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Diplomacy
El presidente de la República Daniel Noboa Azin mantuvo una entrevistas con Telemundo en Guayas, 12 de enero de 2024 - 9

Clear Victory for President Noboa

by Johannes Hügel

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ecuador shows the red card to a possible return of the Correísmo. Daniel Noboa remains president of Ecuador. The young head of state won the run-off election for the highest state office against his left-wing populist challenger Luisa González by a surprisingly clear margin of over eleven percent. The refusal of the loser to acknowledge her defeat once again demonstrates the great polarization in the country. After a peaceful election, this division into two camps is one of the biggest challenges facing the winner of the election, alongside curbing organized crime and the complicated economic situation. When the National Electoral Council announced an "incontrovertible trend" in favor of President Daniel Noboa just a few hours after the polling stations closed on 13 April, his supporters erupted in jubilation. This was particularly great, as the victory of 55.65% to 44.35% after more than 99% of the votes had been counted was much clearer than all the polls had predicted. The expected close election result had given rise to general concern that the election could have unpleasant repercussions in the form of electoral disputes, which would be detrimental to Ecuadorian democracy. The strong result for incumbent Daniel Noboa is beyond question but should not be read as total approval of Noboa's policies by the electorate. Rather, it clearly shows that, despite all the criticism of the government, Ecuadorians do not want to return to the "socialism of the XXI century" and its Ecuadorian figurehead Rafael Correa, from whose all-consuming shadow the defeated presidential candidate Luisa González was unable to emerge. Correismo's resistance to recognizing the election result on election night seems more than questionable given Noboa's clear lead of more than one million votes. The election campaign While Noboa was clearly committed to retaining the dollar as a means of payment, a further opening towards the USA and a relentless fight against organized crime in the run-up to the run-off election, González stood for a completely different course. She questioned the dollarization of Ecuador, proposed recognition of the Maduro regime in Venezuela with the resumption of diplomatic relations and, with regard to the fight against drug-related crime, wanted to follow the example of former Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, whose policy of "abrazos, no balazos" ("hugs, no bullets") was more of a sham pacification and a modus vivendi with the drug gangs than a real approach to the issue. Businessman's son Daniel Noboa, who has only been in power since November 2023 thanks to an extraordinary election following the end of former President Guillermo Lasso's government, has been characterized by a pragmatic approach in his brief time in office since November 2023. His government prioritized concrete and high-profile measures, particularly in the fight against crime, over ideological discourse. However, due to his short time in office, many of his actions were characterized more by campaign tactics than strategy. In contrast, Luisa González attempted to link her program to the legacy of former President Rafael Correa but made certain nuances and strategic distancing. In particular, she was critical of the Communications Law (also known as the "muzzle law"), which had been used as the basis for the persecution of journalists and the media during Rafael Correa's time in office (2007-2017). In the weeks leading up to the run-off, the focus of the election campaign was on the economy, security, and organized crime. There was no shortage of mutual accusations and all too often polemics took precedence over arguments. In view of the continuing catastrophic security situation, in which people are losing their lives in violence every hour and kidnapping rates in the country have risen by 73.9% between 2023 and 2024,[i] concepts are urgently needed. Clever marketing After the young electorate between the ages of 18 and 29 voted for the 37-year-old Noboa in the first round of voting, this time the older population groups also appear to have voted for the president. The general voter turnout was 83.76%, around two percentage points higher than in the first round of voting. In a country where many people have lost confidence in politics and its representatives, Noboa still seems to represent their hopes of overcoming the grievances, the outdated elites and the Correísmo. With his presence in the social media and a renewed self-presentation with giant papier-mâché figures distributed throughout the country, he once again managed to achieve a strong public presence. People of all ages and social classes could be seen roaming the streets of the capital Quito, for example, taking selfies with the papier-mâché Noboas, which were then shared millions of times on social networks. With such marketing tricks, his determined and youthful appearance and the fear of large parts of Ecuador of a return of the Correísmo, Noboa was able to extend his lead compared to the virtually undecided first round of elections on February 9 and win five provinces that had previously gone to Luisa González - El Oro, Guayas, Imbabura, Orellana and Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas. Major construction sites For Ecuador and its old and new president, however, Noboa's election victory means only a brief respite in a situation that remains tense. The challenges remain enormous. The new National Assembly elected in February is divided into two large blocs that support Noboa and González (or Correa). There are also a number of smaller blocs and individual deputies, on whose support Noboa will be dependent due to the lack of a majority of his own. Noboa will have to demonstrate his ability to act and make convincing political proposals in order to achieve governance that serves the common good. The future of the country will depend on how well it manages to identify points of consensus and tackle the structural challenges. In this context, technical and non-partisan initiatives that manage to bundle the country's national priorities offer an opportunity. A national deficit of more than five billion US dollars, high foreign debt, and too few sustainable sources of revenue for the state will make governing difficult. Debt repayments and difficult renegotiations with the International Monetary Fund regarding the granting of further loans are also on the cards. The new government must therefore also aim to create jobs and get people into regular employment. Around 70 percent of the population still lives from the informal sector. In other words, only around 30 percent of the population work in the context of a formal employment relationship and pay taxes regularly. The president must also develop a coherent strategy for restructuring the energy system in order to avoid the hours-long power cuts that plagued the country last year. A supply system that is dependent on hydropower, dilapidated infrastructure, and a lack of diversification in the energy mix hang like a sword of Damocles over the president and could soon earn him the displeasure of the population. Last but not least, the Noboa government must get to grips with the enormous security problem associated with organized crime and various forms of illegal economic activity. The support of the USA and international cooperation in general will play a significant role in this. However, a clear and sustainable strategy for anti-mafia legislation on the part of the government is also needed. Concrete proposals are also needed to remove criminal elements from organs of the partly infiltrated state security apparatus. Outlook For Europe and Germany, Noboa's victory and the associated four-year term of office represent a fantastic opportunity to tackle the phenomenon of organized crime in a structured and targeted manner through coordinated cooperation with international allies. Noboa wants to bring his agenda closer to the USA, particularly in the areas of security and trade. As far as the European Union is concerned, strengthening cooperation and investment in areas such as the environment and energy could also be crucial for his government's future positive multilateral orientation. One sign of hope is Noboa's clear support for the port security initiative launched by EUROPOL as well as EU projects to promote comprehensive prison reform and the fight against the mafia. Cooperation on trade, economic and security issues could make Ecuador a stable partner in the Andean region in the face of left-wing authoritarian systems such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. This is particularly important in the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, especially in view of the fact that over 70 percent of all cocaine exports reach Europe via Ecuadorian ports. However, without a clear ethical awareness among Europeans of the drama and the effects of drug trafficking in Ecuador and Latin America, the situation in the Andean country will not improve, but rather worsen due to the demand effect, with all the social and violent consequences for the population. A litmus test for Daniel Noboa's ability to act could be his promise to start a new constitutional process. Ecuadorian institutions are still hampered by the authoritarian legacy of Rafael Correa's constitution, which is still in force. A transparent process with the participation of civil society could give Noboa legitimacy and help the country to leave the Correa legacy behind for good.  References [i] Un asesinato por hora desde el 1 de enero: Ecuador vive el inicio de año más violento desde que hay registros.

Energy & Economics
South America Map with Shown in a Microchip Pattern. E-government. Continent Vector maps. Microchip Series

Polyglobalization, Big Tech, and Latin America, or what happens to the digital periphery when the center shifts.

