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Since independence on June 25, 1975, Frelimo has made Mozambique its private preserve for 50 years. After having been the only authorized party in the country (from 1975 until the introduction of a multi-party system in 1992), it then systematically defrauded all elections, with the partial exception of the very first ones organized by the UN in 1994. But after the last general elections in October 2024, the fraud provoked a real popular revolt. The authorities reacted by unleashing a ruthless crackdown on the protesters, which continues to this day, without any notable reaction from the international community. On October 9, 2024, Mozambique held its seventh general elections (provincial, legislative and presidential) since the introduction of a multi-party system in 1992. Official results gave a clear victory to Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front) candidates, including presidential candidate Daniel Chapo, elected with 70% of the vote (later reduced to 65%). According to international and independent national observers, these were the most fraudulent elections the country had ever seen. A large part of the population is convinced that, in reality, it was the opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane, officially credited with 20% of the vote (then 24%), who won the election. Admittedly, this is not the first time that Frelimo, in power without interruption since 1975, has maintained itself through fraud and, beyond that, through the complete fusion of party and state, as in the days of the single party (1975-1992), through the systematic practice of authoritarian clientelism (people live much better with a Frelimo card than without it or with another party's card!) and, finally, through the assassination of opponents. This time, however, there was a genuine revolt, rather than resignation, against the lack of respect for the people's dignity shown by electoral fraud. Fifty years of authoritarian paternalism In 1975, Mozambique gained independence and the Frelimo, officially of “Marxist-Leninist” orientation, which drew its legitimacy from its struggle against Portuguese colonial rule, came to power. This was followed by a long civil war (1977-1992) between Frelimo and the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), which shaped the country's political life for a long time to come. Although the conflict had internal roots in the authoritarian, anti-peasant modernization policies of the government, the Renamo guerrilla movement was supported by the apartheid regime of neighboring South Africa. The violence was terrible, on both sides, but after the war, particularly in the cities (and especially in the South), even disgruntled people would never have voted for Renamo, seen in the hegemonic discourse as the party of “armed bandits”. However, particularly in the inner cities, the middle-class electorate began to vote for a third party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), which emerged from a split in Renamo and would very likely have won the 2013 municipal elections in the capital Maputo - were it not for a timely power cut when the ballots were being counted. The head of the list was Venâncio Mondlane, then a popular TV and radio commentator. In the 2014 legislative elections, against a backdrop of renewed internal warfare, Renamo doubled its number of votes (from 16 to 36.61%) and deputies (from 49 to 89 out of 250) compared to the 2009 ballot. But in 2018 (municipal elections) and 2019 (general elections, 21.48% of the vote and 60 deputies), this boom was shattered by the machinery of the state apparatus. The fraud took place well before the elections: the electoral census counted more voters than inhabitants in the pro-power Gaza province, but far fewer in some others. The systematic intimidation of voters (by collecting their voter card numbers) was highly effective. Non-Frelimo observers were rarely accredited, while Frelimo observers flocked to polling stations in their thousands, and so on. Even so, it was clear that this time Renamo had actually won the elections in Maputo and Matola, the other major southern city and historic Frelimo stronghold. But Renamo didn't really organize any protests, despite spontaneous youth marches, playing the legalism card and awaiting the results of its appeals to appeal institutions totally controlled by Frelimo. The Venâncio Mondlane phenomenon and the revolt of Mozambican society With the passing of the years and the passing of generations, we could see that, even in the cities of the South, disaffected voters no longer hesitated to vote for Renamo: memories of the civil war were no longer politically structuring. But Renamo was weakened by the death of its historic leader, Afonso Dhlakama, in 2018, and by the appointment as new president of a former guerrilla general, Ossufo Momade, who proved to lack initiative and leadership. Momade prevented Venâncio Mondlane from being Renamo's candidate in the presidential election of October 2024, but Mondlane ran as an independent, as a new type of candidate, a civilian, an educated man from the city, and also an evangelical (a religious current on the rise in the country). Massively, the Renamo and MDM electorates switched to this new candidate, all the more easily as their previous votes were not so much in favor of these two parties as, above all, against Frelimo. They changed tools. Venâncio Mondlane's campaign, though without a seasoned party to back him, was far better organized than Renamo's had been before. He set up a systematic parallel vote-counting system, with computer equipment, etc., in charge of collecting the thousands of minutes as soon as the counting was completed. This enabled him to claim that he had won the elections with 70% of the vote, whereas the official results gave him around 20%. What is certain is that the frauds were innumerable and that the popular conviction of a totally biased result was widespread. Venâncio Mondlane immediately called for “victory parades”, which were hardly tolerated by the authorities, who were claiming victory for their candidate, Daniel Chapo, an apparatchik who was virtually unknown before the election campaign.  The turning point came on October 19, 2024, when two leaders of Venâncio Mondlane's campaign, Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe, were murdered in the street and in their car, most probably by members of the Special Operations Group of the Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR, militarized police), known locally as the “death squads”. This was a warning to Venâncio Mondlane, who had just called a general strike. From then on, the situation shifted from demonstrations against electoral fraud, such as often occur in various African countries, to a revolutionary process. The permanent mobilization of very poor people, young boys leading demonstrations, young girls organizing prayers in the streets, was observed all over the country, including the small bush towns, where they receive the news from time to time. The middle classes in the “cement districts” were not to be outdone: although they didn't take part in the demonstrations, they did “casserolades” (banging pots during protests) from their windows for hours on end. A very important feature was the complete absence of any ethnic dimension: of course, the civil war had never been inter-ethnic, but Frelimo tended to be the party of the south and the cities, and Renamo the party of the north and the bush. The fact that Venâncio Mondlane was from the South did not prevent demonstrations from taking place everywhere, including in the North, which had already been affected by jihadist guerrilla warfare. The authorities accused the demonstrators of looting stores, but the police were also seen looting... and real shots were fired multiple times. The official proclamation of the results and the announced failure of the last appeals, followed by the inauguration of the official president, Daniel Chapo, on January 15, 2025, did not weaken the mobilization. Venâncio Mondlane, who now considered himself to be the “people's president” and “elected president” rather than the “invested president”, began a tour of the country, gathering large crowds even in the regions most loyal to Frelimo. A new turning point in the revolutionary process began to emerge: people were no longer demonstrating against fraud, but rather against the high cost of living - Mondlane had issued a “decree” to lower the price of cement and other products, and people were mobilizing to enforce it. Communities revolted against the international companies that had set up in the country at the behest of the authorities, because compensation for lost land and homes, mentioned in “contracts” accepted under great pressure, was not respected; protests against the enormous pollution of the Moatize open-cast coal mines regained vigor; the destruction of sacred woods -cut down to avoid interfering with oil sands exploitation- was no longer forgiven. More or less, the entire Frelimo state was challenged, and the revolution underway went from being simply democratic to being social. And the price already paid is heavy: 353 proven deaths, including children or very young boys, or simple passers-by; no doubt at least 40 deaths among Venâncio Mondlane's local executives, like these two young men murdered in their car, at that time, outside any demonstration, in Massinga (Inhambane province), on the night of March 8, 2025, having fallen into an authentic ambush. Massinga had been a hotbed of opposition to the government in the south of the country for the previous few days. Thousands wounded (the number is put at 3,000, but this figure mainly concerns the wounded in the major cities), thousands arrested, many missing (including journalists)... Silence, we kill This revolutionary process took place without any involvement from the opposition parties, who agreed to send their elected deputies to sit in Parliament, while Mondlane called for a boycott. Another notable development was the remobilization of the Naparamas in the provinces of Nampula and Zambézia. The Naparamas are a historic phenomenon in Mozambique, magical peasant militias (vaccinated against bullets) armed with bows and arrows. At the end of the civil war, in exhausted societies, they acted mostly in favor of Frelimo against Renamo. But although they never completely disappeared, this time they have remobilized to serve the mobilized people, whom they seek to protect from the militarized police. Despite their “vaccinations”, they are harshly repressed by the heavily armed police. Faced with this outpouring, the authorities signed a reconciliation agreement with all the political currents... except Mondlane. On the very day the agreement was signed, March 5, 2025, a demonstration in Maputo attended by Mondlane was attacked with live ammunition by the UIR, killing four people and wounding others. At the same time, the official president has hardened his rhetoric. At his first public meeting after his investiture, in Pemba (north) on February 24, 2025, he proclaimed that “even if blood has to be shed to defend the homeland against demonstrations, we will shed blood. We will fight terrorism, fight the Naparamas and fight the demonstrations”, equating any form of challenge to power with jihadism, which has been rampant in the North since 2017. It's important to understand that, in the context of a state that has been totally fused with the party for fifty years, an authoritarian party ready to do anything to keep power, when a president publicly says “we will spill blood”, he then has no need to give the order to kill to the intermediate and local echelons of his forces of repression. They've heard the order. Power is ready for a bloodbath to defeat the social revolution in progress. Who will stop it? What is the international community saying, what are the foreign embassies in Maputo saying?

