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Chileans have elected the most right-wing presidential candidate since the end of the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship over three and a half decades ago. In a runoff held on Dec. 14, 2025, José Antonio Kast, a Republican Party ex-congressman and two-time former presidential candidate, won just over 58% of the vote, while his opponent, Jeannette Jara, the left-wing labor minister of current President Gabriel Boric, won nearly 42%. Approximately 15.6 million Chileans were eligible to vote in the first presidential election to take place with mandatory voting and automatic voter registration. As a result of those new election rules, which went into place in 2022, an estimated 5 million to 6 million new voters went to the polls. These voters – found to be largely younger, male and lower-middle class – are seen as lacking a strong ideological identity and rejecting politics altogether. The verdict delivered by Chile’s voters puts it in line with a broader right-wing regional shift – most recently in Bolivia – that has reversed the “pink tide” of left-leaning governments in the past two decades. But as a historian of modern Latin America and Chile, I believe Chile’s election also reflects the important local context of years of increasing disenchantment with the political system. Amid Chile’s expanded electorate, the primary issues of voter concern during this campaign were crime and immigration. An October 2025 poll specifically found delinquency to be the top issue, with immigration, unemployment and health care also marking high. Though Chile has one of the lowest crime rates in Latin America, high-profile cases of organized crime have shaken the nation in recent years. Homicides increased between 2018 and 2022 and have decreased slightly since then. Immigration has also risen significantly, with a large number of immigrants coming to Chile having fled economic and political crises in Venezuela, as well as in Peru, Haiti, Colombia and Bolivia. The foreign-born population in Chile rose from 4.4% in 2017 to 8.8% in 2024. The key constitutional context Many commentators have highlighted the stark polarization of this election, with a Communist Party labor minister campaigning against the arch-conservative Kast, who has lauded the Pinochet dictatorship under which his deceased older brother once served. But there is more to the story. Some observers have drawn comparisons between Kast and other far-right Latin American leaders like Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Javier Milei in Argentina and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. But Chile is not merely following the same far-right playbook of its neighbors. In the weeks leading up to the runoff in Chile, both candidates moved toward the center. Jara vowed to expand the prison system to combat rising crime, while Kast – who had previously threatened expulsion of undocumented migrants – softened his tone to say they would be “invited” to leave. Moreover, Kast learned from his previous failed attempts at the presidency by speaking less about his controversial or more socially conservative positions. For example, he played down opposition to abortion under any circumstances. Chilean voters, in contrast, overwhelmingly approve of the limited abortion rights that were passed by Congress in 2017. Yet beyond the campaign trail messaging, the results also reflect a structural fact of Chilean politics that mirror political realities of other parts of Latin America, and even globally. In every presidential election since 2006, Chileans have voted out the incumbency to swing to the opposing side of the political spectrum. With candidates barred from consecutive presidential terms, the pendulum has swung back and forth since the alternating presidencies of socialist Michelle Bachelet – 2006-2010 and 2014-2018 — and conservative Sebastián Piñera – 2010-2014 and 2018-2022. Boric, a former left-wing student leader, took office in 2022 following a wave of upheaval and popular protests over inequality in 2019-2020. In what was a historic moment, the country voted to begin a process of rewriting its Pinochet-era constitution, which entrenched neoliberal economic policies and limited the government’s capacity to confront inequality. The constitutional convention was made up of directly elected citizens, many of them from grassroots movements. Yet in a stunning reversal, the progressive constitution – which would have protected rights to nature, Indigenous rights and social rights – was roundly defeated in a plebiscite in 2022. Just over a year later, voters similarly rejected a second attempt to rewrite the constitution, albeit under a process that conservative parties helped shape. Boric’s approval ratings, already low, suffered from this failed constitutional process. More than the right-wing elections elsewhere in the region, this national context helps to explain Chile’s own conservative turn. The ever-present discontent of voters Even as the pendulum has swung back and forth in recent Chilean presidential elections, there are deeper continuities across the different Chilean governments in the 21st century. Important among them is generalized voter discontent with the political system. This has traditionally been expressed in popular protests, such as the student movements of 2006 and 2011 and the ‘Estallido Social’– or Social Uprising – of 2019-2020 that were the largest protests since the return to democracy in 1990 and helped propel Boric to power. Public discontent was also expressed in the overwhelming vote to rewrite the constitution, which passed with 78% of the vote in 2020. Even though the constitutional process was ultimately rejected by voters, this underlying discontent has not gone away. One of the recent signs of discontent with the political choices on offer was in the first round of voting on Nov. 16: The third-place candidate was not one of the veteran politicians on the right, but Franco Parisi, a populist economist who has not set foot in Chile in years and who called on his supporters to intentionally vote null – or “spoil” their votes. Discontent has taken many forms – outrage about inequality and neoliberalism in 2019-2020, or unease about economic precarity and crime in the current election. But it has persisted, even as Chile’s political system remains stable. Some observers have pointed out that, unlike in many places around the world, Chile’s democratic norms are holding strong. The fact that power continues to pass peacefully despite major ideological differences is significant, particularly in light of the long struggle for democracy during the Pinochet regime. Kast’s style, for what it’s worth, is not as bombastic as that of U.S. President Donald Trump or Argentina’s Milei. Still, his apparent politeness belies what many fear is a coming erosion of rights: the rights of women to bodily autonomy; the rights of individuals to due process; the rights of workers to dignified conditions. These may well be up for negotiation under the new administration. Kast, a staunch Catholic and father of nine, is opposed to abortion under any circumstances and has even attempted to ban the morning-after pill. He was a supporter of Pinochet up until the regime’s end, campaigning for the “yes” vote in 1988 that would have seen eight more years for the authoritarian leader after 15 years already in power. Kast has likewise vowed to slash public spending and deregulate the economy, a clear echo of the Pinochet years. Despite the momentous shift heralded by Kast’s election, though, it is unlikely to change one of the principal challenges of Chile’s democracy in the 21st century: voter discontent and disenchantment. There has been a consistent trend for the government in power to lose popular support and face strong headwinds in Congress from the opposition. For all the celebration happening right now for Kast and his supporters, it is hard to see that changing once the new government takes office in March 2026.

In the 21st century, the maritime security environment in Northeast Asia is changing more rapidly than ever, with information superiority and covert operational capabilities at sea emerging as core components of national security. At the heart of this shift lies the submarine force, which possesses both strategic deterrence and surveillance/reconnaissance capabilities. As China, Japan, and North Korea advance their submarine technology, South Korea finds itself in a situation demanding independent maritime strategic assets to counter these developments. The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) submarine force, which initially relied on foreign technology, has now grown into a submarine technology powerhouse capable of indigenous design and construction. The introduction of the KSS-III Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarine, in particular, has equipped South Korea with SLBM operational capability and advanced AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion) and electric propulsion technology, establishing a strategic-level submarine force. This technological advancement not only strengthens national defense but also elevates the international status of the Korean defense industry, leading to enhanced export competitiveness. Concurrently, amidst the military expansion of surrounding countries, the need for nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs)—which offer far greater strategic survivability and sustained operational capability—is being raised in South Korea. Despite the high cost, the SSN is a strategic asset that provides overwhelming stealth, range, and operational endurance in the long run. This article will comprehensively examine the importance and technical characteristics of submarines, followed by an analysis of South Korea's submarine force development, its international standing, and comparisons with neighboring countries. Furthermore, it will explore the implications of the nuclear submarine acquisition debate for South Korea's future security strategy. 1. The Importance of Submarines The submarine is an extremely important weapon system in the defense industry from strategic, technological, and economic perspectives. 1) Strategic Deterrence and Control: Submarines act as a strategic deterrent to covertly check the enemy's maritime activities and protect a nation's sea lines of communication and security. The strategic deterrence of a submarine is based on its 'stealth' and 'lethality'. - Stealth (Psychological Pressure): A submarine can move and be deployed secretly underwater without being exposed to the enemy, placing psychological pressure on the enemy's maritime operations and strategic weapon deployment during peacetime. Because it is extremely difficult for an attacking enemy to predict or neutralize the submarine's location, the enemy always harbors the fear of a potential strike. - Lethality (Retaliatory Capability): If the enemy attempts an actual invasion or provocation, the submarine can conduct a sudden and precise strike with high-power weapons like torpedoes or missiles. Specifically, a Strategic Nuclear Submarine (SSBN), equipped with strategic weapons like the SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile), provides a 'second-strike capability' to retaliate against the opponent's core targets at any time. - Maximizing Deterrence: The mere existence of strategic submarines maximizes the 'psychological deterrent effect', making the enemy's political and military leaders hesitate to initiate an attack. Due to the nature of submarines being covertly deployed anywhere in the ocean, the enemy is constantly exposed to threats, making it difficult to attempt military provocations recklessly. In essence, the core principle of strategic deterrence is the creation of a 'deterrence effect through uncertainty', combining the submarine's covert and unpredictable operational methods, its powerful striking capabilities, and the psychological fear it instills. 2) Enhancing National Defense and Economic Effects: The development of advanced submarines is central to a nation's naval power. It enhances defense self-reliance by securing indigenous design and construction technologies and promises enormous economic benefits through overseas exports. - Asymmetric Warfare Power: With its stealth and lethality, the submarine wields the most potent deterrent force and asymmetric warfare effect among all maritime forces. When surface fleet power is relatively insufficient, an advanced submarine can effectively check large enemy vessels or aircraft carriers and deny access to maritime domains. - Advanced Mission Capabilities: Advanced submarines are deployed for various missions, including long-duration submerged operations, strategic surprise, and special warfare support, utilizing cutting-edge technologies like next-generation guided missiles and sophisticated sonar/navigation systems that make detection and tracking difficult. - Increased Defense Industry Competitiveness: When advanced submarines are developed and operated with indigenous technology, it not only boosts the nation's defense industry capacity and technological self-reliance but also significantly increases related industry development and economic effects. In short, the advanced submarine is the qualitative and strategic linchpin of national naval power, encompassing defense, offense, intelligence deterrence, and the securing of cutting-edge technology. 3) Driving Advancement in Overall Defense Technology: The development of highly sophisticated weapon systems (e.g., SLBMs, advanced sonar, low-noise technology, etc.) also promotes the advancement of overall cutting-edge defense technologies. - SLBM Development: Developing SLBMs is not just missile technology; it complexly requires materials engineering to withstand the extreme pressure of the underwater launch environment, precise guidance systems, and miniaturized propulsion technology. The technology secured during this process naturally transfers to other fields, such as space launch vehicles and precision strike weapons. - Advanced Sonar Technology: The process of increasing the precision of underwater acoustic detection advances capabilities in signal processing, AI-based pattern recognition, and big data analysis. Such technology can also be utilized in civilian sectors, including marine resource exploration, underwater communication, and seismic detection systems. - Low-Noise Technology Development: The ripple effect of low-noise technology development is even greater. Vibration reduction in propulsion systems, special hull coatings, and hydrodynamic optimal design enhance the competitiveness of the shipbuilding industry as a whole. Propeller noise reduction technology, in particular, contributes to improving the fuel efficiency of commercial vessels and protecting the marine ecosystem. Furthermore, the process of developing these advanced technologies fosters high-level research personnel, strengthens industry-academia-research cooperation networks, and promotes the domestic production of materials, components, and equipment. Consequently, the single weapon system of a submarine has the effect of elevating the nation's overall scientific and technological capabilities to the next level. 4) High Competitiveness and International Credibility: The limited number of nations capable of manufacturing submarines ensures high competitiveness and international credibility in the global defense market. Currently, only about 12 countries are capable of independently designing and building submarines: the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K., France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Spain, India, Japan, and South Korea. This technical rarity offers several strategic advantages. - Favorable Negotiation Power: Due to the high barrier to entry, a limited supplier market is formed, securing favorable negotiation power during exports. - Proof of Overall Defense Technology: Submarine construction capability serves as proof of comprehensive defense technology, raising the credibility of other weapon systems. South Korea, in particular, has demonstrated strengths in technology transfer and localization by successfully achieving domestic production after introducing German technology. This establishes South Korea as an attractive partner for middle-power countries that desire advanced submarines but find self-development difficult. The interest shown by nations like Indonesia and the Philippines in South Korean submarines is within this context. - Sustainable Economic Effects and Strategic Ties: Submarine projects lead to long-term follow-up businesses, including maintenance, upgrades, and crew training, ensuring sustained economic effects and strengthening strategic ties between nations. As such, the submarine is considered a core capability of the defense industry in terms of national security, industrial competitiveness, technological innovation, and economic benefits. 2. Technical Characteristics of Submarines The technical characteristics of submarines can be broadly divided into three key domains: stealth and survivability, propulsion and power systems, and weapons and combat systems. 2.1. Stealth & Survivability This is the technology area most directly tied to the fundamental purpose of submarines. In underwater environments, radar (radio-wave detection) cannot be used, so detection relies on sonar (sound-wave detection). While radar can detect surface targets from up to 500 km, sonar detection of a quiet, stealthy submarine is typically limited to around 30 km. - Acoustic Quieting Technology is essential for avoiding enemy sonar detection. Submarine noise reduction involves suppressing mechanical noise (machinery vibration), flow noise, structural vibration, and propeller noise through an integrated set of technologies. This is not just a matter of equipment but a comprehensive quieting process that spans the entire lifecycle of a submarine—from design and manufacturing to operation and maintenance. - Non-Acoustic Stealth Technology minimizes physical signatures other than sound—such as magnetic fields, heat/infrared emissions, radar/optical reflections, and surface disturbances—to prevent detection by non-acoustic sensors. Figure 1. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) sonar system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.2. Propulsion & Power System This system is key to determining a submarine's range and submerged operational endurance. It is broadly divided into conventional (non-nuclear) and nuclear propulsion. 1) Conventional Submarines (Diesel-Electric) - Diesel-Electric System: This is the traditional method where a diesel engine powers a generator to charge batteries, and an electric motor provides propulsion. It is favored for its cost-effectiveness and quietness, making it the standard for small and medium-sized submarines. However, because the diesel engine requires oxygen from the atmosphere, the submarine must periodically surface or use a snorkel, which severely limits continuous submerged endurance (to a maximum of about 3 days). Submarines equipped with the latest Lithium-ion batteries can extend this submerged time up to 7 days. - Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP): An innovative technology that produces power underwater without relying on an external oxygen supply. The main types include the Fuel Cell (PEMFC), Stirling Engine, and Closed-Cycle Diesel. AIP is used in conjunction with the diesel-electric system and significantly extends submerged endurance, often up to 3 weeks. Because it is cheaper than nuclear power while offering high strategic value, many nations have adopted it. - Hybrid Propulsion System (Cutting-Edge Technology): The integrated operation of three systems—the diesel generator, Fuel Cell AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion), and Lithium-ion batteries—allows for continuous submerged operation for up to 4 weeks. South Korea's Dosan Ahn Changho-class (KSS-III) utilizes the integrated operation of these three systems: a diesel generator, Fuel Cell AIP, and Lithium-ion batteries. Excluding nuclear power, the current cutting-edge technology is considered to be the Fuel Cell AIP + Lithium-ion battery hybrid system. Each propulsion system is selected based on operational range, mission sustainability, cost-effectiveness, and technological sophistication. South Korea is actively pursuing the development of next-generation submarines that combine both AIP and Lithium-ion battery technologies. However, the maximum continuous submerged endurance (up to 4 weeks) is only achievable when operating at low speeds (5–10 knots, or approx. 9–18 km/h). When operating at maximum speed (around 20 knots, or approx. 37 km/h), the battery consumption is extremely high, causing the submerged time to sharply decrease: - Older Submarines: Can sustain maximum speed for only 1–2 hours. - Li-ion/AIP Submarines: Can sustain maximum speed for 3–6 hours. After high-speed maneuvering, the submarine requires snorkeling for recharging, which significantly increases the risk of detection by the enemy. Figure 2. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) lithium battery system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) Figure 3. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) fuel cell AIP system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2) Nuclear-Powered Submarines (SSN/SSBN) Nuclear-powered submarines use nuclear fission reactors to generate steam, which drives turbines and provides virtually unlimited propulsion. Because they do not require refueling for months, their submerged endurance and operational range are effectively unlimited, enabling them to operate anywhere in the world. Only a small group of states—including the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and India—possess such submarines. Nuclear propulsion is used in both strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN: nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads) and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN: fast attack submarines powered by nuclear reactors). However, nuclear submarines are extremely expensive to build and operate, require large hull sizes (especially SSBNs), and demand sophisticated reactor noise-management technologies. Compared to conventional submarines, nuclear submarines can operate at much higher sustained speeds for long periods. Their average top speed is typically 25–30 knots (46–55 km/h), while specialized Soviet/Russian designs such as the Alfa-class have demonstrated speeds exceeding 40 knots in trials. This makes nuclear submarines more than twice as fast as most conventional submarines, with the added advantage of being able to maintain high speeds for extended durations without limitations. 2.3. Weaponry & Combat Systems This category encompasses the submarine’s offensive capabilities and intelligence-gathering functions. Submarine weapons and combat platforms can be divided into four major types: 2.3.1. Launch Weapons Launch weapons are categorized as follows: - Torpedoes: Underwater weapons fired from a submarine’s horizontal launch tubes, used to attack underwater targets such as other submarines, surface ships, and mines. - Missiles: This includes anti-ship missiles (ASM) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) designed to strike surface or land targets. Some missiles are launched through Vertical Launch Systems (VLS). - Nuclear Weapons: The primary example is the SLBM (Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile), equipped with a nuclear warhead. These form the core of a nation’s strategic nuclear deterrence capability. Table 1. Types of Launch Weapons Table 2. Ballistic/Guided Missiles Table 3. Submarine-Launched Weapon Systems Figure 4. Weapon systems of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class (Jangbogo-III): Torpedoes/Mines (Horizontal Launch) and Missiles (Vertical Launch) (Source: Hanwha Ocean) Figure 5. Vertical Launch System of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class (Jangbogo-III) (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.3.2. Underwater Drones / Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV/AUV) Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) are unmanned underwater platforms deployed from submarines. They can perform missions such as intelligence collection, reconnaissance, mine detection, and even underwater attacks. In the latest technology trends, AUVs serve as important auxiliary assets for submarines, used for tasks such as detecting specific targets, locating and neutralizing naval mines, and tracking enemy submarines. Figure 6. Combat Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.3.3. Electronic Warfare Systems A submarine’s electronic warfare (EW) systems defend against enemy detection through electronic surveillance countermeasures. By transmitting deceptive or disruptive signals, these systems help conceal the submarine’s presence and significantly enhance survivability. Capabilities such as electronic deception, electronic jamming, and counter sonar/radar measures enable the submarine to evade enemy tracking and maintain strategic advantage. In addition, electronic attack (EA) capabilities can inflict direct damage on enemy military assets by disrupting or degrading their electronic systems. 2.3.4. Naval Mines Naval mines are explosive devices used by submarines to block enemy sea routes or hinder the approach of surface vessels. Submarines can deploy underwater mines or launch them from dedicated systems, allowing them to disrupt maritime traffic and defend against the movement of hostile fleets through area denial tactics. 3. Economic Impact of Submarine Strategy Submarine capabilities are not only crucial for military security but also represent a high-value industry that generates substantial direct and indirect economic effects for the nation. 3.1. Direct Industrial Impact (Manufacturing and Employment) Submarine construction is a highly technology-intensive, large-scale project, creating significant economic effects for the shipbuilding and defense industries: • Development of high-value shipbuilding: Submarines require extremely high precision and complex construction within much tighter spaces than commercial ships. The construction process itself represents the pinnacle of shipbuilding technology, directly enhancing the competitiveness and qualitative growth of the shipbuilding industry. • Job creation: Building a single submarine involves thousands of workers over several years, from design and component production to final assembly and sea trials, creating a large number of highly skilled technical jobs. • Activation of component and partner industries: Submarines consist of numerous precision components (sonar systems, propulsion units, special alloys, batteries, etc.), which stimulates supply chains largely composed of small and medium-sized defense companies and elevates technological capabilities across the sector. 3.2. Indirect Economic Impact (Security and Exports) The existence of a submarine fleet generates invisible economic benefits and opportunities: • Reduction of national security costs: Submarines are one of the most effective tools of asymmetric deterrence — a military strategy where a country at a disadvantage in conventional forces or numbers neutralizes an adversary’s attack intentions and deters war through unique and unpredictable means. Maintaining submarine capabilities helps prevent potential economic damages in crises (trade disruptions, destruction of industrial facilities) and raises the cost of potential aggression, effectively reducing national security expenditures. • Protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs): As a highly trade-dependent nation, Korea relies critically on maritime routes. Submarines deter hostile naval forces threatening these routes during crises and protect major trade arteries, ensuring the continuity of economic activity. • Opportunities for defense exports (K-Defense): o Demonstrating Korea’s ability to independently design, build, and operate submarines (Dosan Ahn Changho-class / Jangbogo-III KSS-III) establishes technological credibility in global markets. o This capability generates high-value defense export opportunities, not only for the submarines themselves but also for related components, maintenance, and training systems (Korea has already exported submarines to Southeast Asia). In conclusion, submarine capabilities serve as a form of national security insurance while fostering domestic advanced technology industries and opening export markets, providing significant economic value as a future growth engine. 4. History of South Korea’s Submarine Forces Although the history of the Republic of Korea Navy’s submarines is relatively short, it has made significant leaps in both independent technological development and force enhancement. The following outlines the chronological development and progress of Korea’s submarine forces. Figure 7. Timeline of Submarine Acquisition and Operations of the Republic of Korea. Note: SSM: Submersible Ship Midget (small submarine), KSS: Korea Submarine System (the systematic development plan for the ROK Navy’s submarine force) 4.1. Early Stage (1975–1990): Direct Acquisition of Cosmos-class and Foundation of Submarine Forces Starting in 1975, the ROK Navy acquired seven small Italian-made Cosmos-class submarines (70-ton class) for intelligence missions and special operations, laying the foundation for Korea’s underwater capabilities. These submarines were primarily used for special operations, such as special forces infiltration, mine-laying, and intelligence gathering, rather than as conventional warships. Crew members of the Cosmos-class submarines later became key personnel in the development of the Dolphin-class indigenous submarines in the early 1980s. 4.2. Formative Stage (1983–1991): The Dolphin-class Small Submarine Era In the beginning in 1977, the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) started developing a submarine modeled after Italy’s Cosmos-class. Construction took place at Tacoma Korea’s Masan Shipyard, and a total of three submarines were commissioned starting in 1983. This marked Korea’s first domestically built submarines, and the experience gained became the foundation for developing South Korea’s own underwater weapons. Based on operational results from the first submarine delivered in 1984, the second and third units were designed and built, being commissioned in 1990 and 1991, with reinforced pressure hulls and improved armament: SSM-051 1985 commissioned, 2003 decommissioned, SSM-052 1990 commissioned, 2016 decommissioned, SSM-053 1991 commissioned, 2016 decommissioned. The experience with the Dolphin-class played a critical role in advancing domestic submarine construction technology, serving as the stepping stone for the introduction and deployment of medium- to large-sized submarines. TEXT Table 4. Specifications of the Dolphin-class Submarines (Source: Namuwiki) 4.3. Development Stage (1992–2006): Introduction and Localization of the Jangbogo-class (Jangbogo-I) In 1987, the ROK Navy signed a contract with the German company HDW for three Type 209 submarines (license for design acquisition), officially launching the Jangbogo-class (KSS-I) 1,200-ton program. Among these, one submarine was delivered as a complete unit from Germany in 1992, while the other two were assembled and constructed at Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering’s Okpo shipyard using imported German parts, delivered in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Subsequently, six additional submarines were built, bringing the total to nine in service by 2001. This program was not merely an import project; the core goal was to transfer German technology and secure domestic assembly and construction capabilities. It laid the foundation for Korea’s submarine technology independence and advanced development. Leveraging the experience gained from constructing the Jangbogo-class, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) signed a contract in 2011 to build three 1,400-ton submarines for Indonesia. Known as the DSME1400, these submarines are named the Nagapasa-class in the Indonesian Navy, marking Korea’s advancement in export capabilities. Table 5. Specifications of the Jangbogo-class Submarine (Source: Namuwiki). Note: A batch refers to a group of submarines of the same model built in series, with incremental performance improvements applied in each production run. Table 6. Development Stages of the Jangbogo-Class Submarine 4.4. Leap Period (2007–2020): Son Won-il Class (Jangbogo-II) and AIP Technology In 2000, the Republic of Korea Navy signed a contract with Germany’s HDW to acquire three Type-214 submarines under a design-license arrangement, launching a full-scale 1,800-ton Son Won-il–class program with Hyundai Heavy Industries. The first submarine, Son Won-il, was delivered in 2007, and an additional six submarines were subsequently built by Hyundai Heavy Industries and Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). The key feature of the Son Won-il class is its AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) system, which uses fuel cells to allow submerged operations for 2–3 weeks without surfacing. Construction was divided between Hanwha Ocean (formerly DSME) and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries. The vessels are named Son Won-il, Jeong Ji, An Jung-geun, Kim Dae-geon, Hong Beom-do, Yu Gwan-sun, Yun Bong-gil, Ahn Chang-ho, and Baekdusan. Table 7. Specifications of the Son Won-il Class Submarines (Source: Namuwiki) Table 8. Development Stages of the Son Won-il-Class Submarine   Over time, the armament and electronic systems have progressively advanced. Below is a simplified cross-sectional diagram of the HDW Type 214, which was used as a reference for the construction of the Son Won-il class submarines. The diagram helps to easily understand the complex internal structure by showing the main components. Here, the Fuel Cell Plant represents the AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) technology. Figure 8. Simplified cross-section of the Type 214 Submarine (Source: TKMS) Figure 9. Cross-section of the Son Won-il-class Submarine (Source: Defense Mirror) 4.5. Independent Period (2021–Present): Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class (Jangbogo-III) Indigenous Design Achievements of Complete Domestic Design In December 2012, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) signed a contract with Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) for the construction of two Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class submarines. The contract amount for the two submarines was approximately 1.675 trillion KRW (1.14 billion USD). The project was based on the construction experience of the Jangbogo-class and Son Won-il-class submarines, as well as the technology transferred from HDW and the experience in developing the DSME-1400 submarine (Nagapasa-class submarine) based on the Type 209 design. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho (launched in August 2021) is the first submarine fully designed, built, and equipped with its own weapon systems by South Korea. It has a displacement of 3,000 tons, making it a large submarine. It is the first in the world to be equipped with lithium-ion batteries, enabling long-term submerged operations without the need for an AIP system. Strategic Weapon Deployment Capability The most notable feature of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class is the vertical launch system (VLS) with 6 launchers (Batch-II will have 10 launchers), which allows the operation of the Hyunmoo-4-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). This capability is considered the most powerful strategic strike capability among non-nuclear nations. Currently, the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho, Kim Jong-seo, and Yun Bong-gil have been commissioned, with a total of 9 submarines planned: 3 from Batch-I, 3 from Batch-II, and 3 from Batch-III. Table 9. Specifications of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class Submarine (Source: Namuwiki)   The following is information on the improvement projects for Batch 2 and Batch 3. Table 10. Development Stages of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class Submarine   Over time, the missile payload and electronic systems continue to evolve. Below is a cross-sectional diagram of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class submarine, including a comparison of its size with the North Korean Romeo-class and the German Type 214 submarines. It also includes the proposed diagram by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (now Hanwha Ocean) for the BrahMos missile-equipped version, which was part of their bid for the Indian next-generation submarine construction project. Figure 10. Cross-sectional Diagram of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class Submarine (Source: Naval News) 4.6. Comparison of 3 Generations of ROK Submarines Table 11. Development Stages of South Korean Submarines 5. Exports and International Status The history of South Korean submarines follows a trajectory of introduction, indigenization, technological accumulation, advancement, and international expansion. In 2011, South Korea became the first Asian country to export submarines by selling three Jangbogo-class derivative Nagapasa-class submarines to Indonesia for 1.1 billion USD. Currently, South Korea owns 18 submarines, making it the 8th largest submarine-owning country in the world. When it comes to conventional (diesel-electric) submarines, South Korea is regarded as one of the top global powers, along with Germany and Japan. Current Submarine Power Rankings 1. United States (68 nuclear submarines) - Overwhelming leader 2. Russia (45 nuclear submarines + 20+ diesel submarines) 3. China (12 nuclear submarines + 50+ diesel submarines) 4. United Kingdom (11 nuclear submarines) - Entirely nuclear-powered submarines 5. France (10 nuclear submarines + diesel) 6. India (2 nuclear submarines + 15 diesel submarines) 7. Japan (22 diesel submarines) 8. South Korea (18 diesel submarines) 9. Germany (6 diesel submarines, export power) 10. Sweden (5 diesel submarines, technological powerhouse) Detailed Classification by Country A. Nuclear Submarine Exclusives B. Nuclear + Conventional Submarine C. Conventional Submarine   The following are the rankings of the leading countries in conventional submarine exports: 1. Germany - 100 years of tradition, top exporter 2. Japan - Highest technological capabilities 3. South Korea - Only country with VLS/SLBM capability 4. Sweden - Specializes in stealth technology 5. France - Combines nuclear and diesel capabilities The following compares the key features of export submarines from each country. Table 12. South Korean KSS-III Competitor Submarines Export Competitiveness Evaluation Top Exporting Countries 1. Germany - Type 209/214 series, more than 100 units exported 2. France - Scorpène, 16+ units (additional orders in progress) 3. South Korea - 3 units exported, actively competing in various tenders Latest Trends • Lithium-ion Batteries: South Korea (Jang Yeong-sil class), Japan (Taigei class), France (Scorpène Evolved) • VLS (Vertical Launch System): South Korea (SLBM), Sweden (Cruise Missiles) • Stealth Technology: Germany (Diamond hull), Sweden (Ghost), Japan (Low noise) Hanwha Ocean, the builder of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class KSS-III submarines, and the South Korean government are actively engaging with the following countries for submarine exports: • Canada: The Canadian Navy's Submarine Replacement Program (CSCP) is a major project worth up to 40 billion USD (with an acquisition cost of about 14 billion USD and operation and maintenance costs of around 27 billion USD). Canada plans to introduce 12 new submarines. The KSS-III, at 4,000 tons, is considered a strong candidate due to its suitability for Canada’s operational environment (including the Arctic). South Korean defense companies are offering technical cooperation and local construction options in an effort to secure the deal. • Poland: Poland is pursuing the Orka project to modernize its navy, aiming to acquire 3 new submarines project worth about 14 billion USD. The KSS-III is consistently mentioned as one of the main contenders by the Polish government. • Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries: The Philippines is focused on strengthening its naval power to counter China. Other Southeast Asian nations are also looking to enhance maritime security through submarine acquisitions. South Korea, having previously exported submarines (e.g., the Nagapasa-class to Indonesia), is actively pursuing KSS-III sales in the region. 6. Comparison of the Latest Submarine Capabilities of Countries Surrounding South Korea This section examines the key features of the latest submarine technologies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Japan. Table 13. Comparison of the latest submarines of South Korea and neighboring countries Overall Assessment • Military Ranking: Evaluated as top-tier in Asia in the order of China > Japan > South Korea > North Korea. • Advanced Technology: Japan, South Korea, and China are rapidly advancing in technological innovation, while North Korea focuses on strategic threat capabilities. • Operational Capability: Japan and South Korea excel in maritime route defense and blockade capabilities, whereas China’s strength lies in ocean-going and strategic power projection. Asian military experts particularly regard South Korea’s KSS-III, Japan’s Soryu-class/Taigei-class, and China’s latest submarines as the pinnacle of their respective national defense technologies. North Korea, while still relatively underdeveloped, raises the threat level through the public display of its strategic nuclear-powered capabilities. 7. Future Prospects: Development of Nuclear-Powered Submarines South Korea is considering the development of next-generation submarines over 4,000 tons in the 2030s, with nuclear-powered submarines being a key option under discussion. In the past, in 2003, the basic design for a 4,000-ton reactor was completed, but at that time, cooperation with the United States was essential due to restrictions such as the Korea–U.S. nuclear agreement (“123 Agreement”). Recently, with the revitalization of Korea–U.S. shipbuilding cooperation through Hanwha Ocean and Philly shipyards, the possibility of acquiring nuclear submarine technology has increased. In particular, following the official U.S. approval of South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine construction at the 2025 APEC Summit, technical, fuel, and policy cooperation with the U.S. is expected to move forward in earnest for South Korea’s project. 1. Scope of Future Cooperation • The U.S. has agreed to share key technologies for South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines. • Cooperation will also include securing nuclear fuel for propulsion (highly enriched uranium or HALEU – high-assay low-enriched uranium) and the design and fabrication of small reactors for submarine use. • Both countries have agreed to expand mutual investment and technical collaboration in shipbuilding, marine plants, and submarine construction industries. 2. Technology Transfer and Conditions • South Korea has requested U.S. approval and supply for submarine propulsion nuclear fuel, and the U.S. is reported to have approved the use of nuclear fuel for South Korea’s submarine construction. • However, based on currently available information, this does not automatically include the full transfer of submarine reactor design or propulsion systems; the scope and method of technology transfer (joint development vs. full transfer) are still under discussion. • If South Korea transitions to third-country technology transfer or domestic development under U.S. cooperation, there could be restrictions linked to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 123 Agreement. 3. Potential Timeline • According to the fact sheet released at the APEC Summit, this cooperation is linked to investment in the shipbuilding industry, and South Korea is reported to have pledged around US$150 billion to U.S. shipbuilding. • South Korean government reports indicate the goal is to secure four or more medium-sized (approximately 5,000-ton or larger) nuclear-powered submarines by the mid-2030s. • However, specific milestones such as design completion, project start, construction, and delivery dates have not been officially finalized, and Korean officials have stated that detailed schedules are still under coordination. 8. Comparison of Nuclear Submarines and Conventional Submarines & the Importance of Nuclear Submarines Nuclear submarines can be broadly divided into two types based on their primary missions: 1) Strategic Nuclear Submarine (SSBN: Ship Submersible Ballistic missile Nuclear) • Primary Mission: Equipped with ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carrying nuclear warheads, SSBNs patrol covertly for extended periods to maintain nuclear deterrence. This means deterring adversaries from using nuclear or major conventional attacks by maintaining the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons, thereby preventing war. • Characteristics: Large in size, prioritizes extreme stealth and long-range operational capability. 2) Torpedo-Attack Nuclear Submarine (SSN: Ship Submersible Nuclear) • Primary Mission: Engage enemy submarines (Sub Hunter) or surface ships (Ship Killer), conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), support special operations forces, or carry out land-attack missions using cruise missiles. • Characteristics: Smaller and faster than SSBNs, emphasizes agility and maneuverability. Summary: • SSBN: Strategic missions with nuclear missiles. • SSN: Tactical attack missions with torpedoes and cruise missiles. 8.1. Nuclear-Powered Submarines vs. Conventional (Diesel-Electric) Submarines – Propulsion Comparison The most fundamental difference is in the power source: • Nuclear propulsion: Uses a reactor; heat from nuclear fission boils water to produce steam, which drives turbines to generate propulsion and electricity. • Diesel-electric submarines: Operate differently on the surface/snorkeling versus submerged. o Surface / Snorkeling: Diesel engines are run to propel the submarine or charge the batteries. The submarine must surface or use a snorkel to intake air and expel exhaust gases, reducing stealth. o Submerged: Diesel engines are turned off; the submarine runs solely on large charged batteries powering electric motors. This allows for very quiet, stealthy operation, but operational endurance is limited. Once the batteries are depleted, the submarine must surface to run diesel engines and recharge. Table 14. Comparison of Nuclear Submarine and Conventional Submarine Specifications Key Points • A nuclear-powered submarine is similar to an aircraft carrier: it provides long-range, high-endurance capability and serves as a powerful tool for global power projection. It is designed to dominate the open ocean. • A conventional submarine is comparable to a coastal patrol craft or a hunter-killer submarine: a stealthy and cost-effective weapon optimized for controlling regional waters and coastlines. Its greatest advantage is extremely low noise during battery-powered operation, making it a deadly threat in shallow waters—like “a hole in the water.” • Choosing a submarine type is not about absolute superiority, but about selecting the model best suited to a country’s strategic goals, budgetary limits, and geographic operational environment. 8.2. Maintenance Comparison Between Nuclear-Powered and Conventional Submarines Which force should a nation prioritize: Nuclear submarines, the backbone of strategic deterrence thanks to their unlimited underwater endurance, or conventional submarines, which offer excellent cost-effectiveness and are easier to field in larger numbers? One of the core factors in this decision is operational cost-efficiency. Beyond construction cost, the long-term burden of decades of maintenance, training, reactor refueling, and life-cycle logistics must be considered. The comparison below outlines these sustainment requirements. Table 15. Maintenance Comparison: Nuclear vs. Conventional Submarines 8.3. Total Life-Cycle Cost Comparison Between Nuclear-Powered and Conventional Submarines Let us compare two submarines of similar class size as examples: • Dosan Ahn Changho–class (KSS-III, South Korea) — conventional (diesel-electric + AIP) • Virginia-class (SSN, United States) — nuclear-powered Between these two types, the Total Lifetime Cost is 3 to 4 times higher for the nuclear-powered submarine. Below, we analyze the causes of this massive cost difference using concrete figures. Table 16. Total Life-Cycle Cost Comparison: Nuclear Submarine vs. Conventional Submarine 8.4. Importance of Nuclear-Powered Submarines for the Republic of Korea Navy Despite the enormous cost gap shown earlier, the South Korean government has strong reasons for wanting to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. These reasons are rooted in national security, strategic autonomy, and enhanced maritime defense capability. Key strategic motivations include: 1) Responding to North Korea’s SLBM Threat North Korea: Developing the Sinpo-class SSBN (armed with SLBMs). If a North Korean SLBM submarine hides in the deep waters of the East Sea, it becomes impossible to track with conventional submarines. Only nuclear-powered submarines can conduct continuous 24-hour tracking due to their unlimited underwater endurance 2) Monitoring Chinese Submarine Activity: China has ~12 nuclear submarines + ~50 diesel-electric submarines and is increasing activity in the East China Sea and Western Pacific. To monitor Chinese submarines operating in the open ocean, nuclear-powered submarines are essential 3) Strengthening Strategic Deterrence: Current South Korean SLBM range: ~500 km, requiring operations near the Korean Peninsula. A nuclear submarine can launch from anywhere in the Pacific, drastically expanding deterrence. Provides a “survivable second-strike capability”—a retaliatory force that cannot be located or neutralized 4) National Prestige: Nations that operate nuclear submarines are considered major military powers. Only six countries currently possess them. Strengthens technological sovereignty and diplomatic leverage South Korea’s desire to operate nuclear-powered submarines is driven by strategic and security needs that far outweigh cost considerations. For over 30 years, South Korea has pursued nuclear submarine capabilities as part of a long-term defense strategy, aiming to achieve: enhanced nuclear deterrence, increased strategic autonomy, breakthroughs in defense technology, effective countermeasures against the expanding submarine forces of North Korea and China. Nuclear-powered submarines are seen as essential platforms capable of long-duration, high-speed, and highly covert operations—capabilities that are crucial in Korea’s security environment. Figure 11. Conceptual Cross-Section of the Korean Nuclear-Powered Submarine (KSS-N) Conclusion The Republic of Korea began with the small Dolgorae-class submarines in 1983, and in 42 years has risen to become the world’s 8th-largest submarine operator and one of the “Big Three” diesel-electric submarine powers (Germany, Japan, Korea). The Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (KSS-III), in particular, is the world’s only diesel-electric submarine equipped with 10 VLS cells for SLBMs, and with its combination of AIP and lithium-ion batteries, it possesses some of the strongest underwater endurance and operational capability in the world. It has proven its real-world combat performance by eluding detection from a U.S. aircraft carrier during the RIMPAC exercises, and has demonstrated strong export competitiveness—Korea has already secured a 1.1 billion USD contract with Indonesia, and is competing for additional tenders in Canada, Poland, and the Philippines. Despite the overwhelming cost burden of nuclear-powered submarines, they remain essential for South Korea to counter North Korea’s SLBM-equipped SSBNs, and China’s expanding submarine fleet. Only nuclear-powered submarines can perform unlimited submerged operations and maintain high-speed, long-duration tracking of North Korean SSBNs 24/7. They also allow South Korea to exercise strategic deterrence across the entire Pacific, not just near the Korean Peninsula. While challenges remain—such as restrictions from the U.S.–Korea 123 Nuclear Agreement and various technological barriers—ongoing Korea–U.S. naval cooperation through Hanwha Ocean’s Philadelphia Shipyard significantly increases the likelihood of acquiring nuclear-submarine technology. Securing 4 to 6 nuclear-powered submarines would mark a transformational leap for the ROK Navy and a historic turning point in Korea’s rise as a true maritime power. South Korea’s submarine industry is not just a weapons program—it is an advanced technology sector and a driver of economic growth. It represents a core capability for self-reliant defense and national security. Based on its world-class diesel-electric submarine expertise, if Korea succeeds in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines as well, it will firmly establish itself as one of the world’s top five submarine powers. As history teaches that “those who command the seas command the future”, the continued advancement of South Korea’s submarine capabilities will serve as the foundation for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in the 21st century.

