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Defense & Security
K2 Black Panther - South Korean basic tank. Hyundai Rotem concern has offered the Polish army a K2 model adapted to its needs along with full technology transfer

The Development of South Korea’s Tanks and the Global Competitiveness of the K2 Black Panther

by World and New World Journal

1. Introduction Since the Korean War, South Korea had long relied on U.S.-made tanks, but in the 1970s it launched a full-scale domestic tank development program under the principle of self-reliant national defense. As a result, beginning with the K1 tank, the country gradually increased its localization rate, and today it has fielded the highly advanced K2 Black Panther, placing itself among the world’s leading tank powers. However, when compared to major tanks competing in the global defense market, a comprehensive analysis is still required not only in terms of performance, but also in cost-effectiveness and export competitiveness. This study examines the evolution and localization of South Korea’s tanks, and analyzes the performance of the K2 in comparison with other global competitors to highlight its export potential and strategic significance. 2. Early Background: The Korean War – Early 1970s During the Korean War 1950-1953, North Korean forces launched their invasion spearheaded by the Soviet Union’s best-selling tank, the T-34. In contrast, South Korea did not possess a single tank at the time. The power of the T-34 allowed the North Korean army to advance rapidly in the early stages of the war. However, the arrival of U.S. ground forces changed the situation. The M24 Chaffee light tank was the first to be deployed, followed by the M4 Sherman medium tank, the M26 Pershing heavy/medium tank, and the M46 Patton medium tank, all of which overwhelmed the North Korean forces. Thanks to this reinforcement, the Nakdong River defensive line was held, and the tide of the war shifted in favor of the UN forces. Additionally, by late 1950, the British Army had committed its renowned A41 Centurion tanks to the conflict. After the war, in 1959, South Korea received the M47 Patton tank from the United States as part of its allied support policy and broader equipment modernization program. After the war, South Korea relied on U.S. assistance until 1970 to accumulate experience in operating and maintaining tanks. In particular, in 1966, when the M48 Patton tanks were provided by the United States, South Korea also received a Technical Data Package (TDP), which included key technology transfers alongside major upgrades. Through this, South Korea acquired comprehensive expertise in armor casting and welding, production processes, precision manufacturing and assembly, as well as quality inspection and testing. This foundation became a crucial stepping stone for the subsequent development of the Korean tank industry. 3. Development of the K1 Indigenous Tank: 1970s–1980s Under President Park Chung-hee’s policy of self-reliant national defense, South Korea launched the Republic of Korea Indigenous Tank (ROKIT) program in 1975 in cooperation with the United States. Following the signing of a memorandum of understanding in 1978, full-scale development began. The design direction was set to base the new tank on the form and performance of the U.S. Army’s latest third-generation tank at the time, the M1 Abrams. Chrysler Defense (now GDLS), the manufacturer of the M1, participated in the project, while South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development and Hyundai Precision (now Hyundai Rotem) worked together to create a smaller, terrain-optimized “Little Abrams” for the Korean Peninsula. In April 1984, two prototypes were produced, and after passing a series of tests, mass production began in 1985. The production K1 tank was armed with a 105 mm rifled gun and equipped with a 1,200 horsepower German MTU-series diesel engine, built with General Dynamics technology. A key feature was the adoption of a hydropneumatic suspension system, allowing adjustable ground clearance suited for Korea’s mountainous terrain. The tank weighed 51.5 tons, carried a crew of four, and a total of 1,026 units were produced between 1985 and 1997. During its service, the upgraded K1A1 variant was developed, featuring a 120 mm smoothbore gun, improved fire-control systems, and enhanced armor protection. A total of 484 K1A1s were produced between 1996 and 2008. Subsequent modernized versions, the K1E1 and K1E2, have ensured that the K1 series continues to serve as a core component of the South Korean Army’s armored forces. 4. The K2 Black Panther: 2000s – Present Beginning in 1996, the Republic of Korea Armed Forces acquired 68 T-80U tanks from Russia as repayment for an economic cooperation loan. At the time, the T-80U was Russia’s latest main battle tank, and for South Korean engineers, who had previously only worked with U.S.-made tanks, it provided a valuable opportunity to gain direct experience with a new model. The lessons learned from operating the T-80U contributed significantly to the later development of the K2 tank. After the Ministry of National Defense announced its next-generation tank program in 1992, a system concept study was carried out in 1995, followed by exploratory development in 1998. In 2003, full-scale system development began. By 2007, three prototypes were unveiled for operational testing and evaluation, and mass production was initially scheduled to begin in 2012. However, issues arose during the development of the domestic powerpack (engine and transmission). These included an engine protection temperature setting error, which failed to safeguard the engine from overheating, and insufficient cooling fan speed in the transmission at maximum output, which led to inadequate cooling. Despite multiple redesigns, persistent problems in performance and reliability testing delayed deployment. As a result, the first production batch of 100 K2 tanks was equipped with Germany’s MTU engines and RENK transmissions instead of the domestic powerpack. These vehicles began delivery to the ROK Army in April 2014. By September 2014, the domestic engine had passed the Defense Acquisition Program Administration’s evaluation, and the second batch of 106 tanks and the third batch of 54 tanks were produced with a “hybrid powerpack”—a Korean-made engine combined with a German transmission. Starting with the fourth production batch, SNT Dynamics’ domestic transmission was successfully integrated, completing full localization of the K2 powerpack. Unlike its predecessor, the K1, which had been developed under the leadership of General Dynamics and relied heavily on U.S. components, the K2 Black Panther is a fully indigenous South Korean tank. With domestically developed engines and transmissions, it achieved a high localization rate, giving South Korea independence from U.S. and German export restrictions and allowing greater freedom in operating and exporting its tanks. As South Korea’s most advanced tank, the K2 incorporates cutting-edge technologies that set it apart from its predecessors. These include a 120 mm smoothbore gun, an active protection system (APS), an autoloader, and stealth features, delivering superior mobility, protection, and firepower. Today, it stands as a core asset of the South Korean Army. Specifications (K2 Black Panther):Crew: 3Weight: 55 tonsEngine: Doosan Infracore DV-27K diesel engineTransmission: SNT Dynamics EST15K automatic transmissionMain Gun: Hyundai WIA 120 mm smoothbore CN08Fire Control System: South Korean domestic technologyArmor: Korean-developed composite armor  5. Timeline of South Korea’s Tank Development: From U.S. Aid to the K2 The introduction and development of tanks in the ROK Army have been organized in a chronological timeline with images. This timeline is designed to provide a clear overview of the entire progression — from U.S. aid tanks, to tanks acquired from Russia, and finally to the development of indigenous Korean tanks.   6. K2 vs. Regional Main Battle Tanks — Performance Comparison Tank performance can be compared across four key categories: Mobility, Firepower, Protection, and Sensors & C4I. MobilityComponents: engine & transmission (powerpack), suspension, roadwheels, sprockets, tracks, and fuel systems.Role: determines speed, acceleration, cross-country mobility, and operational range. Maintainability (ease of maintenance and access) is also included here. FirepowerComponents: main armament (gun) — barrel and mantlet, stabilization system, autoloading/manual loading systems, coaxial and anti-aircraft machine guns, ammunition stowage.Role: defines ability to defeat enemy armor and other targets, hit probability (integrated with the fire-control system), and ammunition variety (e.g., APFSDS, HE).ProtectionComponents: baseline composite/steel armor, explosive reactive armor (ERA), active protection systems (APS), smoke generation, fire suppression and NBC protection, and crew survivability compartments.Role: protects crew and systems from penetration, fragmentation, anti-tank weapons, and environmental threats.Sensors & C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence)Components: fire-control system (FCS), thermal and night sights, laser rangefinder, communications suites, electronic warfare and laser warning receivers, and power-management systems.Role: responsible for target acquisition, firing accuracy, and networked combat — i.e., information sharing with friendly forces.Below is a comparison of the K2 and the region’s current main battle tanks.    The K2 Black Panther is regarded as a world-class main battle tank, demonstrating well-balanced excellence in mobility, firepower, protection, and electronic systems compared to neighboring countries’ tanks. 7. South Korea’s Tank Export Outlook and Key CasesWhile exports of the K1 tank were restricted due to U.S. technology regulations, the K2 tank—developed with fully indigenous Korean technology—became eligible for overseas sales. In 2022, South Korea successfully signed a contract with Poland, and negotiations are currently underway with countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, signaling the expansion of Korean tanks into the global defense market. 7.1. Turkish Joint Development of the Altay Tank Based on the K2 (USD 540 million)In 2007, South Korea signed a design support and technology transfer contract with Turkey for the development of the Altay main battle tank. Under this agreement, South Korea transferred several core technologies derived from the K2 tank, including:- 120 mm CN08 smoothbore gun technology (Korean-produced main gun)Advanced armor and composite equipment design consultation and production support- Powerpack (engine + transmission) technology transfer and testing: the Altay successfully completed durability trials with the HD Hyundai Infracore engine and SNT Dynamics transmission The Altay is scheduled to enter full-scale mass production in 2025, with an initial production run of 250 units and a long-term goal of building up to 1,000 tanks. 7.2. K2 Export to Poland: First Batch of 180 Units (USD 3.4 billion), Second Batch of 180 Units (USD 6.5 billion) In 2022, the K2 tank was selected by Poland over strong competitors such as Germany’s Leopard 2A7 and the U.S. M1A2 Abrams. The key factors behind this successful export were as follows: - Rapid delivery and phased supply: South Korea demonstrated its ability to deliver tanks within a very short timeframe. Following the 2022 contract, the first batch of 10 units was delivered within the same year. By contrast, competitors faced production line bottlenecks, raising concerns over delivery delays. - Modern design with European upgrade potential: The K2 features a 120 mm 55-caliber smoothbore gun, an autoloader, an active protection system (APS), and hydropneumatic suspension—technologies equal to or in some cases more advanced than those found in Europe’s latest MBTs. Moreover, South Korea promised to develop a localized version, the K2PL, through joint development with Poland, tailored to Polish requirements. - Local production and technology transfer: South Korea offered local production of the K2PL, guaranteeing the participation of Polish defense industries, along with technology transfer, industrial cooperation, and the prospect of using Poland as a base for future exports. - Cost competitiveness: Despite being a state-of-the-art tank, the K2 is relatively more affordable than the M1A2 or Leopard 2A7. Maintenance and sustainment costs are also projected to be lower than those of European tanks, giving the K2 a strong reputation as a “cost-effective MBT” with excellent value for performance. - Tactical versatility and advanced systems: Equipped with an autoloader, hydropneumatic suspension, and advanced smart fire-control systems, the K2 offers outstanding adaptability across diverse operational environments, including mountainous terrain, urban warfare, and extreme cold.Through this deal, South Korea and Poland established a relationship that goes beyond a simple arms sale, building long-term defense industry partnership and mutual trust. Potential export destinations for the K2 include the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Egypt, Morocco, and India. 8. Comparison of Tanks from Export Competitor Nations South Korea’s K2 tank has attracted global attention for its outstanding performance, but the international tank market is already dominated by several major players.This chapter analyzes and compares the leading tanks that compete with the K2, while also examining each country’s export competitiveness.   The K2 Black Panther, while incorporating cutting-edge technologies, is lighter than many Western main battle tanks, resulting in relatively lower sustainment costs. It is therefore widely regarded as a cost-effective, well-balanced tank. The cost of a tank varies greatly depending on its design and configuration, but if we break down the production cost (manufacturing, components, and assembly) into four categories, the estimated shares are as follows:- Protection: 30–40%- Firepower: 20–30%- Mobility: 15–25%- Electronics & C4I: 15–25% The actual share, however, depends on specific factors. For example, the use of advanced armor materials (composite/uranium) or the inclusion of an Active Protection System (APS) significantly increases protection costs. Similarly, specialized gun and ammunition systems (such as a 120mm smoothbore, autoloader, or advanced munitions) raise firepower costs. Integration, testing, and safety features greatly affect electronics costs, while options like autoloaders, high-performance thermal sights, and networked systems can heavily influence the final balance. Other important factor is Lifecycle Perspective (Unit Cost vs. Total Life-Cycle Cost), which can be defined as below.- Procurement: About 20–30% of total life-cycle cost (highly variable)- Operations & Support (O&S): 60–70% — dominated by fuel, maintenance, spare parts, and maintenance personnel costs- Upgrades & Depreciation: 10–20% In other words, the long-term operation and maintenance costs take up a much larger share than the initial procurement cost of a tank.Below is a comparison table of modern main battle tank costs: unit acquisition cost, annual sustainment cost, and 30-year life-cycle cost (procurement + sustainment).*The sustainment cost for China’s Type 99A and Russia’s T-90M is an estimate.   9. Conclusion This study has systematically examined the evolution and localization of South Korea’s tanks, and verified the level of their advancement through performance comparisons with leading global competitors. In particular, the K2 has demonstrated balanced capabilities in mobility, firepower, protection, and electronic command-and-control, supported by advanced technologies and a high degree of localization. At the same time, it offers superior cost-efficiency in sustainment and operational expenses compared to heavier Western MBTs. This makes the K2 not only a key asset for strengthening domestic defense, but also a competitive and cost-effective platform in the global arms market. Taken together, these findings suggest that South Korea’s tanks have progressed beyond being a mere symbol of self-reliant defense, and are now positioned to expand exports and build long-term strategic partnerships worldwide.

Energy & Economics
nuclear fusion reactor tokamak concept background, 3d rendering

Accelerating the realization of nuclear fusion: A clear milestone is needed

by Choongki Sung

A few days ago, the author visited Commonwealth Fusion Systems (CFS) near Boston, USA. CFS is one of the most highly watched fusion energy startups in the world, currently constructing SPARC, a next-generation experimental device utilizing high-temperature superconductor technology. The researchers I met there were filled with confidence that nuclear fusion commercialization would be possible soon, and their passion resonated deeply. At the same time, it raised concerns about what we are doing and whether we are falling behind. The reason the world is accelerating efforts to advance the commercialization of fusion power is clear. As the heat wave continues to exceed 30°C even in September, it shows that the climate crisis has become a part of our daily lives. At the same time, rapidly evolving generative artificial intelligence (AI) is signaling an unprecedented demand for electricity. Faced with the dual challenge of responding to the climate crisis and the surge in energy demand, there is an urgent need for a new energy source that can ensure stable supply while minimizing environmental impact. Recently, fusion energy has been gaining attention as a next-generation energy source that meets these conditions. Fusion energy is a clean energy source that emits no carbon, and it uses hydrogen isotopes as fuel, which are virtually inexhaustible. It is often called the 'ideal energy source' because it is not constrained by weather or geographical conditions. Although the technical difficulty has historically been so high that it was considered an 'endless challenge,' the situation has now changed. In 2022, the U.S. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (NIF) succeeded in achieving 'net energy gain'—producing more energy than was input—in a laser-driven fusion experiment, raising expectations for the realization of fusion power. Furthermore, the fact that over 50 private companies worldwide are now diving into technology development with the goal of early commercialization shows that nuclear fusion is no longer a distant dream. Major nations are already focusing their national capabilities by presenting phased goals and execution plans. The U.S. has established a public-private partnership-based national strategy to actively support the endeavors of startups like CFS. China is promoting the construction of a demonstration reactor called CFEDR and, as a precursor, plans to complete the BEST device, capable of burning plasma operation, by 2027. The U.K. is ramping up national preparations by constructing the STEP device with a target of 2040, while also putting in place the engineering technology research facilities and institutional framework to support it. South Korea also possesses research capabilities that are by no means lagging. The core technology accumulated through the construction and operation of KSTAR is world-class, and its experimental results are internationally recognized. The country's experience in operating nuclear power plants is also an asset for future fusion engineering technology development. However, since the establishment of the ‘Nuclear Fusion Energy Realization Acceleration Strategy' last year, no specific roadmaps and execution plans have been revealed publicly. It is necessary to recall that the clear path from KSTAR to ITER to DEMO in the past allowed us to dedicate ourselves to the construction and operation of KSTAR, enabling South Korea to join the ranks of advanced nuclear fusion nations. Major countries around the world are currently moving ahead rapidly, aiming for commercialization in the 2030s and 2040s. To avoid being left behind in this competition, South Korea must urgently formulate an innovative plan for constructing a fusion demonstration reactor, targeting a demonstration in the 2030s. Furthermore, key technologies and large-scale research infrastructure must be strategically secured. A clear goal is essential to ensure that research and investment do not lose direction. Once the execution plan is clearly defined, universities can lead the necessary research and train appropriate talent, and young researchers can envision a future for themselves. Nuclear fusion is a new energy source that can simultaneously solve the climate crisis and energy security issues. What we need is a specific plan to realize it and unwavering determination to execute it. If we make the right choices and preparations now, South Korea can leap forward as an energy powerhouse that future generations can trust and rely on.