by Carina Borrastero

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском So far in the 21st century, we are witnessing the consolidation of an international division of labor in which the levers of economic, political, and technological power are increasingly decoupled from local capacities for the vast majority of nations and relocated to the international arena. The cooperative competition among oligopolistic forces vying for control of key assets to secure global hegemony—energy, finance, digital technology, logistics, military, and space—is one of the fundamental vectors of this framework. The constant expansion of these forces is rooted in the constitutive interaction between giant corporations in strategic sectors and the core states of the new poly-globalization—namely the United States and China—whose geopolitical rivalry is intrinsically linked to the success of the accumulation regime. The oligopolies and their centers of origin appropriate the market and innovation rents generated by the new productive map, accumulating a structural and relational power (in Susan Strange’s terms) that is quickly and markedly outpacing the rest. In this way, both companies and states outside these core zones are being pushed into increasingly dependent positions regarding the technologies, goods, and basic services produced by the winning oligopolies. They are, we might say, being shifted to the new extended periphery. How does this happen? What role does technology play, and where is Latin America in this story? GEOPOLITICS Today, the United States and China sit at the center, while the rest of the world occupies the periphery. UNCTAD Secretary-General Rebecca Grynspan (2023) describes the novel emergence of “centers within the periphery” as part of a process she calls poly-globalization: both China’s rise to the top ranks of global power and the consolidation of highly productive and commercial hubs in other parts of Asia challenge the sustainability of the post–Cold War unipolar world and the traditional North–South divide. Within this framework, historical peripheral dependency does not disappear, but rather changes in form and geography—especially considering that a growing number of developed countries are becoming productively and technologically dependent on countries like China, more so than the reverse (a case in point is Germany in the automotive industry; Zhang & Lustenberger, 2025). However, the periphery is not a homogeneous entity, and not all regions and countries have the same capacities or room for maneuver within this scheme, where starting points significantly shape long-term trajectories. Developed countries (formerly located at the center) remain better equipped than developing countries to face the challenges of their new condition. We can conceptualize the peripheral configuration as tiers or peripheral rings: there is no “semi-periphery”, but rather tiers or rings within the periphery. From this perspective, we might say that Western Europe constitutes a first peripheral ring (1st tier periphery), and industrialized Asia a second ring (2nd tier periphery). Latin America, in this framework, occupies a third ring: it possesses certain accumulated productive capabilities, but due to being more "distant" from the center in terms of the criticality of its production, it receives fewer benefits from integration into major global value chains in terms of investment and technological learning (as Evolutionary Economics and Latin American Development Theory have long pointed out, producing semiconductors, AI, or green hydrogen technology —as in Taiwan, India, or Germany, respectively— is not the same than assembling automobiles as in Mexico and Argentina). In this scenario, the Latin American region—historically subordinated to a single center (the North-Center)—is now subordinate to two. China has been rapidly tightening its economic ties with the region, primarily through trade and financial assistance (Dussel Peters, 2021; Ugarteche & De León, 2020; Villasenin, 2021). Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, rose from less than 1% of the region’s total FDI in 2012 to 10.8% in 2019 (although it still lags behind investment from the US and the European Union) (Dussel Peters, 2022). The Asian giant is already Brazil’s main trading partner, is rapidly deepening its ties with Mexico, and an increasing number of countries across the continent have joined the Belt and Road Initiative, including Argentina since 2022 (the other two major Latin American economies have not joined so far). However, the benefits of these relationships for the region remain ambivalent: on the one hand, they have reduced financial dependence on the US—a significant achievement—but they have not yet translated into higher value-added development such as export diversification or upgrading. On the contrary, they have tended to reinforce the trend toward re-commoditization of local economies (Wainer, 2023; Alami et al., 2025). DIGITAL ECONOMY The current dynamics of the tech industry are particularly illustrative of the broader landscape described above, and for that reason, we take it as a focal point of observation. Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei—the flagship tech giants of the US and China, commonly referred to as Big Tech (BT)—operate collectively as a global oligopoly. This formation increasingly relegates Latin America to the role of data provider and accelerates the shift of other industrial powers from technology innovators to adopters—that is, to a position of subsidiarity. To this picture we must add Nvidia, the Musk ecosystem, and DeepSeek, among other firms whose products and executives carry significant weight in the global chain of technological decision-making, beyond even their specific market shares. No country outside of the US and China has leading firms in AI, cloud computing, advanced chip knowledge, or 5G champions (with the exception of Ericsson in the latter sector, which remains Swedish. It’s worth noting that Nokia is not included here, as although its production and brand profile are still centered in Norway, the largest shareholding stake belongs to BlackRock). An example of an interesting yet ultimately failed challenge to Big Tech dominance in large-scale projects is the European federated cloud initiative Gaia-X (European Association for Data and Cloud AISBL, https://gaia-x.eu/about/). Originally promoted by the Ministers of economic affairs of Germany and France, Gaia-X is a non-profit international association that brings together companies, state agencies, and third-sector organizations involved in European industrial and technological development (such as SAP, Siemens, the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, or Luxembourg’s National Data Service, alongside hundreds of SMEs). Its aim is to pool capabilities in order to create a large shared cloud infrastructure that allows companies and public bodies to store and develop applications securely—that is, independent of servers located outside the continent that fail to meet European data protection standards. In short, the goal is to enable competition with US tech giants and ultimately establish a “gold standard” in data security that tends to exclude them—driven by European governments’ stated concern over the region’s digital sovereignty. The conceptually appealing strategy of combining the complementary capacities of local companies of different sizes on a single platform and offering joint products, initially acted as a carrot for the industry (over 300 members joined, up from 22 at the beginning). However, over time, even the governments most vocal about sovereignty declined to adopt Gaia-X as a primary provider: Germany, for instance, signed a €3 billion agreement with Oracle Cloud (a strategic partner of AWS, Microsoft, and Nvidia) to provide cloud services in 2024. To this day, US tech giants continue to control 70% of the European cloud market (Gooding, 2024). Gaia-X remains a valuable project with over five years of development, but with frankly limited real-world reach—also, it must be said, due in part to the tech giants’ own offensive, as they increasingly offer services aimed at the “territorialization” of data (e.g., https://www.oracle.com/cloud/sovereign-cloud/what-is-sovereign-cloud/). As things stand, the European industrial powers do not control the supply, circulation, or demand of digital technologies, and major Asian players—such as India or Taiwan—occupy intermediate links in the value chains of either the Western bloc or China, depending on the case. This kind of displacement is not so surprising when we consider the oligopolistic dynamics that currently govern the global economy, involving the leadership of core countries across all strategic sectors. Particularly in the digital economy. Oligopoly is a market structure in which a small number of firms control the supply of certain goods and/or services—that is, a large-scale market dominated by a few major sellers, who are often interconnected. Oligopolies are everywhere (in oil, automotive, telecommunications, and more), but in certain sectors, structural traits such as the hyper-scale at which production is viable and profitable, the pace of innovation required for sectoral expansion, or the relevance of brand reputation drive the formation of so-called natural oligopolies (NOs): markets in which open competition (several smaller actors producing the same and rotating their market shares over time) would tend to hinder efficient production. In these markets, the number of firms capable of minimizing total industry costs is “naturally” low, due to the high entry barriers that are established. Each NO actor holds considerable market power, allowing it to develop productive and technological capacities in a privileged way over long periods. As a result, the minimum threshold for joining the oligopoly becomes increasingly difficult for outsiders to overcome. This is the case in sectors such as the extraction of scarce and critical natural resources (like lithium), energy generation and supply (e.g., wind farms), large physical and cyber-physical infrastructure for logistics (commercial ports and oceanic bridges, 5G, or submarine internet cables), or transversal digital technologies (like AI, big data, or cloud computing). All of these require massive upfront investments, accumulated know-how, strong commercialization capacity, and the ability to retain rents—which includes “artificial” legal barriers such as intellectual property rights, trade secrets, and various mechanisms to capture innovation rents. It’s not the same to have oil reserves in your territory and develop or invite companies to exploit them (which several countries do, with companies of varying sizes) as it is to develop powerful AI models using 20 years of data from the entire public internet (which only OpenAI-Microsoft of the US originally achieved with ChatGPT, even though the data came from millions of people around the world). In fact, comparable AI capabilities have only been reached by Google’s Gemini and the open-source DeepSeek model recently developed in China following US sanctions on Nvidia chip acquisitions. In a technological oligopoly, the ability to invest and innovate at scale grants companies significant prospective power: they can pour enormous sums into R&D and start-up acquisitions to develop innovations that will pay off a decade later—after numerous failed attempts costing millions—thus shaping future markets in the process (Google, for example, has heavily invested in AI development since the 1990s and has, at times, acquired one start-up per week). Additionally, NO actors actively exclude potential competitors outside the oligopoly through more questionable mechanisms such as collusion or lobbying, among others (Borrastero & Juncos, 2024). Today, given the broad productive and geographic scope of global value chains and the extreme concentration of investment capacity typical of financial capitalism, more and more markets are becoming structured as natural oligopolies. Especially in digital technologies. Only Amazon, Microsoft, Alibaba, and Google together dominate 75% of the global cloud computing market (with respective shares of 47.8%, 15.5%, 7.7%, and 4%, according to Gartner, 2024), a sector whose relevance is crucial for the development of technologies such as generative AI. In the years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic, Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft also became owners or lessees of more than half of the world’s submarine bandwidth capacity—a market historically controlled by states and large telecommunications companies like NEC, Alcatel, and Fujitsu, which still make up the backbone of global data traffic infrastructure (Business Research Insights, 2025). Huawei is the world’s largest supplier of telecommunications equipment, particularly for 5G networks and smartphones, holding a 28% share of the global market and over 4,000 patents (Merino et al., 2023). This helps explain Donald Trump’s insistence on making it both a material and symbolic target in the US-China trade war. The fact that Big Tech companies share technological and market domains—beyond specializing in particular niches—fuels an intense internal competitive race that, unlike monopolies, drives continuous innovation. This means that, in addition to competing to outdo one another, these firms also cooperate extensively to maintain their global leadership far ahead of the rest of the market: each company develops interoperability features to ensure their apps function properly on others’ platforms, and they share open source projects on GitHub (now owned by Microsoft), for instance. Microsoft has contributed significantly to the development of AI in China through its Microsoft Research Asia lab in Beijing and collaborations with Chinese institutions such as the National University of Defense Technology (Hung, 2025)—efforts that neither the US nor Chinese governments have blocked. Long before the current reloaded geopolitical confrontation emerged, core-country governments had already been promoting initiatives aimed at the expansion and globalization of their tech firms, such as China’s Digital Silk Road (Borrastero, 2024) or Silicon Valley itself in the US (it bears repeating just how much state R&D funding is packed inside an iPhone; Mazzucato, 2013). And what each state has done to strengthen its own technological base has ended up, in some way, benefiting the other. Consider, for example, that what China’s customs agency classifies as “foreign-invested enterprises” are mostly US-based companies, which control three-quarters of the country’s most advanced high-tech products. These include large-scale electronics exports that often involve importing key components from the US, assembling them in China via foreign companies like Foxconn (which builds Apple’s iPhones), and then exporting them. At the same time, private Chinese firms have also expanded their role in these core exports, going from virtually zero in the 1990s to over 20% today (Kenji Starrs, 2025). The offshoring of US tech production has helped the US continue leading by producing more cheaply, and has helped China learn how to lead too. As can be seen, the actors of a Global Technological Oligopoly (GTO) are deeply interdependent. To this picture, we must add the increasingly blatant symbiosis between dominant governments and individual stakeholders, as exemplified by the Trump-Musk case. We are no longer simply talking about "public-private complexes", "revolving doors" or "intimate relations". These notions describe very close ties, but between separate entities. What we are seeing now is a kind of fusion (or confusion) between a tiny handful of public and private actors who are able to govern strategic global value chains and set the rules of the game for the rest of the world. In China’s case, the country is characterized by what Weber and Qi (2022) describe as a “state-constituted market economy”: a strong state deeply intertwined with a fundamentally marketized economy, resulting in a political-economic balance that differs somewhat from Western models but still yields a global power that is difficult to challenge. In sum, we are witnessing a competition scheme designed for the very few, that generates a spiraling cycle of leveraged success in which core states play a crucial role. LATIN AMERICA A scheme like this reinforces Latin America's historic peripheral condition. GTO companies operate directly within the territory (setting up data centers, having subsidiaries, providing services, among other things), but they also rely on regional actors to amplify the generation of indigenous data, the large-scale paid consumption of BT’s technological infrastructures, and the global dissemination of their business models. The free domestic use of email applications or social networks enables data capture, but not the monetization of digital assets, whose massive volume comes from services provided to businesses and governments (as someone aptly put it, Amazon is famous for its store but rich from its servers; Lacort, 2021). In Latin America, there is a handful of large technology companies – the so-called 'tecnolatinas' – that replicate the e-marketplace, fintech, or cryptocurrency development models characteristic of the BT, managing to stand out as champions in the regional league far ahead of the rest. However, they continue to be dependent users of the fundamental technologies produced by the GTO. Mercado Libre, originally from Argentina, is the largest and most widely used digital platform on the continent, the one with the highest market value, and the first to be listed on Nasdaq. Modeled after Alibaba, it is a marketplace with an integrated online payments and credit system, technology development and service divisions, and an extensive ground-based logistics infrastructure. For its data storage and management, Mercado Libre is a client of Amazon Web Services (AWS): it processes over 40 purchases per second across 18 countries and has migrated more than 5,000 databases to Amazon DynamoDB (AWS, 2021). As of 2024, it was using nearly a dozen services from the tech giant with which it had signed an agreement to reduce its data computing costs by 13% (AWS, 2024). The other two regional champions, both Brazilian in origin, also maintain strong ties with the BTs: the marketplace Magazine Luiza runs on Google Cloud; and the fully digital bank Nubank (of Nu Holdings) is an AWS client, has received investments from Warren Buffett, Tencent Holdings and Sequoia Capital, and many of its executives have worked at Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Alibaba. The following chart illustrates the stark imbalance in market value and profits between the GTO firms, other global tech giants, and two of Latin America's top champions, in descending order: Source: Own elaboration based on data from Forbes Global 2000 (2024).