal exports by Nicaragua, granting the opportunity for Beijing to fully influence the export capacity under the Ortega-Murillo regime. Nicaragua has rapidly stepped forward to ban media by prohibiting Bibles, newspapers, magazines, books, drones, and cameras from entering the country. This came without an official decree by the government but has still been enforced by immigration and customs at border crossings. Since 2018, 61 media outlets have been closed or confiscated with over 2,300 recorded violations by journalists, forcing 300 journalists into exile from Nicaragua. Globally, the world must continue to investigate and report the egregious human rights violations conducted by this family dictatorship. Their goal of alienating their civil populace to generate wealth for themselves and Beijing through illicit and shadowy economic efforts must face legal hearings to benefit the people of Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s corrupted government continuing to weaken the foundations of their democratic institutions to favor Chinese ownership of commercial and industrial zones will freeze Nicaraguan exports in favor of dependence on Chinese imports.

Rarely in the history of the European Union has it faced challenges comparable to the ones it faces today. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has been on the rise. Its membership has expanded quantitatively and qualitatively. Pan-European institutions and European law have been strengthened. Diplomacy and security policy have been taking shape. The EU has gradually become more like a confederation or a federation. However, it has lacked the centralized security structures to truly become a full-fledged state or even a super-state — primarily the armed forces. The EU has remained a junior partner of NATO and part of Euro-Atlantic security architecture, where the US has played a leading role. However, the question of the EU's strategic autonomy has gradually departed from purely theoretical considerations. While maintaining its role as an economic giant, Brussels has long remained a political dwarf. The Ukraine conflict has become a powerful political stimulus for expanding political opportunities, although the preconditions for such a dynamic existed earlier. Similar incentives are emerging in other areas as well. The European Union has been forced to provide immediate answers to the eternal question of "what to do," playing on several chessboards at once. What to do with the United States? A year ago, such a question would have rarely occurred to anyone. Brussels and Washington were closely aligned on the issue of containing Russia. There was also common ground on the issue of growing competition with China. The level of economic ties remained high. Military-political integration has been revived. NATO has welcomed two new EU members — Finland and Sweden. Surprises were expected from Donald Trump. But the experience of his first term still served as an indicator of their predictability. Moreover, the European allies themselves had been moving toward Trump's demands during his previous term — increased defense spending, energy purchases from the US, a rejection of Russian raw materials and so on. However, the US president has exceeded expectations, disconcerting the EU on several fronts. These include a special position on Ukraine, territorial ambitions for Greenland (formally part of Denmark, a member of the EU and NATO), a trade war affecting EU countries, criticism of the Old World in doctrinal documents and speeches by senior officials, as well as an overt policy of force. A close ally and key guarantor of security has transformed, in a matter of months, into a cold, calculating, and unpredictable player. The EU's actions regarding the American issue have so far revealed a wait-and-see tactic. In the medium term, the plan is to "outlast" Trump. His term will expire in three years. With that, a shift in foreign policy can be expected from the new administration. That is, if the Democrats come to power. In the short term, the plan is to avoid angering the American leader, to play on his personality traits (praising his achievements, avoiding criticism), to concede on certain issues, or to present as concessions what is inevitable. These include arms and energy purchases from the US and a trade balance adjustment in Washington's favour. The Greenland issue could be resolved using the same logic. The US military has de facto controlled the island for decades. Moreover, the United States formally remains an ally of Denmark and other EU countries. Why not concede? Especially if the procedure is carried out democratically. Of course, the Danish king or prime minister is unlikely to be kidnapped by American special forces, and they are unlikely to face charges in a US federal court. But Denmark risks being outvoted in the democratic process. The EU's perception of Donald Trump could be compared to the perception of the Russian Emperor Paul I among the Russian aristocracy and nobility. Paul was renowned for his eccentricity and was extremely unpopular. He fell victim to an inevitable conspiracy by his inner circle. But the expectation that problems with the United States will be resolved after a change of leadership, similar to the case in Russian history, rests on a fragile foundation. Unlike the Russian emperor, who became a lone figure on the throne, the American president is backed by a vibrant and young team, widespread support, and a consistent ideology. Donald Trump's departure is unlikely to resolve the EU's American problem. Moreover, his young successors could cling to their ally with an even tighter grip. What to do with Russia? In EU political rhetoric, Russia occupies the position of its most important and dangerous adversary. This approach took hold after February 2022, but had been brewing since the events in Crimea in 2014. Compared to the United States, maintaining a confrontational approach to Russia in a semantic sense is easier, as the identity structures of both sides already contain established, centuries-old patterns of mutual perception as a "significant other." (Neumann, I. (1999) Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation. University of Minnesota Press.) Regarding the United States, such patterns have either not yet been developed or have been lost. The EU's approach to Russia over the past four years has been characterized by a fairly active policy of containment. This includes the consistent severing of trade and economic ties, even at the cost of economic damage to itself; large-scale military and political support for Ukraine; remilitarization and the restoration of the military-industrial complex; and attempts to influence third countries in their trade with Russia, not to mention information and ideological warfare. The problem for the EU is that the results have largely been negative. Yes, Brussels is doing its part to keep Ukraine afloat. Yes, Russia has suffered economic damage. Yes, defense spending is rising and the military-industrial complex is slowly recovering. Yes, third countries are wary of secondary sanctions. Yes, the information machine is working. But Russia hasn't gone anywhere. Its economy has been reoriented towards other areas, and its market for EU companies has been lost. Hostilities with Ukraine continue. Russia's military-industrial complex has been deployed, and its nuclear potential makes any Yugoslavia – or Libya-style solutions futile. Russia has its own financial and informational network, which has become more difficult, or significantly more difficult to influence. The good news for the European Union is that Moscow is unlikely to be planning military expansion against the EU countries themselves. War with them makes neither political nor practical sense for Russia, although the issue of responding to hypothetical military aggression by NATO or individual member states against Russia is likely to be addressed. Moscow cannot harm the Union with trade wars, and it simply lacks the desire to seriously fight for public opinion support. Ultra-conservative forces may at first glance seem convenient for Russia. But experience shows that conservatives and populists in power are hardly helpful in close foreign policy circles. Poland is a paragon of traditional values, but it is at the forefront of Russia's adversaries. In other words, Russia is a convenient foe. It can be fought through