Diplomacy
India vs Pakistan conflict concept background with flags and map in the backdrop. Political, war, trade, India pakistan sports

Comparative analysis of India and Pakistan's foreign policy through a postcolonial lens

by Sana Mumtaz

The 1947 partition of British India gave rise to two sovereign states, India and Pakistan, that inherited similar colonial legacies but developed starkly divergent foreign policy paths. These differences were not purely strategic but were rooted in how each state interpreted its postcolonial condition. While India adopted a policy of non-alignment to protect its sovereignty in a bipolar world, Pakistan aligned itself early with Western powers, prioritizing security over autonomy. These choices, driven by internal insecurities, historical trauma, and leadership visions, shaped their global engagements for decades. This paper argues that the postcolonial experiences of both countries profoundly influenced their foreign policies, with India pursuing strategic autonomy and soft power projection, while Pakistan adopted dependency-based alignments driven by survival instincts and regional insecurity. Post-colonialism and Foreign Policy Identity Post colonialism refers to the condition of states that have emerged from the yoke of colonial rule and are navigating their way toward independent identity formation, both domestically and globally. It is a political, cultural, and psychological process that involves reasserting autonomy after years of subjugation (Cvetanovska et al., 2016). For India, postcolonial diplomacy was a tool to construct an independent identity distinct from the former colonizers and the Cold War superpowers. Nehru's advocacy for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1950s was deeply rooted in India’s postcolonial ethos of resisting domination, militarism, and Western dependency (IRJSSH, 2024). Pakistan’s postcolonial trajectory was markedly different. The trauma of partition, including widespread violence and the loss of territory, fostered an intense sense of vulnerability. Lacking economic strength and surrounded by perceived hostilities particularly India Pakistan's leadership quickly sought external patrons, viewing alignment as essential for its survival. In 1954, Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and later the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), receiving substantial U.S. aid in return (Ahmar, 2024). This early dependence on Western powers shaped Pakistan’s foreign policy as one centered on external security guarantees rather than autonomous diplomacy. India’s Evolving Foreign Policy India's foreign policy evolved in three broad phases: 1. Idealist non-alignment (1947–1971)2. Pragmatic balancing (1971–1991)3. Multi-alignment with strategic autonomy (1991–present). In its early years, India sought to play a moral leadership role among decolonized nations, promoting peace, non-intervention, and South-South cooperation. Nehru’s role in establishing the NAM in 1961 underscored India's desire to remain outside Cold War binaries and carve a distinct place for itself on the world stage (Taneja, 2019). However, India’s 1962 border war with China revealed the limitations of idealism. This military defeat prompted a rethinking of foreign policy, leading to closer ties with the Soviet Union. By 1971, India had signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, signaling a partial alignment to protect regional interests, especially as it supported Bangladesh’s liberation (Ahmar, 2024). India’s economic liberalization in 1991 was a turning point. With its economy opening to global markets, foreign policy began prioritizing trade, investment, and strategic partnerships. India launched the “Look East” policy, now rebranded “Act East,” to deepen ties with ASEAN and East Asian powers. Simultaneously, India cultivated strong relations with the United States, particularly in defense, nuclear cooperation, and technology transfer (IRJSSH, 2024). Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has expanded its global footprint further by participating in multilateral platforms like the QUAD, BRICS, G20, and the SCO. It has also invested in soft power diplomacy, promoting yoga, Bollywood, and higher education as cultural exports. India’s campaign for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and its 2023 G20 presidency signal its aspiration to emerge as a major global player. Pakistan’s Security-Oriented Diplomacy Unlike India’s autonomy-focused policy, Pakistan’s foreign policy has remained anchored in strategic partnerships, primarily driven by regional security anxieties. Its early Cold War alliances with the U.S. brought military and economic support, including weapons, aid, and development funding. However, these benefits came at the cost of diplomatic flexibility. Pakistan became part of the American containment strategy rather than a voice for postcolonial solidarity (Ahmar, 2024). During the 1970s, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto attempted to diversify foreign ties by engaging China and Islamic states. Yet, Pakistan remained entangled in great-power politics. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked another watershed moment: Pakistan became a frontline state in the U.S.-backed resistance, supplying weapons and training to the mujahideen. While this brought short-term geopolitical relevance and aid, it also sowed the seeds of extremist militancy that later destabilized the region (The Guardian, 2025). In the post-9/11 era, Pakistan again aligned with the U.S. as a key ally in the War on Terror, receiving billions in aid. However, mistrust over counterterrorism commitments led to strained relations. More recently, Pakistan has deepened ties with China through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multi-billion-dollar initiative under the Belt and Road Initiative. CPEC has transformed infrastructure and energy access but raised concerns about rising debt and reduced strategic independence (Financial Times, 2025). Simultaneously, Pakistan has relied heavily on Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE for financial bailouts. However, the country’s emphasis on Islamic solidarity has not always translated into diplomatic support—especially on the Kashmir issue—where economic interests increasingly override religious or ideological ties (Economic Times, 2025). Comparative Analysis Although born from the same colonial womb, India and Pakistan followed radically different paths in foreign relations. India’s strategic approach has evolved from Nehruvian idealism to Modi’s pragmatic multi-alignment, allowing it to maintain relationships with the U.S., Russia, and China simultaneously. It has strengthened its global standing through economic diplomacy and soft power, investing in trade, culture, and multilateralism (IRJSSH, 2024). Pakistan, meanwhile, has remained stuck in a pattern of dependency, cycling through major power patrons to meet its security and economic needs. Its alliances have often been transactional and security-driven, resulting in short-term gains but long-term vulnerabilities. This reliance on external support has constrained Pakistan’s ability to assert an independent foreign policy agenda (Cvetanovska et al., 2016). India’s soft power and diaspora networks have significantly enhanced its global image, while Pakistan’s foreign relations have been more narrowly focused and reactive. Moreover, India’s diversified diplomatic strategy has helped it gain global influence despite regional tensions. Pakistan’s narrower diplomatic focus has limited its ability to pivot globally beyond its traditional allies. Conclusion India and Pakistan’s foreign policies reflect not just their immediate strategic calculations but also how each internalized its postcolonial legacy. India transformed its colonial trauma into a quest for autonomy and leadership among the Global South. Its foreign policy matured from idealism to realism, culminating in strategic flexibility and global engagement. Pakistan’s path, however, was shaped by existential insecurity, leading to a foreign policy centered on alliances for survival. This comparative lens reveals the long-term consequences of early postcolonial choices. India’s foreign policy has grown more self-reliant and global, while Pakistan remains vulnerable to dependency, volatility, and limited diplomatic bandwidth. Understanding these divergent trajectories is crucial for comprehending the subcontinent’s enduring tensions and each state’s future on the global stage. Bibliography Ahmar, M. (2024). Post-Independence Compulsions and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. Pakistan Horizon.Alden, C., & Aran, A. (2016). Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches (2nd ed.). Taylor & Francis.Cvetanovska, D., Nurgaliyeva, L., & Saidov, A. (2016). India–Pakistan Relations from Foreign Policy Perspective. Journal of Political Studies, 23(1), 45–59.Economic Times. (2025). Why countries still support Pakistan despite terrorFinancial Times. (2025). Pakistan’s strongman courts the US while drawing closer to China.IRJSSH. (2024). Comparison of foreign policy of Pakistan and India during 1947 to 2023. International Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 3(1), 861–871.Taneja, K. (2019). India’s Grand Strategy: From Nonalignment to Multi-Alignment. Oxford University Press.The Guardian. (2025). Thawing of relations between Pakistan and the US.

