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Türkiye is developing a conceptual framework and tangible initiatives to sustain its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, including bilateral military cooperation, maritime capacity building, the development of interregional trade corridors, and diplomatic outreach. Turbulence in the global geopolitical landscape, which has been growing for about a decade, became widely visible across all levels of global governance at the beginning of 2026. Developments such as the release of the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), the capture and prosecution of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by U.S. officials, arguably the most sensational Davos summit in history, and the Munich Security Conference convening under the title ‘Under Destruction’, have collectively brought the debate on ‘power transition’ (which was previously only theoretical in international relations literature) into the realm of realpolitik. It is within this context of an accelerating multipolar order that the Munich Security Conference Report’s assessment assumes particular analytical significance: analysing the spheres of influence of regional powers in depth, and analysing the need for them to cooperate. As the report asserts, “The US administration generally seems to accept that the new order will be multipolar, recognising that other powers are entitled to their own regional spheres of dominance.” And indeed, Türkiye, as it appears, is poised to emerge as one of the countries that will grow increasingly dominant within its own region. Over the past two decades, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a significant structural transformation, becoming increasingly anchored in a doctrine that might be characterised as ‘proactive geopolitical neutrality’. This approach has given Ankara the strategic flexibility to manoeuvre deftly between competing great and regional powers while projecting its influence far beyond its immediate geographical boundaries. This transformation has extended Türkiye’s strategic reach to Southeast Asia, drawing Ankara into the emerging geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific. Türkiye’s growing presence at the crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and South and Southeast Asia indicates a significant strategic shift towards the Indo-Pacific region. These engagements are deliberate attempts to expand Türkiye’s footprint along the Indo-Pacific maritime corridor, in pursuit of greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable global order. The Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea constitute the western gateway through which Indo-Pacific trade routes connect to European markets. From this perspective, Türkiye occupies a position of considerable strategic value. It does not merely border the Eastern Mediterranean or project military and diplomatic influence into the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa; it effectively functions as a frontier state to the Western Indo-Pacific. This geographic and strategic proximity means that Türkiye is closer to the Indo-Pacific region than many other external actors currently engaged with it. To fulfil this emerging role, Türkiye is developing the conceptual framework and tangible initiatives to sustain its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. These efforts include bilateral military cooperation, maritime capacity building, development of interregional trade corridors and diplomatic outreach, all of which are aimed at bridging the gap between Ankara’s historical legacy and its ambitions as a rising Indo-Pacific actor. These strategic efforts are as follows: • The Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine: This represents more than a maritime boundary claim; it constitutes a conceptual reorientation of Turkish strategic culture toward sea-based strategic autonomy. By asserting sovereign interests across the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and beyond, Ankara has effectively established a theoretical basis for projecting naval presence into waters that sit at the very core of Western Indo-Pacific geopolitics. In this sense, Mavi Vatan should be read not merely as a defensive posture, but as a maritime expression of Türkiye’s broader ambition to operate as a self-sufficient, extra-regional power. • Libya Agreement: The 2019 maritime delimitation agreement between Ankara and Libya’s internationally recognised government was a calculated geopolitical move, one that not only extended Türkiye’s jurisdictional reach across the Eastern Mediterranean but also effectively positioned Ankara as an indispensable player in the region. • Gulf Anchor: The Qatar-Türkiye Combined Joint Force Command represents a decisive foothold, granting Ankara both air and naval reach into the Persian Gulf and establishing Türkiye as a credible balancing force at one of the Indo-Pacific’s most strategically vital chokepoints. • Strategic Engagement in Horn of Africa: Türkiye’s military base in Mogadishu, its largest overseas installation, combined with security agreements, economic partnerships, and naval patrols within Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, has secured Ankara a rare operational foothold near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, placing Türkiye among a select few non-regional powers with genuine access to the Gulf of Aden and the maritime corridor linking the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific. • Connectivity Gambit in Basra: As confidence in the Suez Canal as a reliable trade route between the Indo-Pacific region and Europe continues to deteriorate and become increasingly fragile, Türkiye is positioning itself as the strategic backbone of an alternative corridor, most notably through the ‘New Development Road’ project, which would connect the Persian Gulf to European markets via Iraqi and Turkish territory. By doing so, the New Development Road is, in essence, Ankara’s attempt to convert geographic centrality into economic and political leverage, offering Indo-Pacific partners a credible overland-maritime alternative at precisely the moment when the old route’s reliability is most in question. • Asia Anew: Launched in 2019, the Asia Anew Initiative codifies Türkiye’s decision to engage with the Indo-Pacific region on its own terms: a non-aligned, non-interventionist approach focused on economic, diplomatic, and cultural outreach. In a region increasingly characterised by rivalry between major powers, Ankara is establishing a unique identity as a partner that avoids geopolitical rivalry. Beyond its long-term strategic initiatives, it is increasingly evident that Türkiye has also been capitalising on recent regional developments to consolidate meaningful strategic gains. The Syrian crisis, which has long been one of Ankara’s most costly burdens with direct implications for domestic politics and the economy, has gradually shifted in Türkiye’s favour. Meanwhile, the UAE’s diminishing influence in Yemen has strengthened Saudi Arabia’s and Türkiye’s positions, effectively placing these two powers on a common strategic platform built on converging interests. Significantly, the first outcome of this realignment was the potential for a trilateral security pact among Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. One process accelerated by these developments, as well as development in Somalia, is the potential establishment of a Turkish military base on Sudan’s Suakin Island. If realised, this would give Ankara a connected military presence stretching from Sudan through Qatar to Somalia, spanning some of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. At a time when the international order is moving towards a framework of regional spheres of influence in which regional powers are increasingly being allowed to shape their own regions, Türkiye finds itself with a rare strategic opportunity: to act as the playmaker between the wider Levant, the Gulf, the Horn of Africa and the Western Indo-Pacific. Türkiye’s deepening partnerships with legitimate governments across the region are steadily expanding its operational footprint in the Western Indo-Pacific. In an era of accelerating global instability, Ankara is poised to emerge as an actor that both great powers and regional players will increasingly need to factor into their Indo-Pacific strategic calculus. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Over the last two weeks, the Israeli website +972 reported, “Six ‘game-changing’ recent cabinet decisions may push the occupation past a tipping point toward permanent Israeli rule.” Many think this will spell political disaster by ending all hope for a negotiated two-state solution. I suggest a different, and perhaps overly optimistic perspective. Maybe – just maybe – these new moves could spark a long-term process ending in a more democratic, egalitarian, and peaceful Israeli-Palestinian space. The current government of Benjamin Netanyahu has been heavily influenced by its ultra-nationalist cabinet members, including Finance Minister Bezalal Smotrich, who leads the political party “Religious Zionism,” and whose responsibilities include administering the Palestinian West Bank (known to his supporters as “Judea and Samaria”). Another key right-wing government figure is National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, head of the Israeli party, “Jewish Power,” who was handed control over the powerful national police. Under the influence of these and other right-wing coalition partners, the Netanyahu government – which won Israel’s national elections in late 2022 – wrote policy guidelines that committed itself to efforts aimed at ensuring the Jewish people’s full and exclusive rights over what they called the entire “Land of Israel.” These guidelines were interpreted by many as commitments to strengthening Israel’s legal and administrative hold over the West Bank in preparation for eventual annexation. In the last week or so, the government has passed new rules enhancing Israel’s ability to take over more West Bank land and tighten its administrative and legal grip over the area. These include: • Declassifying West Bank land ownership records, which would allow settler groups to place pressure on individual Palestinian owners to sell or abandon their property. • Striking down a Jordanian law, long applied to the West Bank, barring private land sales to foreigners, including Israelis. • Mandating a new land registration process, which might allow the government to register more West Bank property as “state land,” which could then be turned over to settlers, and opening the door to fraud during the registration process itself. • Eliminating the need for a special permit to register land sales, again expanding opportunities for skulduggery. • Expanding the Israeli military’s law enforcement role in the West Bank’s “A” and “B” zones, which are supposed to be under the control of the Palestinian Authority, to varying degrees. • Transferring control over some West Bank areas from Israeli military commanders to civilian agencies, normalizing their incorporation into the Israeli state. Until now, the West Bank has been legally defined as an object of “military rule,” although Israel’s civilian ministries have long crept into specific areas of jurisdiction. Taken together, according Ziv Stahl, director of the Israeli human rights organization, Yesh Din, these actions are accelerating processes of de facto West Bank annexation:l by Israel. “Legally speaking,” Stahl told +972, “I don’t know if we can still call it occupation. I think we have been shifting to a reality of annexation. It’s hard to determine where exactly the pivotal moment was, but the physical situation on the ground in the West Bank has completely changed in these three years of this government.” Many regard annexation as an absolutely disastrous political development that will permanently end all hope of a two-state solution. It is this solution, in turn, that is the desired outcome of most European states, the Palestinian Authority, most Arab countries, most UN members, and the US government. Under President Trump, of course, support for the two-state option has grown muddier; he hasn’t endorsed annexation, but hasn’t made any effort to promote the two-state idea either. Among some of Israel’s more moderate political parties – as well as left-of-center Jewish advocacy groups such as J Street or Peace Now – the idea of two separate, sovereign states is also sacrosanct. One would be for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, and another would be for Israeli Jews living in roughly 70% of Mandatory Palestine. For most international diplomats and many advocacy groups, the two-state option has long been regarded as the best possibility for long-term political stability, justice, and human rights for all. I’d like to offer a different perspective. If Israel were to annex the entire West Bank, the demographics of Israel’s official polity (as opposed to its hybrid ‘internationally recognized state plus militarily occupied Palestinian zones’) would include an additional three million Palestinians. This number includes some 2.8 million Palestinians living in the West Bank’s A and B zones (Palestinian Authority-controlled, in theory), and another 250,000 living in the West Bank’s C zones (controlled by the Israeli military). To these, add another roughly 1.6 million current Palestinian citizens of Israel, living chiefly in the country’s north, along with some 350,000 Palestinians who are permanent residents of Israel, living in East Jerusalem. This combined total of roughly 5 million Palestinians would represent just over 40% of the entire population under direct Israeli sovereignty, using today’s figures. It would not include the roughly 2.2 million Gazan Palestinians now living in utterly dire conditions. (I do not include them here because the Israeli cabinet’s new regulations do not refer to Gaza). Although only 1.6 million of these five million Palestinians currently have Israeli citizenship and the right to vote today in Israeli elections, there might be pressure, over time, to add more Palestinians living in sovereign Israeli territory to the voter rolls. Over the next few decades, newly enfranchised Palestinians could exert increasing influence on Israel’s legislature and governments. With a bit of luck, this pressure might eventually lead to a softening of Israel’s commitment to Jewish political, legal, and cultural supremacy, gradually leading to a more pluralistic and democratic space. Importantly, this could give desperate Palestinians a viable, non-violent alternative for shaping their political fate, relegating the Palestinian Authority’s moribund diplomatic efforts and the violence of Hamas and others to the back of the line. Several authors have discussed the possibility of a “one-state solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including a 2010 volume by American academic Virginia Tilley, and the more recent book by Sarah Leah Whitson and Michael Omer-Man. These analysts have identified a fifth option that is distinct from the four possibilities currently on the table for Israelis and Palestinians. These five options include: • The Israeli radical right’s current plan for Jewish annexation and eternal Palestinian subordination. • The two-state solution promoted by the international community and other mainstream actors ever since the Oslo Peace Accords. • A new set of proposals for a political consociation of “two sovereign peoples living in a single land,” promoted, among others, by the Palestinian-Israeli NGO, A Land for All; • The violent status quo, in which the Palestinian Authority continues to crumble, Palestinian militant groups occasionally strike Israelis, and Jewish settlers, backed by the Israeli army, wield violence against Palestinians. • The “one-state solution,” which involves the creation of a single, unified state from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea, in which all residents are lawful citizens, have the right to vote, are equal before the law, and share in the country’s internal and external defense. If Gaza were to be included in this single state, the new entity’s population would include roughly coequal ethnic populations, although divergent birth rates might, over time, lead to an Arab majority. If Gaza were to be excluded, Palestinians would make up just over 40% of the unified territory’s population, using contemporary numbers. If the Israeli cabinet’s recent annexation-enhancing efforts lead to the eventual annexation of the West Bank’s A, B, and C, this may prepare the ground for an eventual move towards political, cultural, and legal democratization. For West Bank Palestinians to become full-fledged voters would likely take years. It would require repeated cycles of social protest, and might include at least some violence from all sides. Still, the death toll could hardly rival today’s horrific conditions. The radical right is well aware of the one-state possibility. It has spoken of threading that needle by annexing only Area C. Although C includes the vast majority of the West Bank’s landmass, it has only a tiny fraction of the Palestinian population. C is also the zone where most Jewish colonies are currently situated. The radical Jewish right might try to devise a hybrid, “neither fully in, nor fully out” arrangement for Areas A and B, limiting the inclusion of millions of new Palestinians into their newly expanded Greater Israel. Still, the momentum for including all three West Bank areas into Israel’s sovereign territory would persist, both among settlers and Palestinians. A and B zones are small, isolated enclaves, and they will struggle to remain distinct from the C hinterland. The radical right and its associated settler movement, moreover, will continue to cast their eyes over A and B for religious, security, economic, and other reasons. Stripped of the “sea” of Area C, the “islands” of A and B could eventually be incorporated as well. In my optimistic reading, the Israeli radical right’s new turbo-charged efforts to annex more Palestinian land may include a silver lining, offering a more hopeful path forward. In the martial art of ju-jitsu, the weaker party seeks survival by using and redirecting their opponent’s strength. For almost a century, Palestinians have tried to blunt and even reverse the Jewish community’s encroachments by fighting fire with fire: guns, regional alliances, international diplomacy, and UN maneuvering. Those efforts have failed. Israel’s Jewish community is just too strong, too committed, too well-organized, and too capital-intensive. It cannot be overcome with the weapons that Palestinians and their dwindling circle of allies have at their disposal, or by economic boycotts, diplomacy, the International Criminal Court, or UN resolutions. International human rights reporting, after all, did nothing to prevent Gaza’s destruction, Hamas’ horrendous (if briefly successful) October 7 attack yielded nothing good, and the Oslo Peace Accords have, in the end, been spectacularly useless. The UN’s resolutions, moreover, have proved about as useless as everything else. Now, perhaps, the time has come to absorb and gradually metabolize the “blow” of West Bank annexation. Once Palestinians have been incorporated as subjects of the Israeli state, and not as mere objects of military occupation, they can try to transform their opponent’s kinetic energy into something new and more positive for both sides.