Ukraine and pinned on it the answer to the question of "who is to blame?" But at the same time, doing all this is relatively safe for the Europeans. The tactic toward Russia is loud and wait-and-see. Loud in terms of rhetoric. Wait-and-see in the hope that the Russian side will not withstand and collapse. Fortunately, there are many who support the theory of Russia's imminent decline. The problem for the EU is that not only Donald Trump, but also Vladimir Putin differs from the aforementioned Emperor Paul I. While Brussels hopes for the fatal blow with the snuffbox, Russia lives its own life. Apparently, Washington was the first to realize this. What shall be done with Ukraine? The answer to the Ukraine question is also seemingly simple: support Kiev by all means possible. In the short term, the practical policy here is more or less clear: continue financial and military support for Ukraine in order to restore it and prevent military defeat. In the medium term, there is greater uncertainty. The key issue is resources. The confiscation of Russian sovereign assets is still theoretically possible. But even if Brussels bears the full costs of such confiscation, it will not fundamentally solve the problem. The EU faces the prospect of becoming the main donor to a large and warring state with a very specific political system. The benefits of its integration into the EU are ambiguous. Furthermore, the problem of security guarantees and the material backing of such guarantees remains. Unlike the US, the EU is unlikely to be able to demand that Kiev repay its debts through enslaving agreements and then quickly distance itself from the problem. Regarding the Ukrainian issue, the EU may try to leave things as they are, while simultaneously awaiting a change of power in the US and potential problems in Russia. Brussels apparently has sufficient resources to keep Kiev afloat for a couple of years. The EU is likely prepared to accept further material losses for the sake of political principles, just as it did when it severed economic ties with Russia. At the same time, an agreement on Ukraine would also be in the EU's interests. Yes, Kiev is losing territory, but Ukraine remains a fairly large state. It will inevitably remain within the EU's political and economic orbit. An end to hostilities with a ceasefire along the line of contact would likely be more acceptable to the EU than the large-scale, legally binding agreement Moscow is insisting on. If US policy changes and problems escalate in Russia, a ceasefire would be more convenient for a new round of the Ukraine conflict. However, experience shows that even such agreements can be violated, so a binding agreement in itself is not a major problem for Brussels. It is important for the EU that Ukrainian losses in the negotiations are minimized, and that security guarantees do not expose the EU to the threat of military escalation directly with Russia. In answering the question of what to do with Ukraine, the EU will likely have to acknowledge the "realities on the ground." If the US continues to distance itself from the Ukraine issue, and the Russian army continues to advance, delaying such recognition will increasingly devalue Brussels's course. However, a willingness to adhere to this course at any cost cannot be ruled out. What to do with China? Compared to the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, China hardly poses a pressing problem for the EU. China remains a major trading partner and market. Secondary sanctions against Chinese companies for their cooperation with Russia have not yet led to complications. On the Taiwan issue, the EU has avoided taking a leading role in anti-China mobilization. Attempts by individual member states (such as Lithuania) to assert themselves on the Taiwan issue have not found much support in Brussels, and Chinese sanctions have further dampened their efforts. The EU has generally supported the long-standing US policy of curbing China's global economic projects and Beijing's high-tech capabilities. But in reality, there is no rush to undermine the foundation of economic cooperation with China in the western part of Eurasia. Within China itself, there is a countermovement. They don't generalize the US and EU into a single West and, apparently, proceed from the idea that the interests of Washington and Brussels differ. This means that relations with the EU are not identical to relations with the US. The complexities of transatlantic relations are likely to contribute to a situational rapprochement between the EU and China. In the political sphere, this is unlikely to be excessive, but rivalry is still a long way off. Anti-Chinese voices in the EU are likely to become quieter in the near future, despite Beijing's active cooperation with Moscow. China, with its predictable political course in the current turbulent conditions, is becoming an attractive partner for the EU. There are no immediate threats from it, but the benefits are more than sufficient. It's possible that Donald Trump will pressure the EU to adopt a more coordinated course toward China. Brussels could use such demands as a trump card. However, EU diplomacy will be unable to influence Russian-Chinese relations, and the conflict with Russia will be secondary in answering the question "what to do with China." What to do with the EU? It appears that the issue of internal transformation, taking into account external challenges, remains paramount for the EU. The logic of relations with China allows for no changes for now. However, here too, the prospect of intense competition over technological security remains under the rug. This will likely require more stringent regulatory measures. Political consolidation was required in relations with Ukraine, and it has the potential to gain more ground if necessary, seeking additional reserves. In relations with Russia, even clearer demands for increased levels of control have come to the fore. The change in the procedure for applying sanctions against Russia's sovereign assets is symptomatic. Now, it will be more difficult for individual countries, such as Hungary or Slovakia, to use their veto power in EU Council votes with regards to this issue. Finally, the US maneuvers raise a fundamental question: how do Europeans ensure their own security? For now, NATO remains an ironclad structure. But NATO's mere existence is unlikely to block deeper defense cooperation within the EU. Brussels has incentives to play a more significant role in NATO, and in the long run, the alliance itself could become a US-EU pair, rather than a conglomerate of European allies centered on the US. Resolving security issues will inevitably require the EU to become increasingly centralized and directive in its decisions, and thus, to reduce the effective sovereignty of its member states. The big question is whether the EU itself and its member states are ready for such a scenario, especially given the disparity in their potential and capabilities. Could the Franco-German tandem, for example, serve as the framework for such centralization? Does Brussels have the resources and legitimacy to align member states around a unified and firm political line? Is Greece, for example, ready, and what is Estonia ready for? Will it be possible to controllingly package their approaches into a single policy line where defense and specific military risks, including the risk of a clash with a nuclear power, are at stake, not just in words but in deeds? To simplify the question even further, is the European Union ready to devolve from a confederation/federation into a de facto empire? The unification of disparate states for military-political purposes will sooner or later raise the question of an imperial component, despite the seeming impossibility of such a development, if judged through the eyes of the post-Cold War era. Moreover, beyond the US, Russia, Ukraine, and China, there are other areas of common policy. Such a structural evolution could have a far greater impact on relations with other centers of power than situational issues. "What to do with the EU" could become a fundamental question for other participants in international relations.