' Germany and Europe must invest more in defense and deterrence capabilities to assert and maintain themselves. This requires substantial and long-term investment in our armed forces, in research and development, in infrastructure, material and personnel. ' Various analyses indicate that the upcoming significant increase in defense spending is a fantastic opportunity for German industry. However, despite the high demand, it is very hesitant to transfer its partially idle capacities to the lucrative defense sector. ' To strengthen the competitiveness of the German defense industry and thus benefit from lower prices through mass production, better use should be made of the advantages of the EU internal market. ' Germany has globally unique knowledge and unparalleled production networks in many sectors that are needed to produce defense equipment. At the same time, many of these sectors are currently in crisis and have spare capacity. ' At the same time, sustainable and long-term financing of military procurement is essential, which is primarily achieved through long-term contracts or purchase guarantees. ' Such measures should also contribute to a change in mentality so that employees, customers, and financiers increasingly perceive the defence industry as a positively valued industrial sector. Defense capabilities: Investment is essential. President Donald Trump has made it clear that the United States no longer sees itself as a security guarantor for Europe. While the USA is scheduling talks with Russia on the future of Ukraine, there is great concern in Europe about new arbitrary border demarcations: a division of Europe. The Munich Security Conference has ruthlessly exposed the USA's disengagement from Europe and the breakdown in values between the EU and the Trump administration. Since then, developments have become thick and fast. There are fears of the end of the transatlantic partnership and the US reneging on its NATO commitment. However, it has long been clear that Germany and Europe must invest more in deterrence and defense capabilities to assert and maintain themselves and can no longer be free riders for the USA. The EU is not helpless: the accumulated economic power of the EU states is equal to that of the US and ten times that of Russia. However, defense capability requires considerable and long-term investment in the armed forces, in research and development, in infrastructure, material and personnel. Closing capability gaps is the top priority. With this goal in mind, the procurement of fighter jets, drones, transport and combat helicopters, air defense systems, infantry fighting vehicles, transport vehicles, submarines, corvettes and much more has been commissioned over the past three years. So far, however, only the essentials have been ordered and made up for, which have been neglected for years. The defense industry: fragmented and underfunded Despite clear analyses, good plans and declarations of intent, the European defense industry remains underfunded and fragmented, according to the Draghi Report1. As of 2023, for example, the European NATO states were operating nineteen different battle tanks, twenty different fighter aircraft and ten diverse types of submarines. Projects for joint development and production revealed some insurmountable hurdles, as the FCAS example shows. Europe has so far benefited little from the additional funds for defense: between mid-2022 and mid-2023, 78% of total procurement expenditure went to non-EU companies, 63% of which went to the USA. In this respect, it is particularly important to strengthen domestic and European industry. To remain competitive, investments must be made at increasingly shorter intervals. Development cycles are becoming shorter and shorter - as can be seen in drone production, for example. The potential of an integrated European defense is huge! The new and first-time EU Commissioner for Defense and Space, Andrius Kubilius, has set himself the goal of exploiting this potential. In March 2025, he will present the first White Paper on the future of European defense. Various analyses indicate that the upcoming significant increase in defense spending is a terrific opportunity for German industry. It has been calculated that an increase in defense spending to 3 percent of GDP would increase economic output by 1 to 1 ½ percent.2 It is clear that economic output in Germany will only increase as a result of defense spending if domestic manufacturers or suppliers are involved in the production of the goods in question. However, despite the high demand, German industry is very hesitant to shift its partially idle capacities into the lucrative armaments sector. Why is that? Germany: in a particularly good technological position In terms of technical capabilities and the necessary production capacities, Germany is fundamentally in a particularly acceptable position. Traditional companies as well as young, agile start-ups are thriving on the market. The country has unique expertise and unparalleled production networks in many sectors that are needed to produce defense equipment. This applies, for example, to vehicle construction, mechanical engineering, the chemical industry, the metal industry, the aerospace industry, and automation technology. At the same time, many of these sectors are currently in crisis - primarily due to the transformation in the automotive industry - and have spare capacity. With a view to the goal of expanding the production of defence equipment in Germany quickly, resiliently, and efficiently, there is immense potential here that can be realized quickly and operated economically. In December 2024, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) showed that the global defense industry will continue to grow by 4.2 percent in 2023. Four German companies are among the top 100 companies worldwide: Rheinmetall (26), ThyssenKrupp (66), Hensoldt (73) and Diehl (83), as well as three European companies: Airbus (12), MBDA (33) and KNDS (45).3 At the top of the global list are companies from the USA, the UK, Russia and China. Some of them focus entirely on armaments or on dual use, as the example of Boeing shows. There is potential in Germany and Europe that needs to be tapped into now to secure the continent. However, many details have so far stood in the way from the point of view of the private sector. Defense industry: obstacles Industry often waited a long time for contracts, sometimes in vain. While Russia switched to a war economy, Germany missed a real turning point. There is a lack of reliable commitments from the German government regarding long-term financing for procurement. This is because companies only invest in new capacities if they can assume that these can be utilized profitably for at least ten years. In addition, social acceptance of the arms industry remains low. Companies not previously active in the armaments sector - for example in the automotive industry - fear that employees, customers, and investors will be skeptical about a shift towards weapons production. However, tank manufacturer KNDS has shown that there is another way with its takeover of Alstom's former locomotive plant in Görlitz. The financing of armaments projects is still more expensive than for civilian projects. This is also due to the EU's taxonomy, which, despite a recent weakening, still makes investment in armaments more difficult. This increases financing costs and may make projects completely unprofitable. The production of armaments is also subject to significantly more regulations than civilian production, which is justified. However, it should be possible to significantly reduce the regulations to the absolute minimum necessary without reducing safety. It is also often overlooked that the defence industry can hardly take advantage of cross-border supply chains - the core of German industry's high competitiveness. This is due to different export licenses in European countries. As a result, there is an incentive to keep supply chains in one's own country. Synergies from mass production based on the division of labor cannot be promoted in this way, and as a result, armaments are still often manufactured products with correspondingly soaring prices. Finally, there are still civilian clauses that prohibit universities from conducting research on military issues and purposes and from cooperating with the arms industry. This cuts the arms industry off from the traditional path of innovation. Seven viable solutions The following measures could enable the arms industry to ramp up its production capacities quickly and become much more competitive: 1. The immense economic advantages of the EU internal market can only be exploited if there is a significant simplification and standardization of export rules for the arms industry. Up to now, most German-made systems used in the Bundeswehr can only be exported to other NATO or EU partners without any problems. However, it is desirable for European producers to be able to specialize and focus on the global market so that they can achieve the competitiveness that otherwise characterizes the German export industry. This requires European supply chains, which has hardly worked in the military sector to date due to the strict German export regulations, as the participation of a German company is tied to strict arms export regulations. The term german-free has been a selling point at international arms fairs to date, as this is the only way to guarantee smooth deliveries and maintenance of military equipment. The possibility of exporting to third countries such as Israel, Japan or South Korea would bring advantages: Bundeswehr weapons systems and spare parts would become cheaper due to economies of scale. 2. Further European and German regulations should be revised immediately. These include the sustainability directive in the financial taxonomy, the dual-use regulation and many particularly stringent requirements for the arms industry, whose production in many cases hardly differs from other branches of industry (only a few companies work with explosives or other hazardous materials). Special economic zones for arms production would also be conceivable, in which selected regulations and rules would not apply or would apply differently than otherwise. 3. Long-term contracts of the federal government for arms purchases should be secured by a robust and sustainable regular defense budget. 4. For other equipment (ammunition, protective equipment, light vehicles, etc.), Europe-wide tendered purchase guarantees are a much better means than "priority procurement in Germany". Ideally, the Bundeswehr would conclude a contract with more than one company that stipulates that a certain quantity of military equipment must be purchased at a minimum price - even if the item in question can be bought more cheaply on the world market. On the other hand, the company guarantees a maximum price at which it must sell the specified quantity to the Bundeswehr - even if the prices on the world market are higher. It is right to put such contracts out too tender throughout Europe and to take advantage of the EU single market. The German (supplier) industry is so strongly positioned in Europe that it participates in a substantial proportion of production. With reference to the safety aspects that apply here, the associated exclusion of non-European producers is WTO-compliant. 5. In view of the above, regulations that stipulate procurement only from Germany or provide for quotas of domestic production should be dispensed with. 6. KfW should provide credit lines for the conversion of existing industrial plants into defense plants. 7. Civil clauses should be abolished. This should ensure for all researchers at universities and colleges that third-party funding and other sources of financing will not be reduced or completely cut if they decide to cooperate in research with the defense industry. Conclusion The measures would strengthen the competitiveness of the German defense industry and deepen cooperation between EU states. They should also contribute to a change in mentality so that employees, customers, and financiers increasingly perceive the defense industry as a positively valued industrial sector. This should be flanked by political communication and, if necessary, marketing measures. With an appropriate policy that focuses on incentives and not on detailed regulations, several goals could be achieved at the same time: German industry could grow again in its traditional sectors, the Bundeswehr would be able to procure urgently needed equipment and material for its defense and deterrence capabilities faster and more cheaply, the European Union could grow closer together and Europe's security in these turbulent times would be strengthened. References 1 The Draghi report on EU competitiveness, 9. September 2024. 2 Vgl. EY, Dekabank: Wirtschaftliche Effekte europäischer Verteidigungsinvestitionen. Februar 2025 und Ethan Ilzetzki: Guns and Growth: The Economic Consequences of Defense Buildups. Kiel Reports Nr.2/2025, Kiel Institute for World Economy. 3 The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-producing and Military Services Companies, 2023 | SIPRI, Dezember 2024.

The plans of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel can only weaken the Hebrew State's last regional allies. The expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza -which the breakdown of the truce by Israeli forces on 17 March is intended to provoke- could lead, by a domino effect, to the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt, while the annexation of the West Bank could have the same consequences in Jordan. The warmongering policy of the Netanyahu government has profoundly altered the strategic balance of power in the Middle East in favour of the Jewish state. Operation ‘Iron Swords’ in Gaza has considerably reduced the military capabilities of Hamas, which is said to have lost between 15,000 and 20,000 men and almost all its leaders. Hezbollah, decapitated, deprived of thousands of fighters and of its anchorage points south of the Litani river, is no longer able to maintain a sufficient threat to dissuade Israel from directly attacking its Iranian sponsor. And the collapse of Bashar Al-Assad's regime has completed the Iranian-led ‘axis of resistance’. Against this backdrop of a reversal of the strategic balance of power totally in Israel's favour, the Netanyahu government, spurred on by its radical wing embodied by Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, could consider ‘settling’ the Palestinian question once and for all. To do so, he would have to continue the process of colonising the West Bank and force the Palestinians to abandon the Gaza Strip, in line with Donald Trump's announcements. Assured of the support of the White House, with no regional adversaries capable of standing up to him militarily, Netanyahu could, driven by a certain hubris, lay the foundations for the realisation of a ‘Greater Israel’ extended to Gaza and the biblical ‘Judea-Samaria’, that is the West Bank. Nevertheless, this apparently beneficial dynamic for Israel could, in the medium and long term, position the Hebrew State in a strategic impasse, seriously compromising its security and its chances of building a lasting peace with its neighbours. The resumption of the colonisation process in the West Bank has two very dangerous consequences for Israel: the rise of Hamas in the West Bank and a total discrediting of the Palestinian Authority set up after the 1993 Oslo agreements. Since the start of the war in Gaza in October 2023, demonstrations against the Palestinian Authority have become such a common occurrence that the regime of Mahmoud Abbas can only hold on to power at the cost of increasingly violent repression. In this context, it is hard to see what could prevent Hamas from taking power in the West Bank, which would open up a new front and a colossal new security challenge for Tsahal. The creation of a ‘Greater Israel’, over and above the legal and moral issues it would raise, seems all the more dangerous for the security of the Israeli state as it would weaken two neighbouring regimes which, until now, have contributed as much as possible to regional stability: Jordan and Egypt. The weakening of Jordan's indispensable partner In addition to weakening the Palestinian Authority, i.e. its only Palestinian partner and interlocutor, Israel's policy of relaunching the colonisation of the West Bank could cause a political earthquake in Tel Aviv's other partner: Jordan. The Hashemite kingdom, where almost 60% of the population is descended from Palestinians who fled the Nakba in 1948-1949 and the Israeli conquests after the Six-Day War in 1967, has been living with the rhythm of pro-Palestinian riots since Since 7 October 2023, Jordan has been evolving in sync with pro-Palestinian riots, which express the solidarity of the Jordanian street with the Palestinians, but also echo a sharp criticism of King Adballah's policy of rapprochement with the Jewish state since the Wadi Araba agreements signed by his father Hussein with Yitzhak Rabin in 1994. In fact, Jordan plays an active role in Israel's security by fighting terrorism and the establishment of Hamas in the refugee camps of Zarqa, Baqa, Jabal Al Hussein and Jerach. It also plays a fundamental strategic role in opposing Iran: Iranian missiles and drones all flew over Jordanian skies during the major attack carried out by Iran in April 2024, and Jordanian anti-aircraft defences helped to thwart the Iranian attack. This strategic position between Israel and the Persian Gulf via southern Iraq explains in particular the installation of Western bases such as Azraq, where European (French and German in particular) and American aircraft and air defence equipment are stationed. In the event of a massive Israeli air offensive against Iran's nuclear programme, Jordanian airspace would play an essential role, as it would be an obligatory route for Israeli aircraft on their way to Iran. However, Likud's policy continues to undermine this precious ally for Israel, by strengthening the Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition force to the Hashemite monarchy. Organised around the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the Jordanian branch of the Brotherhood movement is tolerated by the authorities and has achieved impressive electoral success: after the legislative elections in September 2024, the IAF became the main political force in the Jordanian parliament, winning 31 seats out of 138. This success is all the more spectacular given that the Jordanian electoral system only allows list voting at national level to fill 38 seats, the other 100 being reserved for local notables loyal to the regime and allocated via ballots organised in constituencies where the parties are not represented. The result of last September's Jordanian elections was therefore a veritable tidal wave for the Brotherhood. This phenomenon is essentially explained by the mobilisation of the electorate around the theme of support for Gaza, of which the numerous demonstrations that have shaken Jordan are another symptom. In this context, what would be the consequences for the Hashemite kingdom of stepping up settlement on the West Bank? The massive influx of Palestinian refugees would obviously strengthen the FIA, which is particularly well rooted in the Palestinian diaspora. This situation is all the more explosive in that the descendants of Palestinian refugees, despite having been granted Jordanian nationality, act as a veritable diaspora and refuse to cut ties with their country of origin. The very spectacular demonstrations that took place in the country during the last two weeks of April 2024 are the most recent proof of this. In order to condemn Jordan's aid to Israel in its war against Iran and to express their solidarity with Hamas and the ‘axis of resistance’, Jordanians of Palestinian origin are mobilising in Hiraks, youth movements that have emerged in the post-Arab Spring context, condemning the monarchy's ‘compromises’ with Israel as much as rising prices and unemployment. In this context, the King of Jordan finds himself forced to make his security partnerships with Israel invisible or even to reduce them, and could eventually withdraw from the 1994 Wadi Araba agreements, for fear of seeing social unrest rise and the Muslim Brotherhood inexorably gain in popularity. In the long term, the demographic and political rise of the Palestinian opposition to the Hashemite monarchy threatens the latter's vital prognosis and therefore Israel's security. The return of the Muslim Brotherhood to Egypt and the risk of the collapse of the Al-Sissi regime A similar reasoning can be applied to Egypt, where Marshal Al-Sissi's regime, in place since 2013, would not emerge unscathed from a massive influx of Palestinians from Gaza. The implementation of the Trump plan and the displacement of the two million Gazans in Egypt would considerably strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood in a country where it already holds a majority in public opinion, as demonstrated by the success of Mohamed Morsi in the 2012 elections, and has remained so despite the severe repression it has been the target of since then. By participating in the displacement of Gazans, the regime in Cairo would see itself accused by public opinion of participating in the Israeli colonisation of Gaza, which would lead to a reflex of solidarity on the part of the Egyptian street towards the Palestinians that the Egyptian military regime might not survive. As in Jordan, if Trump's plan for Gaza were to come to fruition, it is hard to see what could stop the Muslim Brotherhood from taking power in Egypt, even if it is currently operating clandestinely and organising itself primarily from abroad (Turkey and Qatar). However, calling into question the 1979 Camp David agreements and the total remilitarisation of the Sinai are undoubtedly the first measures that would be taken by a government aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, whose anti-Zionism is one of its main guiding principles. In addition to this security disaster for its southern border, Israel would see a new axis of resistance forming around it which, unlike the one currently led by Iran, would be Sunni, more rooted in regional nationalism and would bring together the major powers allied to the Muslim Brotherhood: Turkey, Qatar and HTC's Syria. In this hypothetical context, Israel would be surrounded by enemy states and its survival would once again be threatened, as was the case in the early 1960s before the Six-Day War of 1967. The Trump plan would accentuate the spectacular gap between, on the one hand, an Arab street that is very hostile to the normalisation of relations with Israel and anxious to defend the Palestinian ‘Dar Al Islam’ and, on the other hand, Arab regimes that have become partners or even allies of Israel. The inconsistencies of Trump's Middle East policy should be noted here: on the one hand, he intends to bring Israel closer to its Arab neighbours by extending the Abraham Accords of 2020 (which enabled the normalisation of relations between Israel on the one hand and Morocco, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Sudan on the other), while at the same time nurturing the breeding ground for insurrection on which the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood is developing. Ultimately, implementing the Trump plan would have disastrous consequences for Israel: turning the streets of Arab countries against their respective governments in a confrontation that could lead to a new Arab Spring under the banner of anti-Zionism. In this respect, it is interesting to note that this scenario had already been anticipated by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the theorist of Al-Qaeda, at the time of the second intifada : “The opportunity for the jihadist movement to lead the ummah in the jihad for Palestine is greater than ever, because all the secular currents which were outbidding the Palestinian cause and competing with the Islamic movement for the leadership of the ummah in this cause have discovered themselves, in the eyes of the ummah, by recognising Israel's right to exist, engaging in talks and complying with international decisions to liberate what remains of Palestinian territory - or what Israel is willing to give up (the only difference being the amount of crumbs Israel will leave to Muslims and Arabs).” Trump and Netanyahu's plans: a disaster for Israel In conclusion, Trump's and Netanyahu's ‘plans’ for Gaza and the West Bank are not just a breach of international law and do not just raise a moral debate. First and foremost, they appear to be a strategic aberration that could very quickly backfire like a boomerang on the Jewish state. The definitive abandonment by Likud and its extremist allies of the two-state solution, and the resumption of the settlement process in the West Bank and possibly Gaza, are undermining Israel's Arab partners. They put an end to the process of normalisation pursued by Israel towards its neighbours since the Camp David agreements with Egypt in 1979 and could ultimately lead to a return to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the destruction of the Jordanian monarchy, two partners essential to Israel's security. This new anti-Zionist coalition led by the Muslim Brotherhood would be far more dangerous for Israel than the current Iranian-led resistance front. Unlike the Ayatollahs' regime, this new axis of resistance could strike Israel without using proxies, and maintain a climate of permanent insecurity on Israel's borders by hosting the rear bases of terrorist groups or militias fighting the Jewish state on its territory. The dream of a ‘Greater Israel’ remains an ideological chimera in which the security of the Israeli state could be the main victim in the long term.

