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Diplomacy
Russia US Peace Plan as Russian American and Ukrainian deal to end the war as an agreement of Moscow and Washington Kyiv on the outside in negotiations.

Peace in Ukraine? Believe it when you see it, especially if demands are prioritized

by Oleksa Drachewych

The United States recently — and suddenly — announced a 28-point peace plan to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, seemingly jointly written with Russian delegates, and presented it to Ukraine. The leaked contents of the peace plan caused concerns for Ukrainian representatives, European leaders and some American politicians. Yet it has nonetheless led to “meaningful progress”, according to the White House, on a revised peace proposal drafted by Ukrainian and American delegates in Geneva. Ukraine has reportedly agreed to the deal, with minor tweaks, while Russia says it’s premature to say a resolution is close, even as Russian representatives met with U.S. delegates in Abu Dhabi to discuss the revised plan. What was in the first plan? The leaked initial 28-point plan was criticized for asserting many Russian demands that date back to the initial peace negotiations of March and April 2022: • It placed a limit of 600,000 troops on Ukraine’s military; • It prevented Ukraine from having long-range missiles; • It placed a permanent ban on Ukrainian membership in NATO; • It included protections of Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. It also explicitly gave the entire Donbas region of eastern Ukraine to Russia, and called on the international community to recognize full Russian control of the Donbas and Crimea and control of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia on the front lines. In return, there would be “reliable security guarantees” envisioned by U.S. President Donald Trump: a NATO-style “Article 5” for Ukraine. This would mean if Ukraine was purposefully attacked by Russia in the future, the U.S. and other parties involved would come to Ukraine’s defence through sanctions, diplomatic pressure and military support, if necessary. In many of the economic and security arrangements that could emerge from the agreement, Russia and the United States would manage them together under the terms of the 28-point plan. The original plan also offered amnesty to all parties for any crimes and atrocities committed during the war, meaning Russia would not be brought to justice for war crimes. It also called for Russia’s return to European and global affairs, ending its political isolation with the West by reforming the G8. In short, the agreement would essentially act as if the war in Ukraine never happened. Was this a joint U.S.-Russia plan? The origins of the peace plan have been widely debated. The stilted language in the English version has led some to speculate it was translated from Russian. American senators said U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, when briefing them, called the deal a “Russian wish list.” The draft reportedly came as a result of meetings held in Florida between Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, special envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, a noted Putin supporter. Rubio has insisted it was a U.S.-crafted document while Russian President Vladimir Putin said Russia could accept the peace plan. The fact that the document tended to mirror many of Russia’s demands immediately put Ukraine, and Europe, on the defensive. Trump declared that Ukraine would have until American Thanksgiving — Thursday, Nov. 27 — to agree to the plan. He has since softened his stance. But he’s also lambasted Ukraine’s leadership for not showing sufficient “gratitude” for American efforts to bring peace to Ukraine. Details of Europe’s plan In response, European leaders offered their own peace plan. They largely removed some of Russia’s most egregious demands, keeping some of the 28 points, while placing sensitive issues like NATO membership as something to be determined by NATO members and Ukraine. But it also acceded to some Russian demands, including accepting a cap on Ukraine’s military and offering Russia re-entry into the G8. It included a provision for territorial swaps with negotiations starting from the current front lines instead of recognizing Russia’s annexations. European proposals include using frozen Russian assets as reparations for Russia’s aggression, eliminating any of the amnesty clauses and making the European Union and NATO the key players in any future political, economic and military security arrangements. The European deal also removes key qualifiers in the original 28-point plan that could be manipulated by Russian misinformation — namely that Ukraine would be forced to face Russia alone if it struck either St. Petersburg or Moscow with a missile or it failed to “de-Nazify”, a common and erroneous Russian line of attack against Ukraine. The Kremlin rejected the European counter-plan outright. Where does the deal stand now? Ukrainian and American officials recently met in Geneva to discuss the peace plan. Emerging from the meeting, European leaders were cautiously optimistic while insisting a lot more work needed to be done. Trump stated that “something good just may be happening.” So, what resulted from that meeting? Few details have been leaked. Sources have shared that the 28-point plan has now been pared down to 19. It has also been suggested that key issues like territorial swaps and NATO accession have been left for Trump and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy to discuss at a future meeting. Ukrainian officials have said the plan has been substantially revised and reflects Ukraine’s concerns. The Russian response has been cagey, to say the least. Since there’s been no formal presentation of any revised peace plan, they are electing to say nothing firm. But U.S. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll recently met with Russian delegates in Abu Dhabi. Russian sources, meanwhile, have restated their preference for the original 28-point plan. Seeing is believing While this appears to be the most notable progress in the peace process in months, expectations should be tempered until there’s a presidential summit between Zelenskyy and Putin and until their signatures are on a treaty. Such momentum for peace has happened in the past. And it has often been scuttled by the key sticking points of both nations. Ukraine has continued to demand extensive security guarantees, justice for Russian war crimes, and has rejected territorial swaps. Russia has wanted a pliable Ukraine and one that could remain in its orbit politically and economically. Fundamentally, these positions haven’t changed. At this point, it appears the Ukrainians have managed to bring the Americans to their side in the latest peace talks, which reflects the importance Ukraine places on U.S. support in their fight against Russia. Russia has elected to say little, but if it was to agree to the revised deal, it would represent a seismic shift. For those reasons, believe in success in the peace process when you actually see it.

Diplomacy
Washington, DC – March 04, 2025: Ahead of President Trump's speech to Congress, protestors gathered at the US Capitol calling attention to his autocratic ways and to stop Fascism.

Democratic erosion in the United States: a red alert for the region

by Laura Gamboa

The accelerated authoritarian drift of the United States under the Trump administration poses serious risks to democracy and stability throughout Latin America. The United States is undergoing a rapid process of democratic erosion. Despite its limitations, until January 2025 it still had a democratic regime with relatively free and fair elections (though more so in some states than others), universal suffrage, no tutelary authorities, protection of political rights and civil liberties, and a series of checks and balances that restricted executive power. Today, that regime has changed substantially. Following the playbook of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, over the past ten months the administration has dismantled the federal bureaucracy, usurped legislative powers, used government agencies to attack, censor, and extort universities, media, and opponents, and violated due process for immigrants (and African American citizens). The shift has been so extreme that political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have declared that the United States is no longer a democracy but a competitive authoritarian regime. The implications of this autocratization process in the U.S. for Latin America are catastrophic. Empowered by a submissive Congress and Supreme Court — whose majorities are more concerned with ideological victories than with the rule of law or civil and political liberties — Trump has been able to operate with minimal constraints. Despite efforts by district, state, and federal courts to block executive orders and actions that violate the Constitution, the president has managed to find ways around adverse rulings or inconvenient requirements. This is particularly true in areas where the presidency has traditionally enjoyed great flexibility — especially those affecting Latin America — such as foreign aid, immigration, and drug enforcement. In one of his first acts, Trump suspended or eliminated U.S. international aid programs previously approved by Congress. The 2024 budget included, among other things, $90 million for democracy promotion in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua; $125 million to combat fentanyl flows in Mexico and cocaine trafficking in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Costa Rica; and $82.5 million for programs to prevent human trafficking and reduce violence against women in Central America. The dismantling of USAID and the State Department’s human rights programs has been accompanied by measures to end immigration from the Global South. Early in his term, Trump abruptly suspended the asylum and refugee programs and terminated temporary protection for more than 600,000 Haitian and Venezuelan immigrants. Worse still, since March, the administration has used Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain and deport immigrants without due process. By September 2025, ICE had detained more than 59,000 people — 71.5% of them without criminal records — and deported 234,210, many without judicial orders. The process has been so arbitrary that ICE raids have even captured 170 U.S. citizens. Those detained — citizens or not, with or without legal status — are subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment, often disappearing into the immigration detention system or being deported without contact with lawyers or family. For those of us who grew up in Latin America hearing about the human rights abuses of dictators like Rafael Videla or Augusto Pinochet, the images of masked ICE agents refusing to identify themselves or present warrants while loading people into unmarked cars are disturbingly familiar. The consequences of these immigration policies are especially severe for Latin America. They not only endanger our compatriots but also reduce the number of Latin Americans living and earning in dollars — whether through deportation or voluntary departure driven by fear. Over time, fewer migrants in the U.S. mean fewer remittances, closing a vital economic valve for fragile economies. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, remittances range from 0.1% of GDP in Argentina to 27.6% in Nicaragua. Countries like El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala derive around one-fifth of their income from remittances — 60% of which come from North America. The crackdown on migrants, the closure of legal entry routes, and the elimination of economic aid coincide with the U.S. government’s decision to use military force against Venezuela. Over the last three months, U.S. forces have attacked Venezuelan (and Colombian) vessels allegedly carrying drugs. These attacks violate international law and expose worrying changes in the rule of law within the U.S. In a liberal democracy, security forces cannot act as prosecutor, judge, and executioner. Even if evidence of drug trafficking existed — which is not entirely clear — due process requires that the ship be detained, evidence collected, and suspects tried in court. The administration’s warlike rhetoric, combined with increased military presence in the Caribbean and the authorization of covert intelligence operations in Venezuela, signals a dangerously inflammatory policy. Some senators fear that the president may even declare war unilaterally — an unprecedented and devastating step for the region. This brings a final reflection. U.S. support for democratic (or authoritarian) leaders and regimes has long been essential to the stability of democracy (or dictatorship) in the Americas. Over the last two decades, democracy has been threatened and weakened in several countries. Overthrowing dictatorships in Venezuela or El Salvador and protecting democracy in Argentina, Colombia, or Guatemala requires strong democratic allies capable of exerting pressure to complement pro-democracy movements. Trump’s erratic policy toward Venezuela, unconditional support for authoritarian-leaning leaders like Nayib Bukele or Javier Milei, and hostility toward populist figures such as Gustavo Petro all contribute to political polarization, impunity, and the growing influence of autocratic powers like China and Russia — undermining democratic actors and institutions across the region. It is difficult to predict how far the erosion of democracy in the U.S. will go. Despite important resistance, the administration’s authoritarian excesses are mobilizing domestic opposition. With some luck, this mobilization may curb its authoritarian impulses. But until that happens, it is hard to rely on the U.S. to defend democracy and human rights in the region. So far, the regional response has been fragmented and, in some cases, improvised. Latin America would do well to seek collective responses, strengthen democratic leadership, and prepare jointly for the repercussions of the Trump administration.

Diplomacy
Isometric Ballot boxes with completed bulletins with check marks. Counting of votes of the democratic and republican candidate. Ballot boxes with us american flag on the red and blue background.