As the US powers ahead with its plans to recover Latin America’s ‘oil El Dorado’, we explore Venezuela’s environmental and geopolitical outlook. “Uninvestable”. That was the verdict on Venezuelan oil delivered by Exxon’s CEO, Darren Woods, earlier this month. He was speaking at the White House with the US president Donald Trump and representatives from 17 oil companies. Nevertheless, following the extraction of Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, Trump plans to revive the country’s flailing industry. He says a USD 100 billion investment will be geared towards resurrecting the “oil El Dorado” of the 1990s. He has takers. After Woods’ White House comments, the US energy secretary Chris Wright said the US oil and gas company Chevron, the UK’s Shell, Spain’s Repsol and Italy’s Eni were all willing to “immediately increase” investment in Venezuela. He added that a dozen other companies were also interested, while dismissing the doubts expressed by Exxon and ConocoPhillips. Any company following Trump to the country will have to deal with uncertainty – and the estimated USD 1 billion cost of the failed nationalizations enacted by Venezuela’s former president, Hugo Chávez. According to Venezuela’s Centre for the Dissemination of Economic Information (Cedice), the government expropriated several thousand between 1999 and 2019. Independent experts estimate the bill for success will reach USD 180 billion – nearly double that announced by Trump. On the other hand, some companies will be encouraged by successful gas operations in Venezuela. For example, the Perla (Cardón IV) field, which covers the entire domestic demand for gas and is operated by Repsol. And Chevron has been able to continue operating in the country, despite a barrage of economic sanctions initiated by the US under Trump in 2017. Demands and first legal changes Trump has claimed the US could be making money from Venezuelan oil in 18 months. Venezuelan oil experts say this will require a fiscal and contractual framework that does not exist today, and a decade of “arduous democratic work”. The economist José Manuel Puente estimates it will require an investment of USD 180 billion and 15 years of institutional work. Patrick Pouyanné, CEO of the French oil company TotalEnergies, thinks similarly. Without a legal framework that guarantees rights, he says, it would be too expensive and slow to return to production of three million barrels a day. Last week, Venezuela’s interim government responded by announcing that the acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, will send a new Hydrocarbons Law to the national assembly, as well as another for streamlining procedures. The interim government’s strategy is to further “production sharing contracts”. These would allow foreign companies to recover their investments by selling a portion of the extracted crude oil. However, interested foreign oil companies are pushing for greater changes. Reuters has reported that they are seeking to reduce the tax burden by returning to a royalty payment model. They also want the right to sell the majority of the oil, by gaining access to export infrastructure. This infrastructure, currently dilapidated and faulty, includes thousands of kilometers of oil and gas pipelines, 16 shipping terminals, 153 gas compression plants and six large oil refineries. The economy responds Following the capture of Maduro, the Caracas stock market benefitted from a 124% rise, accompanied by a fall in the black market exchange rate. This has been attributed to news that the first sale of Venezuelan oil through the US will generate USD 330 million. This will go to five private Venezuelan banks through the Central Bank of Venezuela. To facilitate this, Rodríguez has announced the creation of two sovereign funds. One will raise the salaries of public employees; the other will address Venezuela’s frequently deficient public services. The minimum wage in Venezuela is VES 130 (USD 0.38) per month. In May 2025, Maduro decreed a “minimum comprehensive indexed income” for public workers of USD 160 per month. This was to be issued through special bonds paid in Venezuelan bolívars at the official exchange rate. In the private sector, the average income was USD 237 per month at the beginning of 2025. The interim government has announced a host of other changes, including the modification of eight legal codes. For her part, the acting president has announced reforms to laws on electricity services and industrial intellectual property. She has also made reference to legislation on agreed prices and socio-economic rights, which aim to maintain a mixed economic model that combines openness with state involvement. Whether these reforms will bring the stability US oil companies need to safely (and profitably) operate remains to be seen. Logistics and corruption Venezuelan oil is plentiful, but it is also of poor quality. The estimated 300 billion barrels in the reserves of the Orinoco belt – the largest oil deposit in the world – consist of heavy and extra-heavy crude oil. These are the most difficult to extract, transport and refine. This has raised doubts among experts, who point to the need for maritime insurance, as well as the risks attached to the poor condition of the country’s pipelines and other facilities. Whether this oil will be refined in Venezuela or shipped to refineries in the United States is another uncertainty. As Patrick Galey, head of fossil fuel investigations for the climate justice campaign group Global Witness, wrote earlier this month: “You would have to be forced at gun point to try to make money from [Venezuelan oil].” Then there are security concerns. Despite Trump’s promise of protection for oil companies, his administration has advised its citizens to leave the country over Chavista militia kidnap fears. The administration is considering the use of private companies to secure oil facilities. It is still difficult to know whether a transition to democracy is possible and when elections can be held. As things stand, Venezuela continues to be run by the same government that has accumulated dozens of corruption cases. For example, a scandal implicating executives of PDVSA (Venezuela’s state oil company) in illegal activities related to cryptocurrencies led to USD 16 billion in losses. Meanwhile, a railway network funded using billions of dollars worth of Chinese investment has never been completed. The role of China Venezuela has played a key role in the story of Chinese investment in South America, becoming its biggest debtor. Following the actions of the US government, Venezuela finds itself once again split between superpowers. Venezuelan imports account for just 3% of China’s total crude oil purchases, according to an analysis published this month by the Center on Global Energy Policy – a think-tank based at Columbia University in the US. But the analysis also highlights the importance of these imports to China’s “teapot refineries”, which specialize in processing unconventional crude oil. Venezuela’s debt to China is estimated to be between $10 billion and $19 billion. This is being paid off slowly with crude oil shipments, prompting Chinese officials to approach their Venezuelan and US counterparts to try and obtain payment guarantees. Some analysts have suggested that a stabilizing of Venezuela’s economic situation and a lifting of US sanctions could actually increase the chances of Chinese development banks recouping their investments. The environmental issue, pending The full environmental impacts of a Venezuelan oil recovery are unclear. While it would not involve exploitation in new protected areas or Indigenous territories, significant concerns remain. These include the tens of millions of dollars’ worth of methane gas that leaks from damaged pipelines, as reported by Bloomberg Green. And more methane gas is lost through flaring, for which Venezuela ranks fifth worldwide. Some onlookers have suggested that greater transparency and better technology could improve this situation. This view is not shared by Juan Carlos Sánchez, co-winner of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for his work as an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change author. Sánchez, who also worked at PDVSA for 21 years, told Dialogue Earth he does not foresee a positive environmental scenario: Trump promotes climate denialism, while the track records of oil companies operating in other Latin American countries are littered with environmental damage. “In my experience, when oil companies decide to cut costs to increase profits, the budgets that are most affected are environmental projects,” said Sánchez. Moreover, he adds, Venezuela lags considerably in terms of institutional frameworks regarding climate change. “Only a Venezuelan government that is genuinely interested in environmental issues and policies will be able to demand environmental safeguards in the future.” References Business Insider. (2026, January 22). Exxon CEO calls Venezuela ‘uninvestable’ during meeting with Trump. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com El País. (2026, January 22). Trump insta a las petroleras a invertir 100.000 millones de dólares en Venezuela para controlar la industria. El País. https://elpais.com Swissinfo.ch. (2026, January 22). EEUU asegura que Chevron, Shell y Repsol “elevarán de inmediato” su inversión en Venezuela. Swissinfo.ch. https://www.swissinfo.ch Yahoo Finanzas. (2026, January 22). Venezuela tendrá que pagar a Exxon menos de 1.000 mln dlrs por nacionalización de activos. Yahoo Finanzas. https://es-us.finanzas.yahoo.com PaisdePropietarios.org. (2026). ”Exprópiese”: la política expropiatoria del “Socialismo del Siglo XXI”. PaisdePropietarios.org. https://paisdepropietarios.org Repsol. (2026). Perla (Cardón IV) field details. Repsol. https://www.repsol.com Euronews. (2026, January 22). ¿Por qué Chevron sigue operando en Venezuela pese a las sanciones de Estados Unidos?. Euronews. https://es.euronews.com elDiario.es. (2026, January 22). Estados Unidos necesitará más de una década para resucitar El Dorado petrolero de Venezuela. ElDiario.es. https://www.eldiario.es El Colombiano. (2026, January 22). ”Recuperar la producción petrolera en Venezuela tomaría 15 años y hasta US$180.000 millones”, José Manuel Puente, economista venezolano. El Colombiano. https://www.elcolombiano.com Asamblea Nacional de Venezuela. (2026). Hydrocarbons Law draft. https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve Petroguía. (2026). Production sharing contracts overview. https://www.petroguia.com Reuters. (2026). Companies seek reduced tax burden, export access [Headline varies]. https://www.reuters.com Cedice. (2026). Venezuela oil and gas pipeline infrastructure details. https://cedice.org.ve Scribd. (2026). Map of Venezuelan oil refineries and facilities. https://es.scribd.com Bloomberg. (2026). Caracas stock market reaction and data. https://www.bloomberg.com Sumarium.info. (2026). First oil sale through U.S. channels data. https://sumarium.info Banca y Negocios. (2026). Average private sector income data. https://www.bancaynegocios.com Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. (2026). Venezuelan migrant photo and context. Flickr. https://www.flickr.com Globovisión. (2026). Legal code modifications announcement. https://www.globovision.com Bitácora Económica. (2026). Electricity services reform reference. https://bitacoraeconomica.com Cuatrof.net. (2026). Socio economic rights legislation reference. https://cuatrof.net Infobae.com. (2026). Refinery uncertainty and U.S. oil imports. https://www.infobae.com LinkedIn. (2026). Patrick Galey quote on Venezuelan oil risks. https://www.linkedin.com La Razón. (2026). Kidnap fears among Chavista militia detail. https://www.larazon.es CNN Español. (2026). Private security company oil protection reference. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com Transparencia Venezuela. (2026). PDVSA corruption cases and figures. https://transparenciave.org El Clip. (2026). Unfinished Chinese funded railway network reference. https://www.elclip.org Wilson Center. (2026). Venezuela China financing/debt relationship. https://www.wilsoncenter.org Center on Global Energy Policy. (2026). Analysis of China’s share of Venezuelan imports. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu Contrapunto. (2026). Chinese “teapot refineries” processing explanation. https://contrapunto.com New York Times. (2026). Venezuela debt to China and negotiations coverage. https://www.nytimes.com Bloomberg Línea. (2026). Chinese approaches to payment guarantees. https://www.bloomberglinea.com Bloomberg Green. (2026). Methane leakage and environmental concern details. https://www.bloomberg.com El País. (2026). Environmental transparency and technology quote. https://elpais.com LinkedIn. (2026). Juan Carlos Sánchez environmental outlook quote. https://www.linkedin.com Climatica.coop. (2026). Trump climate denialism reference. https://climatica.coop RAISG.org. (2026). Venezuela climate change framework context. https://www.raisg.org

The United States has employed different geopolitical strategies to maintain its status as a dominant power vis-à-vis rival countries such as China and to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Since his return to the White House, President Donald Trump has announced tariff increases on 60 countries, issued ultimatums to Russia to end the War in Ukraine, and recently intervened in Venezuela by capturing Nicolás Maduro. In this way, a rise in the use of hard power by the United States can be observed, aimed at forcing other countries to behave in a particular manner in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. The foreign policy process of a state is the most important means through which it formulates and implements the policies that determine its interactions with other actors in the international system. Hans Morgenthau (1949) argued that self-preservation is the primary duty of a nation; in this regard, the choice of foreign policy objectives and means is predetermined in two ways: by the goals to be pursued and by the power available to achieve them. For his part, Joseph Nye (1999) argued that a state’s interests are not revealed solely through power or security considerations, since they also include economic concerns. Thus, countries also focus on economic relations, which may entail interdependence effects among states. Consequently, both national security and economic well-being are important to states’ interests. Within this framework, it is possible to discern the geopolitical landscape that the United States is developing through its foreign policy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that they would not allow the Western Hemisphere to become a base of operations for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States. “This is our hemisphere,” he affirmed, “and President Trump will not allow our security to be threatened” (The White House, 2026). This warning, together with the National Security Strategy and the recent intervention in Venezuela, represents a new form of the Monroe Doctrine. In his address to Congress in 1823, President James Monroe articulated the United States’ policy regarding the new political order that was developing in the Americas and Europe’s role in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe administration warned the European imperial powers not to interfere in the affairs of the newly independent Latin American states. In this way, it sought to increase U.S. influence and trade throughout the southern region (Office of the Historian, n.d.). Likewise, the Trump administration’s geopolitical objective is to consolidate its hemisphere of influence in the face of rival powers, primarily China. Marco Rubio indicated that it is important to secure the national interest in the region and stated: “we have seen how our adversaries are exploiting and extracting resources from Africa. They are not going to do it in the Western Hemisphere” (The White House, 2026). In addition to Latin America, the United States has sought to increase its presence in Africa to counterbalance China. China’s main foreign policy strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013 with the aim of strengthening global connectivity through infrastructure initiatives such as roads, ports, and railways. As a result, China’s economic and political influence expanded by linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. By early 2025, more than 150 countries had joined the BRI, representing approximately 75% of the world’s population and more than half of global GDP. China’s Ministry of Commerce reported that the cumulative value of BRI investments and construction contracts has exceeded one trillion dollars across all participating countries (Ulubel, 2025). In Africa, one example of Belt and Road infrastructure is the Mombasa–Nairobi railway in Kenya, which was financed by Chinese banks under the framework of the agreements. As a result, more than 2 million passengers and around 6 million tons of goods