Amid the economic downturn of the global economy during the early 2020s, Russia’s economy has demonstrated notable resilience and growth. Despite a brief period of GDP decline by 1.2 percent in 2022 on account of Western sanctions, Russia’s economy grew by an estimated 4.1 percent in 2023 and 2024. This exceeded the growth rates witnessed in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). During these years, Russia faced a cascade of more than 16,000 financial, trade, sectorial, logistical, personal and other punitive sanctions, unprecedented in world history. Moreover, financial assets abroad were frozen/stolen, and export pipelines were physically attacked. The Russian economy’s resilience in the face of external shocks can be explained by three reasons: 1) the result of 30 years of market reforms; 2) accumulation over these years of heavy experience in stress-resistant and anti-shock strategies; and 3) miscalculations of the West in its ability to isolate Russia’s economy. Due to the market institutions, the Russian economy is not only highly adaptive but also diversified. Russia is self-sufficient in energy, minerals, food, crops and water resources. It has a developed and stable domestic market and a stress-resistant banking system, cleared of major problem banks. The national innovation system provides a sound technological base, from vaccine creation to hypersonic technologies and the simultaneous competing development of two AI models. Streamlined healthcare regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic permitted the entry of targeted therapy medicines for autoimmune diseases in the market. The 2022 economic crisis is the fifth one in the history of modern Russia. Over time, the government, federal regulators, and the Central Bank have gained unique professional experience in crisis management and counter-cyclical policies. The same applies to businesses and even households, with the Russian middle class becoming adept at techniques of asset allocation across bank deposits, real estate, currency, and gold. Oil producers made a dramatic redirection of export flows. While in 2021, almost 100 percent of crude oil exports went to Europe, by the end of 2022, 80 percent went to Asian markets. If in 2021, the top three leading trade partners of Russia were China, Germany, and the Netherlands, then in 2023, it was China, India, and Tükiye. Russia is now Europe’s top trade partner with China and is one of the few countries with which China has a trade deficit. Paradoxically, Russia remains the second LNG supplier to the EU. Sanctions sharply stimulated domestic production. Since 2014, agriculture, food production, and manufacturing have been included in the import substitution sphere, which has proven to be quite successful. Today, without cancelling the efforts in manufacturing, the focus of industrial policy is shifting to services: first, medicine, education, and tourism. This transition relies heavily on large-scale digitalisation and Artificial Intelligence (AI) integration. Key areas such as taxation, customs, government, banking, and educational services have been digitised, increasing efficiency, easing demographic constraints, and reducing white-collar corruption. Macro policy instruments have also undergone another anti-crisis transformation: budget rules have been relaxed; the fiscal impulse has increased revenues and consequently demand, including credit demand. Economic expectations have improved. The intention is to manage inflation not only through demand compression but also through supply growth and the liberalisation of entrepreneurship. Formulated by Vladimir Putin, he said “Restraining price growth today is not only the task of the Bank of Russia, but also an assessment of the quality of the RF Government's work on stimulating supply growth”. The Russian government is simultaneously completing “de-offshorisation”—bringing key companies under Russian jurisdiction to special administrative districts created in advance.. At the same time, foreign holdings that acted as intermediaries and asset holders are being dismantled. Collectively, these can be called the Russian version of supply-side economics. What are its preliminary results? The Russian economy, by most indicators, including the level of consumption in 2023, has returned to the level of the end of 2021. The main economic problems of the Russian Federation remain labour shortage (at full employment) and closed export markets. According to the latest estimates of the World Bank, Russia has become one of the five largest economies in the world in terms of GDP in purchasing power parity. This result is attributed not only to the abovementioned factors, but also to the fact that for a long time, the depreciation of the ruble has been significantly outpacing the price growth. Therefore, the equivalent value of the consumer basket of goods in dollar terms has declined. Russia's support for the Global South is an expected reaction to the “unipolar world order”. Russia was the first to challenge it. Ten years ago, Kurt Campbell, warned that “dual containment of Russia and China is a nightmare for U.S. national security”, which by 2019 has become a reality. Sanctions against Russia strengthen ties between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and BRICS countries, and these organisations themselves are an obstacle to the fragmentation of the global economy. By 2025, Russia's supply-side economy will have reached a sustainable trajectory. The task of the current year is to eliminate imperfections of this model, including inflation (9.5 percent in 2024), labour market constraints (unemployment 2.3 percent in 2024), and high budget expenditures. Price pressure is a classic consequence of ultra-high defence spending. In addition, the government sees a downside risk to oil prices. Therefore, the goal for 2025 is to reduce overheating of the economy. The expected growth rate is around 1.5-2 percent of GDP. This can be pursued through fiscal consolidation and a tight monetary policy. However, inflation expectations and foreign trade conditions are still pro-inflationary. Therefore, inflation will have a “long braking path”. In 2025, the Central Bank expects inflation to fall only to 7-8 percent on an annual basis; however, by the end of 2024, the cooling of credit activity as a result of high lending rates became noticeable. They also overinflated the population's inclination to save. At the same time, the total volume of Russian budget revenues in December 2024 increased by 28 percent compared to the same month of the previous year. To summarise, it can be stated that the Russian economy, having successfully navigated the COVID-19 crisis, was well-prepared for the shock from the sanctions of 2022. After a slight holdback, it has entered the growth trajectory. The immediate effects of the sanctions have been borne, but they have come with “boomerang” consequences, both economic and political, especially in Germany. Russia could manage, not without certain difficulties, to increase defence production and at the same time maintain and even improve the living standards of the population.

Cook Islands' recent deals with China sees shift from soft to hard-edged diplomacy embedded in Pacific. Strategic engagement between the Pacific and its partners has now well and truly switched to overt security transactionalism, from soft to hard diplomacy. The explicit position emanating from the United States under the Trump administration reflects what has already been happening in the Pacific, particularly with the region’s largest aid donor Australia. When the Cook Islands and China signed deals this month, they sidelined New Zealand, leaving it to reassess how to do business with Pacific island nations. In recent years there’s been a flurry of agreements, MoUs, treaties and more between Pacific island countries and their partners, both established and emerging. The recently confirmed Papua New Guinea rugby league deal with Australia introduced “strategic trust” into the lexicon. Grafted on to the prized spot in the Australian National Rugby League competition is an undertaking by PNG to rebuff any kind of security agreement with China. Similar trade-offs form part of Australia’s deals with Nauru last year and Tuvalu in 2023.  How this transactionalism can or should be accommodated, or even countered, by Pacific island states has the region talking. Professor Transform Aqorau in his keynote speech to last week’s Pacific Islands Political Science Association (PIPSA) conference in New Zealand stated: “The question that we must ask ourselves is, ‘how do we assert agency in this space while we avoid being drawn into the conflicts that are not of our making?’” Many who spoke at PIPSA agreed that conversations about security and strategy must be led by Pacific voices and underpinned by Pacific norms. There were numerous calls for partner countries (of all stripes) to do better - listen, focus on relationships, work more ‘Pacifically’.  The other side of the asymmetrical power dynamic remained largely unaddressed – what can and should Pacific leaders and officials do to shift partners’ behaviour to what is wanted and needed? And if business-as-usual is already getting these partners what they want, where is the incentive for them to change?  Unlike the successes Pacific nations have had when taking a united regional posture, guided by the Pacific Islands Forum and advancing their Blue Pacific Strategy 2050, the bilateral deals see them operating without the benefit of collective support.  There are some ‘green shoots’ of Pacific assertiveness. In a Facebook post over the weekend, Vanuatu’s newly-elected Prime Minister Jotham Napa said, “climate change is very critical to our survival. Moving away from (the) Paris agreement by (the) Trump administration is like committing suicide. Climate change must be part of any security agreement in the future.” The message to the U.S. is clear. It is also a message to Australia, who have long sought a security agreement with Vanuatu and will no doubt continue to press that with Napat. That is not to say partners’ approaches are not evolving. When it comes to engaging with China, the overall picture is that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is now focused on smaller projects with greater use of grant financing rather than loans. Of course, it is often the case that the exception proves the rule. The recent agreement (and associated MoUs) between Cook Islands and China envisages serious infrastructure investment in the maritime sector, including ports. Cue “dual-use” alarm bells in Canberra, Wellington and beyond. The New Zealand government is now contemplating a more transactional approach with Pacific partners. Its relationships with Kiribati and Cook Islands have deteriorated markedly in the last few weeks, following what could be termed “assertive” actions by Pacific leaders. After months of trying, New Zealand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Winston Peters was all set to meet President Taneti Maamau in Kiribati in January. The arrangements were upended at the last minute resulting in a public diplomatic tiff. Peters has now initiated a review of New Zealand aid to Kiribati as an expression of his frustration. Meanwhile, Cook Islands’ Prime Minister Mark Brown also raised the ire of Wellington. Peters has claimed that there was insufficient consultation by Cook Islands (which is in free association with New Zealand) about entering into a strategic partnership agreement with China and signing of other MOUs. Peters has now called for a “reset” of the relationship. Whilst much has been made of the geopolitical aspects of these tensions, the most significant implications are in the domestic spheres.  In Kiribati, opposition leader Tessie Lambourne has argued that the falling out with New Zealand is part of a pattern of isolationism on the part of Maamau, which is harming the interests of the i-Kiribati population. His government switched allegiance from Taiwan to China in 2019 and has become increasingly withdrawn, including a ban on diplomatic visits last year. A New Zealand aid cut would have a significant impact on health, education, and climate resilience projects in Kiribati. In Cook Islands, Brown’s bullish approach has come back to bite him. Last week around 400 people marched in protest, and he faced a motion of no confidence in the Parliament, which failed. Whilst the strategic partnership with China was part of what prompted Cook Islanders to take the streets, they were also enraged at the debacle surrounding Brown’s attempt to introduce a Cook Islands passport, in addition to the New Zealand passport they currently hold. The geostrategic environment in the Pacific is becoming increasingly complex and the tempo of bilateral offers shows no sign of slowing. The calculated nature of relations offered by partners poses a huge challenge to Pacific leaders, negotiating in relative isolation, often in secret, while they try to maintain their “friends to all, enemy to none” positions. Pacific states will have to work harder than ever and expend precious resources to strike the right balance as they assert their agency while managing strategic partnerships. Copyright ©2015-2024, BenarNews. Used with the permission of BenarNews.