US president Donald Trump’s advisor on Arab and African Affairs, Massad Boulos, announced in February 2026 that Washington and three Middle East states – Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (collectively known as the Quad) – were close to finalising a detailed initiative aimed at ending Sudan’s war. The plan resembled the roadmap shared by the Quad in September 2025. According to Boulos, the proposal had received preliminary approval from the two warring parties in the civil war: Sudan’s Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Civil war erupted in the country in mid-April 2023 over disputes surrounding military reform and the future configuration of Sudan’s political system. Since then, more than 14 million Sudanese have been displaced inside and outside the country. Tens of thousands have been killed and more than half of the population – around 21 million people – are facing acute hunger. Meanwhile, the battlefield has produced a de facto territorial split. The army and its allies remain entrenched in eastern, northern and central Sudan, including the capital, Khartoum. The RSF controls much of western Sudan, including all Darfur states. Active fighting is now largely concentrated in Kordofan, which lies between the two zones of control. The region represents 20% of Sudan’s territory, extends over roughly 390,000 square kilometres and has a population of around 8 million. Based on my research on Sudan’s political and conflict dynamics, I argue that the prospects for the Quad-led initiative remain limited in the short term, even if it could, over time, help pave the way for a ceasefire. Continued military escalation, deep mistrust between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary forces, and the army’s refusal to legitimise the RSF undermine prospects for de-escalation. Additionally, regional and international actors have yet to generate sufficient pressure for peace. Competing regional interests and continued external support for the warring parties reduce incentives for compromise. As a result, the most realistic outcome for now is a temporary humanitarian pause rather than a lasting political settlement. The obstacles The latest Quad framework has five main parts: 1. An immediate ceasefire 2. Unhindered humanitarian access 3. Civilian protection 4. The launch of a political process leading to civilian governance 5. A reconstruction pathway supported by a pledged US$1.5 billion. Media leaks suggest the proposal includes coordinated withdrawals by Sudanese warring parties from major cities. Under the proposal, the RSF would pull back from key positions in South Kordofan and around El-Obeid, the closest RSF-controlled area to Khartoum. Army units in the capital would, meanwhile, be replaced by local police as part of efforts to prepare urban centres for civilian governance. A UN-led mechanism would monitor the ceasefire and secure humanitarian corridors. Despite the seriousness of this proposal, developments on the ground indicate that neither side is ready to de-escalate. The biggest obstacles continue to be: 1. The army’s refusal to legitimise the RSF Within hours of the initiative’s announcement, army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan publicly reiterated that he would not accept any political or military role for the RSF. This stance aligns with reports that senior army figures objected to key provisions of the Quad proposal, particularly those allowing the RSF to retain local governance structures in areas under its control to facilitate aid delivery. For the army, recognising such arrangements would amount to legitimising the RSF as a political actor. 2. The army’s broader insistence that it alone should oversee any reform of Sudan’s military institutions This is the very issue that triggered the war in 2023. 3. Escalation on the battlefield Neither side appears to be preparing for withdrawals. On the contrary, recent weeks have seen escalating clashes and the opening of new fronts. For instance, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North, an RSF ally, has launched new attacks against army forces in Blue Nile state. At the same time, the army has succeeded in lifting sieges on key towns in South Kordofan that had been encircled by the RSF for nearly two years. This increasingly complex military map makes agreement on withdrawal zones exceptionally difficult. 4. Deep mistrust between the warring parties This mistrust derailed previous efforts. In May 2023, the US-Saudi mediated Jeddah agreement collapsed after both sides reneged on commitments to withdraw from civilian areas. 5. External actors are not yet incentivising peace Regional and international dynamics remain a major obstacle. This includes some of the Quad’s members, who publicly endorse a ceasefire even as battlefield realities suggest otherwise. These actors have repeatedly denied accusations of providing military support to one side or the other. As long as both Sudanese warring parties retain access to regional backing, there is little incentive to halt the fighting. Continued war allows them to compete over territory and extract resources while sidelining any meaningful civilian political alternative. Chances of breakthrough A breakthrough is possible. But it won’t happen quickly. A meaningful shift would require stronger international pressure. Washington appears to be moving gradually in this direction as part of a broader effort to consolidate western influence in Sudan while curbing rival regional and global actors. This is happening most notably amid concerns over Russia’s reported interest in establishing a naval facility in Port Sudan. A pillar of this approach is drying up the drivers of war, especially arms flows. In December 2025, the US Congress passed legislation expanding American intelligence engagement in Sudan to monitor and expose external actors fueling the conflict. The language of the bill suggests that all suppliers are potential targets. In this context, media leaks about external involvement in Sudan can be seen as a form of political pressure on arms suppliers. This places current providers in a difficult position: either align with Washington’s framework or risk confrontation with it. Regional actors may gradually follow suit if Washington demonstrates sustained resolve. Egypt, in particular, could pivot towards a ceasefire as the conflict edges closer to Blue Nile state near Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam, a core national security concern for Cairo. These dynamics could eventually restrict external military support to both Sudanese parties, narrowing their options and increasing the geopolitical cost of continued war. In this context, maintaining current suppliers of Russian, Chinese and Iranian weapons could provoke countermeasures by Washington and its allies, a costly gamble for both sides. Over time, this may push the army and the RSF towards negotiations, at least to secure a humanitarian ceasefire.

SECRETARY RUBIO: Well, thank you for allowing me to come. As you can imagine, last night we had the State of the Union; it was two hours, the speech, and then we got on a plane and came here. And when I told my colleagues I needed to come here to Saint Kitts and Nevis on a work trip, they were like, “Oh, sure, you’re going on a work trip.” (Laughter.) But in fact it is, with our important partners, allies, and friends from the region, and I want to thank you for giving me this small opportunity to share some time with you and to be a part of this gathering. I don’t know when the last time – you said 10 years ago was the last time all the members were together, or the last time a secretary of state joined you? MODERATOR: They told me 10 years ago. That is what I am told. SECRETARY RUBIO: I was hoping it had been some 30 years since a secretary of state came. (Laughter.) Anyway, I’m happy to be here. This is – in many ways, the Caribbean Basin is home for me, having grown up and lived almost the entirety of my life in Miami, and during my career in the United States Senate followed very carefully the issues that impact this region. And I am very happy to be in an administration that’s giving priority to the Western Hemisphere after largely being ignored for a very long time. There’s extraordinary opportunities. We share two things: We share common opportunities, and we share some common challenges. And that’s what we hope to confront. I want to start out by saying that I’m also happy to be part of an administration that is not constrained by outdated orthodoxy, outdated boilerplate platitudes about partnerships and the like. We are interested in rebuilding and constructing a new dynamic in this Western Hemisphere in which we partner with all of you on the issues we share in common. I won’t go long. I don’t want to go long, but I want to touch upon a few of those because I think they’re important and they impact the broader Americas. The first is the one I’ve shared with many of you individually and will share with you again now: We believe that perhaps the most urgent security threat in the region – that includes us, but obviously all of you – is the threat of these transnational criminal organizations, many of you – many of whom have funding and power that rival if not exceed that of many of the nation-states that they threaten. We recognize that it is an interlocked challenge that comes from a broader perspective. Number one, they’re obviously fueled by narcotrafficking and other illicit means. Oftentimes, those drugs and the proceeds from those drugs – those drugs are destined for the United States, but the proceeds from those drugs, the money they’re ultimately making, is being made in the streets of our country. This is a danger in the countries that they transit, and it’s ultimately a danger to the national security of the United States. We’ve also watched with alarm at the level of armament that these groups have. We recognize that many of these groups are buying weaponry from the United States, and that we are committed and continue to work very hard with our law enforcement agencies to shut that down. I hope you have seen, both in the case of Haiti but in other dynamics, that we have not shied away, not just from designating groups for what they are – these are terroristic organizations – but even individuals who are responsible for being supportive of them. We’ve also gone after them, and this is something that we have as a shared dynamic. We have a long history of working together on responding to these challenges, but I think our cooperation will have to grow even deeper and our commitment to it will have to