Defense & Security
Bricked wall with stop terrorism sign

Causes of women involement in terrorism

by Eraj Farooqui

AbstractThis paper explores the complex factors that contribute to women's participation in terrorism, a subject that has attracted more scholarly interest, particularly in the wake of 9/11. The discipline is nonetheless politicised and divided despite a great deal of study, which is frequently made worse by a lack of primary data. Women, who are typically thought of as quiet and non-violent, have taken on important roles in terrorist groups, especially during the 1990s, where they have participated in high-profile attacks and leadership roles. The study identifies the main factors: political, religious, personal, and gender equality—that motivate women's participation. Examples show how different organisations differ in that some encourage women to participate actively, while others limit their positions. The study also examines how terrorism has changed over time, with a particular emphasis on its gendered aspects, and assesses how contemporary organisations such as the Islamic State have reshaped the roles of women in terrorist networks. Finally, by illuminating the ideological, cultural, and societal factors that lead to women's radicalisation and involvement, this research offers an in-depth examination of the relationship between gender and terrorism.Keywords:  Terrorism , Women , Political , Religion , Personal , Gender-equality Introduction The reasons behind female terrorism have been extensively studied and debated by numerous academics. Even though there is a wealth of study, a substantial portion of it is contradictory or incomplete. Frequently, the highly politicised word of terrorism has led to contradictory claims in the research. To understand why individuals resort to women terrorism, scholars highlight political, religious, social, and personal causes. In our culture, women were seen as housewives and peaceful members of society, and terrorist groups were controlled by men. Research on women and terrorism can be done on a variety of subjects; however, this paper will mostly focus on the causes of why women participate in terrorism. After 9/11 the academic research on scholarly papers on terrorism have increased by 300% since 9/11.[1] The connection between terrorism and gender is often overlooked due to governments' reluctance to reveal the primary causes and the reluctance to provide reliable data. Researchers often avoid original sources for security reasons. A 2009 review by Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor found a reluctance to describe events, excessive narrative analysis, and reliance on secondary sources. [2] The word "terror" comes from the Latin verb "terrere" which means to frighten. It was originally used by the Romans in 105 B.C. to characterise the terror that engulfed Rome during the attack by the Cibri tribe. During the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror, Maximilien Robespierre incited fear among the people.[3]The word "terrorist" was used by Edmund Burkey in the Regicide Peace letter. With the end of Reign of Terror, the word ‘terrorism’ gained popularity.[4] Terrorism, a deliberate use of force or intimidation, is a significant issue in the 21st century, often driven by ideological, religious, or political factors. However, the term "terrorism" has no widely recognised definition. There are four distinct stages of modern terrorism. The first wave of terrorism began in Russia and spread to Western Europe and the United States, using revolutionary and anarchist beliefs.[5]  The final wave is founded on religious beliefs that the world is currently dealing with. This wave started in 1979 when Iran underwent an Islamic revolution. Because of gender norms, terrorists are frequently perceived as masculine attackers. Women are perceived as powerless, passive, and victims during times of conflict, but it is important to remember that if they participate in terrorism, they may pose a greater threat than men.[6]And since 1990, women have gained prominence in terrorist organisations, assuming leadership positions and taking part in more brutal assaults. More media attention is given to female attackers, and people are more curious about the motivations behind their actions. Additionally, terrorist organisations are recruiting more women as a result of this. Although they have historically been involved in terrorist organisations, women's numbers have been small. As an example, the number of female suicide attackers has surged from eight in the 1980s to well over 100 since 2000, indicating a growth in the involvement of women in terrorist actions.[7]  On the other hand as per Bloom’s report over 257 suicide attacks were carried out by female bombers between 1985 and 2010, accounting for 25% of all terrorist incidents. Since 2002, the proportion of female bombers in several nations has surpassed 50%.[8]The first known incidence of female political violence happened in 1878, when Zasulich shot Fedor Trepov, the governor of Saint Petersburg. David Rapoport identified this as one of the four waves of modern terrorism.[9] Weinberg and Eubank claim that women have primarily assumed leadership positions in left-wing revolutionary bands while being assigned to inferior positions in right-wing organisations. They mostly perform supporting and auxiliary functions for numerous religious institutions. [10]Gender, Palestinian Women, and Terrorism: Women's Liberation or Oppression? was written by Anat Berko and Edna Erez. stated that during his questioning, he discovered that many Palestinian men did not approve of women participating in suicide bombings because they saw them as inferior to men.[11] After doing study with a local terrorist organisation, Jacques and Taylor chose 30 male and female suicide bombers. He finished by studying the fact that males prefer to join terrorist organisations for religious and nationalistic reasons, but female suicide terrorists are motivated by personal ones. Mia Bloom’s book the Bombshell: Women and Terrorism examines the motivations of women who participate in terrorism,[12] with an emphasis on relationships, respect, revenge, and redemption. According to Vetter and Perlstein, one of the reasons why women join terrorist organisations is because of gender equality. However, Jacques and Taylor disagree with this notion.[13]The main reason women join the LTTE is to fight for gender equality; they participate in every aspect of the group and do so to avoid being discriminated against and repressed by the male-dominated society.  The following studies will provide an academic perspective on the causes of women's involvement in terrorism. The main focus will be on four causes: political, religious, personal, and gender equality, as well as a list of important terror occurrences conducted by female terrorists as a result of some key ideological beliefs. Religious Cause: Religious convictions have been the foundation of many terrorist organisations throughout history. The Crusaders can be categorised as a terrorist group. Although the Crusaders' main objective was to propagate Christianity, they also committed heinous acts of terrorism. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was the fourth wave of contemporary terrorism, and David Rapport claims that it was the first instance of religious terrorism in the modern era. Religious terrorism's core principle is the promotion of violence in the name of furthering religious beliefs. For example, Al-Qaeda and ISIS promote an Islamic caliphate globally.[14] However, attempting to do so by using cruel and aggressive methods. Islam and terrorism have become more associated since 9/11, as terrorist organisations have posed a serious threat to Western ideologies and societal influences.[15] Gonzalez-Perez notes that suicide bombers frequently use the idea of martyrdom and benefits in the afterlife to lure people into justifying their acts.[16] Women are also part of religious terrorist organisations but there are two argument over women involvement in jihadi group. As explaind by Muhammad Khayr Haykal in his book Al-Jihad wa al-qital fi al-siyasah al-shar'iyyah. 1. Women were seen as having a responsibility in raising money for Jihadis, caring for children, and providing medical treatment.[17] 2.    The Islamic state should set up training facilities for women to learn how to wield weapons and combat techniques, according to Islamic legal expert Muhammad Khayr Haykal. According to him, all Muslims should be held accountable for jihad if it turns into fard ‘ayn, and women must be prepared for this possibility in order to perform their duty. This strategy permits the practice of female jihadism in martyrdom missions and on the battlefield.[18] Role of women in Al-Qaeda According to Robet Pape in his book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.[19]Highlights that male terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda oppose women's participation in terrorism. However the Tamil Tigers used twenty-three female attackers, the Palestinians used six, the Lebanese used six, the Chechens used fourteen, and the PKK used ten. Consequently, he concluded that Islamic fundamentalists oppose female fighters.[20] However, after the rise of the Islamic state, which encourages women to join their organisation and accept arms, the Pape argument is no longer regarded as legitimate. For example, some 200 women joined the Islamic State in Syria in 2014 after migrating from Western nations. Additionally, they more than doubled their numbers in 2015, reaching over 550 women.[21] This suggests that the Islamic State may assign women a direct role, such as suicide bombing, in a way that is different from that of many other jihadist organisations, such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  In Al-Qaeda the women played a secondary role for.e.g: Al Qaeda also benefited strategically from the assistance that women provided. For instance, the female terrorists of Al Qaeda were strongly using the internet to try to convince men to join the worldwide Jihad. Some males are inclined to join these groups because they feel ashamed of their masculinity as a result of these communication strategies.[22]Women's roles in jihadist organisations are valued in that they bear children and raise them to be potential recruits for terrorist organisations. Usama Bin Laden thanked women by saying: "You have inspired and encouraged [men] to join jihad, and you have raised all the men who fought in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, and you are the ones who produced the squadron of heroic men who carried out the raids in New York and Washington."[23] On the other hand Ayman al-Zawahiri's wife, Umayma al-Zawahiri, also urged her "Muslim sisters" to raise their kids on the love of jihad in God's way and "to induce their brothers, husbands, and sons to protect Muslims' lands and properties. To support (male) jihadists with prayers and financial support. [24] Al Khansa'a was one of the authors of the online magazine that inspired Muslim sisters with her articles; while she did not advocate for women to fight in combat, she did counsel them to stay in shape and exercise so they would be prepared for jihad.[25] Al-Qaeda Iraq's founder and Al-Qaeda member Abu Musab al Zarqawi urged Iraqi women to join the military. In Talafa, Iraq, a US military recruiting centre was the target of the first female suicide bomber. According to the announcement made by al Qaeda in Iraq on its website, "A blessed sister carried out a brave strike defending her beliefs. May God include our sister among the group of martyrs.’’[26]According to Mia Bloom the attack was carried out under the alias "ghost group" because it was still forbidden for Al Qaeda Central to collaborate with women on suicide bombings.[27] The identities of male suicide bombers are mentioned by AQI members, but the names of female suicide bombers are never mentioned. As a result, it is challenging to determine the purpose or driving force for their membership in terrorist organisations. Despite the lack of data regarding female suicide bombers, certain enquiries and interviews provide us with comparable reasons why they chose to join AQI as female terrorists. After losing a loved one, women join terrorist organisations in order to kill the offender and get revenge for the deaths of their husbands and brothers. Furthermore, AQI members urged young females to die as martyrs, claiming that they would immediately enter heaven and be the prophet Muhammad's neighbours.[28] Al-Qaeda is therefore mostly a male organisation that discourages women from engaging in violent activities. Women's roles are limited to becoming teachers, fund-raisers, social media advocates, and moms of potential jihadists. Role of women in Islamic State(IS) Islamic State was founded in 1999. The Islamic State had the greatest number of foreign terrorist fighters in history, making it a unique terrorist organisation. About 41,490 foreign nationals from 8 nations joined the Islamic State with the goal of restoring the caliphate. Of the foreign terrorist fighters, about 4761 (13%) were female. Following Eastern Europe (44%), Western Europe (42%), the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand (36%), and other regions, Eastern Asia had the greatest percentage (70%) of women connected with the Islamic State.[29] The biggest motivation for joining an Islamic terrorist organisation is religion. Women typically played a supporting role in Islamic terrorist organisations prior to the rise of the Islamic State. However, the role of women in these organisations has grown stronger after the fall of Al-Qaeda and the rise of Islamic State in the Middle East. Muriel Dagauque, a Muslim woman who converted to Islam and was married to a Muslim man, was one of the Islamic State suicide bombers. She moved to Iraq with her spouse from Europe in order to become a martyr, and on November 9, 2005, she bombed herself.[30] Many jihadist suicide bombers are comforted by the assurance that they will be sitting next to God (Allah), experiencing only joy and no agony, before the first drop of their blood ever hits the earth.[31]Women joined the Islamic State mostly for religious reasons. Umm Layth, also known as Aqsa Mahmood, was a 21 year old Scottish university student who travelled to Syria to take part in Islamic State terrorist activities. Mahmood expressed her opinions on jihad with the following sentences.: "If not you, then your grandkids or their grandchildren. But do not worry, our cubs will eventually shed your blood. This Islamic dominion will become well-known and dreaded all over the world. Choose a side; this is a fight against Islam. You may either support them or support us.''[32] Role of women Chechnya Terrorism: Islam is the predominant religion in Chechnya, and Wahhabist terror ideology is linked to Chechen terrorism, particularly suicide terrorism.[33]The Wahhabi sect appears to have spread to the Chechen territories through other terror cells in the Middle East, such as al Qaeda.[34] This ideology which glorifies martyrdom and promotes jihad in order to establish a worldwide Muslim caliphate is a rationale for carrying out acts of retaliation and acting on behalf of a national separatist movement.[35] Chechen women, due to their Islamic influence, often wear black and traditional Muslim clothing, such as a head scarf or jilbab, which allows them to conceal weapons and bombs, as seen in the Dulbrov theatre incident.[36] Religion is one factor that contributes to women joining terrorist organisations, but it is not the only one; other factors also play a role. Political Cause According to Gus Martin, terrorism can occur under a variety of circumstances when there is political repression. First, the group is resentful of the injustices they perceive in society. The group also believes that their social dissent is insignificant. Last but not least, the group believes that there are problems with the system that can be fixed, which leads them to confront the conflict.[37] Despite the widespread belief that women do not participate in political violence, women have been planning attacks and taking part in political violence since 1800.[38] Violence is a tactic used by women who are dissatisfied with the government, have their opinions ignored, and are under-represented in organisational structures With anarchist and revolutionary beliefs, anarchism was the beginning point of the first wave of contemporary terrorism, which swept from Western Europe to America. Nonetheless, women's political motive persisted until the second wave of terrorism, when nationalism emerged as the primary driver of women's participation in terrorism.[39] However, they were only allowed to serve as scouts and messengers during the second wave of terrorism. David Rapoport claims that because women once again assumed leadership roles, there are some similarities between the first and second waves.[40] Vera Zasulich shot the governor of St. Petersburg; she said that she had a political purpose for doing so because the governor was well-known for his Polish insurrection and had ordered to execute political prisoner Arkhip Bogolyubov. This infuriated the revolutionary forces, and six people made the decision to kill the governor, but Zasulich was the first to take the initiative. This was the beginning of the first wave of terrorism. Despite the fact that women participated in political violence, her case is notable as the first instance of female political violence in the modern era or the first to be acknowledged. [41] Russian university students founded the group, which specifically targeted political figures. Vera Figner and Gesia Gelfman, Sofia Perovskaya, and three ladies from Narodnaya Volya had a key role in the March 13, 1881, assassination of Russian Emperor Alexander II in St. Petersburg.[42] The reason behind this act was that Tsar Alexander II released his renowned Emancipation Manifesto in 1861 after the Russian intellectuals struggled to achieve their demands. This was intended to end the peasantry's enslavement and, if feasible, bring about a new, more liberal era. Perovskaya and other disappointed reformers decided to accelerate change as it became evident that this new age was a false dawn. As a result, hundreds of revolutionaries left St Petersburg in 1874 to tour the Russian countryside and read pamphlets to the peasants about socialism, nihilism, and anarchism in an attempt to educate them for the day when they would destroy the Tsar.[43] In 1954 the Algerian muslim formed a group called National Liberation Front. Their major goal was to achieve independence from the colonial power France. FLN rose to prominence thanks to its female members, Zohra Drif, Dajmila Bouhard, and Samia Lakhdar. They were able to cross the French checkpoint and leave bombs in various locations, and as a result, three people died in an explosion on September 3, 1956, and several others were injured.[44]This movement occurred at the time of second wave of contemporary terrorism which was based on the idea of nationalism and anticolonialism. As per reports between 1970 and 1984, 451 Italian women joined terrorist organisations and then engaged in political violence. The bulk of these women had degrees and performed identical duties to those of male terrorists, they found, with 35% of them being students, 23% being clerks, secretaries, nurses, technicians, and 20% being instructors. A paramilitary group called Red Brigade was established in 1970 and was engaged in terrorist activities around the nation. Because it supported Italy's withdrawal from NATO and dominated the Marixist-Leninist worldview. Known for its kidnapping and murderous activities, Red Brigades also killed former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro and abducted James L. Dozier, a senior US officer at NATO. Barbara Balzerian had murdered him. Many female members of the Red Brigades participated in the group's violent assaults, and Margherita Cagol (Mara), one of the Red Brigade's co-founders and one of the first victim in an armed conflict with the police, became a symbol of the left-wing movement.[45]The most violent communist organisation throughout the 1970s and 1980s was the Red Army Faction which engaged in ideologically motivated terrorism in West Germany. Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin, co-founders, protested consumerism by burning a department store in Frankfurt in 1968.[46] A major problem is the Chechen people's desire for independence from Russia, which is driven by their nationalist and separatist beliefs. In the lengthy history of the Chechen Republic, Russians, have been the target of several violent attacks. Since June 7, 2000, Khava Barayeva and Luisa Magomadova stormed the temporary headquarters of an elite OMON (Russian Special Forces) squad in Alkhan Yurt, Chechnya, sparking the start of Chechnya's "Black Widows" movement. With two fatalities and five injuries, the incident brought attention to the group's notorious actions.[47]According to the report, women were responsible for 47% of all terrorist incidents and 81% of suicide attacks in the Chechen region between 2000 and 2005.[48] For more than 30 years, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) battled the Sri Lankan central government, mostly because of the Tamil minority's ethnic oppression. Their goal was to establish their own nation in Sri Lanka's north and east.[49] The use of female suicide bombers and the LTTE's high proportion of female members were well-known. The proportion of female LTTE members varied between 20 and 30 percent, with some estimates reaching as high as 50 percent in certain years.[50]According to LTTE theorist Anton Balasingham's wife, Adele Ann, a Tamil woman's decision to join the group was a sign to society that she was dissatisfied with the status quo and had the ability to rebel against authority.[51]To sum up, female revolutionaries have contested the idea that they are less capable of committing acts of terrorism or have less political clout, and. Additionally, nationalism and revolution are the main goals of the majority of terrorist organisations that are focused on women. Personal reason Personal causes, such as revenge, family instability, rape, personal tragedy, and revenge, are important motivations for the individual to join terrorism. Women are more likely to cite these as their original motivation in joining terrorist organizations than men. Mia Bloom, Jaques and Taylor, and Robert Pape have all proposed that the reasons behind female terrorists are different from those of male terrorists. According to them, the emotions of female terrorists such as family problems, discontent, and the desire to commit suicide are what motivate them. These motivations are further divided by Bloom into four categories: respect, relationship, revenge, and redemption. [52] 1. Women who experience sexual assault, including rape, may retaliate violently; some may even choose suicide bombing as a last resort. After women were raped in Iraq, Samira Ahmad Jassim, dubbed the "mother" of suicide bombers, was accused of encouraging rape victims to commit honour suicide and conducting 28 suicide attacks, according to the Die Welt article..[53] 2. During the Chechen War, Russian soldiers sexually assaulted many Chechen women. According to estimates from Doctors Without Borders, 85 percent of Chechen women experienced sexual assault at the hands of law enforcement and military during the Chechen War. Journalist Svetlana Makunina claims that after being drugged and raped, Chechen women were left with no choice but to commit suicide bombing.On the evening of May 21, 1991, LTTE suicide bomber Dhanu killed former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at an election rally in Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu. She clarified that she took this action after being gang-raped by Indian peacekeeping troops. 3. Another crucial element that encourages women to join terrorist groups is relationships. Family members and relatives, who are important in the recruitment process, could function as a conduit between the terror group and women. Sidney Jones claims that while some women freely choose to wed male terrorists, others are coerced by their relatives.[54] Many women join ISIS for a variety of reasons, including a desire to contribute to the caliphate, a desire for friendship with like-minded individuals, or direct pressure by family members and acquaintances.[55] For e.g., Shamima Begum was influenced by her friend Sharmena to join IS. Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers stated that instead of acting on their own initiative, female Palestinian suicide bombers are “at the mercy of, or in love with, their handlers.”[56] (women join terrorist organisations because they are forced by male) 4. Guillermo Galdos, and “Eliana Gonzales,” points out that male influence is not an essential prerequisite for recruiting women into violent organizations. In order to join revolutionary movements, women have reported willingly leaving their boyfriends, husbands, and kids. The oldest woman in Columbia's Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Eliana Gonzales Acosta, for instance, abandoned her husband, sister, and daughter to join the group.[57] 5. Many people who have been directly impacted by the acts of another group resort to terrorism. The revenge theory is the name given to this. An individual is more inclined to engage in terrorism if they have lost a friend or loved one to a terrorist organisation or the military.[58] Additionally, according to Jacques and Taylor, revenge influences people's decision to join terrorist groups.[59] In literature and art, the stereotype that women are more revengeful than males is mirrored. According to William Cosgrove's The Mourning Bride, "Heaven is furious, like love turned to hate, and Hell is furious, like a woman scorned.”[60]Russian negotiator suggests the difference between men and women is that “[Chechen women] are ‘zombified’ by their own sorrow and grief.[61] The Russian and international press called Chechen women bombers "Black Widows" as it was revealed that many were acting in retribution for the deaths of their husbands, kids, and brothers.[62]Since the takeover of the Dubrovka Theatre in October 2002, nineteen female bombers have appeared in black mourning garments with bombs attached to their bodies. They held 850 people hostage for two and a half days. Until Russian forces imposed persecution on the people and executed the terrorist. While these motivations were not limited to revenge or family difficulties, they were also gender specific. There are more men killed in these battles, resulting in an imbalance of women battling for retribution. Furthermore, women constitute the majority of rape victims in these communities, which motivates them to join. Gender Equality: According to Vetter and Perlstein, one of the reasons why women join terrorist organisations is because of gender equality. However, Jacques and Taylor disagree with this notion.[63]FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, was established to combat societal inequality and provide women with opportunities for advancement. Despite being predominantly dominated by women, the organization offers women's rights, sexual freedom, and opportunities for advancement in a patriarchal society.[64] FARC recruits in rural areas, where women often have fewer opportunities, highlighting the organization's societal focus on women's rights.[65]A woman who had spent many years of her life in the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army) was interviewed by Anne Phillips in 2012.[66]For the numerous reasons mentioned above, this woman, code-named "Athena," joined the FARC before turning thirteen. She explains why she joined this group  as it provides gender equality. She had economic reasons because she was from a rural area and lacked access to economic and educational opportunities. Women in Colombia's rural communities face a lack of opportunities, which leads to prostitution. Many women turn to the FARC as a viable alternative to prostitution. The FARC gives women a stable income. Women turn to the FARC because they are guaranteed food and other requirements. They are given the same opportunities as males and are able to support themselves. Also, by women joining terrorist organizations they are challenging gender stereotypes in their societies. O’Rourke says that women dislike these gender norms and rise out against them in opposition of the stereotyped female in their culture.[67]The LTTE gives women the same incentive to advance gender equality. According to LTTE women, they felt liberated and empowered within the organisation. By establishing sexual limitations and providing equal training chances, the LTTE established an environment that was equal for men and women. Women held leadership roles inside the LTTE and believed they were on par with the men themselves. Often, women join these groups to either learn about or escape gender inequality. CONCLUSION: The primary goal of this article was to examine the primary motivator for women to join terrorist organisations. For more than a century, women have been participating in terrorist activities, but only in recent decades have studies of terrorism examined female terrorists. Political, religious, personal, and gender equality are some of the motivations for women to join terrorist groups and participate in liberation movements. Since the 19th century, women have joined a variety of terrorist organisations; some conduct these horrible deeds to defend their beliefs or territory. Religion is another reason these women wish to sacrifice themselves in the name of Islam. They act in this way because they believe that, despite their crimes, they will be admitted to heaven if they commit murder for Islam. Women's terrorist operations might occasionally be motivated by personal issues. Although forced marriage, family issues, rape, the death of a loved one, and defiance of the patriarchal society are some of the main causes, other traumas could also influence their choices. However, each of the four factors has a major impact on women's decision to participate in terrorism. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, for example, are heavily influenced by religion. The Tamil Tigers and FARC, on the other hand, are primarily driven by personal motives and gender equality. Furthermore, the political cause of Red Brigade and the National Liberation Front has been their main source of motivation. "Personal, political, and religious motivations are the main cause behind women's involvement in terrorism," claim Cunningham and Bloom. In order to curb terrorists' actions in the modern world, it is critical to comprehend their objectives and the reason behind their organisation. Furthermore, since many highly educated women have joined terrorist organisations, we cannot claim that education may have a major influence. There is extremely little research on gender and terrorism, particularly on women's participation in terrorist actions. To determine the primary reason women, participate in terrorism, we must conduct additional research in this field. Due to the fact that the information offered is highly generalised. What steps should the government take to prevent women from joining terrorist organisations? What other variables might encourage women to join terrorist organisations? Researchers from all social science fields should conduct some research on these pressing concerns as political scientists alone are unable to provide these answers. Bibliography[1] Jessica Shepherd, “The Rise and Rise of Terrorism Studies,” last modified July 3, 2007, accessed December 10, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2007/jul/03/highereducation.research.[2] Jessica Shepherd, “The Rise and Rise of Terrorism Studies,” last modified July 3, 2007, accessed December 10, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2007/jul/03/highereducation.research.[3] Ariel Merari, Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism, 1st ed. 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Cunningham, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 3 (May 2003).[51]“Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/srilanka/terroristoutfits/ltte.htm.[52] Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008).[53]Mia Bloom, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism,” Gender Studies 28, no. 1–2 (June 1, 2011).[54] Sidney Jones, “Inherited Jihadism: Like Father, like Son,” International Crisis Group, last modified July 4, 2007, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/inherited-jihadism-father-son.[55] Daniel Milton and Brian Dodwell, “Jihadi Brides? Examining a Female Guesthouse Registry from the Islamic State’s Caliphate,” Combating Terrorism Center 11, no. 5 (May 2018).[56]Edward E. Azar, “Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions,” International Interaction 12, no. 1 (January 9, 2008).[57]“GENDER and TERRORISM: MOTIVATIONS of FEMALE TERRORISTS ,” DNI.gov, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/DF-2023-00139-Gender_and_Terrorism_Thesis.pdf.[58]LindseyA O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 710.[59]Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 322[60] “GENDER and TERRORISM: MOTIVATIONS of FEMALE TERRORISTS ,” DNI.gov, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/DF-2023-00139-Gender_and_Terrorism_Thesis.pdf.[61]Ibid.,63[62] Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 5 (September 22, 2006).[63]Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008).[64]Natalia Herrera and Douglas Porch, “‘Like Going to a Fiesta’ – the Role of Female Fighters in Colombia’s FARC-EP,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 4 (January 26, 2009).[65]Mia Kazman, “Women of the FARC,” William J.Perry Center, accessed December 23, 2024, https://wjpcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Women-of-the-FARC.pdf[66]Christine Balling, “Why Women Turn to the FARC -- and How the FARC Turns on Them,” Foreign Affairs, last modified June 1, 2012, accessed December 23, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/colombia/2012-06-01/fighting-mad.[67]LindseyA O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 702

Diplomacy
2025 SCO Summit - Tianjin Meijiang International Convention and Exhibition Center