In Brief Despite its increasingly repressive domestic rule, more countries than ever are engaging with Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers. India’s first official meeting with the Taliban in January 2025 encapsulates a broader global trend of once-reluctant countries now engaging with the Taliban. Credible terrorism concerns, worsening humanitarian conditions and geopolitical rivalries are pushing governments toward quasi-acceptance and recognition of Taliban rule. When the Taliban took over Afghanistan in 2021, the prevailing sentiment was that the regime would be an international pariah if it did not moderate its hardline positions. The Taliban’s violent past also made it inconceivable for some states to engage with it as the government of Afghanistan. Despite the Taliban’s repressive rule worsening considerably since it seized control in 2021, with restrictions on women taken to a new extreme and the reintroduction of brutal punishments for alleged moral crimes, the regime is overcoming its international isolation. More governments are prepared to look past the ethical dilemma of dealing with the Taliban and quasi-recognise it as the government of Afghanistan. India stepped up its outreach to the Taliban in January 2025, with India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi holding their first meeting. This is the highest level meeting between the two sides since India began small and indirect engagements with the Taliban after its return to power in 2021. For the Taliban, its meeting with India’s foreign secretary is a major diplomatic breakthrough given its tense and fractious relations with India since the 1990s. After this January 2025 meeting, the Taliban referred to India as a ‘significant regional and economic partner’. The sea change in relations likely stems from New Delhi not sensing any significant terrorist threats from the Taliban or groups allegedly linked to the Taliban. Worsening Taliban–Pakistan relations may have played a role in India’s outreach to the Taliban. Pakistan firmly backed the Taliban when it was mounting a comeback in Afghanistan. But since the Taliban’s return, border disputes and the rise of Pakistani Taliban militancy inside Pakistan have sent their relations into a downward spiral. The souring Pakistan–Afghanistan relations suggest New Delhi’s interests may not be as affected as feared when the Taliban took over in 2021. Despite India’s growing outreach, its relations with the Taliban are still very calibrated and limited — paling in comparison to China’s. Yet India’s outreach may be more diplomatically significant for the Taliban than China’s as it sets a precedent for Western democracies that also seek to strike a balance between not recognising the Taliban as the legitimate government, while engaging with it on necessary matters. Western governments, particularly the United States, were unfazed by some of India’s initial engagements, but now seem to recognise the necessity of limited engagements with the Taliban. It was revealed in January 2025 that the former Joe Biden administration negotiated with the Taliban to secure the release of two US prisoners in Afghanistan. In 2024, the Biden administration debated expanding direct engagements and cooperation with the Taliban to mount more effective counterterrorist activities. The return of US President Donald Trump is likely to change US–Taliban relations. Under Trump’s first administration, the United States pursued talks with the Taliban, culminating in the 2020 Doha Agreement that facilitated the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Trump’s return increases the possibility of greater US engagements with the Taliban, though it has also created uncertainties. President Trump was critical of how the US departure from Afghanistan was handled under the Biden administration. In January 2025, Trump said that the Taliban needed to return US military equipment in Afghanistan as a precondition for future financial assistance. The Taliban have also said that they seek a ‘new chapter’ in their relations with the United States under the second Trump administration. The biggest roadblock for the West engaging with the Taliban has been its repressive policies and human rights violations. But there are now compelling reasons for the West to engage with the Taliban. Western sanctions, in addition to having no effect on the Taliban’s draconian governance, have worsened humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. Despite the sanctions’ ineffectiveness, it is unclear whether the West would go as far as to lift the sanctions. Instead, Western countries might find ways to work with the regime on specific issues. Foremost among these issues is addressing the growing presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan — such as Al-Qaeda, a Taliban ally, and the reviving Islamic State–Khorasan Province. The growing Chinese influence in Afghanistan also has Western countries concerned that turning their backs on Afghanistan may work to China’s advantage. China perceives Afghanistan as a gateway for China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects in Central Asia and seeks to exploit the country’s vast and untapped natural reserves. Though more governments are now prepared to engage with the Taliban, the Taliban’s most strategic relationship will likely remain with China. China–Taliban relations are comprehensive and long-term, spanning economic, political and security cooperation. China does not recognise the Taliban but was the first to accept a Taliban envoy. China and the Taliban have inked several notable agreements, including China granting the Taliban tariff-free trade access in October 2024, which could provide an economic boost to the cash-strapped regime. But China’s relations with the Taliban are also not without problems. Some Afghanistan-based terrorist groups have China on their radar and pose security concerns in the sensitive Chinese border provinces. The Taliban’s affiliates have previously attacked Chinese interests in neighbouring Pakistan. Despite these concerns, Beijing appears committed to strengthening its relationship with the Taliban, focusing on mutual security, technological exchanges and investments. Another diplomatic breakthrough for the Taliban is its improving relations with Russia. Russia invited the Taliban to the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, among other meetings held in Russia in 2024. Russia also decided to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations. These overtures suggest Russia is seeking closer relations with the Taliban. The Taliban played a long waiting game, biding its time since the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. It ultimately prevailed by returning to power as soon as the United States withdrew 20 years later. Growing diplomatic engagements prove that the Taliban is again capable of playing a long game to wear down governments into a quasi-acceptance and recognition of its draconian rule. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1741341600

In response to the weakening of the Atlantic Alliance and the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, the Europeans have announced their intention to rearm, leveraging the European Union (EU) as part of this effort. To fully grasp the dynamics unfolding in Brussels—particularly regarding military financing—and to bring order to the myriad of initiatives launched in this field in recent years, it is essential to take a step back. ReArm Europe: Prioritizing National Over European Financing For several years now, the EU has developed new competencies to support and strengthen Europe’s defense industrial base. Since 2017, it has introduced various programs aimed at funding collaborative defense projects among member states, including the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the upcoming European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP)—the latter still under negotiation. These programs, managed by the European Commission and financed through the EU’s ordinary budget, have remained relatively limited in scope. So far, member states have been reluctant to allow the European executive to gain too much influence in this area, which they consider a matter of national sovereignty. However, the evolving geopolitical landscape—particularly the rapprochement between the United States and Russia—has underscored the urgency for European countries to pursue strategic autonomy by increasing their military spending and by joining forces through their common defense policies. Consequently, they have asked the Commission to explore ways to support defense sector investments while maintaining national control over decision-making. On March 6, 2025, the Commission proposed a plan called ReArm Europe, in an attempt to square the circle desired by the Member States, namely reconciling the principle of national sovereignty with the need to act together. At this stage, the plan does not directly expand the existing EU defense support programs, such as the EDF or the future EDIP. Decisions regarding funding for these programs will be made in the coming months as part of the negotiations for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (2028–2034). Instead, ReArm Europe focuses on facilitating national military budget increases while ensuring a degree of European coordination. Five Key Measures of ReArm Europe To achieve this balance, the Commission has proposed five key measures: • Activating the Stability and Growth Pact’s escape clause—which allows member states to exceed deficit and debt limits during crises. Under this proposal, countries could be allowed to increase their military budgets to up to 1.5% of GDP without this expenditure being counted in their national deficits. This measure could generate an estimated €650 billion over four years for defense spending.• Raising €150 billion through EU-issued bonds, which would then be lent to member states at low-interest rates and with long repayment terms. This funding would support pan-European military projects, such as air defense systems, by pooling demand and enabling joint procurement. Some of the military equipment financed through this mechanism could also be sent to Ukraine.• Facilitating the use of cohesion funds for defense investments. In this regard, it should be recalled that Member States remain free to decide whether or not to use the cohesion funds due to them for defense. These, in fact, must finance projects that are identified by the Member States and their local entities, although they must subsequently be approved at EU level.• Creating a European savings and investment union to encourage private financial institutions to support the military industry—something they have been reluctant to do.• Expanding the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) role in defense financing. Currently, the EIB can only fund dual-use (civilian and military) projects. The proposal seeks to lift restrictions on military financing entirely. However, this issue has been debated for years, and since the EIB’s board of directors comprises member states that make decisions unanimously, the Commission has no direct authority over this matter. The Risk of a Counterproductive Outcome The plan could undoubtedly strengthen European defense, but it could also weaken it. Much will depend on the technical details, as yet unknown, that will be adopted to implement it. To understand this point, it is worth recalling that the ultimate purpose of EU action on armaments is to reduce the fragmentation of the European defense industrial base, in order to consolidate it and make it more competitive. The EU must create a critical mass in terms of defense capabilities and technologies that will enable Europeans to stand up to the world’s major powers together. However, if ReArm Europe simply leads to increased national military spending without coordination or a common EU strategy, it could produce the opposite of the intended effect. In such a scenario, each country would finance its own defense industry in isolation, exacerbating fragmentation and duplication of efforts, rather than strengthening Europe’s collective military capabilities. Difficult Questions That Are Still Waiting for an Answer The technical and regulatory details that will be adopted to implement the ReArm Europe plan will determine whether it will serve a European strategy or whether it will be nothing more than a futile attempt to water the desert sand. Several contentious issues remain to be addressed—particularly regarding the proposed exemption from the Stability and Growth Pact. These questions can be grouped into three main categories: What Types of Defense Expenditures Will Be Exempt from Deficit Calculations? The EU must clarify which military expenditures will be excluded from national deficit calculations and which will still count: Will ReArm Europe apply only to investment spending (e.g., R&D, acquisitions), or will it also cover operational costs (e.g., salaries, training, deployment expenses)? 1.Under What Conditions Will Defense Spending Be Exempt? The EU will also have to define the conditions under which arms expenditure will not be taken into account in the deficits: • Will Member States have to invest in equipment identified as a priority at EU level, or will they be able to finance whatever they want without coordination within the EU?• Will they have to do so through trans-European collaborative projects or not?• What about European preference and eligibility criteria? Will they have to use this money to produce or purchase European equipment, or will they also be able to equip themselves abroad? Who Will Decide? Finally, the issue of decision-making power remains unresolved: • To what extent will the European Commission have discretion in determining which military expenditures qualify for exemption?• Will the Commission have the authority to reject certain expenditures if they do not align with EU strategic objectives?• For EU-backed loans, how will the projects to be financed be selected? The negotiations that will have to be initiated within the EU to answer these questions will not be easy. Behind their bureaucratic appearance lie the perennial political and existential challenges that have plagued European defense since its inception: What level of integration are the member states prepared to accept? What role should Brussels and the Commission play? The squaring of the circle is far from resolved.