Following Russian-Indian talks, Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi made statements for the media. The statements were preceded by a ceremony for the exchange of signed documents. Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi (retranslated): Your Excellency Vladimir Putin, my dear friend, Representatives of the two countries, and our friends from India, good afternoon. I am delighted to welcome President Putin to the 23rd Russia–India Annual Summit. President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India is taking place at a time marked by several historical dates in our relations. President Putin laid the groundwork for our strategic cooperation 25 years ago, and 15 years ago, in 2010, we upgraded our partnership to the level of a special privileged strategic partnership. Over the past 25 years, President Putin has been relentless in promoting these relations by demonstrating his wise leadership and vision. Regardless of the circumstances, it is his leadership that has reinforced our mutual relations and enabled us to achieve new heights. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to President Putin for his friendship and for his unwavering commitment to working with India. Friends, The world has faced numerous ups and downs over the past 80 years, during which humankind has had to endure many crises and challenges. And throughout this time, the friendship between Russia and India has successfully weathered these storms. These relations are based on mutual respect and deep trust and have invariably stood the test of time. Today, we discussed our ties and cooperation in all their aspects with a view to creating an even more solid foundation. We want to reinforce our economic cooperation and elevate it to a new level. This is the objective we share and it is our shared priority. To make this a reality, we have agreed to implement a programme for economic cooperation until 2030. It will provide for diversifying our trade and investment, making them more balanced and sustainable. At the same time, it will help unlock new dimensions in our cooperation. Today, President Putin and I will be taking part in the Russia–India Business Forum. I am convinced that this platform will also help strengthen our business ties and open new doors for exports, joint manufacture and technical innovation. Both countries have been proactive in working on a free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and our country. Our cooperation in agriculture and fertilizers is extremely important for our food security and the prosperity of our farmers. I am happy that our countries will work together to promote our mutual production of urea. Friends, Promoting connectivity between our countries is another priority for us. We will redouble our efforts regarding the discussions on the North-South International Transport Corridor and the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor. I am confident that we will effectively cooperate in the interests of promoting polar trade via local trade routes. We have offered an opportunity to strengthen our cooperation in the Arctic, which will create new jobs for Indian young people. At the same time, our deep cooperation in shipbuilding will help us boost our joint initiatives. This is yet another important example of our mutually beneficial cooperation, which is increasing the number of jobs and skills while strengthening regional connectivity. Energy security is another important pillar of partnership between Russia and India. Our cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy, which is rooted in our history, has helped us uphold our commitment to providing clean energy, which is extremely important for both countries. I have no doubt that our mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of critical minerals will also be important for a safe and diversified provision of resources to the world. We also maintain our cooperation in such areas as clean energy, high technologies and modern industries. Friends, Our cultural relations and ties between individual representatives of our countries are of special importance for relations between Russia and India. Over the past decades, our peoples have demonstrated respect and admiration for each other’s cultures, and we have coordinated various measures to further strengthen this cooperation. The recent opening of two Indian consulates in Russia is a significant step forward, facilitating contacts for all our citizens and bringing our nations even closer together. This October, hundreds of thousands of pilgrims received blessings at the sacred relics of Buddha Shakyamuni in Kalmykia. I am confident that we will soon implement a 30-day visa-free regime for tourist groups, which will greatly enhance travel between our countries. This measure will not only bring our peoples closer but also invigorate our societies and unlock new opportunities. I am therefore pleased that today we were able to sign two key agreements to advance this initiative. Our collaboration will also deepen in education and professional development, including through increased student and academic exchanges. Friends, Today, we discussed a range of pressing regional and global issues. On Ukraine, India’s position has been consistent from the outset: we stand for peace. We welcome all initiatives and efforts aimed at achieving a peaceful, long-term resolution of this conflict. India has always been ready to support such efforts, and we will continue to do so. India and Russia have always supported one another and worked shoulder to shoulder in the fight against terrorism. The terrorist attack in Pahalgam and the cowardly atrocity at Crocus City Hall are connected by a common, hateful ideology. India firmly believes that terrorism constitutes a direct assault on universal human values. Our unity within the global community is the only effective way to combat this evil. We cooperate closely within the UN, the G20, the SCO, BRICS, and other multilateral forums. We will continue this essential dialogue and cooperation across all these platforms. Your Excellency, I am confident that our enduring friendship will provide the strength needed to address global challenges. Together, we can help lead the way towards a more prosperous future. Once again, I thank you and all members of your delegation for your visit to India. Thank you very much. President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr. Prime Minister, dear friend, Ladies and gentlemen, My sincere thanks to the President of the Republic of India, Droupadi Murmu, to you, Mr Prime Minister, and to all our Indian colleagues for the exceptionally warm and cordial welcome extended to the Russian delegation. The discussions we have just concluded with our Indian colleagues, along with our highly productive one-on-one conversation last night – for which I thank you again, Mr Modi, for your generous hospitality – were held in a constructive and friendly spirit, reflecting the privileged partnership between Russia and India. I would note that the Prime Minister and I have established a close working and personal rapport. We have met at the SCO summit in September, we maintain regular contact by telephone and personally oversee the development of our strategic cooperation across all key areas, as well as the progress of major bilateral projects. Today, with the participation of our delegations, we conducted a thorough and comprehensive review of the entire spectrum of Russian-Indian cooperation. We also exchanged views on current international and regional issues. The joint statement we have adopted outlines clear priorities for advancing our ties in politics, security, trade, the economy, and cultural and humanitarian affairs. As you have seen, this was complemented by the signing of a substantial package of intergovernmental, interdepartmental, and corporate agreements. Many of these documents are aimed at expanding our economic partnership. This is only natural, as our nations are important partners in trade, investment, and technology. Last year, our bilateral trade grew by a further 12 percent, reaching a new record. While various estimates differ slightly, the consensus places the figure somewhere between US$64 and US$65 billion. We project trade will stand at a comparable level by year’s end. That said, we believe there is clear potential to increase this volume to US$100 billion. To realise this ambitious goal, we have now agreed upon a joint Programme for the Development of Russian-Indian Economic Cooperation until 2030. This comprehensive roadmap provides clear guidelines. Our intergovernmental commission and the relevant economic ministries and agencies are tasked with removing barriers to the flows of goods and capital, implementing joint industrial projects, and deepening our collaboration in technology and investment. Today, His Excellency the Prime Minister shared a comprehensive list of issues with us. It goes without saying that both Russia and India will be extremely diligent and responsive in reviewing them. Make no mistake, we will work on this matter. Of course, having India create a free trade zone with the Eurasian Economic Union would help boost Russia-India business ties. The effort to draft an agreement to this effect is already in progress. I must express my satisfaction with the fact that the two countries have been consistent in their commitment to switching to national currencies in mutual transactions. Their share in business deals has already reached 96 percent. Our two countries have developed resilient interbank channels for lending and financial transactions. Russian economic actors have been making wider use of the rupees they generate from export contracts. Major joint projects receive their funding in Russian rubles. There has been positive momentum in our energy partnership. Russia is a reliable supplier of energy resources and everything India needs for developing its energy sector. We are ready to continue ensuring uninterrupted fuel supplies for the Indian economy to support its rapid expansion. Of course, our bilateral energy cooperation goes far beyond this horizon. The flagship project to build India’s biggest NPP, Kudankulam, is underway. Two out of six reactors have been connected to the power grid, while the other four are in the engineering and construction stages. Once this NPP reaches its full capacity, it will make a meaningful contribution to India’s energy mix, helping Indian companies and households access affordable and clean energy. We believe that building small modular reactors and floating NPPs could also be relevant, just as using nuclear technology for non-energy purposes, including in healthcare, agriculture and other sectors. We are also working with our Indian partners to create new effective international transport logistics routes. This includes a project to create the North-South corridor linking Russia and Belarus to the Indian Ocean. Infrastructure development along the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, including the Northern Sea Route as its main artery, offers ample opportunities for expanding bilateral trade. There are many other economic sectors in which Russia and India have built a positive track record. We are working on joint initiatives in manufacturing, machine building, digital technology, space exploration and other research-intensive domains. For example, a business agreement that was signed as part of the visit provides for building a major Russian-Indian pharmaceutical plant in the Kaluga Region for producing high-quality anticancer medicine using cutting-edge Indian technology. At the same time, Russian companies will start producing their goods as part of the Make in India programme, which is Prime Minister Modi’s flagship project. Prospects for strengthening interaction between Russian and Indian entrepreneurs and business communities are being discussed in detail at the business forum that is currently underway in New Delhi. Mr Prime Minister and I will attend its plenary session later today. Russian-Indian humanitarian cooperation is ongoing in many spheres. Our peoples have been sincerely interested in each other’s traditions, history and spiritual values for centuries. Our scientific and educational contacts, as well as youth and public exchanges are actively developing. The regular cross festivals of Russian and Indian films invariably enjoy success. Mutual tourist flows grow every year. The Russian RT channel will begin broadcasting to India today. This will certainly help the Indian audience learn more about Russia and Russians and acquire objective information about current developments in our country. Our discussions on key global and regional issues have reaffirmed the similarity of our countries’ positions. Russia and India pursue an independent and sovereign foreign policy. We are working together with our allies in BRICS, the SCO and other countries of the Global Majority to promote the shaping of a more just and democratic multipolar world order, and to protect the fundamental principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter. These include the right of every country to its own path of development, the preservation of its own cultural and civilisational identity, respect for sovereignty and a delicate balance of interests of all members of the international community. Russia and India, as the founding nations of BRICS, have done and continue to do a great deal to enhance the prestige of that organisation. As you know, India will assume the BRICS chairmanship next year. We will provide all-round assistance to our Indian friends in their work on the current BRICS agenda. Of course, I would also like to say that Russia and India have traditionally worked closely together in the military-technical sphere. Our country has been assisting the modernisation of the Indian army, including the air defence, air force and navy, for over 50 years. Overall, we are certainly satisfied with the results of our talks. Our plans include a meeting with President of India Droupadi Murmu. However, I can already express my confidence that this visit and the agreements reached will effectively promote the further strengthening of the Russian-Indian strategic partnership for the benefit of the people of India and Russia. Thank you.

According to the IEA by 2024, more than 20% of new cars sold worldwide were electric, exceeding 17 million and positioning China as the leader in the market with more than 11 million sales. In comparison, the European and US markets also saw a growth in the sector, but not comparable to the Chinese counterpart. Figure 1: Global EV sales, 2014-2024. Source (IEA, 2025) Figure 2: EVs registrations share in China, US and Europe: 2018-2023. Source: IEA, 2025. On the other hand, autonomous vehicles, whose market value size was estimated at USD 68.09 billion in 2024, are also trending worldwide, North America being the largest market in 2024 (market share of 37.1% and passenger vehicles leading the market with 69% of the global revenue), while the Asia Pacific region is the fastest-growing market. Figure 3: Autonomous Vehicle Market. Source: Grand View Research. (Grand View Research, 2025) Recently, despite the data and market share, discussions and analysis of the vehicle industry have moved into new concerns related to security risks, trade protectionism and unfair competition. Why? Because the vehicle industry has evolved and adopted new technologies, at the same time, concerns have shifted accordingly. These changes have relied on or prioritized human convenience and connectivity over everything else. A New Security Paradigm for Mobility: Are Connected Cars Data Weapons A simple answer is no, but there are elements that can change the answer into a yes in the future. Vehicles are evolving into connected machines, with software-driven platforms, sensors, cameras, connectivity modules and AI systems. Thus, the vehicle industry is entering a new era where data is key, and whoever controls it, is likely to control the market itself. As mentioned before, vehicle-related security risks have sparked discussions in recent years. Nowadays, practically any vehicle sold has a certain degree of connectivity, naturally this leads to a continuous and massive collection of information (sensitive or not), including for example: real-time location, driving patterns, biometric data, audio recordings, images from the Advanced Driver-Assistance Systems (ADAS) and more. For common people this might pass unnoticed but for governments, the fact of collecting and storing data or having the possibility to do so has become a critical point and a threat to their national security. After all, fear is real, and the more connected a vehicle is, the higher the chances that it can become a surveillance device, for example. The speculations can grow as much as our/their imagination leaves them, but after all, security risks and fear related to them exist. In line with the security risks, the possibility of software backdoors hidden in operating systems or telematic units is another possibility. Naturally, if exploited this possibility, these vulnerabilities could allow a remote shutdown of vehicles or fleets, manipulation of navigation systems or even data extraction could occur. In simple terms, this could open the door to cyberattacks, including the potential loss of control of a vehicle. Once again, the possibility of these ideas has reshaped and changed the paradigm of connected vehicles Actual measures and global regulatory trends As governments start recognizing these security threats associated with connected vehicles, many have begun implementing several regulations to protect their national security. For instance, the UK, Israel, the USA and the EU are among the most active actors. One of the branches of the economic war between the US and China is exactly the mobility industry, the fierce competition between both nations has tightened the nationalist policies of President Trump, in fact the US has rapidly adopted a national-security lens for automotive imports. There have been discussions in Congress and even the Commerce Department has proposed rules allowing Washington to prohibit connected car technologies linked to foreign adversaries. In addition, there is huge pressure over the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), specifically in the encouragement to revise the vehicles entering the US and the promotion of US vehicle-manufacturing companies. For those reasons, the US had imposed tariffs on Chinese-made vehicles (from 25% up to 100% on 2024 during Biden’s administration and later a 35.5% extra tariff on Chinese-made EVs) and had set several rules in line with the USMCA, to limit or protect the American market from Chinese vehicles, as it argued that China is taking advantage of the USMCA by using Mexico or Canada as the entry points to the American market, avoiding tariffs and minimizing costs. According to experts, this Chinese circumvention of US tariffs can occur in three main ways. First through transshipment – products enter Canada or Mexico and then they are shipped to the USA. The second way is by incorporating the Chinese products into the North American supply chains. And the third way is through direct Chinese investments in manufacturing facilities in Mexico or Canada. At the same time, across the Atlantic the EU has also been working on tightening regulations through the Cyber Resilience Act, as well as strengthening the General Safety Regulations, both focusing on the application of rigorous standards to vehicle cybersecurity, data governance, and supply-chain transparency. Also in Europe, recently, a British newspaper reported that military and intelligence chiefs had been ordered not to discuss official business while riding in EVs, and cars with Chinese components had been banned from sensitive military sites. In addition, the former head of the intelligence service MI6 claimed that Chinese-made technology, including cars, could be controlled and programmed remotely. Consequently, the UK has begun evaluating supply chains for hidden dependencies in infotainment systems, telematics, and semiconductors. In the same line, Israel has adopted rigid measures, the Israeli army has begun withdrawing Chinese-made vehicles from officers, citing espionage concerns. Other measures implemented include auditing imported vehicles to ensure no remote-access pathways existence, plus the encouragement of local automakers and tech firms to develop secure telematics modules to minimize foreign reliance. What is China’s role in this new paradigm? To understand the role of China in the EVs and connected vehicles is important to highlight the low labor costs in China, coupled with government subsidies and a well-structured and established supply chain, these three factors gave the Chinese firms huge advantages over their competitors. However, those are not the only factors involved in the equation, the promotion of EVs over internal combustion vehicles and the adoption and development of technologies that turn “simple” vehicles into connected vehicles are important to mention too. All these factors have been well capitalized by Chinese firms, in consequence, China has become the world’s largest EV exporter and somehow a threat for the West. As mentioned throughout the article, the security risks have sparked discussions and concerns, and it is fair, as Chinese-made vehicles have become competitive and technologically well-connected, much, that nowadays are in conditions to fight for the global automotive market. Therefore, there is a clear sense of concern among Western governments, especially in conditions of a politicized world that we live in nowadays. Naturally Beijing argues that bans and investigations on their Chinese-made vehicles are forms of economic protectionism and rejects any claims related to espionage, data leaks or misuse. While, it has also responded by tightening its own domestic rules: foreign vehicles are prohibited from accessing sensitive regions, including areas near government buildings and military facilities. Benefits and challenges for other key players and global automakers Automakers from Korea, Japan or the European and American are being directly benefited from the rising Chinese scrutiny of connected cars, meaning that new export and investment opportunities could be achieved by them. If these countries can materialize transparent software supply chains, strong cybersecurity frameworks, and local data-storage compliance, their advantage would increase. Specifically Korean and Japanese firms – which are proven reliable players with a strong presence worldwide and strengths in battery technology and infotainment systems –, can position themselves as trusted suppliers in those markets that are worried about Chinese-made vehicles and their possible espionage or security risks. On the other hand, however, there are big challenges ahead. If each country or region decides to have proper regulations, major hurdles will appear. For example; compliance costs will rise as automakers must meet different cybersecurity rules across regions; the technology surrounding software auditing, and the transparency of the supply chains itself will require significant investments; the supply chain and design of vehicles will be affected and in consequence production cost will increase; and, if there are different digital standards or rules, it is likely that there could be some limitations in the global interoperability. Conclusions While the rapid growth of EVs worldwide can be considered a good sign for sustainability goals – as they displaced over 1 million barrels per day of oil consumption in 2024 –. Recently there have appeared certain concerns related to security risks – proven or not – trade protectionism and unfair competition. On top of that, the transformation of cars into fully connected digital platforms has created a new paradigm, in which certain nations – mostly western nations – have started to be worried and rethinking their mobility through the lens of national security. In consequence, governments have tightened rules related to data, cybersecurity and foreign software dependencies. This new vision is already changing and transforming the vehicle industry, while the most affected, being the Chinese firms – due the natural competition and geopolitical reasons – there are other global automakers that, if they take the chance, could become key players – as far as they prioritize transparency in supply chains, security and technological trust. The new paradigm has shifted what used to be an ordinary, everyday product into a critical national infrastructure that must be subject to regulation. Finally, this paradigm also highlights the importance of data sovereignty and how important it has become and will be in the future. Referencias Carey, N. (2025, December 2). China floods the world with gasoline cars it can't sell at home. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/investigations/china-floods-world-with-gasoline-cars-it-cant-sell-home-2025-12-02/ European Commision. (2025, March 5). Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector . Retrieved from European Commision: https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/89b3143e-09b6-4ae6-a826-932b90ed0816_en Financial Post. (2025, December 11). Why China's EVs are dangerous to Canada: CVMA. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WV7bn29lpOQ Grand View Research. (2025). Autonomous Vehicle Market (2025 - 2030). Retrieved from Grand View Research: https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/autonomous-vehicles-market IEA. (2025). Trends in electric car markets. Retrieved from IEA: https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2025/trends-in-electric-car-markets-2 Introvigne, M. (2024, February 6). Should Chinese Electric Cars Be Banned in the West? Retrieved from Bitter Winter: https://bitterwinter.org/should-chinese-electric-cars-be-banned-in-the-west/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=11726773838&gbraid=0AAAAAC6C3PdZ9Jx_edcTzlW0hHoO8yN2D&gclid=CjwKCAiA3L_JBhAlEiwAlcWO59TNJrosoZkG7MwAid0bRuGKs5KY0P7csiXimfUzLlbYshtFMafkdxoCqvQQAvD_Bw Leggett, T. (2025, June 10). China's electric cars are becoming slicker and cheaper - but is there a deeper cost? Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy8d4v69jw6o Meltzer, J. P., & Barron Esper, M. (2025, September 23). Is China circumventing US tariffs via Mexico and Canada? Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-china-circumventing-us-tariffs-via-mexico-and-canada/#:~:text=Chinese%20intermediate%20goods%20used%20in,to%20the%20production%20of%20new: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-china-circumventing-us-tariffs-via-mexico-and-canada/#:~:text=Chinese%20intermediate%20goods%20used%20in,to%20the%20production%20of%20new Navarrete, F. (2024, May 21). Aranceles de EU a autos chinos ponen en aprietos a México. Retrieved from El Financiero: https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/empresas/2024/05/21/aranceles-de-eu-a-autos-chinos-ponen-en-aprietos-a-mexico/ Oertel, J. (2024, January 25). European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://ecfr.eu/article/security-recall-the-risk-of-chinese-electric-vehicles-in-europe/: https://ecfr.eu/article/security-recall-the-risk-of-chinese-electric-vehicles-in-europe/ Radio biafra. (2025). Fearing data leaks, Israel bans Chinese-made cars for army officers. Retrieved from Radio biafra: https://radiobiafra.co/ Schuman, M. (2025, November). China’s EV Market Is Imploding. Retrieved from The Atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2025/11/china-electric-cars-market/684887/ Zhang, Z. (2025, December 4). China’s EV dominance sparks EU retaliation. Retrieved from East Asia Forum: https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/12/04/chinas-ev-dominance-sparks-eu-retaliation/

President Vladimir Putin’s current visit to India is his first since the start of the Special Military Operation in 2022. This gives it a certain symbolic weight: over the past three years, Russia–India relations have not only withstood the impact of Western sanctions and political pressure but have also developed to a degree that would have seemed unimaginable just a decade ago. The President’s trip to India serves as a consolidation of the progress achieved and a signal that the special relationship between Moscow and New Delhi is here to stay, while trade between our countries will continue to grow. Politics The political foundation of the current stage of Russia–India relations was laid in 2000, when Vladimir Putin and Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed the Agreement on Strategic Partnership. Since then, nothing has changed conceptually in the political relationship between Moscow and New Delhi: neither side seeks to transform the partnership into a formal alliance. The addition of the term “specially privileged” to the phrase “strategic partnership” in 2010 only underscored that relations with India are no less important for Russia than those with China. The vector set 25 years ago has shaped the development of bilateral relations ever since. Moscow supported New Delhi’s bid to join the SCO, where India was eventually admitted in 2017, and has consistently advocated for India’s inclusion among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. India, in turn, has steadily supported Russian initiatives in international organizations and, after the start of the conflict in Ukraine, declined to condemn Russia—much to the disappointment of European and American officials and politicians who had expected moral support from the “world’s largest democracy.” The reasons that allow this strategic partnership to endure and flourish have puzzled outside observers for decades. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet–Indian partnership, formalized by the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, was usually explained through a set of entirely practical considerations: the Soviet leadership’s desire to secure a valuable ally in Asia, to establish close ties with one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, and to shield itself from a potential Chinese attack—something that was taken quite seriously in both New Delhi and Moscow at the time. Had clashes along the Line of Actual Control in the Himalayas or on the USSR’s Far Eastern frontiers escalated into a full-scale armed conflict, Beijing would have faced the prospect of waging a two-front war in two remote and inhospitable theaters, with complex logistics and harsh climatic conditions. After the end of the Cold War and the normalization of Russian-Chinese relations, this incentive for rapprochement disappeared, yet it had no effect on the relationship between Moscow and New Delhi. It appears that the underlying reason is that the political partnership between Russia and India represents a rare phenomenon in Russian foreign policy practice: it is not reactive, but proactive in nature. It is not a tactical response to an emerging problem, but a deliberately constructed and carefully maintained axis designed to yield mutually beneficial political dividends in the future. At every meeting, Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi reaffirm their commitment to the concept of a multipolar world. In the context of a shifting international order moving toward natural polycentricity, any country seeking to preserve internal stability and independence in political decision-making in the new era can do so only by relying on a broad network of interactions with other centers of power—and Russia and India view each other precisely as such centers. No matter how turbulent global politics becomes in the coming decades, New Delhi remains convinced that Moscow will continue to be a reliable and valuable partner, while Moscow is confident that New Delhi will stay the course of strategic autonomy and will not join any anti-Russian alliances, including military ones. Such confidence is rare in relations between major powers, and it has allowed the partnership to withstand difficult moments in the past and will continue to do so in the future. Economy Economic relations between Russia and India are breaking records: the current fiscal year’s trade turnover is likely to exceed $75 billion, a level not seen since the dissolution of the USSR. This growth has been driven by Western sanctions and the subsequent rupture of Russian exporters’ commercial ties with their traditional partners in Europe, accelerating the long-declared “pivot to the East.” It soon became clear, however, that at least part of this pivot to the East amounted to a partial “turn back toward the West.” A significant share of Russian hydrocarbons sold to India and other Eastern states ends up in Europe after being refined. India thus plays the role of a transit hub, ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of the “oil pump.” In the end, Russia sells at a discount, Europe buys at a premium, and the margin is pocketed by Indian refineries as a reliability premium amid geopolitical turbulence. This model has two major problems. First, its growth has clear limits and is extremely dependent on the broader foreign-policy environment. The record figures were reached in record time—less than three years—but Russia is now selling to India, in value terms, roughly the same amount of oil it once sold to Europe before the conflict began. This does not mean that trade growth will stop in the next fiscal year; however, the pace will clearly slow, and the stated goal of reaching $100 billion by 2030 will have to be approached gradually rather than through a sharp surge. The second problem will become fully apparent if the West either abruptly lifts or, conversely, tightens sanctions. In the first scenario, India’s role as an intermediary would no longer be needed; in the second, there is a risk that Indian companies—deeply integrated into Western business networks—may choose not to take the risk and withdraw, leaving the intermediary role to firms from other countries. In either case, trade turnover could collapse just as rapidly as it grew. To avoid this situation, and at the same time address the enormous trade imbalance between India and Russia, the very model of economic interaction must change. At present, India exports mainly agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, and light-industry goods to Russia. To prevent a collapse in trade should sanctions be lifted or tightened, India’s exports to Russia must expand. The focus should be on heavy machinery and high-tech products to which Russia has lost access due to sanctions. This would benefit both sides. India would gain a guaranteed market and an incentive to develop its own high-tech industries (spare parts, electronics, and so on), which has been declared a priority under the “Make in India” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat” programs. Russia, in turn, would be able to secure access to goods that it cannot produce domestically in the short term. Another important area of cooperation is the creation of new production chains. Against the backdrop of declining Western investment in its economy and a clear reduction in interest from Western companies, India is in need of capital and technology. Russia, living under sanctions, needs goods. This creates a situation that effectively pushes the two economies toward cooperation and the formation of production chains in which Russia can assume responsibility for research and development (R&D), while India serves as the manufacturing base. With sufficient flexibility, such arrangements would, on the one hand, make it possible to involve companies from third countries in production, and on the other, facilitate the entry of jointly produced Russian-Indian goods into global markets. Finally, India could play with respect to Western technologies and investment the same transit-hub role it already plays with oil—serving as an intermediary through which Western companies interested in maintaining or expanding their business in Russia could invest and export to the Russian market. If this mechanism has worked for oil, it may also work for capital and technology. The only question is political will, well-developed operational mechanisms, and a clearly organized logistical framework capable of reducing transaction costs. Experts & People One of the key factors that can, and should, shape the further rapprochement between Russia and India is raising the level of specialized expertise. An expert in and of himself—whether in the Russian or Indian economy, specific industries, or domestic politics—does not produce or sell a physical good. But as a specialist, he can identify in a timely manner which goods should be sold, to whom, and where. Expert services can save companies considerable resources. At the same time, there is a clear shortage of specialists in both Russia and India, though the deficit is far more pronounced in India. In Russia, in recent years, specialized universities, responding to the demands of the moment, have significantly expanded the training of professionals who work directly with India, primarily economists with knowledge of Hindi (although the training of specialists in Indian law remains seriously underdeveloped). In India, however, there are still no academic institutions that systematically train experts in the modern Russian economy or Russian law with knowledge of the Russian language. Most universities that teach Russian studies are oriented toward history and literature. As a result, the niche of specialists on contemporary Russian realities is often filled by individuals who, in many cases, enter the field by chance and derive all their information about Russia from the U.S. and British press. In this context, training specialists becomes a top priority. This task can be addressed through a comprehensive set of measures—opening branches of Russian universities and analytical centers in India, increasing quotas for Indian students in Russia (including in the social sciences), and intensifying exchange programs. The more highly qualified Russia specialists India has, and vice versa, the more significant the impact of this factor will be. Finally, an important issue is the development of tourism. It is no secret that the flow of tourists from Russia to India is far greater than the flow from India to Russia. Some travel to India for a couple of weeks of warm sea, sunny skies, and fresh fruit in the middle of winter; others come in search of ancient wisdom or just because it is interesting to them. The inbound flow from India, however, is far weaker. First, Indians on average have less disposable income, and those who do tend to prefer domestic tourism, neighboring countries, or Europe. Second, many Indians simply have no idea what there is to see in Russia beyond Red Square and the Hermitage. These problems can and should be addressed by reducing costs and removing barriers. An important step in this direction could be an agreement to waive visas for organized tour groups. However, corresponding measures are also required from Russia’s tourism industry, above all special offers tailored to Indian travelers, who may be interested not only in the classical destinations of Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also in natural and industrial tourism. At the time of writing, neither the visit’s program nor the list of signed documents and agreements had been released. Nonetheless, the visit itself is the main event: it signals that the period when the public dimension of the partnership had to be downplayed so as not to ruffle Western feathers has now passed. TEXT

With its fragmented production process, European defence procurement is inefficient and uncompetitive in comparison to the United States. A new approach, prioritising cross-country collaborations, could improve things, but would not be without its own challenges. Introduced in March 2024, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) forms the centrepiece of European Defence Industrial Policy. The strategy aims to strengthen the competitiveness and readiness of the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB) through greater inter-state collaboration. It includes some ambitious targets, all of which are designed to allocate more resources to the EDTIB. For example, by 2030 the goal is for 50% of defence procurement budgets and at least 40% of defence equipment procurement to come through collaboration. There is also a designated €1.5 billion budget for European defence industry ‘readiness’. The background to all of this is British and European rearmament (readiness), largely in response to the increasing threat of Russia (following its acquisition of Crimea and its illegal military operations in Ukraine). European defence spending increased from €343 billion in 2024 to €381 billion in 2025. Figure 1 shows 2024 defence spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) by European country. Taking 2% as a target, Italy, Spain and Portugal are below the threshold. Poland – which shares a border with war-torn Ukraine – spent more than double the target last year, at 4.15%. At the same time, last year Russia spent an estimated 7.05% of its GDP on ‘defence’. Figure 1: European defence spending as a share of GDP, 2024. Source: NATO & SIPRI. Note: NATO members have agreed a new benchmark for defence spending, targeting 5% of GDP by 2035. How do inefficiencies in the European defence market affect spending? Inefficiencies within the European defence market shape spending patterns. For example, there are cases of duplication of defence R&D, fragmented national defence markets, ‘off-the-shelf’ procurement from non-EU suppliers, and a general failure to exploit economies of scale and learning. Compared with the US market, for instance, Europe is neither efficient nor competitive. This inefficiency is reflected in Europe producing three different types of combat aircraft: the Eurofighter Typhoon, the French Rafale and the Swedish Gripen. Each type supplies national and export markets: 782 Typhoons, 710 Rafales, and 369 Gripen aircraft had been ordered or delivered as of October 2025. So, if each European nation had agreed to buy one type of combat aircraft, total output would have been around 1,800 units. Common procurement would also have reduced production costs by an estimated 10-20%. In contrast, the American F-35 combat aircraft has a total planned output of 3,556 units – almost twice the total for Europe. What about sixth-generation aircraft? The sixth-generation fighter aircraft market already looks highly competitive. By 2027, Europe plans to build the Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS), with France, Germany and Spain all taking part in the project. At the same time, the UK is developing the Tempest combat aircraft jointly with Italy and Japan, with the first flight also due in 2027. Meanwhile, across the pond, in March 2025, the United States announced that Boeing would be developing the F-47 Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter. It is designed to replace the F-22 aircraft, with the first flight planned in 2028. There have already been 185 orders. For public policy purposes, there are questions as to whether Europe can afford to fund two similar combat aircraft projects. In one sense, the answer must be that Europe and the UK can afford to pay the price of having two separate independent developments. Even so, there are other policy options (with differing costs). On the one hand, European countries could collaborate further and undertake the project with great cost-sharing. On the other hand, they could simply buy American aircraft. Further collaboration is economically and politically attractive. Economically, more nations joining a project would lead to greater sharing regarding R&D and the pooling of production orders. But this assumes all else remains unchanged – which is unlikely. Further collaboration is costly, as each partner nation demands its share of high technology on the project – namely, a share of the advances in airframe, engine and avionics (aviation-specific electronics), and duplicate flight test centres. Similarly, partners will each demand a share of the production work, leading to duplicate final assembly lines and adding to total costs (although these could still be less than a national-level initiative would cost). At the same time, and perhaps most importantly, more collaborative partnerships could lead to cost sharing and cost savings. This is likely to mean lower prices for each partner nation compared with an independent, single-nation solution. But problems can also come from further collaboration. The number of partner nations will rise from three to six, increasing transaction costs. More difficult will be the process of selecting the ‘winning project’ and the inevitable ‘national champion’ – namely, a choice between BAE Systems in the UK and Dassault of France. In an ideal world, sharing design work between two world-class firms should produce an outstanding design. But in reality, the outcome is likely to be a compromise, with equal sharing of development work on the aircraft, which might not be an efficient solution. Even so, some inefficiencies are the price of further collaboration. An alternative solution would be for European governments to buy American units. The options here are to buy off-the-shelf, either completely or with some form of ‘offset’ (a type of compensation arrangement made between a supplier and the purchasing government) offering varying amounts of work to the importing nation. Again, these options involve different benefits and costs. For example, direct imports involve foreign currency payments while an offset provides some jobs and the retention of domestic industrial capability for the importing nation. Another possibility is a negotiation similar to the F-35, where the UK was a ‘level 1 partner’ with a 15% share of the programme. A similar deal might be negotiated for the purchase of the US F-47, with the UK enjoying similar benefits. Where next in an ideal world for European defence? European defence industrial policy must address the choice of the next-generation combat aircraft. A simple solution would be to continue with the FCAS and UK-led Tempest projects as separate independent ventures. But the new EDIS framework, with its commitment to European solutions, suggests a better option would be to seek a new collaboration between the FCAS and Tempest. These seem like similar aircraft, and creating a new collaboration involving six partner nations could be beneficial. Such a collaboration would offer cost savings in both R&D and production. Fixed R&D costs would be shared between six nations rather than three, and production orders would be considerably increased (possibly even doubled). This could allow for further economies of scale and learning, and at least a 10% unit cost savings (PwC, 2021; Mueller, 2025). Indeed, production numbers for the FCAS have been estimated at 200-300 units and a merger with the Tempest could double this to 400-600 units (Mueller, 2025). There would, however, still be transaction costs associated with the six-part collaboration. This is not a unique problem. For example, the Airbus Atlas military transport aircraft is a seven-nation collaboration, and the Eurofighter Typhoon involves four partner countries. Conclusion A possible merger between the FCAS and Tempest programmes might be a way forward for both projects. It would create a large military-industrial-political complex whose true economic benefits and costs would still need to be assessed. It would also be a centrepiece of the new European defence industrial policy, and might attract new export customers from the European Union (EU) and elsewhere. A more ambitious target is the formation of a European Army, Navy and Air Force. But this would require a single European decision-making mechanism replacing the current arrangement of individual European Member States. It would allow common procurement policies and large-scale purchasing for land, sea and air weapons. This is certainly a long run dream but could be one worth pursuing. Removing the inefficiencies in European defence markets described above by creating a single European market for defence equipment could create substantial gains, both economically and in terms of security.