grow even stronger because these groups grow stronger. I point you only to something not in the Caribbean Basin, but nonetheless indicative of what we’re – the challenges that we’re facing here, and that is the role that these drug cartels have established for themselves in Mexico. I’m not sure if you’ve seen some of the imagery of these groups after their leader was killed, but they’re out there with full military gear, military weaponry, armed transports – very dangerous. And it is something that we need to address collectively and together. The second thing is there are extraordinary opportunities for economic advancement, to work together on issues like energy. Energy is critical for the future; it’s critical for every economy in order to prosper. Many of the countries represented here today have energy resources that I know you seek to explore responsibly, safely, but in a way that generates wealth and prosperity for your people and your countries, and we want to be your partner in that regard. So that’s another area of – that hopefully we can cooperate on very closely together. And I would add to that that part of the dynamics there is some of the regional – some of the regional opportunities that are occurring. Irrespective of how some of you may have individually felt about our operations and our policy towards Venezuela, I will tell you this, and I will tell you this without any apology or without any apprehension: Venezuela is better off today than it was eight weeks ago. The progress being made there is substantial, and there’s a long ways to go. But the new interim authorities, led by Delcy Rodríguez, have done things that eight or nine weeks ago would have been unimaginable. They have released political prisoners; they have closed Helicoide, which is their most infamous prison of all. They are, for the first time in a long time, generating oil revenue that’s going to the benefit of their people, using those funds not just to make payroll for government services but to purchase medical equipment that’s necessary for their system. There’s a long ways to go, and we’re committed to making it work. We have opened – reopened our embassy in Caracas, where we have an excellent chargé who’s on the ground, along with other government officials, and we intend to continue to build on that. Now, we believe strongly – and I think all of you would share this view – that ultimately, in order for them to take the next step to truly develop that country and to truly benefit from that country’s riches for the benefit of their people, they will need the legitimacy of democratic – fair, democratic elections. But our initial priority in the aftermath of Maduro’s capture was to ensure that there wasn’t instability, that there wasn’t mass migration, that there wasn’t spillover violence, and we believe we have achieved that. Now we are in the process from going from that phase of stability to a phase of recovery. That country needs to recover from a lot of things, including deep, internal fractures, but also some dysfunction that existed in their economic systems. I say all this to you because ultimately we do believe that a prosperous, free Venezuela who’s governed by a legitimate government who has the interests of their people in mind could also be an extraordinary partner and asset to many of the countries represented here today in terms of energy needs and the like, and also one less source of instability in the region. So we expect to work very closely with all of you on that topic as well to the extent possible, and I think it’s related to the topic of security that I highlighted. The third point is just the broader stability of the region. We want the region to be seen. And I include the region of the southern United States, which we know is part of the Caribbean Basin. We want it to be a place that is attractive for inbound investment. Many of you have taken on the – and done a tremendous job of seeking to diversify your economies and continue to seek ways to diversify your economies. To the extent that there are opportunities for American businesses or American investors to be a part of that, we want to facilitate that. We want to be a part of making that happen. Here’s the bottom line: the stronger, the safer, the more prosperous, and the more secure that all of your counties are, the stronger, safer, more secure, and prosperous the United States is going to be. We view our security, our prosperity, our stability to be intricately tied to yours and we are going to evidence in the actions we’re prepared to take and in the priority that we want to give this our intent to follow through on it, which is why I’m here today, which is why I wanted to come here today and interact with all of you collectively and a few of you individually in the time that’s permitted to me. So I want to thank you for this opportunity to address you. I hope that my presence here today serves as a real-world demonstration of our commitment to being your partner, to – I don’t even want to call it resetting relations because it’s really not about a reset. I mean, we have longstanding ties to each of you bilaterally and all of you collectively, but reinvigorating our relationships because we have a lot in common to work on, both opportunities and challenges, and the United States is committed to doing that. And certainly over the next three years and I remain in this post, it will be personal priority to me. It will be one that I will be personally engaged in and it’s one that I hope to leave for my successor, whoever that may be, a very strong and stable relationship that they can continue to build upon as well. So I want to thank you for this opportunity to address you and to join you here today in this gathering. (Applause.)

For years, the relationship between Mexico and Cuba was portrayed—when not deliberately minimized—as a low-intensity bond: a propagandistic mirage [1], symbolic, rhetorical, or, at best, consistent with a shared Latin Americanist diplomatic tradition upheld by governments of different political orientations during the authoritarian period and the democratic transition. Even under the governments of Morena, closeness with Havana was interpreted by broad sectors of public opinion [2] as an ideological affinity—celebrated or lamented—but largely harmless, devoid of deep material implications and far removed from the organic alignments Cuba maintained—and continues to maintain—with openly authoritarian regimes such as those of Venezuela and Nicaragua. That reading, however, has begun to crack. Amid recent developments, the debate over Cuban influence in Mexico has acquired unprecedented density. The capture of Nicolás Maduro and the evidence pointing to the active presence of Cuban agents within Venezuela’s intelligence and repression apparatus not only revived discussions about Havana’s role as an exporter of authoritarian know-how, but also forced a rethinking of its regional projection beyond the myth of passive survival. Added to this is the sustained increase in shipments of Mexican oil to the island, ordered by the government of Claudia Sheinbaum, which are increasingly being interpreted as a political subsidy to a failed regime rather than as a humanitarian or diplomatic gesture. It is no coincidence, in this context, that influential voices in Mexico’s public debate—such as Carlos Bravo Regidor [3] or Julio Patán [4]—have begun to point out the risks and contradictions of a foreign policy that, while brandishing a sovereigntist and democratic rhetoric, materially sustains one of the hemisphere’s longest-standing dictatorships. What for years was considered irrelevant, exaggerated, or ideologically biased is now beginning to be perceived as a real problem of political coherence and, more importantly, as an institutional risk. This shift in the public conversation is revealing—but also belated. Long before the oil subsidy placed Cuba at the center of the national debate, various analyses had already warned of a growing and multifaceted Cuban influence in Mexico. Authors such as Armando Chaguaceda and Johanna Cilano, in an article published in Letras Libres, [5] as well as multiple reports by the organization Government and Political Analysis A.C. (GAPAC), [6] had previously argued that the relationship between the self-styled Fourth Transformation and the post-Castro regime could not be reduced to symbolic gestures or historical affinities. On the contrary, they pointed to a dynamic of persistent influence across economic, cultural, and political spheres, anchored in material exchanges, institutional networks, and authoritarian promotion. Yet, as has happened for far too long with the disbelief—born of a mixture of naïveté and ideological affinity—toward the domestic reality and global influence of Castroism, no one was listening. [7] From this perspective, the question is not only why Cuba influences Mexico, but why—until now—that influence had been systematically denied, relativized, or normalized. The current conjuncture did not inaugurate the phenomenon; it merely made it media-visible. And in doing so, it forces a critical reassessment of a relationship that, far from being exceptionally innocuous, appears to fit within a regional pattern of authoritarian symbiosis. The Oil Subsidy and the End of Assumed Irrelevance The increase in shipments of Mexican oil to Cuba has functioned as a turning point in public perceptions of the bilateral relationship. For the first time in years, closeness with Havana ceased to be read exclusively in symbolic terms and began to be evaluated in terms of concrete material costs. In a country with severe energy shortages, a heavily indebted state-owned company, and wide unmet social demands, the decision to allocate strategic resources to sustain a foreign regime in crisis could hardly go unnoticed. The controversy lies not only in the volume of oil sent, but in the political meaning of the gesture. According to reports by the Financial Times, [8] Mexico has already become Cuba’s main supplier of crude oil, effectively displacing Chavismo—and other allies such as Russia and Iran—as the island’s primary energy lifeline. This shift is far from trivial: it entails assuming, consciously or not, a role of external support long played by Venezuela, and doing so in a regional context marked by the collapse of the Bolivarian axis and by growing evidence of Havana’s active role in preserving allied authoritarian regimes. With the added threat [9] of tariffs announced by Trump against countries that “sell or otherwise supply oil to Cuba, protecting the national security and foreign policy of the