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском A series of rapid domestic political changes in Lebanon has disrupted the established balance of power, creating a foundation for a reassessment of the positions of key players. Amid a pause in regional escalation, the debate on the decline of Hezbollah’s influence — long the dominant military and political force in the country, has become a topic in numerous publications. However, there is no consensus on the group's future: some experts predict its complete disappearance, while others, on the contrary, believe that the current conditions will serve as a catalyst for its restructuring. A sober view of what Hezbollah represents today seems more important than ever. Since the election of Joseph Aoun as President of Lebanon and the subsequent appointment of Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister, Lebanese politics has continued to undergo changes that are shaping its new landscape. The intensification of diplomatic contacts, escalating tensions in the border region, and unexpected administrative decisions — all these factors reflect the search for a renewed equilibrium that aligns with contemporary realities. Weakened by war and political shifts, Hezbollah finds itself at the center of these transformational processes. Hezbollah's Pyrrhic Victory With the end of active military operations in November 2024, the question arose regarding the extent of the damage suffered by the Shiite group. Despite all the statements by the organization's Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, about a "great victory" over the Zionist enemy, the pathos of his rhetoric is significantly devalued when confronted with the stark reality. In fact, the transition of Hezbollah’s current leader to this position from his long-held role as Deputy Secretary-General — a position he occupied for over 30 years under Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah — is directly linked to a key consequence of the war: significant losses within the organization’s ranks. One of the most devastating blows to the group was the physical elimination of the majority of its leadership. Since Hezbollah’s involvement in supporting Hamas's "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation, key figures within the organization have been consistently targeted and killed. Among them were prominent Radwan Unit commander Wissam Tawil, the heads of the Nasr and Aziz special units Talib Abdallah and Mohammed Nasser, as well as the overseer of Hezbollah’s rocket program and chief military advisor to the Secretary-General, Fuad Shukr. Additionally, Ibrahim Aqil, a member of the Jihad Council, Hezbollah’s main military body, was also eliminated. The most shocking event, however, was the death of Hezbollah's longtime leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, following an Israeli strike on Dahiyeh, the southern suburb of Beirut. The attack also claimed the lives of another Jihad Council member, Ali Karaki, and General Abbas Nilforoushan, a commander of Iran’s Quds Force. Hezbollah supporters would likely have reacted with even greater dismay to the elimination of Hashem Safi al-Din, the head of the group's Executive Council [1]. This is because the Shura Council, Hezbollah's main administrative body, is required to elect two Secretary-Generals every three years — one acting and the other "reserve". This procedure was established in the 1990s after the assassination of Hezbollah’s second leader, Abbas Musawi, to prevent internal discord and confusion in the event of a sudden elimination of the Secretary-General. Hashem Safi al-Din was precisely such a designated successor, yet due to his untimely death, he never had the opportunity to enact this contingency mechanism. The losses suffered by the Shiite group, of course, were not limited to its senior command. Before the launch of Israel’s Operation Northern Arrows, the number of Hezbollah casualties among rank-and-file members was estimated at around 400–500 fighters. However, by the end of the Third Lebanon War, Arab and Israeli sources reported that this number had risen to 3,000–4,000, accounting for approximately 6–8% of the organization's 50,000-strong force (as estimated by the U.S. Congress). This figure does not even include a significant number of non-fatal combat casualties — those wounded and rendered incapable of further service. It is also important to note that the number of casualties continues to rise even after the ceasefire agreement came into effect, as Israel’s interpretation of the agreement grants it "full military freedom of action" against Hezbollah. The Israeli military continues to carry out air and missile strikes on any targets suspected of harboring Hezbollah members or being linked to the group. By the end of December 2024, the number of ceasefire violations had already exceeded 300 cases. The "Blue Helmets" (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL) peacekeeping mission in Lebanon has expressed concern over Israel’s actions. Another crucial aspect of Hezbollah’s post-war situation is the state of its missile arsenal, which posed the primary threat to Israel. As of March 2024, the group was estimated to possess between 100,000 and 200,000 missiles, the majority of which were short-range rockets. According to U.S. and Israeli assessments, Hezbollah’s remaining arsenal now constitutes between 20% and 50% of its pre-war stockpile. However, independent analysts tend to agree only with the upper limit of this estimate. Thus, it becomes almost indisputable that the events of the Third Lebanon War have dealt a significant blow to Hezbollah. The hopes of its supporters for a swift and miraculous recovery are unlikely to materialize. Given the deteriorating geopolitical environment and growing internal pressure on Hezbollah within Lebanon, it remains unclear where the organization will find the resources for its restoration. At the same time, it would be premature to write off the Shiite group entirely. Even Israeli media acknowledge this, publishing bold headlines stating that Hezbollah has not been defeated. The most valuable asset of any political organization is its people, and in this regard, Hezbollah still holds strong advantages. Among objective Lebanese analysts, there is a consensus that support for Hezbollah within the Shiite community remains consistently high. Some even argue that its position has strengthened. Faced with widespread dissatisfaction with the group outside its sectarian base and increasing external pressure on Lebanon, Shiites fear becoming scapegoats. The fear of collective punishment is pushing them to rally around their traditional leadership, as they recognize that they are all in the same boat. Today, the ball is in Hezbollah’s court. The group must act with the utmost responsibility and precision to justify the trust of its supporters. A key focus of this strategy will be its cooperation with the new government, where Hezbollah and its allies, notably, still hold a significant position. The New Cabinet: Remembering Siniora or Bring Back My 2005 On Saturday, February 8, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced the completion of the formation of a new national government, calling it a "government of reform and salvation". The process took 26 days, which, for the country's political history in the 21st century, is almost a record. The only time a cabinet was formed faster was in 2005, when Prime Minister Fouad Siniora assembled his government in 19 days amid nationwide mobilization following the Cedar Revolution [2]. This rapid pace is, in fact, a testament to the critical state of Lebanon, whose governmental and bureaucratic system only begins to "wheeze into action" when it is just steps away from plunging into the abyss. The cabinet has been deliberately composed of 24 figures who are formally unaffiliated with political parties [3] and do not intend to participate in future elections. According to the prime minister's vision, this approach is meant to reduce political friction within the government and ensure its effective functioning. Instead of engaging in Lebanon’s traditional positional party politics, ministers are expected to focus solely on their respective portfolios. However, the consultation process between the prime minister and political forces somewhat dilutes the effectiveness of this strategy. Powerful parties still have a significant influence over appointments due to the requirement for parliamentary approval of the cabinet. Nevertheless, the composition of the new government has been strongly influenced by the personal vision of reform-minded President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam — an unusual situation for Lebanon. Ten ministerial candidates were directly nominated by this top-level tandem, while another twelve were backed by political forces [4]. Despite widespread predictions of doom, the Hezbollah-Amal duo — often referred to as the "Shiite duo" — secured four trusted representatives in the government, two from each organization. Another Shiite quota, assigned to the Minister of State for Administrative Development, became a compromise between the Prime Minister and Speaker Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal. However, in the final assessment, this was still framed as a "non-partisan" appointment made on behalf of the head of government. Thus, the configuration of Shiite ministers in the new cabinet clearly demonstrated the practical inevitability of Hezbollah and Amal’s continued influence. The political weight of the "Shiite duo" simply did not allow the Prime Minister to significantly limit their representation in the highest executive body, even though it seems that Nawaf Salam himself is at least somewhat interested in weakening Hezbollah and Amal’s positions. Furthermore, Amal managed to retain its long-standing monopoly over the Ministry of Finance, which was given to former MP Yassine Jaber, a member of the movement. This appointment was preceded by intense speculation, as the Finance Minister holds the second most powerful position in government after the Prime Minister. Any governmental decision that requires budgetary allocations must be signed off by the Finance Minister, meaning that the lack of approval could effectively block any government initiative. Although Jaber was quick to assure that he would not abuse his position, it is clear that President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, who are oriented toward the West and the Gulf monarchies, are unlikely to be pleased that a key tool for obstructing government operations remains in the hands of figures close to pro-Iranian Hezbollah. At the same time, it appears that in exchange for this “veto” power, another mechanism of obstruction for the Shiite duo has been neutralized — the current cabinet includes a Shiite minister who is not directly dependent on the will of Hezbollah and Amal. This means that if the four representatives of the duo decide to withdraw from the government in an attempt to delegitimize it, the Minister of State for Administrative Development, Fadi Makki, will remain in office. As a result, the argument about the lack of Shiite representation — and therefore the alleged illegitimacy of the cabinet — would become irrelevant. This move by the country’s leadership was not merely a symbolic concession — it is rooted in historical precedents. During the tenure of Fouad Siniora’s government (2005–2009), Hezbollah and Amal effectively withdrew [5] all five Shiite ministers from the cabinet, arguing that the government had become unrepresentative due to the absence of Shiite figures. At that time, Hezbollah and its allies demanded the formation of a national unity government in which the opposition — meaning themselves — would hold a so-called "blocking third". Government decisions in Lebanon require a two-thirds majority, meaning that a political force controlling at least one-third of the cabinet plus one minister has the power to veto decisions and, if necessary, bring down the government. The crisis peaked in 2008, leading to violent clashes between Hezbollah and pro-government forces, which resulted in over 100 casualties. The conflict was eventually resolved, but it remains a cautionary precedent in Lebanese politics. Since then, and until the formation of the current cabinet, every Lebanese government has had one political alliance that held the coveted "blocking third", effectively giving it the ability to stall the cabinet's work. This dynamic is precisely why Lebanon has experienced four governmental crises since 2009. Against this backdrop, Nawaf Salam’s decision to eliminate this risk in the new cabinet appears prudent, as it significantly reduces the chances of yet another executive power collapse. Meanwhile, the Minister of Finance remains a trump card in the hands of Nabih Berri, a highly skilled political tactician. It will only be played if the stakes become too high and the current political arrangement starts leading toward defeat. The Shiite duo is not in a position to oppose the government without cause, but it still has the leverage to defend its core interests when necessary. At the same time, the Shiite duo’s main domestic political opponents — the Lebanese Forces (LF) and Kataeb Party — secured a total of five ministerial portfolios. Additionally, two seats in the government went to candidates from the traditionally Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), which has a long history of political maneuvering in pursuit of the best outcome for its community. Its de facto leader, Walid Jumblatt, has alternated between criticizing Hezbollah and aligning with it, depending on the political climate. Another ministerial position was assigned to Noura Bayrakdarian, a representative of the Lebanese branch of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) "Dashnaktsutyun". The Dashnaks have long been junior partners in the March 8 Alliance [6] and have maintained close ties with the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). Notably, for the first time in two decades, the FPM failed to secure a single cabinet appointment — a situation last seen during Fouad Siniora’s government. A particularly symbolic shift occurred with the Ministry of Energy, a traditional stronghold of the FPM, which was handed over to the Lebanese Forces (LF). The decoupling of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) from Hezbollah, which we previously discussed, largely predetermined the Shiite bloc’s isolation in the new government — this is the first time they are in the cabinet without a strong Christian ally (the Marada Movement has also been left "overboard"). Following the cabinet’s approval, FPM leader Gebran Bassil expressed willingness to work constructively in opposition, yet at the same time, he voiced serious dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister’s actions. According to Bassil, Nawaf Salam granted greater influence over the cabinet’s composition to Shiite and Druze forces, at the expense of Christian and Sunni interests. His discontent over FPM’s exclusion from the government was further evident during the parliamentary confidence vote. During the session, Gebran Bassil accused the Prime Minister of reneging on commitments made during consultations over his appointment. As a result, the FPM faction refused to support a vote of confidence in Nawaf Salam’s government, stating that the Prime Minister "did not deserve it". However, the parliamentary confidence vote left Gebran Bassil and his Strong Lebanon bloc in the minority. The ministerial statement delivered by the Prime Minister focused on the same priorities outlined in President Joseph Aoun’s inaugural speech: restoring the rule of law and sovereignty, reforming institutions, and committing to the implementation of UN Resolution 1701. The declaration contained at least two clear warning signals directed at Hezbollah. Nawaf Salam reaffirmed the government’s stance that only the state should have the authority to decide on matters of war and peace and hold a monopoly on the use of weapons. Regarding judicial independence, the declaration stressed the urgent need to shield the judiciary from interference and pressure, particularly in relation to the investigation of the Beirut port explosion. This was an explicit reference to the fact that the "Shiite duo" has been obstructing the work of Judge Tarek Bitar, who, in the course of his investigation, attempted to summon high-ranking members of the Amal Movement for questioning. In his speech, Mohammed Raad, the leader of Hezbollah’s Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc, while offering a few policy recommendations, refrained from harsh criticism of the government and expressed the faction’s trust in it. Other MPs' speeches reflected cautious optimism toward the government's agenda, frequently emphasizing that their support was conditional and could only be justified by concrete steps toward promised reforms. Common ground for the speeches were calls to resolve the problems of depositors and the entire banking sector, to conduct electoral reform and future elections on time, and to economically revitalize depressed areas. The two most popular appeals turned out to be issues that opposing forces usually raise on their banners - the need to put an end to the Israeli occupation and to hand over all weapons to the state. Ultimately, 95 MPs voted to vote in confidence in the cabinet, 12 voted against it and 4 abstained from voting. Overall, the new Lebanese government appears to be, at the very least, an extremely interesting and therefore promising structure. Attention is drawn both to the stylistic aspects – the high representation of women and people with an academic background – and to the formal ones – the absence of a blocking third and the large number of ministers appointed by a tandem of senior officials. All this creates the impression of a very balanced and well-composed cabinet, which is likely to be largely capable of coping with the ambitious tasks of restructuring the country. At the same time, the cabinet in its current form will exist only until the parliamentary elections in May 2026, when the updated balance of power will be established. In this regard, the little over a year that the cabinet has seems to be a period that is insufficient to achieve all the goals set, but suitable for starting the flywheel of change. And despite the fact that Hezbollah and the new Lebanese leadership, represented by the president and prime minister, do not find understanding on all issues, there is something that unites them - to put it mildly, a cool attitude towards Israel. However, on this front, as it turns out, everything is not going as smoothly as we would like. Retreating "Israeli-Style": The IDF Bids Farewell, But Doesn’t Quite Leave… The ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel officially expired on February 18, by which time the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were expected to fully withdraw from Lebanese territory. However, few anticipated that the process would proceed without surprises, given reports of Israel’s interest in extending the agreement once again. Indeed, just one day before the deadline, Israeli military officials announced that, as a temporary measure, the army would maintain its presence on five strategic heights. The United States, as the leading party in the ceasefire monitoring committee established by the agreement, was quick to support this move. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s entire political leadership — including the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament — continues to insist on the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces. Israel's strategy in the Lebanese direction remains in the logic of tough and uncompromising suppression of security threats. In reality, the "delay" of Israeli troops and the continuation of strikes devalue the entire meaning of the established agreements, giving one of the parties a "legal" opportunity to violate them. In turn, in response, the Israelis insist that Hezbollah is violating its obligations to care for the Litani River. Some experts suggest that the five strongholds in southern Lebanon will become objects of long-term occupation. Control over the hilly terrain along the perimeter of the Israeli border deep in Lebanese territory should obviously create a certain buffer zone, which in theory will secure the borders of the Jewish state. However, if the IDF does not plan to linger on Lebanese soil, it is not very clear until what point its military presence is necessary. In accordance with the agreements, this territory is taken under control by units of the Lebanese Armed Forces, which do not pose any threat to Israel. Moreover, the sincerity of statements about the temporary nature of such measures also calls into question the fact that the land component of the cross-border tensions between Hezbollah and Israel has never been the main cause for concern. The main threat has always come from the missile potential of the Shiite group. In his recent statement, Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem predictably demanded a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory after October 18 and called on the government to pursue this without compromise. At the same time, he did not disclose what specific actions would be otherwise, but noted that “everyone knows how to deal with occupation.” The restrained tone of his remarks (albeit against the backdrop of the usual anti-Israeli rhetoric) and the lack of any particular threats in the words of the organization’s leader in the language of Hezbollah can be considered cautious statements. Without a doubt, the group at this stage does not have the resources to actively oppose Israel: deliberately going into confrontation today is the same as throwing a slingshot at a tank. Moreover, escalation puts at risk the predominantly Shiite population of southern Lebanon, which is a key component of the organization’s supporters and has already become refugees. The Waning Influence of Hezbollah In addition to the challenges of de-occupation of Lebanese territory, both domestic and foreign policy developments in recent months have been marked by other significant events. All of them point to a certain reconfiguration of Lebanon’s political landscape — one that, more often than not, appears to be unfavorable for Hezbollah. The expected shift is taking place in the system of foreign relations - preconditions for strengthening American-Saudi influence are emerging, namely, the name of the recently elected president of the country was associated with the protection of Washington and Riyadh. Thus, it is this alliance (but, above all, the Saudis) that has for many years acted as a counterweight to Iranian influence on Lebanon, the main conductor of which is Hezbollah. In January, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, visited Beirut for the first time in 15 years. He expressed support for the president and the prime minister in their course for reform. A few weeks later, the example of her Saudi colleague was followed by the deputy special representative of the US president for the Middle East, Morgan Orgatus. However, her visit caused much more noise: from indignation over a ring in the form of the Star of David at a meeting with the Lebanese president to an audience with an ally of Hezbollah, the speaker Nabih Berri, who during the conversation called Israel "absolute evil". It is curious that the American envoy's visit took place on the eve of the announcement of the cabinet composition. In this regard, her statements that «Hezbollah should not be part of this government in any form» did not go unnoticed, especially after the list of ministers was made public. Another big event was the announcement that Lebanon had a “future” again. Saad Hariri, the longtime leader of the Mustaqbal (Arabic for “future”) movement and former prime minister, announced his return to politics after a three-year hiatus on the twentieth anniversary of the assassination of his father, also Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Before the 2022 parliamentary elections, he announced that he would not participate in them and effectively dissolved his movement. This step left the Sunni forces fragmented (and therefore weak), and the Sunni part of Lebanese politics was left without a clear leader at the helm. This happened because Mustaqbal had long dominated this segment of society, and now Saad Hariri found the best opportunity to make a political comeback. His return to politics can also be seen as an additional factor in the growth of Saudi influence, since he himself is a native of Riyadh and a subject of the kingdom. His ties to the Al Saud family, which go back to his father, have never been a secret, but after the incident in 2017 [7], the relationship has been going through hard times. He also has certain connections to the Emirati elite, in particular to Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Finally, the most important news of recent weeks is the government-initiated ban on Iranian civilian aircraft landing in Lebanon, and in particular at Beirut's Rafik Hariri International Airport. After one of the Iranian airliners was denied landing, Hezbollah supporters began protests and blocked the road to the only international airport in the country. The government's extension of this measure, first until February 18, and now indefinitely, is due to information published by the IDF that Iran is sending funds to Hezbollah via aircraft. In his statement following the events, Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem did not vigorously attack the country's leadership, noting that the decision was made under the threat of an Israeli «strike on the runway» if the Iranian plane landed. At the same time, he criticized the government's position, which assumes compliance with Israeli orders. This development once again demonstrates the waning power of Hezbollah and reveals how tense the situation is in Lebanon. *** The recent public funeral of Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, as a symbol of the end of an era, involuntarily becomes the leitmotif of complex internal Lebanese processes. The flight of Israeli fighters over the funeral procession of many thousands and the absence of the president and prime minister, despite the invitation, make comments unnecessary. At present, in the words of the funeral speech of Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem, the time has come for “state responsibility” — Hezbollah is deliberately giving way to the proscenium (but not leaving), realizing the sensitivity of the moment and its own difficulties. And although today it seems that the new reality has already been formed, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that this transition is still far from complete. Most likely, a somewhat predictable situation (if this is applicable to Lebanon at all) will be achieved only after the parliamentary elections in 2026. The path to them in the next year or so will be no less important, but electoral cycles often tend to present surprises. For now, Hezbollah's chosen line of minimizing conflict and a reasonable, but sometimes unyielding, conversation with the new government seems balanced. Three aspects will be key factors at this time that can determine Hezbollah's future. First, the degree of consolidation of the Shiite population around the organization. The extent to which the leadership manages its resources in relation to people is the extent to which the group will remain firmly on its feet. As after the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah (through its institutions such as Jihad al-Binaa [8]) is engaged in the reconstruction of housing in the affected areas and the payment of targeted compensation (rent). However, this campaign is already facing financial difficulties, despite the tens of millions of dollars spent, since the organization relies almost exclusively on Iran. In this and other dimensions, Tehran's position in the medium term is also critical. Second, the topic of Hezbollah's disarmament will acquire particular importance in the foreseeable future. This problem has already been outlined by the country's top leadership on several occasions, and has also been mentioned in the government's declaration to parliament and supported by a considerable number of deputies in their speeches thereafter. It is becoming clear that such statements are not a bluff, they are for the benefit of Lebanon's international image, but it is not yet at all obvious how this process can be set in motion without clashes within the country. The requisition of weapons from Hezbollah will mean a radical change in the ontological foundations of the group's existence. Strictly speaking, it will no longer be Hezbollah, but something else. The last defining aspect, certainly related to everything outlined earlier, is Israel's behavior. Its escalation will catalyze two mutually directed processes - the government will increasingly put pressure on Hezbollah with the goal of pacifying it or even disarming it, while the group itself will be less and less willing to do so. At the same time, the scenario in which the Israelis manage to completely defeat Hezbollah seems as unrealistic as the idea that Israel will soon abandon its assertive (if not aggressive) policy of suppressing security threats. In this regard, the development of the situation in the Washington-Tehran-Tel Aviv triangle will, for obvious reasons, continue to be relevant for Lebanon and Hezbollah. It is still too early to see Hezbollah as a dying swan. At this stage, the organization stands at a crossroads, where the choice of path carries significant consequences. Only time will tell whether the new leadership can make the right decisions, rebuild the organization's structure, and improve its internal Lebanese relations. The current state of international politics, with its unexpected twists and sudden outcomes, suggests that Hezbollah should rather be viewed as a black swan.  1. The Executive Council is one of the five main bodies of Hezbollah, responsible for the non-military and non-political development of the group (education, social support, medical care, media support, etc.). 2. The Cedar Revolution is a series of popular protests after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, centered around the Syrian military presence in Lebanon (both condemning and supporting it). As a result of the protests, Syrian troops were withdrawn from the country after 30 years on Lebanese soil. 3. According to the Lebanese newspaper L’Orient-Le Jour, the Minister of Youth and Sports Nura Bayrakdaryan is an active member of the Armenian Dashnaktsutyun party, however, according to the prime minister’s inaugural statements, the cabinet does not have any ministers who are party members. 4. There are 24 ministers in the government, including the prime minister and deputy prime minister, respectively, the remaining 22 ministers are responsible for their respective areas. 5. The ministers stopped participating in the government's work and submitted their resignations, which, however, were not accepted by the prime minister. 6. The pro-Syrian (and/or pro-Iranian) parliamentary bloc that emerged as a result of the Cedar Revolution of 2005 was formed on the basis of three major political forces: Hezbollah, Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement, as well as their junior partners. 7. In November 2017, while serving as the prime minister of Lebanon, Saad Hariri was effectively detained in Saudi Arabia. He then went on television to announce his resignation and condemn Hezbollah and Iranian influence in the country. The situation was later resolved and the prime minister was released. 8. Jihad al-Binaa is an organization within Hezbollah that is involved in the construction of infrastructure and the construction (reconstruction) of buildings.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Political sociologists concur that no society exhibits complete homogeneity in its structure; however, the degree of internal variation differs significantly across societies. Subcultures—defined by linguistic, religious, tribal, sectarian, racial or national distinctions—can serve as points of leverage in managing interstate conflicts, with states potentially exploiting these divisions either positively or negatively. This fragmentation leads to a spectrum of loyalties, ranging from the immediate family unit to broader affiliations such as clan, tribe, nationality, or religion, encapsulating the essence of the Pyramidal Segmentary theory.[2] This issue arises when individuals or groups experience a dispute between loyalty to a higher affiliation and loyalty to a lower one. Such disputes provide an entry point for political exploitation by other states, especially since the theory suggests that, in cases of dispute, lower loyalties often take precedence over higher ones. The intensity of these disputes can escalate when they develop into full-blown conflicts. This dynamic is further elucidated by Elizabeth Colson’s theory of Conflicting Loyalties. Colson argues that there is a fundamental disagreement regarding the priorities of loyalty—whether lower loyalty or higher loyalty should take precedence. If higher loyalty prevails, subcultures will face significant pressure to conform to the demands of the higher loyalty. However, if lower loyalty prevails, societal unity is at risk of geographic and political fragmentation.