SCO Summit 2025: an illusion of smiles and handshakes

by Hammad Gillani

Introduction The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental organization with significant Chinese influence and spans over the vast Eurasian region. Considered to be among the world’s largest regional organizations, SCO has gained immense attraction and a boost in its mission, particularly in 21st-century geopolitics.(SCO 2017) Since its very inception in 2001, the SCO has been promoting three main objectives, including regional stability (terrorism, extremism and separatism), multilateral cooperation (politics, trade, economy and culture), and a multipolar global order.(Calderonio 2025) The fundamental geopolitical dynamics have been further elucidated by the SCO summit in 2025. Held in Tianjin province of China, the SCO 2025 was a notable diplomatic event where friends and foes were brought under a common framework. By extraordinary meet-and-greets, the summit sends a clear message to the Western bloc that accepting the realities is the key to success in the current international structure. While, on the stage, the summit depicted a united multipolar world, but the internal differences between the member states reveal the illusion behind the optics. Tianjin Summit: Strategic Signaling to the West The CCP selected Tianjin city for the summit, primarily due to the following reasons: · Historically, Tianjin had been under the control of European powers. China signals the West of its supremacy by holding a summit in the same city.· Located very close to Beijing, Tianjin is a port city that represents China’s economic might.· Tianjin is a technological and industrial hub of China. It represents China's readiness to advance its vision of peaceful development.· Tianjin is also a critical junction of China’s BRI project, which further glorifies China’s growing economic significance in the international arena. No doubt, China tried its best to project its economic superiority to the west by selecting Tianjin for the summit. But this selection can be considered as China centrism by the member states. It will give rise to the feelings of Chinese brand promotion rather than collective ownership. Summit Significance The current geopolitical dynamics make the 2025 SCO summit unique. This year witnessed the revival of President Trump in the Oval Office, which altered the political and economic status quo of the international arena in a very short period of time.(Jonathan Swan 2023) The Russia-Ukraine war is still there. The Trump administration has tried its best to somehow resolve the Ukraine war, but it has miserably failed to do so. The previous Biden administration, along with the European allies, had frozen the Russian assets. In addition, the ongoing Israel-Gaza tensions have further added fuel. This year witnessed the combined US-Israel efforts to denuclearize Iran through military means. Israel has put an iron hand on the axis of resistance. Last but not least, 2025 once again witnessed a military standoff between Pakistan and India, where China provided immense support to Pakistan.(Clary 2025) Similarly, the situation in the Middle East has completely deteriorated. The 2025 SCO summit gathers half of the world’s states on a single platform with a prime motto of multi-polarity to be the sole solution to increasing crises in the international arena. In spite of all this, this summit didn’t result in any new development. As usual, the initiatives were taken but remain merely declaratory. The consensus-driven decision-making has caused serious hurdles for the SCO to deduce some fruitful results. The difference of opinion of the member states belonging to different parts and blocs of the world creates a mess that at the end cannot produce any concrete decision. Dead Economies: Response to Trump After the recent tensions between the US and India due to the tariff issue, President Trump titled both Russia and India as dead economies. In a broad context, Trump slammed the eastern powers, saying that without US assistance, their economies are considered as fatal.(Kay 2025) However, President Trump's bold claims were shattered by the attendance of 26 world leaders at the SCO summit in 2025. To foster regional and global cooperation, nations from opposing ideologies came together under the SCO banner. Furthermore, the idea that China, Russia, and India were isolated nations that the West ignored was destroyed. Instead, the three major regional titans teamed up to strengthen their connections even more. Yet, one can say that this collective response to the West is just for a stage show. It is due to the fact that SCO is surrounded by internal rivalries and differences of opinion in driving the international structure. Concerns of Central Asian states are its best manifestation. According to them, SCO is becoming more a China-centric platform rather than a multi-vocal stage. Moreover, Chinese debt trap diplomacy and Uyghur issues are also a cause of divide. Similarly, Indian strategic rivalry with China and its close ties with the West, i.e., QUAD, will always be a major loophole in the SCO. The member states know the reality that the world is heading towards Multipolarity, but the US dominance and hold in the international arena can’t be neglected. UN Chief Participation The participation of the United Nations Chief, Antonio Guterres, in the SCO meeting at this juncture also gives more strength to the multipolar manifestation of the international system. This visit is of huge importance, as Trump's political and pro-Israeli actions have caused the allies, particularly the UN and European allies, to lose their confidence. By attending the SCO summit, Guterres positively sent the message that only the new international order dominated by China could provide a practical solution to global regional peace and security. Xi, in response, showed his willingness to work with the UN.(Fisayo 2025) But his statement is more like just a symbolic gesture. This is due to the fact that SCO, up till now, can’t meet the institutional level of the UN, NATO or the EU. With weak institutional structure, including consensus-based decision-making, absence of supranational authority, no permanent parliament or court, etc., the SCO is still very far away from that of the Western security and economic bloc. Thus, the participation of the UN Chief was no doubt of much significance, but the participation has to go beyond declaring statements and symbolic gestures. East Meets West: NATO Boots in SCO NATO’s prominent member state, Turkey, participated in the SCO summit 2025.(Xinhua 2025) In view of recent geopolitical dynamics, the revival of Turkey has increased its vitality. The role of Turkey in post-Assad Syria and its continuous support to Gaza has emboldened its footprints in the region. The strained relations between Turkey and Israel further added to the duel. Moreover, in the recent Indo-Pak conflict of May 2025, Turkey played its vital part assisting Pakistan alongside China against India. President Erdogan’s participation signals to the West that nations have many balls in the air to play with. Not only Turkey, but also the Slovakian Prime Minister also participated in the summit. Note that Slovakia is a member of both NATO and the European Union. Fico has a pro-Russian view, maintaining neutrality in the foreign policies. His government also denies President Trump’s proposal of raising NATO defense spending up to 5%. Similarly, the ideological rift with the EU has further broadened the gap. While meeting on the sidelines of the SCO summit 2025, President Putin praised Robert Fico’s policies, saying, “We are very grateful that you and your government are following an independent foreign policy and are not contributing to the widespread anti-Russo sentiment that is engulfing most of Europe. Right now, there are constant attempts to spread fear about Russia's alleged plan to attack Europe.”(Reuters 2025) In addition, many non-NATO US allies participated in the SCO summit 2025. These include Azerbaijan and Armenia. Armenia unquestionably belongs to the Russian Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). But the latest peace brokered by the Trump administration between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh has reduced the Russian influence in the region. Their participation in the summit at such a critical time suggests that the eastern flank, especially the PRC and China, can’t be ignored.(Yerevan 2025) Now, it seems like there is a clear divide in the western blocs i.e. NATO or the EU, and the SCO is going to attract these divided western members. But, that’s not the only case. There is also another side of the coin. No doubt, Turkey is taking interest in eastern initiatives, but still it is not given any permanent member status by China and Russia. It is still under the observer status. This is because Turkey has been an essential member of NATO for a very long period of time. As of now, Turkey is trying to balance its relationship with east and west. It can’t simply ignore the Western dominance and, at the same time, can’t leave the rising multipolar world alone. Similarly, several EU states, including Hungary and Slovakia, have some differences with the European Union, but it does not mean that they will be completely switching their blocs. Moreover, these EU states have a very low status in the Eastern Bloc, while on the other hand, they enjoy a higher degree of autonomy in the EU. Sino-Indian Convergence The participation of Indian Prime Minister Modi in the SCO summit 2025 after a five-year gap was an immediate shift. India emerged as a key ally of the United States in the Indo-Pacific, and the United States recognized India as the region's “Net Security Provider.”(Hassan and Ali 2025) But the recent clash between the Trump administration and India over the tariff issue and Trump’s supportive statements for Pakistan have created a political divide between the two allies. Participation of the Indian prime minister in the SCO summit explicitly signals to the US that they have an independent foreign policy, and if not the US, then the eastern flank is ready to cooperate with them. And the world witnessed that both Xi and Putin welcomed PM Modi warmly, signaling to the US that they have been successful in destroying the Indo-Pacific struggle of the US against China. President Xi stated while meeting with PM Modi, “Let the dragon and elephant dance together.”(Simone McCarthy 2025) Now, this statement by the Chinese leader is just like a symbolic gesture. The realities can’t be ignored. China is continuously increasing its military arsenals and building a new military city, but where? In the backyard of India. In addition, there are border disputes between both the states. For this, the Indian strategic thinking cannot compromise its security over diplomatic relations with China. Here, the long-term vital ally of India is only the US in the Indo-Pacific. The dragon and elephant will not dance together until and unless historical grievances, security dilemma and public perception are all addressed. Institutional Limitations of SCO   US Foreign Policy Failure From the very first day of his second tenure, President Trump has been trying to create a divide between China and Russia. During his election campaign, he used to propagate a pro-Putin stance, stating that he will be going to end the Ukraine war in just 24 hours.(Hagstrom 2023) Similarly, he has given multiple times this statement that Russia is a very big power, and the US doesn’t want to strain its relation with Russia. Trump also accepted Putin’s demands of expelling NATO from its eastern borders. At the same time, Trump started a tariff war against China. He tried to get the favor of the Russian president while creating tensions with China. This policy is not new. President Richard Nixon had done this before. But the current geopolitical dynamics have completely changed as compared to the past, and this is the reason that Trump’s Nixonian version has miserably failed.(Wright 2025) In doing so, it seems that the Trump administration has lost the trust of its historical allies, including the European states and India. Despite the fact that the ongoing situation is going against the US, we can’t ignore the strategic hold of the US in the international arena. Whether it is trade, security or technology, the US is still considered to be the dominant player. The rising multipolarity has no doubt created dents in the Western system, but the dollar monopoly in the international markets is still playing its part, with many nations, whether by choice or not, conducting their financial transactions in the US dollar. Cooperation and Caution in SCO The SCO member states are somehow caught in between balancing and hedging. They not only try to balance between East and West but also between China and Russia. The Central Asian republics can’t ignore Russia, which is sitting in their backyard. Similarly, they want Chinese to invest but simultaneously restrain from overdependence on China. Then comes the case of Iran, which tends to be active in eastern diplomatic and security initiatives. The western sanctions and isolation forced it to join the eastern camp. But, due to its economic constraints, Iran does not have much say in the decision-making process. Last but not least, Pakistan and India. Both rivals try to improve their image by projecting their different stances in the Eastern Bloc. Pakistan plays its part in the SCO to gain regional popularity, but its fragile economy is again the main hurdle. On the other hand, India does a to-and-fro motion by maintaining close strategic relations with the West, especially the US and on the sidelines, not ignoring Russia completely. This creates a fractured picture, which demonstrates that the outer layer is hard, but the inner one is soft enough to be broken by just a small shock. Conclusion The 2025 SCO summit has become a landmark event where friends and foes were seen under a common banner. It can be considered a political power show where China and Russia conveyed a clear message to the West that capitalist behavior is no longer a viable option for anyone. The world is moving towards a multipolar region where there are multiple options for states to collaborate with. But, simultaneously, the internal contradictions, fractured structure and geopolitical hedging have surrounded the SCO stage. Thus, we can conclude that the SCO is more a symbolic platform where cohesion and coherence is still absent. Only the illusion of photo shoots, smiles and handshakes are apparent. References Calderonio, Vincenzo. 2025. “A Basis for Human Responsibility in Artificial Intelligence Computation.” ArXiv, 1–14. http://arxiv.org/abs/2501.12498.Clary, Christopher. 2025. “Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025 • Stimson Center.” Stimson Center. 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/four-days-in-may-the-india-pakistan-crisis-of-2025/.Fisayo, Jeremiah. 2025. “China’s Support for Multilateralism Is Essential, Says UN Chief Antonio Guterres at Key Summit.” Euro News. 2025. https://www.euronews.com/2025/08/30/chinas-support-for-multilateralism-is-essential-says-uns-antonio-guterres-at-key-summit.Hagstrom, Anders. 2023. “Trump Describes How He Could Solve Russia-Ukraine Conflict in 24 Hours.” Fox News. 2023. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-describes-how-he-could-solve-russia-ukraine-conflict-24-hours?msockid=3238bbf1abda66eb085dadedaada6754.Hassan, Abid, and Syed Hammad Ali. 2025. “Evolving US Indo-Pacific Posture and Strategic Competition with China.” Policy Perspectives 22 (1). https://doi.org/10.13169/polipers.22.1.ra4.Jonathan Swan, Maggie Haberman & Charlie Savage. 2023. “How Trump Plans to Wield Power in 2025: What We Know - The New York Times.” New York Times. 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-2025-second-term.html.Kay, John Reed & Chris. 2025. “Donald Trump Slams India and Russia as ‘Dead Economies’ after Tariff Stand-Off.” 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/390be64a-1527-4f71-a322-59af41133914.Reuters. 2025. “Slovak Prime Minister Fico to Meet Xi, Putin, Zelenskiy This Week.” Reuters. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/slovak-prime-minister-fico-meet-xi-putin-zelenskiy-this-week-2025-09-01/.SCO. 2025. “General Information | External Communication | The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.” Accessed September 6, 2025. https://eng.sectsco.org/20170109/192193.html.Simone McCarthy, Nectar Gan & Rhea Mogul. 2025. “India’s Modi Meets Xi on His First China Trip in Seven Years as Trump’s Tariffs Bite.” CNN. 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/31/china/india-china-xi-modi-meeting-intl-hnk.Wright, Mark Antonio. 2025. “Why a ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Won’t Split Xi and Putin.” National Review. 2025. https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/the-prospects-of-a-reverse-nixon-to-split-russia-and-china-grow-dimmer/.Xinhua. 2025. “Xi Meets Turkish President.” Xinhua News. 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202508/31/content_WS68b44ea4c6d0868f4e8f5365.html.Yerevan. 2025. “Armenia Intends to Join SCO in Line with Its Balanced Policy - Pashinyan.” Arka News Agency. 2025. https://arka.am/en/news/politics/armenia-intends-to-join-sco-in-line-with-its-balanced-policy-pashinyan/. 

Diplomacy
NEW YORK, USA - JUNE 21 2013 - United Nations security council hall headquartered in New York City, in a complex designed by architect Niemeyer open to public.