* Originally in Borrastero & Juncos (2024).** Magazine Luiza is not publicly traded.  Regional firms, in turn, capture data from countless Latin American users, acquire local start-ups, participate in scientific research networks, and work with governments to access tax and especially regulatory benefits—mechanisms that enable their gradual “giantization” (Borrastero & Juncos, 2024). In short, they are part of this kind of stratified oligopoly led by Big Tech, which tecnolatinas help sustain while securing their regional slice of the pie. Far from being a marginal arena, despite Latin America’s relatively low share in global cross-border data flows compared to Asia or Europe (UNCTAD, 2021), the region represents a key market to conquer. This includes sectors with crucial resources for Big Tech’s vertical integration strategies, such as lithium. For instance, Tesla is one of the main buyers of Arcadium Lithium, which operates in the salt flats of northern Argentina, and along with other tech moguls like Bill Gates, is planning new direct investments and investments in companies developing technologies related to extraction (such as Lake Resources, which works on reducing freshwater usage in lithium mining) (López King, 2025). Big Tech companies form true global ecosystems for resource capture and the monetization of informational assets, supported by states and firms across the globe. SYSTEMIC RISKS One of the main problems of the dynamics described so far is the deepening of the international division of learning which—already highly unequal—continues to grow at breakneck speed, while technological learning becomes increasingly fundamental to value creation, and peripheral states are less and less equipped to deal with ever-larger corporations. In this context, peripheral countries risk becoming mere providers of informational raw material for platforms developed in the global centers, and end up having to pay for the digital intelligence extracted from them. Meanwhile, industrial hyper-concentration makes it increasingly difficult for the market to address these structural issues on its own. Rent refers to income derived from control over a scarce and strategic asset. The oligopolistic control of such rent-generating assets by central countries drives an endogenous concentration of rent in the central regions, and the result, in terms of income distribution both between and within nations, is a deepening of inequality at all levels (UNCTAD, 2021; Milanovic, 2019; Torres and Ahumada, 2022). Another major issue stemming from the scale reached by dominant actors and the penetration of their digital infrastructures is how difficult it has become to reverse the technological path — in terms of how to generate and provide services in a different way, while maintaining the reach and quality. Just imagine, for example, trying to establish alternative global data traffic routes or to produce world-class AI for diagnosing and treating rare diseases, without at some point relying on the technological resources of the oligopoly. The key question is how societies across the globe can harness these accumulated technological capabilities for collective purposes, without depending so heavily on heteronormative political and market-driven decisions. The list of systemic risks is a long one, and there isn’t space here to delve into the broader political dimensions of the issue. But it is worth highlighting these two particular risks tied to the current techno-economic order, given their impact on the very possibility of building concrete alternatives. LOCAL INITIATIVE Latin America enjoys neither structural power (that is, the ability to shape the rules of the game in terms of production, finance, security, or the global control of knowledge and culture), nor relational power in relation to other regions with accumulated techno-productive capacities (the ability to influence other actors into doing something they otherwise wouldn’t, following Strange’s 1988 classification). This essay may lean more toward pessimism of the intellect than optimism of the will when it comes to the global order within which Latin America must forge a new place.  Yet it is clear that the continent holds bargaining potential, rooted in the fact that it remains a highly coveted region for all the reasons discussed above—and many more (including the fact that it is, for now, a territory free of military wars). In the context of a “divide and conquer” logic typical of today’s intensified inter-core battles, strategies of absolute alignment with any single power are far from the wisest. The global oligopolistic economy will only deepen Latin America’s peripheral status if countries in the region fail to adopt a solidary non-alignment—or poly-alignment—approach, one that allows them to consolidate minimum thresholds of technological sovereignty. From dependent adoption to sovereign adoption (deciding what and how to adopt in order to learn), and from there to emancipation (integrating and developing what is needed for the people’s well-being). In Brazil, multiple state-led projects are underway to develop a sovereign data economy in collaboration with small and medium-sized enterprises and the academic sector (Gonzalo & Borrastero, forthcoming), along with large-scale initiatives to build national tech and energy infrastructures by leveraging the techno-productive capabilities accumulated over decades by Petrobras, BNDES, the national research council, and public venture capital funds (Alami et al., 2025). Mexico and Colombia are currently undergoing political processes inspired by the ideals of a “common home” and the care of virtual lands, advocating for continental unity on the one hand and strict regulation of Big Tech on the other (BBC News Mundo, 2025; Forbes Central America, 2025; Government of Colombia, 2024; Colombian Presidency, 2025; Wired, 2025). Argentina has a range of digital development projects based on policy frameworks designed to autonomously leverage the productive capacity the country has accumulated since the 1940s (Gonzalo & Borrastero, 2023)—though these efforts have been obstructed by the pro-Trump government of Javier Milei. EPILOGUE As these lines are being written, stock markets around the globe are tumbling amid the tariff war unleashed by the United States, forcing everyone else to adjust. Even the “Magnificent Seven” (Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Nvidia, and Tesla) have lost billions in just a few days. This raises the question of whether we are witnessing the birth of a new international economic order. Whether this is a true turning point or merely another heightened episode in the ongoing geopolitical rivalry remains to be seen. What we can already observe, however, is that global control over strategic assets for development places the GTO and core economies in a structurally advantageous position to lead long-term value chains. At the same time, the polycrisis opens up opportunities for marginalized regions to seize the momentum and assert their own demands. In financial capitalism, not everything is determined in the marketplace, and amid widespread and persistent instability, self-determination remains, without a doubt, one of the most powerful antidotes. References Alami, I., DiCarlo, J., Rolf, S. & Schindler, S. (2025). The New Frontline. The US-China battle for control of global networks. In Transnational Institute, State of Power 2025. Geopolitics of Capitalism, Ch. 2.AWS (2024). Mercado Libre acelera el time to market con servicios de la nube de AWS. Amazon Web Services. Recuperado de: https://aws.amazon.com/es/solutions/case-studies/mercado-libre-migration/.AWS (2021). Mercado Libre escala su negocio y mejora su fiabilidad al migrar 5000 bases de datos a Amazon DynamoDB. Recuperado de: https://aws.amazon.com/es/solutions/case-studies/mercado-libre-dynamodb/.BBC News Mundo (2025). Plan México: cómo es el ambicioso proyecto de Claudia Sheinbaum para colocar a su país entre las 10 principales economías del mundo. BBC News Mundo, 15 Enero 2025. Recuperado de: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cre8ze0dvdno.Borrastero, C. (2024). Estado, empresas y factores geopolíticos en el sendero de desarrollo de las redes 5G en Argentina. Estudios Sociales del Estado, 10(19), pp. 104-138.Borrastero, C. y Juncos, I. (2024). El Oligopolio Tecnológico Global, la periferia digital y América Latina. Desarrollo Económico, 64(243), pp. 110-136.Business Research Insights (2025). Submarine Cable Market Size, Share, Growth and Industry Analysis, By Type        (Impregnated Paper Insulated Cable, Oil-filled Cable), By Application (Shallow Sea, Deep Sea), and Regional Insight and Forecast to 2033). Retrieved from: https://www.businessresearchinsights.com/market-reports/submarine-cable-market-121770Dussel Peters, E. (2022). Capitalismo con características chinas. Conceptos y desa-rrollo en la tercera década del siglo XXI. El Trimestre Económico, 89(354).Dussel Peters, E. (2021). Monitor de la OFDI China en América Latina y el Caribe 2021. Recuperado de: https://www.redalc-china.org/monitor/images/pdfs/menuprincipal /DusselPeters_MonitorOFDI_2021_Esp.pdfForbes Centroamérica (2025). Petro aboga por la colaboración entre países ante tensión entre multilateralismo y soledad. Forbes Centroamérica, 9 Abril 2025. Recuperado de: https://forbescentroamerica.com/2025/04/09/petro-aboga-por-la-colaboracion-entre-paises-ante-tension-entre-multilateralismo-y-soledad.Gartner (2024). Gartner Says Worldwide IaaS Public Cloud Services Revenue Grew 16.2% in 2023. Retrieved from: https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2024-07-22-gartner-says-worldwide-iaas-public-cloud-services-revenue-grew-16-point-2-percent-in-2023Gonzalo, M. y Borrastero, C. (2025). América Latina y la “Economía de datos”: definiciones, temas de agenda e implicancias de política, en Lastres, H. y Cassiolato, J. Economia Política de Dados e Soberania Digital: conceitos, desafios e experiências no mundo, ContraCorrente, en prensa.Gonzalo, M. y Borrastero, C. (2023). Misión 7 “Profundizar el avance de la digitalización escalando la estructura productiva y empresarial nacional”. En Argentina Productiva 2030 - Plan para el Desarrollo Productivo, Industrial y Tecnológico. Ministerio de Economía de la Nación, Argentina.Gooding, M. (2024). Gaia-X: Has Europe's grand digital infrastructure project hit the buffers?. Data Center Dynamics, May 13th 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/gaia-x-has-europes-grand-digital-infrastructure-project-hit-the-buffers/Grynspan, R. (2023). Globalización dislocada: Prebisch, desbalances comerciales y el futuro de la economía global. Revista de la CEPAL, 141, 45-56.Gobierno de Colombia (2024). Estrategia Nacional Digital de Colombia 2023-2026. Recuperado de: https://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/715/articles-334120_recurso_1.pdf.Hung, K. (2025). Beyond Big Tech Geopolitics. Moving Towards Local and People-Centred Artificial Intelligence. In Transnational Institute, State of Power 2025. Geopolitics of Capitalism, Ch. 10.Kenji Starrs, S. (2025). Can China Challenge the US Empire?. In Transnational Institute, State of Power 2025. Geopolitics of Capitalism, Ch. 6.Lacort, J. (2021). Así es como gana dinero Amazon: cada vez más nube y un futuro de producciones audiovisuals. Xataka, 3 Febrero 2021. Recuperado de: https://www.xataka.com/empresas-y-economia/asi-como-gana-dinero-amazon-cada-vez-nube-futuro-producciones-audiovisuales-1López King. E. (2025). Litio: Argentina pudo unir a Elon Musk y a Bill Gates en una inversión clave en la que ambos coinciden. Litio.com.ar. Recuperado de: https://litio.com.ar/litio-argentina-pudo-unir-a-elon-musk-y-a-bill-gates-en-una-inversion-clave-en-la-que-ambos-coinciden/Mazzucato, M. (2013). The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. London: Anthem Press.Merino, G., Bilmes, J. y Barrenegoa, A. (2023). Economía en el (des)orden mundial: Ascenso de China, estancamiento del norte global y nuevo paradigma tecno-económico en disputa. Instituto Tricontinental de Investigación Social, Cuaderno 5.Milanovic, B. (2019). Capitalism, Alone. The Future of the System That Rules the World. Harvard University Press.Presidencia de Colombia (2025). Intervención del Presidente Gustavo Petro Urrego durante la plenaria IX Cumbre de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y Gobierno de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC), Tegucigalpa, 9 de Abril de 2025. Recuperado de: https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=1727297164867599Strange, S. (1988). States and Markets. An introduction to International Political Economy. Pinter Publishers, London.Torres, M. y Ahumada, J. M. (2022). Las relaciones centro-periferia en el siglo XXI. El Trimestre Económico, LXXXIX (1), 53, 151-195.Ugarteche, Ó. y De León, C. (2020). El financiamiento de China a América Latina. http://www.obela.org/analisis/el-financiamiento-de-china-a-ame¬rica-latina#:~:text=EnLatinoaméricaexisten4sucursales,en Brasil%2C Chile y PerúUNCTAD (2021). Digital Economy Report 2021. Cross-border data flows and development: For whom the data flow. Recuperado de https://unctad.org/publication/digital-economy-report-2021.Villasenin, L. (2021). Las oportunidades de América Latina en su relación con China en el siglo XXI. Interacción Sino-Iberoamericana / Sino-Iberoamerican Interaction, 1(1).Wainer, A. (2023). ¿Un puente al desarrollo? Cambios en el comercio de América Latina con Estados Unidos y China. Problemas del Desarrollo. Revista Latinoamericana de Economía, 54(213).Weber, I. & Qi, H. (2022). The state-constituted market economy: A conceptual framework for China’s state–market relations. Economics Department Working Paper Series, 319, University of Massachusetts Amherst.Wired (2025). Claudia Sheinbaum propone aumentar los impuestos a plataformas como Google, Netflix y Amazon en México. Wired.es, 17 Febrero 2025. Recuperado de: https://es.wired.com/articulos/claudia-sheinbaum-propone-aumentar-los-impuestos-a-plataformas-como-google-netflix-y-amazon-en-mexico.Zhang, Y. & Lustenberger, U. (2025). Balancing Protectionism and Innovation: The Future of the European Automotive Industry in the Age of Chinese Electric Vehicles. Singularity Academy Frontier Review, #20250219.

