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Introduction An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or unmanned aircraft system (UAS), commonly known as drone, is an aircraft without a human pilot, crew or passenger on board, but rather controlled remotely or autonomously. Drones can be seen as cutting-edge technologies with tremendous ramifications across various fields, including military, security, economics, and logistics – ranging from lightweight consumer drones to advanced autonomous combat platforms – that have transformed global security economics and technological developments. Their proliferation marks a shift in the conduct of warfare, industrial processes, and urban infrastructure design. In this context, this article aims to analyze these dynamics across three domains: geopolitical and security implications, economics and industrial processes, and future technological transformation. I. Geopolitical and Security Perspective: "Game Changers" The Dawn of the Unmanned Warfare Era The past decade — and especially during the conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Caucasus —has showcased an irreversible shift toward unmanned warfare. Low-cost drones have enabled nations and non-state actors to conduct reconnaissance, precision strikes, and electronic warfare at a fraction of traditional military costs. The democratization of drone warfare erodes conventional military hierarchies by giving smaller nations and even non-state groups asymmetric capabilities (Kania, 2020), (Vision of Humanity, 2024). Figure 1: Use of drones by type. A major consequence of this shift is the emergence of continuous aerial presence, which fundamentally alters operational rhythm and tempo. Previously, only major powers could afford persistent surveillance through manned aircraft or satellites. Today, even insurgent groups can deploy swarms of commercial drones to maintain near-constant observation of enemy movements. This constant presence of drones on the battlefield forces militaries to make decisions much faster and operate as if they are always being watched. As drone technology becomes cheaper and more widely available, it also becomes easier for states or groups to launch low-risk, hard-to-trace attacks without putting their own people in danger. This reduces the barrier to starting or escalating conflicts and makes the overall situation far more unpredictable. On the other hand, despite automation, drone warfare remains heavily dependent on human adaptation, moreover, in practice, drones’ use is constrained by weather, terrain, and limited night capability (Newton, 2025). Nonetheless, and as seen in the Ukraine War, the adaptation, development and improvement of the designs and systems have skyrocketed and shortened from months to weeks. A Paradigm Shift in Modern Warfare Traditional doctrines built around armored vehicles, manned aircraft, and centralized command structures are giving way to distributed, networked, and automated operations. Drones allow for constant ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), rapid kill chains, and battlefield transparency that reduces the effectiveness of concealment and mass maneuver (Biddle & Oelrich, 2016). Swarm technology further accelerates this shift by overwhelming air defenses through algorithmic coordination. On a broader strategic level, unmanned systems are transforming operational art, forcing militaries to rethink how they structure campaigns. Instead of relying on a small number of high-value manned platforms, modern forces must integrate thousands of expendable, semi-autonomous assets into a coherent command-and-control ecosystem. This shift elevates the importance of data fusion, algorithms, and electronic warfare, as success increasingly depends on which side can process information more effectively rather than which side has heavier armor or more firepower. Furthermore, the psychological effects of drone warfare — constant monitoring, unpredictable strikes, and the invisibility of operators — alter the morale and behavior of both soldiers and civilians. In this sense, unmanned warfare not only changes tactics but reshapes the human dimension of conflict. Evolution of Defense Strategies States now are prioritizing anti-drone systems (C-UAS), electronic warfare, and resilient supply chains. Defense strategies emphasize dispersion, decoys, deception, and multi-layered air defense, recognizing that the cost ratio favors attackers using cheap drones against expensive assets. Militaries increasingly incorporate AI-enabled targeting, autonomous perimeter defense, and drone-versus-drone combat (Mehta, 2022). The rapid evolution of offensive drone capabilities has forced governments to pursue a new generation of integrated counter-unmanned systems, blending kinetic interceptors, directed-energy weapons, radio-frequency jamming, and cyber tools. However, the challenge is not merely technological — it is organizational. Modern militaries must revise procurement cycles, adopt flexible doctrine, and restructure units to counter the fast-changing