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Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The history of Russian-American relations has been marked by numerous ups and downs, periods of cooperation and confrontation that have shaped not only bilateral relations but also had a significant impact on the global political stage. In this regard, these relations have always attracted the attention of researchers attempting to predict their development. Moreover, every U.S. presidential election is not just a change of power in the country but also an opportunity to reassess foreign policy, which, in turn, affects the interests of other nations, including Russia. Each new president comes to power with their own views, priorities, and strategies, directly influencing both bilateral and multilateral relations. One only needs to recall examples where shifts in the White House have led to dramatic turns in foreign policy — ranging from escalations in tension to attempts to set a new tone for dialogue. For instance, consider President Obama's “reset” policy towards Russia, followed by the intensification of anti-Russian sanctions when the “reset” did not unfold according to American expectations. What significance do the 2024 U.S. presidential elections hold for Russian-American relations? Will the continuity of U.S. foreign policy towards Russia persist? How might the election results impact the future of these two great powers and their interactions on the global stage? At the Intersection of Hopes and Ambitions Among the factors influencing Russian-American relations are the views, priorities, and strategies of American decision-makers. In this regard, the 2024 U.S. presidential election drew the close attention of the international community. It is expected that a change in president and government could lead to a transformation of foreign policy. The position of the elected president serves as an indicator of the likely foreign policy tactics and strategies Washington may adopt towards other countries and in addressing various international issues during the upcoming four-year term.   So, what do we know about Donald Trump? First and foremost, he brings valuable presidential experience and is well aware of the pitfalls that await him now. He is better prepared for the role than he was eight years ago. Secondly, he might challenge the deep state, which, while unlikely, cannot be entirely ruled out. He has nothing left to lose unless he amends the Constitution to create the possibility of running for a third term. Thirdly, he fiercely defends the national interests of the state in the spirit of realism. This means he can be engaged within this paradigm.   At the same time, he is a businessman, which implies that reaching an agreement with him is possible one way or another. The key is to offer him a “price” that aligns with his interests. If a foreign policy “business proposal” does not appeal to him or offer any tangible benefit, he will not even consider it.   It is also important to note that he is ambitious when it comes to wielding power. He has both the financial resources and influence within certain circles. It seems that what he lacks is global power. To realize his ambitions — such as demonstrating his ability to shape world destinies and influence international events through Russia — he may facilitate a revival of Russian-American relations from their current low point.  Whether Moscow would find this scenario acceptable is another question entirely. Nevertheless, American foreign policy does not depend solely on the desires and intentions of the president. Typically, it retains its key characteristics, even with occasional deviations from continuity in foreign policy tactics and strategies. An example of this can be seen in the shift towards a quasi-isolationist stance during Donald Trump's first term, followed by a reversal under Joe Biden's presidency (such as rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement, reversing the U.S. withdrawal from the WHO, and lifting the travel ban on citizens from several Muslim and African countries). Now, a return to Trump's approach is anticipated, though the main directions of previous foreign policies across all fronts are expected to remain intact.   It is also crucial to consider the presence of the so-called deep state in the U.S., which may attempt to hinder Trump’s plans and intentions. During his first term, the deep state proved to be a significant force, preventing the president from implementing certain plans and agreements with other world leaders, including Russia — for example, in the realm of cybersecurity.  However, Trump is now more aware of the specific challenges he might face and is better positioned to shape his foreign policy strategy in a way that circumvents potential obstacles posed by the deep state, enabling him to achieve his desired outcomes. This includes negotiating and implementing agreements he reaches.  Who will prevail in this dynamic — Trump or the deep state — remains to be seen in the near future. At the same time, it is essential to consider the impact of previously made decisions on U.S. foreign policy. For example, laws are much more challenging to amend or repeal than executive orders issued by a previous president. This is particularly relevant to one of the major sticking points in Russian-American relations — sanctions. Reaching an agreement to lift sanctions would be extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, under current conditions, as a law can only be repealed with the approval of the U.S. Congress. In other words, the president does not have the authority to unilaterally lift sanctions without Congressional consent.   However, if such a move aligns with strengthening the global influence of the United States — particularly Donald Trump’s role — it is conceivable that he might find a way to achieve the seemingly impossible. At the same time, the U.S. president is not the sole influential figure in shaping the country’s foreign policy — Congress also plays a crucial role. The current situation is unfolding in a manner similar to 2016. The outcome of the 2024 U.S. elections resulted not only in the victory of former president and businessman Donald Trump, but also in Republican candidates securing a majority in Congress. The Republican Party now holds the upper hand, with 53 seats in the Senate compared to the Democrats' 47, and 220 seats in the House of Representatives compared to the Democrats' 215.   There is a likelihood that Republicans will be inclined to support Trump’s initiatives. However, opposition on certain issues is also possible, one of which could be Russia, particularly regarding anti-Russian sanctions, as was the case during his previous term.  In this context, it is important to note that Republican members of Congress have backed the nomination of the current Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson, for the same position in the new House. The vote on his candidacy is scheduled for January 3, 2025. While he previously supported funding for Ukraine, his rhetoric has recently shifted, and he has started opposing this initiative.   Meanwhile, John Thune has become the new Republican leader in the Senate. He has already expressed his willingness to approve Trump’s cabinet appointments through a simplified and expedited process. Notably, he also supported aid for Ukraine in the past. However, this fact is now being downplayed in public discourse in the United States. In addition to the role of the president and the composition of Congress, those appointed to key foreign policy positions and the advisors to the head of state can also play a significant role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Currently, Donald Trump, drawing on his experience from his first term, is selecting candidates for his team who are not only loyal to him but also influential and well-resourced figures, such as Elon Musk. He is choosing individuals who share his ambitions.  In this regard, Trump and Musk are quite similar — both aspire to global influence. This has led to a consolidation of Trump’s inner circle around his expressed ideas, even if some of these individuals previously held different positions on foreign policy issues. This dynamic is evident, for instance, in the case of Mike Johnson.   Undoubtedly, this alignment is primarily motivated by the desire to secure positions in the upcoming administration. However, these individuals are also well aware that if they oppose Trump, they risk being replaced by more loyal candidates. One of the top priorities on the agenda for the newly elected president is filling government positions. The importance of those he selects for his team should not be underestimated. Despite their loyalty, it is important to consider the potential, albeit limited, influence they may have on the stance of the newly elected president. First and foremost, Donald Trump has selected U.S. Senator J.D. Vance from Ohio as his vice president. Vance considers Russia an adversary of the United States but believes treating Moscow as an outright enemy is counterproductive. He has been cautious in supporting anti-Russian sanctions, remarking that the Biden administration's use of this tool against Russia has been as effective as a “damp firecracker”.   J.D. Vance has been a vocal opponent of providing aid to Ukraine and has advocated for negotiations with Russia. According to him, “just because we don’t like someone doesn’t mean we can’t talk to them from time to time”. This suggests a degree of pragmatism in the approach toward Moscow within the future U.S. presidential administration.   Nonetheless, national interests will remain the top priority for Trump’s entire team, as well as for Trump himself. In this context, one potential negotiation strategy could involve emphasizing that agreements on specific issues align with American national interests. Currently, Michael Waltz is being considered for the role of National Security Advisor. This position is one of the most significant in the U.S. administration and does not require Senate confirmation. Waltz would be responsible for briefing Donald Trump on key national security issues and coordinating the work of various agencies.   Regarding his foreign policy views, Waltz believes it is necessary to reassess the U.S. objectives in Ukraine. At the same time, he is among those who support imposing sanctions on Russia and conducting strikes deep within Russian territory. So far, no changes in his stance on these matters have been observed.   However, it is unlikely that he will openly contradict Trump. Instead, a “good cop, bad cop” dynamic may emerge, which could align perfectly with the newly elected president's objectives. After all, Trump is advancing the concept of “peace through strength”. Donald Trump plans to appoint Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State. In recent interviews, Rubio stated that Ukraine should seek opportunities for a peaceful resolution with Russia rather than focusing solely on reclaiming its territories. He was also one of 15 Republican senators who voted against the $95 billion military aid package for Ukraine passed in April 2024. This alignment with Trump’s position on Ukraine indicates Rubio’s intention to remain loyal to the U.S. president.   For the role of Secretary of Defense, Trump is considering Pete Hegseth, a Fox News host. Hegseth has expressed skepticism about continuing U.S. support for Ukraine, further reflecting his loyalty to Trump, consistent with other candidates being considered for positions in the new administration. Donald Trump has proposed New York Congresswoman Elise Stefanik as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Stefanik has called for “crushing actions” to defeat Russia and was one of the initiators of anti-Russian sanctions. However, she voted against a multi-billion-dollar aid package for Ukraine in early 2024.   For the position of Director of National Intelligence, Trump has nominated Tulsi Gabbard, known for her criticism of U.S. foreign policy regarding Ukraine and Russia. In early 2022, she attributed the conflict to the Biden administration's failure to acknowledge Russia's “legitimate security concerns” regarding Ukraine's potential NATO membership. Other key positions include Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of Commerce, who are responsible, among other things, for implementing anti-Russian sanctions, as well as the Director of the CIA. Additionally, the new Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) will be led by businessman Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, Trump's former rival in the primaries.  In this context, it is important to note that Donald Trump places a high value on loyalty and support for his ideas. Consequently, members of his team are likely to carefully weigh their words to avoid contradicting him — or at least not contradicting him significantly — while subtly advancing their own views when possible.   