US Electoral System

by World & New World Journal Policy Team

I. Introduction Elections in the United States are held for government officials at the federal, state, and local levels. At the federal level, the head of state, the President, is elected indirectly by the people of each state, through an Electoral College. All members of the federal legislature, the Congress, are directly elected by the people of each state. There are many elected offices at state level, each state having at least an elective governor and legislature. In addition, there are elected offices at the local level, in counties, cities, towns, and villages, as well as for special districts and school districts which may transcend county and municipal boundaries. The US election system is highly decentralized. While the US Constitution sets parameters for the election of federal officials, state laws regulate most aspects of elections in the US, including primary elections, the eligibility of voters (beyond the basic constitutional definition), the method of choosing presidential electors, as well as the running of state elections. All elections-federal, state, and local-are administered by the individual states, with many aspects of the electoral system’s operations delegated to the county or local level. [1] Under federal law, the general elections of the president and Congress are held in even-numbered years, with presidential elections occurring every four years, and congressional elections taking place every two years. The general elections that are held two years after the presidential ones are referred to as the mid-term elections. General elections for state and local offices are held at the discretion of the individual state and local governments, with many of these races coinciding with either presidential or mid-term elections as a matter of cost saving and convenience, while other state and local races may occur during odd-numbered “off years.” The date when primary elections for federal, state, and local races take place are also at the discretion of the individual state and local governments; presidential primaries in particular have historically been staggered between the states, beginning sometime in January or February, and ending about mid-June before the November general election. [2] With this basic information in mind, this paper explores the US electoral system. This paper first provides an overview of the US electoral system and then explains the US Congress (Senate and House of Representatives) and features of US electoral systems. Finally, the paper compares the US electoral system with Canadian and Mexican electoral systems.  II. US Elections  1. Federal elections The United States has a presidential system of government, which means that the executive and legislature are elected separately. Article II of the US Constitution requires that the election of the US president by the Electoral College must take place on a single day throughout the country; Article I established that elections for Congressional offices, however, can be held at different times. Congressional and presidential elections are held simultaneously every four years, and the intervening Congressional elections, which take place every two years, are called mid-term elections. The US constitution states that members of the US House of Representatives must be at least 25 years old, a US citizen for at least seven years, and be a legal inhabitant of the state that they represent. Senators must be at least 30 years old, an US citizen for at least nine years, and be a (legal) inhabitant of the state that they represent. The president and vice president must be at least 35 years old, a natural born US citizen, and a resident in the US for at least 14 years. It is the responsibility of state legislatures to regulate the qualifications for a candidate appearing on a ballot paper, although in order to get onto the ballot, a candidate must often collect a legally defined number of signatures or meet other state-specific requirements. [3] A. Presidential electionsOverview of the presidential election process The presidential election process in the US follows a typical cycle as Table 1 shows. Table 1: US Presidential Election Cycle (source: USA In Brief: ELECTIONS. https://www.usa.gov/presidential-election-process) The president and the vice president in the US are elected together in a presidential election. It is an indirect election, with the winner being determined by votes cast by electors of the Electoral College. The winner of the election is the candidate with at least 270 Electoral College votes. It is possible for a candidate to win the electoral vote, but lose the nationwide popular vote (receive fewer votes nationwide than the second ranked candidate). This has happened five times in US history: in 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016. [4] Electoral College votes are cast by individual states by a group of electors; each elector casts one electoral college vote. Until the Twenty-third Amendment to the US Constitution in 1961, citizens from the District of Columbia did not have representation in the electoral college.  State laws regulate how states cast their electoral college votes. In all states except Nebraska and Maine, the candidate that wins the most votes in the state receives all its electoral college votes (a “winner takes all” system). From 1996 in Nebraska, and from 1972 in Maine, two electoral votes are awarded based on the winner of the statewide election, and the rest (three in Nebraska and two in Maine) go to the highest vote-winner in each of the state’s congressional districts. [5] The Electoral CollegeOverview of the Electoral College  In the US, the Electoral College is the group of presidential electors that is formed every four years for the sole purpose of voting for the president and vice president in the presidential election. This process is explained in Article Two of the US Constitution. The number of electors from each state is equal to that state’s congressional delegation which is the number of senators (two) plus the number of Representatives for that state. Each state appoints electors using legal procedures determined by its legislature. Federal office holders, including US senators and representatives, cannot be electors. In addition, the Twenty-third Amendment granted the federal District of Columbia three electors (bringing the total number from 535 to 538). A simple majority of electoral votes (270 or more) is required to elect the president and vice president. If no candidate receives a majority, a contingent election is held by the House of Representatives, to elect the president, and by the Senate, to elect the vice president. [6] The states and the District of Columbia hold a statewide or district-wide popular vote on Election Day in November to choose electors based upon how they have pledged to vote for president and vice president, with some state laws prohibiting faithless electors. All states except Nebraska and Maine use a party block voting, or general ticket method, to choose their electors, meaning all their electors go to one winning ticket. Nebraska and Maine choose one elector per congressional district and two electors for the ticket with the highest statewide vote. The electors meet and vote in December, and the inaugurations of the president and vice president take place in next January. The merit of the electoral college system has been a matter of ongoing debate in the US since its inception at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, becoming more controversial by the latter years of the 19th century, up to the present day. More resolutions have been submitted to amend the Electoral College mechanism than any other part of the US constitution. An amendment that would have abolished the system was approved by the House in 1969, but failed to move past the Senate. [7] Supporters of the Electoral College claim that it requires presidential candidates to have broad appeal across the country to win, while critics argue that it is not representative of the popular will of the nation. Procedure of Electoral College Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the US Constitution directs each state to appoint a number of electors equal to that state’s congressional delegation (two senators plus the number of members of the House of Representatives). The same clause empowers each state legislature to determine the manner by which that state’s electors are chosen but prohibits federal office holders from becoming electors. Following the national presidential election day on Tuesday after the first Monday in November, each state, and the federal district, selects its electors according to its laws. [8] After a popular election, the states identify and record their appointed electors in a Certificate of Ascertainment, and those appointed electors then meet in their respective jurisdictions and produce a Certificate of Vote for their candidate; both certificates are then sent to US Congress to be opened and counted. [9] In 48 of the 50 states, state laws mandate that the winner of the plurality of the statewide popular vote receives all of that state’s electoral votes. In Nebraska and Maine, two electoral votes are assigned in this manner, while the remaining electoral votes are allocated based on the plurality of votes in each of their congressional districts. The federal district (Washington, D.C.) allocates its 3 electoral votes to the winner of its single district election. States generally require electors to pledge to vote for that state’s winning ticket; to prevent electors from being faithless electors, most states have adopted various laws to enforce the electors’ pledge. [10] The electors of each state meet in their respective state capital on the first Tuesday after the second Wednesday of December, between December 14 and 20, to cast their votes. The results are sent to and counted by the Congress, where they are tabulated in the first week of January before a joint meeting of the Senate and the House of Representatives, presided over by the current vice president, who is the president of the Senate. [11] Should a majority of votes not be cast for a candidate, a contingent election takes place: the House of Representatives holds a presidential election session, where one vote is cast by each of the fifty states. The Senate is responsible for electing the vice president, with each senator having one vote. The elected president and vice president are inaugurated on January 20. Since 1964, there have been 538 electors. States select 535 of the electors, this number matches the aggregate total of their congressional delegations. [12] The additional three electors came from the Twenty-third Amendment, ratified in 1961, providing that the district established pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 as the seat of the federal government (namely, Washington, D.C.) is entitled to the same number of electors as the least populous state. In practice, that results in Washington D.C. being entitled to three electors. [13] Figure 1: Current number of presidential electors by state in US (Source: Wikipedia)B. Congressional electionsOverview of US Congress The US Congress is the legislative branch of the federal government of the United States. It is a bicameral legislature, including a lower body, the US House of Representatives, and an upper body, the US Senate. They both meet in the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. Members of Congress are chosen through direct election, though vacancies in the Senate may be filled by a governor’s appointment. As Figure 2 shows, Congress has a total of 535 voting members, a figure which includes 100 senators and 435 representatives. The vice president of the United States, as president of the Senate, has a vote in the Senate only when there is a tie. [14] Figure 2: Current US Congress Structure (Source: Wikipedia) Congress convenes for a two-year term (a Congress), commencing every other January. Each Congress is usually split into two sessions, one for each year. Elections are held every even-numbered year on Election Day. The members of the House of Representatives are elected for the two-year term of a Congress. The Reapportionment Act of 1929 established that there be 435 representatives, and the Uniform Congressional District Act requires that they be elected from single-member constituencies or districts. It is also required that the congressional districts be apportioned among states by population every ten years using the US census results, provided that each state has at least one congressional representative. Each senator is elected at-large in their state for a six-year term, with terms staggered, so every two years approximately one-third of the Senate is up for election. Each state, regardless of size and population, has two senators, so currently, there are 100 US senators for the 50 states. [15] Article One of the US Constitution requires that members of Congress be at least 25 years old for the House and at least 30 years old for the Senate, be a US citizen for seven years for the House and nine years for the Senate, and be an inhabitant of the state that they represent. Members in both chambers may run for re-election an unlimited number of times. [16] Figure 3: US House of Representatives Seats by State (source: Britannica) Congress was created by the US Constitution and first met in 1789, replacing the Congress of the Confederation in its legislative function. Although not legally mandated, in practice members of Congress since the late 19th century are typically affiliated with one of the two major political parties, the Democratic Party or the Republican Party, and only rarely with a third party or independents affiliated with no party. Members of Congress can also switch parties at any time, though this is uncommon. [17] Role & Power of US Congress Article One of the US Constitution states that “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a US Congress, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” [18] The House and Senate are equal partners in the legislative process – legislation cannot be enacted without the consent of both chambers. The US Constitution grants each chamber some unique powers. The Senate ratifies treaties and approves presidential appointments while the House initiates revenue-raising bills. The House initiates and decides impeachment while the Senate votes on conviction and removal of office for impeachment cases. A two-thirds vote of the Senate is required before an impeached person is removed from office. [19] US Congress has authority over budgetary and financial policy through the enumerated power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.  The Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 extended congressional power of taxation to include income taxes without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration. The US Constitution also grants Congress the exclusive power to appropriate funds, and this power of the purse is one of Congress’s primary checks on the executive branch of the United States. Congress can borrow money on the credit of the US, regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states, and coin money. Generally, the Senate and the House of Representatives have equal legislative authority, although only the House may originate revenue and appropriation bills. [20] In addition, Congress has an important role in national defense, including the exclusive power to declare war, to raise and maintain the armed forces, and to make rules for the military. Some critics charge that the executive branch has usurped Congress’s constitutionally defined task of declaring war. While historically presidents initiated the process for going to war, they asked for and received formal war declarations from Congress for the War of 1812, the Spanish–American War, the Mexican–American War, World War I, and World War II, although President Theodore Roosevelt’s military move into Panama in 1903 did not get congressional approval. In 1993, Michael Kinsley wrote that “Congress’s war power has become the most flagrantly disregarded provision in the Constitution,” and that the “real erosion of Congress’s war power started after World War II.” Disagreement about the extent of congressional versus presidential power regarding war has been present from time to time throughout US history. [21] US Congress can establish post offices and post roads, issue patents and copyrights, fix standards of weights and measures, establish courts inferior to the US supreme court, and make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the US, or in any Department or officer thereof. Article Four gives US Congress the power to admit new states into the Union. One of Congress’s foremost non-legislative functions is the power to investigate and oversee the executive branch. Congressional oversight is usually delegated to committees and is facilitated by Congress’s subpoena power (see Tables 2 & 3). Some critics have charged that the US Congress has in some instances failed to do an adequate job of overseeing the other branches of government. In the Plame affair, critics including US Representative Henry A. Waxman charged that Congress was not doing an adequate job of oversight in this case. [22] Table 2: Major Senate committees (source: Wikipedia)Table 3: Major House committees (source: Wikipedia)Power of US Senate Senate approval is required to pass any federal legislation. The US Constitution provides several unique functions for the Senate that form its ability to “checks and balances” the powers of other elements of the federal government. These include the requirement that the Senate may advise and must consent to some of the president’s government appointments; the Senate must also consent to all treaties with foreign governments; it tries all impeachments, and it elects the vice president in the event no person receives a majority of the electoral votes. Legislation Bills may be introduced in either chamber of Congress. However, the Constitution’s Origination Clause provides that All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. [23] Accordingly, the Senate does not have the power to initiate bills imposing taxes. Moreover, the House of Representatives holds that the Senate does not have the power to originate appropriation bills, or bills authorizing the expenditure of federal funds. The constitutional provision barring the Senate from introducing revenue bills is based on the practice of the British Parliament, in which money bills approved by Parliament have originated in the House of Commons per constitutional convention. Although the US Constitution gave the House the power to initiate revenue bills, in practice the Senate is equal to the House in the respect of spending. As Woodrow Wilson wrote: [24] The Senate’s right to amend general appropriation bills has been allowed the widest possible scope. The Senate may add to them what it pleases; may go altogether outside of their original provisions and tack to them entirely new features of legislation, altering not only the amounts but also even the objects of expenditure, and making out of the materials sent them by the popular chamber measures of an almost totally new character. The approval of both chambers is required for any bill, including a revenue bill, to become law. Both the House and the Senate must pass the same version of the bill; if there are differences, they may be resolved by sending amendments back and forth or by a conference committee that includes members of both bodies. Appointment confirmations The president can make certain appointments only with the advice and consent of the Senate. Officials whose appointments require the Senate’s approval include members of the Cabinet, ambassadors, heads of most federal executive agencies, justices of the Supreme Court, and other federal judges.  