The UN in crisis: Justice without power, power without justice

by Francisco Edinson Bolvaran Dalleto

Abstract The United Nations (UN), eighty years after its creation, faces a structural crisis that reveals the tension between justice and power. This essay examines how the design of the Security Council, with its veto power, perpetuates an unequal order inherited from 1945 and limits the effectiveness of the collective security system. Through theoretical perspectives — Morgenthau, Schmitt, Habermas, Falk, and Strange — it is shown that international law remains subordinated to power interests, that proclaimed universality masks hegemonies, and that global economic dynamics lie beyond institutional reach. Cases such as Kosovo, Libya, Gaza, and Myanmar illustrate the paralysis and delegitimization of the Responsibility to Protect. Considering this scenario, two paths emerge: reforming multilateralism with limits on the veto and greater representativeness or resigning to a fragmented order. The conclusion is clear: without adaptation, the UN will become a symbolic forum, making chronic its inability to respond to current challenges. Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the UN, warned: “The United Nations was not created to take us to heaven, but to save us from hell.” [1] Eighty years after its founding, that promise seems to falter in the face of multiple wars, such as those in Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan, or Myanmar, among many others, with a sense of ineffectiveness, loss of prestige, and collective impotence being perceived: does the UN no longer fulfill the role it once assumed? At first glance, blame falls solely on the nature of the institution itself. But the root of the problem seems to lie not only in New York, but also in the main capitals of the world. The UN is nothing more than what States allow it to be. Its effectiveness depends on the will of those who comprise it; and the uncomfortable truth is that the great powers prefer to limit its scope rather than cede parcels of sovereignty. As John Rawls pointed out, a just international system requires that peoples accept common principles of justice. [2] Today, by contrast, it is a constant that collective interest systematically gives way to particular interest. The Security Council is the most evident symbol of this contradiction. It remains anchored in post-war logic, with five permanent members clinging to the privilege of the veto. That power, already met with skepticism in San Francisco in 1945, turned into a tool of paralysis. As Canada denounced in 2022, the veto is “as anachronistic as it is undemocratic” and has prevented responses to atrocities. [3] Aristotle said that “justice is equality, but only for equals.” [4] In the UN, the Assembly proclaims sovereign equality, while the Council denies it in practice: some States remain “more equal” than others. The UN Charter articulates its backbone in a few luminous rules: the prohibition of the use of force (Art. 2.4), non-intervention in internal affairs (Art. 2.7), and, as a counterbalance, the collective security system of Chapter VII (Arts. 39–42), which grants the Security Council the authority to determine threats to peace and authorize coercive measures. In parallel, Art. 51 preserves the right of self-defense against an “armed attack.” [5] This normative triangle — prohibition, collective security, defense — is the promise of a world governed by law and not by force, but it must be put into practice. In the 1990s, a dilemma arose: what to do when a State massacres its own population or is unable to prevent it? The political-legal response was the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), affirmed at the 2005 World Summit (paras. 138–139). [6] Its architecture is sequential: (I) each State has the primary responsibility to protect its population against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; (II) the international community must help States fulfill that responsibility; and (III) if a State manifestly fails, the international community, through the Security Council, may adopt collective measures — preferably peaceful ones; as a last resort, coercive — case by case and in accordance with the Charter. Properly understood, R2P is not a license to intervene; it is a duty to protect framed within International Law. The historical record shows both its necessity and its perverse effects. Kosovo (1999) inaugurated, without authorization from the Council, the narrative of “humanitarian intervention,” based on a supposed “legitimate illegality.” [7] The precedent left a dangerous standard: humanitarian purposes invoked to circumvent the hard core of the Charter. Libya (2011) seemed to be the “ideal case” of R2P: the Council authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. [8] However, the shift toward regime change eroded the trust of Russia and China, which since then have blocked robust resolutions on Syria, hollowing out the effectiveness of R2P. [9] The lesson is bitter: when protection is perceived as a vehicle of hegemony, the norm is delegitimized, and the veto becomes reflexive. Gaza and Myanmar display the other face of paralysis. In Gaza, the Council’s inability to impose sustainable ceasefires — despite patterns of hostilities that massively impact the civilian population — has shifted the debate to the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice through interstate actions and provisional measures. [10] In Myanmar, the genocide of the Rohingya mobilized condemnations, sanctions, and proceedings before the International Court of Justice (hereinafter, ICJ), [11] but did not trigger a coercive response from the Council. R2P exists on paper; its implementation is captive to the veto. Thus, the “right to have rights” that Arendt spoke of still depends on geopolitics. [12] History teaches that international law has always been strained by force. Rousseau warned that the strong seek to transform their power into law. [13] That is what the winners of 1945 did by crystallizing their hegemony in the Charter. And so, what Kant dreamed of as perpetual peace remains chained to an unequal order. [14] The UN, more than a republic of law, still seems a field of power. That fragility has opened space for alternatives. The BRICS, for example, have emerged as a heterogeneous bloc that combines the cohesion of historically homogeneous powers such as China and Russia with the diversity of India, Brazil, and South Africa. Paradoxically, their strength lies in articulating that heterogeneity against a common enemy: the concentration of power in the Security Council. [15] In a multipolar world, heterogeneity ceases to be a weakness and becomes a driver of plurality and resistance. The UN crisis is not only about security; it is also economic and distributive. The universalist promise of the Charter (Arts. 1.3 and 55–56, on cooperation for development) coexists with a global financial architecture whose heart beats outside the UN: the IMF and World Bank, designed in Bretton Woods, project a structural power — in Susan Strange’s terms — that conditions public policies, access to liquidity, and investment capacity. [16] The sovereign equality proclaimed in New York becomes blurred when the asymmetry of weighted voting in financial institutions (and the conditionality of credit) makes some States more “equal” than others. This is not a recent claim. Since the 1960s, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and, later, the Declaration on a New International Economic Order (1974), sought to correct structural problems such as the deterioration of terms of trade and the dependence between “center” and “periphery” countries, as Prebisch had pointed out. [17] However, the results were limited: ECOSOC lacks teeth, UNDP mobilizes cooperation but fails to change the rules of the system, and the 2030 Agenda sets important goals but without mandatory enforcement mechanisms. [18] The pandemic and the climate crisis have further worsened these inequalities, highlighting problems such as over-indebtedness, the insufficiency in the reallocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and climate financing that often arrives late and under unsuitable conditions. In this scenario, the New Development Bank of the BRICS emerges, seeking to open a path toward greater financial autonomy for developing countries. [19] International economic justice is the reverse side of collective security. Without fiscal space or technological transfer, the Global South remains trapped between development promises and adjustment demands. The UN has political legitimacy to outline a Global Economic Council (as proposed by the Stiglitz Commission in 2009) [20] to coordinate debt, international taxation, and global public goods, but it currently lacks normative muscle. The result is fragmentation: fiscal minilateralism, climate clubs, and value chains that distribute risks to the South and rents to the North. The solution does not lie simply in “more aid,” but in prudent rules such as: (I) a multilateral debt restructuring mechanism under UN auspices; [21] (II) effective international taxation on intangibles and the digital economy; [22] (III) binding compliance with the loss and damage fund in climate matters; [23] and (IV) a reform of quotas in IFIs that reflects the real weight of emerging economies. [24] Without constitutionalizing — even gradually — this economic agenda, sovereign equality will remain an empty liturgy and the discontent of the Global South a political fuel that erodes the UN from within. The truth is that the United Nations of 1945 no longer responds to the challenges of 2025. As the president of Brazil recently said: “The UN of 1945 is worth nothing in 2023.” [25] If States do not recover the founding spirit — placing collective interest above particular ones — the organization will remain prisoner of the veto and the will of a few. The question, then, is not whether the UN works, but whether States really want it to work. Taking the above into account, this essay will analyze the UN crisis from three complementary dimensions. First, the theoretical and philosophical framework that allows us to understand the tension between power and law will be addressed, showing how different authors highlight the structural roots of this contradiction. Second, historical episodes and current examples will be reviewed to illustrate the paralysis and democratic deficit of the organization. Finally, possible scenarios for the future will be projected, engaging in the exercise of evaluating the minimum reforms that could revitalize multilateralism in contrast to the alternative of critical global fragmentation. Considering all together, the argument is that the UN finds itself trapped between justice without power and power without justice, and that its survival depends on its ability to adapt to an international order radically different from that of 1945. I. The contradiction between power and law: Hans Morgenthau and political realism To understand the paralysis of the UN, it is useful to turn to Hans Morgenthau, a pioneer of realism in international relations. In his work “Politics Among Nations” (1948), he warned that the international order is always mediated by the balance of power and that legal norms only survive to the extent that they coincide with the interests of powerful States. [26] His idea is provocative: international law is not an autonomous order, but a language that powers use so long as it does not contradict their strategic objectives. Applied to the UN, this analysis is clear: the institution reflects less universal ethical commitment and more correlation of historical forces. The Security Council is not a neutral body, but the mirror of the hegemony of 1945, crystallized in Article 27 of the Charter, which enshrines the right of veto. The supposed universality of the UN is subordinated to a mechanism designed precisely to ensure that no action contrary to the superpowers could be imposed. Contemporary critiques confirm Morgenthau’s intuition. When Russia vetoes resolutions on Ukraine, [27] or the United States does the same regarding Gaza, [28] it becomes evident that international justice is suspended in the name of geopolitics. The legal is subordinated to the political. In this sense, the UN crisis is not an accident, but the logical consequence of its design, and what Morgenthau pointed out seventy years ago remains valid: as long as there is no coincidence between law and power, international norms will remain fragile. Political realism helps explain why the UN fails when it is most needed. States continue to act according to their national interests, even when this contradicts the international norms they themselves have subscribed to. The Security Council has become a space where powers project their strategies of influence, blocking collective actions whenever these affect their geopolitical priorities. The war in Ukraine, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the inaction in the face of the Rwandan genocide show that international law is applied selectively, reinforcing the idea that rules are valid only when they do not interfere with the power of the strongest. This pattern evidently erodes the legitimacy of the UN in the eyes of societies, because it generates the perception that the organization is incapable of representing the collective interest and, instead, merely reflects the correlation of forces of each historical moment. II. Carl Schmitt and the Myth of Universal Order Another voice that resonates is that of Carl Schmitt, who in “The Nomos of the Earth” (1950) argued that every international legal order arises from a founding political decision, that is, an act of power. [29] For Schmitt, there is no “universal law” that imposes itself; what is presented as universal is, in reality, the crystallization of a particular domain. The UN perfectly embodies this diagnosis. The founding discourse of San Francisco in 1945 spoke of “we the peoples of the United Nations,” [30] but in reality the Charter was written under the predominance of the winners of the Second World War. What was presented as a universal order of peace and security was, in fact, the codification of the Allied hegemony. Schmitt helps explain why the UN has never escaped that original logic. Although the General Assembly proclaims sovereign equality in Article 2 of the Charter, the structure of the Council reproduces the privilege of a few. [31] The international law of the UN appears, in Schmittian terms, as a “nomos” imposed by the winners, not as a true universal community. The consequence is a legitimate deficit that has persisted until today and explains much of the perception of ineffectiveness. The original structure of the UN perpetuates an unequal design that remains in force. The veto privilege is not only a defensive mechanism for the winners of the Second World War, but it has also functioned as a lock — one without keys — that prevents any real evolution of the system. Over eight decades, demands for reform have clashed with the resistance of those who benefit from keeping the rules intact. The contradiction is evident: developing States, which today represent the majority in the General Assembly, lack effective power in the most important decisions on international security. The gap between the universalist discourse of sovereign equality and the hierarchical practice of the Council undermines the credibility of the multilateral order. As long as this tension persists, the UN will hardly be able to become the space of global governance that the world requires more urgently than ever in the 21st century. III. Habermas and the Need for a Deliberative Community In contrast to this pessimism, Jürgen Habermas offers a different perspective. In “The Inclusion of the Other” (1996) and in later essays, he proposed moving toward a “constitutionalization of international law,” understood as the creation of a global normative space in which decisions are not based on force, but on rational deliberation. [32] From this perspective, the UN would be an imperfect embryo of a community of world citizens. The impact of this idea is enormous: it suggests that, beyond current deadlocks, the UN embodies the possibility of transforming power relations into processes of public deliberation. Article 1 of the Charter, which speaks of “maintaining international peace and security” and of “promoting friendly relations among nations,” can be read not only as a political mandate but also as a normative ideal of cosmopolitan coexistence. [33] Criticism of Habermas is evident: his proposal errs on the side of idealism in a world where national security interests remain paramount. However, his contribution is valuable because it allows us to think of the UN not only as a paralyzed body but also as a field of normative struggle. The problem is not only the strength of the vetoes but also the lack of will to transform that space into a true deliberative forum. [34] Thinking of the UN as a deliberative community requires recognizing that its current procedures do not guarantee authentic dialogue. Debate in the General Assembly is often reduced to formal statements, while crucial decisions, as everyone knows, are taken in restricted circles. The lack of effective mechanisms for the participation of non-state actors, such as regional organizations or civil society, further limits the inclusive character of the institution. Genuine deliberation should open spaces where multiple voices can influence decision-making processes, not only through speeches but by building binding consensus. However, the most powerful States fear losing control over the international agenda, which generates a vicious circle: an elitist governance system is maintained that protects privileges, but at the cost of sacrificing legitimacy and effectiveness. Thus, the promise of a deliberative order is reduced to a normative horizon that has not yet been realized. IV. Richard Falk and the Global Democratic Deficit A more recent contribution comes from Richard Falk, jurist and former UN rapporteur, who has insisted on the “democratic deficit” of the international order. In his view, the UN suffers from a structural contradiction: while the Charter proclaims the sovereignty of peoples, in practice it concentrates power in a small club of States. [35] This not only limits its effectiveness but also erodes its legitimacy in the eyes of the peoples of the world. The case of Palestine is emblematic. The General Assembly has repeatedly recognized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, but the veto in the Council blocks any effective measure. [36] Falk interprets this as evidence that the UN operates under a “democracy of States” but not under a “democracy of peoples.” The impact is devastating: millions of people perceive the organization not as a guarantor of rights, but as an accomplice to inequality. This leads us to a brief analysis of the International Criminal Court (ICC), born from the Rome Statute (1998), which promised a civilizational breakthrough: that the most serious crimes (“which affect the international community as a whole”) would not go unpunished. [37] Its design is cautious: complementarity (it acts only if the State is unwilling or unable), restricted jurisdiction (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and — with limits — aggression), and jurisdiction based on territory, nationality, or referral by the Security Council. The two major milestones of the Council — referrals of Darfur (2005) and Libya (2011) —demonstrated both the potential and the limits. There were procedural advances and arrest warrants, but also contested operative clauses and very little cooperation for arrests. [38] The implicit message to the Global South was ambiguous: justice is universal, but its activation depends on the map of alliances in the Council. At the same time, key powers are not parties to the Statute (United States, China, Russia) and yet influence when the Court acts. The result fuels the argument of “winners’ justice” that several African foreign ministries have raised. The Court has tried to rebalance its map: investigations in Afghanistan, Palestine, and Ukraine, as well as arrest warrants against high-ranking authorities in cases of aggression or serious international crimes, have partly disproved the idea of a one-sided persecution. But the Achilles’ heel persists: without State cooperation, there are no executions of warrants; without the Council, there is no activation in key contexts; with the Council, there is a veto. In addition, Article 16 of the Statute allows the Council to suspend investigations for 12 renewable months, a political valve that subordinates the judicial to the geopolitical. [39] Integrating Falk’s critique into this essay makes it possible to highlight that the UN crisis is not only institutional but also democratic. Article 1.2 of the Charter proclaims respect for the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples, but this ideal becomes empty when the veto power systematically contradicts it. [40] The democratic deficit of the UN is not limited to the Security Council but runs through the entirety of its institutional architecture. Developing countries have little influence on global economic governance, despite being the most affected by decisions on debt, trade, or climate financing. Unequal representation in bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank, together with dependence on international cooperation, reproduces relations of subordination that contradict the principles of equality and self-determination. Moreover, world citizenship lacks a real channel of influence: peoples see their demands diluted in state structures that do not always — or almost never — reflect their needs. This divorce between peoples and States turns the UN into an incomplete democracy, where the most vulnerable collective subjects fail to make their voices heard. Overcoming this limitation is essential to restoring the legitimacy of multilateralism. V. Susan Strange and the Geopolitics of the Economy Finally, Susan Strange adds another dimension: the economic one. In “The Retreat of the State” (1996), she argued that power in the contemporary world does not reside only in States, but also in transnational forces — financial markets, corporations, technologies — that escape institutional control. [41] The UN, designed in 1945 under the logic of sovereign States, lacks instruments to govern this new scenario. The impact is evident. While the Security Council is paralyzed in debates over traditional wars, global crises such as climate change, pandemics, or the regulation of artificial intelligence show that real power has shifted toward non-state actors. [42] Strange warns that if international institutions do not adapt to this reality, they risk becoming irrelevant. In this sense, the UN faces not only a problem of veto or representativeness, but also a historical mismatch: it was designed for a world of States and conventional wars, but today we live in a world of transnational interdependencies. The Charter, in its Article 2.7, continues to emphasize non-interference in the internal affairs of States, but this clause seems insufficient to govern global threats that transcend borders. [43] And it is vitally important to note that the global threats of the 21st century do not fit the traditional paradigm of interstate wars that has been preconceived. Challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and technological revolutions pose risks that no State can face alone. However, the UN lacks effective mechanisms to coordinate global responses in these areas. The fragmentation of climate governance, competition for vaccines during the pandemic, and the absence of clear rules to regulate large digital corporations illustrate the magnitude of the challenge. In this context, state sovereignty proves insufficient, and the principle of non-interference becomes obsolete. If the UN does not develop innovative instruments that integrate transnational actors and strengthen multilateral cooperation, it risks becoming a merely declarative forum, incapable of offering concrete solutions to the problems that most affect contemporary humanity — and it is important that these critiques be heard before it is too late. VI. Current Scenarios All the above opens up a momentous dilemma of our time: either we reform multilateralism so that law contains “force,” or we normalize “exception” forever. [44]Scenario A: A minimal but sufficient cosmopolitan reform. A critical group of States —supported by civil society and epistemic communities — agrees to self-limit the veto in situations of mass atrocities (ACT-type codes of conduct), promotes the expansion of the Council with some permanent presence of the Global South (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and one African seat, probably South Africa), and strengthens “Uniting for Peace” mechanisms to circumvent blockages. [45] The ICJ gains centrality with advisory opinions politically bound by prior compliance commitments, the ICC ensures interstate cooperation through regional agreements, and the UN creates a rapid civil deployment capacity for the protection of civilians, minimal cybersecurity, and climate response. [46] In the economic sphere, a Global Economic Council emerges within the orbit of the UN to coordinate debt, climate, and international taxation with common standards. [47] Scenario B: Ordered fragmentation of anarchy. Blockages become chronic. Security shifts to ad hoc coalitions and minilateralisms (NATO Plus, QUAD, expanded BRICS), economic governance is decided in restricted membership forums, and the UN remains a symbolic forum without decision-making capacity. [48] Exception becomes the rule: “preventive interventions,” widespread unilateral sanctions, proliferation of private military companies, opaque cyber-operations, and a data ecology controlled by a few platforms. [49] International law endures as a language, but its social force dissipates; incentives push toward strategic autonomy and legal security by blocs. In other words, the future of the UN will depend on its ability to balance justice and force in an international environment marked by multipolarity. I insist that one possible path is to advance toward gradual reforms that strengthen transparency, broaden the representativeness of the Council, and grant greater autonomy to the General Assembly and judicial bodies. Another, far more radical, is the consolidation of parallel mechanisms that de facto replace the role of the UN through regional alliances, ad hoc coalitions, and alternative economic forums. Both paths involve risks: reform may stagnate in the lowest common denominator, while fragmentation may deepen inequalities and conflicts. However, what seems clear is that maintaining the status quo will only prolong paralysis and further weaken the legitimacy of the multilateral system. The choice between reform or irrelevance will, ultimately, be the decisive dilemma of the 21st century. I believe that three milestones will indicate where we are headed: (1) effective adoption of commitments to abstain from vetoes in the face of mass atrocities; (2) funded and operational implementation of the climate loss and damage mechanism; (3) cooperation with the ICC in politically sensitive cases, without ad hoc exceptions. [50] VII. Conclusion: Between Disillusionment and Hope The UN marks eighty years caught in Pascal’s dilemma: “force without justice is tyranny, justice without force is mockery.” [51] The diagnosis is clear: the Security Council has turned justice into a mockery, while the great powers have exercised force without legitimacy. [52] The result is a weakened organization, incapable of responding to the most urgent tragedies of our time. However, it would be a mistake to fall into absolute cynicism. Despite its evident limitations and alongside all that has been mentioned, the UN remains the only forum where 193 States engage in dialogue, the only space where there exists even a minimal notion of common international law. [53] Its crisis should not lead us to abandon it, but rather to radically rethink it. Perhaps the path lies in what Habermas calls a “constitutionalization of international law,” as previously proposed, or in a profound reform of the Security Council that democratizes the use of force. [54] History teaches that institutions survive if they manage to adapt. [55] If the UN does not, it will be relegated to the status of a giant that humanity needs but that is paralyzed, a symbol of a past that no longer responds to the challenges of the present. [56] But if States recover something of the founding spirit of 1945, perhaps it can still save us from hell, even if it never takes us to heaven. [57] VIII. References [1] Dag Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld. Citado en Brian Urquhart. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.[2] John Rawls. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.[3] Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations. Statement on the Veto. UN General Assembly, 26 April 2022.[4] Aristóteles. Política. Traducido por Antonio Gómez Robledo. México: UNAM, 2000.[5] Naciones Unidas. Carta de las Naciones Unidas. San Francisco: Naciones Unidas, 26 de junio de 1945.[6] Naciones Unidas. World Summit Outcome Document. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.[7] Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. New York: Penguin, 1968.[8] Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. 1795; repr., Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003.[9] Oliver Stuenkel. The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015.[10] Susan Strange. States and Markets. London: Pinter, 1988. 11. Hedley Bull. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.[12] Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.[13] Martha Finnemore. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.[14] Alexander Wendt. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.[15] Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.[16] Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.[17] Joseph Nye. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.[18] Joseph Nye. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.[19] Robert Keohane y Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.[20] Robert Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.[21] Stephen Krasner. Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.[22] Robert Cox. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55.[23] Robert Cox. Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.[24] Charles Kindleberger. The World in Depression, 1929–1939. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.[25] John Ikenberry. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.[26] John Ikenberry. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.[27] Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.[28] Michael Doyle. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism. New York: W. W. Norton, 1997.[29] Charles Beitz. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.[30] Andrew Moravcsik. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–53[31] Peter Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.[32] Friedrich Kratochwil. Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.[33] Nicholas Onuf. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.[34] Christian Reus-Smit. The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.[35] Martha Finnemore y Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.[36] Michael Barnett y Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.[37] Ian Hurd. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.[38] Allen Buchanan y Robert Keohane. “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions.” Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 4 (2006): 405–37.[39] Thomas Franck. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.[40] David Held. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.[41] Ian Hurd. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.[42] Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations. Statement on the Veto. UN General Assembly, 26 April 2022.[43] Oliver Stuenkel. The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015.[44] Naciones Unidas. World Summit Outcome Document. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.[45] Corte Internacional de Justicia. Advisory Opinions. La Haya: CIJ, varios años.[46] Naciones Unidas. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. A/59/565, 2 December 2004.[47] Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.[48] Robert Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.[49] Thomas Franck. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.[50] Joseph Nye. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.[51] Blaise Pascal. Pensées. París: Éditions Garnier, 1976.[52] Brian Urquhart. Hammarskjöld. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.[53] Naciones Unidas. Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco: Naciones Unidas, 1945.[54] Jürgen Habermas. The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.[55] John Ikenberry. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.[56] Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.[57] David Held. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Defense & Security
Indonesia and Pakistan, two crossed flags isolated on white background. 3d image