In summary, all candidates share a common trait: loyalty to Trump and support for his ideas, particularly regarding Ukraine, even if they previously held differing views on certain issues. However, it would be premature to infer a shift in the U.S. position toward Russia based solely on their expressed desire to resolve the Ukrainian conflict. Bridges or Walls: The Shape of Russian-American Relations After 2024  The trends in relations between Moscow and Washington after 2024 will largely depend not only on the outcome of the recent elections but also on the genuine readiness of both nations for dialogue and cooperation. Notably, Russia has already articulated its position, expressing its willingness for constructive dialogue. However, the question remains: Is Washington prepared for this, considering its deeply entrenched anti-Russian background? Can Donald Trump navigate these challenges effectively, and more importantly, does he even want to?   Russian-American relations after the elections stand at a crossroads. The choice between constructive cooperation and deepening confrontation will be critical. What factors will ultimately determine the future trajectory of these relations? It is important to remember that Donald Trump is a businessman who thinks and acts accordingly. He is ambitious and seeks to influence international relations while positioning himself as a leader. Consequently, he will never agree to concessions. At best, the outcome will be compromise solutions on a range of issues that he, as U.S. president, does not consider vital but which allow him to fulfill his ambitions and emerge as the winner in negotiations. On one hand, under current conditions, the shadow of conflict will continue to loom over Russian-American relations regardless of the statements and actions of Donald Trump and his team. Among the contentious issues that will be challenging to resolve are North Korea (a longstanding U.S. adversary), relations with China (Trump would like to reduce the level of Russian-Chinese cooperation), and Iran (its nuclear program remains a major concern for the U.S.).  On the other hand, potential areas for dialogue and cooperation could include counterterrorism efforts and cybersecurity. An attempt was made during Trump’s first term in 2017, when a bilateral working group on cybersecurity was proposed following a meeting between the Russian and U.S. presidents. However, these agreements ultimately fell apart due to pressure on Trump from the U.S. deep state. It is highly unlikely that Russia and the United States will be able to overcome their significant differences, establish a mutually beneficial dialogue, restore strategic stability, or “reset” their relations over the next four years, especially given Donald Trump's stance on achieving “peace through strength”. Interestingly, Trump has expressed a desire to resolve the crisis in Ukraine as quickly as possible. However, during his first presidential term, his administration approved the transfer of weapons to Ukraine. It can be speculated that this decision was influenced by the deep state, which may have pressured him to provide military aid to Kyiv.   That said, it is improbable that Trump's current desire to end the conflict will take Russian national interests into account. Notably, he has been largely silent on the broader development of relations with Russia. One should not expect a dramatic shift in Russian-American relations. The United States will continue to act in its national interests, as it always has. However, there is now an opportunity to reopen negotiations with Donald Trump, approaching him as a businessman open to a potential win-win scenario, provided that the strategy is carefully crafted — much like Henry Kissinger once did.   Russia has made its move; now it is Trump’s turn. Whether he is capable of restoring even a minimal level of trust between the two countries, necessary for de-escalating tensions, will become evident over the next four years.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Western missteps in Africa are creating an opening for Russia to deepen its influence. Recent protests against International Monetary Fund (IMF)-imposed austerity measures have rocked several African states. Kenya, a long-time partner of the United States and a key contributor to UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti, experienced violent clashes between government security forces and anti-austerity protestors over tax hikes in a controversial finance bill. Simultaneously, many protesters saw Kenyan engagement in Haiti as footing the bill for American security interests while ordinary Kenyans struggled to make ends meet. Soon after, similar protests against IMF measures spread to Nigeria. Analysts and locals are concerned that spreading protests may threaten stability across Africa. Citizens of other countries continue to voice their displeasure with the political and economic status quo through protest (in Mozambique) and at the ballot box (in Botswana). IMF loans come with significant stipulations, including reforms to financial systems and governance. Critics of these conditions frequently malign the IMF as a violator of sovereignty. Changes to economic and governing models, combined with high debts and economic stress, increase the costs of everyday products and diminish purchasing power across the continent. To many ordinary citizens, the West is benefiting from the fruit of African resources while hindering Africans’ access to the global economy. Publics in these countries demand alternatives to IMF funding, protesting governments to oppose IMF-imposed austerity. Youth, an increasingly important demographic, are especially active. Many of these young people are college-educated but fail to secure adequately paid employment in skilled industries. The informal economy is growing but increasingly separated from formal and international economies. IMF austerity measures are driving the continent to economic crisis and protest that may have lasting effects anathema to US foreign policy and the liberal international order. Some already see China as a viable alternative, although public opinion of Chinese influence is mixed. Elsewhere, faded Cold War memories make Russia a relatively unknown economic and political alternative. So, while recent Western actions in Africa have put long term relationships at risk, Russia is slowly increasing its influence on the continent. In fact, the Kremlin has already taken action and is engaged in the politics surrounding the various debt crises in African nations. African countries owe debts to multiple international actors, including Russia. However, Moscow has forgiven debts owed by many of these countries, coupling debt relief with additional economic benefits, including an influx of grains and energy resources. It has also deepened defense cooperation with several African countries. This cooperation often includes contracts for weapons sales and the deployment of irregular military units, including the Wagner Group. Diplomatic actions such as the above have led some protestors to see Russia as a viable alternative to IMF funding and partnerships with the US and Europe. In a visual representation of this phenomenon, protestors have been seen waving Russian flags at mass gatherings across Africa. Russia appears to receive the greatest support in the Sahel, where governments have failed to curb political instability and deliver on economic development promises. Publics in the region were already angry with the continued postcolonial military presence of France, and Russia took advantage. Mass publics are not the only actors seeking alternatives, ruling elites also see Russia as an attractive partner. Russian defense cooperation and the presence of irregular forces bolster these regimes in the face of increasing civilian protests over poor governance or human rights. Still, Russia has not yet made the gains it could. The war in Ukraine is hurting Africans and contributing to economic stress as global grain prices have skyrocketed. Some perceive Russia as exacerbating the problems of failed governance through its use of Wagner Group formations to back corrupt officials, protect corporate interests, and bolster unpopular governments. Russian interest in the region is also less significant than in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, or the Arctic, where Russia has more proximate strategic, economic, and political goals. Rather than rushing in, Russia’s economic presence in Africa is slowly advancing Moscow’s goals on the international stage. When Russia sought to undermine financial, technological, and energy sanctions from the West as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, it turned to Africa to find new consumers for food products, energy, and arms. Already, in the wake of the invasion, only half of the continent voted to condemn Russia. Such voting patterns at the UN indicate greater support for Russia in Africa than in other regions around the world, even if distrust of Russia remains high in some parts of the continent. Forecasted crises could increase Russian influence on the continent as well. Shocks generated by the African debt crisis could become a proximate cause for geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts. Rapid demographic changes and disastrous climate events (e.g., droughts and floods) exacerbate existing economic and migratory challenges. Since the tentacles of Russian economic and security influence, as well as misinformation, are already present in Africa, such future crises could pull multiple African states further into Russian orbit, and away from Western countries and institutions. Further alignment of African states with Russia would have several drawbacks. Russia would discourage democratization and use security assistance to bolster dictators across the continent. Environmentally sustainable development is also likely to be hampered. Russia may increase the extraction of natural resources in environmentally damaging ways. Additionally, Russian energy exports will be oil and gas, eroding the already significant investment and progress in green energy development many African political economies have made. As Western missteps create openings for Russia to gain a foothold in Africa, they also set the stage for other global powers to capitalize on the vacuum. Chinese-built infrastructure in Africa also contributed to debt burdens, but unlike Western approaches tied to IMF austerity measures, China is recalibrating its strategy. By shifting to smaller projects with lower debt exposure and promoting green energy development overseas, China positions itself as a more appealing partner. This strategy not only bolsters China’s domestic solar and EV industries but also enhances its soft power by responding to local economic needs. Moreover, as Western policy blunders alienate African publics and governments, both Russia’s and China’s influence may grow. Russia’s gains in the region could indirectly strengthen China’s position by fostering broader skepticism of Western-led systems, aligning African leaders more closely with Beijing’s geopolitical goals, including its stance on Taiwan. Africa is a burgeoning continent. One in four humans will be African by 2050. If the US and Europe pass on opportunities to engage with a continent of emerging green development powers and an increasingly educated demographic bulge, Western policies will undermine their own power and influence in the international order. Russia’s quiet increase in trade and security assistance offers an established alternative. Meaning ultimately, both Russia and China, may play the long game, gaining incremental support from a region of one billion people at a time. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0) [add link: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/]