drone threat. For example, some nations are creating dedicated “drone defense battalions” or embedding electronic warfare teams at lower echelons of command. Once more the Ukraine War is a good example: Ukraine’s early-warning systems (so called, “drone walls”) use layered reconnaissance UAVs to identify threats and enhance battlefield visibility, unfortunately, these are highly vulnerable to electronic warfare and radar destruction. More examples include the fiber-optic FPV drones as countermeasure of jamming, or decoy drones to lure air defenses and absorb munitions. (Newton, 2025) The rise of drone warfare also places huge demand on secure communications and resilient digital infrastructure; adversaries increasingly target supply chains, software vulnerabilities, and satellite links that control unmanned systems. Thus, the evolution of defense strategies represents a multi-domain effort that spans hardware, software, organizational culture, and national-level industrial capacity. Major Countries' Competition in Drone Weapon Development The United States, China, Israel, Turkey, and Iran dominate the global drone arms race, while Russia and Ukraine deserve a special mention too. • USA: it focuses on high-tech autonomous systems, for example the MQ-25, Collaborative Combat Aircraft. In addition, according to the Federal Aviation Administration they have an estimated 822,039 drones registered as of July 2025. (FAA, 2025)• China: leads in export volume, offering cost-competitive platforms like the Wing Loong series (Fischer, 2020).• Turkey: gained strategic influence through the Bayraktar TB2, proven in multiple regional conflicts like the Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 or its use for strategic communications for Ukraine during the ongoing conflict. (Péria-Peigné, 2023)• Israel: its research, development and production of innovative drone technology and exports roughly $500 million worth of UAV-related products per year, have positioned Israel as a world leader in the area. Israel is well known for its indigenous and competitive manufacturing UAVs like the Hermes 450, the Searcher Mk II and the Heron. (Sadot, s.f.)• Iran: their Shahed-136 drone is a low-cost drone that has gained attention internationally as it has shown affordability, precision, long-range, and cheapness during the Ukraine War – deployed by Russia. (Kesteloo, 2025)• Ukraine: has emerged as a leader in tactical warfare, including mass quantities of low-cost First-Person View (FPV) drones for frontline and deep-strike operations. But also, it has implemented “Spider’s Web” operations, which strike deep inside Russia, while using low-cost assets but with strategic and punctual strikes. Ukraine has also expanded into the maritime domain with unmanned surface vessels (USVs) using them with a kamikaze-style operation targeting ships and critical offshore infrastructure in the Black Sea. (Newton, 2025)• Russia: the war has institutionalized an UAV doctrine with mass deployment of FPV drones (Newton, 2025) and the creation – similar to Ukraine – of an Unmanned System Force (USF) aiming to encompass aerial, land and surface drones. (Altman, 2025) II. Economic & Industrial Perspective: “Flying Industrial Revolution” Future Logistics and Delivery Systems Beyond the battlefield, drones are reshaping global economies and enabling new industrial ecosystems. For instance, drones are rapidly transforming last-mile delivery by reducing transportation time, bypassing road congestion, and enabling access to remote or disaster-affected areas. Companies like Amazon, Wing, and Zipline have already demonstrated how unmanned aircraft can deliver medical supplies, parcels, and consumer goods more efficiently than traditional vehicles. As autonomous navigation, battery technology, and payload capacity continue to improve, drones are expected to become critical components of global supply chains, especially in regions where infrastructure is limited or demand for ultra-fast delivery is increasing. Global drone delivery is expected to reach multi-billion-dollar scale by 2030 (PwC, 2023). In the longer term, logistics networks are expected to evolve into hybrid ground–air systems, where drones work alongside autonomous ground vehicles and smart warehouses. These systems could drastically reduce operational costs by automating pickup, sorting, and delivery processes. Integrating drones with AI-driven inventory management and predictive delivery algorithms will allow companies to anticipate demand and route products dynamically. As eVTOL cargo aircraft mature, the concept of “airborne logistics hubs” may also emerge, enabling rapid long-distance transport between distribution centers without the need for airports. Together, these developments point toward a future where aerial logistics are not just an add-on, but a central pillar of modern supply chains. Improving Industrial Efficiency Across agriculture, energy, construction, and mining drones significantly improve efficiency by automating tasks that previously required expensive equipment or manual labor. By replacing