The powers of the Senate concerning nominations are, however, subject to some constraints. For instance, the US Constitution provides that the president may make an appointment without the Senate’s advice and consent during a congressional recess. The recess appointment remains valid only temporarily; the office becomes vacant again at the end of the next congressional session. Nonetheless, presidents have frequently used recess appointments to circumvent the possibility that the Senate may reject the nominee. Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Myers v. United States, although the Senate’s advice and consent are required for the appointment of certain executive branch officials, it is not necessary for their removal. However, recess appointments have faced a significant amount of resistance and in 1960, the US Senate passed a legally non-binding resolution against recess appointments to the Supreme Court. [25] Treaty ratification Moreover, the Senate has a role in ratifying treaties. The US Constitution provides that the president may only “make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur” in order to benefit from the Senate’s advice and consent and give each state an equal vote in the process. However, not all international agreements are considered treaties under US domestic law, even if the agreements are considered treaties under international law. Congress has passed laws authorizing the president to conclude executive agreements without action by the Senate. In a similar way, the president may make congressional-executive agreements with the approval of a simple majority in each House of Congress, rather than a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Neither executive agreements nor congressional-executive agreements are mentioned in the Constitution, leading some scholars such as John Yoo and Laurence Tribe to suggest that they unconstitutionally circumvent the treaty-ratification process. However, US courts have upheld the validity of such agreements. [26] Impeachment trials  The US Constitution empowers the House of Representatives to impeach federal officials for “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors” and empowers the Senate to try such impeachments. If the sitting president of the United States is being tried, the US chief justice presides over the trial. During an impeachment trial, senators are constitutionally required to sit on oath or affirmation. Conviction requires a two-thirds majority of the senators present. A convicted official is automatically removed from office. In addition, the Senate may stipulate that the defendant is banned from holding office. No further punishment is permitted during the impeachment proceedings; however, the party may face criminal penalties in a normal court of law. The House of Representatives has impeached sixteen government officials, of whom seven were convicted (one resigned before the Senate could complete the trial). Only three US presidents have been impeached: Andrew Johnson in 1868, Bill Clinton in 1998, and Donald Trump in 2019 and 2021. The trials of Johnson, Clinton and both Trump trials ended in acquittal; in Johnson’s case, the Senate fell one vote short of the two-thirds majority required for conviction. [27] Election of the vice president Under the Twelfth Amendment, the Senate has the power to elect the vice president if a vice-presidential candidate does not receive a majority of votes in the Electoral College. The Twelfth Amendment requires the Senate to choose from the two candidates with the highest numbers of electoral votes. But Electoral College deadlocks are rare. The Senate has only broken a deadlock once; in 1837, it elected Richard Mentor Johnson. The House elects the president if the Electoral College deadlocks on that choice. [28] Power of US House of Representatives  The US House of Representatives has the exclusive power to initiate all revenue bills, impeach federal officials, and elect the US president if the Electoral College is tied. Along with the Senate, it also shares the power to make laws. [29] The organization and character of the House of Representatives have evolved under the influence of political parties, which provide a means of controlling proceedings and mobilizing the necessary majorities. Party leaders, such as the majority and minority leaders, as well as the speaker of the House, play a central role in the operations of the House. However, party discipline (for example, the tendency of all members of a political party to vote in the same way) has not always been strong due to the fact that House members, who must face reelection every two years, often vote the interests of their districts rather than their political party when the two diverge. A further dominating element of House organization is the committee system, under which the membership is divided into specialized groups for purposes such as preparing bills for the consideration of the entire House, regulating House procedure, and holding hearings. Each committee is chaired by a member of the majority party. Almost all bills are first referred to a committee, and ordinarily the full House cannot act on a bill until the committee has “reported” it for floor action. There are approximately 20 standing committees, organized mainly around major policy areas, each having subcommittees, staffs, and budgets. They may hold hearings on questions of public interest, propose legislation that has not been formally introduced as a bill or resolution, and conduct investigations. Among important standing committees are those on appropriations, on ways and means (which handles matters related to finance), and on rules. In addition, there are select and special committees, which are usually appointed for a specific project and for a limited period of time. The committees also play an important role in the control exercised by Congress over governmental agencies. Cabinet officers and other officials are frequently summoned before the committees to explain policy. The US Constitution (Article I, section 6) prohibits members of Congress from holding offices in the executive branch of government—a major difference between parliamentary and congressional forms of government. [30] 2. State elections Overview State laws and state constitutions, controlled by state legislatures regulate elections at state level and local level. Various officials at the state level are elected. Since the separation of powers applies to states as well as the federal government, state legislatures and the executive (for example, the governor) are elected separately. Governors and lieutenant governors are elected in all states, in some states on a joint ticket and in some states separately, some separately in different electoral cycles. The governors of the territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the US Virgin Islands are also elected. In some states, executive positions such as Secretary of State and Attorney General are also elected offices. All members of state legislatures and territorial jurisdiction legislatures are elected. In some states, members of the state supreme court and other members of the state judiciary are elected. Proposals to amend the state constitution are also placed on the ballot in some states. [31] As a matter of cost saving and convenience, elections for many of these state and local offices are held at the same time as either the federal presidential or mid-term elections. There are a handful of states, however, that hold their elections during odd-numbered “off years.” Governors  As state managers, governors are mainly responsible for implementing state laws and overseeing the operation of the state executive branch. As state leaders, governors advance and pursue new and revised programs and policies using a variety of tools, among them executive orders, executive budgets, and legislative proposals and vetoes. As chiefs of the state, governors serve as the intergovernmental liaison to the federal government on behalf of the state. [32] Governors carry out their management and leadership responsibilities and objectives with the support and assistance of agency & department heads, many of whom they are empowered to appoint. A majority of governors have the power to appoint state court judges as well, in most cases from a list of names submitted by a nominations committee. Although governors have many roles and responsibilities in common, the scope of gubernatorial power varies from state to state in accordance with state constitutions, legislation, and tradition. Governors often are ranked by political historians and other observers of state politics according to the extent and number of their powers. States, commonwealths, or territories vary with respect to minimum age, US citizenship, and state residency requirements for gubernatorial candidates and other state office holders. The minimum age requirement for governors ranges from no formal provision to age 35. The requirement of US citizenship for gubernatorial candidates ranges from no formal provision to 20 years. State residency requirements range from no formal provision to 7 years. [33] State legislature  In the United States, the state legislature is the legislative branch in each of the 50 US states. A legislature generally performs state duties for a state in the same way that the US Congress performs national duties at the national level. Generally, the same system of checks and balances at the federal level also exists between the state legislature, the state executive officer (governor) and the state judiciary. In 27 states, the legislature is called the legislature or state legislature. In other 19 states, the legislature is called the general assembly. In New Hampshire and Massachusetts, the legislature is called the general court, while North Dakota and Oregon designate the legislature the legislative assembly. [34] The responsibilities of a state legislature vary from state to state, depending on the state’s constitution. The primary function of any legislature is to make laws. State legislatures also approve budgets for state government. They may establish government agencies, set their policies, and approve their budgets. For example, a state legislature could establish an agency to manage environmental conservation efforts within that state. In some states, state legislators elect other state officials. State legislatures often have the power to regulate businesses operating within their jurisdiction. They also regulate courts within their jurisdiction. This includes determining types of cases that can be heard, regulating attorney conduct, and setting court fees.With respect to other responsibilities of a state legislature, under the terms of Article V of the US Constitution, state lawmakers have the power to ratify Constitutional amendments which have been proposed by both houses of Congress and they also retain the ability to call for a national convention to propose amendments to the US Constitution. [35] After the convention has concluded its business, 75% of the states will ratify what the convention has proposed. Under Article II, state legislatures choose the manner of appointing the state’s presidential electors. In the past, some state legislatures appointed the US Senators from their respective states until the ratification of the 17th Amendment in 1913 required the direct election of senators by the state’s voters. Sometimes what the legislature wishes to achieve cannot be done simply by the passage of a bill, but rather requires amending the state constitution. Each state has specified steps intended to make it difficult to revise the constitution without the sufficient support of either the legislature, or the people, or both. Organization All states except Nebraska have a bicameral legislature. The smaller chamber is called the senate, usually referred to as the upper house. This chamber usually has the exclusive power to confirm appointments made by the governor and to try articles of impeachment. (In a few states, a separate executive council, composed of members elected from large districts, performs the confirmation procedures.) Nebraska originally had a bicameral legislature like other states, but the lower house was abolished following a referendum, effective with the 1936 elections. The remaining unicameral (one-chamber) legislature is called the Nebraska Legislature, but its members are called state senators. During the 20th century, state legislatures further emulated the activities and structures of the US Congress as institutions at both levels grew in size and complexity, often accompanied by increases in staffing and member pay. While most state legislatures remain part-time institutions, a handful of states have expanded theirs to meet year-round. [36] Local elections At the local level, county and city government positions are usually filled by election, in particular within the legislative branch. The extent to which offices in the executive or judicial branches are elected vary from city-to-city or county-to-county. Some examples of local elected positions include sheriffs at the county level and mayors and school board members at the city level. Like state elections, an election for a specific local office may take place at the same time as either the presidential, mid-term, or off-year elections. III. Features of US electoral system Voting methods A number of voting methods are used within the various jurisdictions in the US, the most common of which is the first-past-the-post system. In the first-past-the-post system, the highest-polling candidate wins the election. Under this system, a candidate who achieves a plurality (that is, the most) of votes wins. But the State of Georgia uses a two-round system, where if no candidate receives a majority of votes, then there is a runoff between the two highest polling candidates. [37] Since 2002, several cities such as Burlington in Vermont have adopted instant-runoff voting. Voters rank the candidates in order of preference rather than voting for a single candidate. Under this system, if no candidate receives more than half of votes cast, then the lowest polling candidate is eliminated, and their votes are distributed to the next preferred candidates. This process continues until one candidate receives more than half the votes. In 2016, Maine became the first state to adopt instant-runoff voting (known as ranked-choice voting) statewide for its elections, although due to state constitutional provisions, the system is only used for federal elections and state primaries. [38] Figure 4: US voting methods (source: Wikipedia)Eligibility The eligibility of an individual for voting is set out in the US constitution and also regulated at state level. The constitution states that suffrage cannot be denied on grounds of color, race, sex, or age for citizens eighteen years or older. Beyond these basic qualifications, it is the responsibility of state legislatures to regulate voter eligibility. Some states ban convicted criminals, especially felons, from voting for a fixed period of time or indefinitely. The number of adults in the US who are currently or permanently ineligible to vote due to felony convictions is estimated to be 5.3 million. In addition, some states have legacy constitutional statements barring those legally declared incompetent from voting; such references are generally considered obsolete and are being considered for review or removal where they appear. [39] About 4.3 million US citizens that reside in Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico and other US territories do not have the same level of federal representation as those that live in the 50 US states. These areas only have non-voting members in the US House of Representatives and no representation in the US Senate. Citizens in the US territories are also not represented in the Electoral College and therefore cannot vote for the US President. [40] Those in Washington, D.C. are allowed to vote for the president because of the Twenty-third Amendment. Voter registration While the federal government has jurisdiction over federal elections, most election laws are decided at the state level. All US states except North Dakota require that citizens who wish to vote be registered. In many states, voter registration takes place at the county or municipal level. Traditionally, voters had to register directly at state or local offices to vote, but in the mid-1990s, the federal government made a lot of efforts to make registering easier, in an attempt to increase turnout. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (the “Motor Voter” law) required state governments that receive certain types of federal funding to make the voter registration process easier by providing uniform registration services through drivers’ license registration centers, disability centers, libraries, schools, and mail-in registration. Other states allow citizens same-day registration on election day. An estimated 50 million Americans are unregistered. It has been reported that registering to vote poses greater obstacles for low-income citizens, Native Americans, racial minorities and linguistic minorities, and persons with disabilities. International election observers have called on US authorities to implement measures to correct the problems of the high number of unregistered citizens. [41] In many states, citizens registering to vote may declare an affiliation with a political party. This declaration of affiliation does not cost money, and does not make the citizen a dues-paying member of a party. A political party cannot prevent a voter from declaring his or her affiliation with the party, but it can refuse requests for full membership. In some states, only voters affiliated with a political party may vote in that party’s primary elections. Declaring a party affiliation is never required. Some states, including Georgia, Virginia, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, and Washington, practice non-partisan registration. [42] Non-citizen voting Federal law prohibits non-citizens from voting in federal elections. As of 2024, 7 state constitutions specifically state that “only” a citizen can vote in elections at any level in that state: Florida, Alabama, Arizona, North Dakota, Colorado, Louisiana, and Ohio. [43] Absentee and mail voting Voters unable or unwilling to vote at polling stations on election day may vote via absentee ballots, depending on state law. Originally these ballots were for people who could not go to the polling place on the election day. Now some states let them be used for convenience, but state laws still call them absentee ballots. Absentee ballots can be sent and returned by mail, or requested and submitted in person, or dropped off in locked boxes. About half the states and territories allow “no excuse absentee,” where no reason is required to request an absentee ballot; other states require a valid reason, such as travel or infirmity. Some states let voters with permanent disabilities apply for permanent absentee voter status, and some other states let all citizens apply for permanent status, so they will automatically receive an absentee ballot for each election. Otherwise a voter must request an absentee ballot before the election takes place. [44] In Colorado, Utah, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington state, all ballots are delivered through the mail; in many other states there are counties or certain small elections where everyone votes by mail. [45] As of July 2020, 26 states allow designated agents to collect and submit ballots on behalf of another voter, whose identities are specified on a signed application. Such agents are usually family members or persons from the same residence. 13 states neither enable nor prohibit ballot collection as a matter of law. Among those that allow it, 12 states have limits on how many ballots an agent may collect. Americans living outside the US, including active duty members of the armed forces stationed outside of their state of residency, may register and vote under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). Almost half the states require these ballots to be returned by mail. Other states allow mail along with some combination of e-mail or fax; four states allow a web portal. [46] A significant measure to prevent some types of fraud has been to require the voter’s signature on the outer envelope, which is compared to one or more signatures on file before taking the ballot out of the envelope and counting it. Not all states have standards for signature review. There have been concerns that signatures are improperly rejected from young and minority voters at higher rates than others, with no or limited ability of voters to appeal the rejection. For other types of errors, experts estimate that while there is more fraud with absentee ballots than in-person voting, absentee ballots have affected only a few local elections. [47] Following the US presidential election in 2020, amid disputes of its outcome, as a rationale behind litigation demanding a halt to official vote counting in some areas, allegations were made that vote counting is offshored. Former Trump Administration official Chris Krebs, head of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) during the election, said in a December 2020 interview that, “All votes in the United States of America are counted in the United States of America.” [48] One documented trend is that in-person votes and early votes are more likely to lean to the Republican Party, while the provisional ballots, which are counted later, trend to the Democratic Party. This phenomenon is known as blue shift, and has led to situations where Republicans were winning on the election night only to be overtaken by Democrats after all votes were counted. But Foley did not find that mail-in or absentee votes favored either party. [49] Early voting Early voting is a formal process where voters can cast their ballots before the official election day. Early voting in person is allowed in 47 states and in Washington, D.C., with no excuse required. Only Alabama, New Hampshire and Oregon do not allow early voting, while some counties in Idaho do not allow it. [50] Voting equipment The earliest voting in the US was through paper ballots that were hand-counted. By the late 1800s, paper ballots printed by election officials were nearly universal. By 1980, 10% of American voters used paper ballots that were counted by hand, and then dropped below 1% by 2008. [51] Mechanical voting machines were first used in the US in the 1892 elections in Lockport, New York. Massachusetts was one of the first states to adopt lever voting machines, doing so in 1899, but the state’s Supreme Court ruled their usage unconstitutional in 1907. Lever machines grew in popularity despite controversies, with about two-thirds of votes for president in the 1964 US presidential election cast with lever machines. Lever machine use declined to about 40% of votes in 1980, then 6% in 2008. Punch card voting equipment was developed in the 1960s, with about one-third of votes cast with punch cards in 1980. New York was the last state to phase out lever voting in response to the 2000 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) that allocated funds for the replacement of lever machine and punch card voting equipment. New York replaced its lever voting with optical scanning in 2010. In the 1960s, technology was developed that enabled paper ballots filled with pencil or ink to be optically scanned rather than hand-counted. In 1980, about 2% of votes used optical scanning; this increased to 30% by 2000 and then 60% by 2008. In the 1970s, the final major voting technology for the US was developed, the DRE voting machine. In 1980, less than 1% of ballots were cast with DRE machines. Prevalence grew to 10% in 2000, and then peaked at 38% in 2006. Because DREs are fully digital, with no paper trail of votes, backlash against them caused prevalence to drop to 33% in 2010. [52] The voting equipment used by a given US county is related to the county's historical wealth. A county’s use of punch cards in the year 2000 was positively correlated with the county’s wealth in 1969, when punch card machines were at their peak of popularity. Counties with higher wealth in 1989 were less likely to use punch cards in 2000. This supports the idea that punch cards were used in counties that were well-off in the 1960s, but whose wealth declined in the proceeding decades. Counties that maintained their wealth from the 1960s onwards could afford to replace punch card machines as they fell out of favor. [53] Multiple levels of regulation Elections in the US are actually conducted by local authorities, working under local, state, and federal law and regulation, as well as the US Constitution. It is a highly decentralized system. The secretary of state in about half of US states is the official in charge of elections; in other states it is someone appointed for the job, or a commission. It is this person or commission who is responsible for certifying, tabulating, and reporting votes for the state. Ballot access Ballot access refers to the laws which regulate under what conditions access is granted for a candidate or political party to appear on voters’ ballots. Each state has its own ballot access laws to determine who may appear on ballots and who may not. According to Article I, Section 4, of the US Constitution, the authority to regulate the place, time, and manner of federal elections is up to each state, unless Congress legislates otherwise. Depending on the office and the state, it may be possible for a voter to cast a write-in vote for a candidate whose name does not appear on the ballot, but it is extremely rare for such a candidate to win office. [54] Primaries and caucuses In partisan elections, candidates are chosen by primary elections and caucuses in the states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the US Virgin Islands. [55] A primary election is an election in which registered voters in a jurisdiction (nominating primary) select a political party’s candidate for a later election. There are various types of primary: either the whole electorate is eligible, and voters choose one political party’s primary at the polling booth (an open primary); or only independent voters can choose a party’s primary at the polling booth (a semi-closed primary); or only registered members of the political party are allowed to vote (closed primary). The blanket primary, when voters could vote for all parties’ primaries on the same ballot was struck down by the US Supreme Court as violating the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of assembly in the case California Democratic Party v. Jones. In addition, primaries are used to select candidates at the state level, for example, in gubernatorial elections. Caucuses also nominate candidates by election, but they are very different from primaries. Caucuses are meetings that occur at precincts and involve discussion of each political party’s platform and issues such as voter turnout in addition to voting. Eleven states: Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia use caucuses, for one or more political parties. [56] The primary and caucus season in presidential elections lasts from the Iowa caucus in January to the last primaries in June. Front-loading – when larger numbers of contests take place in the opening weeks of the season—can have an impact on the nomination process, potentially reducing the number of realistic candidates, as fund-raisers and donors quickly abandon those who they see as untenable. However, it is not the case that the successful candidate is always the candidate who does the best in the early primaries. There is also a period dubbed the “invisible primary” that takes place before the primary season, when candidates attempt to solicit media coverage and funding well before the real primary season begins. A state’s presidential primary election or caucus usually is an indirect election: instead of voters directly selecting a particular person running for president, it determines how many delegates each party’s national political convention will receive from their respective state. These delegates then in turn select their party’s presidential nominee. Held in the summer, a political convention’s purpose is also to adopt a statement of the political party’s principles and goals known as the platform and adopt the rules for the party’s activities. [57] The day on which primaries are held for congressional seats, and state and local offices may also vary from state to state. The only federally mandated day for elections is the election day for the general elections of the president and Congress; all other elections are at the discretion of the individual state and local governments. Criticism and concernsA. Voter suppression and subversion Voting laws and procedures between the states vary as a consequence of the decentralized system, including those pertaining to voter IDs, voter registration, provisional ballots, postal voting, voting machines and vote counting, felony disenfranchisement, and election recounts. Thus the voting rights or voter suppression in one state may be stricter or more lenient than another state. After the 2020 US presidential election, decentralized administration and inconsistent state voting laws and processes have shown themselves to be targets for voter subversion schemes enabled by appointing politically motivated actors to election administration roles with degrees of freedom to subvert the will of the people. One such scheme would allow these election officials to appoint a slate of “alternate electors” to skew operations of the electoral college in favor of a minority political party. [58] B. Vote counting time As detailed in a state-by-state breakdown, the US has a long-standing tradition of publicly announcing the incomplete, unofficial vote counts on election night (the late evening of election day), and declaring unofficial “projected winners,” despite that many of the mail-in and absentee votes have not been counted yet. In some states, in fact, none of them have yet been counted by that time. This tradition was based on the assumption that the incomplete, unofficial count on the election night is probably going to match the official count, which is officially finished and certified several weeks later. A basic weakness of this assumption, and of the tradition of premature announcements based on it, is that the general public is likely to misapprehend that these particular “projected winning” candidates have certainly won before any official vote count has been completed, whereas in fact all that is truly known is that those candidates have some degree of likelihood of having won the election; the magnitude of the likelihood (all the way from very reliable to not reliable at all) varies by state because the details of election procedures vary from state to state. This problem has impacts on all non–in-person votes, even those cast weeks before election day—not just late-arriving ones. [59] C. Structural problems In 2014, political scientists from Princeton University did a study on the influence of the so-called “elite,” and their derived power from special interest lobbying, versus the “ordinary” US citizen within the US political system. These scientists found that the US looked more like an oligarchy than a real representative democracy; thus eroding a government of the people, by the people, for the people as stated by Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address. In fact, they found that average citizens had an almost nonexistent influence on public policies and that the ordinary citizen had little or no independent influence on policy at all. [60] Sanford Levinson claims that next to the fact that campaign financing and gerrymandering are seen as serious problems for democracy, also one of the root causes of the American democratic deficit lies in the US Constitution itself. For example, there is a lack of proportional representation in the Senate for highly populated states like California, as regardless of population all states are given two seats in the Senate. [61] Partisan election officials in the US can give an appearance of unfairness, even when there are very few issues, especially when an election official like a secretary of state runs for an election that they are overseeing. Richard Hasen claimed that the US is the only advanced democracy that lets partisan officials oversee elections, and that switching to a nonpartisan model would improve trust, participation and effectiveness of the elections. [62] The Electoral College has been criticized by some people for being undemocratic (it can select a candidate who did not win the popular vote) and for encouraging campaigns to mainly focus on swing states, as well for giving more power to smaller states with less electoral votes as they have a smaller population per electoral vote compared to more populated states. This can be seen through one electoral college vote representing 622,000 voters in California, compared to one electoral college vote representing 195,000 voters in Wyoming. [63] The first-past-the-post system has also been criticized for creating a de facto pure two-party system (as postulated in Duverger’s law) that suppresses voices that do not hold views consistent with the largest faction in a major political party, as well as limiting voters’ choices in elections. [64] IV. Comparison of US Electoral System with Mexican and Canadian electoral systems US electoral system has both similarities and differences with Canadian and Mexican systems. All of three countries have federal systems and bicameral legislatures. All elections in these three countries are on a fixed schedule. In addition, Us and Canada have first-the-post voting systems.  However, there are many differences among these three countries. The elections in Canada and Mexico are managed and administered by a national election agency. Thus elections in both Canada and Mexico are carried out the same way across the country. By contrast, elections in the US are managed and carried out by each state in different ways. The biggest difference is that unlike Canada and Mexico, the US elect the head of government (President) though the Electoral College. In addition, unlike the US and Canada, Mexico has a hybrid system across first-past-the-post voting (single-member district), party-list proportional representation, and/or mixed-member proportional representation. Moreover, unlike Mexican members of Congress, members of US congress do not have term limits. Table 4, 5, and 6 show the similarities and differences among the US, Canada, and Mexican electoral systems. Table 4: Federal elections comparison, US vs Canada (Elections Canada, 2025)Table 5: Federal elections comparison II, US vs Canada (Elections Canada, 2025)Table 6: Comparison of Federal elections, US vs Mexico (source: Wikipedia)Table 7: Political parties in the Mexican Senate (source: Wikipedia)Table 8: Political parties in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies (source: Wikipedia) V. Conclusion This paper explained US electoral systems and its features. The paper also explained federal elections in the US, including presidential and congressional and state elections, including local elections. In addition, the paper described the power and role of the US Congress. Moreover, this paper compared US electoral systems with Canadian and Mexican systems and showed the similarities and differences among these three countries’ electoral systems.  Referencias [1] "Elections & Voting". whitehouse.gov. April 2, 2015. [2] For more information, see Wikipedia [3] "Constitutional requirements for presidential candidates | USAGov". www.usa.gov. [4] "Electoral College History". National Archives. November 18, 2019. [5] "Maine & Nebraska". FairVote. Retrieved December 31, 2023. [6] For more information, see Wikipedia [7] Ziblatt, Daniel; Levitsky, Steven (September 5, 2023). "How American Democracy Fell So Far Behind". The Atlantic. [8] Statutes at Large, 28th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 721. [9] Neale, Thomas H. (January 17, 2021). 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Diplomacy
The Japanese and Chinese flags are being pulled apart, with the Taiwanese flag in the middle. This suggests that Japan's stance is,