United States from the malign actions and policies of the Cuban regime,” Claudia Sheinbaum’s position becomes even more problematic, exposing Mexico to potential coercive measures by the U.S. administration should oil shipments to the island continue. This policy openly contradicts the Mexican government’s sovereigntist rhetoric. While foreign interference is denounced and national self-determination is invoked, a support scheme is maintained that props up the economic viability of a single-party dictatorship—while compromising national stability. The principle of non-intervention is selectively invoked and disappears when it comes to assisting an ideologically aligned regime. Oil, in this sense, has stripped the bilateral relationship of its rhetorical veil and placed it squarely in the realm of political responsibility. An Influence That Goes Beyond Oil Reducing Cuban influence in Mexico to the energy sphere would nonetheless be analytically insufficient. As recent research [10] has shown, Havana’s regional projection does not depend exclusively on material resources, but on a combination of political, institutional, and symbolic instruments that operate cumulatively and, in many cases, discreetly. One of the most sensitive areas concerns Cuban medical missions. Presented as a pragmatic solution to healthcare system deficits, these missions have been widely questioned for their implications of forced labor, wage retention, and political surveillance. In the Mexican case, the problem is compounded by the opacity of the agreements signed and by the normalization of practices incompatible with basic democratic and labor standards. Health cooperation is not, in this sense, a neutral technical exchange, but rather a mechanism with clear political implications. Added to this are the party-to-party ties [11] between the Communist Party of Cuba and Morena. These exchanges go beyond protocol gestures and constitute spaces of ideological affinity and mutual learning in matters of political mobilization, discursive hegemony-building, and power management in polarized contexts. That Mexico’s ruling party maintains organic relations with an organization that upholds a single-party regime is far from trivial, particularly in light of the growing disdain among some official sectors for institutional checks and balances. The academic and cultural sphere completes this web of influence, as documented by GAPAC. [12] Exchange programs, seminars, and institutional collaborations have at times served as platforms for legitimizing the Cuban model or relativizing its authoritarian nature. Authoritarian influence is rarely imposed abruptly; it more often filters through narratives and interpretive frameworks that gradually erode democratic consensus. The Venezuelan case offers a cautionary tale: for years, Cuban presence was dismissed as opposition exaggeration, until its role within intelligence and repression apparatuses became incontrovertible. The Collapse of a Narrative The renewed interest in Cuba’s influence in Mexico does not stem from a sudden revelation, but from the collapse of a long-standing narrative: that of irrelevance. The oil subsidy has acted as a catalyst, but the phenomenon is broader and deeper. What has now become visible is a relationship characterized by growing political symbiosis that contradicts both the sovereigntist rhetoric of the current Mexican government and its professed commitment to democracy. One in which the leaderships of a new authoritarianism—born of a successful populist and illiberal project—forge close ties with a veteran antiliberal autocracy, whose advisers, agents, and agitators are more than willing to export—chequebook in hand—their accumulated experience in indoctrination, repression, diplomatic influence, and social control. Recognizing this reality does not imply adopting alarmist positions or mechanically extrapolating foreign experiences. Rather, it requires abandoning comfortable myths and acknowledging that threats to contemporary democracy rarely appear abruptly. More often, they take root gradually and asymmetrically, shielded by discourses of solidarity, sovereignty, or social justice. In this sense, the influence of Cuban authoritarianism in today’s Mexico is not a speculative hypothesis, but an uncomfortable reality that demands public scrutiny and political coherence. To evade it is to repeat mistakes that, in other regional contexts, have already produced consequences that are difficult to reverse. References [1] https://confabulario.eluniversal.com.mx/mexico-y-cuba-el-pasado-incomodo/ [2] https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=71310 [3] https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2026/1/13/subsidio-autocratico-758593.html [4] https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2026/1/14/el-fracaso-cubano-758900.html [5] https://letraslibres.com/revista/el-elefante-en-la-habitacion-cuba-en-el-mexico-de-la-4t/ [6] https://gobiernoyanalisispolitico.org/cuba-en-america-latina-la-influencia-persistente/ [7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ExrLPbu6U4 [8] https://www.ft.com/content/f04088c3-66af-4d7c-b5fd-df0e423bd837 [9] https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-addresses-threats-to-the-united-states-by-the-government-of-cuba/ [10] https://www.amecip.com/publicacion/detalle?id=55 [11] https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2025/05/03/politica/partido-comunista-de-cuba-pcc-firma-acuerdo-con-morena [12] https://gobiernoyanalisispolitico.org/mexico-exporta-a-cuba-no-solo-petroleo-tambien-apoyo-academico/

Donald Trump delivered an ultimatum to Iran at the first board of peace meeting in Washington on February 19. He told Tehran to reach a “meaningful” deal with the US within ten to 15 days, or “really bad things” will happen. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt had earlier said there are many arguments for taking military action in Iran. These comments came as reports indicated that the latest round of indirect talks between the two countries in Switzerland on February 17 had made at least some headway. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, emerged from the negotiations hailing what he saw as “good progress”. He added that the US and Iran had reached an understanding on “guiding principles”. The assessment of US representatives was less positive. Despite acknowledging that “in some ways” the talks went well, US vice-president J.D. Vance said Iran was refusing to acknowledge core US demands. The US wants Iran to dismantle its nuclear programme completely, reduce the number and range of its ballistic missiles and end its support for regional proxy groups. Following the talks, the US has continued to reinforce its military presence in the Middle East. Cargo planes, fighter jets, refuelling tankers and an aircraft carrier have been moved to the region, with a second aircraft carrier expected to arrive soon. According to the New York Times, the buildup of US forces in the Middle East is now sufficient for Trump to order military action at any moment. Iran appears to be gearing up for a confrontation. Its military held joint drills with Russia on February 19, days after the Strait of Hormuz was closed temporarily as Iran carried out live-fire exercises. And while emphasising that it “neither seeks tension nor war”, Iran has told the UN that if it were attacked it would consider “all bases, facilities and assets of the hostile force” in the region as “legitimate targets”. These developments come less than a week after hundreds of thousands of people, largely from the Iranian diaspora, demonstrated in cities worldwide. They did so in solidarity with protesters who took to the streets of Iran in January to demand regime change. In late December, protests that began over worsening economic conditions quickly spread nationwide in one of the most serious threats to Iran’s political establishment since the Woman, Life, Freedom protest movement of 2022. That protest wave began after the death of a 22-year-old women called Mahsa Amini in police custody. This time round, the Iranian authorities imposed a near-total internet shutdown, creating a nationwide communications blackout in an effort to suppress the unrest. Human rights groups say thousands of people were killed, while many more were injured, detained or remain missing, in what was one of the most severe crackdowns in Iran’s modern history. According to local police, around 250,000 people rallied on February 14 in the German city of Munich alone, where world leaders had gathered for Europe’s biggest security conference. Many of those in attendance waved flags bearing the lion and sun emblem of Iran that was used before the Islamic revolution in 1979 ended the Pahlavi dynasty. Israeli and American flags were also visible at many of the rallies. This has widely been seen as a call for foreign intervention against Iran’s clerical leadership. Trump had raised the prospect of US military action during the unrest, urging the Iranian people to continue protesting and telling them that help was “on its way”. Such action now appears likely. Brink of war Iran’s fate is hanging in the balance. The deployment of US military assets to the Middle East suggests Trump may be preparing for imminent military action. However, despite making no secret of his desire to topple the Iranian regime, there is still a chance that Trump settles for a diplomatic agreement with the country’s leadership. Iranian opposition voices, including exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi, say such a deal would only prolong the survival of the Islamic Republic rather than address the demands of people in Iran for regime change. In an interview with American political commentator Glenn Beck on February 11, Pahlavi called the negotiations between the US and Iran “another slap in the face of the Iranian people”. But the prospects that any deal will be reached look slim. The US and Iran remain in fundamental disagreement over Tehran’s nuclear programme and have been unable to reach a deal since the Trump administration withdrew the US from a previous agreement in 2018 that had been negotiated by the Obama administration. Many people, including the US vice-president, are also sceptical that Iran’s authorities will budge on additional US demands around ballistic missiles and proxy groups like Hamas and Hezbollah – whether or not they are threatened with military action. Iran’s future is murky. But one thing is for certain: with war or without war, the Iranian people have started a revolution that has extended beyond their country’s borders.