[3] These dynamics are central to strategic planning by international actors, particularly in their engagement with minority issues and their potential utilization. This study aims to elucidate the potential resurgence of Israel’s historical projects in this domain, identifying indicators of such revival, and examining mechanisms to counteract these developments, as well as their implications for Palestinian rights. First: Arab Pyramidal Segmentary A comparison between the Arab region and other geopolitical areas reveals significant differences in the level and dimensions of Pyramidal Segmentary, as shown in the following table:[4] The table indicates that: 1. The Arab world exhibits a moderate level of ethnic diversity compared to other global regions. However, since 2014, it has experienced the highest levels of political instability.[6] This disparity suggests that ethnic diversity alone does not account for the region’s instability. Therefore, it is essential to examine additional factors contributing to this instability, while still acknowledging the role of minority groups. 2. If we examine the relationship between the level of democracy and ethnic diversity in Arab countries, we observe that the extent of ethnic diversity does not align with the degree of democratic governance. While the Arab region ranks lowest in terms of democracy, its ethnic diversity is not as pronounced as that of Africa. However, despite this, democracy in Africa surpasses that in the Arab region.[7] The above indicates that external powers recognize that instability and the absence of democracy provide an entry point to exploit the grievances of minorities in the Arab world, especially when ethnic diversity is combined with variables governing minority separatism. In a previous study, we found that the geographical variable is the most important factor in promoting the separatist tendency of any minority. This variable is represented in three dimensions:[8] 1. Minorities situated on the periphery of a state, such as the tribes of South Sudan and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, often find it easier to engage with neighboring regions and the international community. This peripheral location facilitates the arrival of international aid and foreign intervention. In contrast, minorities located in the heartland, like the Amazigh in the Maghreb countries, may experience different dynamics due to their central position within the state. 2. The concentration of a minority population in a specific geographical area, such as the Kurds in Syria or Iraq, can reinforce their sub-identity. Conversely, minorities like Christians in Egypt or Shiites in Saudi Arabia, who are dispersed across various regions, may experience a different dynamic. In these cases, the lack of a concentrated territory can lead to a more fragmented sense of identity. 3. The presence of significant economic resources in regions predominantly inhabited by minorities can lead to economic benefits being concentrated among a smaller segment of the population, rather than the majority. This concentration can foster separatist sentiments, as seen with oil in Iraqi Kurdistan and northern Syria, and petroleum in South Sudan prior to its secession. Second: The Historical Record of Israeli Infiltration into the Structure of Minorities in Arab Countries Israeli studies and reports document facts about Israel’s cooperation with Arab minorities, while official Israeli literature has promoted political projects aimed at integrating minorities into its broader penetration strategies. This is evident in the following examples: 1. An Israeli study indicates that, before the Camp David period, relations with Arab minorities and certain Arab countries were overseen by Israeli security agencies rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the fundamental hostility between Israel and the Arabs. Furthermore, some interactions with minorities required confidentiality, as was the case with the Kurds, the Maronites and certain groups in the Maghreb.[9] 2. A dissertation traces the development of contacts between the Jewish Agency and minorities, particularly the Kurds, in the early 1930s. It examines Israel’s efforts to instill the concept of “Greater Kurdistan” among Kurdish minorities, with an initial focus on Iraq. However, these attempts faced opposition from the countries with Kurdish minorities, namely Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The study then examines how the extent of Zionist penetration into Kurdish society was linked to the political regime’s stance toward Israel in the Middle Eastern country. Accordingly, Zionist plans emphasized that Kurds and Jews share a common enemy—the Arabs—framing cooperation between the two as necessary in confronting this shared adversary.[10] 3. At a later stage, the issue of the relationship with minorities in the Arab world evolved into declared projects, occupying the focus of research circles in Israel. This was evident in the work of Oded Yinon, who was responsible for the long-term planning division in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His central idea was to divide Arab countries based on sub-identity lines, even very narrow ones.[11] 4. The effort to perpetuate the sub-identities of minorities—sectarian, religious, ethnic, and others—by disseminating extensive literature on each group. The ultimate goal is to position the Jewish identity in the Middle East as an integral and consistent part of the region’s broader ethnic landscape.[12] In his book, Kamal Jumblatt discusses Israel’s relationship with certain sub-identities in Lebanon, including its provision of weapons, and highlights studies published by various institutions to reinforce subcultural identities. He references correspondence between former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and his ambassador in Rome, which outlines a strategy to fragment the region—Lebanon in particular—into sectarian states, thereby establishing Israel as the dominant power while aligning its political geography with the social composition of neighboring countries.[13] 5. In his October 2024 appointment speech, Israel’s current foreign minister, Gideon Sa‘ar, emphasized the need to re-establish relations with the Kurds, whom he viewed as being “victims of repression and hostility on the part of Iran and Turkey.” He highlighted that “they enjoy autonomy…in Syria it is de facto, and in Iraq it is also de jure, in the Iraqi constitution.” Sa‘ar also advocated for strengthening ties with the Druze in both Syria and Lebanon, presenting this strategy as a counterbalance to what he described as Iran’s use of minorities to further its regional policies.[14] He believes that “an alliance with the moderate Sunni Arab countries will ensure Israel’s security against the Iranian axis,” effectively aligning along sectarian lines.[15] He has advocated for the division of Syria into several states: a Sunni state in the center, a Druze one in the south, an Alawite state along the coast, and a Kurdish in the north.[16] Third: Utilizing the Variables Governing Israel’s Relationship with Minorities in the Arab World Israeli policy towards sub-identities in the Arab world is characterized by clear duplicity. On one hand, it aims to dismantle Palestinian refugee camps (RCs) in the Arab diaspora, particularly in neighboring Arab countries, as these RCs have been a key factor in strengthening Palestinian national identity, which Israel views negatively. Simultaneously, it seeks to assimilate Palestinian refugees into the societies of the diaspora. In October 2024, Israel took steps to disrupt the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in RCs in the occupied territories, intending to push these RCs toward social disintegration due to economic hardship. The Knesset passed two laws that ban all UNRWA activities and services in Israel, sever all ties between government employees and UNRWA and strips its staff of their legal immunities.[17] This position has been supported by the US since the first Trump presidency. A document titled Concept Paper, published and prepared by Israeli security agencies, outlines plans to integrate Palestinians into both Arab and Western societies.[18] This aligns with President Trump’s February 2025 proposal to relocate Gazans and resettle them in non-Palestinian communities.[19] On the other hand, Israel actively works to revive sub-identities within Arab society to encourage separatist movements and further geopolitical fragmentation. It is among the strongest supporters of separatist tendencies, as seen in its growing ties with South Sudan following its secession, its relationships with Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, and its engagement with certain Christian factions in Lebanon. This highlights the political exploitation of sub-identities to serve Israeli interests. This means that the Israeli strategy relies on contradictory approaches. On one hand, it aims to assimilate and integrate Palestinians into diaspora societies, while on the other, it seeks to revive the historical identities of subcultures in Arab countries to dismantle these nations. Furthermore, it strives to revive Jewish sub-identities in societies worldwide, encouraging disconnection from their original communities and migration to Israel based solely on religious identity. This is further evidenced by Netanyahu’s calls for Israel to be a “Jewish state.”[20] Fourth: Israeli Infiltration Mechanisms within Sub-Identities Israel’s strategy of infiltrating sub-identities within the Arab world is founded on several key principles: 1. Awareness of the Phenomenon of Arab Minorities: Scientific research on ethnicity, sectarianism, and other sub-identities is central to a broad network of research centers. One key institution in this field is the Shiloah Institute, which was founded in 1959 and was named after Reuven Shiloah, the first director of the Mossad and a specialist in Kurdish affairs. The institute was to be linked to the Hebrew University but was duly established to Tel Aviv University in 1965, where it became known as the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies. It includes departments focused on central Middle East regions, each headed by an expert assigned to a specific region.[21] Notably, current Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa‘ar was among those involved in this academic work. 2. Direct Communication with the Elites and Party Leaders of Some Minorities: A review of studies on this issue reveals that Israel has historically exploited the sensitivities between sub-identities to engage with their leaders, amplifying their fears and offering support to confront the “tyranny of the Arab majority.” Initially, covert and semi-public channels were the primary strategy for Israel. However, as the base of normalization expanded with several key Arab countries, these methods became less covert, with a focus on engaging with sub-identity elites in the countries neighboring Israel.[22] However, this does not mean Israel overlooked minority elites in other countries such as Sudan or Morocco. Many Israeli studies highlight rounds of secret talks with Sudanese leaders during the intense periods of Arab nationalist movements, which lasted from 1954 to 2019. These efforts ultimately paved the way for full normalization between the two parties, with the secession of South Sudan being one of the significant outcomes of Israel’s involvement in this regard.[23] 3. Exploiting Minority Grievances and Authoritarianism on Sub-Identities and Income Misdistribution: The Israeli focus is primarily on minorities where the geographical determinant encompasses three key dimensions: peripheral location, significant economic resources, and demographic concentration. This focus is most evident in relations with the Kurds and South Sudan, though the political exploitation of other minorities remains significant as well. The gaps in democracy and the unequal income distribution across groups or regions within Arab societies provide an easy loophole for exploitation. The Arab region, being the least democratic globally and one of the most unequal in terms of wealth distribution (according to the Gini Index), faces a situation that fosters political instability and promotes separatist tendencies. 4. Israel seeks to dismantle the social fabric of historic Palestine through the Pyramidal Segmentary theory, dividing Palestinian society into three groups: the Arabs of 1948, the inhabitants of what it calls “Judea and Samaria,” and the residents of Gaza Strip (GS). It then further fractures Palestinian identity within each group, classifying the Arabs of 1948 into Christians, Muslims, Druze and Bedouins (Negev).[24] In the West Bank (WB) and GS, it promotes local government administrations based on tribal and clan affiliations, fostering lower loyalties at the expense of the higher loyalty.[25] Furthermore, it has announced a Shin Bet plan to divide GS into small local districts, assigning their administration to tribal or clan leaders based on the size of each tribe or clan.[26] Despite tribal and clan leaders rejecting this Israeli concept, research in this direction continues intensively. Notably, discussions on this matter are not isolated from past precedents, such as Village Leagues in WB. In fact, research on this topic dates back more than a decade and a half before Operation al-Aqsa Flood.[27] This demonstrates that Israeli policy applies the Pyramidal Segmentary theory to serve political objectives rather than adhering to international norms and conventions. The table below highlights this contrast:   The table above reveals the following: 1. Israel encourages Jews abroad to maintain their sub-identity in anticipation of future immigration to Israel, while simultaneously weakening their broader national identity in favor of religious or ethnic affiliation. In contrast, it pushes the Palestinian diaspora countries toward policies of integration, assimilation and naturalization. 2. In Israel, the Jewish community is focused on promoting common values that define Jewish identity, striving to create unity by employing the Melting Pot approach to eliminate sub-identities (such as Ashkenazi/ Sephardic, white/ black, Russian, African, Arab, and others). At the same time, efforts are being made to revive sub-identities among Palestinians in WB, 1948 Palestinians, and those in GS, through distinctions such as tribe, clan, sect, religion, nationality (Arabs/ Druze), or place of residence (urban/ Bedouin/ peasants). 3. Efforts to strengthen the collective identity of Israeli society, rooted in the Jewish religion, are reflected in the growing influence of Jewish religious forces and their increasing political weight in decision-making. Meanwhile, there is a push to assign local authorities and administrations in Palestinian areas based on social divisions, such as village leagues, clans and tribes, etc. 4. Weakening the geographical determinant in its three dimensions, as discussed previously, aims to push the Palestinian individual to emigrate. Fifth: Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the above, any revival of sub-identities within Palestinian society contributes directly to Israel’s project of fragmenting the Palestinian social fabric, which underpins all forms of resistance. Whether the fragmentation occurs on regional, ethnic, sectarian, religious, tribal, or clan lines, it significantly serves Israel’s political strategy, which calls for: 1. Intensifying scientific studies and the content of Palestinian political discourse should focus on fostering general loyalty to Palestinian identity, rather than special or lower loyalty (such as organizational, tribal, regional, or religious), as outlined in the Pyramidal Segmentary theory. This responsibility falls on universities, research centers, Palestinian organizations, and civil society bodies. 2. Palestinian organizations should consider how to adapt Israeli political practices to target Israeli sub-identities. In a previous study, we highlighted the significant diversity of Israeli sub-identities, which could be leveraged to destabilize the Israeli social structure.[28] 3. There is a need to strengthen and institutionalize communication between Palestinian organizations and Palestinians in the Diaspora, encouraging the establishment of civil society organizations that aim to preserve Palestinian identity through educational tools and various social symbols. This approach mirrors the method employed by Israel with Jewish communities worldwide. 