Introduction Soft-power dynamics have gained importance in the global arena. Moving from the classical cultural approach to the digital realm, soft power has now the ability to shift and transform geopolitics through technological influence. In the age of AI – where digital competitiveness across language blocs determines access to innovation, data, and influence – the emergence of a robust, multilingual digital ecosystem has become essential. Within this landscape, Spanish has become a key player. Spanish is a Romance language from the Indo-European language family that is spoken by around 636 million people worldwide. This number represents 7.6% of the global population and makes it the third most widely spoken mother tongue, after Mandarin and Hindi. Therefore, holding that position, Spanish has rapidly become one of the most influential languages in the digital sphere, this can be seen in the fact that Spanish ranks as the second most used language on the web, surpassed only by English. In fact, this digital presence is not a coincidence, it is part of a rapid digital reinvention driven by demographic strength, expanding connectivity, regional and local policies modernization, and a growing tech-savvy diaspora. Therefore, this transformation can be said to be reshaping Spanish-speaking economies, is enabling new digital ecosystems, and is positioning several Spanish-speaking countries as emerging innovation and digital hubs. As the transformations unfold, the digital reinvention of the Spanish-speaking world presents a powerful case of how linguistic, demographic, and technological forces converges to reshape geopolitical and economical power through digital soft-power. Figure 1: Spanish speaking countries. Source: Speak easy. The Acceleration Drivers For a better understanding, there are multiple forces that can explain why this shift is happening now. In economic terms, the demand for fintech, e-commerce, and mobile-based services has grown as Latin America’s expanding middle class accelerates the shift toward digital consumer habits. In demographic terms, with over 60% of the region’s population under 35 years old, it has one of the world’s youngest digital workforces. In addition, the large Spanish-speaking diaspora in the U.S. and Europe further amplifies cross-border entrepreneurship, remittances, and cultural-technological exchange. Moreover, global connectivity — expanded through fiber, 4G/5G networks, the widespread smartphone adoption and including digital transformation projects and financing — has enabled digital inclusion and remote-work globalization. While governments have also introduced strategic initiatives, such as digital identity programs, fintech sandboxes, and AI policies, helping structure the ecosystem. Key Regions Leading the Transformation Spain has become a European gateway for Spanish-speaking startups by providing access to EU-wide digital infrastructure, funding programs, and regulatory harmonization. For instance, Barcelona and Madrid – usually ranked among Europe’s top tech hubs –, and initiatives like ‘España Digital 2026’ or the AI Strategy 2020 have played an important role in supporting Spain in this regard. In addition, Spain is also home of one of the European Blockchain Service Infrastructure (EBSI) nodes and has hosted major innovation events like 4YFN or the Mobile World Congress, which help Latin American founders integrate into the EU market In the Americas, Argentina stands out for its strong AI talent pipeline and world-class developer community. The country produces one of the highest numbers of software engineers per capita in Latin America – just behind Brazil and Mexico –, and some Argentinian Universities – like the UBA and UTN – are constantly top-ranked in math and computer sciences in the region. In addition, Argentina is home to pioneering companies such as Auth0 or Mural, while its AI scene has also contributed to multilingual datasets and early experimentation with Large Language Models (LLM) fine-tuning tailored to Spanish and regional dialects. Argentina’s neighbor, Chile, has taken a leadership role in digital governance, cybersecurity, and regulatory modernization. In 2021, Chile became the first Latin American country to pass a National AI Policy, and it is among the first to establish a Fintech Law and regulatory sandbox, enabling companies like NotCo, Fintual, and Betterfly to scale with legal clarity. In terms of digital governance, Chile’s Digital Government Division is internationally recognized for its interoperability standards and cybersecurity strategy aligned with OECD recommendations. Colombia is another key player in the region as it is rapidly scaling its digital workforce and fintech ecosystem, becoming one of the fastest-growing digital economies in Latin America. For instance, companies such as Rappi, Addi, and Mercado Pago Colombia have turned the country into a logistics and payments innovation center. In addition, the Colombian government has boosted initiatives like Misión TIC 2022 – which objective was to train over 100,000 citizens in software development – or GovTech Colombia – aiming to accelerate digital procurement – to strength its young-tech talent base. Finally, Uruguay is known for having built one of the strongest digital infrastructures in the hemisphere. In this context, Uruguay – ranked among the top in digital connectivity worldwide – has a universal fiber-optic coverage and nearly 100% of households connected to high-speed internet through the public telecom company ANTEL. In addition, its digital ID system, Ceibal, and its national e-government platform, AGESIC, are considered global benchmarks for digital public infrastructure in the region. Figure 2: LATAM Fintech ecosystem growth. Source: Finn Summit. Data collected by Finnovista and the IDB within the framework of this report (2023) and historical data. The 2023 report considers 26 LAC countries, including The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. https://www.finnosummit.com/en/fintech-ecosystem-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-exceeds-3000-startups/ Where does innovation happen? As read in the previous section, innovation is happening already across different key sectors. For instance, AI and LLMs are rapidly being adapted to Spanish, Indigenous languages, and regional contexts. At the same time, the region’s fintech and digital banking sectors are expanding at remarkable speed, positioning Latin America as one of the world’s most dynamic fintech environments. On the other hand, smart cities and digital public infrastructure — such as digital IDs, online government portals, and interoperable public services — are being deployed across major urban areas. In parallel, the EdTech sector is training millions of new professionals and turning the region into an exporter of digital-skilled talent. Finally, e-commerce and logistics innovations are also undergoing transformation, they are evolving introducing blockchain and Web3 frameworks, enabling new forms of decentralized marketplaces and governance. Together, these developments reveal how the Spanish-speaking world is building a connected and technologically adaptive innovation landscape. Figure 3: Innovation competitiveness scores of certain Spanish-speaking countries. Source: ITIF. Latin American Subnational Innovation Competitiveness Index 2.0 https://itif.org/publications/2025/09/22/latin-american-subnational-innovation-competitiveness-index-2/ Challenges However, despite the rapid progress shown, several issues continue to limit the digital transformation of the Spanish-speaking world. First, the digital divide remains a major challenge, particularly between urban centers with high-speed connectivity and rural or low-income areas where access to broadband, devices, and digital skills is still limited. Therefore, the resulting gap is visible in education, financial inclusion, and the ability of smaller communities to participate in the digital economy. The second challenge is the regulatory lag, which is also slowing the adoption of emerging technologies such as AI, cryptocurrency, and automation. This can be visible in the fact that many countries are still developing comprehensive frameworks for data protection, AI ethics, and digital asset oversight, usually leaving innovators operating in uncertain legal environments in the meantime. The third challenge is talent mobility. The region continues to experience significant brain drain as skilled workers tend to migrate to the U.S. and Europe. Even though there is an emerging countertrend of “brain return” thanks to remote-work global hiring, competitive salaries in tech, and new government incentives aimed at retaining or repatriating talent, still is not enough and is a challenge to be addressed. Finally, the fourth challenge is the cybersecurity risks, which have also become a big problem. Latin America has become one of the regions most targeted by ransomware and phishing attacks, vulnerabilities in public infrastructure, small businesses, and critical sectors have been highlighted in most of these attacks. In addition, the spread of misinformation and weak data-governance systems further threaten trust in digital services and democratic institutions. What Comes Next? Although significant challenges remain, addressing them requires aligning technological growth with stronger governance, skilled talent, sustained investment in human capital, and resilient digital infrastructure. Therefore, the next phase of digital reinvention will likely focus on region-wide AI standards, cross-border digital markets, and stronger public-private collaboration to scale infrastructure, talent pipelines, and cybersecurity. Thus, countries that successfully integrate education reforms, innovation incentives, and robust digital institutions will position themselves as global players in emerging technologies. Conclusion Spanish, as the third most spoken language in the world, provides a unique base for building a shared digital ecosystem that could connect people across continents – or the world. This linguistic advantage – combined with a young population, a growing connectivity, and a wave of technological innovation – has positioned the Spanish-speaking world at a pivotal moment of digital reinvention. Countries within the Spanish-speaking sphere are not only adapting new tools or technologies; they are building digital public infrastructure, developing and exporting tech talent, and contributing and participating in the global development of AI, fintech, and smart-city solutions. Still, innovation on its own is not enough. Consequently, closing the gap in the digital divide, strengthening cybersecurity, modernizing regulations, and finding ways to retain and reverse brain drain remain the main challenges. If governments and private actors succeed in building resilient digital institutions and harmonizing regional standards, the Spanish-speaking world could emerge as a major center of global technological influence. Ultimately, this transformation has the potential not just to modernize economies, but to redefine how more than 600 million Spanish speakers participate – and shape – in the digital age. Referencias AGESIC (Agencia de Gobierno Digital) (2023). Digital Government Strategy of Uruguay 2020–2025. https://www.gub.uy/agesic/ BIS (Bank for International Settlements) (2022). Fintech Regulation and Payment Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean. https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap124.pdf CAF (2022). GovTech Index for Latin America — Colombia Chapter. https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1916 CAF (2022). Urban Mobility Observatory: Digital Public Infrastructure in Latin American Cities. https://www.caf.com/en/knowledge/ CB Insights (2023). Global Fintech Report: Q4 2023 — Latin America Section. https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/fintech-trends-q4-2023/ CMF Chile (2022). Ley Fintech y Marco Regulatorio para Innovación Financiera. https://www.cmfchile.cl ECLAC (2022). State of Digital Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. https://www.cepal.org/en/publications ECLAC (2023). Status of Digital Infrastructure in Uruguay. https://www.cepal.org/en European Commission (2023). Spain Digital 2026: Spain’s Digital Transformation Strategy. https://espanadigital.gob.es/ Fira Barcelona (2023). Smart City Expo LATAM Congress Report. https://www.smartcityexpolatam.com GSMA (2023). Mobile World Capital Barcelona: Digital Talent Overview. https://www.mobileworldcapital.com GSMA (2023). The Mobile Economy: Latin America 2023. https://www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/latin-america/ Government of Chile (2021). National Artificial Intelligence Policy. https://www.ciencia.gob.cl/ia/ IDB (2021) Accelerating the Digitization of SMEs in Latin America and the Caribbean. https://www.iadb.org/en/project/RG-T3902#:~:text=and%20the%20Caribbean-,Accelerating%20the%20Digitization%20of%20SMEs%20in%20Latin%20America%20and%20the,the%20digital%20transformation%20of%20MSMEs. IDB (2022). The Digital Transformation of Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities, Challenges and Policy Priorities. https://flagships.iadb.org/en/MicroReport/digitalizing-public-services-opportunities-for-latin-america-and-the-caribbean IDB (2023). Argentina’s Digital Talent and Innovation Ecosystem. https://www.iadb.org/en IDB (2025) IDB Approves Financing to Support Digital Transformation and Use of Artificial Intelligence in Piauí, Brazil. https://www.iadb.org/en/news/idb-approves-financing-support-digital-transformation-and-use-artificial-intelligence-piaui-brazil#:~:text=The%20expansion%20of%20connectivity%20is,co%2Dfinancing%20is%20$12.5%20million.&text=The%20Inter%2DAmerican%20Development%20Bank%20(IDB)%20is%20devoted%20to,well%2Dbeing%20in%2026%20countries. Instituto Cervantes (2025). Anuario del Instituto Cervantes 2025: El Español en el Mundo. https://www.cervantes.es/sobre_instituto_cervantes/informes_actividad/anuario.htm MIT Technology Review (2023). AI Innovation in Latin America: Spanish-Speaking Ecosystems. https://www.technologyreview.com/ Ministerio TIC (2022). Misión TIC — Informe de Resultados. https://mintic.gov.co OECD (2020). Digital Government Review of Chile: En Chile, hacia un Estado Digital. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/digital-government-in-chile_9789264258013-en.html OECD (2020). Latin American Economic Outlook 2020: Digital Transformation for Building Back Better. https://doi.org/10.1787/20725140 OECD (2022). OECD Digital Government Review of Spain: Enhancing the Digital Transformation of the Public Sector. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2021/07/enhancing-digital-diffusion-for-higher-productivity-in-spain_8b97078e/ce12270a-en.pdf Poorte, Marielle (2025) How many people speak Spanish in the world? 42 Statistics. Speak easy. https://www.speakeasybcn.com/en/blog/how-many-people-in-the-world-speak-spanish#:~:text=42%20statistics%20about%20Spanish%20speakers,most%20widely%20spoken%20Romance%20language. Stanford HAI (2024). AI Index Report 2024 — Regional Spotlight: Latin America. https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/ Statista (2023). Fintech in Latin America – Market Insights and Outlook. https://www.statista.com/topics/5123/fintech-in-latin-america/?srsltid=AfmBOorQcdxpAWPuf6g7Ojqbg8Yb_bQtZZmsl--OxOL29w4nQxKsI8lp#topicOverview UNESCO (2021). Latin America and the Caribbean: Artificial Intelligence Needs, Challenges and Opportunities. https://unesdoc.unesco.org United Nations (2022). World Population Prospects 2022 — Latin America & Caribbean Profile. https://population.un.org/wpp/ World Bank (2020). Argentina: Fostering Technology and Innovation for Productivity. https://documents.worldbank.org World Bank (2021). Digital Economy for Latin America and the Caribbean (DE4LAC) Report. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/digitaldevelopment World Bank (2022). GovTech Maturity Index 2022 — Uruguay Profile. https://www.unesco.org/ethics-ai/en/uruguay World Bank (2023). Colombia Digital Economy Country Assessment (DECA). https://www.worldbank.org