On January 19, 2026, an unprecedented event in Bulgarian political history in the post-socialist period occurred: President of the Republic of Bulgaria Rumen Radev announced his early resignation. The resignation of the head of state fits into the logic of the country's long-standing crisis, in which European integration serves not so much as a factor in economic modernization but also as a catalyst for political instability and social alienation from traditional institutions. Radev served as president for nine years, from January 2017 to January 2026. During this period, the country underwent dramatic transformations: the collapse of the traditional bipolar party system (GERB-BSP), the formation of new political forces (especially the nationalist Vazrazhdane Party), the fragmentation of the parliamentary majority, and a wave of unprecedented government changes. Between 2021 and 2025, Bulgaria experienced ten government changes, including four technical cabinets appointed by President Radev himself. His resignation marked the eleventh change. This instability not only reflects a systemic crisis but also proves the inability of the country's political system to function and ensure governance. The July 2021 elections brought an end to decades of the two-party system between GERB and BSP. Although they remained major parties, their combined share of parliament fell from a historical 70% to 45%. The emergence of numerous new political actors for the following elections (ITN, PP-DB, Vazrazhdane, Sword, APS, and others) fragmented the political field and made it difficult to form stable coalitions. In the October 2024 elections, fragmentation reached new heights: nine parties won parliamentary representation, with the centrist GERB party winning 26.4% of the vote (66 seats), and the PP-DB coalition only 14.2% (36 seats). Turnout was 39%. Euro integration as a catalyst for political instability Radev's resignation takes on particular significance in the context of the Euro integration. Bulgaria's accession to the European Union in 2007 cemented European integration as a central vector of foreign policy and a key driver of domestic reform. However, this process has been characterized not only by the structural adaptation of institutions but also by growing socio-political polarization. Although more than half of the country's population opposed the introduction of the euro in February of last year, the transition to the single European currency was officially launched on January 1, 2026. In his final speech as president, Radev noted that during his tenure, the country had joined the Schengen Agreement and adopted the euro, but expressed doubt that these initiatives had brought stability and satisfaction. This rhetoric suggests that his resignation was a calculated move aimed at positioning Radev as an alternative center of political power capable of overcoming the crisis. Parallel to political instability, Bulgaria faced an unprecedented wave of mass protests. Beginning in November 2025 over a proposed budget that included tax and social security increases, the protests quickly escalated into a general expression of discontent with corruption and poor governance. According to the MYARA news agency, support for the protests stood at 71.3% of the population, indicating widespread alienation from traditional political institutions. Simultaneously, support for Rosen Zhelyazkov's government fell to 19.2%, while dissatisfaction reached 66%, just 100 days after its inauguration. Trust in the National Assembly was even lower: only 15.2%, compared to 75.1% of citizens who disapproved of its performance. Amid widespread dissatisfaction with political institutions, the only figure left with voter trust was former President Radev himself. According to the MYARA agency, 44.6% approved of his performance in September 2025, while only 37.9% dissatisfied, significantly higher than any other political figure. A paradoxical situation is emerging: a popular president is unable to resolve the crisis of a parliamentary system in which he has only limited powers; his resignation could be interpreted as a refusal to act as an arbiter of the parliamentary game and a transition to the role of an alternative leader capable of proposing a new political project. The strategic nature of Radev's resignation In Bulgaria's parliamentary system, the president has limited powers. His primary functions are essentially limited to appointing technical governments during parliamentary blockades, submitting laws for parliamentary review, and representing the country in international affairs. In practice, his role is to act as an "arbitrator" between the branches of government and various institutions. Real executive power rests in the hands of the prime minister and his government. During his nine years as president, Radev made the most of these limited powers – appointing seven technical governments was a record. His resignation allows the now-former president to move on to a new phase of his political career. There is active media speculation that the outgoing president will create his own political party and run in the upcoming parliamentary elections. If this happens, Radev will be able to assume the post of prime minister – a position that carries considerably more real power. The head of state's transition from institutional arbiter to active party leader has created a fundamentally new reality for all political forces, forcing them to urgently reassess their strategies. The ruling Euro-Atlantic coalition of GERB-SDS and PP-DB has suffered the most significant blow. For them, the emergence of Radev's political project is tantamount to a "black swan," disrupting the familiar bipolar model of confrontation. While the president could previously be used as a convenient lightning rod to excuse one's own failures, accusing him of exceeding his authority and blocking reforms, this tactic has now become meaningless. Radev has become a direct competitor, attacking the government's vulnerabilities in the socio-economic sphere. He is successfully attracting not only protest voters but also disillusioned moderate voters, tired of endless compromises within the government and the lack of tangible results. The conflict with Delyan Peevski's wing of the DPS has also entered a more acute phase. What previously looked like an institutional war between the branches of government has now evolved into a brutal, head-on clash on the electoral field. The former president now has a free hand to directly criticize corruption patterns, posing an existential threat to the "New Beginning" project, depriving its leader of the opportunity to position himself as the sole defender of parliamentarism from "presidential tyranny." Paradoxically, the new alignment poses the greatest electoral risks to forces ideologically aligned with Radev – the Vazrazhdane party and the BSP. The popular leader's emergence as a defender of national sovereignty threatens to "divvy up" their voter base. For the BSP, this could be a fatal blow, as their former candidate could completely absorb the remnants of the left-wing electorate, effectively relegating the party to the margins of history. Vazrazhdane, meanwhile, faces the loss of their monopoly on Eurosceptic rhetoric and the prospect of competing against a political heavyweight whose personal trust ratings significantly exceed those of their own party leaders. National minority parties (DPS, APS) have traditionally been crucial for the formation of majorities in Bulgarian politics, often determining the composition and viability of governing coalitions. Radev's resignation does not change their fundamental strategy – ensuring access to state resources for their communities and political representation of their interests. For them, his resignation could mark the end of a period in which they enjoyed disproportionate influence. If parliamentary elections result in a more stable majority (without the support of the DPS), these parties' influence could decline. However, given the fragmented nature of the Bulgarian parliament, it is unlikely that any coalition will be able to avoid the need for negotiations with national minority parties. Parliamentary elections in spring 2026: hope and risk The parliamentary elections planned for spring 2026 could either resolve the crisis or deepen it. On the one hand, new elections provide an opportunity for the electorate to express its will more clearly and create the basis for a more stable coalition. On the other hand, if voters continue to vote volatilely, as they did in 2021, 2023, and 2025, new elections will simply reproduce a fragmented parliament, and the crisis will continue. Moreover, if Radev creates a new political party and proves successful in the elections, this could lead to further fragmentation of parliament, as his new party will seek the votes of voters who currently support existing parties. During his nine years as president, Radev exhausted all constitutional tools available to him for managing the political crisis. The president's resignation could facilitate long-needed institutional reforms that could strengthen the Bulgarian political system. If new elections result in clearer political majorities, the former president could create a political party that positions itself as a reformist alternative to GERB and PP-DB. Or, if constitutional changes are made to strengthen executive power, this could usher in a new phase in the development of Bulgarian democracy.