are transported annually, allowing transportation costs to be reduced by 40%. In addition, the expansion of the line toward Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan is planned, with the aim of integrating the economies of East Africa into a common railway system (Ulubel, 2025). Figure 1 illustrates the countries that have partnered with the Belt and Road Initiative, by year of accession. The geographic areas where China is consolidating its presence can be observed, especially on the African continent. Source: Lew et al., 2021, p. 14. The Belt and Road Initiative, with the support of state-owned banks and Chinese companies, is displacing U.S. exports and challenging American firms in BRI countries. Consequently, the United States has increasingly moved closer to African countries to counter China’s influence. Recently, the House of Representatives voted to continue trade programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which protect and strengthen U.S. strategic, economic, and national security interests, including access to critical minerals found outside the country. In this way, AGOA seeks to challenge the economic coercion and exploitation of African nations by China and Russia (Ways & Means, 2026). This approach has also been pursued during the foreign policy of former President Joe Biden. In 2022, the Secretary of State of the Biden administration, Antony Blinken, launched the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, which reinforced the view that African countries are geostrategic actors and key partners on urgent issues, ranging from promoting an open and stable international system to shaping the technological and economic future (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In this context, Blinken stated: “Africa is a major geopolitical force. It has shaped our past, it is shaping our present, and it will shape our future” (US Africa Media Hub, 2022). In 2022, Blinken indicated that even as President Putin’s war continues, they remained focused on the most serious and long-term challenge to the international order: the People’s Republic of China. This is because it is the only country with both the intention to reshape the international order and has the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so. Consequently, Blinken stated: “China is a global power with extraordinary reach, influence, and ambition. It is the second-largest economy, with world-class cities and public transportation networks. It is home to some of the world’s largest technological companies and seeks to dominate the technologies and industries of the future. It has rapidly modernized its military and aims to become a top tier fighting force. And it has announced its ambition to create a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power” (Blinken, 2022). Consequently, the United States has sought to consolidate its bilateral relations in regions where China has a greater presence. However, U.S. power in the international system relies on the strength of the dollar. The petrodollar system helps sustain the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. In 1974, Saudi Arabia and other regional oil suppliers agreed to accept only dollars for the sale of oil in exchange for military aid and equipment from the U.S. In addition, the Saudis invested the surpluses from that production in U.S. Treasury bonds, thereby financing U.S. spending (Wong, 2016). This process, commonly called “petrodollar recycling,” is beneficial for the parties involved: oil-producing countries have a reliable destination to invest the income from their exports, while the United States ensures a source of financing to cover its fiscal deficit. Consequently, countries seeking to purchase oil must do so using U.S. dollars, which drives demand for this currency in international markets (Grant, 2018). Since that time, the oil market has been trading in dollars, increasing demand for the currency. The predominance of the dollar as the world’s reference currency gives the United States enormous geopolitical influence, with the ability to impose sanctions on countries it considers adversaries, freeze dollar-denominated assets, or exclude a country from the international financial system, paralyzing its foreign trade or complicating the import of raw materials priced in that currency, such as oil. This mechanism represents one of the foundations of U.S. power and allows it to maintain its status as a hegemonic power. However, if oil trade were to begin taking place in another currency, it would affect the dominant position of the United States. Within this framework, the United States has prevented rival countries from attempting to displace the supremacy of the dollar, such as the members of BRICS. This bloc has sought to reduce dependence on the dollar by using local currencies for trade. One example is the BRICS Pay initiative, a cross-border digital payment system being developed by the BRICS countries. This means that trade among its members could be settled directly in reais, rubles, rupees, yuan, or rand, with the system managing conversion, clearing, and settlement without routing transactions through the U.S. dollar. The initiative is part of a broader strategic effort to reduce dollar dependence, strengthen financial sovereignty, and create alternative global payment infrastructures outside systems controlled by the West (BRICS, 2026). With the creation of the BRICS New Development Bank, there has been speculation that they could launch a common currency as a strategy for de-dollarization. Given this possibility, many market operators advocate for the currency to be digital, backed by gold or other resource assets. If the project materializes, the implications for the international monetary system and financial markets would be significant (Lissovolik, 2024). The United States was aware of this possibility. When the BRICS 2025 summit was held, Trump stated that the bloc is not a serious threat, but that they are attempting to destroy the dollar so that another country could take control. “If we lose the dollar as the global standard,” he declared, “it would be like losing a great world war; we would no longer be the same country. We will not allow that to happen” (Messerly et al., 2025). Later, on his Truth Social account, he wrote: “Any country that aligns with the BRICS’ anti-American policies will receive an additional 10% tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy” (Reuters, 2025). Although there is still no BRICS currency, the United States has anticipated its potential effects. Dollar supremacy also gives the U.S. the power to sanction or economically isolate certain countries, such as Russia in 2022. In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the European Union, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom agreed to exclude several Russian banks from the international payment messaging system SWIFT. This decision was one of the most forceful sanctions within a set of measures aimed at economically isolating Russia and, consequently, weakening its financial system, with the goal of pressuring Vladimir Putin’s government to end its military operations in Ukraine (Pérez, 2022). Therefore, Russia has conducted its commercial transactions in another currency, such as the Chinese yuan. In this context, the growing weight of the Chinese currency in financial markets could erode the primacy of the dollar, a trend that began to concern Washington. In this scenario, Venezuela announced in 2017 that the country was prepared to sell oil to China and receive payments in yuan, thus making international agreements using a currency other than the dollar (Valladares & Medina, 2017). In 2023, Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (Pdvsa) announced that PetroChina International Corp purchased one million barrels of Venezuelan crude, a transaction carried out in digital yuan through the Shanghai International Energy Exchange. In this way, a trend is marked toward abandoning the dollar as the currency for transactions in the energy market (CIIP, 2023). When the United States intervened in Venezuela this year and captured Nicolás Maduro, it was not only seeking oil but also preventing the displacement of the petrodollar system. As a result, this operation directly affects China, since part of Venezuela’s oil exports to China is used to pay debts, estimated between 10 and 12 