Defense & Security
Philippines and China flags are waving in the sky. Double country Flag waving with mast. Philippines china national flag for agreement.

Geopolitical disputes: China and the Philippines in the South China Sea

by Eduardo García Torres

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The South China Sea (SCS) is a strategic region in international geopolitics and a hotspot of disputes involving sovereignty, economy, and security. This text analyzes the positions of two key actors in the region — China and the Philippines — whose growing tensions have been a defining factor in the evolution of the conflict. Located in Southeast Asia, the SCS borders China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, and connects the Pacific to the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca, one of the busiest maritime routes. Its wealth in fishery and energy resources has intensified disputes over the Pratas, Macclesfield, Paracel, and Spratly Archipelagos, which are claimed entirely or partially by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In this context, the SCS holds significant geopolitical importance. From the classical perspective of Alfred T. Mahan, maritime control is essential for a country to consolidate itself as a power, as it enables access to strategic resources, trade routes, and the projection of military power. Today, this remains a key factor of political, economic, and military influence in the macro-region that authors such as Ulises Granados (2022) refer to as the Indo-Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, from the perspective of critical geopolitics, the SCS conflict is a dispute rooted in the construction of geographic and political meanings. According to Gerard Toal, space is not fixed but rather a construction shaped by power relations and discourses. One example is its naming: China calls it the South Sea, the Philippines refer to it as the West Philippine Sea, and Vietnam calls it the East Sea. Each name not only reflects a territorial claim but also a geopolitical imaginary. Interests in the SCS date back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when Japan exerted control over some areas through the state and its corporations. However, after World War II, sovereignty over these territories remained undefined, leading to competing claims from neighboring countries. During the Cold War, the United States strengthened its alliance with the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations to contain communism, while China consolidated its presence in areas like the Paracel Islands. This context has been key in shaping the current competition over the sea. The Chinese government claims sovereignty in the SCS based on historical precedents going back to the Han dynasty. Beijing argues it recovered the Spratly and Paracel Islands after World War II, invoking the Cairo Declaration (1943) and the Potsdam Declaration (1945), which called for the return of territories occupied by Japan. In 1958, China issued the Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea, incorporating the Pratas (Dongsha), Paracel (Xisha), Macclesfield (Zhongsha), and Spratly (Nansha) Islands into its sovereign territory. Later, in 2009, it reaffirmed its claim through the Nine-Dash Line (NDL), a delimitation drawn in 1947 that encompasses nearly 80% of the SCS. Although this line is not clearly defined in international law, Beijing maintains that it holds sovereign rights within it and that disputes should be resolved without intervention from extra-regional actors — a stance that contrasts with the Philippines’ actions, which have sought international support to strengthen their position. From China’s perspective, its claims in the SCS are essential to its sovereignty and national security. For this reason, it has increased its naval, paramilitary, and civilian presence. Maritime projection and control of trade routes are also key aspects of its strategy to advance initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which is fundamental to its regional and international economic growth. In contrast, the Philippines has claimed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands since the 1970s and has resorted to legal and media avenues to denounce China. In 1995, it protested China’s construction of structures on Mischief Reef, and in 1997, it stationed the Sierra Madre ship in the Spratlys. Today, the Philippine Navy maintains operations in the area. Moreover, in 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes. However, tensions escalated in 2009 when China reaffirmed the Nine-Dash Line. In response, in 2013, the Philippines brought the case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), arguing that China was violating the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and asserting its rights over exclusive economic zones. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled in favor of the Philippines, concluding that China's claims lacked legal basis under international law. However, China rejected the ruling, stating that it does not reflect its interpretation of territorial sovereignty based on its history and legal frameworks. Moreover, Beijing considered the Philippine complaint a unilateral action. In 2024, the Philippines enacted the “Maritime Zones Law” and the “Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act,” which define its maritime rights in the South China Sea. In response, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected both laws, arguing they violate its sovereignty. From the Philippine perspective, China’s actions represent a challenge to its security, prompting it to seek support from ASEAN for a joint response in the SCS. However, the bloc’s positions are divided: the Philippines actively denounces China, Vietnam takes a more pragmatic approach, and Malaysia avoids confrontation. These differences have led ASEAN to adopt a moderate stance, prioritizing diplomacy over conflict. In summary, the Philippines is strengthening its alliance with the United States under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which ensures assistance in the event of an attack in the Pacific, including the SCS. This cooperation aligns with the U.S. geopolitical strategy in Asia, which has evolved from Obama’s “Asia Pivot” to the “Indo-Pacific” vision, focused on a “rules-based order” and the security of trade routes. However, the exclusion of China has led to perceptions that this strategy is a containment mechanism against the world’s second-largest economy. For example, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi argues that the U.S. strategy aims to “besiege and contain China” through alliances that promote confrontation. He also claims it undermines regional cooperation, while the Asian giant promotes a “community with a shared future in the Asia-Pacific” based on integration and stability. Thus, China employs the concept of the Asia-Pacific and, although it remains cautious in its rhetoric, insists that its approach prioritizes cooperation and avoids a bloc-based logic in the region. In this context, during Balikatan, a joint military exercise between the U.S. and the Philippines in April 2024, Washington deployed Typhon missile systems in the northern part of the country. By the end of the year, Manila expressed interest in acquiring them, which Beijing perceived as a threat. In 2025, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. stated he would reconsider the U.S. military presence if China ceased its territorial claims. China has not officially responded, and these remarks could be part of Philippine political rhetoric, reflecting its perception of threat in the region. Additionally, the Philippines has strengthened security cooperation with Japan, which also faces territorial disputes with China. In 2024, they signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement to facilitate military deployments, and Japan supported the modernization of the Philippine Navy. In 2025, both nations reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. While Manila strengthens its position through strategic alliances, Beijing views this as an attempt to internationalize the conflict. Another point is that the Philippines’ approach varies depending on the administration in power. During Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency (2016–2022), Manila prioritized closer ties with Beijing, favoring economic cooperation. In contrast, the arrival of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in 2022 strengthened the alliance with the United States, increasing defense and security cooperation, but also escalating tensions with China. On the other hand, while the U.S. has expanded its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, Trump’s first term (2017–2021) had a more isolationist approach compared to the Obama (2009–2017) and Biden (2021–2025) administrations. The Philippine government hopes to maintain the agreements reached in 2024, although their continuity will depend on how the new Trump administration (2025–) manages its Indo-Pacific strategy. Moreover, the Philippines cannot fully align with just one actor, as both China and the U.S. are essential to its economy. The United States is its main export market, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority, while China is its largest source of imported goods, top investor, infrastructure partner, and shares agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Therefore, while Manila strengthens its defense cooperation with the U.S. and maintains strategic interests in the South China Sea, its relationship with China remains crucial due to its economic importance. Final Considerations From a geopolitical perspective, cooperation between the Philippines and the United States seeks to counterbalance China's presence in the region, while China reinforces its position in the SCS for sovereignty and security reasons. In this context, the relationship between Manila and Washington, along with the stance of ASEAN members, will be decisive in the evolution of the conflict. Thus, the dispute in the South China Sea reflects a geopolitical competition between regional and extra-regional actors for control of strategic areas, where each defends its own interests. Although none of the parties appear to seek open conflict, increasing militarization and patrols have raised the risk of incidents that could escalate tensions. In this context, the future will depend on the willingness of actors to negotiate concessions, although the lack of consensus and divergent interests make a definitive solution unlikely in the short term. In this way, Alfred T. Mahan’s theories on maritime power remain relevant in the SCS, although their application is not absolute. Beyond the control of sea routes, the competition also unfolds through the construction of narratives by regional and external actors. The way these narratives shape alliances and perceptions will be key in defining power dynamics in the region.

Energy & Economics
NEW DELHI, INDIA - February 25, 2020: U.S. President Donald Trump wife Melania Trump, Indian President Ram Nath Kovind, Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a ceremonial at the presidential palace

Trump's tariffs: an economic windfall for India

by Catherine Bros

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском US tariffs on Indian goods will rise from 17% in 2023 to 26% in 2025. Yet the world's most populated country can see this aggressive US policy as an economic boon for three reasons: its low level of integration into the global market, its ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ policy of strategic autonomy and its position as an alternative to China. The United States is India's biggest customer. It accounts for 19% of India's exports. India considered itself relatively unaffected by the new US customs policy unveiled on April 2. US tariffs on Indian goods will rise from 17% in 2023 to 26% in 2025, if President Trump does not postpone the implementation date once again... This 26% figure is much lower than the duties imposed on other South-East Asian nations, which to some extent compete with Indian industry. Bangladesh, for example, has tariffs of 37%, Vietnam 46% and Thailand 36%. Certain key sectors of Indian industry, such as pharmaceuticals, are even exempt from additional duties. This exemption underlines the strategic importance of India's exports of generic medicines to the United States. A variable geometry customs strategy. India, which has no plans to retaliate, is confident of concluding a relatively advantageous agreement thanks to the bilateral negotiations that began in February 2025, following Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the United States. Indian reindustrialisation? Some see this new customs policy as an opportunity for India to reindustrialise, something it badly needs to boost employment. Over the years, India has lost its comparative advantage in certain sectors to other South and South-East Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand and Vietnam. The latter face customs duties that are higher than India's, and that are rising faster. Is this likely to boost the competitiveness of these Indian industries? However, they would require long-term investment. India's industrial strategy has preferred to focus on more technologically advanced sectors, by introducing subsidies for the creation of production capacity through the Production Linkes Incentive (PLI) Scheme. The aim is to reduce dependence on imports and boost exports in priority sectors. The semi-conductor sector, for example, has benefited greatly, with the hope, among other things, of turning India into a manufacturing hub for these products. It hopes to attract €27 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI). The task will certainly be made more difficult by the protectionist policies of the United States. Re-industrialisation in India will require regulatory reforms and investment in infrastructure. Despite the substantial progress made in these areas, more remains to be done. In any case, for US protectionist policy to encourage the development of Indian industry, it would have to be stable, which does not seem to be the primary orientation of the current Trump administration. Weak integration into world trade India's participation in world trade in goods is modest given the size of its economy: in 2023, India's market share in world trade was 2%. Despite its growing trade surplus with the United States, India has been relatively unaffected by the rise in tariffs, partly because Indian imports account for only 3% of total US imports. Its economy, which is very little integrated into global value chains, will de facto be less severely affected by the new US customs policy.  Although its economy trades few goods with the rest of the world, India has a comparative advantage in the service sector, which accounts for almost half of its exports of goods and services. Yet services are largely unaffected by tariffs and remain outside the perimeter of the new US policy. Indian protectionism: "Atmanirbhar Bharat" The protectionist stance adopted by the United States may reinforce the Indian government's conviction that it is right for its economy to be only marginally integrated into world trade in goods. The Indian economy is not very open and its trade policy has long tended towards protectionism. The latest industrial policy plan, "Atmanirbhar Bharat" ("Self-sufficient India"), aims to promote both exports and the strategic autonomy of the Indian economy in a number of sectors, including pharmaceuticals, solar energy and electronics. Since the ‘Made in India’ programme, India's industrial policy has not sought to create growth through exports, but to attract foreign capital to create production capacity in India, mainly for the Indian market. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has risen sharply, albeit from a relatively low base: it stood at 45.15 billion dollars in 2013. By 2022, it will have risen to $83.6 billion. India, more than ever courted India is strengthening its strategic position on the international stage. Its economy was already attracting the attention of investors, thanks to its potential market of 1.4 billion consumers and its position as Asia's alternative to China. The erratic behaviour of the Trump administration makes any partnership with India even more desirable, particularly for Europeans. There is no doubt that the trade talks for an agreement between the European Union and India, that began in 2022 and were brought back to the forefront by the visit of the President of the European Commission to New Delhi in February 2025, will take on a new dimension in the eyes of the Europeans. India's current nationalist government has worked hard to ensure that India becomes a pivotal player in the international community. This leading role on the international stage is a significant electoral asset that should strengthen Narendra Modi's influence within the country.