manned inspection systems, drones can reduce labor costs, increase safety, and provide data of unprecedented detail (McKinsey, 2022). For example, farmers use drones for precision spraying and crop monitoring, reducing fertilizer and water usage. Energy companies deploy unmanned systems for pipeline inspections and powerline surveys, minimizing downtime and enhancing worker safety. Construction and mining firms rely on drones for site mapping, progress tracking, and 3D modeling, improving project accuracy while lowering operational costs. Beyond task automation, drones are becoming essential to data-driven industrial optimization. Equipped with thermal sensors, LiDAR, and multispectral cameras, unmanned systems can capture high-resolution data that feeds directly into AI analytics platforms. This allows companies to detect inefficiencies, predict equipment failure, and optimize resource allocation in real time. As industries move toward digital twins — virtual models of physical assets — drones will play a key role in continuously updating these systems with accurate spatial and environmental data. The result is a more responsive, efficient, and resilient industrial ecosystem that leverages aerial automation for competitive advantage. Regulatory Environment and Market Growth Regulation remains the single most influential factor shaping the global drone market. Governments are gradually introducing frameworks to enable Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations, Remote ID tracking, and certification standards for commercial drones. Regions like the European Union have adopted unified risk-based rules through EASA, while the United States continues to refine its Part 107 and UTM integration policies through the FAA. These regulatory milestones are essential for scaling commercial drone usage, as they provide clarity to manufacturers, operators, and investors. As regulatory frameworks mature, they are also becoming a competitive advantage for regions that adopt them early. Countries that implement drone-friendly ecosystems — such as Singapore, the UAE, and Rwanda — are rapidly emerging as hubs for drone research, testing, and deployment. This regulatory momentum encourages multinational companies to establish operations in these markets, accelerating local innovation and talent development. Furthermore, harmonized international standards will make it easier for drone manufacturers to reduce production complexity and expand globally. Ultimately, the pace of market growth will depend not just on technological advancement but on how effectively governments balance innovation with safety, privacy, and public acceptance. Investment Trends Investment in drone-related technologies has surged, driven by the convergence of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. Venture capital firms increasingly fund companies developing autonomous navigation systems, UTM software, battery technology, and specialized industrial drones. Defense investors continue to expand their portfolios into dual-use drone companies, reflecting growing geopolitical interest and national security incentives. Meanwhile, major tech firms and automotive companies are exploring opportunities in cargo drones, eVTOL aircraft, and autonomous mobility ecosystems. Beyond private investment, government funding and public–private partnerships are accelerating drone adoption globally. Many nations are launching test corridors, innovation hubs, and subsidies to attract drone startups and support local manufacturing. This trend is particularly strong in Asia and the Middle East, where governments see drones as strategic tools for digital transformation and economic diversification. As markets mature, investment is shifting from hardware-heavy startups toward software, analytics, and integrated airspace management solutions — reflecting a broader transition from drone manufacturing to drone ecosystems. This shift signals a long-term, sustainable evolution of the drone industry from early experimental phases to full-scale commercial and civil integration. III. Future Technologies The Need for Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) As drones and future eVTOL air taxis multiply, low-altitude airspace will become increasingly crowded. To prevent collisions and maintain order, UTM frameworks — already being developed by NASA, the FAA, EASA, and ICAO — aim to coordinate autonomous flights using real-time tracking, automated route planning, and digital air corridors (Kopardekar, 2016). These systems will act as the “air-traffic control of the future,” but designed for far larger numbers of smaller, faster-moving vehicles. In addition, as demand grows, it is likely that UTM will evolve into a fully automated, AI-driven airspace ecosystem capable of managing thousands of simultaneous flights with minimal human oversight. Future systems could incorporate weather prediction, dynamic rerouting, and AI-powered detect-and-avoid features, which more than a technical upgrade, would transform the air mobility in the cities worldwide. Global Standardization