billion dollars. The U.S. intervention endangered the flow of discounted Venezuelan oil to China’s teapot refineries and will likely affect the role of Chinese oil companies in Venezuela’s upstream business. The Trump administration has declared that all Venezuelan oil will now flow through legitimate and authorized channels, in accordance with U.S. law and national security. This strategy seeks to prevent any influence over natural resources in the region. Consequently, the U.S. president’s approach of directing all oil flows from Venezuela will negatively impact China, Venezuela’s largest oil customer and a major creditor (Downs & Palacio, 2026). However, it is not only rival countries that have been affected by the U.S. attempt to maintain its hegemony; its allies and strategic partners have also been impacted. In January 2025, Trump posted an image of the map of Canada with the U.S. flag, hinting at a possible annexation. On other occasions, Trump referred to his neighbor as the 51st state. In February of that year, the White House announced an additional 25% tariff on Canadian imports and a 10% tariff on its energy resources (The White House, 2025). As a result, Prime Minister Mark Carney negotiated trade agreements with China, allowing for a mutual reduction of tariffs (Yousif, 2026). On the other hand, Trump generated tensions within NATO when he threatened to annex Greenland by force and warned those who did not support him of increased tariffs. He later declined both measures and assured that a framework agreement had been reached (Holland & Hunnicutt, 2026). Nevertheless, the political damage was already done. Trump’s plan for territorial expansion destroyed an important post-World War II norm: that borders cannot be redrawn by force of arms. Mark Carney stated at this year’s Davos Forum that “great powers have begun using economic integration as a weapon, tariffs as leverage, and financial infrastructure as coercion.” In this way, he indicated that the world order is “in the middle of a rupture, not a transition” (World Economic Forum, 2026). Consequently, the United States, as a hegemonic power, has acted unilaterally, disregarding the rule-based world order, and has even accelerated its breakdown. Therefore, from this background, it can be concluded that the United States has developed geopolitical strategies to remain a global power vis-à-vis rival countries, primarily China. Two strategies can be discerned. First, the U.S. emphasizes national security by securing the Western Hemisphere, reviving the Monroe Doctrine. Second, economic interdependence is intensified through the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, preventing financial alternatives. Moreover, the attention the United States has directed toward Africa responds to the intention to balance China’s growing influence in the region gained through the Belt and Road Initiative. Finally, it can be observed that the Trump administration has set aside soft power (attraction and persuasion) and has relied on hard power mechanisms, such as military threats to annex Greenland, ultimatums to Russia, intervention in Venezuela, and economic sanctions and tariff increases on countries that do not comply with its directives. These measures demonstrate that the United States has lost its capacity for attraction and has had to resort to threats to influence the behavior of other states. In summary, the frequent use of hard power shows that the status of the United States as the leading power has begun to decline, and it is striving to maintain its global hegemony by force, regardless of the consequences for the international order. References Blinken, A. (2022). The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ BRICS. (2026). What Is BRICS Pay and How Does It Work?What Is BRICS Pay and How Does It Work? BRICS. https://infobrics.org/en/post/77791/ CIIP. (2023). Compra de petróleo venezolano en yuanes afianza desdolarización del mercado energético global. Centro Internacional de Inversión Productiva. https://www.ciip.com.ve/compra-de-petroleo-venezolano-en-yuanes-afianza-desdolarizacion-del-mercado-energetico-global/ Downs, E. y Palacio, L. (2026). US Action Threatens Venezuela-China Oil Flows, Debt Repayment, and Investments. Center on Global Energy Policy al Columbia SIPA. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/venezuela-china-oil-ties-severely-impacted-by-us-action/ Grant, J. (2018). The end of the petrodollar? American Foreign Policy Council. https://www.afpc.org/publications/articles/the-end-of-the-petrodollar Holland, S. y Hunnicutt, T. (2026). Trump backs down on Greenland tariffs, says deal framework reached. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/davos/determined-seize-greenland-trump-faces-tough-reception-davos-2026-01-21/ Lew, J., Roughead, G., Hillman, J. y Sacks, D. (2021). Task Force Report N° 79: China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States. Council on Foreign Relations. Lissovolik, Y. (2024). Changing the Global Monetary and Financial Architecture: The Role of BRICS-Plus. BRICS Journal of Economics, 5(1). https://brics-econ.arphahub.com/issue/4634/ Messerly, M., Hawkins, A. and Bazail-Eimil, E. (2025). ‘The president is pissed’: Trump's Brazil tariff threat is part of a bigger geopolitical dispute. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/10/trumps-brics-fueled-anger-sparked-50-percent-tariff-threat-on-brazil-00447814 Morgenthau, H. (1949). The Primacy of the National Interest. The American Scholar, 18(2), 207–212. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41205156 Nye, J. (1999). Redefining the National Interest. Foreign Affairs, 78(4), 22–35. https://doi.org/10.2307/20049361 Office of the Historian. (s. f.). Monroe Doctrine, 1823. Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe Pérez, C. (2022). What Does Russia’s Removal From SWIFT Mean For the Future of Global Commerce? Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/08/swift-sanctions-ukraine-russia-nato-putin-war-global-finance/ Reuters. (2025). Trump says alignment with BRICS' 'anti-American policies' to invite additional 10% tariffs. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-says-alignment-with-brics-anti-american-policies-invite-additional-10-2025-07-07/ The White House. (2025). Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Imports from Canada, Mexico and China. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-imposes-tariffs-on-imports-from-canada-mexico-and-china/ The White House. (2026). RUBIO: This Is Our Hemisphere — and President Trump Will Not Allow Our Security to be Threatened. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/01/rubio-this-is-our-hemisphere-and-president-trump-will-not-allow-our-security-to-be-threatened/ Ulubel, Y. (2025). 12 years, over 150 countries: Inside the Belt and Road Initiative's global legacy. China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202509/17/WS68ca22caa3108622abca13d4.html US Africa Media Hub. (2022). [@USAfricaMediaHub]. X. https://x.com/AfricaMediaHub/status/1604782790029049858 U.S. Department of State. (2022). Travel to Cambodia, the Philippines, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda, August 2-12, 2022. U.S. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/secretary-travel/travel-to-cambodia-the-philippines-south-africa-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda-august-2-11-2022/ Valladares, D. y Medina, J. (2017). Venezuela venderá petróleo a China en yuanes. 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I. Introduction The European economy is in big trouble. Szu Ping Chan and Hans van Leeuwen, the economics editors of the Telegraph, a British daily newspaper, claim that the European Continent is stuck on a path of disastrous decline. [1] As Figure 1 shows, EU share of world GDP has continued to decline from 27% in 1990 to 17% in 2024.  Figure 1: EU share of World GDP (source: IMF) As a result, EU’s GDP in 2000 was six times larger than Chinese GDP, but EU’s GDP in 2025 is expected to reach the similar level of China’s GDP as Figure 2 shows. EU’s GDP in 2000 was $3 trillion smaller than US GDP, but EU’s GDP in 2025 is expected to be over $ 10 trillion smaller than US GDP.  