Civil-Military Relations in Transition: Learning from Indonesia’s Democratic Reform to Curtail Pakistan’s Military Dominance in Politics and the South Asia Region.

by Muhammad Younus , Halimah Abdul Manaf , Dyah Mutiarin

We explore a crucial comparative study between Indonesia and Pakistan, which have long histories of military intervention in politics. Written by Muhammad Younus and colleagues, it seeks to answer a pressing question: How can Pakistan reduce military dominance in its politics by learning from Indonesia’s democratic reform? The work's central theme is the struggle between military power and civilian supremacy. By analyzing Indonesia’s successful democratization after Suharto’s fall in 1998 and comparing it with Pakistan’s repeated cycles of military rule, the authors highlight institutional, political, and social reforms that can help Pakistan overcome entrenched interventionism. Military Rule in Pakistan: Historical Roots and Persistence Let's trace Pakistan’s persistent military dominance to its security-centric founding context. From independence in 1947, Pakistan faced border conflicts with India and a fragile political leadership that left a power vacuum. The deaths of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan deprived Pakistan of strong civilian leaders, allowing the military to step in as guardian of national survival. Other factors reinforced this role: Border insecurities – the wars with India (1947–48, 1965, 1971, and later crises) created a perception that only the army could guarantee sovereignty.Geopolitics of the Cold War – Pakistan’s strategic location drew U.S. and Western support, channeling resources to the military rather than civilian governance.Weak political institutions – fragmented elites and fragile parties enabled military takeovers in 1958, 1977, and 1999. Economic and business roles of the military – Pakistan’s military developed vast commercial interests, strengthening its autonomy from civilian governments. As a result, Pakistan has spent nearly half its history under direct military rule, with civilian governments often overshadowed by the so-called establishment or deep state. This hybrid arrangement has created enduring instability and undermined democratic consolidation. Indonesia’s Trajectory: From Military Authoritarianism to Reformasi In contrast, Indonesia experienced a different but comparable pattern of military dominance. After independence in 1945, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) played a founding role in defending sovereignty. Under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1957–65), the military expanded its influence, but during Suharto’s New Order (1967–1998), the military became fully entrenched in politics, bureaucracy, and business. The military’s “dual function” doctrine allowed officers to control defense and governance. Civil liberties were suppressed, and military-backed elites monopolized power. However, Suharto’s collapse in 1998 amid economic crisis and mass protests triggered the Reformasi era, which brought sweeping democratic reforms: Military representatives were removed from parliament. The TNI was separated from the police and confined to defense roles. Civil society and student movements mobilized to keep the military in check. Successive civilian governments gradually asserted constitutional authority. While challenges remain, Indonesia is now regarded as one of the most successful cases of democratic transition in Southeast Asia. Comparative Themes Between Indonesia and Pakistan We identify multiple comparative themes that connect and contrast Indonesia and Pakistan. These themes highlight similarities in their historical trajectories and expose the structural differences that explain why Indonesia successfully reduced military intervention while Pakistan continues to struggle. - Muslim-Majority Identity and Political Legitimacy Both Indonesia and Pakistan are Muslim-majority states, and Islam plays a central role in legitimizing governance. In Pakistan, Islam was a founding ideology: the creation of Pakistan in 1947 was justified as a homeland for South Asian Muslims. As a result, the military often presents itself as the guardian of Pakistan’s Islamic identity and territorial integrity, using religion to strengthen its political authority. For instance, General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime (1977–1988) fused Islamization with military rule, giving the armed forces a dual role as defenders of both faith and nation. Islam also permeates social and political life in Indonesia, but its role in legitimizing military dominance has weakened. Despite being the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, Indonesia developed a more pluralist political identity under Pancasila ideology, which emphasized unity and diversity. This pluralism limited the military’s ability to monopolize religious legitimacy. Thus, while both militaries operated in religious societies, Pakistan’s military more successfully embedded itself as a religious-political actor than Indonesia’s TNI. - Colonial Legacies and Institutional Development Colonial experiences profoundly shaped state institutions. Indonesia’s 350 years under Dutch rule created a centralized but rigid bureaucracy, while Pakistan’s British colonial legacy emphasized indirect rule through local elites. In Indonesia, the Dutch left behind weak political institutions but a militarized control structure, which the TNI easily adopted after independence. In Pakistan, the British institutional legacy emphasized bureaucracy and military professionalism, but weak democratic roots allowed the army to dominate once independence brought political instability. Both states inherited fragile democratic institutions at independence. Still, Indonesia’s authoritarian consolidation under Suharto created a long, stable period of military dominance, whereas Pakistan experienced repeated coups and oscillations between military and civilian governments. - Military Dictatorships and Modes of Authoritarianism Both countries experienced prolonged military dominance, but the nature of their authoritarianism differed. In Indonesia, Suharto’s New Order (1967–1998) created a centralized, corporatist system where the military had constitutional political space under the “dual function” doctrine. Under a stable authoritarian order, the TNI occupied bureaucratic, political, and business roles. Citizens experienced repression, but the system provided economic growth and relative stability until the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis triggered a collapse. In Pakistan, military rule has been more fragmented and cyclical. Generals Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf seized power through coups, justifying intervention as necessary to restore stability. However, no institution was as stable as Suharto's system. Instead, Pakistan alternated between weak civilian governments and recurring military takeovers. The instability prevented the military from being permanently curtailed, as civilian institutions remained fragile. - Geopolitics and the Cold War Indonesia and Pakistan were strategically significant during the Cold War, but their alignments diverged. Pakistan aligned closely with the United States, joining alliances like SEATO and CENTO. As a frontline state against communism and later against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military received significant financial and military aid. This external support strengthened the army as an autonomous actor, independent of civilian oversight. Indonesia, under Sukarno, initially pursued non-alignment and even leaned toward the socialist blocs. But after the failed 1965 coup attributed to communists, Suharto realigned Indonesia with the West, becoming a key anti-communist ally. Unlike Pakistan, however, Indonesia’s external support did not give the TNI unchecked autonomy in the long run. When Suharto fell, the international community supported democratic reform, not military dominance. Thus, while both militaries were empowered by Cold War geopolitics, Pakistan’s international patronage entrenched military supremacy, whereas Indonesia’s geopolitical reorientation facilitated eventual reform. - Demography and Population Pressure Both Indonesia and Pakistan are densely populated developing countries. High population growth, urbanization, and inequality have strained governance. In Indonesia, the population pressure was partly managed through economic growth under Suharto and decentralization after democratization, though inequality and corruption remain challenges. In Pakistan, population growth and poor governance deepened social unrest. Military regimes often justified intervention by claiming that civilian governments failed to manage these pressures. Population dynamics thus fueled instability in both countries, but Indonesia’s reformist elites turned these pressures into momentum for democratization, while Pakistan’s elites often relied on military backing instead. Civil Society and Public Attitudes Civil society is a critical difference. In Indonesia, students, NGOs, and media mobilized strongly during the 1997–98 crisis. Their sustained activism ensured that reforms were not reversed after Suharto’s fall. Public opinion strongly supports civilian supremacy, and the memory of military abuses under Suharto reinforces this sentiment. In Pakistan, civil society is weaker and fragmented. While lawyers’ movements and urban middle-class activism have occasionally resisted authoritarianism (e.g., the Lawyers’ Movement of 2007–09), civil society has not been consistently able to constrain the establishment. However, recent shifts show rising criticism of military interference, suggesting potential for change. Public Mindsets: Shifts in Perceptions Another contribution of this analysis is the changing public attitudes in both countries. In Pakistan, regime changes (such as Imran Khan’s ouster) have shifted from individualistic to collective voting behavior, where people increasingly prioritize national over personal benefits. A shift from state-centric to people-centric perspectives, demanding governance that serves citizens rather than the state or establishment. Growing criticism of military involvement in politics is unprecedented in Pakistan’s history. Stronger participation in elections, with citizens using the ballot to challenge establishment influence. Calls for a new social contract, clarifying the responsibilities of political and military institutions. In Indonesia, public opinion strongly favors civilian leadership and views the military’s role as limited to national defense. While some sectors still favor military involvement in anti-corruption efforts, the dominant sentiment is democratic and reformist. Additional Regional Perspectives: Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand While this study focuses on Indonesia and Pakistan, a broader South and Southeast Asian perspective reveals that civil–military contestation is not unique to these two countries. Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand provide parallel yet distinct experiences of military intervention in politics, enriching the comparative landscape. Bangladesh Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh has struggled with repeated military interventions. Coups in 1975 and 1982 entrenched the army as a dominant political actor, often presenting itself as the guardian of national stability. Like Pakistan, the military developed political parties and cultivated influence even during civilian rule. However, unlike Indonesia’s post-1998 trajectory, Bangladesh has oscillated between civilian governments led by rival parties (Awami League and BNP) and military-backed caretaker administrations. The persistence of confrontational party politics provides fertile ground for military influence, similar to Pakistan’s fragile democracy. Myanmar Myanmar represents one of the most entrenched military-dominated systems in the region. Since the 1962 coup, the Tatmadaw institutionalized military supremacy under the guise of “discipline-flourishing democracy.” Even during the 2011–2020 hybrid transition, the constitution reserved parliamentary seats and key ministries for the military, limiting civilian authority. The 2021 coup confirmed the Tatmadaw’s unwillingness to cede real power. Compared to Indonesia’s Reformasi and Pakistan’s hybrid arrangements, Myanmar illustrates a worst-case scenario: the military refuses reform and resists domestic and international pressure. Thailand Thailand’s modern political history is punctuated by repeated coups (more than a dozen since 1932). The Thai military often positions itself as the arbiter of political conflict, stepping in during crises and withdrawing after resetting political rules. The 2014 coup, followed by the 2017 constitution, institutionalized military oversight of civilian politics. Unlike Pakistan’s Islam-centered legitimacy or Indonesia’s nationalist developmentalism, Thailand’s military has leaned on monarchy-centered legitimacy and nationalism to justify interventions. Despite periods of electoral democracy, the military’s entrenched influence makes Thailand comparable to Pakistan in terms of cyclical authoritarianism, but distinct from Indonesia’s relatively consolidated democratic transition. Recommendations for Pakistan and Other South Asian Countries We draw from Indonesia’s reform success to propose recommendations for Pakistan. These can be grouped into political leadership, institutional reform, military restructuring, and civil society engagement. Strengthen Civilian Leadership and Authority Pakistan’s repeated political crises stem partly from weak leadership and fragmented parties. To emulate Indonesia, Pakistan’s leaders must: Assert authority over military appointments, ensuring that promotions and postings reflect professional criteria rather than political manipulation. Demonstrate unity among parties by agreeing not to invite or legitimize military intervention against rivals. In Indonesia, elite consensus was critical to sidelining the TNI. Build legitimacy through governance performance, reducing the military’s justification for intervention. Reduce the Military’s Commercial Empire The Pakistan Army runs one of the world’s largest military-business complexes (e.g., Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust). This gives the military financial independence and political clout. We recommend: Gradual divestment of military-run businesses to civilian authorities. Transparent auditing of military-owned enterprises. Laws restricting the army’s involvement in commercial ventures. Indonesia pursued similar reforms by curbing TNI’s business interests after 1998, a move Pakistan could replicate. Pursue Constitutional and Institutional Reforms Civilian supremacy must be enshrined legally. Key steps include: Amending the constitution to clarify the military’s defense-only role. Strengthening parliamentary committees on defense and national security to provide oversight. Enhancing judicial independence to protect civilians from military overreach. Indonesia’s constitutional amendments and reforms limiting TNI’s legislative seats offer a model. Professionalize the Military A professional military is less likely to interfere in politics. Recommendations include: Reforming military training curricula to emphasize apolitical professionalism. Enhancing civilian expertise in defense policy, reducing dependence on military decision-making. Encouraging cross-branch appointments to reduce the Army’s dominance over other services (Navy, Air Force). Empower Civil Society and Media Civil society pressure was a decisive factor in Indonesia’s Reformasi. For Pakistan: NGOs, lawyers, students, and independent media must be supported to demand transparency and accountability. Educational reforms should foster democratic values, encouraging citizens to resist authoritarianism. Digital platforms should be used to strengthen civic activism and counter establishment narratives. Encourage Civil-Military Dialogue and Trust-Building Instead of open confrontation, Pakistan must create structured spaces for civilian-military dialogue. These should: Clarify roles and responsibilities. Build trust so the military sees its institutional strength as linked to democratic stability. Encourage joint decision-making on security issues within constitutional limits. International Support for Reform Indonesia benefited from international backing after Suharto’s fall. Similarly, Pakistan’s reform agenda would require: External partners emphasizing democratic reforms in aid and cooperation. Regional diplomacy reduces Pakistan’s security anxieties, often fueling military dominance. Conclusion Civil-Military Relations in Transition is both a scholarly contribution and a practical guide. Juxtaposing Indonesia’s reformist success with Pakistan’s struggles shows that military interventionism is not inevitable but can be curtailed through leadership, reform, and public mobilization. For Pakistan, the Indonesian example offers hope and caution: reforms require political consensus, a strong civil society, and an unwavering commitment to democratic norms. Without these, cycles of intervention may persist. With them, however, Pakistan could achieve the same democratic consolidation that Indonesia has pursued since 1998. The article emphasizes that sustainable democracy rests on civilian supremacy, institutional reform, and citizen empowerment. Only by embedding these principles can Pakistan move toward stable, democratic governance and curtail the political role of its military establishment. 