Why Japan’s support for Taiwan has gone down so badly in China

by Lewis Eves

Tensions are rising between China and Japan again over a dispute in the East China Sea. Such tensions are usually over the Senkaku Islands, an uninhabited chain administered by Japan but claimed by China. The current row, however, stems from international anxiety over a possible Chinese invasion of democratically ruled Taiwan. On November 17, in her first parliamentary address since taking office in October, Japan’s prime minister Sanae Takaichi suggested that her country could intervene militarily in the event of an attack on Taiwan. Takaichi’s comments sparked anger in China, with state media framing her rhetoric as reminiscent of Japanese acts of violence towards China during the second world war. Beijing has demanded that Takaichi retract her comments – a call she has rebuffed – and is advising Chinese citizens against travelling to Japan, claiming there has been a deterioration in public security there. China has also introduced a blanket ban on Japanese seafood imports as the row continues to escalate. The ruling communist party, which frames itself as the protector of the Chinese nation, has long sought to reunify China following the so-called “century of humiliation”. Starting with the first opium war in 1839 and concluding with the end of the second world war in 1945, this period saw China victimised and partitioned by various foreign powers. Taiwan is thus problematic for the party. The island state broke away from China in 1949 at the end of the Chinese civil war, and its autonomy from Beijing contradicts the goal of national unity that the party has promised. Some observers fear that China will seek reunification through force, with some predictions suggesting it will be ready to invade Taiwan as soon as 2027. There is no guarantee that an invasion will occur. But the international community, led by the US, is preparing for a confrontation over Taiwan regardless. On the same day Takaichi made her comments, the US government announced it had agreed to sell US$700 million (£535 million) of arms to Taiwan. In this context, Japan’s show of support for a strategic partner in the region is not surprising – yet Takaichi’s remarks about Japanese intervention are particularly provocative for China. One reason is that Japan occupied and colonised Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, contributing to China’s century of humiliation. This makes Japanese threats to intervene in Taiwan’s defence a contentious prospect for China to consider. Another reason is that anti-Japanese sentiment is a prominent characteristic of Chinese nationalism. Many Chinese nationalists are vocal in condemning Japan for any provocation, pointing to historical atrocities committed against China as evidence of a need to stay vigilant against renewed Japanese aggression. The idea of Japan intervening to maintain the status quo in what China considers a breakaway province probably falls under their idea of an aggressive act. Will tensions escalate? Outright conflict between China and Japan remains unlikely. It is possible that Takaichi’s remarks were simply an effort to shore up domestic political support, rather than a genuine military threat. Her rightwing Liberal Democratic party (LDP) previously governed Japan in coalition with the centre-right Komeito party. This coalition broke down in October 2025, forcing the LDP to rely increasingly on its nationalist base for support – a group that is generally suspicious of China’s growing military and economic strength. Irrespective of Takaichi’s motive, China has responded assertively. It sent its coast guard to the Senkaku Islands in what it called a “rights enforcement patrol”. The Japanese government has also accused China of flying military drones near Japan’s most westerly territory, Yonaguni, which is close to Taiwan’s east coast. Any misfire risks open hostility between the two nations. The Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan but claimed by China as the Diaoyu Islands. vadimmmus / Shutterstock Relations between Japan and China are tense, yet I see cause for optimism. Takaichi has positioned herself as a successor to the late Shinzo Abe, who served as Japan’s prime minister from 2006 to 2007 and again from 2012 to 2020.Like Takaichi, Abe promoted an assertive Japanese foreign policy. He oversaw reinterpretations of Article 9, the pacifist clause of Japan’s constitution, to lessen restrictions on his country’s use of military force. This included passing legislation in 2015 which allows Japan’s self-defence force to deploy to protect the country’s allies. This legislation has enabled Takaichi to consider military intervention in Taiwan’s favour. When Abe entered office in 2012, it was also a tense time for China and Japan. Japanese nationalist activists swam to the Senkaku Islands and raised their country’s flag, triggering massive anti-Japanese protests in China. Tensions remained high for several years, with both countries deploying ships and warplanes to the region. This resulted in several near-misses that could have escalated into outright conflict. In 2014, Chinese fighter jets flew extremely close to a Japanese surveillance plane and intelligence aircraft near the islands, passing about 30 metres from one plane and 50 metres from another. However, once tensions passed, Abe and China’s leader, Xi Jinping, oversaw several years of relative calm and cooperation between their two countries. In fact, this is usually linked to the familiarity Abe and Xi developed through their interactions while managing their countries’ mutual animosity over the disputed islands. So, if Takaichi can follow her mentor’s lead and successfully navigate the tensions to build an effective working relationship with Xi, a more stable relationship between China and Japan in the future is still possible.

Diplomacy
President Donald Trump greets Chinese President Xi Jinping before a bilateral meeting at the Gimhae International Airport terminal, Thursday, October 30, 2025, in Busan, South Korea. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

Between Tactical Easing and Strategic Confrontation: The Busan Moment in China-US Relations

by Bo Ma , Yiyi Xu

On 30 October 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump held their first in-person meeting since 2019 on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Busan. The encounter marked a cautious “tentative reengagement” after six years of sustained friction, signalling neither a diplomatic thaw nor a substantive breakthrough, but a forced recalibration. Both sides recognised that prolonged confrontation was increasingly costly, yet neither was willing to display strategic vulnerability or compromise on core interests. The central challenge of this “six-year reunion” was how to balance unavoidable competition with limited cooperation. The Busan meeting did not resolve long-standing disputes, but it did illuminate the evolving structure of bilateral engagement: limited economic de-escalation coexisting with sustained tensions in security and technology. Trust remained thin, and risk management defined the tone. Within this framework of cautious interaction and enduring rivalry, both sides resumed dialogue while leaving key structural contradictions unresolved. Tactical Easing: A “Mutual Ceasefire” over Rare Earths and Tariffs Building on preliminary understandings reached during earlier Kuala Lumpur discussions, the Busan meeting yielded limited but concrete outcomes. Washington agreed to suspend part of its planned tariff increases and delay the expansion of export restrictions. Beijing, in turn, postponed implementation of newly announced controls on rare earth elements and related technologies. These reciprocal measures were explicitly time-limited, with a one-year horizon.While framed as mutual concessions, the steps reflected pragmatic political calculations within each country’s domestic context. President Trump sought short-term economic calm to support financial markets and reassure key Midwestern constituencies ahead of the election cycle. Beijing, for its part, aimed to preserve a stable external environment through managed openness, gaining room for continued economic restructuring and technological adaptation. Yet the truce was fragile. China’s decision to delay export controls was not a concession but a strategic withholding of leverage. As the supplier of roughly 60 percent of the world’s mined rare earths – critical to semiconductors, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and US defence platforms such as the F-35—Beijing retains significant influence over global supply chains. The Busan easing was therefore less a structural breakthrough than a tactical pause: a deferral of escalation rather than a resolution of underlying tensions. Diplomatic Silence over Taiwan: Strategic Caution and Latent Risks The Busan meeting made no reference to the Taiwan issue—an omission that is rare in the history of China–US summitry. Following the talks, President Trump remarked that President Xi “understands the consequences” of attempting to seize Taiwan but declined to clarify whether the United States would intervene militarily. Secretary of State Marco Rubio similarly emphasised that Washington would not trade Taiwan’s interests for economic concessions. Taiwan thus became the “elephant in the room”: too consequential to ignore, yet too politically volatile to confront directly. For Beijing, Taiwan constitutes an inviolable sovereignty red line. For Trump, raising the issue risked derailing trade-focused dialogue and undermining his image of diplomatic control. Both leaders chose strategic silence as a means of avoiding escalation. This silence did not indicate convergence, but rather mutual restraint under high pressure. Taiwan has become a latent variable in every round of China–US engagement: absent from formal discussions, yet structurally embedded in the broader strategic equation. The longer it is avoided, the more its political cost accrues. In the future, renewed tensions—whether triggered by trade disputes or maritime incidents in the South China Seas—could rapidly return Taiwan to the center of bilateral confrontation. Taiwan’s “absence” in Busan does not reduce its relevance; it only signals that the crisis has been temporarily displaced from public diplomacy rather than defused. Institutionalised Decoupling: From Policy Choice to Structural Reality The diplomatic silence over Taiwan reflected tactical caution, while at a deeper level, the Busan meeting underscored the entrenched technological and institutional divergence between China and the United States. Trump signalled that US firms such as NVIDIA might engage in selective transactions involving mid-range AI chips, but reaffirmed that the most advanced semiconductor products would remain tightly restricted. This reaffirmed Washington’s “technology defense logic,” in which high-tech rivalry is governed by national security imperatives rather than market access concerns. In Beijing’s view, technological self-sufficiency is equally central to national resilience and regime security. Both sides now frame their strategic contest as a “struggle over national trajectory,” where concession is viewed as structural vulnerability. As a result, each is doubling down on domestic institutional insulation rather than pursuing negotiated guardrails. This bifurcation has produced a dual trajectory: modest stabilisation in trade flows paired with accelerating fragmentation in high-end technologies. Both governments are using this brief “technological cooldown” to advance structural measures. Washington is deepening coordination with allies and expanding export control and investment screening regimes. Beijing, for its part, is formulating new legal instruments—including draft frameworks akin to a Science and Technology Security Law and prospective regulations on critical technologies—to consolidate oversight over strategic sectors. While these initiatives are not yet fully codified, they reflect a clear intent to embed technology governance within national security architecture. In this context, technology has lost its value as a bargaining lever in diplomacy. Both sides tacitly acknowledge that strategic technologies can no longer be traded without compromising sovereignty. Technological decoupling has thus evolved from a temporary response into a systemic condition. The Busan “easing” did not reflect progress toward convergence, but rather a managed pause in an increasingly institutionalised contest. From High-Intensity Confrontation to Managed Competition The Busan meeting marked a shift in China–US relations from high-intensity confrontation to limited management. The two sides temporarily stabilised trade and exercised restraint on political and security fronts, while competition in technological and institutional domains remained entrenched. This was not reconciliation, nor a turning point, but the formation of a provisional equilibrium. For China, Busan offered a space for economic adjustment and accelerated efforts toward technological autonomy. For the United States, it maintained strategic pressure while averting short-term escalation. Beneath the optics of diplomacy, structural divergence and strategic mistrust persist. Across the Indo-Pacific, this “uneasy coexistence” is increasingly becoming the regional default. The significance of Busan lies not in concrete outcomes, but in the shared recognition that strategic confrontation must be managed, even if it cannot yet be resolved. This article was published under a Creative Commons license and may be republished with attribution, check original source for more information.