Good afternoon everyone, and thank you again for being here. I am very pleased to have hosted Chancellor Merz and his Ministers in Rome today for this intergovernmental summit between Italy and Germany – the second in just over two years, following the one we held in Berlin in November 2023. Among other things, this summit kicks off a particularly significant year for the bilateral relationship between our nations, with 2026 marking the 75th anniversary of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Rome and Berlin. This summit is also clearly being held at a particularly complex moment in time, which is forcing Europe to choose whether it intends to play a leading role in its own destiny, or have its destiny dictated to it. In our view, this phase requires clarity of mind, responsibility, courage and, above all, the intelligence required to transform crises into opportunities. I am personally convinced that, at this turning point in history, Italy and Germany have a special responsibility, by virtue of their history, influence and leadership. We are two great European nations, founders of the European Union and leading players in international dynamics. We are Europe’s two main manufacturing powers, with strongly interconnected production and industrial systems that are complementary in many ways. However, above all, we both share a common vision on some of the most strategic issues, and are in fact pursuing the same underlying goal: to build an authoritative Europe that is aware of its role in the world and is able to be competitive on the global stage, a Europe capable of strengthening its strategic autonomy with pragmatism, concreteness and common sense. Two years ago, in Berlin, we signed an Action Plan whose objective was to take our bilateral cooperation to a higher level and explore new areas for common growth. That is precisely what we have done over these years and months, as can be seen in the many examples of collaboration we have developed. I am thinking of the agreement on the security of gas supplies; the joint venture between Leonardo and Rheinmetall; the agreement for the integration of ITA Airways into the Lufthansa Group; and I could name many others. With today’s summit, we have decided to continue along this path and keep investing with conviction in our strengthened cooperation by setting ourselves even more ambitious goals. I believe I can now say that Italy and Germany are closer than ever, and I think this is good news, not only for our peoples, but also for Europe as a whole. For if two important nations are friends, allies, and solid from both an economic and an industrial point of view – as Italy and Germany are – and they decide to move in the same direction, with each contributing their own added value, then the conditions are in place to achieve excellent and significant results for our businesses, our workers, our citizens, and their families. Today, we have decided to strengthen our cooperation - cooperation in the truest sense of the word. As I have said before on several occasions: the etymology of words gives us back a picture and the underlying meaning of what we say. ‘Cooperation’ comes from the Latin ‘co-operari’, meaning ‘to work with’. Cooperation never involves an active and a passive role, someone who buys and someone who sells, for example. When there is true cooperation, something new is always born, with each party contributing their own added value. That is precisely what we are doing, and what we have done on this important day by adopting three very significant documents, in addition to the agreements you saw signed and exchanged earlier. The first is a cooperation protocol to expand our areas of collaboration, which updates the bilateral Action Plan we signed in 2023. I am thinking of agriculture, our plans to further strengthen our already solid industrial cooperation, cultural dialogue, and cooperation in the management of migration flows. Migration is one of the crucial challenges for our continent, on which there is full alignment with the German Chancellor. We both think the main challenge lies in defending the European Union’s external borders, fighting human trafficking, and working to ensure respect for legality in strengthening the return system, as well as in cooperating with the nations of origin and of transit, which Italy in particular (but not only Italy) is trying to develop through a new model of cooperation with the African continent. Clearly, our goal is to consolidate the change of approach which, thanks also to our governments, has taken hold and is becoming increasingly well established in Europe. Over the last years, this new approach has enabled us to guarantee a significant reduction in the number of irregular entries, illegal departures and landings. Italy also intends to pursue this commitment through innovative solutions, starting with the protocol with Albania we have been promoting. I want to tell Chancellor Merz that I am grateful for his decision to regularly participate in the informal working group of like-minded countries, which meets in the margins of European Council meetings to discuss precisely the issue of migration. The other very important matter on which Chancellor Merz and I agree is the need for a decisive step change in Europe regarding the competitiveness of our companies. It is now evident and clear to anyone with intellectual honesty that a certain ideological view of the green transition has ended up bringing our industries to their knees, giving Europe new and dangerous strategic dependencies, and without even managing to have a real impact in terms of protecting the environment and nature globally. We are convinced there is room to correct these mistakes and avoid our continent’s industrial decline, but, of course, courage is required. We want to accelerate on these issues, which is why we will be presenting our joint non-paper at the next informal meeting in Brussels on 12 February, where discussions will begin regarding the next European Council meeting in March - of particular importance precisely for matters regarding competitiveness. This joint non-paper is focused on a number of priorities which, in our view, cannot be postponed: simplifying and cutting EU red tape; strengthening the single market; relaunching the automotive industry based on technological neutrality; ensuring an ambitious trade policy based on shared rules and a level playing field. This is the second document we signed today, and it is a document which I consider to be very significant and which we intend to share with the European Commission and the President of the European Council as well as with all the other leaders who will be participating in these discussions. The third document we signed this morning on defence, security and resilience is equally as important. These are sectors in which Italy and Germany can count on industrial players of absolute excellence, which generate incredibly high added value. We want to strengthen our cooperation in this area, and we believe our production systems can make a significant contribution to building a solid European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance, which for many years we have been calling for without ever really making any progress, and to act accordingly. To this end, I have informed Chancellor Merz of Italy’s decision to join the multilateral agreement on arms exports, which is already in place between Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. This is the reason why we held an important 2+2 meeting this morning between our Foreign and Defence Ministers, in order to coordinate our positions and also work even more closely together on the main international issues, starting with Ukraine and the Middle East. We have always been strongly aligned on both of these fronts too, and we will continue to do our part to achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and to build a stable framework for security and prosperity in the Middle East. This morning, we also discussed how to enhance our cooperation in many other areas. I am thinking of energy interconnections and economic and infrastructure interconnections, which are increasingly crucial in this era. We are working together to support strategic initiatives that are in line with this goal, for example: the SoutH2 Corridor; Medlink; Elmed; and the IMEC, which is the corridor that will connect India, the Middle East and Europe, and in relation to which Italy and Germany are playing a key role in Europe. The work we have done, and have still yet to do, is very extensive. Today, Italy and Germany are not only confirming their partnership but are also deciding to strengthen it at all levels, by working side by side on challenges that are crucial for our time. I’ve read a number of comments over the last few hours, with some observers saying that 2026 will be “the year of Italy and Germany”. I can’t say whether this prediction corresponds to reality, but what I can say is that we intend to give it our all; we absolutely intend to do our part in order to consolidate a friendship that is strategic not only for our nations, but for Europe as a whole. Thank you again.

Will the US-Iran ‘peace talks succeed or fail? Given the mix of personalities and national interests involved, we just don’t know. Success would likely be a short-term, mutually face-saving compromise, leaving many major bilateral and regional issues still to be resolved. Failure is likely to lead to a US-initiated war with chaotic outcomes and perhaps no real winners. What does President Donald Trump want? In the short term, he wants a “peace deal” comprising multiple components. While not all details are public, the first and foremost goal is nuclear. Iran must not have the capability to make a nuclear weapon. While some reports suggest the US demands that Iran close down its whole nuclear program, most reporting claims US demands are limited to Iran ceasing the production of and giving up all enriched uranium beyond that needed for its domestic nuclear energy needs. US demands also include Iranian agreement to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections to verify they comply with this commitment. Other demands include limiting the range of all ballistic missiles to some 500 km (compared to some 2000 km at present), the cessation of all hostilities toward both regional countries, and support for other nations or proxies engaged in such hostilities. These terms would put all of Israel out of range and discourage further attacks from Iran on Israel, despite the term “hostilities” being left vague. It is difficult to see Iran agreeing to the former. A deal on the latter might be possible. One formula could be through recognizing Israel’s right to exit (as does the Palestine Authority - PA) and ceasing hostilities and support to proxies in the context of progress towards a two-state solution. Trump’s aim is ‘maximum pressure’, precipitating ‘regime change’— that is, the end of Iran’s conservative mullah-led autocracy and its military guardians, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This is a longer-term goal, but one he would pursue opportunistically in the short term if circumstances permit, such as in the event of an outbreak of war. Denials and Tricky Negotiations Iran has always denied its intention to develop nuclear weapons; most recently, this week, by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi. The international community generally believes Iran knows how to make a nuclear weapon and would do so if it could; however, Iran won’t because it could not hide the process, and external intervention in response could be horrendous. Therefore, Iran is willing to negotiate the nuclear issue. It did so before, as part of negotiations between Iran and the US, resulting in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 