Defense & Security
9th September 2025. Kathmandu, Nepal. Gen Z moment destruction in the parliament of Nepal, protest against corrupted Nepalese government and the banned of social media.

How hardships and hashtags combined to fuel Nepal’s violent response to social media ban

by Nir Kshetri

Days of unrest in Nepal have resulted in the ousting of a deeply unpopular government and the deaths of at least 50 people. The Gen Z-led protests – so-called due to the predominance of young Nepalese among the demonstrators – appeared to have quieted down with the appointment on Sept. 12, 2025, of a new interim leader and early elections. But the protests leave behind dozens of burned government offices, destroyed business centers and financial losses estimated in the billions of dollars. The experience has also underscored the importance of social media in Nepal, as well as the consequences of government attempts to control the flow of online information. I study the economic, social and political impacts of social media and other emerging technologies. Being based in Kathmandu, I have watched firsthand as what began as a protest over a short-lived ban on social media snowballed into something far greater, leading to the toppling of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli. Indeed, social media has played a crucial role in this ongoing turmoil in two ways. First, the government’s decision on Sept. 4 to ban social platforms served as the immediate catalyst to the unrest. It provoked anger among a generation for whom digital spaces are central not only to communication, identity and political expression, but also to education and economic opportunities. And second, the pervasive use of these platforms primed the nation’s youth for this moment of protest. It heightened Gen Z’s awareness of the country’s entrenched social, economic and political problems. By sharing stories of corruption, privilege and inequality, social media not only informed but also galvanized Nepal’s youth, motivating collective mobilization against the country’s systemic injustice. The role of social media As with many other nations, social media is central to daily life and commerce in Nepal, a landlocked nation of 30 million people situated between two Asian giants: China and India.   As of January 2025, just short of half the population had social media accounts. This includes some 13.5 million active Facebook users, 3.6 million Instagram users, 1.5 million LinkedIn users and 466,100 X users. Indeed, social media platforms drive roughly 80% of total online traffic in the country and serve as vital channels for business and communication. Many users in Nepal depend on these platforms to run and promote their businesses. As such, the government’s decision to block 26 social media platforms sparked immediate concern among the Nepalese public. The move wasn’t completely out of the blue. Nepal’s government has long been concerned over the growth of social media platforms. In November 2023, the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology introduced new social media regulations, requiring platforms to register with the government, set up a local contact point, appoint a grievance officer and designate an oversight official. Platforms were also obliged to cooperate in criminal investigations, remove illegal content and comply with Nepali law. The Nepalese government, citing concerns over fake accounts, hate speech, disinformation and fraud, said the measures were to ensure accountability and make operators responsible for content on their platforms. Then, in January 2025, the government introduced a Social Media Bill that placed further requirements on social media platforms. Censorship concerns Regardless of their intent, these government measures sparked immediate civil liberties concerns. Critics and rights groups argued that both the ban and the bill function as tools for censorship, threatening freedom of expression, press freedom and fundamental rights. Ncell, Nepal’s second-largest telecommunications service provider, noted that shutting down all platforms at once was, in any case, technically difficult and warned that the move would severely impact business. Small business owners, who rely on social media to promote and sell their products, were especially worried with a busy festive season looming. The ban also had significant implications for education. Many students rely on social media platforms to access online classes, research materials and collaborative learning tools. More generally, the Nepalese public criticized the government’s measures disproportionate impact on ordinary users. As such, this deep reliance on social media by Nepalese society turned the ban into a flashpoint for public dissent. The rise of #NepoKids Even before the protests began on Sept. 8, the pervasive use of social media, along with exposure to content showcasing inequality and elite privilege, had heightened Gen Z’s awareness of Nepal’s entrenched social, economic and political problems. A few weeks before the protests began, the hashtags #NepoBaby and #NepoKids began trending, fueled by viral videos of politicians’ lavish lifestyles. The content drew attention to the country’s inequality by contrasting the lives of the children of the country’s elite – with designer clothing and foreign vacations – with images of Nepali migrant workers returning home in coffins from dangerous jobs abroad. The hashtag campaigns gained traction on TikTok and Reddit, leading to calls for asset investigations, anti-corruption reforms and even transferring the assets of the wealthy to public ownership. One particularly notable viral video featured the son of a provincial government minister posing in front of a tree made from boxes of luxury labels including Louis Vuitton, Cartier and Gucci. Such posts served to further fuel public outrage over perceived elite privilege. The immediacy and interactivity of social media platforms amplified the outrage, encouraging group mobilization. In this way, social media acted both as a magnifier and accelerator, linking perceived injustice to on-the-ground activism and shaping how the movement unfolded even before the Sept. 8 protests began. A deeper story of hardship and corruption Yet a social media campaign is nothing without a root cause to shine a light on. Economic insecurity and political corruption have for years left many of Nepal’s youth frustrated, setting the stage for today’s protest movement. While the overall unemployment rate in 2024 was 11%, the youth unemployment rate stood significantly higher at 21%. But these figures only scratch the surface of Nepal’s deep economic problems, which include pervasive vulnerable employment – informal and insecure work that is prone to poor conditions and pay – and limited opportunities that constrain long-term productivity. Between 2010 and 2018, fewer than half of new entrants into the workforce secured formal, stable jobs; the remainder were primarily engaged in informal or precarious work, which often lacked consistent income, benefits or legal protections. Most available positions are informal, poorly compensated and offer little stability or room for career growth. All told, children born in Nepal today face a grim economic reality. By age 18, they are likely to achieve only about 51% of their productivity potential – that is, the maximum economic output they could reach if they had full access to quality health, nutrition and education. Meanwhile, corruption is widespread. In 2024, Nepal ranked 107th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, with 84% of people perceiving government corruption to be a major problem. An upshot of corruption is the growing influence of Nepal’s politically connected business elite, who shape laws and regulations to benefit themselves. In the process, they secure tax breaks, inflate budgets and create monopolies that block competition. This capture of public policy by an entrenched elite stifles economic growth, crowds out genuine entrepreneurs and exacerbates inequality, while basic public services remain inadequate. Combined, these economic and political pressures created fertile ground for social mobilization. While persistent hardships helped fuel the rise of the #Nepokids movement, it was social media that gave voice to Nepali youths’ frustration. When the government attempted to silence them through a ban on social media platforms, it proved to be a step too far.

Diplomacy
President of Russia Vladimir Putin meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2025)

Why Xi, Putin and Kim on One Stage Matters

by Roie Yellinek

Beijing’s Victory Day parade in Tiananmen Square was designed to dazzle: ranks of uniformed troops, formations of aircraft, and an arsenal of new systems meant to underscore China’s rapid military modernization. But the most consequential image was not a missile or a stealth jet. It was a tableau of three leaders—Xi Jinping at the center, flanked by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un—watching the spectacle together. The scene, widely broadcast and photographed, turned a commemorative event into a geopolitical marker. It was less a snapshot than a signal: the public normalization of a deepening alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea, at a moment when Western democracies are struggling to sustain cohesion on core strategic questions. The parade itself offered the familiar mixture of hardware and narrative. Coverage highlighted the unveiling or public confirmation of advanced systems across domains: upgraded intercontinental missiles, new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, hypersonic and anti-ship capabilities, long-range bombers, early warning aircraft, and a broad stable of unmanned platforms, including undersea vehicles and “loyal wingman” drones. Chinese media presented these developments as evidence of a “world-class” People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moving beyond legacy constraints and into truly multi-domain operations, with information, space, and cyber now integrated alongside land, sea, and air. Independent reporting catalogued the breadth of systems and emphasized a narrative of credible deterrence and strategic depth rather than mere choreography. Yet the more instructive message was political. The presence of Putin and Kim, alongside other leaders, was not a mere ceremonial occurrence. Each leader arrived with clear incentives to be seen at Xi’s side, and each gained by lending visual weight to Beijing’s story. For Moscow, the image reinforced the claim that Russia is not isolated, that it retains powerful partners and is embedded in a wider non-Western coalition. For Pyongyang, the moment was even more significant: an opportunity to step out of diplomatic isolation and be recognized publicly as a member of a consequential strategic grouping. For Beijing, hosting both leaders signaled that China can convene and coordinate—projecting status, reassuring sympathetic governments, and unsettling adversaries by hinting at a tighter web of cooperation among U.S. rivals. The convergence behind the optics has been building for years, and could have happened only on Chinese soil. China and Russia have expanded their coordination across energy, defense, and diplomatic, even as they preserve maneuvering room on sensitive issues. North Korea’s accelerating exchanges with Russia, alongside growing political warmth with Beijing, provide a third leg to this emerging tripod. None of this amounts to a formal alliance with mutual defense obligations. But it does resemble a strategic alignment held together by shared interests: resisting a U.S.-led order, blunting sanctions pressure, reducing vulnerability to Western technology restrictions, and demonstrating that alternatives exist to dollar-centric finance and Western supply chains. The choreography on the rostrum did not create this alignment; it made it more legible and clear. Memory politics is a key component of that legibility. Beijing’s decision to anchor the parade in the commemoration of victory over Japan allows contemporary power projection to be cloaked in a unifying moral narrative. China increasingly leverages World War II memory in diplomacy—shaping a “memory war” that reframes the post-1945 order and what is seen from China as its rightful place within it. Russia’s long-standing use of the “Great Patriotic War” plays a parallel role, justifying current policies through selective historical continuity. North Korea’s revolutionary mythology fits easily into this narrative architecture. By standing together at an anniversary of anti-fascist victory, the three leaders signaled an ideational convergence that complements their material cooperation: a claim to moral legitimacy as guardians of an alternative international vision. The military dimension of the parade, while not the core of this argument, still matters. Displays of a maturing triad—land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched systems, and an air-launched nuclear component—aim to convey survivable second-strike capacity. The public presentation of hypersonic and anti-ship systems is meant to complicate adversary planning in the Western Pacific. The range of unmanned platforms suggests an intent to saturate domains with relatively low-cost, attritable assets, improving persistence and compressing the sensor-to-shooter loop. It is prudent to treat parades cautiously: not all showcased systems are fully operational or fielded at scale, and performance claims are difficult to validate. But as an indicator, the breadth and integration of platforms reflect a planning culture committed to joint operations and “intelligentized” warfare, where AI-enabled targeting and decision support are not theoretical ambitions but programmatic priorities What, then, does the image of Xi–Putin–Kim actually change? First, it clarifies expectations. Observers no longer need to infer the trajectory of this triangular relationship from scattered bilateral overtures. The three leaders have chosen to make their alignment visible. Visibility creates deterrent value, raising the perceived costs of coercing any one member, and it can also facilitate practical cooperation: intelligence sharing, diplomatic coordination at the UN and other fora, synchronized signaling during regional crises, and mutually reinforcing sanctions-evasion practices. Second, it complicates Western planning. Even if Beijing keeps caution around direct military assistance in Europe or the Korean Peninsula, diplomatic top-cover, economic buffering, and technology flows short of lethal aid can still alter the correlation of forces over time. Finally, it resonates across the Global South. Many governments seek strategic autonomy and resist being forced into binary choices. The parade’s optics supplied a ready-made narrative for those who argue that the international system is already multipolar and that non-Western coalitions can deliver security and development without Western tutelage. The contrast with Western coordination was strikingly evident. In the transatlantic community, support for Ukraine remains substantial; however, debates about resource levels, war aims, and timelines have intensified. In the Indo-Pacific, there is a growing alignment on deterring coercion in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea; however, national economic interests and differing risk tolerances result in uneven policies toward China. Across Europe and North America, electoral politics continue to inject volatility into foreign policy, complicating efforts to sustain long-term, bipartisan strategies. None of these frictions amounts to collapse, and there are genuine Western successes in coalition-building—from NATO enlargement to evolving minilateral formats in the Indo-Pacific. However, an analytically honest reading of the moment acknowledges that the authoritarian trio in Beijing has projected a unity of purpose that Western capitals currently struggle to match consistently. Three implications follow. The first is narrative competition. If Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang can turn a commemorative event into a global story about legitimacy and resilience, they will continue to use history as a strategic resource. The appropriate Western response is not to cede the narrative field but to invest in historically grounded, forward-looking messaging that explains the link between rules-based order and practical benefits—trade reliability, crisis management, and sovereignty protection—for diverse audiences. The second is coalition maintenance. Western policymakers will need to prioritize “coalition hygiene”: aligning export controls and investment screening where it matters most; building redundancy into critical supply chains; closing divergences in sanctions enforcement; and coordinating messaging so that tactical differences do not obscure strategic alignment. This requires political discipline more than new institutions. The third is theater integration. As the Beijing image suggested a cross-regional understanding among three adversarial capitals, allied planning must better account for cross-theater linkages—how actions in Europe affect deterrence in Asia, and vice versa—and ensure that resource allocations and industrial policies reflect genuinely global prioritization. It is important not to overstate. The emerging alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea is asymmetric and interest-based, not a tightly binding alliance. Beijing’s global economic integration imposes constraints that Moscow and Pyongyang do not share. Russia and North Korea each bring liabilities that China will manage carefully. Frictions—over technology, pricing, and regional equities—will persist. But the threshold crossed in Beijing is nonetheless meaningful. These governments judged that the benefits of public proximity now outweigh the costs. That judgment, once made, is difficult to reverse quickly; it tends to generate its own momentum through bureaucratic follow-through and sunk reputational costs. One image cannot rewrite the balance of power. It can, however, crystallize a trend and concentrate minds. The sight of Xi, Putin, and Kim standing together did exactly that. It captured an authoritarian convergence rooted in shared grievances and converging strategies, and it highlighted the challenge facing democracies that wish to preserve an open and stable order: maintaining the patience, unity, and policy discipline to act together. The test for the West is less whether it recognizes the signal—most capitals do—than whether it can convert recognition into sustained, collective action. If Beijing’s parade was a demonstration of choreography and intent, the appropriate answer is not a counter-parade, but the quieter work of alignment: aligning narratives with interests, interests with instruments, and instruments with partners. That work is not glamorous. It is, however, what turns a photo into policy.