Diplomacy
WASHINGTON, DC - JANUARY 20: President Donald Trump signs executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House on January 20, 2025 in Washington, DC. Trump takes office for his second term as the 47

Donald Trump: Reconfiguring Global Order

by Jeffrey Sommers , Zoltán Vörös , István Tarrósy

Chaos seems to mark US policy under President Donald Trump at first blush. But behind what appears (and sometimes is) capricious Trump Administration decision making are policymakers with serious plans. They intend to engage perceived threats to the United States power, while transforming its economy in ways making it less dependent on global supply chains and “reserve assets.” Recognizing festering wounds to the US economy while seeing areas of strength, Trump policymakers look to cauterize the former while pivoting more fully to the latter. Trump’s presidency has openly engaged in criticizing past US liberal interventionist and neoconservative foreign policy. Branded as “America First” Trump’s US does not seek isolationist  withdrawal from the globe, but rather a dismantling of institutional structures and alliances that no longer benefit Washington. The United States can and should continue projecting power far but, not wide, according to America Firsters. Under America First, the national interest does not always align with the “international community,” a term America Firsters would regardless see, borrowing a line from Benedict Anderson, as a fictitious “imagined community.” America First means dismantling the liberal hegemonic world order, or at minimum the US offloading the bill for it. The cost of that liberal order, with some 750 US military bases abroad, combined with growing power of the BRICS (China chiefly, but not only), signals to America Firsters America’s need to retreat from some parts of the world, while continuing to exercise dominance in others. Related to national security is the fallout from a generation of globalization in labor markets. US offshoring of manufacturing in the post-Bretton Woods period lowered production costs. Cheap goods produced abroad were then purchased by Americans even more cheaply courtesy of the overvalued dollar as the world’s reserve currency. This worked great for US consumers, albeit with the intention of also pushing down US labor costs. Globalization enabled the United States to vacuum up global manufactures, while also running up massive government fiscal deficits. As former Vice-President Dick Cheney described it during globalization’s heyday, “Reagan proved deficits don’t matter.” What was once, however, a massive advantage for the United States later became its “twin deficits” problem.   In short, the best fit for the US is a realist spheres of influence model, according to the Trump Administration. The criticism of the liberal world order, of course, circles back to the aforementioned economic challenges: on the one hand, the negative economic processes related to global labor organization and America’s indebtedness, and on the other hand, the strengthening of emerging international actors. Amongst these entities, the People’s Republic of China has long been high on the agenda. During the first Trump administration the president escalated tariffs on goods imported from Asia’s giant, which then led to a trade war. According to a Pew Research Center survey from mid-April 2025, although Americans believe that this bilateral trade relationship benefits China more than the US, they are “skeptical that increased tariffs on Chinese imports will have a positive effect on the country or on their own lives.” The Trump Administration thinks otherwise. America’s economy entering Trump’s presidency looked strong. On the cusp of the great 2008 financial shock, the European Union’s dollar GDP was $16.4 trillion, the US’ was $14.8 trillion. But by 2024, EU GDP was $18.7 trillion, while the United States posted a GDP of $28 trillion. Thus, in the span of less than a generation, the US went from having a GDP 9.8% short of the EU’s in 2008 to leaping ahead with a GDP 32% larger by 2024. These impressive US GDP gains were built on the foundations of financial services, corporate high-value added HQ (headquarters) functions, intellectual property, higher education, and information technology. Yet, there were problems: Maintaining world order, or empire, was, as we asserted above, expensive. In 2024 the US military budget was $824 billion. This figure does not even count huge “off (or black) budget” items related to security, etc., for which costs are not precisely known. Besides these numbers, we should not forget about the military’s global presence: The US paid for global security costs, protecting important maritime trade routes, chokepoints – not just supporting the American interest, but for instance chiefly helping China trade with the world. These costs were covered, in part, through US borrowing, much of it from abroad. In 2024, the US government deficit stood at $1.8 trillion, or 6.4% of GDP. While the total US debt reached $38 trillion. The last time the US federal budget was in surplus was in the last term of President Bill Clinton, when there were both reduced military expenditures (post-Cold War “peace dividend”) and top marginal income tax rates of 39.6%. And before Clinton’s second term, US budgets were only in surplus in 1969 and before that only for several years in the 1950s. Decelerating US decline also requires addressing these areas. First is the area of domestic costs. US public pension costs (Social Security and Medicare) face a fiscal crisis. The dedicated taxes (Federal Insurance Contributions Act, or “FICA”) will soon be insufficient to pay for pension costs. FICA taxes in the late 20th century, under President Ronald Reagan, were raised above pension costs. The surplus (a de facto tax on labor) was to finance costs of a future changed 21st century demographic mix creating lower ratios of workers to pensioners. This funding forward model could only work if surplus revenues were invested in productivity enhancing infrastructure creating larger future economic growth and productivity. Instead, the FICA tax surpluses levied on labor were largely used to reduce budget deficits resulting from tax cuts to the wealthy and corporate sectors. In short, to be blunt, the money was taken from labor, with continued borrowing now to pay pension costs running up against the limits of the US to borrow. Second, reserve assets. Lack of ground rents, given the US had no centuries long accumulation of land ownership from feudalism, meant low land prices and reduced inequality generally in the United States. Additionally, the United States applied tariffs to protect domestic markets and promote industrialization generally starting with their first Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures in 1791 that gave the US high tariffs, only later rivaled by Russia under the economic leadership of Sergei Witte and Pytor Stolypin in Russia’s late Czarist Russia period. Third, after the 2008 US financial shock it became clear that China was not limited to being merely a supplier of lower-tier consumer goods to the world, but risked becoming a power that could challenge the United States (an idea encapsulated in the Thucydides trap). Rather than markets paving the path toward liberal democracy, as many US policymakers previously assumed, the ascendancy of Xi Jinping signaled China’s fealty to an autonomous route to development. However, China still depends on the global system, the institutions, and structures that have ensured and continue to ensure its participation in global trade, for example. China does not yet possess the global capabilities that would allow it to defend its interests beyond its borders. Therefore, taking action against Beijing as a rival could cause difficulties in time for a country that is dependent on numerous structures maintained by Washington. The Trump administration’s goals and responses to the US crises are to: • Offload costs of US “empire” to other states currently benefiting from it• Recovery through fall in commodity prices (energy, food, metals, etc.)• Move from globalization to regional spheres of influence• Postpone “Armageddon” of global exit from US dollar• Widen leads in AI, thus requiring cheap energy• Reduce US government debt levels• Widen US lead in space• Reshore US industry To achieve these goals, a tariff policy was established that fundamentally shapes American economic and foreign policy, to which Washington has put forward the following proposals: First, other countries can accept tariffs on their exports to the United States without retaliation, providing revenue to the U.S. Treasury to finance public goods provision. Critically, retaliation will exacerbate rather than improve the distribution of burdens and make it even more difficult for us to finance global public goods; Second, others can stop unfair and harmful trading practices by opening their markets and buying more from America; Third, they can boost defense spending and procurement from the U.S., buying more U.S.-made goods, and taking strain off our service-members and creating jobs here; Fourth, they can invest in and install factories in America. They won’t face tariffs if they make their stuff in this country; Fifth, they could simply write checks to the Treasury that help us finance global public goods. Or more passively, accept conversion of their Treasury Bills into century-long non-interest bearing bonds. American foreign policy actions can generate results that are drastically different from expectations, and in certain cases can accelerate and amplify problems Washington faces. Although it is evident classic free trade agreements have not formed the basis of American foreign and economic policy for some time, the tariffs introduced and then implemented (and periodically suspended) by the Trump administration, imposed challenges to the United States on several fronts: First, tariffs have severely affected or even targeted states that have traditionally been in partnership with the United States (e.g. EU, Japan, South Korea), which Washington could rely on for support, for example during its international interventions. Such steps can, on the one hand, harm and jeopardize American global and economic interests, and on the other hand, push actors towards a multipolarity that Washington fears. Similarly questionable are trade actions against states that could be pillars of a coalition against China (e.g. Vietnam and the Philippines). American weaponization of trade and unilateral military expectations make Washington an unattractive, if not unreliable, partner, thus encouraging multilateralism. Second, Washington’s demands that states sever trade relations with China, or even with Russia, as Trump asked India to do, is accelerating states decoupling from the United States not on ideological grounds but primarily based on realistic economic policy considerations. Third, these steps could also threaten the dominance of the US dollar, and even accelerate decline in confidence of the dollar – further complicating the financing of the deficit. The Trump Administration (Treasury Department) are aware of the dangers (the “Triffin” reserve currency dilemma) but think the crisis is so acute that they must do something even if they risk accelerating the dollar’s collapse. However, it is also true that a drastic decline in confidence in the US currency would require an alternative reliable currency, and currently, the currency of no potential player can be considered perfectly reliable or transparent. Finally, on a global scale, the America First slogan is not necessarily guaranteed to win partners for Washington. It is evident that in the short term, several actors will not be able to free themselves from the security architecture guaranteed by the Americans (see: NATO), but most actors will strive to advance by developing and building their own capacities. In conclusion, Washington under Trump looks to downsize and rightsize. American economic and military power, while strong, has declined from its post-Cold War unipolar moment. Reduced power has diluted American confidence, thus resulting in the US taking at times a more aggressive posture in an increasingly multipolar world. Meanwhile, the rest of the world grows wary at how the Trump Administration reacts to these changed global ‘‘adjustments” that are creating confusion over where spheres of influence begin and end. The days of America acting to, in the phrasing of Joseph Nye Jr., “winning the hearts and minds” of the world, seems off the table. The United States now retreats from soft power with dramatic cuts to foreign aid and international exchanges, such as its Fulbright program. Rather than winning the world over, under Trump, demands for deference to US authority and power now mark its preferred relations with the world, while it disengages from other parts of the globe.

Diplomacy
Paz pereira

Bolivia: The challenges facing Rodrigo Paz’s incoming government

by Franz Flores

After ending two decades of MAS hegemony, Rodrigo Paz assumes the presidency of Bolivia with the legitimacy of change, but faces the enormous challenge of governing without a solid party structure.   The center-left candidate from the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Rodrigo Paz, secured victory with 54% of the votes, gaining nearly ten points over his rival, Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga. This triumph not only puts an end to two decades of dominance by the Movement for Socialism (MAS), led by Evo Morales, but also grants strong legitimacy to the new administration. However, the political challenges facing the government of Paz, set to take office on November 9, are substantial.   The first major test for Paz will be consolidating his power base in the legislature. The main weakness lies in the fact that the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) functioned as a “rented womb”—an instrumental vehicle lacking social or national roots to support the candidacy. Although Paz managed to attract votes from the MAS “hard core” in several regions, he did not inherit his predecessor’s party structure or mobilization capacity. This fragility within the party gives rise to two points of friction.   Within the PDC’s parliamentary bloc, multiple factions could emerge, each seeking its share of power. The tensions already visible between Paz and his running mate, Edman Lara, during the campaign could deepen, complicating executive governance and the management of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly (ALP).   At the same time, Paz will need to build consensus with other parties. Although he enjoys the explicit support of Samuel Doria Medina’s Unidad party—formalized during the runoff—the relationship with Quiroga’s party, LIBRE, is more strained. Despite sharing ideological affinities (market economy, openness to the world, respect for institutions), the aftermath of the aggressive campaign will make an alliance difficult. A simple majority in the ALP is secured through the PDC–Unidad alliance, but deeper reforms—such as a potential constitutional change—will require rapprochement and negotiation with LIBRE, which holds the key to the two-thirds majority.   A second crucial challenge will be the relationship with powerful and decisive social movements. While the support of these organizations for the PDC ticket was a determining factor in its victory, it does not guarantee unconditional loyalty. With a strong history of political empowerment, these groups will seek to safeguard their privileges and, if they feel sidelined, could resort to mobilizations that threaten social stability. Their backing will be essential to legitimize any economic or social adjustment. How the new government manages tensions with these sectors—and how it handles the legacy of “Masismo”—will be vital to maintaining national stability. In many ways, these are anti-system forces capable of obstructing Paz’s government.   The new administration’s ability to pursue any economic or social policy depends on overcoming these two political challenges: securing a legislature aligned with the executive and establishing effective coordination with social movements.   Once these political hurdles are addressed, the next major challenge will be economic. Paz inherits a country in crisis, facing a shortage of U.S. dollars, inflation, and dwindling international reserves. The removal of fuel subsidies—a crucial step for fiscal sustainability—could trigger serious social unrest. The precedent of 2010, when Evo Morales was forced to reverse a similar measure under pressure from social movements, underscores the delicacy of the situation.   October 19 not only marked the end of a political era but also opened a crucial question: Is Bolivia heading toward genuine transformation—or merely a continuation of the MAS model by other means?   The answer to this question will determine the country’s direction in the coming years. If Rodrigo Paz’s new government chooses the path of genuine transformation, it will be essential to undertake structural reforms aimed at strengthening democratic institutions. These reforms would include reducing presidentialism and establishing a justice system free from political influence.   If, on the other hand, the Paz administration focuses solely on addressing the most pressing economic issues—such as inflation and fuel shortages—while ignoring their deeper causes, the MAS model may well endure. That model is characterized by a narrow-based economy, lacking significant industrialization and stable job creation.   It is likely that MAS, now without a parliamentary majority, will initially grant the new administration some room to maneuver. However, the political landscape will not be fully defined until next year’s subnational elections. Only then will the new balance of power in the country become clearer. For now, Bolivia is taking its first steps beyond the hegemonic dominance of MAS and the shadow of Morales.

Diplomacy
Aerial view Panama Canal, third set of locks, water shortages, maritime traffic, water reuse vats, summer drought.