Defense & Security
Economic Community of West African States member countries flags on world map with national borders

The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS: Outlines of a new regional order in West Africa

by Vasil Kostanyan , Alexander Chekashev

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The first half of the 2020s dramatically changed the situation in Sahel. Military coups in Mali (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) brought the military to power. In Niger, the military junta that came to power, the National Council for the Protection of the Homeland led by Abdurahmane Tchiani, faced fierce criticism, sanctions, and a de facto economic blockade of the country by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In addition, ECOWAS has threatened military intervention, with the stated aim of restoring deposed President Mohamed Bazoum. In many ways, the risk of more military coups in countries in the region drove the organization, causing particular concern for Nigeria, its chairman at the time. Abuja positioned itself as a leader in the region, particularly in ECOWAS, so it was important for it to preserve the integrity of the organization and the status quo in neighboring countries. Pressure from France, in turn, also had a corresponding effect. Paris has significant economic interests in Niger due to the country's large uranium reserves to support French nuclear power plants. As a result, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger began a process to create a military alliance aimed at the common defense of the three countries, including the fight against terrorism and separatism. As a result, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was created on September 16, 2023, and transformed into a confederation on July 6, 2024. Thus, the range of cooperation between the three countries was broadened: now it covers not only military-political but also socio-economic spheres. Already on January 28, 2024, the AES countries announced their intention to leave ECOWAS, but since immediate withdrawal from the organization was not possible, they formally remained in the organization for another year, during which time the ECOWAS member states tried to find a compromise with the AES. On January 28, 2025, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formally announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS. This political process in the Sahel significantly changes the balance of power in the region. Why did the AES countries witdraw from ECOWAS? The reasons for the withdrawal of states from the organization are related to the problems of separatism and terrorism in the region. In early 2012, at the height of the civil war in Libya, Libyan Tuaregs formed the “National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad” (MNLA) and moved to Mali to rebel against the government in order to create an independent Tuareg state. After the military coup in Mali in March 2012, the rebels took advantage of the situation and proclaimed the “Independent State of Azawad” in the north of the country. They were supported in this by fighters from the Ansar al-Din Front, who were in contact with Al-Qaeda. However, after the declaration of independence of Azawad, the Islamists did not accept the secular status of this unrecognized state, which led to contradictions with the MNLA. As a result of fighting between the Islamists and secular rebels, the latter were defeated and went underground. The entire territory of Azawad came under the control of radical Islamists. The Islamization of the movement, as well as Islamist attacks on southern Mali, forced France to intervene, as it could destabilize the situation in the region. Operation Serval was announced. ECOWAS, under Article 3 of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance Defense, signed in Freetown on May 3, 1981, was obliged to provide assistance to Mali for anti-terrorist operations Accordingly, and also referring to UNSC Resolution №2085, ECOWAS launched the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). As a result, France and ECOWAS managed to liberate all the towns captured by the militants by February 2013, after which the ECOWAS mission was placed under the auspices of the UN. The UN operation was called the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and was peacekeeping in nature. But these efforts were not enough to destroy extremist groups in Mali. Militants began to use guerrilla warfare methods, and a wave of terror began in the country's cities. Neither the UN mission nor the new French Operation Barkhan (2014–2021) were able to stop terror in the country. The situation worsened after a new radical Islamist group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), a regional branch of al-Qaeda, appeared on the scene in 2017. It has operated not only in Mali, but also in Burkina Faso and Niger. Over the past few years, separatists of the Azawad Liberation Front have been in contact with JNIM, which could lead to the consolidation of anti-government forces and, as a result, further strengthen the terrorists' position in the country. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2025, while the number of conflict-related deaths in the Sahel per year in 2017 was about 5,400, it will be 25,000 in 2024. Both ECOWAS and France were powerless against this threat. The fight against guerrilla insurgents required special tactics and a great deal of manpower, but neither France nor ECOWAS had these tools. Although ECOWAS had repeatedly deployed troops to war-torn countries (e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc.), it had no experience in fighting terrorism. In the Sahel, ECOWAS forces faced Islamists using sabotage and terrorism. In addition, ECOWAS is primarily an organization aimed at solving economic problems, so the vast majority of its resources are deployed in solving economic problems rather than military ones. However, for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the first priority is to eliminate separatist and terrorist groups, hence these countries give priority to security cooperation within the organization. Since ECOWAS did not provide sufficient assistance due to its inability to carry out the combat mission (in Burkina Faso and Niger ECOWAS did not conduct any anti-terrorist operations at all), the three countries preferred to create their own military alliance, which is focused on the fight against separatism and terrorism, takes into account all the peculiarities of the fight against guerrillas and corresponds to the common interests of the three countries. This is the reason for the withdrawal of the AES countries from the Economic Community. Apollinaire Joachim Kyélem de Tambèla, Prime Minister of Burkina Faso, in his statement of 30 January 2024, noted that for almost a decade, the three countries have been confronted by criminal groups supported, financed and equipped by their partners, with the indifference of some neighbouring countries and subregional organizations, including ECOWAS. It can be concluded that the Sahel countries are disillusioned with the ECOWAS policy on security issues in the region. What does the future hold for the "Sahel trio"? At the end of January 2025, the AES countries announced the creation of a 5,000-strong joint force contingent to fight terrorism, thus fulfilling the military alliance's primary objective of coordinated counterterrorism organization in the region. This has raised the profile of the military in power in the three countries. The course taken by the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger resonated with the public. On January 29, 2025, following the official announcement by the President of the ECOWAS Commission of the withdrawal of the AES countries, the people of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger took to the streets to celebrate. In the event of successful counter-terrorism operations in the region, popular support will increase, which will help to consolidate the power of the military and, as a result, stabilize the political situation in these countries at least in the medium term. However, for the final stabilization of the situation in the region, it is necessary to eliminate the terrorist threat, as well as to create strong and combat-ready armed forces. Not only the stabilization of the political but also the socio-economic situation in the Sahel countries depends on this. In contrast to the politico-military sphere, socio-economic ties with ECOWAS remain. Although the AES countries have also left ECOWAS, some key provisions of the organization remain in force. For instance, according to the official ECOWAS statement on the withdrawal of the AES countries dated January 29, 2025, passports and identity cards with the ECOWAS emblem remain in place, goods and services from the AES countries have access to the ECOWAS market under the same conditions, visa-free travel is maintained, and civil servants from the AES working in ECOWAS institutions are supported and retained in their positions. However, the same document notes that these conditions are temporary. Permanent terms of cooperation with the three countries will be adopted at a future Summits of Heads of State. The socio-economic situation in the Sahel countries is very difficult. According to the World Population Review, the percentage of the population below the poverty line is 45.5% in Niger, 44.6% in Mali and 43.2% in Burkina Faso. Although the states are rich in natural resources, they are unable to realize their full potential due to poor infrastructure. Continued investment in the economies of the three countries is needed, but the investment climate is deteriorating due to the terrorist threat. Economic difficulties can be overcome by joint efforts. The confederative beginnings of the AES provide an opportunity to begin the process of economic integration. The Sahel countries are seeking to establish an economic and monetary union, which will lead to a new currency called the Sahel. The logical continuation of these actions could be the exit from the franc zone. Thus, the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS could stabilize the political situation in the Sahel countries due to massive support for the AES exchange rate, while plans to create a single currency and leave the franc zone could strengthen the economic independence of the three countries. The Changing Regional Order in West Africa  For almost a century and a half, West Africa has been part of the French zone of influence. Ever since French troops established their control over these lands, all political and socio-economic processes in the region have taken place with direct French participation. However, over the past few years, France has significantly lost its influence in West Africa. The turning point in this was the failure of the anti-terrorist operation “Barkhan” in Mali, as a result of which France had to withdraw its troops from the country. After a series of military coups in the Sahel, which were largely anti-French in nature, Paris' position weakened further. French troops left Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Senegal. The final blow was the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS and the creation of the Confederation of Sahel States. This was particularly dangerous for France because the AES showed an alternative development alternative to West African countries. Now it is not only the pro-French ECOWAS that is acting as an integrationist grouping in West Africa, but also the AES. Already Chad is attempting rapprochement with the AES countries. On February 21–22, 2025, Chadian President Mahamat Déby attended The Panafrican Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou. In addition, the Central African head of state met with his Burkina Faso counterpart, Captain Ibrahim Traoré. During the dialog, the two sides discussed the fight against neo-colonialism and security challenges in the region. The French newspaper Le Monde regarded this as a possible rapprochement between Chad and the AES. Although Ghana acts more as an intermediary in the negotiations between the AES and ECOWAS, it has also made attempts to move closer to the AES countries. Thus, President John Dramani Mahama visited the AES countries from March 8–10, 2025. During his visit, he discussed with the Heads of State the strengthening of bilateral cooperation and security issues in the Sahel. The authority of the AES in Africa is gradually growing, which may encourage some countries in the region to move closer to the Confederation. On January 29, 2025, new AES passports were introduced and the flag of the Confederation of Sahel States was approved on February 22. All these measures should help strengthen the organization's position in the region.  Not only France, but also the United States is losing its former regional positions. In 2012, American troops were sent to Niger to fight terrorism, but after the coup in Niger in 2023, the military that came to power demanded that Washington withdraw its military contingent from the country. The United States had to make concessions. By early August 2024, all U.S. military personnel had been withdrawn from Niger, and military bases were placed under the control of local militaries. Russia is one of the actors whose regional positions are being strengthened. Moscow has been particularly active in cooperating with Mali. Since gaining independence in 1960, the Republic has signed a number of important economic agreements with the USSR and, after its collapse in 1991, with Russia. At the current stage of Russian-Mali relations, the range of cooperation has been significantly expanded: it also covers the military and political sphere. Thus, an agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed in 2003, in 2009 - Memorandum on cooperation in the field of combating terrorism and transnational organized crime, and in 2019 an Intergovernmental Agreement on Military Cooperation. Russia can be characterized as the main partner of the Sahel trio. Thus, it supported the initiative to create a Confederation of Sahel States. At the end of December 2024, Russian Ambassador to Mali Igor Gromyko said that Russia confirms its intention to continue to provide the necessary support to the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States, including assistance in improving the combat effectiveness of the national armed forces, training of military and law enforcement personnel, as well as to develop mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation with these states, and added that the establishment of the AES is an important step in the fight against terrorism in the region. It is for the implementation of these tasks that the African Corps under the Russian Ministry of Defense was established at the end of 2023 on the basis of the private military company Wagner, which aims to fight terrorism in the region. This is an important step toward consolidating Russia's position in West Africa. Russia is gradually pushing France out of the Sahel, and this is expressed not only in the military-political sphere, but also economically. The Russian Federation has signed a number of economic and trade agreements with the AES countries, which have seriously affected French companies and businesses in the Sahel. The most painful blow, perhaps, was the ban on uranium mining for the French company Orano in Niger, one of the largest uranium producers in the world. For France, uranium ore from Niger supplied a number of nuclear power plants. Since then, Russian companies have been invited to mine in Niger, including the French company Orano, one of the largest uranium producers in the world. For France, uranium ore from Niger supplied a number of nuclear power plants. Russian companies have since been invited to mine minerals in Niger, which include uranium. At the end of February 2025, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Exploration and Mining, which provides for the development of bilateral cooperation to strengthen Niger's mineral exploration and mining potential. China is also increasing its influence in the region. According to the China Global Investment Tracker, Chinese direct investments in Mali amounted to $600 million in 2023–2024 and $700 million in Niger. They were mainly directed to the metallurgical and oil sectors, as well as nuclear power. Military cooperation occupies an important place in China's relations with the Sahel countries. Thus, in July 2023, it became known about the signing of a contract for the supply of Chinese arms to Niger in the amount of $4.2 million. Although it is mainly light weapons (rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, rocket systems, etc.), the fact that there is a defense agreement greatly enhances China's authority in the region. Another actor that has increased its influence in the Sahel is Turkey. Ankara emphasizes military cooperation with the AES countries. So, in 2022, the Malian Armed Forces received unmanned aerial vehicles Bayraktar TB2, which are to be used in the fight against terrorism in the region. The diplomatic forum held in Antalya from March 1–3, 2024, highlighted the problems of the Sahel region. The forum was attended by representatives of the AES countries who criticized ECOWAS. In particular, Mali's Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop said that ECOWAS was inadequately addressing regional problems and that it had not responded to crises in the region but opposed the new foreign policy of the Sahel countries. In addition, the Minister noted that the harsh sanctions imposed on the AES countries had no legal basis, while cooperation within the framework of the AES appeared to be a solution to regional problems. *** The withdrawal of the AES countries from ECOWAS led to a transformation of the regional order in West Africa: an alternative to ECOWAS emerged in the form of the Confederation of Sahel States. The AES is not as capable as ECOWAS, but it is growing rapidly. There are already countries showing interest in the AES. Plans for economic integration will only strengthen the position of the organization, which will lead to the AES competing with ECOWAS. It remains to be seen whether this competition will turn into a confrontation. Russia, in turn, by supporting the military that came to power as a result of coups, is gradually pushing France out of the region. This is a serious challenge for French foreign policy, which will be extremely difficult to overcome at least in the medium term. The political vacuum created by the withdrawal of France and the United States from the Sahel has been filled not only by Russia, but also by China and Turkey. These countries are increasingly consolidating their influence in the region and seeking access to resources. There have been regular Islamist and separatist attacks on the armed forces of the three countries. The threat from jihadist groups is increasing. In order to finally stabilize the established regional order, it is necessary to destroy terrorist and separatist cells that threaten the current regimes of the AES countries, which will determine political stabilization in the three countries and the development of socio-economic projects. The Sahel countries are likely to continue cooperative efforts to combat terrorism and expand defense cooperation with Russia, Turkey, and China.