Figure 2: EU, US, China, Japan GDP, 2000 & 2025 (source: Alcott Global) Moreover, the Ukraine war in 2022 brought more uncertainty to Europe by creating energy problems for the European economy. Europe’s reliance on external energy sources has been a long-standing issue. The energy crisis that began in 2021, fueled by the Ukraine war and climate change, has exposed how fragile the region’s energy infrastructure remains. Skyrocketing LNG prices, unreliable renewable energy production, and Russia’s strategic use of fossil fuels as leverage have left the European continent struggling with record-high energy costs. With this information in background, this paper explores why the European economy has under-performed and fallen behind. This paper first describes the current economic situation of Europe and explains why the European economy has failed. II. The Current Situation of European Economy Europe may be a great place to live with free health care, generous welfare, and great cities. However, when we compare the economy of three major economies, the US, Europe, and China, it is obvious that the European economy is in big trouble. Europe is being squeezed by the US and China. As Figure 3 shows, economic growth has been anemic across Europe. Germany has been its worst performer in recent years. The German economy is the same size today as it was in the fourth quarter of 2019. In other words, it has had five years of lost growth. But the rest of Europe has not fared much better. The French economy is only 4.1% larger than it was in the final quarter of 2019, while Italy’s economy is 5.6% bigger. (See Figure 3.) And while Spain’s GDP has increased by 6.6% since then, this has been helped greatly by an influx of immigration that meant that GDP per capita has increased by only 2.9% over the same period. By contrast, the US economy has grown by 11.4%.  Figure 3: Real GDP (Q4 2019 = 100) (Source: LSEG, Capital Economics) As Figure 4 shows, over the period 2020-2024, the EU’s total GDP growth was 12.2% compared to 23.4% for China, 15% for the US.  Figure 4: Growth, EU, US, China, and Japan, 2020-2024 As Figure 5 shows, the EU grew only 1.1% in 2024 compared to 2.8% for the US and 5.0% for China. Figure 5: GDP growth, EU, US, China, and Japan, 2024 Moreover, when we compare the economies of two Western rivals, the US and Europe, it is obvious that the EU has grown slower than the US, as Figure 6 shows.  Figure 6: US grow faster than EU countries, 2010-2024 (source: World Bank) As Figure 7 shows, Europe’s unemployment has been higher than the US.  Figure 7: EU unemployment is higher than US, 2000-2024 As Figure 8 shows, Europe’s LNG price has been higher than US price during the 2020-2024, and higher than Asian price immediately after Russia invaded Ukraine, thereby burdening the European economy.  Figure 8: LNG price, EU, US, Asia, January 2000-January 2024 Furthermore, when it comes to new engines of growth – big tech, AI, electric cars, Europe has slipped behind both the US and China. Europe is being squeezed by cheaper imports in China and better tech in America. III. Causes of the Failure of European Economy Why has the European economy failed? According to Neil Shearing, a chief economist of Capital Economics, Europe’s under-performance has been due in part to the effects of the energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as Figure 9 shows Europe’s skyrocketing gas prices. [2]  Figure 9: Natural gas prices, Europe, US, Japan, January 2021- end 2024 In addition, as Figure 10 shows, energy prices in the Euro area reached an all time high of 171.75 points in October of 2022 following the Ukraine war. It decreased to 145.49 points in November 2025, but it is still too high.  Figure 10: Energy price, Euro zone (source: Eurostat) As Table 1 shows, dependence on energy imports has shown divergent trends since 2000: The US has dramatically reduced its reliance on energy imports and become a net exporter, while the European Union has maintained a high level of energy dependence, and China’s dependence has generally increased along with its enormous economic growth. The US has undergone a remarkable transformation. Around 2005, US crude oil imports reached a peak at about 60% of their consumption. Thanks to the shale revolution and growing renewable energy use, US domestic production soared, and the US became a net energy exporter in 2019. By 2024, US energy imports made up only 17% of its energy demand. China’s rapid economic growth has driven a massive increase in energy demand. As a result, its dependence on energy imports has increased significantly since 2000. China is the world’s largest importer of crude oil. While China is also the leading investor in renewable energy, which meets a portion of its growing energy demand, the absolute need for fossil fuel imports to power its industrial sector remains high. In 2024, energy imports met around 25% of their total energy demand. Table 1: Dependence on Energy Imports, 2000–2025 As Figure 11 shows, the EU consistently shows high dependence on energy imports over the last three decades during the 1993-2024 period. The EU’s dependence on oil and gas imports have been much higher than the US and China. EU’s dependence on oil imports was over 90%, while EU’s gas import dependence reached over 90% in 2023 following the Ukraine war. While the EU has made progress in renewable energy, it remains heavily reliant on oil and gas imports, and has recently shifted its import sources from Russia to other partners such as the US and Norway. This high dependence on energy imports and energy crisis in Europe following the Ukraine war led to a deterioration in the region’s terms of trade that manifested itself in a large squeeze in real incomes and loss of competitiveness of energy-intensive industries, thereby lowering economic growth in Europe.  Figure 11: Dependence on energy imports, EU, US, and China, 1993-2024 In addition, European households have also become more reluctant to spend, thereby leading Europe to lower growth. The household saving rate in Europe is now three percentage points higher than it was before the Covid-19 pandemic in 2019, while the savings rate in the US is now lower than it was in 2019. (See Figure 12.) The tendency of Europeans to spend less leads to lower growth in Europe.  Figure 12: Euro-zone household savings rate (% of disposable income) However, the weakness of the European economy is fundamentally structural. There are several elements to this. The first key issue related to low growth in Europe is regulation in Europe that stifles competition and innovation. The EU has become increasingly protectionist, mainly through regulation. While convenient, this strategy proves counterproductive. It eliminates the incentives for creativity and efficiency. The Digital Services Act and increasingly narrow interpretations of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) were intended to rein in US tech giants, but have instead held Europe back in these same sectors. The AI Act and supply chain laws are similarly damaging. It is perhaps no surprise that the major disruptive and innovative firms of the past two decades have come from the US and China rather than from the Euro-zone countries. Robot taxis are a good example. One in three taxi rides in California is already in a robot taxi. The growth has been exponential and they are set to overtake ordinary taxis. The market opportunity is huge; they will be cheaper than paying a driver. In Texas, Tesla charges just a dollar a mile. They are safer too – 90% fewer accidents. And that means cheaper car insurance. They will save income, decrease emissions and reduce the need to buy an expensive car. It’s not just America; 2,000 self-driving cars have already been transporting millions across the big cities in China. But, for Europeans, the idea of a self-driving car, is still the stuff of science fiction. Or more accurately, something blocked by the European love of regulation, risk-aversion, and a powerful car lobby still stuck in the combustion engine era. [3] Another example is the tech industry. Europe is hampered by fragmented and excessive regulation. A US start-up can launch a product under a single regulatory framework and immediately access a market of more than 330 million consumers. The EU has a population of about 450 million but remains divided among 27 national regulatory regimes. An IMF analysis shows that internal market barriers in the EU act like a tariff of around 44% for goods and 110% for services – far higher than the tariff levels that the US imposes on most imports. [4] True, Europe has some successes such as Revolut, Klarna and Spotify, but these are dwarfed by the US giants of Meta, Google, Microsoft and Apple. Today, approximately half of the world’s 50 largest technology firms are American, while only four are European companies. [5] Over the past five decades, 241 US firms have grown from start-ups into massive unicorn companies. The EU’s response has been to seek to regulate the murky world of big tech surveillance, but in a way, the sledgehammer of GDPR regulation has done more to increase costs for local European business and tech startups as Figure 13 shows. While California alone has produced a quarter of the world’s tech unicorns, Germany-a similarly sized economy-has produced just 2% of high-value start-ups. Without urgent reform, Europe risks being sidelined in the global technological race.  