during the presidency of Barack Obama. The difference between Obama and Trump is that Obama understood the subtleties of negotiating with Iran, i.e. build trust through the JCPOA before moving on to missiles and issues of regional hostilities. Trump 1.0 trashed the JCPOA in 2018, remarking it was “the worst deal in history.” Although Iran continued to comply with its conditions for a further 12 months. President Joe Biden dropped the ball on this issue, and Trump 2.0, upon re-election, continued where he left off in 2021. The Iranians are certainly not easy to negotiate with. Relevant “subtilties” include being a proud, fiercely independent, well-educated people who seek to own/control their own resources (e.g., oil) and, to the extent possible, be self-sufficient. They do not like being bullied, and trust is a key part of relationships. They claim Trump has consistently bullied them with his threats and actions, and all trust has long gone, dating back to Trump 1.0. Iranian officials have argued privately that the policies and actions of both Trump 1.0 and Biden, including the heavy economic sanctions, forced Iran into the “axis of evil” for basic survival reasons. They claim they want their independence, and have no particular affinity for the Russians, Chinese and North Koreans. One conclusion from that any negotiations with the US will occur in an atmosphere of tension and distrust. So, who does Iran trust? Violence on the Streets of Tehran: Regime Change and Civil Unrest On the issue of regime change, US (and Israeli) exploitation of last month’s widespread demonstrations throughout Iran was both an opportunity and a challenge. But the regime survived. There are four basic criteria for the successful change of any regime: leadership, the reason for change, the will of the majority of the people, and the support of a significant element of the armed forces and security forces to facilitate and sustain change Discontent with the Iranian government has been evident among different groups in the country for some time. Mostly, this has been political, but this time the driver was economic, driven principally by the hard squeeze of external sanctions, coupled with mismanagement and corruption. The outreach of hardship and dissent was much broader than before. And despite targeted input from outside Iran, the regime did not topple. Demonstrators were strongly suppressed by the government, and Trump’s threat to help demonstrators did not eventuate. Would his military intervention have been the tipping point? We can only guess. But here was no apparent split within the armed or security forces – given their deep involvement in the economy, there were strong self-interest motives not to – and no leadership figure, civilian or military, emerged. Attempts to promote Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s son, who was deposed in 1979, as a rallying figure, if only temporarily, failed. I doubt he has much appeal in-country due to the heavy suppression and corruption of his father. But the message was loud: there is disaffection, political and especially economic, which could ignite if the fuse is right. What to Expect Will Trump be tempted to use military force to try to facilitate regime change if he doesn’t get his way at the next round of nuclear negotiations, now due to be held in Oman late this week? He has the fleet in place, and comprehensive planning will be well underway, building on lessons learned from the Israeli-US 12-day war last June and recently in Venezuela. The planning focuses on key kinetic and non-kinetic targets, especially those requiring a preemptive strike. Israel will be part of this, with its own targets, which presumably will include key leadership, military and other persons. Iran will have done its planning also around its own lessons learned. Iranian early warning of an attack, even if measured in only minutes, will be critical in determining how quickly events unfold within and outside Iran, and how devastating they are. However, if this does force regime change, who will take over? Without the mullahs and lacking any civilian opposition infrastructure, the military (minus the IRGC?) would have to be the backbone of any new government. Civilian leadership is an unknown, though talented politicians and technocrats exist. Iran could become very fragmented and unstable as it sorts itself out. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

In Latin America, corruption is not an anomaly of the democratic system, but rather a structural cog that weakens it, fuels populism, and perpetuates inequality. Corruption is a constant in most Latin American countries. Regardless of ideology and party alternation, corruption has remained persistent across much of the region and, in many cases, has even increased. Between 2014 and 2024, only five countries in the region—Uruguay, Costa Rica, Colombia, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic—registered an improvement in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In Paraguay the index shows no variation, while in the remaining 14 countries the perception of corruption increased. Large-scale abuse of power by senior government officials, the public bureaucracy, and major private corporations contributes to undermining citizens’ trust in their representatives and in democratic institutions as a whole. How corruption is expressed Corruption in Latin America takes multiple forms and manifests itself at different levels of political, economic, and social life. In its most visible and highest-impact expression are large corruption schemes involving top state authorities and major private companies. Cases such as that of the construction firm Odebrecht, whose illicit practices spread to several countries in the region and came to light between 2014 and 2016, revealed the existence of transnational networks of bribery and illegal political financing. Similarly, scandals such as the “Mensalão” and Operation “Lava Jato” in Brazil exposed the depth of these schemes and their ability to cut across governments and political parties, seriously compromising the credibility of democratic institutions. One of the most sensitive areas in which this dynamic is expressed is the financing of electoral campaigns. The lack of clear regulations, transparency, and effective oversight has turned political financing into a privileged gateway for corruption. As a result, electoral processes tend to produce governments constrained by private interests that, once in power, seek to recoup their investment through legislative favors, budgetary allocations, or regulatory decisions, thereby weakening democratic representation. However, corruption is not limited to these major scandals. It also manifests itself in everyday practices that directly affect the relationship between citizens and the state. The payment of bribes to access public services, expedite procedures, or exercise rights that should be universally guaranteed contributes to normalizing illegality and steadily erodes trust in public institutions. At the same time, corruption in Latin America transcends the state sphere and extends into the private sector. Tax evasion, consumer fraud, and other fraudulent practices are frequent and generate serious social costs. In addition, the advance of drug trafficking has deepened these dynamics, promoting corruption at different levels of the state and society and reinforcing a vicious circle that undermines legality and institutional legitimacy. Delegitimization of democracy Although corruption is not exclusive to the political sphere, when it involves politicians, members of governments, or public officials, its impact on the loss of legitimacy of democratic institutions among the population is greater. The persistence of high levels of corruption in the state is an indicator of significant failures in control mechanisms among state institutions—that is, in so-called inter-institutional accountability, a fundamental dimension for the proper functioning of liberal representative democracy. Without oversight bodies and institutions with effective capacity to investigate and punish corruption, the quality of democracy is seriously affected. The fragility or inefficiency of oversight institutions and bodies is also reflected in insufficient sanctions, delays in institutional timelines for applying the corresponding penalties, and, in many cases, their complete absence. This undoubtedly contributes to a sense of impunity and serves as an incentive for the repetition of corrupt practices. The persistence of corruption, and the difficulties in imposing exemplary and effective punishment on those responsible, has influenced the loss of citizens’ trust in traditional political parties and leaderships, and even in the democratic system itself, boosting electoral support for populist parties and leaders. At the beginning of the century these had a left-wing profile (the so-called twenty-first-century socialism), but today they assume a clear far-right profile. These are movements and leaders critical not only of traditional political elites but also, to varying degrees, of traditional democratic institutions—especially institutions of political oversight and accountability, such as the judiciary, prosecutors’ offices, and audit bodies, among others. These populist parties and leaders come to power, in most cases, with promises to put an end to the corruption inherited from “traditional politics.” Nevertheless, once in government they tend to dismantle or co-opt oversight bodies and institutions. Examples of this were the governments of Morales in Bolivia, or the government of former president Bolsonaro in Brazil. The latter dismantled the existing network of anti-corruption bodies because, according to him, there was no corruption in his government. With the co-optation or limitation of oversight institutions and bodies, populist governments face fewer obstacles to engaging in corrupt practices. And in the context of an eroded democratic regime, institutions find it more difficult to punish those responsible. The correlation between corruption and inequality Societies marked by social and economic inequality are more vulnerable to corruption, and at the same time corruption increases those very inequalities. It is no coincidence that Latin America is considered the most unequal region in the world: according to Oxfam’s report for Latin America and the Caribbean Wealth Unchecked, Democracy at Risk. Why Latin America and the Caribbean Need a New Fiscal Pact, the top 1% of the population concentrates around 45% of regional wealth, in a context of persistently high levels of corruption. Corruption deepens inequality because it gives the corrupt greater capacity to influence government decisions and changes in legislation for their own benefit. This leads to democracies captured by particular interests and with less efficient outcomes for the population as a whole, which in turn contributes to weakening trust in democracy as a system capable of meeting, at least in basic terms, citizens’ needs and expectations. The other side of this phenomenon is the case of Uruguay. The Latin American country with the lowest perception of corruption, according to Transparency International, is also the one with the lowest level of inequality in the region and the only full democracy in Latin America, according to The Economist index. It is also, together with Argentina, one of the two countries with the highest support for democracy in the region: 70% of Uruguayans express support for democracy, compared with a regional average of 52%, according to Latinobarómetro. The corollary seems clear, though undoubtedly difficult to implement: reducing corruption requires strengthening oversight institutions and bodies, accompanied by a reduction in social inequality.