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It also seems that various international, domestic, and regional variables in the economic and political dimensions will prevent widespread military-security tension in Turkey-Israel relations. Turkey recognized Israel in March 1949. Less serious ups and downs sometimes accompanied the bilateral relations between the two sides in the following decades. These relations continued during the rule of the Justice and Development Party over Turkey.The killing of 8 Turkish citizens by Israel in 2010, the reduction of tensions in 2016, the expulsion of ambassadors in 2018, and the existence of many ups and downs were important incidents in Turkey-Israel relations. While Erdoğan and Netanyahu met in New York in September 2023, seeking to normalize relations fully; the Israel-Gaza War on October 7, 2023, made Ankara to intensify its criticism and recall its ambassador from Israel. Although some Turkish diplomats continued to operate in Tel Aviv, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced in November 2024 that Turkey had severed all ties with Israel and currently had no relations with Israel. However, it appears that the Turkish embassy in Israel is operating and the Israeli diplomatic mission in Ankara is also open. Сhallenges Israeli-Turkish relations have reached a critical point, and the scope of tensions and disagreements has also expanded. Turkey has been one of the major critics of Israel in recent years, and the recent November 2024 announcement indicates an escalation of diplomatic tensions. Turkey’s approach to the Israel-Palestine crisis has been based on Turkey’s foreign strategy, increasing the status of Palestine in its foreign policy. Turkey, by opposing Israeli settlement in the West Bank, and using the international mechanism, emphasizing the two-state solution, etc., tries to play a leading role in diplomatic efforts on Palestine. But from Israel’s point of view, many of Turkey’s approaches include interfering in social and political issues inside Israel, are considered as weakening the Israeli government, reviving Muslim institutions, and inciting violence against Israel. Ankara has sought to cement its role in advancing Palestinian aspirations by engaging with various groups, including Hamas, offering to host Hamas political offices, mourning the assassination of Haniyeh, and occasionally “visiting” Hamas leaders from Turkey. In May, Erdoğan called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a “vampire” and called on Muslims to fight the Jewish state. In this view, Israel is a threat to “all of humanity” and has been mistreating Gaza for years. Therefore, it must be pressured by holding Israel accountable for its “genocide” and actions in Gaza, the Islamic League of Nations, and the international community. Earlier this year, Turkey filed a request to join the genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in support of Palestine. On November 1, Turkey initiated an arms embargo, calling for a halt to arms sales to Israel. In addition, it seems that Turkey wants to facilitate access to its national interests and even a mediatory role in reaching peace with Israel by exerting appropriate influence between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Also, apart from Turkey’s explicit opposition to Israel’s war in Lebanon and the risk of expelling Palestinians, the disagreements in Syria could be an important current and future stage in Israeli-Turkish relations. Israel and Turkey are the main beneficiaries of Assad’s collapse in Syria, but Turkey is known to support Islamist and Salafi-jihadi factions. Although Benjamin Netanyahu called Assad’s fall on December 8 a “historic day,” Ankara does not accept Israel’s seizure of buffer zones, advance into Syrian territory, and bombing of Syrian military sites after the collapse. Turkey and Israel have pursued their red lines in Syria with highly contradictory plans. Turkey does not accept Kurdish parties and the PKK taking advantage of the new situation in Syria or Israel occupying Damascus and reaching northern Syria. Also, while many in Israel have declared the Kurds to be Israel’s “allies” and have emphasized the importance of protecting minorities in Syria, Turkey now sees the Kurdish threat as more prominent. In addition, Ankara is likely to have regional and international convergences in mind to pressure Israel by highlighting Israel’s role in Syria. In the geopolitical sphere, alliances and coalitions in the Eastern Mediterranean are also not in Turkey’s interest. Ankara does not want to witness the risk of anti-Turkish geopolitical-geoeconomic coalitions forming in the region with Israel’s presence. Dimensions of geopolitical and security cooperation between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus pose major challenges for Ankara,. Ankara is pursuing a two-state solution in Cyprus but knows that in the Cyprus tension and dispute between Turkey and Greece, Israel stands in the Athens and Cyprus front. Turkey has also had tumultuous relations with the European Union and the United States in recent years. Israel is an important partner and collaborator of Western military and political institutions. Ankara still seems reluctant to have broader ties with NATO. Turkey is also trying to reduce the possibility of Israeli cooperation (against Ankara’s interests) with the Greek-American community, Turkish opposition parties, Gulen, Armenians. Turkey and Israel announced trade barriers against each other in 2024 and relations deteriorated. Turkey announced a trade embargo against Israel in May 2024, imposing restrictions on the export of 54 products. However, despite trade through third countries, the trade situation has hurt the state of the economies of both sides, bilateral trade agreements, and their plans for joint initiatives for gas extraction and transportation. The Turk opposition continues to challenge Erdoğan for his continued supply of Azerbaijani oil to Israel via Turkey and the Turkish Kurcik radar base, and for his double standards. However, anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments have increased in Turkey. The Turkish government continues to face public backlash over the continued flow of Azerbaijani oil to Israel via Turkey, Turkey’s ongoing trade relations with Tel Aviv, and indirect trade through third countries. Even amid public outcry in Turkey, Zorlu Holding announced its intention to sell its stake in Israel’s Dorad Energy. In this context, Ankara cannot immediately increase economic ties with Israel. Opportunities for relations Ties with Israel will help Erdoğan use the Israeli influence in the United States to improve relations between Washington and Ankara. Maintaining the relationship could benefit from some intelligence, security, and military agreements or military-technological and defense cooperation, cooperation in the field of information exchange and regional security, Turkey’s military modernization, cooperation on illegal immigration, and human trafficking. Israel and Turkey both have common interests in areas such as the South Caucasus. However, easing tensions with Israel could help Athens compromise and reduce pressure on Ankara over the Greek islands, and militarize the Aegean Sea. Turkey’s transportation policy could reach the Middle East, North Africa, and the Mediterranean region by taking advantage of port connections in Turkey and strengthening projects such as the sea bridge from Iskenderun to the port of Haifa. Some key issues, especially geoeconomics in the Eastern Mediterranean and energy policy, and common interests in the field of energy could prevent a complete break. Israeli gas to Europe could help reduce Turkey’s dependence. Turkey is also still the conduit for 40 percent of Israel’s energy, which comes from Azerbaijan via Turkey. Israel was Turkey’s 13th largest export partner in 2023, and the total value of trade between Israel and Turkey reached $6.8 billion. Expanding economic relations and using the economy as a factor in strengthening relations can add to other dimensions of cooperation between the two actors. Outlook: Although tensions between Turkey and Israel have not escalated to a security or military level, Turkey has repeatedly warned that a war between Turkey and Israel could break out. However, many challenges remain. The level of pessimism about Ankara’s intentions in Israel is very high. Turkey cannot show a broad retreat on Turkey’s red lines in Palestine. The range of mutual pessimism and the role of different variables may hurt the outlook for the Turkey and Israel relationship.  Therefore, in the short term, it is inconceivable that the defense and security relations between Turkey and Israel will return to the level of relations of the 1990s. With Trump coming to power in the US, the long-term strategic tension between Israel and Turkey will become more difficult for Ankara’s interests. It also seems that various international, domestic, and regional variables in the economic and political dimensions will prevent widespread military-security tension in Turkey-Israel relations. It is also possible that actors such as Baku could help reduce tensions. In this situation, it seems that Ankara, with a more pragmatic approach and a complex interaction of ideology, pragmatism, and geopolitical strategy of economic relations between the two countries, does not want to witness widespread, practical, or even military tension with Israel.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump has claimed that he could end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours of taking office. He now calls for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and the beginning of negotiations. However, history shows that what cannot be achieved on the battlefield is unlikely to be obtained at the negotiating table. Immediate ceasefire of the Ukraine war could be a double-edged sword for the United States under the current circumstances. Russia occupies significant Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and parts of Zaporizhzhia, amounting to approximately 18% of Ukraine’s territory. Ukraine has made incursions into the Russian regions of Belgorod and Bryansk, only amounting to less than 1% of Russia’s total territory. How can both sides achieve their goals at the negotiating table?  Trump’s special envoy Keith Kellogg suggests ending the war by halting weapon supplies to Ukraine if it refuses to engage in peace talks — and increasing weapon deliveries to Ukraine if Russia fails to do the same. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has suggested the possibility of negotiating a cease-fire deal with Russia, proposing that the status of occupied territories could be addressed diplomatically at a later stage. This reflects Ukraine’s constrained position under various pressures. Russia is open to a peace talk but is unlikely to make a huge compromise with Ukraine. Despite NATO’s extensive support, sufficient military resources such as ammunition and air defense systems have not been provided to enable Ukraine to effectively counter Russian advances and produce decisive outcomes in strategic offensives due to unclear strategic objectives and effective implementation measures.   Sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies have not crippled the Russian economy as intended; instead, the Russian economy grew by 3.1% in the third quarter of 2024, and its national debt remains at 14.6% of GDP—approximately the same level as when the war began in 2022.  In 2023, Russia spent $160 billion on military needs, accounting for about 40% of its budget. For 2025, Russia has already allocated 13.5 trillion rubles (over $145 billion) for national defense, representing 32.5% of the budget. With support from North Korea, Iran, China, and other countries, Russia is likely to sustain its efforts on Ukrainian soil. In contrast, Ukraine is unlikely to achieve a decisive victory in the short term. If its allies continue with the current strategy while reducing financial aid, Ukraine risks depleting its resources and prolonging the conflict into an unpredictable stalemate, potentially leaving it at a disadvantage during negotiations. Without doubt, an immediate ceasefire could help stop further casualties and bring some much-needed relief to the people affected by the conflict. It can also ease the immediate burden of supporting Ukraine militarily and financially, freeing resources for domestic priorities and addressing other international challenges, particularly countering China’s challenges. However, an immediate ceasefire according to the current battlefield map could also benefit U.S. rivals—authoritarian regimes. First, it would solidify Russia’s control over occupied territories, allowing Moscow to claim a partial victory and bolster domestic support. Such an outcome rewards territorial aggression and undermines international norms. Second, it could weaken the U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, signaling to adversaries that aggression can succeed if sustained long enough. European allies might interpret a ceasefire as a sign of wavering U.S. resolve, leading to fractures within NATO and weakening transatlantic unity. Allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, may question the reliability of U.S. security commitments in the region. Third, China has been closely watching the West’s response to the Ukraine crisis, focusing on the cohesion of alliances, the impact of sanctions, and the dynamics of military support. An immediate freeze of the war would demonstrate limited Western resolve and suggest that territorial aggression can yield lasting gains. This reinforces Beijing’s belief that the international community would hesitate to intervene militarily in Taiwan and encourages China to change the status quo over the Taiwan Strait, believing it can manage economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures. Fourth, an immediate ceasefire does not guarantee long-term peace. The lack of a comprehensive peace agreement leaves underlying issues unaddressed, and it merely postpones hostilities, making the prospect of sustainable peace elusive. Historically, frozen conflicts like those in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Moldova’s Transnistria have fostered prolonged instability, enabling aggressors to consolidate control over occupied territories and exert leverage over affected states. The lesson from Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea demonstrates that tolerating an aggressor only encourages further expansion of their ambitions. Instead of an immediate ceasefire agreement, it is necessary to further support Ukraine in reclaiming its territory by changing the current strategy before reaching any cease-fire deal. Historical patterns show that successful territorial recaptures often require asserting military strength before engaging in peace talks. A cease-fire without the necessary restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty risks legitimizing Russia’s invasion. A successful Ukrainian counteroffensive could not only enhance Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations but also serve as a powerful deterrent against future territorial ambitions by other authoritarian regimes globally. The United States will not compromise American national interests when mediating a cease-fire agreement between Ukraine and Russia. However, it will be an extremely challenging task for any American president to broker a peace deal at this time because a deal should uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and internationally recognized borders, align with U.S. support for a rules-based international order, and ensure a balance between both parties instead of rewarding Russian aggression. It should strengthen U.S.-European relations rather than undermine allied unity, adhere to longstanding U.S. foreign policy principles rather than prioritize political gains, and enhance the U.S.’s reputation as a reliable global leader. Otherwise, immediately freezing the war could potentially harm U.S. national interests in the long term and directly encourage the ambitions of aggressors worldwide. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/]