What CK Hutchison told us in the Panama Case?

by Wallace Loo

The attempted sale of CK Hutchison’s Panama Canal operations to the US-based company BlackRock and Terminal Investment Limited was more than a commercial transaction. When Beijing publicly opposed the deal, branding it a betrayal of national interests, it transformed into a case study in how global business is being reshaped by strategic rivalry. The controversy illustrates a deeper question: Can Hong Kong’s leading conglomerates still operate on commercial logic alone, or are they inevitably drawn into the geopolitical contest between the United States and China? For Hutchison, the Panama case shows that the room for neutrality is shrinking. Why does it matter? Beijing’s intervention signals to Hong Kong businesses and foreign investors alike that commercial neutrality is no longer assured. Loyalty, alignment, and political sacrifice are emerging as expectations alongside profit and efficiency. For global decision-makers, this raises two critical issues: Why did Hutchison seek to exit its Panama Canal holdings in the first place? Why did Beijing judge it necessary to intervene in a transaction that, on the surface, was driven by corporate strategy? Why Hutchison sold its Panama Canal operations? 1. Strategic Realignment Toward Core Businesses CK Hutchison has steadily repositioned itself around two “twin engines”, i.e. real estate in Asia and infrastructure in Europe. While ports in Latin America once fit into its global footprint, they were never central to this model. By selling its Panama Canal operations, Hutchison freed resources to consolidate strengths where it sees long-term stability and growth. This is part of a deliberate shift visible over the past decade: acquiring the German infrastructure firm ISTA in 2017 and securing UK regulatory approval in 2024 for the £11 billion merger of Vodafone UK and Hutchison’s subsidiary Three. These moves point to a concentration of capital in Europe’s regulated infrastructure and Asia’s high-demand property markets, underscoring a deliberate pivot toward strengthening European operations and ensuring cash flow visibility. This implies that Hutchison is reducing its exposure and a systematic exit to regions marked by political uncertainty and doubling down on reinvesting into higher-yielding and strategically aligned assets, particularly in European infrastructure platform while deepening its Asian real estate footprint. For governments and investors, this suggests that Hong Kong conglomerates are not retreating from globalization but are planning to recalibrate toward safer, higher-visibility assets. 2. Capitalizing on Market Timing and Asset Valuation The divestment also reflected classic Hutchison discipline: Buying early and exiting when valuations reach the peak. With global demand for strategic infrastructure rising, the Panama Canal assets commanded a premium. The resulting HK$19 billion in proceeds and a sharp rise in share price underlined investor confidence. Such timing underscores Hutchison’s longstanding strategy of opportunistic repositioning. This divestment was both value-accretive and strategically well-timed. By crystallizing gains now, the group strengthens its balance sheet and cash-reserve, maintaining its flexibility to reinvest or return capital to shareholders. For policymakers, this implies that global infrastructure assets are increasingly financialized. Strategic nodes like the Panama Canal are no longer just trade arteries but high-value commodities in global capital markets. Governments must therefore view divestments not only as corporate decisions but as moves that can shift control of strategic assets between geopolitical actors. 3. Geopolitical Considerations and Risk Mitigation The Panama Canal is a corridor of strategic significance and what US-President Donald Trump calls Chinese ownership on the potential dual-use nature of port terminals there inevitably drew scrutiny in Washington. U.S. allies have already tightened the screening of Chinese-linked infrastructure deals and the EU’s 2019 FDI framework explicitly flagged ports as areas requiring “special oversight”. Against this backdrop, Hutchison sought to avoid being cast as a “Chinese state-backed actor”, an extension of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Hutchison has taken deliberate steps to present itself as a neutral and commercially driven multinational investor, rather than an extension of Chinese state policy. The company restructured in 2015 to a Cayman Islands base carefully positioning itself apart from state-linked Chinese enterprises, which creates an international legal identity rather than retaining a mainland Chinese or Hong Kong corporate domicile. By exiting Panama, Hutchison not only monetized assets but also reduced exposure to the intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry in one of the world’s most contested trade chokepoints. For European and U.S. decision-makers, this implies that Hutchison’s move signals how Hong Kong firms navigate geopolitical pressure. It shows that even Chinese-origin conglomerates may prefer retreat to avoid being entangled in state rivalries. Hutchison pre-emptively mitigated the risk of being labelled a “Chinese state proxy” in a critical geopolitical theatre. This move not only alleviated Western concerns about Hutchison’s control of Panama’s ports but also demonstrated the group’s ability to act with commercial neutrality and flexibility, preserving its ability to operate, finance, and expand in Western markets without being constrained by the “Chinese capital” label. For Beijing, however, this retreat risks weakening China’s global port footprint. This highlights a potential divergence between the commercial logic of Hong Kong firms and China’s strategic ambitions. Why did Beijing intervened? 1. Loss of Chinese Strategic Assets and Diplomatic Advantage The Panama Canal is among the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints and control of its ports carries weight far beyond commerce. For China, investment in Latin American terminals has been part of a wider strategy to shape global shipping routes and enhance strategic reach. From Beijing’s perspective, CK Hutchison’s divestment was more than a business transaction. This was a strategic setback. The transfer of control to U.S.-linked interests was seen as a symbolic “recapture” of the terminals, which weakens China’s presence at a vital corridor. Within the Chinese leadership, the ports had been regarded as potential bargaining leverage in trade negotiations with Washington. But this loss reduced Beijing’s diplomatic toolkit at a time of rising frictions. The episode illustrates how Chinese policymakers increasingly view overseas ports as instruments of geopolitical positioning, not just commercial assets. Hutchison’s decision to sell underscored a broader reality: not all Chinese-affiliated enterprises act in alignment with state objectives. For Beijing, this implies that the Panama case highlighted the limits of relying on Hong Kong conglomerates to advance strategic interests abroad. For foreign governments and firms, it signalled both China’s heightened sensitivity to divestments in contested regions and the growing tension between corporate autonomy and state geopolitical expectations. 2. Absence of Beijing’s Prior Approval Sparked Political Backlash In the Panama Canal divestment, Beijing’s leadership reacted strongly against CK Hutchison’s “transaction first, then approval” approach. Beijing expressed dissatisfaction and even instructed state-owned enterprises to suspend new collaborations with the Li family, who serve as the controlling shareholders and principal decision-makers of Hutchison. Hutchison defended this sale as a “purely commercial and competitive process” by emphasizing Mediterranean Shipping Company as the principal buyer. Yet, in the context of intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry, this stance was no longer acceptable. Regulatory pressure and political intervention from Beijing slowed negotiations, preventing the transaction from proceeding as planned. The broader precedent is clear: in strategically sensitive areas, Beijing now expects Hong Kong firms to align commercial decisions with state priorities. Neutrality is no longer an option. This marks a fundamental shift in the operating environment, binding the leading Hong Kong conglomerates more closely to state interests and constraining their room for independent strategic choices. For policymakers and investors, this implies that the Panama case shows how Beijing is extending political oversight into commercial domains once seen as autonomous. Hong Kong enterprises face increasing limits on their ability to separate business logic from state loyalty, particularly where Sino-U.S. rivalry is at stake. 3. Public Opinion as Strategic Pressure: Shaping a New Regional Order Beijing’s response to Hutchison’s Panama sale was not confined to official channels. Pro-Beijing media denounced the deal as disloyal and profit-driven, framing it as a matter of national honour. When the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, which is the Beijing central body responsible for overseeing Hong Kong and Macao affairs, amplified these narratives, they gained quasi-official status and exerted pressure on both Hutchison and other Hong Kong firms. This discourse resonated beyond China. The Panama Canal Authority warned that excessive concentration of terminal assets could undermine neutrality and competitiveness. This wording strikingly complies with Beijing’s “anti-hegemony” rhetoric. By shaping the terms of debate, Beijing positioned itself to argue for greater balance and competition in Panama’s port operations. Looking ahead, China advocates to leverage new concession tenders to advance its tactical objectives: strengthening the role of China Ocean Shipping Company, counterbalancing U.S. and European dominance and embedding Chinese capital in Latin America’s maritime infrastructure. More broadly, the case illustrates how Beijing integrates public opinion, regulatory narratives, and commercial strategy to shape a regional order more favourable to its interests. For policymakers, this implies that Panama demonstrates how Beijing transforms domestic media pressure into a tool of international influence. What begins as reputational discipline at home can translate into bargaining leverage abroad, particularly in contested regions where infrastructure and influence are intertwined. Points of Special Relevance: Beijing’s Strategic Signal Beijing’s intervention in the Panama Canal case should be read not as a single act but as a strategic signal. Its aims to prevent U.S. and European firms from consolidating control at a vital chokepoint and to avoid the appearance of “losing” strategic assets. At the same time, Beijing used this episode to remind Hong Kong conglomerates that in sensitive geopolitical contexts, commercial logic alone is no longer sufficient. The Panama case demonstrates how Beijing leverages commercial disputes as instruments of statecraft. The more plausible outcome is a conditional arrangement to encourage Panama to introduce mechanisms that limit Western influence in Latin America. China seeks structural adjustments that preserve its influence and reshape the regional order to its advantage. From Neutrality to National Loyalty As U.S. China tensions intensify, many multinational firms pursue de-risking strategies: not full decoupling as it is economically unviable, but carefully calibrated ambiguity that allows them to operate in both markets without explicit political commitments. This balancing act is becoming harder in Hong Kong. Since 1997, the influx of mainland state-linked enterprises has blurred the line between state and market. Benefiting from the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, these firms embedded political expectations into business norms. Ties to the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference are increasingly relevant in Hong Kong. By 2019, Beijing moved further, promoting patriotism in the business sector such as the Greater Bay Area Business Support Scheme, which channels funding toward firms demonstrating “patriotic entrepreneurship” or contributions to “national rejuvenation”. The result is a growing convergence of economic and political expectations. Commercial autonomy is increasingly contingent on political alignment, eroding the distinction between business logic and ideological loyalty. For investors and firms, this raises strategic concerns: - Will political loyalty requirements constrain the free flow of capital? - Could companies risk state intervention or even nationalization if perceived as acting against China’s interests? These questions remain unresolved, but Hutchison’s Panama case shows how quickly a commercial decision can be redefined as a matter of national loyalty. The broader uncertainty surrounding Hong Kong’s business environment will shape the city’s role as a financial hub in the decade ahead. This is my view on things: An Outlook on Hong Kong Looking ahead, the space for Hong Kong conglomerates to maintain commercial neutrality is narrowing. The rise of a nationalist business paradigm means companies must increasingly balance political conformity with economic self-interest. Two scenarios are emerging: 1. “Hong Kong, then China”: firms retain some operational autonomy and global credibility by prioritizing commercial logic, while carefully managing political sensitivities. 2. “China, then Hong Kong”: political loyalty takes precedence, with business priorities subordinated to national strategic goals of the Chinese Communist Party. Which path prevails will determine Hong Kong’s role as a financial hub. The tension between economic liberalism and political loyalty is no longer abstract. It is becoming the defining fault line for Hong Kong’s business landscape in the decade ahead.

Diplomacy
Sharm El Sheikh Summit for Peace: Agreement to End the War in Gaza, 13 October 2025. Photo by Roman Ismayilov. President.az, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Gaza Peace Plan: End of war, or A beginning of occupation?