Defense & Security
HAJJAH, YEMEN – October 29, 2023: A visit by senior military leaders to internationally recognized forces in the Yemeni Saada axis

Trump, Tehran, and the Trap in Yemen

by Mohd Amirul Asraf Bin Othman

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As the Middle East braces for another escalation of conflict, Tehran finds itself cornered by Donald Trump’s coercive diplomacy, facing the stark choice between strategic concession or regional confrontation. Donald Trump’s return to the presidency has reignited US–Iranian hostilities, transforming Yemen into a strategic flashpoint. His administration’s doctrine of militarised diplomacy, cloaked in zero-sum calculations, has elevated the Houthis from a peripheral proxy to a principal trigger for escalation. By explicitly linking Houthi missile fire to Iranian command, Trump has effectively nullified Tehran’s longstanding strategy of plausible deniability.  Historically, Iran’s use of proxies has relied on operating within a grey zone; projecting influence while avoiding direct confrontation. Trump’s return seeks to dismantle this strategic ambiguity, reclassifying all proxy activity as acts of Iranian statecraft. The US military has launched its most expansive campaign under United States Central Command (CENTCOM) against the Houthis since the Red Sea crisis began in late 2023, targeting ballistic missile infrastructure, drone depots, and senior leadership in Yemen. The operation, launched on 15 March, marked a strategic shift, following Trump’s re-designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation and his vow to “rain hell” on their positions if the attacks continued. Trump’s rhetoric has escalated accordingly, and he has warned: “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of Iran.”  This traps Tehran in a paradox: either abandon the Houthis, risking both reputational credibility and strategic depth, or absorb the full brunt of US retaliation. Neither option is strategically tenable. Recognising the stakes, Iran has reportedly urged the Houthis, via Omani intermediaries and back channel diplomacy in Tehran, to scale down their maritime attacks, particularly in the Red Sea. However, Houthi leadership has publicly dismissed such appeals, reaffirming their commitment to targeting Israeli shipping and rejecting external interference in their operational decisions. Their resistance is fuelled by ideological conviction, conflict-tested resilience, and an expanding sense of regional purpose.  Since the beginning of the recent Israel-Hamas conflict, and amid Hezbollah’s decline, Hamas’s isolation, and Syria’s collapse, the Houthis have emerged as Iran’s most assertive proxy. Their attacks on Red Sea shipping and missile strikes against Israel, while mostly intercepted, nonetheless embarrass Arab regimes and stretch Israeli and American defensive postures.  The renewed Gaza conflict, triggered by Israel’s March 2025 bombing that killed five Hamas leaders and over 400 civilians, according to the Gaza Health Ministry, has collapsed the fragile ceasefire and reignited a multifront war involving Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. With Gaza’s death toll now exceeding 50,000, Hamas frames its actions as part of a broader resistance to Israeli aggression. This development has galvanised regional anger and contributed to a broader mobilisation among Iran-aligned actors. Hezbollah has resumed intermittent rocket fire along the Lebanese border, while the Houthis, citing solidarity with Gaza, have intensified missile launches towards Israeli territory, including attempted strikes near Ben Gurion Airport, underscoring their expanding operational capacity and the symbolic coordination anchoring the Axis of Resistance.   Tehran’s influence may be weakening. The Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated a higher risk appetite, often acting beyond Iran’s preferred thresholds of escalation. This divergence complicates Tehran’s efforts to preserve plausible deniability while reaping the strategic dividends of proxy activism. The resulting imbalance reveals a deeper problem: Iran seeks the benefits of Houthi militancy without bearing the cost, an increasingly unsustainable equilibrium under Trump’s zero-tolerance posture.  Iran’s dilemma: no more deniability  According to the 2025 US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment, the Houthis continue to enhance their military capabilities through arms and dual-use technology imports from Russia and China. The smuggling of drone components through the Red Sea and the Omani-Yemeni border indicates a pattern of sustained logistical support. By dismantling Iran’s plausible deniability and publicly attributing every Houthi strike to Tehran, Washington seeks to force a binary: either Iran controls its proxies or accepts full strategic liability.  This exposes Tehran to a potential regional escalation that it is likely unprepared to navigate. The US narrative, amplified by Trump’s statements and CENTCOM’s operational tempo, collapses the operational gap between proxy and patron. This leaves Iran with shrinking room for strategic manoeuvre, particularly as it seeks to avoid direct conflict while preserving deterrent credibility. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have already conducted cross-border raids into Yemen, and Israel is lobbying for expanded UN sanctions on Iran’s missile program.  Backchannel bargains: araghchi’s high-wire diplomacy  Amid growing domestic unrest, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has reportedly been granted authority to pursue indirect negotiations with Washington. While Supreme Leader Khamenei maintains opposition to direct talks, the use of European and Omani channels offers Tehran a diplomatic off-ramp, though under immense diplomatic and political pressure. Araghchi, a veteran of the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) talks, is viewed as more pragmatic than hardliners in the regime.  This opening follows Trump’s letter to Khamenei, demanding a new nuclear agreement within two months. The letter includes explicit demands: dismantle uranium enrichment, abandon missile development, and sever ties with regional proxies.   Iran’s nuclear posture remains opaque. The IAEA confirms Tehran has stockpiled enough 60 percent enriched uranium for multiple warheads if refined further. Yet, Iran insists its nuclear aims are peaceful. Semi-official sources suggest that continued Western escalation could prompt withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.   Iran’s domestic pressures are compounding. The economy suffers under inflation, sanctions, and currency collapse. The unrest in Urmia during Nowruz—the Persian New Year celebrated on the spring equinox—driven by inter-ethnic Kurdish-Azeri tensions, underscore the regime’s waning ability to manage internal dissent. With state institutions weakened, and central authority increasingly concentrated in the hands of Khamenei, public disillusionment is deepening.  The squeeze on Iran: less room to manoeuvre  Iran’s ability to maintain the status quo is under unprecedented strain. Its decades-old strategy of “strategic patience” is becoming harder to sustain. Though Iran continues to nurture ties with China and Russia, and remains engaged with European interlocutors,these relationships no longer offer the same buffer. The European Union, constrained by Washington’s hard-line approach, lacks the independence to offer credible guarantees.  Meanwhile, Israel and Saudi Arabia remain resolute in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. The Begin Doctrine, which justified Israel’s pre-emptive strikes on Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007), may resurface should diplomacy falter. The spectre of unilateral military action now shapes Tehran’s strategic calculus.  Regionally, Iran’s proxy entanglements are escalating. The synchronised attacks from the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah are overstretching Israeli defences and fuelling calls in Tel Aviv for broader regional offensives. Israeli retaliation, paired with US military strikes, has intensified the risk of a wider conflagration. Arab regimes, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, fear being drawn into the fray, threatening their economic visions for 2030 and beyond.  Meanwhile the Palestinians remain largely abandoned, with no Arab state willing to absorb the population of Gaza as Trump toys with expulsion scenarios. This hard-line vision, absent regional consensus, risks igniting further instability across Jordan, Egypt, and the broader Arab world. Trump’s coercive diplomacy may satisfy tactical aims but alienates Arab publics, a recipe for internal backlash across fragile states.  Yet, abandoning its nuclear leverage is not politically viable for the Iranian regime. Any concessions must be matched by credible, enforceable guarantees—a lesson painfully learned from Trump’s unilateral exit from the JCPOA in 2018. Tehran may accept a phased or limited deal but will resist anything perceived as total capitulation.  In sum, Iran now faces a multidimensional siege: external coercion, proxy volatility, domestic instability, and ideological polarisation. Trump’s second term seeks to corner Tehran into submission, not negotiation. Yet, by collapsing the space between proxy action and state responsibility, Washington may provoke precisely what it seeks to prevent: a regional war with no clear exits. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