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском “Changes! We’re waiting for changes!” proclaimed Viktor Tsoi nearly 40 years ago, at the dawn of the Soviet perestroika. If one were to summarize the multitude of diverse and contradictory events, trends, and sentiments of the past year in a single phrase, it would be that the modern world is eagerly awaiting change. Much like the former USSR in the 1980s, few today can clearly define what these changes should entail or what their ultimate outcome will be. Yet, the idea of maintaining the status quo has evidently found little favor with the public over the past year. This impatient anticipation of change was reflected, for instance, in the outcomes of numerous elections held over the past 12 months across the globe. In total, more than 1.6 billion people went to the polls, and in most cases, supporters of the status quo lost ground. In the United States, the Democrats suffered a resounding defeat to the Republicans, while in the United Kingdom, the Conservatives were decisively beaten by the Labour Party. In France, Emmanuel Macron's once-dominant ruling party found itself squeezed between right-wing and left-wing opposition, plunging the Fifth Republic into a deep political crisis. The seemingly stable foundations of political centrism were shaken in Germany, South Korea, and Japan. Even the party of the highly popular Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi failed to retain its parliamentary majority after the elections, and in South Africa, the African National Congress led by Cyril Ramaphosa also lost its majority. Pessimists might argue that abandoning the status quo in itself solves no problems, and the much-anticipated changes, as the final years of the Soviet Union demonstrated, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. Replacing cautious technocrats with reckless populists often backfires, affecting those most critical of the entrenched status quo. Optimists, on the other hand, would counter that the rusted structures of state machinery everywhere are in desperate need of radical modernization. They would add that the costs inevitably associated with maintaining the existing state of affairs at all costs far outweigh any risks tied to attempts to change it. The international events of the past year are also open to various interpretations. Pessimists would undoubtedly point out that none of the major armed conflicts carried over from 2023 were resolved in 2024. On the contrary, many of them showed clear tendencies toward escalation. For instance, in late summer, Ukraine launched an incursion into the Kursk region of Russia, and in mid-November, the U.S. authorized Kyiv to use long-range ATACMS missiles against targets deep within Russian territory. Meanwhile, the military operation launched by Israel in Gaza in the fall of 2023 gradually expanded to the West Bank, then to southern Lebanon, and by the end of 2024, to parts of Syrian territory adjacent to the Golan Heights. From the optimists' perspective, however, the past year demonstrated that the disintegration of the old international system has its limits. A direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO did not occur, nor did a large-scale regional war break out in the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, or the Korean Peninsula. The economic results of 2024 are equally ambiguous. On one hand, the global economy remained heavily influenced by geopolitics throughout the year. The process of “technological decoupling” between the U.S. and China continued, and unilateral sanctions firmly established themselves as a key instrument of Western foreign policy. On the other hand, the world managed to avoid a deep economic recession despite the numerous trade and investment restrictions. Global economic growth for the year is expected to reach around 3%, which is quite respectable for such turbulent times, especially considering that the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have not yet been fully overcome. In 2024, the average annual global temperature exceeded pre-industrial levels by more than 1,5 °C for the first time, crossing another critical “red line”. However, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) held in November in Baku fell short of many expectations. At the same time, China reached its peak carbon emissions by the end of the year, achieving this milestone a full five years ahead of previously announced plans. In the past year, the UN Security Council managed to adopt only 12 resolutions, mostly of a humanitarian nature, clearly reflecting the declining effectiveness of this global governance body. For comparison, in 2000, the Security Council approved 29 resolutions, including key decisions on conflict resolution in the Balkans and Africa. At the same time, 2024 saw continued efforts to explore new formats for multilateral cooperation, including mechanisms within the BRICS group, which held its 16th summit in Kazan for the first time in its newly expanded composition. With enough imagination, one can easily find evidence in the past 12 months to confirm any omen or superstition traditionally associated with leap years. However, all these signs and superstitions predicting upheavals and catastrophes—while aligning with the pessimistic conclusions about the year now ending—do not apply to the year ahead. Human nature, after all, tends to lean more towards optimism than pessimism; if it were the other way around, we would still be living in caves. As they bid farewell to a difficult and challenging year, people around the world continue to hope for better times. And the mere act of hoping for the best is already significant in itself. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe aptly remarked, “Our wishes are forebodings of our capabilities, harbingers of what we are destined to achieve”. Originally published in Izvestia.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine faces mounting challenges as battlefield victory becomes unlikely, with Donald Trump’s proposed “peace plan” offering a ceasefire based on territorial concessions. While Russia’s vulnerabilities may push Vladimir Putin toward negotiations, the outcome risks freezing the conflict and undermining the international rules-based order. Winning the war against Russian through  “victory on the battlefield” does not look good for Ukraine. The odds are just too high:  from the overall sobering strategic outlook for Ukraine on the battlefield, Ukraine’s limitations in terms of overall military power, the weakening support from Western nations and their fear of a further escalation (falling for Putin’s red lines regarding nuclear escalation); to the president-elect Donald Trump’s newly touted “peace plan”  for Ukraine. Trump has made ending the war in Ukraine one of his election promises. The reasons for his optimism include his perceived personal diplomatic potential, but also necessity in US economic concerns, political strategy, and the ability to able to focus on the China challenge. Russia is weakened and needs a pause in the fighting Vladimir Putin’s own challenges, of course, might make him more inclined to listen to a US led “peace plan” for Ukraine. These include the worsening economic downturn, the erosion of his military power, and recent setbacks of Russian brinkmanship in the Middle East and its alliances with both Iran and Syria. Last week’s dramatic events in Syria with Bashar Al Assad’s regime finally toppling has revealed several miscalculations in Russia. The events of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war in Palestine has shifted regional power dynamics, not only diminishing Russia’s role but also its ally Iran whose  ‘Axis of  Resistance’ , including Hamas and Hezbollah, hasbeen severely weakened. The fall of Syria is a major strategic loss for Putin and has serious consequences for Russia’s role and standing not only in the Middle East but beyond. The “strong” and perhaps “wise” man image is falling apart. Not a good prospect when it comes to China and the “no limits” partnership: a weak Russia is not what President Xi Jinping needs in his challenge to the current political and military Western order. Given these strategic circumstances it is in Putin’s interest to find a diplomatic solution for ending “his” war in Ukraine. A negotiated freezing of the conflict, with Russia keeping the current occupied parts of Ukraine and Crimea, might be a way out for Putin to declare “mission accomplished.” Ukraine’s precarious position President Volodymir Zelensky’s five step victory plan of November 2024, is already dead. its two main conditions, full NATO membership in the very near future and a step up in Western military assistance, will not happen. NATO maintains that Ukraine is on an “irreversible path to NATO membership,” subject to the Alliance members’ agreement and conditions being met, and the end of hostilities. Perhaps more concerning, the mood seems to have shifted among Ukrainians: recent polls show a majority of Ukrainians supporting a negotiated peace with Russia as current battlefield gains by the Russian Armed Forces continue. This poll also reveals that Ukrainians have become increasingly wary of promises of  support of the West. President Zelensky, maintaining optimism in the face of grave difficulties, has openly stated that he is looking forward to Trump’s return to the White House. He now also suggests  that the war may  end sooner with Trump’s re-election. The most contentious points remaining are NATO membership and no territorial concessions. Zelensky has recently indicated a willingness to trade (at least temporarily) territory for NATO membership. Given NATO’s clear messaging during the 2024 Washington Summit that this would not happen without peace first he might need to change his position in respect to NATO membership as well. How would Trump’s peace plan look like Trump’s “Peace Plan” is still vague but it will be a cease fire agreement with territorial concessions, a potential demilitarised zone, continuing security assistance, and potentially “boots on the grounds,” with sanctions relief for Russia as a further stimulus. In signposting his seriousness with the proposal, Trump has appointed retired General Keith Kellogg as a special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, and has met with Zelensky about ending the war during last week’s meeting of world leaders in France at the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral. President Zelensky called his discussions with Trump “good and productive.” An armistice in Ukraine cannot be just an extension of the Minsk II agreement of 2015. The agreement did not work for multiple reasons, but most importantly because of Russian non-compliance and a lack of a deterrence element. Such an armistice would need to be a modern day Korean Armistice Agreement with a potential UN monitoring presence in a demilitarised zone, and a sizeable military deterrence component from Western militaries for Ukraine. NATO membership in the immediate future would be the best option, but likely off the cards due to Russia’s opposition and lack of support from NATO. A twenty year moratorium on Ukraine’s NATO bid, as proposed by the Trump team, could be a way forward. A “West German model of NATO membership” for the unoccupied territories of Ukraine would also be a possible option for Ukraine, which President Zelenksy seems to support. Again, such a proposal seems unlikely given the headwinds from both NATO and Russia. A European permanent military presence in the unoccupied parts of Ukraine (inclusive of US military support), like the US in South Korea, would in theory be possible as they would explicitly be in the respective national but not NATO capacity. This option would rejuvenate an idea of French President Emmanuel Macron madeearlier this year, and if mandated by the UN could be a potential security safeguard for Ukraine. Whatever the outcome, care needs to be taken that this temporary “freezing” of hostilities does not become a de facto “victory for Putin” and a loss for the Rules Based Order. Trump’s attitude towards solving diplomatic and other issues has been described in the past as being “transactional” in essence: ending the Ukraine War has now become the first major test for Trump, the transactional president. Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann is Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra), University of Canberra, and a Research Fellow with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also a Fellow with NATO SHAPE – ACO Office of Legal Affairs where he works on Hybrid Threats and Lawfare. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The fall of B. Assad’s regime was the result of a number of internal and external contradictions, in which the Turkish factor played a key role. Ankara is celebrating the success of its diplomacy in Syria. The success in Syria is giving R. Erdogan wings In its diplomacy, Türkiye consistently tries to adhere to a pragmatic course of achieving its national interests. At the same time, Ankara’s policy does not represent the short-term ambitions of an adventurist leader, rather reflects a long-term programme in accordance with the doctrines and strategies of neo-Ottomanism and neo-pan-Turanism. Türkiye does not hide its ambitions; it makes public various programme provisions and concepts, which focus on raising the status of Turkish statehood to the rank of a regional superpower. For this reason, when former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu explained in Washington the essence of the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism, developed by him in the framework of his ‘Strategic Depth’, he noted Ankara’s attachment to the post-Ottoman space, i.e. to the peoples and countries that were previously part of the Ottoman Empire. Of course, no nation freed from the tyranny of the Ottoman Empire will voluntarily return to the new Türkiye or become its vassal, however Ankara does not set (at least at this point in historical development) the task of reuniting independent entities of the post-Ottoman space with Türkiye. Ankara is trying to spread its influence and realise national interests in relation to geographical neighbours, to use its advantageous economic and geographical position on transit routes, which increases Türkiye’s status at the junction of Europe, Africa and Asia. For these purposes, the Turkish authorities are effectively using economic, political and military means. In North Africa, betting on one of the political forces in the devastated Libya and the local use of military forces – combined with the supply of weapons – provided Ankara with the opportunity to gain access to oil fields. The energy partnership with Russia and the consideration of Moscow’s crisis relations with the West have, in a certain sense, created not only trade and economic interests, but also the relative geopolitical dependence of the Russian Federation on relations with Türkiye. As a result, through partnership diplomacy, the Turks localised military and other threats from Russia to implement the geopolitical strategy of neo-pan-Turansim in the post-Soviet southeast. Ankara is supporting Turkic countries in local conflicts With regard to the newly formed Turkic countries, Türkiye did not rely only on Turkism and pan-Turkism, instead choosing a more flexible tactic: combining ethno-cultural kinship and ideological expansion with a more rational, economic (primarily energy, transport, communication and transit) integration strategy according to the formula ‘One people – two (three, four, five, six) states’. However, Ankara has strongly and consistently supported Turkic countries in local conflicts, providing them with the necessary military, military-technical, intelligence and diplomatic assistance. In this regard, the Turkish-Azeri tandem against Armenia in the Karabakh conflict is a good example. As a result, Türkiye, using its position in NATO and its allied relations with the UK and US, achieved the implementation of new strategic communications bypassing Russia to export oil and gas from the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea and then to Europe. This ambitious transport and energy programme, as well as the military victory in Karabakh, laid the foundation for strengthening the independence of Turkic countries and supporting common Turkic integration, which allowed Türkiye to create the international Organisation of Turkic States (OTG) and move towards the goal of a single Turan. In the Middle East, Türkiye supports is allied with Qatar and opposed the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, which previously (2009) abandoned the transit project of a Qatari gas pipeline through Syria to Türkiye and Europe. Given the unsolvable intra-confessional (between Sunnis and Shi’as, Alawites) and inter-ethnic (the Kurdish issue) contradictions in Syria, President Erdogan waged a consistent battle to overthrow the undesirable regime, strengthen the pro-Turkish forces of Sunni Islamic radicals and local Turkmen in Syria, as well as to neutralise any forms of independence of the Syrian Kurds. Türkiye was not only aware of the plans of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS) and the Syrian National Army* (SNA) for six months, but it was Türkiye itself that developed the plan for a military operation against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, providing them with the necessary military, technical, intelligence and diplomatic support. Türkiye said that Bashar al-Assad refused the hand that Erdogan extended to him and refused negotiations on Ankara’s terms with the recognition of the reality on the ground (i.e. the de facto Turkish occupation of the ‘security zone’ in the north-west of Syria). In response, Turkish proxy forces taught Assad a lesson by excommunicating him from power and removing him from Syria itself. Erdogan exhibited violent and aggressive rhetoric against Netanyahu because of the conflict in the Gaza Strip and took cosmetic measures within the framework of the trade embargo. In reality, Ankara did not follow Tehran’s example and did not provide military assistance to the Palestinians. Türkiye has not banned the transit of Azeri oil to Israel via its territory. Regarding the military operation against the Assad regime in Syria, Ankara skilfully used Tel Aviv’s signals about the launch of an offensive on Aleppo and Damascus. For some reason, the Turks are not blaming Israel for its numerous airstrikes on Syrian communications and the military arsenal of the former Syrian army, which greatly facilitated the advance of HTS* and SNA* forces in Syria. Ankara did not make harsh statements against Israel about the fact that the IDF entered the buffer zone in the Golan Heights and that Israeli tanks were 20km from Damascus. However, as the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak reports, Türkiye is threatening to shoot down the Israeli Air Force with its air defence systems if they support the Kurdish forces in Syria. Erdogan’s triumph Turkish media is enthusiastically celebrating Erdogan’s triumph in Syria and the fall of the Assad regime. At the moment, the Turks have strengthened their positions in Syria. The interim (or transitional) government in Damascus, headed HTS* leader Mohammed al-Jolani, is, in fact, an ally of Ankara. With even greater effort and reliance on the new Syrian authorities, Türkiye will obviously continue its policy of forcibly resolving and neutralising the Kurdish issue in Rojava. The fall of Assad allows Türkiye to repatriate more than 3 million Syrian refugees and strengthen its influence on domestic political life in a weak Syria. Finally, the Turks are counting on the implementation of the Qatari gas pipeline project in the near future, a project which was postponed due to the past position of Bashar al-Assad and his allies. It is no coincidence that on December 13, the heads of the Turkish and Qatari intelligence services met in Damascus, where they held joint talks with the leader of the HTS*, al-Jolani. Ankara and Doha have already announced their plans to open diplomatic missions in Syria. Immediately after the fall of the Assad regime, Türkiye announced on December 9 that it would help Syria rebuild its energy sector, although Ankara did not receive an official request from the new government. In turn, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar did not rule out that the Qatari gas pipeline project will be revived, as Syria has restored its unity and stability. Bayraktar stressed that it is necessary to ensure the safety of the gas pipeline. It seems that the question of ensuring the security of the future gas pipeline was also addressed by the Turkish and Qatari heads of intelligence with HTS* leader al-Jolani. The most openly pretentious statement vis-à-vis Syrian territory was the speech of President R. Erdogan at a party meeting, in which he proposed to review the results of the First World War and return the Syrian provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Damascus and Raqqa to Türkiye, as they were previously part of the Ottoman Empire. This is how neo-Ottomanism manifests itself in real life. However, Erdogan apparently forgot that following the results of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire lost and collapsed and the territories of the new Türkiye changed. The author of revised borders within the framework of the Versailles Treaty system was Türkiye’s eternal ally Great Britain. Following that logic, today Russia has the right to demand from Türkiye Kars, Artvin, Ardahan and Surmalu district with Mount Ararat, which the Bolsheviks unreasonably ceded in March, 1921, to Kemal Pasha. Which problems may await Türkiye following the regime change in Syria? Of course, at this stage Türkiye’s success in Syria is obvious, but it is unlikely to be the result of Turkish planning alone. The United States did not officially interfere in the situation surrounding overthrowing the Assad regime, but did not leave Syria either. Washington and Tel Aviv actually dragged Ankara into a joint plan to collapse Iran and Russia in Syria. Given the inaction of the Syrian authorities and the army, Moscow did not get involved in a new conflict. Tehran adheres to approximately the same position. Some experts believe that the newly elected US President D. Trump supposedly promised to redistribute spheres of influence with Russia, where Moscow gets peace in Ukraine in accordance with the reality on the ground, but withdraws from Syria. However, in Syria, the United States and Israel will support the Kurds, who are Türkiye’s main opponents. Ankara continues to insist on eliminating Kurdish structures in Syria, which may be at odds with the approaches of the United States and Israel. Russian expert Stanislav Tarasov believes that the Turkish-Kurdish confrontation in Syria can lead to sad consequences for the Turks and the loss of almost eight Kurdish-populated vilayets in the south-east of Türkiye itself with the involvement of the United States and Israel. At the same time, D. Trump’s focus on confrontation with Iran in Israel’s favour prolongs the risk of war waged by the Western coalition against Iran, in which Türkiye will face a military conflict with Tehran. It is more likely that Russia will abstain from intervening in such a conflict. Türkiye, however, could suffer significantly. Syria can either follow the path of ‘Iraqisation’ and the division of its territories into ‘zones of responsibility’ of external and internal forces or find itself divided between neighbours and new entities (including Israel, Türkiye, Iran and Kurdistan). * currently banned in the Russian Federation