by Muhammad Abdullah

On 29 September 2025, President Trump held a press conference along with his counterpart, Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, and issued 20 Points detailed peace plan for the war-torn Gaza, though he claims that the plan was backed by prominent Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan and some other’s. By and large these Muslim states also welcomed the Plan, most importantly Palestinian political body which is Palestinian Liberation Organization also called the plan an opportunity to end the war on Gaza. Some significant points of the peace plan. Gaza will be a deradicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned. (Gjevori, 2025)Role of ArabsSince the start of Trump’s tenure  and the new American administration Arabs were making efforts to stop the long running Gaza War, they propose alternatives to Trump’s Gaza Rivera plan and so on. (Jazeera, 2025) Now, when eventually Gaza Peace Plan announced by Trump, they (Arabs ) not only endorsed the Plan but also Nations like Qatar, Egypt and Türkiye take part in negotiations with Hamas and Israel, along with envoy to Middle East Steve Witkoff, and finally brought some relief for Gazans like (ceasefire and immediate supplies of aid) which is very crucial for the starving people Gaza. (Irish, 2025)Proposed Governance ModelGaza would be governed by technocrats, apolitical Palestinian committee responsible for day-to-day public services and municipal functions in Palestine. The committee would be composed of qualified Palestinian and International experts. They will be overseen by a body called the Board of Peace. There would be a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF). To oversee security in Gaza during transition. (Walsh, 2025)Parties response to the plan.Hamas, which is the military body of Gaza has also issued a response to Trump’s Plan, in which they accepted the demands like hostage release, and to hand over the administration of Gaza to independent Technocrats, but they clearly stated that they want to negotiate over some points through mediators.PLO which is Political body of Palestine, welcomed the ceasefire but they are opposed to hand over Gaza’s governance to foreign actors, as Nasser al- Qudwa, a prominent Palestinian and Nephew of Yasser Arafat, has warned against foreign governance of Gaza post-Hamas, (Newspaper, 2025) stressing that leadership must be rooted locally rather than imposed from abroad. The statement highlights the potential opposition and undermines the credibility of the plan.The Israeli Prime Minister called the plan as their victory and fulfillment of their objectives, as they want to decommission Hamas, they will achieve this once the plan is implemented. The tunnels which were in Gaza and which caused Israel unbearable damage, especially in early days of war. (Bronner l., 2025) They are also going to get rid of them by Hamas exclusion and their deradicalization and development of infrastructure by independent actors. The most favorable point for Israel is Trump's statement that “if Hamas does not accept the plan then you [Netanyahu] are allowed to finish the job in Gaza and destroy Hamas completely”. (Griner, 2025) Which I think is a very provocative statement and can cause more bloodshed of innocent civilians. which may end up in complete occupation of the Strip.  Since the day Trump’s plan for Gaza was announced, the Israeli military did not slow down their advancement in the strip, instead they continued with their actions against civilians which reflect their intentions clearly.But for the implementation of the so-called peace plan and to further discuss over its terms both parties take part in negotiations in Egypt. With the mediation of Qatar and Egypt, these negotiations continued for days and then concluded with the statement made by Donald Trump that Israel and Hamas have agreed to his peace plan for Gaza. The Israeli military says that a ceasefire in Palestinian territory took effect on Friday 10th. And that it has begun to withdraw from parts of the Strip as per plan. The first phase of Trump's plan is expected to see the release of all 20 living Israeli hostages in exchange for around 250 Palestinian prisoners and 1,700 detainees from Gaza. Increased amounts of aid will also enter the Strip. (BBC, 2025). On October 13th, Hamas released the 20 living hostages and Israel began to release the Palestinian prisoners. (BBC, 2025) The same day, in Sharm El Shaikh, Egypt, an international peace summit was held, attended by representatives from various nations, - including Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, UK, among others – but notably excluding Hamas and Israel representatives. The summit focused on humanitarian access to Gaza and mechanisms to monitor the proposed ceasefire, aiming to end the two-year war. The outcome was the signing of a joint declaration by Egypt, US, Qatar and Türkiye. Despite these recent developments, the Plan gave the UN only a minimal role, limited to the supply of aid. Although the UN was created to maintain world peace and to resolve conflicts peacefully, when we see the plan, Trump did not assign any role to the peace keeping body, instead he appointed Tony Blair [former British PM, who invaded Iraq in 2003] as head of the Board of peace, which is an international Transitional body whose responsibility is to supervise the apolitical Palestinian committee (responsible for day to day running activities in Gaza). AnalysesThe future of the 20 Points Plan is quite uncertain because it neither has a security guarantee for Palestinian nor any durable provisions about the existence of Palestinian state. The plan calls for an ISF (International stabilization Force) which will be deployed in Gaza immediately for ensuring peace, but the fact is the world does not have a pool of experienced peacekeeping force for this purpose that can handle the situation.  Furthermore, the Israeli PM made it clear that there is no meaningful withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza anytime soon.Moreover, the Plan prohibits Israeli annexation of Gaza, but it does not address the issue of the West Bank. Annexation there is opposed by present and potential Abraham Accord States. But I think soft annexation there would be continued through expansion and establishment of settlement. (weller, 2025)ConclusionWhile the world is admiring Trump’s 20 Points Peace Plan, how can we think of peace anywhere, without an army, and most importantly without recognizing the place as a sovereign State with demarcated borders? Although the Plan has some appealing aspects like immediate ceasefire, entry of aid, development of infrastructure in Gaza and exchange of prisoners, it lacks in terms of security from future Israeli aggression, and it also has no provision about the Palestinian state with borders of before 1967 with East Jerusalem as its Capital. Furthermore, if the plan is implemented Palestinians will be governed by the people of other countries, who will govern them as per the policy devised by the committee, (whose members probably belong to West and other States) not according to the needs and opinion of Palestinians. Which may add more to their misery. So, for a short span of time the Plan may seem like the end of war, but in the long run if more reforms like the recognition of Palestinian statehood and its existence will not be made, then this is just a start of a new occupation. References BBC. (2025, october 9).  BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgqx7ygq41o.ampBBC. (2025, october 14). BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c740jx07vz0oBronner, L. (2025, september 30). Le Monde.  https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/09/30/netanyahu-accepts-trump-s-gaza-peace-plan-under-pressure-but-sets-conditions_6745930_4.html?utmGjevori, E. (2025, sep 29). al jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2025/9/29/heres-the-full-text-of-trumps-20-point-plan-to-end-israels-war-on-gazaGriner, A. (2025, oct 3). AL Jazeera. from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/3/trump-issues-sunday-deadline-for-hamas-to-accept-gaza-peace-proposal?utm_sourceIrish, J. (2025, october 8). Reuters. from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/europeans-arabs-meet-flesh-out-next-phase-trump-gaza-plan-2025-10-09/?utm_sourceJazeera, A. (2025, feb 21). Al Jazeera. Arab leaders hold a meeting and discuss alternatives to GazaNewspaper, T. T. (2025, october). the times.  https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/nasser-al-qudwa-gaza-hamas-palestine-israel-news-vl7xmgct9?utm_sourceWeller, M. (2025, oct 2). Cathom house. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/10/can-trump-peace-plan-gaza-succeed?utm

Diplomacy
Bimstec summit banner or poster concept. 2025 summit held in Bangkok, from April 2-4. Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal, Bhutan

SAARC is Dead: BIMSTEC the Way Forward?

by Darshit Thakar

The combined population of South Asia is around 2.09 Billion while the world is around 8.24 Billion. When we compare GDP data, South Asia’s GDP is 5.2 Trillion USD, while the entire world is around 115 Trillion USD. South Asia despite having ¼ of the world population contributes only around 4.5% to the world's GDP. If we dig deeper in the data, India contributes to around 86% of South Asia’s GDP; approx 4.5 Trillion USD.Now let's talk about South Asia’s Eastern Neighbours. If we look at the picture in that region, there is a stark contrast. The population of that region is around 701 million, approximately one quarter of South Asia's population but its entire GDP is about 4 Trillion USD. This GDP is spread across all nations. Why this big turn in this region? It was because of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN provided a platform for all these countries to work together.Similar efforts were made by South Asian Countries. In 1985, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation(SAARC) was established. It included member states of South Asia. But this organisation isn't as effective as ASEAN, despite having nearly four times population than ASEAN, the GDP of ASEAN is approximately three-quarters that of SAARC and when we compare global exports; SAARC exports goods and services worth $900 Billion while ASEAN exports $1.9 Trillion.Why was SAARC unable to succeed?The majority of South Asian countries were once part of the British Empire. They obtained their independence from Britain during the late 1940s. But since independence, there has been political instability in almost all countries of South Asia. Besides this there have been conflicts within and among these countries. India & Pakistan, two largest countries of South Asia, fought four wars and many skirmishes since their inception due to the dispute over the region of Kashmir, the dispute has also caused Insurgency in Kashmir. Afghanistan and Pakistan’s entire border is disputed which resulted in minor skirmishes between both nations and Insurgency in the border regions. Nepal has faced political instability, recent incidence of GenZ protest being the best example. Bangladesh has faced dozens of military coups and last year Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power, with elections planned for 2026. Sri Lanka had brutal civil war, after the end of civil war, there was some political stability but due to Government mismanagement there were protest and Rajapaksha was ousted from power in 2022.The problem even continues beyond Conflicts. South Asia suffers from weak physical connectivity, there is poor cross-border rail, road, and energy networks that prevent the flow of goods and people. Tariff and non-tariff barriers remain high, discouraging regional trade. Smaller states also fear Indian dominance, leading to mistrust. And unlike ASEAN, SAARC lacks strong institutional mechanisms to enforce agreements making cooperation more symbolic than concrete. In short, National Politics and Mistrust among nations are the key drivers behind SAARC's inefficiencies. When we compare the workings of ASEAN and SAARC, we find big differences. In ASEAN, there is a system called ASEAN Minus X. It is a decision-making principle used by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to enhance flexibility in regional cooperation, particularly in the field of economic integration. It allows a subset of ASEAN member states to proceed with specific agreements or initiatives, without requiring unanimous participation from all 10 members. The member states can join later on, once they're ready. Unlike ASEAN, SAARC lacks a similar mechanism. Their strict consensus rules often lead to paralysis (e.g., SAARC’s stalled summits due to India-Pakistan tensions). ASEAN Minus X’s flexibility is a key reason for ASEAN’s success.Since the early 1990s, ASEAN members created the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) lowering tariffs across the region. The grouping fostered regional supply chains which has helped in linking production networks between Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia. ASEAN has also promoted tourism and easier labor mobility through visa exemptions. By comparison, SAARC’s South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) which was signed in 2006 has failed to meaningfully boost trade because of weak implementation.BIMSTEC: A Pragmatic Solution?While SAARC remains mired in political deadlock, a promising alternative has emerged known as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Launched in 1997 and revitalized by its 2022 Charter, BIMSTEC unites seven nations—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand—spanning 1.73 billion people and a $5.2 trillion GDP. By excluding Pakistan, it dodges SAARC's veto traps and channeling energy into practical sectors like transport connectivity, Regional Trade, Energy, Counter terrorism and so on. This setup positions BIMSTEC as a bridge to ASEAN, with intra-regional trade at ~7% but poised for growth. Recent 2025 momentum, including summits on sustainable development, signals political will to avoid SAARC's pitfalls—focusing on economic development and regional cooperation.Yet challenges persist. BIMSTEC remains under-resourced having a small secretariat and limited funding compared to ASEAN. Its Free Trade Agreement negotiations which were launched in 2004 are still incomplete. Member states often look to India for leadership but this reliance can also breed mistrust because of India's Size & Strength. Without flexible mechanisms like ASEAN Minus X, BIMSTEC risks repeating SAARC’s rigid consensus traps. ConclusionSouth Asia’s demographic weight holds immense economic potential, yet SAARC’s rigid consensus and political disputes, particularly India-Pakistan tensions have stalled integration limiting intra-trade to 5% against ASEAN’s 25%. BIMSTEC, bypassing these hurdles offers a pragmatic path with initiatives like the Master Plan for Transport Connectivity (2022-2028) and interregional ASEAN ties. To succeed, South Asia could revive SAARC with sub-regional frameworks like BBIN (Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal) or empower BIMSTEC with Minus X-style flexibility for trade and energy grids. Shared challenges like climate change, digital economy could unify efforts, leveraging India’s IT sector ($210B exports) and Bangladesh’s garments ($50B). By 2030, a reformed SAARC or robust BIMSTEC could transform South Asia’s demographic strength into global economic clout, rivaling ASEAN’s success and changing the region’s narrative from potential to power. Sources·         Worldometers - Southern Asia Population (2025) https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/southern-asia-population/·         Worldometers - World Population (2025) https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/·         IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2025) https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile/SAQ; https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD; https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/IND/GBR·         World Bank South Asia Development Update (April 2025)·         ClearTax World GDP Ranking (2025)·         Worldometers - South-Eastern Asia Population (2025) https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/south-eastern-asia-population/·         IMF World Economic Outlook (ASEAN GDP, 2025)·         Wikipedia SAARC (Exports)·         ASEAN Key Figures 2024 (Exports)·         Wikipedia BIMSTEC (Population, GDP) https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIMSTEC·         BIMSTEC Secretariat - 6th Summit 2025·         World Bank Trade in South Asia (SAARC intra-trade)·         ASEAN Stats Bulletin (ASEAN intra-trade, 2024)·         Reuters Nasscom Report (India IT exports, 2025) https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-tech-sector-seen-growing-51-fy25-nasscom-says-2025-02-24/·         Bangla News Garment Statistics (Bangladesh garments, 2025)  https://inews.zoombangla.com/bangladesh-garment-export-statistics-2025-what-the-numbers-say/·         Diversifying Global Supply Chains: Opportunities in Southeast Asia – McKinseyhttps://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/sas/south-asia/exportshttps://oec.world/en/profile/international_organization/aseanhttps://bimstec.org/event/190/bimstec-charter-enters-into-forcehttps://bimstec.org/event/247/thailand-hosts-the-6th-bimstec-summit-in-bangkok-on-04-april-2025-https://www.stimson.org/2024/why-bimstecs-maritime-transport-agreement-is-essential-for-india/ https://www.stimson.org/2024/why-bimstecs-maritime-transport-agreement-is-essential-for-india/