Diplomacy
Uyghur map flag grunge history

Opinion – The Colonial Roots of the Ongoing Uyghur Genocide

by Salih Hudayar

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском For over a decade, the world has witnessed mounting evidence of internment camps, forced sterilizations, family separations, religious and cultural persecution, organ harvesting, forced labor, and high-tech surveillance emerging from East Turkistan—an occupied nation China refers to as the “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” These atrocities, targeting Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples, have led multiple governments, including the United States, to designate China’s actions as genocide, while the United Nations has identified them as crimes against humanity. The genocide of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other Turkic peoples is routinely framed as mere human rights violation or a symptom of authoritarian overreach. Such framing obscures the root cause: the illegal occupation and ongoing colonization of East Turkistan by China. To end the genocide and achieve lasting peace, dignity, and justice for the East Turkistani people, the world must recognize that this is not a question of human rights or religious persecution—it is a colonial crisis. And like all colonial projects, it demands not reform, but an end. East Turkistan, home to the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Turkic peoples, has a long and distinct sovereign history, culture, and identity separate from that of China. While the Manchu Qing Empire occupied the nation in 1759, Qing occupation over East Turkistan has never been continuous or consensual. The people of East Turkistan persistently resisted, launching 42 uprisings between 1759 and 1864, and regained independence as the State of Yette Sheher (1864–1877), before being re-occupied by the Qing Empire in December 1877. In 1884, Beijing renamed the country “Xinjiang” (meaning “New Territory”)—a colonial term imposed to normalize its conquest, and Chinese settlers were encouraged to alter the nation’s demographics. These were not merely administrative measures—they were calculated steps in the construction of a colonial regime. Yet, the people of East Turkistan continued to resist the occupation and sought to re-establish their independence. The people of East Turkistan re-declared their independence twice in the 20th century—in 1933 and again in 1944—establishing the East Turkistan Republic.  before falling victim to geopolitical deals and military occupation. Both republics were short-lived, undermined by geopolitical maneuvering and military aggression. n 1949, following the Chinese Communist Party’s rise to power, the People’s Liberation Army invaded East Turkistan with Soviet support. Under the pretext of “peaceful liberation,” the PLA dismantled East Turkistan’s sovereignty and imposed a colonial regime that persists today. Since then, Beijing has implemented long-term strategies aimed at erasing East Turkistan’s national identity and integrating the nation into its Han-centric nation-building project. These strategies have included mass settlement of Han Chinese colonists, criminalization of East Turkistani history and identity, suppression of cultural and religious freedoms, the dismantling of native institutions, and the violent suppression of dissent. Although some observers refer to these policies as “assimilation,” such language understates the scope and violence of China’s actions. This is not cultural integration—it is national erasure and demographic replacement. The ongoing Uyghur genocide is the latest phase in this decades-long campaign. It has moved beyond political repression into a full-fledged effort to destroy the East Turkistani nation physically, culturally, and psychologically. Millions of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Turkic peoples have been arbitrarily detained in concentration camps, where they are subjected to indoctrination, torture, sexual violence, and forced labor. Furthermore, experts estimate that at least 25,000 to 50,000 Uyghurs are being killed annually solely for their organs. Uyghur and other Turkic women are forcibly sterilized or forced to undergo abortions to prevent the birth of future generations. Over a million Uyghur and other Turkic children are separated from their families and placed in state-run boarding schools designed to sever their cultural and linguistic ties. Over 16,000 Mosques, cemeteries, and historic sites have been demolished, while Uyghur and other Turkic language instruction has been eliminated from public education. In international law, these actions meet the criteria outlined in the UN Genocide Convention. China’s campaign fulfills all five of the acts defined as genocide. This includes killing members of the group through executions, massacres, deaths resulting from torture and neglect in concentration camps, and systematic organ harvesting. It also involves causing serious bodily or mental harm, through forced labor, indoctrination, physical and sexual abuse, and long-term psychological trauma. The Chinese regime has deliberately inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction, including mass internment, surveillance, forced separation of families, and deprivation of basic needs. Additionally, China has imposed measures intended to prevent births, such as forced sterilizations, abortions, birth prevention policies, and the destruction of Uyghur family structures. Finally, it has forcibly transferred children of the group to another group by removing over a million Uyghur and other Turkic children from their families and placing them in Chinese state-run boarding schools and orphanages. What makes this genocide even more insidious is its bureaucratic and technological sophistication. The CCP uses AI surveillance, biometric data collection, and big data policing to monitor and control every aspect of East Turkistani life. Genocide in East Turkistan is not committed with bombs or mass graves—it is executed with facial recognition cameras, QR codes, “predictive policing” apps, forced sterilizations, forced abortions, organ harvesting, and crematoriums to hide the evidence. The answer lies not in ideology alone but in geopolitical calculation. East Turkistan is central to Beijing’s global ambitions. It serves as the strategic linchpin of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), through which China seeks to reshape global trade and influence. Over 60 percent of China’s overland trade passes through the region. Rich in oil, natural gas, gold, lithium, and rare earth elements, East Turkistan is not only a corridor—but a resource base essential to China’s industrial economy. Chinese strategists have long seen East Turkistan as a buffer protecting the Chinese state from perceived threats to its west and north. This logic continues to shape Beijing’s approach today: the occupation of East Turkistan is central to advancing China’s geopolitical ambitions, including control over critical infrastructure, access to Central Asia, and the stability of its broader colonial system. The erasure of East Turkistan is not about internal security—it is about imperial consolidation and expansion. The Uyghur genocide is therefore not a domestic or regional issue—it is an international one. It is rooted in a colonial model of domination that has broad implications for global security, trade, and human rights. Yet the international community continues to treat East Turkistan as a part of China’s “internal affairs,” even as it condemns the crimes taking place there. This contradiction lies at the heart of the global failure to stop the genocide. By framing the issue merely as one of “human rights” or “religious repression,” leaders obscure the core truth: East Turkistan is an occupied country, and the Uyghurs are not a “minority group,” but a nation under siege. This framing benefits Beijing by allowing it to invoke sovereignty and non-interference to shield itself from accountability. In reality, China is misusing the language of sovereignty to justify colonization. This distortion of international norms must be challenged. Addressing the Uyghur genocide requires a shift in global thinking. First, East Turkistan must be recognized as an occupied country, with its people’s right to external self-determination affirmed under international law. The UN Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other legal instruments affirm the right of all peoples to determine their political status. Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples have never chosen to be part of China; their subjugation has been enforced through military occupation, demographic engineering, systemic repression, and a campaign of cultural and national erasure—not integration or coexistence, but elimination. Second, the genocide must be understood as part of a broader colonial project, not merely an episode of repression. This includes recognizing mass enslavement, demographic engineering, and physical and cultural erasure as fundamental tools of colonial domination. Efforts to address these violations must be paired with political actions to end China’s illegal occupation of East Turkistan. Third, the voices of East Turkistani institutions and leaders in exile must be included in international discussions about the future of the nation. The East Turkistan Government in Exile, along with rights groups and diaspora communities, have been calling for recognition, justice, and decolonization for decades. Their perspectives are essential to any serious solution. Finally, international legal mechanisms must be pursued with urgency. This includes supporting East Turkistan’s case at the International Criminal Court and filing additional cases at the International Court of Justice, sanctioning Chinese officials and entities involved in the genocide, and supporting investigations under universal jurisdiction laws in national courts. The failure of the international community to stop the genocide in East Turkistan is not merely a failure of will—it is a failure of principle. So long as governments, media, and international institutions continue to treat this as an “internal issue” for China, the genocide will continue. Only by reframing this as a crisis of occupation, colonization, and national survival can the path to justice become clear. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

Energy & Economics
United States Global Trade War as American tariffs and US government taxation or punative trade war policy or duties imposed on imports and exports  as a 3D illustration.

The trade deficit isn’t an emergency – it’s a sign of America’s strength

by Tarek Alexander Hassan

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском When U.S. President Donald Trump imposed sweeping new tariffs on imported goods on April 2, 2025 – upending global trade and sending markets into a tailspin – he presented the move as a response to a crisis. In an executive order released the same day, the White House said the move was necessary to address “the national emergency posed by the large and persistent trade deficit.” A trade deficit – when a country imports more than it exports – is often viewed as a problem. And yes, the U.S. trade deficit is both large and persistent. Yet, as an economist who has taught international finance at Boston University, the University of Chicago and Harvard, I maintain that far from a national emergency, this persistent deficit is actually a sign of America’s financial and technological dominance. The trade deficit is the flip side of an investment magnet A trade deficit sounds bad, but it is neither good nor bad. It doesn’t mean the U.S. is losing money. It simply means foreigners are sending the U.S. more goods than the U.S. is sending them. America is getting more cheap goods, and in return it is giving foreigners financial assets: dollars issued by the Federal Reserve, bonds from the U.S. government and American corporations, and stocks in newly created firms. That is, a trade deficit can only arise if foreigners invest more in the U.S. than Americans invest abroad. In other words, a country can only have a trade deficit if it also has an equally sized investment surplus. The U.S. is able to sustain a large trade deficit because so many foreigners are eager to invest here. Why? One major reason is the safety of the U.S. dollar. Around the world, from large corporations to ordinary households, the dollar is used for saving, trading and settling debts. As the world economy grows, so does foreigners’ demand for dollars and dollar-denominated assets, from cash to Treasury bills and corporate bonds. Because the dollar is so attractive, the Federal Reserve gets to mint extra cash for use abroad, and the U.S. government and American employers and families can borrow money at lower interest rates. Foreigners eagerly buy these U.S. financial assets, which enables Americans to consume and invest more than they ordinarily could. In return for our financial assets, we buy more German machines, Scotch whiskey, Chinese smartphones, Mexican steel and so on. Blaming foreigners for the trade deficit, therefore, is like blaming the bank for charging a low interest rate. We have a trade deficit because foreigners willingly charge us low interest rates – and we choose to spend that credit. US entrepreneurship attracts global capital – and fuels the deficit Another reason for foreigners’ steady demand for U.S. assets is American technological dominance: When aspiring entrepreneurs from around the world start new companies, they often decide to do so in Silicon Valley. Foreigners want to buy stocks and bonds in these new companies, again adding to the U.S. investment surplus. This strong demand for U.S. assets also explains why Trump’s last trade war in 2018 did little to close the trade deficit: Tariffs, by themselves, do nothing to reduce foreigners’ demand for U.S. dollars, stocks and bonds. If the investment surplus doesn’t change, the trade deficit cannot change. Instead, the U.S. dollar just appreciates, so that imports get cheaper, undoing the effect of the tariff on the size of the trade deficit. This is basic economics: You can’t have an investment surplus and a trade surplus at the same time, which is why it’s silly to call for both. It’s worth noting that no other country in the world enjoys a similarly sized investment surplus. If a normal country with a normal currency tries to print more money or issues more debt, its currency depreciates until its investment account – and its trade balance – goes back to something close to zero. America’s financial and technological dominance allows it to escape this dynamic. That doesn’t mean all tariffs are bad or all trade is automatically good. But it does mean that the U.S. trade deficit, poorly named though it is, does not signify failure. It is, instead, the consequence – and the privilege – of outsized American global influence. The president’s frenzied attacks on the nation’s trade deficit show he’s misreading a sign of American economic strength as a weakness. If the president really wants to eliminate the trade deficit, his best option is to rein in the federal budget deficit, which would naturally reduce capital inflows by raising domestic savings. Rather than reviving U.S. manufacturing, Trump’s extreme tariffs and erratic foreign policy are likely to instead scare off foreign investors altogether and undercut the dollar’s global role. That would indeed shrink the trade deficit – but only by eroding the very pillars of the country’s economic dominance, at a steep cost to American firms and families.

Defense & Security
Armed Forces tribute, Malvinas Islands

President Javier Milei’s Speech at the Tribute to the Heroes of the Malvinas

by Javier Milei

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Good morning, everyone. Forty-three years after the beginning of the Malvinas War, we gather once again as a nation to commemorate our veterans and those who fell in combat, under the proud gaze of their families, to whom I also extend this tribute. Today, we remember those Heroes who gave their lives for the Homeland, who are part of the pantheon of those who forged our history through their sacrifice. Today, we honor them by reaffirming, with genuine determination, Argentina’s claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands, as well as the surrounding maritime areas. Unfortunately, in recent decades, our sovereign claim over the islands has been directly or indirectly harmed by the economic and diplomatic decisions of the political caste. No one can take seriously the claim of a nation whose leadership is known worldwide for its corruption and incompetence, and for dragging Argentina into the arms of the world’s scum. A country that systematically impoverishes its land and sides with dictators and petty tyrants enters any diplomatic negotiation from a position of weakness. And if we add the disarmament and deliberate demonization of the Armed Forces, we had the perfect recipe for the Malvinas Islands to remain forever in foreign hands. The first step we must take, then, is to rise as a country in every sense — both materially and spiritually — and to reclaim the place in the international community that we should never have lost. And there is no other way to achieve this than by applying the ideas of liberty, both within our borders and beyond, by opening ourselves to international trade and adopting a foreign policy aligned with the free nations of the world. This is the first government in a long time that understands that a sovereign country must, first and foremost, be a prosperous country. Only then can we take the second step: to dignify our Armed Forces through the necessary investments that only a prosperous nation can afford. Growth is in vain if public spending is not reorganized, strengthening those areas in which the State should be involved and eliminating those that are unnecessary, because when the State assumes responsibilities that do not belong to it, it is always to the detriment of essential functions. Despite the political caste’s decades-long effort to convince us otherwise, Argentina needs a strong Armed Forces. They are essential to defend our vast territory from potential threats in a global context of growing uncertainty. They are also indispensable in any diplomatic discussion. In this regard, history is unforgiving: a strong country is a respected country. This does not mean that might makes right, but foreign policy cannot be conducted from a naïve and childish idealism either. For us, the Armed Forces are a source of pride. The time when they were undervalued has come to an end. Proof of this is that, on July 9 of last year, for the first time, more than 2,000 of our veterans led the military parade during the Independence Day celebrations, before a proud and grateful crowd for their actions in defense of the Homeland. That is also why we have just enacted a decree instructing the Ministry of Defense to grant the rank of Reserve Second Lieutenant to those Reserve Officer Candidate Soldiers who are veterans of the Malvinas War. This rank would have been granted to them upon completion of their military service, but it was left unfulfilled as they were discharged directly after the war ended. This is, simply put, about settling a debt with these Heroes — a debt that has been ignored for 43 years by successive governments and that we now intend to correct once and for all. Without all the above, any notion of sovereignty loses its meaning. Sovereignty is not about the State owning many companies, nor about financing the film industry, or second-rate concerts, or similar things. Believing that more State means more sovereignty is an Orwellian concept under which politics has historically tried to conceal its dirty dealings — resulting in a poor people enslaved by an omnipresent State. We, on the other hand, have come to reclaim that word, which until recently had been hijacked, and to restore the meaning it truly deserves. A sovereign people is a flourishing, vigorous, respectable people — and above all, a people proud of its Armed Forces. A nation like the one built by the generation of the 1880s, which, after a century of humiliation, we are rebuilding. As I’ve said on other occasions, we are not here to apply extravagant formulas, but rather to return to those strategies that once made us successful. And when it comes to sovereignty over the Malvinas, we have always made it clear that the most important vote is the one cast with feet. We hope that one day the people of the Malvinas will choose to vote with their feet — for us. That is why we seek to make Argentina such a powerful nation that they will prefer to be Argentine, and persuasion or deterrence won’t even be necessary to achieve it. That is why we have embarked on the path of liberation we are now walking — so that Argentina becomes the freest country in the world, once again has the highest GDP per capita on the planet, and inspires people around the world to dream of the Argentine dream. That is what this government understands by sovereignty. It is the standard by which we measure ourselves, and we will not settle for anything less. To conclude, on this second April 2nd that I experience as President, I want to once again reaffirm our unwavering claim over the Malvinas Islands, reinforcing our commitment to exhaust all diplomatic means within our reach so that they may return to Argentine hands. Finally, to the veterans, to their families, and to all those who wear the uniform in defense of the Homeland, I extend my eternal gratitude on behalf of all Argentines. May God bless the Argentine Republic, may the forces of heaven be with us! Long live freedom, damn it! Thank you very much! Long live the Homeland!