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the rise of Russia and China, the world is shifting dramatically from a unipolar US-dominated order to a multipolar one. Russia’s strategic alliances, along with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and economic growth, are reshaping global power dynamics. On the other hand, the United States’ military interventions and isolationist moves have raised a critical question: can it adapt to this new global reality, or will it continue to lose influence on these emerging powers? The Decline of U.S. Global Dominance The global order is witnessing a transformative period, from a unipolar order under US dominance to a multipolar one. The latter provides other major powers an extensive opportunity to challenge the US-led global system. China, Russia, and even the middle powers use this waning US influence to expand their global political clout. The rise of these powers is altering the global balance of power. Numerous US policy decisions have weakened its position in the global sphere. The militarization approach of the United States and the successive unpopular government policies have made its fall inevitable. The realist theorists attempt to attribute these changes in global power distribution as a result of the anarchic world system. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its growing economic might present the strongest challenge to the US economic and military hegemony in the world. The BRI has posed it as an indispensable economic partner of the countries across the three continents including Africa, Asia, and Latin America due to the investment of trillions of dollars in infrastructural projects. Moreover, its trade volume reached $6 trillion in 2022 surpassing the US trade volume of $4.9 trillion. This economic might has enabled it to entice states that became weary of the US’s harsh approach towards the developing and underdeveloped world. The Emergence of a Multipolar World Order Furthermore, globalization has also prompted the Third World countries to partake in knowledge and economic competitions with the Western world.   The liberal theorists hold that the leveling effect of globalization enables it to redistribute power. The emergence of this new multipolar world order has made it difficult for the US to establish and maintain its influence over the globe and remain relevant in global governance. The rise of BRICS, with its share of 37.4 percent in the global GDP in 2023, and its decision to introduce its currency for mutual trade have challenged the US financial system, hastening the decline of the US-led economic and political order. Moreover, the US policies under a few former presidents have also contributed to the rapid decline of the country’s hegemony. United States military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, its covert involvement behind sparking the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and its compliance in Israel’s war crimes in Gaza have all damaged Washington’s global standing. Its deadliest invasion of Iraq, under the pretext of unverified reports of WMDs, undermined its credibility and destabilized the whole Middle Eastern region. In addition, the United States failed invasion of Afghanistan also contributed to its malignity around the globe. Russia and China were emboldened by such US failures and challenged it economically, militarily, and ideologically. Leadership crises in the United States have also undermined its international standing. President-elect Donald Trump’s previous government damaged America’s reputation to a great extent. His decision to withdraw from the Paris Accord and his criticism of NATO also inculcated distrust among the country’s allies. The US also holds a reputation for betraying its allies after achieving its ambitions. Pakistan is one of the best examples of this. The United States had always had a transactional relationship with Islamabad. After achieving its regional ambitions, it has always imposed sanctions on the country. Therefore, the US allies have started thinking of it as an unreliable ally. President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election has once again inculcated frustration among the US allies. His stance on Ukraine has already been criticized by its allies. President-elect Donald Trump seeks an immediate and peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Recently, he called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine after meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He advocates a non-interventionist policy. Therefore, it is believed that the Russia-Ukraine conflict would come to an end after his final selection as the US President. Moreover, his presidency might also affect the unity of NATO, as he has always been critical of funding it. His “America First” approach also contributes to decreasing US influence and dominance over the world. President-elect Donald Trump’s crackdown against immigrants has also contributed to the United States’ isolation in the American region and beyond. In addition, Russia and China’s rise and BRICS expansion have also provided the middle powers and third-world countries a novel opportunity to form new alliances. The election of President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election, de-dollarization by BRICS, and the swift rise of Russia and China, along with other middle powers, all are contributing to the rapid decline of the US influence and dominance over the world.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This analysis focuses on possible short and medium-term effects of Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States. This paper starts with a brief account of Trump’s first presidency and then continues to account for major challenges that Trump’s administration will have to face domestically,The central part of the analysis focuses on the geopolitical consequences of Trump’s election. In particular, the author looks at Europe (the ongoing war in Ukraine): Middle East and Far East – especially China.The paper concludes with the author's conviction that the next few years will bring decisive changes likely to usher in the new world order.Keywords: Trump, US, Europe, Security, Geopolitics Introduction Donald Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States in 2017 had significant and far-reaching effects on world politics, marking a departure from previous administrations' approaches to foreign policy and international relations. Trump's presidency shifted from globalization to isolationism, protectionism, and nationalism (Kawashima, 2017). His "America First" strategy emphasized unilateral action and challenged the liberal international order the United States had led and protected since World War II (Mansbach, 2021). This approach has strained relationships with traditional allies, particularly in Europe, while simultaneously raising authoritarian leaders (Mansbach, 2021). Interestingly, Trump's election immediately negatively impacted trust in the U.S. government in Latin America, as demonstrated by a regression discontinuity design study (Carreras et al., 2021). Additionally, his controversial policies, such as the trade war with China, have had significant impacts on the global economy (Sahide et al., 2024). The Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Islamic World was notably less friendly compared to the Obama era, causing tensions in US-Islamic World relations (Bahari & Sahide, 2022). There seems to be a consensus that Trump's presidency accelerated societal processes, undermined democratic institutions, and encouraged hyperpartisanship within political institutions (James, 2021). While he did not always succeed in implementing major policy changes or fulfilling campaign promises, his leadership style and policy decisions significantly altered the global perception of the United States and its role in world politics, creating what some scholars describe as " a more dangerous world" (Mansbach, 2021).  Admittedly, Trump does not seem to be exceptionally hawkish when it comes to using military tools in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Let us remember that Barak Obama (Democratic Party), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, ordered airstrikes in seven different countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria) (Liptak, 2014). During first Trump’s presidency, no new campaigns were started, although the intensification of the existing ones allegedly increased. Ultimately, it was Trump who was mainly behind the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Trump 2.0 November 2024 Presidential elections brought sweeping changes to the American political kaleidoscope. Donald Trump took a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Kamala Harris, securing 312 electoral votes (with 270 being a victory threshold). Republicans also won the Senate with 52 seats against 47 and the House with 218 seats against 212. (Election Centre 2024).  This is arguably one of the most important political events in the world in 2024. Already Trump’s declarations regarding the first decisions to be taken once sworn in office on the 20th of January next year, plus his appointments for top offices in the U.S. administration, have caused a furore – a phenomenon referred to by many as the so-called ‘Trump Effect’. As much as political scientists, cognitive anthropologists or psychologists usually use this term to refer to racially inflammatory Elite Communication (Newman et al., 2020), this short analysis will look at the tectonic shifts in international relations, international security system and geopolitics that have already happened or are likely to occur after the 20th of January 2025. U.S. – politics Undoubtedly, the U.S. economy, society, and political system are in deep crisis. Economically, the Americans have been doing worse than ever since the Second World War. Inflation is rampant; economic inequality is very high; unemployment is on the rise; the state of infrastructure is relatively poor, and the level of public services is far from desirable, whereas taxation is reaching new heights amidst a slowing economy and diminishing number of small and medium enterprises (USA FACTS). Societywise, the problems are equally severe. According to Pew Research, the top issues facing the U.S. in this category are in the order of importance from top to bottom: the affordability of healthcare, drug addiction, illegal immigration, gun violence, violent crime, the state of moral values, the quality of public k-12 schools, Climate change, international terrorism, infrastructure condition, domestic terrorism and racism (Pew Research Centre, 2024). One should also add here the rising “wokeness’ of the American educational system, which poses a great challenge to the cohesion of the society and its future in terms of military power.  Politically, the picture is not better. According to the same research institution (Pew), the biggest problems that the U.S. political system faces are: political leaders do not face the consequences if they act unethically, it is difficult to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics, Congress accomplishes less than people give it credit for, the Federal Government does less for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for. Other problems include the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in policymaking, the cost of political campaigns and the animosity between the Republicans and the Democrats, which, in consequence, causes the inability of the political system to solve critical societal problems (Pew Research Centre, 2023). The first and foremost task ahead of Trump is to rectify problems at home. His Agenda47 (Republican Platform) declares 20 core promises: seal the border and stop the migrant invasion, carry out the largest deportation operation in american history, end inflation, and make america affordable again, make america the dominant energy producer in the world, by far, stop outsourcing, and turn the United States into a manufacturing superpower, large tax cuts for workers, and no tax on tips, defend the constitution, the bill of rights, and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to keep and bear arms, prevent world war three, restore peace in europe and in the middle east, and build a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country -- all made in america, end the weaponization of government against the american people, stop the migrant crime epidemic, demolish the foreign drug cartels, crush gang violence, and lock up violent offenders, rebuild cities, including washington dc, making them safe, clean, and beautiful again, strengthen and modernize the military, making it, without question, the strongest and most powerful in the world, keep the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, fight for and protect social security and medicare with no cuts, including no changes to the retirement age, cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations, cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory, radical gender ideology, and other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on children, keep men out of women's sports, deport pro-hamas radicals and make college campuses safe and patriotic again, secure our elections, including same day voting, voter identification, paper ballots, and proof of citizenship and lastly unite the country by bringing it to new and record levels of success (Agenda 47).  International Politics Internationally, Trump faces many challenges. His presidency will have to address three primary regions defined geographically: Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. - Europe As far as Europe is concerned, the most pressing issue is the war in Ukraine. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly declared that his administration's support for the continuation of the U.S. support for the war effort against Russia would be terminated during the first 24 hours of his presidency (Hansler, 2024). As a consequence, shortly after Trump’s winning the White House race, the outgoing administration under POTUS Joe Biden finally allowed the Ukrainians to attack Russian territory with American long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS), which allegedly came in as a response to the North Korean decision to send its troops to support Russian soldiers against Ukraine (Entous, Schmitt and Barnes, 2024). Next, in counter-response, President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a new nuclear Doctrine into power. Chillingly, it declares that Russia may use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear state, even in case of a conventional attack (Associated Press, 2024). As of the beginning of December 2024, the media are full of reports of an alleged concentration of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border, fueling speculation about an imminent mass invasion, this time with cities such as Kyiv being targeted in a conventional terrain operation (Bodner, De Luce and Smith, 2024).  One can only speculate what all this means and how far we are from the outbreak of the III World War (Sky News, 2024). Some things are, however, more or less evident. Firstly, the current escalation of war in Ukraine is likely a direct effect of Trump's winning and his declaration to end the war as soon as possible. The more the Russian troops advance in the field, the higher they can bid once the peace talks begin. Similarly, the more complex the situation in the field (Biden’s decision regarding the use of ATACMS), the more challenging it will be for Trump and his administration to achieve peace. Knowing the radically different approach to conflict with Russia of President Trump, the outgoing administration and national security advisors most likely wanted to achieve militarily as much as possible before they were ousted from their jobs. Secondly, Trump declared on numerous occasions that if European members of NATO want to continue their support for Ukraine, they should take the whole responsibility. He singled Germany, France, and Poland out. Poland, for that matter, enthusiastically agreed to carry on the baton and declared that it was ready to bear the heavy burden. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, when participating in a radio broadcast, “We [Poland] are ready to take over the large part of the costs of supporting Ukraine” (Nczas Info, 2024). At the same time on the 3rd of December, the new Secretary General of NATO – Mark Rutte, during his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, openly declared: “The immediate priority must be to provide more arms to the country's forces as Russia gains territory along the battlefront in eastern Ukraine.The [Ukrainian] front is not moving eastwards. It is slowly moving westwards. So, we have to make sure that Ukraine gets into a position of strength, and then it should be for the Ukrainian government to decide on the next steps in terms of opening peace talks and how to conduct them." (VoA, 2024). To sum up, it looks like the current escalation, according to theoretical models such as those proposed by Herman Kahn in 1965 – a Cold War physicist - we are at stage 12 of 44 steps on the escalation ladder. As comforting as one might think it is, let us remember that according to Kahn’s theory, a local nuclear war takes place as early as at step 21 (Tinline, 2023). As history has proved many times, it is difficult, if impossible, to wage a systemic war on two fronts at the same time. Given the economic and military challenges perceived by Trump during his first tenure as U.S. President (See: A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017), China is the challenger number one for the position of the United States in the international system and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, China wants to reorder the area in its favour. Would it be too much of a stretch of the imagination to claim that most likely, given the context above, Trump will probably arrange for peaceful talks with Russia over Ukrainian political and military leadership heads’? What will he want? Probably Russia’s neutrality in the face of the coming escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and China. What can he offer? Probably a big part of Ukrainian territory and the amendment to the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the country should forever be neutral militarily and politically. At the same time, the American withdrawal from Europe will most probably create a void that is most likely to be filled by Germans. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts (The Federal Government, 2022).  The leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's ‘special responsibility’ for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government’s ‘special responsibility’ for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. (German National Security Strategy, 2023). In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the ‘best equipped armed force’ in Europe (Euronews, 2022). Let us also remember that Berlin vigorously supported the latest proposal for a European army, which presumably might serve as a vehicle for further European integration towards the federalization of Europe.  At the same time, the prospect of federalization will face two major challenges: firstly, the future of transatlantic relations is less than certain, especially the economic competition between the EU and the U.S. European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen signalled the possibility of an economic war with the U.S. as a response to Trump declared protectionism of the American economy (Berg, Meyers, 2024). Secondly, the EU is highly inefficient in energy, so the question of future energy security becomes a priority. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the redirection of Russian gas to China will profoundly affect the future of European economic development amid the so-called ‘Fit-for-55’ -  a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (Fit for 55, 2024). - Middle East As of the writing of this paper, one sees the escalation of the war in Syria. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “ongoing hostilities in northern Syria continue to expand to other parts of the country, endangering civilians and humanitarian workers, causing severe damage to critical infrastructure and disrupting humanitarian operations. As of 5 December, at least 178,000 people have been displaced due to the recent escalations in northern Syria, including 128,000 newly displaced and 39,000 displaced at least twice. Figures are still being reconciled, noting that UNHR and NGOs operating in the northeastern part of Syria estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people have been newly displaced there, including more than 25,000 currently hosted in collective centers”. (OCHA, 2024). According to international media (CBC News, 2024): ”Syria's long-running civil war came to a head Sunday when opposition forces entered the capital city of Damascus and the government of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. Russian state media later reported that Assad and his family had fled to Moscow. Crowds gathered in Damascus to celebrate the fall of Assad's government with chants, prayers and occasional gunfire, marking the end of a regime that, between the ousted President and his father, had ruled over Syria for half of a century.” […] "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen," President Biden said Sunday afternoon at the White House after convening his national security team to discuss the developments. He said the fall of Assad presented a "historic moment of opportunity" and pledged support for Syria and its neighbours against any threats” (Ott, 2024). Syria seems to be just another litmus test of the so-called regional security complex in the Middle East. As such, the war in Syria is obviously but a puzzle in a much bigger jigsaw that includes all major powers that operate in the region: the U.S.A, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran to name the most obvious ones. All of the above are deeply engaged in Middle East politics for the sake of their national interests and international security strategies. All of the above deserve separate analyses. For the sake of this paper, however, the author will focus only on the U.S. According to Douglas Macgregor and Dave Ramaswamy, “The fear in many nations’ capitals is that President Donald Trump’s return to Washington might make Israel feel more confident in attacking Iran. According to Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, “There is no world leader Trump respects more than Netanyahu.”  The evangelical leader also confides that President Trump would support an Israeli attack before his inauguration on the assumption that the destruction of Iran’s oil production facilities would devastate Iran’s economy, inducing Iran to end the war with Israel before President Trump assumes his office. This thinking by no means excludes an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear development sites as well.” (Macgregor & Ramaswamy, 2024). In their article, they state that “If America joins Israel in its war against Iran, the outcome will be a geopolitical showdown that could dramatically alter the world as we know it. It is the storm of the 21st century and, for the moment, the American ship of state is sailing right into it. “ They consequently pose four fundamental questions:  1. What is the American purpose in waging war against Iran? Is Washington’s purpose to destroy the Iranian state? To destroy its capability to wage war against Israel? To eliminate Iran’s developing nuclear capability? Or to decapitate the Iranian state in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow their national government? 2. How will U.S. military power achieve the objectives? 3. What is the desired end state? What does the President want Iran and the region that surrounds it to look like when the fighting ends? 4. What is the strategic cost to the American people if Washington declines to participate in a regional war begun by Israel?  They conclude by asking yet another, perhaps the most crucial question: what do Netanyahu’s goals mean for the health of the American economy and the stability of the international system? Can Israel survive without attacking its numerous enemies?  The next couple of months are likely to bring at least some answers to some of these questions. Importantly, expert voices concerning the future of Israel seem to be abounding more and more (Teller, 2024). - China and the Far East Finally, there is a question of China. As mentioned before, Trump sees China as a major challenger to the role and position of the U.S. in the international system. The Republicans and the Democrats may be divided by numerous issues, but there is at least one regarding which they stay united. The true bipartisanship revolves around the Chinese challenge. Both parties, therefore, claim that the possibility of a systemic conflict with China is not a science fiction scenario. On November 20, 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress heard that the U.S. had to prepare for a potential conflict with China by raising its defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP. (South China Morning Post, 2024). The recommendation came during an interactive exercise for members of the House Select Committee on China, based on a scenario predicted for 2026 and hosted by Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report titled: The First Battle of the Next War Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, authored by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham opens with a chilling question: “What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is, therefore, not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.” (The First Battle of the Next War, 2023). They go on to claim that: “China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.” China has grown increasingly assertive over the last decades and sees no reason to continue accepting a dominated world that facilitates the benefits of Western powers, especially the U.S.A. At a recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (November 2024), the President of China openly called for a multipolar world (Xinhua, 2024). In his words: “China and Brazil stay committed to peace, development, fairness and justice. We have similar or identical views on many international and regional issues. Both are staunch defenders of the basic norms of international relations and multilateralism, coordinating closely and consistently within the United Nations, G20, BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms on crucial issues, including global governance and climate change. Not long ago, China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Our initiative has received a positive response from the international community. China and Brazil, embracing our roles and responsibilities as major countries, have contributed to a multipolar world, conduced to greater democracy in international relations and injected positive energy into global peace and stability.” (Xinhua, 2024 b).  