Energy & Economics
At Singapore 2023 075

A Post-Humanist Perspective of Singapore's Ecomodernist Leadership

by Sasha Maher , Rhiannon Lloyd , Lydia Martin

Abstract Green growth has become doxa in the political economic governance of climate change. This is despite the lack of empirical evidence of its success and concerns that it reifies a business-as-usual dynamic. The question arises: why have practices of ‘green leadership’ maintained a hegemonic hold on how nation states respond to climate change? This provocation examines this question through an analysis of Singapore's policy ambition to become Asia's climate services leader. It draws on post-humanism to suggest that the form of ecomodernist leadership exhibited by Singapore not only perpetuates the status quo but (re)affirms the problematic anthropocentrism underpinning their approach. We demonstrate this through analysis of recent policy, media and private sector documents. Finally, we argue that a focus on Singapore matters because of its influence in the region and networked position globally. Introduction Singapore has emerged as a leader of green growth since gaining independence from Malaysia in 1965. Governed by the People's Action Party (PAP) since 1959, the city-state has pursued a developmental strategy focused on economic growth and wealth accumulation, despite its lack of natural resources. This strategy encompassed value-added manufacturing, high-tech research and financial services, propelling Singapore from a modest per capita GDP in 1965 of USD $516 to a substantial figure of USD $82,807 in 2022 (World Bank, 2022). However, this rapid development brought with it cumulative environmental challenges, including high Green House Gas (GHG) emissions, air pollution, ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss (Goh, 2001). In response, Singapore reframed these issues as economic opportunities, effectively folding an ecomodernist or green growth approach into its development agenda (Dent, 2018; Hamilton-Hart 2006, 2022). This shift was significantly influenced by Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's first Prime Minister, whose vision of a ‘Garden City’ involved a massive, ongoing tree-planting initiative. This initiative was not just an ecological project but a strategic move to attract foreign investment by showcasing Singapore as a modern, liveable city, thereby aligning nature conservation with economic development (Schneider-Mayerson, 2017). Building on Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's leadership, Singapore has continued to adopt ecomodernist policies, promoting concepts such as sustainability as essential for maintaining its competitive edge in the global arena. The state's stance on climate change illustrates this approach: initially seen as a threat and often couched as an enemy in official discourse, climate change has been transformed into an opportunity for growth. This perspective is epitomised in the annual three-day Ecosperity conference, an elite gathering emphasising the synergy between ecological sustainability and economic prosperity. However, this green growth approach has faced criticism for prioritising human needs over ecological integrity (Dent, 2018; Schneider-Mayerson, 2017; Wong, 2012), suggesting that Singapore's model of ‘green’ leadership may not be sufficient for addressing the root causes of climate change and other environmental challenges. We are similarly concerned at Singapore's leadership stance towards climate change. The latest rendition of this is its ambition to become Asia's climate finance ‘leader’ and a hub of carbon trading. Not only does Singapore's green growth approach narrowly cast complex environmental issues as technical problems requiring technical solutions but it renders nature as an object to be used for human development. This anthropocentrism negates non-human agency, instrumentalises nature and limits the radical change necessary as others have noted (Böhm and Sullivan, 2021; Ergene, Banerjee and Hoffman, 2021; Nyberg and Wright, 2023). In the following provocation, we draw on post-humanist critique of anthropocentrism to give a brief overview of green growth (Braidotti, 2013, 2019; Calás and Smircich, 2023). Second, we outline Singapore's emissions profile and latest policy response. We then surface three themes which are indicative of how Singapore's green leadership frames nature as non-agentic and subservient to humans. These themes are: ‘nature as risk producer’, ‘nature as instrument’ and ‘nature's demise as opportunity’. Anthropocentrism and Green Growth The discourse on greening capitalism emerged in the mid-2000s as initiatives by the United Nations Environmental Program, OECD and World Bank. At the Rio + 20 Conference these three organisations released publications promoting green growth with titles that evoked mutual compatibility such as Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable Development and Toward a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication. Subsequently, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change enshrined green growth in the 2015 Paris Agreement in Article 10, paragraph 5, ‘Accelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation is critical for an effective, long-term global response to climate change and promoting economic growth’ (United Nations UNFCCC, 2015: 27). Since then, the prevalence of green growth ideas has accelerated and diffused globally, taken up by states supranational organisations and non-states actors. It has remained a key policy theme at influential climate governance fora. For example, at the recent Green Swan 2023 conference, keynote Sir Nicolas Stern confidently declared that ‘there's no conflict between action on climate change and economic growth. Actually, it's the opposite. Action on climate change will drive economic growth’. Omitted from Sterns's assertion is recognition of the ‘coupling’ effect whereby economic growth has also led to the exploitation of non-humans and a concomitant climate crisis. Green growth approaches view nature as the means to create economic development as measured by GDP. The key assumption is that ‘the environment’ and humans as consumers or workers (see Mildenberger 2020) will both equally benefit through this process of instrumentalisation. The method to achieve the ‘decoupling’ of emissions (or ecological destruction) from GDP is via the application of technologies, investment, markets and innovation. Implementation of these methods will ostensibly redirect capital and production towards the efficient use of resources without disrupting consumption patterns and minimising ‘harm’ to nature. Nature in this framing is characterised as both threatening to humans (‘risk producer’) and simultaneously vulnerable (‘object at risk’). In either case, human beings are presupposed as the agents who will restore the orderliness of life; an orderliness where humans are the dominating species (Ruuska, Heikkurinen and Wilen, 2020) and the state of vulnerability is erased (Schwartz, 2019). At its core green growth is founded on the notion of efficiency gains, but as others (Hickel, 2021; Hickel and Kallis, 2019; Jackson, 2021) have noted, empirically there is no evidence that relative or absolute decoupling will arrest and restore the planet nor reduce carbon emissions permanently to levels that could keep global warming below 1.5 degrees. Efficiency has limitations and at some point, input is required to continue to grow which makes ongoing decoupling in the long-term unsustainable. This calls for an urgent rethinking of policy and the opening up of alternative possibilities such as degrowth or post-growth (Jackson, 2021). However, shifting the paradigm away from wealth accumulation and material prosperity would alter production and consumption patterns. As Hickel and Kallis (2019) remark, this type of transformation would not be politically expedient: ‘The assumption is that it is not politically acceptable to question economic growth and that no nation would voluntary limit growth in the name of the climate or environment; therefore, green growth must be true, since the alternative is disaster’ (2019: 484). Green growth may not only be implausible but it also dangerously reifies dualistic thought-structures that universalises and positions humankind as the privileged, superior species, a tendency which has underpinned the exploitative and extractive relationship between humans and nature that has driven climate change. It also ferments a ‘politics of resignation’ in which citizens tacitly accept harmful externalities (Benson and Kirsch, 2010). In line with post-humanist thought, we perceive nature through a relational lens. From this perspective, ‘nature’ is not a separate entity that exists apart from and below ‘culture’ (e.g., humans, organisations and nation states). Rather nature is understood to be a dynamic, open-ended and interactive ‘living system’ that encompasses all forms of life and matter (Braidotti, 2016). This relational framing of nature is positive in that it attributes agency and vitality to all life and not exclusively to humans and their doings (Braidotti, 2013). In short, more-than-human natures such as the ‘natural environment or ‘atmosphere’ are not tractable or deadened backgrounds for human action but are creative forces that shape life, including our own. In taking this ontological position, post-humanism surfaces and critiques anthropocentric assumptions evident in culture and society (Braidotti, 2013), providing a unique standpoint from which to deconstruct and challenge green growth. Singapore the Green City-StateEmissions Profile Singapore's GHG emissions for 2021 totalled 53 MtCO2e (National Climate Change Secretariat, 2021). In 2000, emissions were 38 MtCO2e and continues to increase over time. These emissions cover direct or primary emissions (Scope 1, 2): energy (39.2%), industry (44.4%), transport (14.2%), building (0.9%), households (0.4%), waste and water (0.6%) and others (0.2%). Secondary or indirect emissions (Scope 3) created within the energy sector from Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) at 94% are mostly in industry (16.6%), buildings (12.6%), household (6.6%) and transport (2.2%). Industry emissions amount to over 60% of Singapore's total emissions of which 75% are from the combustion of fossil fuels by the refining and petrochemicals sector (Tan, 2019). Singapore ranks 27th out of 142 countries in terms of emissions per capita but excluded from official statistics are the emissions from bunkering/marine fuels sales which was 148 MtCO2e in 2020 (The International Council of Clean Transportation, 2022). The rationale for the exclusion is that the UNFCC does not require GHG inventories to include emissions from shipping nor aviation. In 2021 Singapore set a new National Determined Commitment target of limiting GHG emissions in 2030 to 60 MtCO2e from 65 MtCO2e. It also brought forward its emission peak year to sometime ‘before 2030’ and confirmed its target to reach net zero emissions ‘as soon as viable in the second half of the century’ (National Climate Change Secretariat, 2022). Singapore's main mitigation actions were outlined in its long-term low-emission development strategy. These comprise three areas: (a) to transform industry, economy and society; (b) to draw on carbon capture, utilisation and storage and low-carbon fuels; and (c) international collaboration to build carbon markets, carbon storage and regional electricity grids. A key policy lever is Singapore's progressive carbon tax rate which covers 43% of emissions according to Climate Action Tracker (2022). The rate was increased from $5 SGD/tCO2e in 2019 to $25/tCO2e in 2024 and will reach $50–80/tCO2e by 2030. Carbon tax-liable companies are permitted to use carbon credits to offset up to 5% of emissions. However, these credits can only be obtained via the Singapore government's International Carbon Credit Framework under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement and not the voluntary carbon market. The tax works on multiple fronts: it drives demand to create a carbon market, derisks companies to increase investor confidence and incentivises decarbonisation efforts in Singapore and in credit producing host countries. Singapore's other mitigation efforts consist of energy efficiency and resource optimisation across industry, households, buildings, waste management and public transport. Green Finance Leader Singapore is positioning itself as Asia's hub for carbon trading. The government outlines this in its most recent master plan for addressing climate change: Singapore Green Plan 2030 (SGP). Launched in 2020, SGP 2030 aims to centre the city-state as a regional ‘leader’ in climate action and sustainable development, aligning with global commitments such as the UN's 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement. The plan represents a collective effort across five key ministries, guided by the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change. It focuses on five pillars: City in Nature, Sustainable Living, Energy Reset, Green Economy and Resilient Future, striving for efficient resource use, low-carbon energy adoption and innovation-driven change. Key initiatives include enhancing green spaces, promoting water conservation, expanding clean public transport and mandating clean energy vehicles by 2030. The Green Economy pillar of the SGP is particularly significant, framing environmental challenges as opportunities for economic growth. This involves incentivising carbon capture technologies and establishing Singapore as a carbon services and trading hub through the Green Finance Action Plan 2022 (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2022). The plan aims to create a robust green financial ecosystem, making Singapore a global centre for green finance. This includes developing markets for sustainable economic solutions, such as green bonds and insurance products. A study commissioned by the government in 2021 highlighted Singapore's potential to become a carbon trading hub, estimating its value between USD 1.8 billion to USD 5.6 billion by 2050 (Carvalho et al., 2021). As part of its green leadership plan Singapore is also entering into strategic partnerships under Article 6.2 with ‘carbon-rich’, developing countries. It has signed agreements with Vietnam, Bhutan, Paraguay, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Rwanda, Costa Rica, Ghana, Senegal, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Chile, Cambodia, Indonesia, Kenya, Mongolia, Morocco, Peru and Sri Lanka. It also recently signed a Green Economy Agreement with Australia with the aim to generate demand and facilitate the trading of Australian carbon credits. The aim of these Article 6.2 agreements is to facilitate the trading of Internationally Transferrable Mitigation Outcomes or carbon credits which are generated from the reduction of emissions in one country (e.g., PNG) which is then bought by a second country (e.g., Singapore, New Zealand). However, Singapore's interest extends to the role these partnerships play in helping to establish a trading market in Singapore. In its agreements, Singapore asserts that ‘when completed carbon tax liable companies in Singapore will be able to purchase carbon credits from eligible projects to offset up to 5% of their taxable emission’ (National Climate Change Secretariat, 2023). Article 6.2 partnerships not only help reduce costs for Singapore companies but bring to market a portfolio of credit sellers for trading on Singapore's new trading platform, Climate Impact X. Ecomodernist Themes of Nature A post-humanist perspective on Singapore's ambition to transform into a climate leader surfaces three ecomodernist or green growth themes. These themes are: ‘nature as risk producer’, ‘nature as instrument’ and ‘nature's demise as opportunity’. Across these themes, it is implied that humans take priority and should utilise nature to achieve economic growth. A conventional approach would ignore this dualism and support the instrumentalisation of nature without awareness nor concern that this thought-structure plays a key part in producing climate change. In official organisational documents and speeches regarding Singapore's ambitions to create a global carbon trading hub, Singapore is presented as a model city and a vanguard in terms of environmental actions. Reference is also frequently made to the ‘founding father’, and visionary environmental leader, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Nature as Risk Producer Politicians, officials and industry often, if not always, portray climate change as the result of nature being ‘out of place’ and consequently hostile towards the vulnerable nation-state (Douglas, 1966; Ruuska et al., 2020). For example, below is an extract from the SGP which sets up the catastrophic framing, and two quotes from Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong followed by Grace Fu Minister for Sustainability and the Environment at the COP28: Climate change is an existential threat of our times. It has brought rising sea levels and extreme weather patterns…Singapore, as a low-lying island state, is particularly vulnerable. Our weather is getting warmer, rainstorms heavier, and dry spells more pronounced (Singapore Government). Singapore [is] a low-lying, alternative-energy disadvantaged island-state. We therefore appreciate the inherent challenges in climate transitions. However, we believe that new technologies, new financing models and new markets offer us hope (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, 2023). Singapore is a small city-state, lacking in renewable energy. We are a low-lying island that is acutely vulnerable to the threat of rising sea levels. We are an urbanised city near the equator, susceptible to rising temperatures (Ministry of Sustainability and the Environment Singapore, 2023). The narrative that nature is a risk producer is a form of spatial anthropocentrism in which Earth and beyond are considered the rightful and exclusive spaces for humans (Ruuska et al., 2020). If nature was tame and in its proper docile place, then humans would not be at risk. The reasonable response to this logic is to put nature back in its place by constructing hard engineering solutions, such as sea walls and defending infrastructure that deliver services to humans (e.g., water, electricity, transport, telecommunication), alongside the use of soft solutions to absorb the costs of rebuilding, for example, via flood insurance. Nature as Green Growth Tool The case of Singapore demonstrates that the objectification of nature is a prerequisite to instrumentalisation. Our second theme – nature as a green growth tool – is evident in Singapore's continuation of its long-standing Garden City strategy: nature to be altered to ensure the material prosperity of the populace and thus maintain PAP's political legitimacy (Barnard and Heng, 2014; Hamilton-Hart, 2006, 2022; Schneider-Mayerson, 2017). For example, in the SGP, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is quoted as follows: Over 100 years ago, this was a mudflat, swamp. Today, this is a modern city. Ten years from now, this will be a metropolis. Never fear (Singapore Government). The SGP then follows this quote from Prime Minister Lee by stating that,…Having advanced from mudflats, to metropolis, we will turn our metropolis into a global city of sustainability (Singapore Government). Today, Singapore is a City in a Garden, and is one of the greenest cities in the world. We set aside large nature reserves, with about a third of our island covered by trees. We knew public cleanliness and hygiene were important to prevent diseases in our hot and humid urban environment and took tough measures to enforce them (Singapore Government). There is a direct link made between using nature as a tool and nation building. As a consequence of this argument, any opposition to Singapore's ‘global’ ambitions could be viewed as a threat to the state, unpatriotic and regressive. The use of nature as instrument for green growth is most stark under the Green Economy pillar. Nature's Demise as Opportunity The third theme evident in Singapore's attempts to position itself as a ‘green leader’ also concerns the instrumentalisation of nature but takes it a step further, with nature's destruction as a result of anthropogenic climate change being presented as a means to stimulate economic development. In the SGP, four of the pillars focus on efficiency and optimising production and consumption of natural resources. However, the Green Economy pillar not only seeks to capitalise on nature but intends to prosper from its demise. The discourse on the climate crisis is rewoven as a narrative about ‘seizing’ opportunities from the climate crisis and the ensuring there is pressure on states and corporates to act. Similar to disaster capitalism, the impacts of climate change are a new business venture for Singapore to advance its developmentalist approach. Below are instances of this discourse: As the world transits to a low-carbon future, there are many exciting new opportunities in the green economy. For instance, the increasing demand for green financing and carbon services will create good jobs and new opportunities for our enterprises (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore, 2022). Singapore's Green Plan aims to harness sustainability as ‘a new engine of growth’ …Under the plan, the Singaporean government will lead and drive all economic actors to make the transition toward more sustainable economic models, including establishing the country as a hub for green finance, carbon trading and sustainability consultancy (Wangkiat, 2021). We must seek out new areas of cooperation. This will allow us to deepen collaboration while also strengthening our relevance as a global business hub. Sustainability is one area where there are interesting opportunities for growth and strong potential for international collaboration. Green financing, carbon services, and trading are some examples of the new industries that we can look forward to in the green economy (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore, 2023). Singapore is unequivocal in highlighting the competitive advantage that the climate crisis holds for the state. This intensification of the instrumentalism of its Garden City strategy serves not only to commodify but also to financialise climate change. As Ergene, Banerjee and Hoffman (2021: 1320) remark, ‘The Anthropocene is not a story of unintended consequences but is a direct result of a political economy that privileges wealth accumulation at the expense of environmental destruction’. The growth imperative inherent in capitalism relies on the appropriation of nature's ‘resources’ at a low-cost despite ecological consequences. Capitalism seeks to exploit ‘cheap’ resources, including land, labour and energy. This pursuit of cheap inputs is founded on the ontological separation between humans and nature, and the devaluing of nature and some humans compared to others. Capitalism unleashes ‘a “metabolic rift” in the relationship between humans and the earth, resulting in an environmental crisis that now threatens the very basis of life on the planet’ (Wright et al., 2018: p. 459; see also Foster, 2012; Nyberg et al., 2022). Conclusion The three themes explored above underscore how Singapore continues to conceptualise nature as ‘other’. The current understanding of ‘green leader’ and what is legitimate and required in order to be considered ‘green’ maintains a primarily economically centred political agenda. This ‘ecomodernist leadership’ regime is preoccupied by quantitative measures of a known and knowable nature. In short, being ‘green’ requires the improvement of these numbers in directions agreed as beneficial to both the economic and environmental systems they reflect and relate to. Such instrumentalism provides one means towards green futures, but we would argue that this dangerously reifies the dualistic exploitative relations that underpin climate change (e.g., Moore, 2016). Green growth and other notions of ‘greening’ (e.g., Green Economy, Green Finance) do not alter the problematic of anthropocentrism but rather propagate and support a Promethean logic (Dryzek, 2022). So, although Singapore's portion of global emissions is small at 0.1%, we would suggest that Singapore's contribution to climate change extends beyond this number due to its green leadership stance and practices. 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