Figure 13: GDPR regulation and EU & US Venture capital There is an old saying: the US invents, China imitates, and Europe regulates. Harsh, but an element of truth. Though the big change is that China no longer imitates, but produces goods much cheaper than in Europe. But Europe is still stuck in a regulatory mind-set. The result is that productivity growth in Europe - which is the key determinant of economic growth over the long run - is substantially lower, averaging 0.3% a year over the past decade compared to 1.6% a year in the US. The second issue is Europe’s insufficient investment in new technologies (computers, artificial intelligence (AI), software, etc.) and the low level of spending on research and development (R&D). When we compare OECD countries, we see that these two components have a strong influence on productivity differences between countries. The econometric estimate leads to the following effects: a 1- point increase in the rate of investment in new technologies leads to a 0.8 point increase per year in productivity gains. In a similar way, a 1-point increase in GDP for research and development (R&D) expenditure leads to a 0.9 point increase per year in productivity gains. [6] The fear is that Europe will be drawn into a vicious circle By 2022, investment in new technologies represented 5% of GDP in the US and 2.8% of GDP in the Euro zone. The EU’s efforts in advanced technologies, such as AI and cloud computing, far from match those of the US. The main instrument available to the EU, the European Innovation Council, had a budget of 256 million euros in 2024, while the US allocated more than 6 billion dollars for this purpose. The situation is repeated when looking at venture capital investment. In 2023, they invested about $8 billion in venture capital in AI in the EU, compared to $68 billion in the US and $15 billion in China. The few companies that create generative AI models in Europe, such as Aleph Alpha and Mistral, need large investments to avoid losing the race to US firms. However, European markets do not meet this need, pushing European firms to look outside for funding. [7] As a result, for example, the EU has been losing the open model contest as Figure 14 shows.  Figure 14: Cumulative downloads, 2023-25 (source: ATOM project, Hugging Face) Moreover, the EU falls behind the US and China in terms of R&D spending. R&D spending in 2022 amounted to 3.5% of GDP in the US and 2.3% of GDP in the Euro zone. What’s more, from 2007 on, as Figure 15 shows, R&D spending in the US and China increased significantly compared to that of the Euro zone. The lag in technological investment and R&D explains a large part of Europe’s lag behind the US in terms of labor productivity and GDP. [8]  Figure 15: Gross domestic spending on R&D, 2007-2023 The third issue related to lower growth in Europe is the size of welfare states in Europe. The size of welfare states differs markedly across OECD countries. European countries have the largest welfare states in the OECD and among the highest in the World. As Figure 16 shows, European welfare states are significantly larger than in the US, with EU countries allocating approximately 27% of GDP to social benefits in 2024, compared to roughly 19.8% in the US. Some European countries like Austria, Finland, and France spend over 30% of GDP on social benefits in 2024. While the US spends 7% of GDP on public provision of pensions, it is 16% in Italy and it is 13% in France.  Figure 16: Public social spending as a % of GDP in 2024, EU countries & US Big welfare states have a complex, debated impact on economic growth, with evidence showing they can both impede growth through higher taxes and reduced work incentives, or foster it by boosting education, stability, and innovation. However, there has recently been a groundswell of opinion among economists that the scale of the welfare state is one of the elements responsible for slower economic growth and that a retrenchment in the welfare state is necessary if growth will be revived in Europe. The welfare state is indicted with the charge of becoming a barrier to economic growth in Europe through higher taxes and reduced work incentives. As Figure 17 shows, the tax burden is higher in the EU than in the US for most taxpayers. The overall tax-to-GDP ratio for the EU averages approximately 44%. By contrast, the US ranks as one of the lowest among developed countries, with a tax-to-GDP ratio 35% in 2022 approximately 9% lower than the EU average.  Figure 17: Tax burden, EU and US, 2022 (source: OECD Government at a glance, 2023) Figure 18 shows the total tax wedge for average single workers in each member country of EU. Belgium, Germany, Austria, and France confiscate more than half of their workers’ pre-tax compensation. Compared to the EU member countries, workers in the US face the lowest average tax wedge. This distorts work incentives for Europeans and renders everyone in Europe poorer. [9] High taxes and less work incentives make EU citizens spend less than US citizens, thereby lowering economic growth in Europe as Figure 19 shows.  Figure 18: EU workers pay more taxes than US workers, 2022 (source: OECD Government at a glance, 2023)  Figure 19: Americans spend 70% more on EU citizens (Average individual consumption per capita, 2020; United States indexed to 100). (source: National Accounts of OECD countries) In fact, Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson (1998) showed empirically that as the size of general government spending has almost doubled on average in OECD countries from 1960 to 1996, their real GDP growth rates have dropped by almost two thirds on average (see Figure 20). According to them, the worst economic performers were some Southern European countries that increased the size of the government the most.  Figure 20: Big government spending reduces growth. At the height of the Euro-zone crisis in 2012, German Chancellor Angela Merkel tried to make the case that Europe’s welfare states were too large, as Europe accounted for 7% of the global population, for a quarter of global GDP and for 50% of global social spending. The situation has not improved since then. On September 9, 2024, Draghi presented his report “The Future of European Competitiveness,” a 400-page document, to deal with Europe’s sluggish economy, but he kept untouched Europe’s over-sized welfare state, while he strongly called for reforms and investments to reinforce productivity growth. [10] The fourth issue is the Euro. The Euro has been a mixed blessing for Europe. It lowers transaction costs but highlights an unbalanced EU economy. Germany runs a large current account surplus, fringe economies like Portugal and Greece running deficits. But there is no scope for Germany to appreciate, weaker countries to devalue. One size fits all. But, this can have disastrous effects. The Euro Debt Crisis of 2012, led to high bond yields and a response of austerity, which contributed to weak growth in the last decade. Mario Draghi’s intervention reduced bond yields, but the European Central Bank has been criticized for a deflationary bias, and it has certainly struggled since the Covid-19 era, with growth in Europe much less. IV. Conclusion This paper showed that the European economy is in big trouble with lower growth. This paper explained that Europe’s economic under-performance & sluggish economy can be attributed to energy crisis and high saving, as well as over-regulation, large size of welfare state & high taxation, and lack of innovation & low investment in new technology and R&D. 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