4. Supporting political trends in the Middle East, particularly those that eliminate binary narratives of sub-identities and counter trends that deepen fragmentation. The uniqueness of the Palestinian situation necessitates a stronger focus on the literature of national identity within Palestinian society, with loyalty to it serving as the foundation. This applies not only to Palestinians in historic Palestine but also to those in refugee camps in neighboring countries and the Palestinian diaspora abroad. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.[2] T.V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 74–76.[3] Gay Elizabeth Kang, “Conflicting Loyalties Theory: A Cross-Cultural Test,” Ethnology journal, vol. 15, no. 2, April 1976, pp. 203–207.[4] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran journal, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, pp. 67-68. (in Arabic)[5] Encyclopedia Britannica defines ethnicity as “the identification of a group based on a perceived cultural distinctiveness that makes the group into a ‘people.’ This distinctiveness is believed to be expressed in language, music, values, art, styles, literature, family life, religion, ritual, food, naming, public life, and material culture,” see ethnicity, site of Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnicity[6] Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World,” Sydney, June 2024, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf[7] Democracy Index 2023, Age of conflict, site of Economist Intelligent (EIU), https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy-Index-2023-Final-report.pdf[8] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, p. 61. (in Arabic)[9] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment journal, Institute for National Security Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023, pp. 142–145, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Inbari.pdfSee also the relationship with the Berber (Amazigh) in Morocco: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Morocco’s Berbers and Israel,” Middle East Quarterly journal, Middle East Forum (MEF), December 2011, pp. 82–84[10] Scott Abramson, “Early Zionist-Kurdish Contacts and the Pursuit of Cooperation: the Antecedents of an Alliance, 1931-1951” (PhD dissertation, University of California, 2019), pp. 14–25 and 29–41, https://escholarship.org/content/qt2ds1052b/qt2ds1052b_noSplash_b0b0087d30def88f05e48b5dc022997b.pdf?t=py0wm5[11] Israel Shahak, The Zionist Plan for the Middle East (Belmont: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1982), Special Document No.1, https://archive.org/details/the-zionist-plan-for-the-middle-east-by-oded-yinon-israel-shahak-yinon-oded-shah[12] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd edition (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2002), pp.13–23.[13] Kamal Jumblatt, Hazihi Wasiyyati (This is My Will), 1st edition (Paris: Arab World Institute, 1978), pp.76–77.[14] Newly-Appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar: We Still Aim For Peace With The Arab World; We Must Seek Out Natural Alliances With Minorities In The Region, Such As The Kurds, Druze, site of The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 10/11/2024, https://www.memri.org/tv/israeli-fm-gideon-saar-appointment-speech-natural-alliances-minorities-region[15] Sam Sokol, Sa’ar says Israel should seek alliances with Kurds and Druze in the region, site of The Times of Israel, 27/10/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/saar-says-israel-should-seek-alliances-with-kurds-and-druze-in-the-region/[16] Gideon Sa‘ar and Gabi Siboni, “Farewell to Syria,” INSS Insight, no. 754, site of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 13/10/2015, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/farewell-to-syria/[17] Joseph Krauss, Julia Frankel and Melanie Lidman, Israel approves two bills that could halt UNRWA’s aid delivery to Gaza. What does that mean?, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/10/2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-un-aid-refugees-16bc0524adc947b95abe25d7d9eca038[18] Amy Teibel, AP and TOI Staff, Intelligence Ministry ‘concept paper’ proposes transferring Gazans to Egypt’s Sinai, The Times of Israel, 31/10/2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/intelligence-ministry-concept-paper-proposes-transferring-gazans-to-egypts-sinai/[19] What is Trump’s Proposal for Gaza?, site of American Jewish Committee (AJC), 12/2/2025, https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-trumps-proposal-for-gaza[20] To examine the issue of Jewish minorities worldwide and Israel’s approach, with particular emphasis on the dichotomy between Judaism and nationalism—specifically, the distinction between ethnicity and religious affiliation. See William Safran, “Israel and the Diaspora, Problems of Cognitive Dissonance,” International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Paper, no. 53, April 2012, pp.4–6 and 13–16.[21] Reuven Shiloah (Saslani), site of Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/shiloa-x1e25-zaslani-reuben; and Haggai Eshed, The Man Behind the Mossad, translated by David & Leah Zinder (Abingdon: Frank Cass & Co, 1997), pp. 33–34.[22] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023.[23] For details on the depth of penetration of elites and minorities in Sudan, see Elie Podeh and Andrew Felsenthal, “Israel and Sudan: The Origins of Clandestine Relations 1954–1964,” Israel Studies journal, vol. 28, no. 2, June 2023, passim.[24] On these issues, see Kay Zare, “Permanent Transitions: Collective Identity Formation in Israel, Jordan, and Palestine,” site of American University, 2010, https://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/permanent-transitions-2.pdf; and Mia Heapy, Complex Identity Politics In Israel/Palestine, site of The Organization for World Peace (OWP), 10/6/2021, https://theowp.org/reports/complex-identity-politics-in-israel-palestine[25] Hisham Motkal Abu-Rayya and Maram Hussien Abu-Rayya, “Acculturation, religious identity, and psychological well-being among Palestinians in Israel,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Elsevier, vol. 33, no. 4, July 2009, pp. 325–331, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S014717670900056X[26] Nagham Mohanna, Gaza tribes helping Israel to administer territory would be recipe for chaos, experts say, site of The National, 14/3/2024, https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/palestine-israel/2024/03/14/gaza-tribes-helping-israel-to-administer-territory-would-be-recipe-for-chaos-experts-say/; and Yaniv Voller, The Inevitable Role of Clans in Post-Conflict Stabilization in Gaza, site of War on the Rocks, 24/5/2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/the-inevitable-role-of-clans-in-post-conflict-stabilization-in-gaza/[27] Extensive discussions among Israeli elites address this topic, and a review of these papers and their referenced sources should be sufficient to illustrate Israel’s interest in this concept. See Dror Ze’evi, “Clans and Militias in Palestinian Politics,” Middle East Brief series, no. 26, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, February 2008, pp. 3–6.[28] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Correlation Between Social Deviance and Political Violence in Settler Colonial Societies: Israel as a Model, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 10/12/2020, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2020/12/10/academic-paper-the-correlation-between-social-deviance-and-political-violence-in-settler-colonial-societies-israel-as-a-model/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On 8 December 2024, the streets of Damascus erupted in a mix of jubilation and uncertainty as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist militia with roots as an al-Qaeda offshoot, toppled Bashar al-Assad’s regime after a stunning 11-day offensive. Overnight, Syria’s transitional government, led by HTS commander Ahmed al-Sharaa, emerged from the ashes of a decades-long dictatorship. Within days, Turkey reopened its embassy, Saudi Arabia offered a diplomatic relationship, and the U.S. lifted al-Sharaa’s $10 million bounty after a meeting. By December 2024, Qatar and France recognized this authority, while Russia, Britain, and Iraq showed openness. Yet, this swift acceptance of an unelected, terrorist-rooted regime—akin to the Taliban’s 2021 takeover— undermines established norms. It sidelines democracy, excuses HTS’s violent past, and frays a rules-based order as states favor strategy over law. The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 and HTS’s rapid rise in Syria highlight a troubling trend: military control trumps democratic legitimacy and accountability. This pattern, driven by inconsistent global recognition standards, risks emboldening extremist factions—such as the Islamic State in Iraq, Al Qaeda in Yemen, and Lebanon’s Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Fatah al-Islam, Hurras al-Din, and Jund al-Sham—to pursue similar strategies, further destabilizing a region already scarred by sectarian conflict. The rise of HTS has shown that states prioritize strategic interests over legal values. Turkey, a long-time supporter of the Syrian opposition, acted swiftly: on December 12, 2024, intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin visited Damascus, pledging support for stabilization efforts. Two days later, its embassy reopened, affirming prior ties. Saudi Arabia, countering Iran, followed: on January 24, 2025, Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan met al-Sharaa in Damascus; a week later, on February 2, al-Sharaa’s Riyadh visit—his first as leader—sealed a diplomatic win. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s warm welcome signaled Arab recognition. Qatar recognized the transitional government and dispatched a delegation to Damascus on December 12. France endorsed HTS through envoy Jean-François Guillaume’s mid-December talks. The U.S. opted for de facto engagement, lifting al-Sharaa’s bounty after a December meeting. On February 12, Russia’s Vladimir Putin held a constructive call with al-Sharaa, moving to delist HTS as a terrorist group. Iraq invited al-Sharaa to a May 2025 Arab Summit, and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi welcomed him to a March 4 Cairo summit, where he met Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and urged Israel’s withdrawal from southern Syria. The UN’s Geir Pedersen, meeting al-Sharaa in December, pushed for inclusivity under Resolution 2254. The Taliban’s slower path to acceptance contrasts sharply. Since seizing Afghanistan in 2021, it has ruled without elections or a constitution, lacking de jure recognition by February 2025 despite ties with China, Russia, and Pakistan. Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey keep pragmatic links, while Saudi Arabia reopened its Kabul embassy in December 2024. The U.S., via Qatar and UN channels, prioritizes humanitarian needs over legitimacy. Its exclusionary rule—banning women’s education, sidelining minorities—defies norms, hindering broader acceptance. HTS has gained quicker goodwill. Al-Sharaa’s inclusivity pledges, invitations to ex-Ba’athists like Farouk al-Sharaa, and prisoner releases suggest moderation. Unlike the Taliban’s gender apartheid, HTS avoids barring women from public life—though its stance is untested. Assad’s fall, marked by war crimes, casts HTS as a liberator. Yet, the world overlooks HTS’s dark past, swapping Assad’s autocracy for an unproven group. The vulnerability of parts of Asia and the Middle East to terrorist groups seizing power raises concerns that this could become a repeatable strategy. The constitutive theory, tying legitimacy to recognition, falters as HTS gains de facto and formal backing. If brute force proves sufficient for recognition, groups like ISKP in Afghanistan or AQAP in Yemen may seek to replicate this model. Hurras al-Din in Idlib, Jaish al-Adl on Iran’s border, or the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan could exploit vacuums. Syria risks losing oil fields to ISIS; Iraq’s fault lines invite resurgence; Yemen aids AQAP; Lebanon tempts jihadists; and Iran faces border threats. In Yemen, where Houthis battle a crumbling south, AQAP could seize on HTS’s success, potentially making Aden a jihadist hub. Lebanon, reeling from Hezbollah’s 2023-24 clash with Israel and economic collapse, invites Sunni extremists to exploit rifts—Arsal, a militant border town, could be next. Iraq’s rural areas, stalked by ISIS cells, risk resurgence if Baghdad weakens. These nations, scarred by proxy wars and failed governance, face greater threats as HTS’s model hints territorial conquest can win tolerance, if not legitimacy. The recognition of Syria’s HTS-led government could galvanize terrorist groups within, sparking crises as they emulate territorial takeover for acceptance. The unrest in Jaramana, a Damascus suburb, shows this: Syria sent forces after a militia linked to Assad’s regime killed an officer at a checkpoint, defying surrender. Lieutenant Colonel Hussam al-Tahan told SANA it targets illegal groups, but the clash—amid Israel’s Druze defense claim—reveals how militias, emboldened by HTS, could exploit weak authority. Hurras al-Din and Islamic State might seize territory, worsening chaos post-Assad.  This danger has erupted in Syria’s Alawite coastal strongholds, where security forces clashed with pro-Assad gunmen in Latakia and Tartous in early March 2025, leaving over 130 dead, per the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of HTS has fueled such unrest, inviting rival factions to seize territory and seek similar recognition. Israel, claiming to protect minorities, and Iran, potentially backing the Alawites, exploit this chaos—pushing Syria toward partition and creating a fractured state where power supersedes law. For global powers, HTS’s recognition poses a strategic quandary. Iran lost Assad—a major blow in the region. The U.S. and allies, vocal on democracy, weigh their anti-Iran stance against an unelected jihadist regime. This gain could falter if HTS turns radical or if Russia and China exploit the playbook, making the Middle East a proxy chessboard. The strategy—“take territory, wait for acceptance”—worked for the Taliban’s 20-year efforts and HTS’s rapid strike. Without stringent conditions, states risk legitimizing power without elections. Al-Sharaa’s claim on December 30 that elections might take four years met no pushback from the U.S. or Europe—a silence signaling stability over democracy, but at what cost? This precedent erodes core values of international relations, including democracy, accountability, and human rights. HTS’s unelected rule, like the Taliban’s, skirts these norms. De facto engagement—embassies, trade, talks—grants resources without treaty adherence. Their past atrocities—HTS’s civilian attacks, the Taliban’s Al Qaeda ties—go unaddressed, their intentions untested by enforceable promises. Trade with third parties, like China’s mineral deals in Afghanistan or Turkey’s ventures in Syria, risks fueling corruption—Afghanistan’s opium trade now accounts for 90% of the world’s heroin supply, thriving in a governance vacuum. The rush to recognize HTS reflects a realist scramble: Turkey secures its border, Saudi Arabia counters Iran, the U.S. and Israel weaken Tehran’s proxies—without troops. This low-cost, high-impact model could tempt wider use. States might back ISIS in Iraq or AQAP in Yemen to reshape the region. Turkey’s HTS success hinges on moderation; elsewhere, it risks chaos. The lack of a global standard—each state acting independently—undermines international law’s predictability. UN guidelines tying recognition to elections could align legitimacy without rigidity. For now, HTS fills Assad’s vacuum, but at a cost: A Middle East where terrorists become politicians, eroding democracy in a fragile region. Stability today risks a wildfire tomorrow—unless this game is rethought.