Abstract This paper analyses the escalating tensions between the United States and Venezuela as of 2025, focusing on the Caribbean regional security complex. Under President Donald Trump, U.S. - Venezuela relations have sharply deteriorated, marked by increased military deployments, including the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, and over 4,000 troops near Venezuela. Operation Southern Spear targets alleged narco-terrorist groups linked to Venezuela, with numerous airstrikes on suspected drug-smuggling vessels resulting in significant casualties. Despite official claims of counternarcotics objectives, critics question the legality and evidence supporting these actions. Venezuela, backed by Russian arms and military support, has mobilised substantial forces and prepared for guerrilla resistance. The potential for full-scale conflict remains elevated but uncertain, complicated by domestic U.S. opposition, legal constraints, and regional diplomatic backlash. Additionally, Venezuela's rare earth mineral deposits add a strategic dimension to the conflict amid global supply chain concerns. The study highlights the multifaceted geopolitical, military, and economic factors shaping this volatile confrontation. Key Words: the U.S., Venezuela, Regional Security Complex Introduction Recently, the U.S.-Venezuela relations have deteriorated significantly under President Donald Trump, marking a continuation of longstanding tensions rooted in U.S. opposition to the socialist government led by President Nicolás Maduro, including past sanctions and diplomatic isolation. [1] The year 2025 has seen a sharp escalation in U.S. military posturing framed as a counternarcotics campaign, with Trump signing a secret directive in August authorising Pentagon forces against select Latin American drug cartels, including those allegedly tied to Venezuelan entities.[2] This has involved designating groups like Tren de Aragua (TdA) as a foreign terrorist organisation in February and the Cartel de los Soles as a transnational terrorist group in July, with unsubstantiated claims linking them to Maduro's regime in drug trafficking operations targeting the U.S.[3] Recent developments alarmingly include a U.S. military build-up in the Caribbean since August 2025, featuring assets such as Aegis-class destroyers, nuclear-powered submarines, the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, over 4,000 troops deployed off Venezuela's coast, an additional 5,000 on standby in Puerto Rico, F-35 fighter jets, MQ-9 Reaper drones, and B-52 bomber demonstration flights over Caracas. Starting in September, the U.S. has conducted at least 16 airstrikes on suspected drug-running boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific waters, resulting in at least 67 deaths. However, critics argue that these lack sufficient evidence of drug ties and raise concerns over extrajudicial killings.[4] Administration officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, have emphasised that these operations are limited to maritime counternarcotics and intelligence gathering, with no current plans for strikes inside Venezuela itself, citing a lack of legal justification for land-based actions under existing Justice Department opinions. However, the administration is seeking a new legal opinion to potentially authorise future land strikes without congressional approval, aligning with Trump's hints that Maduro's leadership is nearing its end.[5] On November 6, 2025, the U.S. Senate rejected a bipartisan resolution under the 1973 War Powers Act that would have required congressional authorisation for any military attack on Venezuela, failing by a 51-49 vote, with only two Republicans — Sens. Rand Paul and Lisa Murkowski — joining Democrats in support.[6] Some have interpreted this vote as giving tacit approval to Trump's "America First" doctrine, which critics compare to past interventions in Panama (1989) or Iraq (2003), warning of risks like regional instability or failed regime change efforts. Economically, the intensified U.S. pressure has led to a surge in Venezuelan bond prices, reflecting investor speculation on the potential for regime change amid the country's $150 billion in defaulted debt and interest payments.[7] Broader implications include debates over Trump's endgame, with experts suggesting limited strikes to pressure elites around Maduro rather than a full invasion. However, this could echo U.S. misadventures in Afghanistan or Libya.[8] From Venezuela's perspective and allied views, these actions represent an imperialistic push to undermine the Bolivarian Revolution, potentially through fabricated pretexts or assassinations, with international actors like China and Russia conducting joint exercises in the region to counter U.S. moves.[9] Congressional Democrats have voiced scepticism over the campaign's legality and transparency, while Republicans largely support executive authority in combating drug threats.[10] Source: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/instability-venezuela The U.S. military build-up towards Venezuela Diplomatic relations were terminated in 2019 following the United States' recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's interim president. Consequently, as reported by the media, several South American nations, including Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, have also acknowledged Mr. Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela.[11] In response to President Trump's recognition of the opposition leader, President Maduro severed diplomatic relations with the United States and mandated that its diplomatic personnel vacate Venezuela within 72 hours. He accused Washington of attempting to govern Venezuela remotely and alleged that the opposition was endeavouring to orchestrate a coup. Consequently, the U.S. embassy in Caracas remains closed. The United States continues to recognise the National Assembly elected in 2015, but ceased to acknowledge Guaidó's presidential claim in 2023. The U.S. government maintains that neither Maduro nor his affiliates represent the legitimate Venezuelan government. [12] Furthermore, the United States has markedly augmented its military presence in the Caribbean Sea as part of "Operation Southern Spear," purportedly to address drug trafficking. This initiative includes the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier and thousands of military personnel, constituting the largest military deployment to the region in several decades.[13] As reported by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, recent operations have primarily targeted vessels suspected of drug smuggling. The initial attack was recorded on September 2 in the Caribbean, and since then, the frequency of these attacks has increased, extending into the Eastern Pacific.[14]    Reports suggest the strikes in the Caribbean have occurred near the Venezuelan coast. Previous analysis by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) described a potential U.S. surveillance operation off the coast, which the United States has purportedly established to detect and target potential drug traffickers before they integrate with the dense maritime traffic of the Caribbean.[15] Until late summer, the deployment of U.S. Navy ships to the Caribbean was relatively limited compared to previous years. However, as illustrated in Figure 2, this situation changed in August when the administration initiated a significant increase in forces to combat drug smuggling. Deployment levels further escalated with the arrival of the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group (CSG).[16]    Recent deployments have also involved larger vessels, which bring substantial firepower and additional combat capabilities. A rudimentary method to quantify the enhancement in capability is to examine the displacement of the deployed ships. Figure 3 illustrates the significant increase in the displacement of deployed ships since the commencement of the second Trump administration. The initial major increase occurred with the deployment of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group; the arrival of the Ford CSG nearly doubled the number.[17]   Since September 2025, the U.S. has conducted a series of airstrikes on boats in the Caribbean and Pacific, which it claims are drug-trafficking vessels operated by "narco-terrorist" organisations like the Tren de Aragua gang.[18] On Monday, September 15, President Trump announced that, under his directive, United States military forces executed a second kinetic strike against drug trafficking cartels and narco-terrorists identified as extraordinarily violent within the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. This strike was conducted while these confirmed narco-terrorists from Venezuela were in international waters, transporting illegal narcotics intended for the United States, which he described as a deadly weapon poisoning Americans. In the same announcement, President Trump asserted that these extremely violent drug trafficking cartels pose a threat to U.S. national security, foreign policy, and vital U.S. interests.[19] The strike on September 15 resulted in the deaths of three individuals aboard the vessel. Subsequently, on Friday, September 19, U.S. military forces executed an additional strike. President Trump asserted that, under his directive, forces conducted a strike against a designated terrorist organisation involved in narco-trafficking. Intelligence confirmed that the vessel was transporting illicit narcotics and was en route to harm Americans. The strike resulted in the deaths of three male narco-terrorists. It remains unclear which group within the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility was targeted in the third airstrike.[20] On September 2, 2025, the United States military conducted its initial strike, resulting in the deaths of 11 individuals suspected of narco-terrorism. Following the third strike, the cumulative number of suspected drug traffickers killed reached 17. By mid-November 2025, at least 20 strikes had been announced, resulting in over 80 deaths, with most occurring in the Caribbean and several expanding to the Pacific off South America's coast.[21] U.S. officials, including President Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, have justified the actions as part of a counternarcotics campaign against groups like TdA and the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), framing them as an "armed attack" on the U.S. and releasing videos of some strikes.[22] Maduro's government has denounced the U.S. actions as acts of aggression and "regime change through military threat," launching its own "massive mobilisation" of troops and military exercises in response.[23] Additionally, the Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, who is in the midst of a spat with Donald Trump over the boat strikes and tariffs, said: "The attack on another boat in the Pacific … killed people. It is murder. Whether in the Caribbean or Pacific, the U.S. government strategy breaks the norms of international law." Interestingly, María Corina Machado, a prominent Venezuelan politician and opposition leader, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2025 for her "unwavering commitment to promoting democracy and human rights in Venezuela", according to The Nobel Prize.[24] Following her award on October 10, 2025, Machado has called for increased international support, urging U.S. leaders like Donald Trump to intensify pressure on Maduro to facilitate a democratic transition, including by calling for military intervention.[25] The military build-up has fueled speculation of a potential U.S. invasion, though President Trump downplayed the possibility, saying he "doubts it". Experts disagree on the likelihood of a full-scale invasion, noting the U.S. has previously opted for sanctions and diplomatic pressure over direct military action. War Speculation As of mid-November 2025 (when this analysis is written), the likelihood of a full-scale war between the United States and Venezuela remains elevated but not imminent or inevitable.[I] While tensions have escalated dramatically through U.S. military build-up and operations in the Caribbean, several restraining factors—including domestic U.S. opposition, legal hurdles, and high risks of failure would suggest a medium probability of limited escalation to airstrikes or missile attacks on Venezuelan targets, but a lower chance of a ground invasion or prolonged conflict. As mentioned above, the U.S. did launch "Operation Southern Spear" on November 13, a joint task force under U.S. Southern Command aimed at defending against "narco-terrorists" allegedly tied to Venezuela.[26] The arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group on November 11 has shifted the focus toward potential anti-Maduro operations, supported by a build-up of over a dozen warships, an attack submarine, amphibious vessels, roughly 15,000 troops (including Marines in joint exercises with Trinidad and Tobago), 10 F-35 fighter jets, drones, and special operations forces in the region and Puerto Rico. [27] President Trump has authorised CIA covert operations in Venezuela and, on November 14, stated he has "sort of made up my mind" on military options after briefings from top officials like Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. [28] He has suggested "the land is going to be next" after maritime strikes, hinting at ground operations or strikes on Venezuelan soil, such as military facilities, drug routes, or even targeting Maduro directly.[29] However, Trump has also mentioned possible discussions with Maduro and expressed caution about actions that could fail or entangle U.S. troops. In response, Venezuela has mobilised around 200,000 military personnel, civilians, and militias in large-scale exercises, deploying aging Russian-made equipment like 5,000 Igla missiles and preparing for guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and "anarchization" strategies to make the country ungovernable for invaders[30] Maduro has warned that U.S. intervention would turn Venezuela into "another Gaza, Afghanistan, or Vietnam," emphasising national resistance.[31] What could enhance the likelihood of a war between the U.S. and Venezuela? The U.S. holds overwhelming advantages in air, sea, and missile capabilities (e.g., up to 170 Tomahawk missiles in the region, stealth bombers for long-range strikes), making initial air or missile campaigns feasible without ground forces.[32] Venezuela's forces are numerically larger on land but poorly trained, under-equipped, and focused on internal control, with limited operational aircraft and inoperable submarines.[33] Experts note that this imbalance could encourage U.S. escalation, similar to the 1989 invasion of Panama.[34] Trump's administration views the situation as an "armed attack" on the U.S. via drugs and migration, with regime change as a potential endgame to disrupt flows and secure oil deals.[35] The Senate's rejection of a War Powers Act resolution earlier in November gives tacit executive leeway. Analysts describe the region as "on the brink," with the carrier deployment starting a "shot clock" for action before unsustainable costs mount.[36] There are several arguments against a potential war. According to YouGov.US, polls show that 55% of Americans oppose a U.S. invasion, with only 15% in support, including majorities among Democrats, Independents, and even some Republicans.[37] Apparently, Trump's anti-war coalition, including figures like Vice President JD Vance and Hegseth, is sceptical of foreign entanglements.[38] According to experts, there is no current legal justification for land strikes, as the War Powers Act's 60-day limit has expired and Congress is pressing for transparency.[39] Regional leaders (e.g., Brazil's Lula, Colombia's Petro, Mexico's Sheinbaum) condemn the build-up as aggression, suspending intelligence sharing and evoking "gunboat diplomacy." What is more, the UN and human rights criticisms label U.S. actions as potential extrajudicial killings, risking broader isolation.[40] A full invasion could require 50,000 - 150,000 troops, facing guerrilla resistance in challenging terrain and leading to a failed state or protracted insurgency (comparisons to Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya). Experts warn it won't solve drug or dictator issues, damaging U.S. credibility in Latin America (e.g., falling favourability ratings) and diverting from diplomatic alternatives. What about Russia? – Is there the potential for another Cuban Missile Crisis? Russia has been Venezuela's primary arms supplier since the early 2000s under former President Hugo Chávez, providing a wide array of military equipment that forms the backbone of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) and plays a central role in its defence strategy amid escalating U.S. - Venezuela tensions in 2025.[41] This arsenal, largely Soviet-era designs manufactured or upgraded by Russia, distinguishes Venezuela's military from others in Latin America, which typically rely on U.S. or European weaponry, and is intended to deter external aggression, particularly from the U.S., through asymmetric warfare capabilities.[42] Among the most critical for countering U.S. air and naval superiority are Russian-derived air defence and missile systems. In this category, according to media, the key assets include: 12 batteries of S-300 long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), nine Buk-M2E medium-range SAMs, 44 S-125 Pechora-2M short-range SAMs, and thousands of portable Igla-S shoulder-fired SAMs (with up to 5,000 units reported in some estimates).[43] The S-300 and Buk systems are positioned to protect key sites like oil facilities and radar installations, potentially threatening U.S. aircraft, helicopters, and drones at various altitudes. Igla-S launchers are distributed to regular troops and the Bolivarian Militia for low-altitude defence.[44] As for the aircraft and anti-ship capabilities, experts estimate around 20-30 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 multirole fighter jets, armed with Kh-31 "Krypton" anti-ship and anti-radar missiles, serve as the core of Venezuela's air force. [45] These jets, equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles, could challenge U.S. naval vessels in the Caribbean by launching sea-skimming attacks, forcing U.S. forces to operate under heightened risk. Russia has also provided Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters for transport and attack roles.[46] As for ground and artillery systems, Venezuela fields 92 T-72B1 main battle tanks, 123 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, Msta-S self-propelled howitzers, and Smerch multiple rocket launchers.[47] Infantry weapons include Kalashnikov rifles (e.g., AK-103) and Dragunov sniper rifles, with a new factory opened in July 2025 for producing Kalashnikov munitions to sustain supply.[48] Finally, as for other support systems, Russian radar arrays and electronic warfare tools, integrated with Chinese communications, enable jamming of U.S. signals, creating a contested electromagnetic environment.[49] These systems contribute to Venezuela's overall force of about 150,000 active personnel, plus a Bolivarian Militia estimated at 220,000 - 1 million (with government claims up to 8 million), which could use Russian arms for guerrilla-style resistance.[50] Amid heightened U.S. pressure, President Nicolás Maduro drafted a letter in October 2025 requesting additional Russian missiles, radars, drones, upgraded aircraft, and other support directly from Vladimir Putin.[51] According to the media, a Russian Ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane, linked to military or Wagner Group operations, landed in Caracas in late October to deliver cargo, potentially including arms or parts.[52] Russia has also allegedly assisted in maintenance and opened a Kalashnikov munitions factory in Venezuela in July 2025. However, experts caution that Russia's commitments may be limited due to its focus on Ukraine, economic strains, and reliance on allies like China and Iran for broader support, suggesting more symbolic gestures (e.g., past bomber deployments in 2018-2019) than substantial reinforcements.[53] This aid seems to be part of a multipolar strategy involving China and Iran, but Russia's role remains pivotal in sustaining Venezuela's deterrent posture. Conclusion What about Venezuela's rare earths? Venezuela does have deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), though they are not among the world's largest or most developed reserves. Known occurrences include the Navay phosphate deposit in southwestern Venezuela, where phosphorites contain REE concentrations averaging around 208 parts per million, with potential for extraction as a byproduct of phosphoric acid production.