Energy & Economics
The new Russian nuclear icebreaker project 22220 in the Barents Sea. Murmansk region, Kola Bay.

Russia in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities

by Andrey Kortunov

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russia is a distinctly Nordic country. Its Arctic coastline stretches for twenty-four thousand kilometers, and almost two thirds of Russia’s territory is covered by permafrost. Among all Arctic states, Russia has by far the most numerous resident communities in the region in total exceeding two million people (approximately a half of the global Arctic population). All of the biggest cities to the North of the Arctic Circle—Murmansk, Vorkuta, Norilsk—are located in Russia. A very large part of Russia’s history for the last millennium has been included a relentless quest for fur, fish, timber, empty lands and new trading routes along the endless Arctic Ocean. Historians still debate whether this perpetual drive to the North has been a Russian blessing or a Russian curse. The expansion in the Northern direction offered the nation a variety of unique opportunities, but it also created numerous challenges that other Europeans never confronted. In any case, this movement had a critical formative impact on forging the Russian character and left a deep imprint on the national mentality. This heritage will undoubtedly stay with Russians in future, affecting their perceptions of themselves, the overall worldviews as well as many specific economic, social, military and other decisions. Economy Today, the Arctic region houses less than 1.3% of Russia’s population, but it accounts for some 12–15% of the national GDP and for 25% of all the exports. One fifth of all Russia’s oil and four fifth of natural gas are extracted here. The Arctic continental shelf, which remains not fully explored, contains even more hydrocarbons—at least 85 tln cubic meters of natural gas and 17.3 bln tons of oil. With many old easily accessible deposits of hydrocarbons on the continent being depleted, the only way for Russia to remain an energy superpower is by moving further North and by mustering its capacities of offshore drilling under quite harsh climate and weather conditions. Beyond oil and gas, Russia’s Arctic can offer such important minerals as nickel, copper, iron core, rare earth elements, platinum, palladium, etc. However, deep-water drilling not makes extracted hydrocarbons and other minerals quite expensive; for instance, most of sea-based oil repositories in the Arctic turn profitable with oil prices staying at USD 70–80 per barrel. With the global energy transition taking speed it is not clear whether international markets are likely to sustain long term demand for the expensive Russia’s Arctic fossil fuels. Besides, quite often this type of deep-water drilling requires a lot of state-of-the-art technologies that Russia does not always has at its disposal. For a long time, Moscow counted on its Western partners (US, Norway, Germany, UK) to get access to such technologies, but the geopolitical environment of today has made this cooperation impossible. Today, Russia counts mostly on China to replace its former partners from the West, but many China’s energy companies have to exercise caution and sometimes practice over-compliance with Western technology transfers restrictions fearing possible secondary US and EU sanctions. Another evident economic opportunity for Russia in the Arctic region is the Northern Sea Route (NSR)—a 5,600 km long transportation corridor that remains the shortest shipping route between Europe and the Asia-Pacific. With the Arctic ice melting and navigation seasons in the North getting longer due to global warming, NSR becomes commercially more attractive. Another assumed comparative NSR advantage is that it does not contain any security risks comparable to those existing today in the Red Sea or in the Gulf of Aden and has no physical restrictions that limit the cargo traffic through the Panama or Suez canals. Nonetheless, these are both technical and political obstacles on turning NSR into a major international transit route. The seas in the North of Eurasia are mostly very shallow and large modern deep draught container ships simply cannot use them without expensive dredging. Furthermore, the coastal infrastructure along NSR needs quite radical modernization and further maintenance. On top of these complications, today it is hard to imagine that EU states would accept NSR as a preferred transit corridor from the Asia-Pacific using Russia as the main link in this transit. This is why the odds are that in the nearest future NSR will be used mostly to serve Russia’s domestic cabotage needs as well as to ship Siberian oil, coal and LNG to China, India and other consumers in Asia. With due commitment, the annual size, which now amounts to almost 40 mln tons, can be doubled by 2030 and later on it can reach even 150 mln tons a year, but it will hardly ever successfully compete with the Suez Canal that can handle up to 150 mln tons of cargo in just one month. Security The security significance of the Arctic region for Russia has two distinctly different dimensions. First, such a long maritime border creates potential vulnerabilities and has to be protected against possible conventional encroachments (these might include not only actions taken by hostile states, but also by private poachers, human traffickers, etc.). Second, the Arctic region provides Russia with a unique unrestricted access to high seas for the national Strategic Naval Forces that are an organic part of the country’s nuclear triad; this access has to be preserved at any cost to maintain credible nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis the United States and its NATO allies. A conventional challenge to the Russian Arctic could theoretically emerge either in the East, with an adversary entering the region through the Bering Strait, or in the West, from the NATO bases in North Atlantic of from Norway. The ongoing climate change and the Arctic ice melting may further increase Russia’s security vulnerabilities, opening the Arctic waters for more intense military traffic. It seems that for the time being Moscow is not particularly concerned about security challenges coming from the Asia-Pacific, though the recent changes in the defense postures of Japan and South Korea and even of a more remote Australia are significant enough to keep a close eye on them. The NATO naval capabilities in the West arguably present a much more immediate security challenge to Russia, especially with Finland and Sweden having joined the Alliance and Norway having lifted some of its earlier limitations on NATO’s use of the Northern Norwegian coastline. Being a predominantly continental military power, Russia cannot hope to defeat NATO in a large-scale conventional naval war, but it can try to deny NATO forces access to the Russian Arctic while maintaining secure access to the Northern Atlantic for the Russian Navy. The nuclear dimension is different. The Russian Northern Fleet is the largest, the most advanced and the most strategically important fleet in the Russian Navy. Its missions are not limited to the Arctic region alone, but are explicitly global; the Northern Fleet should be in a position to operate in any remote corner of the planet deterring a nuclear attack on the Russian Federation. Some of the newest types of Ballistic Missile Submarines (Borei-class) and Nuclear Attack Submarines (Yasen-class) are operating from Arctic bases, as well as many surface battleships including the sole aircraft carrier that Russia has now (“Admiral Kuznetsov”). The choice of the Arctic region to host a critically important component of the national strategic deterrence force was to a degree involuntary—both the Black and the Baltic Seas are semi-enclosed and exits from them are easy to block, and the free access to the Pacific Ocean for Russia is restricted by the US military infrastructure in Japan, in South Korea and in Alaska. Today, Moscow invests a lot into enhancing and modernizing its military presence in the Arctic region including reopening some of the old Soviet installations that were put out of operation in 1990s and building new ones. These installations include search and rescue centers, deep-water ports, air bases and air-defense missile complexes. All these efforts notwithstanding, they clearly reflect defensive rather than offensive nature of Russia’s military posture in the Arctic region. The conventional Russia’s capacities in the region are not sufficient to confidently cut NATO communication lines in the Northern Atlantic and they can hardly justify an extended NATO forward naval deployment in the Arctic. Avoiding a self-destructive navel arms race in the Nigh North remains a critical challenge for both Russia and its Western adversaries. Environment and Social issues Russia’s Arctic region is warming at a rate that is three times faster than the global average. In some parts of this vast territory (e.g. the North-Eastern tip of the Eurasian continent) the speed of warning is even higher. There is a widely shared view that global warming might have a positive impact on the region opening new opportunities in agriculture, transportation, fisheries, offshore oil and gas drilling and so on. Indeed, some of these opportunities might prove to be very real. However, the likely negative repercussions of global warming for the Arctic should not be underestimated. These include an accelerated coastal erosion, increased frequency of floods and other natural disasters decay of local ecosystems. The most visible manifestation of global warming detrimental impact on the region is permafrost thawing, which is expected to affect at least two thirds of the infrastructure in the coming years, including houses, bridges, railroads, highways, sea and river ports, airports and so on. The likely accelerating rise of sea levels would also have profound implications for the region; the West Siberian Lowlands are particularly vulnerable and a part of this huge landmass might ultimately turn into a seabed. Since Russia cannot stop global warming on its own, it pursues policies of climate change adaptation, including enhanced permafrost monitoring, enforcing new construction standards, creating additional wildlife sanctuaries for endangered species and reducing black carbon emissions. On top of the growing climate change pressure, Russia has to face many social problems in its Arctic region. The overall Arctic population of the country is steadily declining all the time since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Though the decline is not very steep—up to 20 thousand people a year,—for a rather modest Arctic community it is nevertheless quite significant. The Arctic salaries usually exceed Russia’s average, but the costs of living in the region are also higher than in the South. Long and dark winters, harsh cold winds and generally inhospitable environment do not provide incentives to settle in the region. The federal government is trying to cope with this problem by offering affordable housing loans, investing into public transportation and health systems, supporting local colleges and Universities and subsidizing social and cultural life in the region. A lot will depend on whether the Russian leadership has the needed resources to continue these initiatives for a long time and whether economic activities in the Arctic can go far beyond extracting mineral resources, fishing and transportation. Like many other Arctic countries, Russia faces many challenges related to indigenous communities residing in the North. Altogether these communities amount to approximately 250 thousand people belonging to at least forty different ethnic groups. Climate change is only one side of the problem that these groups face today though it contributes to shifting animal migration patterns, disrupting subsistence practices like reindeer herding and fishing, inundating villages and threatening traditional ways of life. However, even putting aside global warming one should confess that oil and gas exploration as well as other large-scale mineral resources extraction projects often lead to pollution and displacement of indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands. At the same time, being scattered along very large territories, indigenous peoples face difficulties in accessing healthcare, education, and legal services. It is not easy to combine traditional cultural and social practices with successful careers in modern business or in the rapidly changing public sector. There are no magic solutions to indigenous people’s problems. Yet, the existing Russian and foreign experience suggests that that the severity of these problems can be significantly reduced by implementing a broad range of economic, administrative, legal and social actions. These actions should include engaging representatives of indigenous population into bodies of local self-governance, shifting economic modernization plans from extensive growth to sustainable development, building resilient private-public partnership with local NGOs engaged, creating systems for assessing the impact of climate change on indigenous communities and involve them in environmental monitoring. First published in the Guancha.cn.