Conclusion Taiwan has long been a global security issue and a point of concern on the geopolitical maps of the national security planners of great powers. It is not the only one, though. The war between the Koreas is formally not over (recently, North Korea allegedly sent soldiers to back Russia in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine); the American military presence in the Far East and South East Asia is likely to remain an issue, especially from the point of view of Beijing. Central Asia, with its geopolitical environment, religious activism and economic challenges, is likely to rise in importance as a chessboard for great powers. As the weight and focus of International Relations is relocating back to Asia (Euroasia rather than the North Atlantic Area), China and Russia are more likely to hold the keys to international peace and security than the United States. On top of that, one needs to look out for North Africa as a source of continuing instability and massive migration, especially to Europe. 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Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Social media manipulation, rural discontent and mainstream complacency: Romania’s cancelled elections offer a stark warning for Europe’s democracies E lections are rarely straightforward, especially in high-stakes environments — and particularly in Romania. The EU member state at the Black Sea, which shares the longest border with Ukraine and, until now, has been a staunch US ally and trusted NATO member, now faces profound political uncertainty following the abrupt cancellation of its presidential elections last Friday. The elections were halted after intelligence services revealed interference in the electoral process by a ‘state actor’, widely presumed to be Russia, aimed at favouring an unexpected far-right candidate. The Constitutional Court intervened, ordering a complete restart of the electoral process. Proceeding with the second round under these circumstances would have effectively turned it into a de facto hidden referendum on Romania’s pro-Western orientation. However, the crisis is far from resolved. The electoral turmoil has left Romania’s democratic mainstream fragmented and facing difficult choices. Stabilising the economy, reducing the fallout from the political crisis and forming a functional parliamentary majority are critical tasks. The Romanian case offers crucial takeaways for other European nations, particularly regarding the disruptive role of social media platforms like TikTok in democratic elections. Curbing Russia’s hybrid warfare capabilities, which exploit these platforms to stoke public anxieties and deepen political divisions, requires swift and coordinated action at the European level. A far-right surge nobody saw coming Romania’s presidential and parliamentary elections were supposed to be held in succession between 24 November and 8 December, with the parliamentary elections sandwiched between the two rounds of the presidential election. The sudden rise of the independent candidate Călin Georgescu, until recently a fringe figure, as a serious contender in the first round of the presidential election triggered a far-right surge. The parliamentary election results that followed one week later revealed the fragility of the democratic mainstream against the radical right, which nobody could have predicted mere weeks ago. Georgescu’s unexpected victory in the first presidential round dealt a heavy blow to Romania’s traditional parties, the Social Democrats (PSD) and the centre-right National Liberals (PNL), which have formed the governing coalition since 2021. Not only were their candidates – Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu (PSD) and Senate Chairman Nicolae Ciucă (PNL) – both surpassed by Georgescu. But the parties themselves each lost almost 10 per cent compared to previous elections. The Social Democrats recorded their worst performance in history, securing 22 per cent of the vote and 123 mandates (down from 157). Although they remain Romania’s largest political force, their ability to form a stable majority is now in question. Meanwhile, the National Liberals lost half their seats, securing only 72 mandates. The other centre-right party, Save Romania Union (USR), fared no better, dropping from 90 to 59 mandates, in spite of their candidate, Elena Lasconi, entering into the presidential runoff with Georgescu. This is in stark contrast to the gains made by the radical right. The Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) surged into second place with 18 per cent of the vote, while two other smaller far-right parties – SOS Romania and the Party of Young People (POT) – crossed the five per cent threshold for the first time. Together, radical right-wing factions now control almost 35 per cent of the new legislature. Who is the far-right candidate who has upended Romania’s politics? A 62-year-old self-proclaimed expert on sustainable development, Călin Georgescu has ties to the ultra-religious, ultra-nationalist movement that also propelled AUR into parliament in 2020. His relationship with AUR, however, was short-lived, as some of Georgescu’s controversial statements proved too extreme even for this party. Dubbed ‘Kremlin Georgescu’ by some because of his Putin-friendly stance, he is no longer tethered to a single party — a factor that many believe has been crucial to his success in a country where trust in political parties is historically low. His blunt position on party politics is summed up in a short sentence: ‘Political parties are bankrupt’, he concluded after the parliamentary elections of 1 December. His statement echoes another rant from April this year when he emphatically declared that ‘Political parties are nags for the golden chariot of the Romanian people. There will be no more political parties in this country. None!’ When questioned about this, Georgescu retorted that he had merely quoted from a Romanian philosopher, Petre Țuțea, a former member of the Iron Guard, a fascist, ultra-nationalist organisation during Romania’s inter-war period. Țuțea’s exact quote, however, would send shivers down anyone’s spine: ‘Political parties are horses for the golden chariot of Romanian history; when they become nags, the Romanian people send them to the slaughterhouse.’ It’s all about the support for Ukraine Georgescu didn’t just reject party politics, he also questioned the core pillars of Romania’s foreign policy — its membership of NATO and the EU, and the US security umbrella. In Georgescu’s view, NATO is ineffective as a defensive alliance. He recently described the Deveselu Aegis Ashore anti-missile defence system, which Romania has been hosting since 2015, as a ‘disgrace to diplomacy’. While other presidential candidates reaffirmed Romania’s commitment to Ukraine, Georgescu campaigned on the promise of pursuing ‘peace’ through rapprochement with Russia, a move that aligns with his praise of ‘Russian wisdom’ in foreign policy. His position resonated with voters increasingly anxious about the war’s economic and security implications. Romania, which shares a long border with Ukraine, has felt the effects of the conflict through rising energy prices, an influx of refugees and trade disruptions. Public sentiment has shifted in recent months, influenced in part by debates in US politics about ending the war in Ukraine. Georgescu’s populist rhetoric, bolstered by the re-election of Donald Trump, helped him capitalise on these war-related anxieties and positioned him as a challenger to the status quo. Georgescu’s surprising rise reflects deep societal divisions in Romania and growing disenchantment with the political and economic establishment. His support is concentrated among voters in rural and economically disadvantaged regions, areas that have long felt neglected by post-communist reforms. A 2021 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) study described these regions as ‘rural and old industrial areas with significant socio-economic challenges’, where many residents experienced the transition to democracy and capitalism as a period of frustration, humiliation and injustice. Georgescu’s platform, ‘Food, Water, Energy’, resonated with voters in these areas. The programme proposes policies at odds with EU norms, including nationalisation and preferential taxation for local businesses. These ideas appealed to small farmers and business owners struggling with rising production costs and competition from cheap Ukrainian grain imports. EU environmental regulations, perceived as burdensome, further fuelled discontent. Protests by Romanian farmers earlier this year, blocking border crossings with Ukraine and Moldova, highlighted these grievances. His rhetoric also struck a chord with Romanians working abroad, many of whom feel abandoned by the state. For decades, urban centres have benefited disproportionately from EU funding and foreign investment, leaving the peripheries to fend for themselves. Georgescu positioned himself as the champion of the forgotten majority, offering a voice to those who felt excluded from Romania’s post-communist success story. A TikTok made Manchurian candidate TikTok proved to be the ‘secret weapon’ that catapulted Georgescu into the political spotlight. Just weeks before the elections, he was virtually unknown to the public, but his discreet TikTok campaign rapidly expanded his reach within days. Declassified documents from Romania’s intelligence services reveal that Georgescu’s TikTok network spanned 25 000 accounts and allegedly received substantial support from a ‘state actor’. Notably, around 800 of these accounts, initially created as early as 2016, remained largely dormant until two weeks before the elections. This highlights the alarming vulnerability of modern politics to manipulation via social media platforms. TikTok’s popularity in Romania – 47 per cent of the population has an account – has made the platform a powerful tool. By contrast, only 36 per cent of people in France and less than 27 per cent in Germany have an account on TikTok. Among voters aged 18-24, who predominantly use this platform, Georgescu secured 30 per cent of the vote, far outpacing his support among older demographics. This is the age group that, according to a recent FES Youth Study, declares the highest fear of violence and war (56 per cent), sees corruption as the main problem for Romania (72 per cent) and agrees with the statement that it would be good for Romania to have a strong leader who doesn’t care much about the parliament and elections (41 per cent). This is, however, only a small part of the picture. While social media played a role in Georgescu’s success, allowing him to rise from obscurity, the rest has to do with a combination of factors that culminated in a cascade of failures and bad decisions of the mainstream parties. The inability of Romania’s mainstream political parties to acknowledge and address the fears, anxieties, and grievances of the electorate alienated many voters. Amid rising concerns about an impending economic downturn and the deteriorating situation in Ukraine, the political class appeared detached from reality. Although the grand coalition remained in government, the Social Democrats and National Liberals devoted much of the electoral campaign to petty controversies and fruitless disputes, failing to engage with issues that mattered to voters. This relentless squabbling overshadowed any opportunity to highlight the government’s notable achievements, which were far from insignificant. These included massive progress on infrastructure projects on a scale unprecedented in the past two decades, Romania’s inclusion in the US Visa Waiver Program and a landmark breakthrough toward full Schengen accession. Adding to this, the lacklustre presidential candidates fielded by the mainstream parties compounded voter frustration and drove many to seek alternatives. The Social Democrats’ overconfidence resulted in sloppy campaign planning and a narrow focus on a single strategy that hinged on their candidate, Marcel Ciolacu, facing far-right AUR candidate George Simion in the presidential runoff. This strategy was decisively upended by Georgescu’s unexpected surge. Moreover, the PSD’s ‘accommodationist stance’ toward AUR – rooted in the party’s preference for transactional, give-and-take politics – contributed to the normalisation of far-right narratives centred on ethnic nationalism and Christian conservatism. This approach not only weakened the democratic mainstream but also provided fertile ground for the radical right to gain legitimacy and momentum. As Romania grapples with its largest budget deficit in years and faces mounting political uncertainty, the ability of democratic forces to regroup and form a stable majority will be critical in the weeks to come. So far, all parties from the democratic mainstream, Social Democrats included, have signalled that they understand how important it is to form a stable majority. Failure to do so risks further empowering extremist forces and destabilising the nation’s pro-European trajectory.