[54] Additional deposits occur in the Amazon Basin and the Guiana Shield, particularly in the Bolívar and Amazonas states, where REEs are found alongside other critical minerals, such as coltan (a source of tantalum), tin, and tungsten.[55] These areas feature preliminary survey results indicating reserves of around 43 million tons of ore with REE oxide concentrations averaging 1.5%, though much of the extraction is informal and unregulated.[56] Historically, Venezuela has exported small amounts of REE compounds, such as $27,600 worth in 2003, but current production is limited and often tied to illicit mining.[57] REEs play a minor but notable role in the ongoing tensions between the U.S. and Venezuela, primarily as part of broader competition over critical minerals rather than as a central driver of the conflict. The main issues in US-Venezuela relations remain oil sanctions, political disputes over the Maduro regime, and human rights concerns, but Venezuela's mineral resources—including REEs and coltan—have drawn international attention amid global supply chain vulnerabilities.[58] The U.S. defence and technology sectors rely on these materials for applications such as fighter jets, missiles, and electronics, and Venezuela's deposits are seen as potential alternatives to China's dominant supply, especially after China's recent export restrictions heightened Western diversification efforts.[59] Mining in these areas is often controlled by armed groups like the ELN and FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) dissidents—designated as terrorist organisations by the U.S.—leading to smuggling, environmental damage, and human rights abuses that complicate international involvement.[60] Some analysts suggest that U.S. policies, including sanctions and border measures, may indirectly aim to secure access to these resources to counter China's influence, viewing Venezuela's alliances with Beijing as a strategic threat in the context of rare-earth dependencies.[61] However, REEs are not the primary motivator compared to oil, and their extraction remains largely illicit rather than a formalised point of diplomatic contention.[62] Notes [I] Importantly, on November 29, 2025, President Donald Trump declared that the airspace "above and surrounding" Venezuela should be considered "closed in its entirety. See more at: https://www.politico.com/news/2025/11/29/trump-venezuelan-airspace-military-00670743 References [1] U.S. Relations With Venezuela. (2024, July 18). U.S. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/ [2] U.S. Confrontation With Venezuela. (2025, July 11). Global Conflict Tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/instability-venezuela [3] The United States Continues Its Attempt to Overthrow Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution: The Forty-Fifth Newsletter (2025). (2025, November 6). Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. https://thetricontinental.org/newsletterissue/us-threats-venezuela/ [4] Bertrand, N., Hansler, J., Lillis, K. B., Cohen, Z., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 7). Trump admin tells Congress it currently lacks legal justification to strike Venezuela. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/06/politics/trump-venezuela-legal-congress-land [5] War looms in Venezuela as Trump tests an “Americas First” doctrine. (2025, November 6). The Economist. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2025/11/06/war-looms-in-venezuela-as-trump-tests-an-americas-first-doctrine [6] O’Brien, C., & Gould, J. (2025, November 6). Senate sinks measure to block military action against Venezuela. POLITICO. https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2025/11/06/congress/senate-venezuela-vote-00640088 [7] Campos, R. (2025, November 7). Venezuela bonds surge as US pressure intensifies on Maduro. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-bonds-surge-us-pressure-intensifies-maduro-2025-11-06/ [8] Kroenig, M., & Marczak, J. (2025, November 6). The expert conversation: What’s Trump’s endgame in Venezuela? Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-expert-conversation-whats-trumps-endgame-in-venezuela/ [9] The United States Continues Its Attempt to Overthrow Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution: The Forty-Fifth Newsletter (2025). (2025, November 6). Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. https://thetricontinental.org/newsletterissue/us-threats-venezuela/ [10] Bertrand, N., Hansler, J., Lillis, K. B., Cohen, Z., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 7). Trump admin tells Congress it currently lacks legal justification to strike Venezuela. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/06/politics/trump-venezuela-legal-congress-land [11] Juan Guaidó: US backs opposition leader as Venezuela president. (2019, January 24). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46980913 [12] Lee, D. D., & News Agencies. (2025, October 7). Venezuela’s Maduro says US embassy ‘false flag’ bombing foiled in Caracas. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/7/venezuelas-maduro-says-us-embassy-false-flag-bombing-foiled-in-caracas#:~:text=Following%20the%20rupture%20of%20diplomatic,and%20upkeep%20of%20the%20premises. [13] Operation Southern Spear: Latest Development in Operationalizing Robotic and Autonomous Systems. (2025, January 28). 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Donald Trump’s campaign against Venezuela escalated recently with the US president announcing that the country’s airspace should be considered “closed”. This is a move that has preceded US military interventions in the past, perhaps most notably in Iraq in 2003. It remains to be seen whether Trump’s declaration will be followed by military action or is just a means of raising the pressure on the Venezuelan leader, Nicolás Maduro, in an attempt to force him from office. But regardless of what happens next, what has been notable is the reaction of China. In a December 3 briefing, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said that closing Venezuelan airspace would violate international norms and infringe on national sovereignty. Jian added that China rejects interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs “under any pretext” and called on all parties to keep Latin America a “zone of peace”. This stance is no great surprise. China has developed strong relationships with several Latin American countries, including Venezuela, as part of a broader strategy to expand its presence in regions long dominated by the US. Trump’s threats of military action could jeopardise the influence China has built there. China has been involved in Latin America for centuries. But its ties to the region have grown rapidly over the past 25 years or so, with China becoming an indispensable partner to many Latin American countries. Brazil is a clear example of this indispensability. The election of Jair Bolsonaro’s right-wing government in 2018 led to expectations that Brazil would tilt towards Washington. However, such expectations were soon dampened due to China’s role as a major consumer of Brazilian goods. By 2020, China was Brazil’s largest trading partner, accounting for over 30% of total exports from the country. Ties between Brazil and China have only deepened under Bolsonaro’s successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. This has been helped by the intensification of the US-China trade war, which has seen Brazil become a crucial alternative source of agricultural products such as soybeans that China has historically imported from the US. This relationship has enabled China to exert economic pressure on the US. Brazil’s large soybean exports to China have increased the global supply, which has suppressed prices for all suppliers – including those in US. China has been a similarly indispensable partner to Venezuela since the days of Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, who took power in the Latin American state in 1999. Chávez was a keen advocate of a multipolar international order, a concept that has gained traction as Beijing’s political and economic power has grown. Over the years, China has become the main destination for Venezuelan oil. In 2024, China bought around 268,000 barrels of oil from Venezuela on average every day – a figure that, in reality, is likely to be higher as Venezuelan oil is routinely mislabelled to bypass US sanctions. Venezuelan oil is key for China. Beijing has been attempting to diversify its sources of natural resources in recent years as part of efforts to retain its global advantage in cheap manufacturing and wean itself off a dependency on Middle Eastern oil. Trump’s threats to intervene militarily in Venezuela may, at least in part, be aimed at challenging Chinese interests. Indeed, the White House issued an official statement on December 2 affirming the Trump administration’s commitment to the Monroe Doctrine. Signed in 1823, the doctrine said the US would reject other countries’ influence in Latin America. A new “Trump Corollary” to the doctrine states that “the American people – not foreign nations nor globalist institutions – will always control their own destiny in our hemisphere”. Challenging Chinese influence Any US military action in Venezuela will probably increase paranoia across the region. Trump warned recently that any country he believes is making illegal drugs destined for the US is vulnerable to a military attack, and singled out Colombia. On December 2, Trump told reporters at the White House that he “heard” Colombia was “making cocaine”. “They have cocaine plants”, he added. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, hit back immediately on social media, saying: “To threaten our sovereignty is to declare war”. But China is unlikely to step in militarily to defend countries in Latin America from US aggression. While China has used its developmental influence there to pursue some political objectives – most notably persuading El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Honduras to renounce diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in recent years – its engagement with Latin America has largely been transactional. China’s strategy in Latin America is driven primarily by economic considerations, and Beijing has generally been reluctant to enter into formal alliances with states there. This hesitance to commit to defending its partners could strain relations with countries in the region that may expect Beijing to support them in the event of a crisis. However, Trump’s Latin America campaign does provide China with some opportunities. Just as European countries concerned about Russia’s expansionist intentions have become a key market for American arms, it’s possible that Latin America becomes a lucrative destination for Chinese weaponry. Venezuela is already buying Chinese arms, varying from riot control equipment to missiles and – possibly in the future – fighter jets. China has also sold military equipment to Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador. The US appears to be taking an increasingly active interest in Latin America. As outlined in its recently published National Security Strategy, the Trump administration is looking to readjust the US’s “global military presence to address urgent threats” in the western hemisphere. Having carefully built up its influence in Latin America over many years, China’s leadership will be keeping a keen eye on how events unfold there in the months ahead.

The United States recently — and suddenly — announced a 28-point peace plan to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, seemingly jointly written with Russian delegates, and presented it to Ukraine. The leaked contents of the peace plan caused concerns for Ukrainian representatives, European leaders and some American politicians. Yet it has nonetheless led to “meaningful progress”, according to the White House, on a revised peace proposal drafted by Ukrainian and American delegates in Geneva. Ukraine has reportedly agreed to the deal, with minor tweaks, while Russia says it’s premature to say a resolution is close, even as Russian representatives met with U.S. delegates in Abu Dhabi to discuss the revised plan. What was in the first plan? The leaked initial 28-point plan was criticized for asserting many Russian demands that date back to the initial peace negotiations of March and April 2022: • It placed a limit of 600,000 troops on Ukraine’s military; • It prevented Ukraine from having long-range missiles; • It placed a permanent ban on Ukrainian membership in NATO; • It included protections of Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. It also explicitly gave the entire Donbas region of eastern Ukraine to Russia, and called on the international community to recognize full Russian control of the Donbas and Crimea and control of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia on the front lines. In return, there would be “reliable security guarantees” envisioned by U.S. President Donald Trump: a NATO-style “Article 5” for Ukraine. This would mean if Ukraine was purposefully attacked by Russia in the future, the U.S. and other parties involved would come to Ukraine’s defence through sanctions, diplomatic pressure and military support, if necessary. In many of the economic and security arrangements that could emerge from the agreement, Russia and the United States would manage them together under the terms of the 28-point plan. The original plan also offered amnesty to all parties for any crimes and atrocities committed during the war, meaning Russia would not be brought to justice for war crimes. It also called for Russia’s return to European and global affairs, ending its political isolation with the West by reforming the G8. In short, the agreement would essentially act as if the war in Ukraine never happened. Was this a joint U.S.-Russia plan? The origins of the peace plan have been widely debated. The stilted language in the English version has led some to speculate it was translated from Russian. American senators said U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, when briefing them, called the deal a “Russian wish list.” The draft reportedly came as a result of meetings held in Florida between Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, special envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, a noted Putin supporter. Rubio has insisted it was a U.S.-crafted document while Russian President Vladimir Putin said Russia could accept the peace plan. The fact that the document tended to mirror many of Russia’s demands immediately put Ukraine, and Europe, on the defensive. Trump declared that Ukraine would have until American Thanksgiving — Thursday, Nov. 27 — to agree to the plan. He has since softened his stance. But he’s also lambasted Ukraine’s leadership for not showing sufficient “gratitude” for American efforts to bring peace to Ukraine. Details of Europe’s plan In response, European leaders offered their own peace plan. They largely removed some of Russia’s most egregious demands, keeping some of the 28 points, while placing sensitive issues like NATO membership as something to be determined by NATO members and Ukraine. But it also acceded to some Russian demands, including accepting a cap on Ukraine’s military and offering Russia re-entry into the G8. It included a provision for territorial swaps with negotiations starting from the current front lines instead of recognizing Russia’s annexations. European proposals include using frozen Russian assets as reparations for Russia’s aggression, eliminating any of the amnesty clauses and making the European Union and NATO the key players in any future political, economic and military security arrangements. The European deal also removes key qualifiers in the original 28-point plan that could be manipulated by Russian misinformation — namely that Ukraine would be forced to face Russia alone if it struck either St. Petersburg or Moscow with a missile or it failed to “de-Nazify”, a common and erroneous Russian line of attack against Ukraine. The Kremlin rejected the European counter-plan outright. Where does the deal stand now? Ukrainian and American officials recently met in Geneva to discuss the peace plan. Emerging from the meeting, European leaders were cautiously optimistic while insisting a lot more work needed to be done. Trump stated that “something good just may be happening.” So, what resulted from that meeting? Few details have been leaked. Sources have shared that the 28-point plan has now been pared down to 19. It has also been suggested that key issues like territorial swaps and NATO accession have been left for Trump and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy to discuss at a future meeting. Ukrainian officials have said the plan has been substantially revised and reflects Ukraine’s concerns. The Russian response has been cagey, to say the least. Since there’s been no formal presentation of any revised peace plan, they are electing to say nothing firm. But U.S. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll recently met with Russian delegates in Abu Dhabi. Russian sources, meanwhile, have restated their preference for the original 28-point plan. Seeing is believing While this appears to be the most notable progress in the peace process in months, expectations should be tempered until there’s a presidential summit between Zelenskyy and Putin and until their signatures are on a treaty. Such momentum for peace has happened in the past. And it has often been scuttled by the key sticking points of both nations. Ukraine has continued to demand extensive security guarantees, justice for Russian war crimes, and has rejected territorial swaps. Russia has wanted a pliable Ukraine and one that could remain in its orbit politically and economically. Fundamentally, these positions haven’t changed. At this point, it appears the Ukrainians have managed to bring the Americans to their side in the latest peace talks, which reflects the importance Ukraine places on U.S. support in their fight against Russia. Russia has elected to say little, but if it was to agree to the revised deal, it would represent a seismic shift. For those reasons, believe in success in the peace process when you actually see it.