Competition The need for standard UTM, drone certifications, communication systems, and detect-and-avoid technology is critical, but it also represents a geopolitical contest. The U.S., the European Union, and China are each developing distinct technological ecosystems, hoping their standards will dominate global markets. Whichever region’s standards become the international norm will shape supply chains, aircraft design, and regulatory practices for decades. This competition mirrors earlier battles over telecommunications and 5G. Nations that establish widely adopted drone standards will gain strategic advantages, including influence over global manufacturing, software ecosystems, and aviation governance. As a result, UTM and drone certification are no longer just technical debates — they have become instruments of national power, economic leverage and somehow geopolitical importance. Urban Safety and Privacy Issues In addition, another major concern for cities is the widespread adoption of drones itself, which translates into surveillance risks, noise pollution from frequent flights, and vulnerability to cyberattacks that could compromise flight controls. Therefore, urban areas need strict rules governing data collection, flight paths, and liability in case of accidents to maintain public trust and safety. In the future, cities will also require integrated emergency response protocols, stronger cybersecurity defenses, and digital identity systems for all unmanned aircraft. Public engagement and transparent oversight will play a major role in ensuring that drones enhance urban life without creating new forms of intrusion or risk. Managing these challenges will be essential for the successful adoption of unmanned urban mobility. Integration with Future Urban Infrastructure In line with the previous section, smart cities could incorporate drones into their core infrastructure. For example, vertiports, rooftop landing pads, sensor-equipped air corridors, and digital twins could enable efficient navigation and real-time monitoring. In addition, drones will become essential for urban mobility and public services – from medical or any goods deliveries to emergency response like fire unit responses. As cities evolve, this integration will create a hybrid transportation ecosystem, where ground vehicles, aerial drones, and automated control systems would operate in sync. Urban planning will increasingly consider airspace as a valuable layer of infrastructure, much like roads or power grids. Therefore, collaboration between governments, industry, and technology providers to design cities capable of supporting high-density autonomous air mobility is required. Conclusion Unmanned systems are redefining the global balance of power, transforming industrial processes, and reshaping urban futures. The convergence of autonomy, AI, and networked airspace introduces both unprecedented opportunity and profound risk. Geopolitically, drones dilute traditional military dominance; economically, they catalyze a new airborne industrial revolution; technologically, they push societies toward complex management of shared automated airspace. Future policy, regulation, and innovation will determine whether unmanned systems become drivers of prosperity or vectors of instability. References Altman, H. (2025, November 13). Russia Creates New Military Branch Dedicated to Drone Warfare. The War Zone (TWZ). https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia-creates-new-military-branch-dedicated-to-drone-warfare Amazon. (2023). Prime Air: The Future of Drone Delivery. Amazon Corporate Publications. Biddle, S., & Oelrich, I. (2016). Future Warfare in the Age of Drones. Council on Foreign Relations. Deloitte. (2022). Drones in Industrial Operations: Transforming Asset Inspection and Performance. Deloitte Insights. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). (2023). Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System. U.S. Department of Transportation. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). (2025). Drones. https://www.faa.gov/uas Fischer, S. (2020). China’s Military–Civil Fusion Strategy: A View from Washington. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission. Kania, E. B. (2020). Learning Warfare from the Laboratory: China’s Progress in Military Innovation. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Kesteloo, H. (2025, September 29). Global Military Drone Race Intensifies as Nations Rush to Copy Iran’s Shahed Design. Medium. https://medium.com/@hayekesteloo/global-military-drone-race-intensifies-as-nations-rush-to-copy-irans-shahed-design-404badf482fb Kopardekar, P. (2016). Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of Operations. NASA Ames Research Center. McKinsey & Company. (2022). The Commercial Drone Market Outlook: Insights on Market Growth, Industrial Adoption, and Regulation. McKinsey Robotics & Automation Practice. Mehta, A. (2022). Counter-Drone Systems and the Future of Air Defense. Defense News. Newton, M. (2025, November 3). How Are Drones Changing War? The Future of the Battlefield. Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). https://cepa.org/article/how-are-drones-changing-war-the-future-of-the-battlefield/ Péria-Peigné, L. (2023, April 17). TB2 Bayraktar: Big Strategy for a Little Drone. IFRI. https://www.ifri.org/en/memos/tb2-bayraktar-big-strategy-little-drone PwC. (2023). Clarity from Above: Global Drone Market Analysis. PwC Global. Roland Berger. (2022). Urban Air Mobility: The Rise of the Drone Economy. Roland Berger Strategy Consultants. Rwanda Civil Aviation Authority. (2021). Regulatory Framework for Drone Delivery and BVLOS Operations. Government of Rwanda. Sadot, U. (n.d.). Proliferated Drones: A Perspective on Israel. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). https://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-israel/ Schmidt, E., Work, R., & Clyburn, M. (2021). Final Report: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. U.S. Government Printing Office. Singer, P. W. (2009). Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. Penguin Books. Statista. (2023). Global Drone Market Value and Investment Trends. Statista Market Outlook. Vision of Humanity. (2024, June 13). How Drones Have Shaped the Nature of Conflict. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/how-drones-have-shaped-the-nature-of-conflict/ Wing (Alphabet). (2023). Autonomous Delivery Networks and Future Logistics. Wing Technical Publications. Zipline. (2022). Operational Impact of Automated Medical Delivery by Drone. Zipline International Case Studies.

When we hear the word Pyramids, the first country to come to our mind is mostly Egypt and its marvelous Pyramids of Giza. But there is one country down south known as Sudan which has significantly more pyramids when compared to Egypt, albeit smaller in size compared to Egyptian pyramids. This country is marred with power struggles, civil war and genocide because of multiple reasons including geographic, social, historical and economic reasons. Since April 2023, the country has been going through its brutal third civil war. Origin of Modern Sudan The history of modern Sudan can be traced back to the beginning of the 19th century. In the year 1820, the Governor of Ottoman-Egypt Muhammad Ali-Pasha sent his army to conquer Sudan and from 1821–1885 it was ruled by the Ottoman-Egyptian rulers. In 1881, Muhammad Ahmad launched a revolt against the Egyptians and established the Mahdist State, which ruled Sudan between 1885–1899. Later, when the British conquered Egypt during the Scramble for Africa, they also conquered Sudan and both countries came under British jurisdiction. Sudan got independence from the British in 1956 after several anti-colonial movements. North–South Civil War Sudan has till now fought two civil wars and is currently fighting its third civil war. The seeds of the first and second civil wars can be traced back to British colonial rule of Sudan. When the British took control over Sudan, they found that the northern and southern regions of Sudan were culturally diverse. Their so-called aim was to preserve the southern culture from the north, and they developed certain policies collectively referred to as the British Southern Policy. Under these policies, the southern provinces (Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal) were closed off to northerners, except for those on government business. Greek, Syrian and Jewish traders were encouraged to open businesses in the south. The Arabic language, lifestyle and even names were discouraged. Christian missionaries were encouraged while at the same time Muslim proselytizing was banned. Source: New York Times The result of these policies wasn’t good; the southerners lagged behind northerners in every aspect from education to economic development. Northerners tended to view southerners as backward and uncivilized. In 1946, the British reversed their policy and began to reintegrate the south with the north. By this time, anti-colonial movements had taken a strong hold in the north and were asking for British withdrawal. Negotiations for the transition to independence largely bypassed the south. Mistrust in the northern government increased when, in 1954, the newly elected transitional government, dominated by the north, began the process of “Sudanization” of government institutions. A total of 800 posts were vacated by the British but only six went to southerners. Although the root cause was that the southerners to some extent lacked the required qualifications to fill these posts — and it was because of the British Southern Policy — the southerners viewed this as domination and discrimination by the north. Tensions were already high, but they escalated in 1955, just prior to Sudan's declaration of independence. Southern soldiers in the Sudanese army stationed in Torit mutinied against their northern commanders. The immediate cause was the transfer of these southern units to the north, which was seen as a move towards further domination and suppression by the northern government. Although the Torit mutiny was quickly suppressed, it sparked widespread unrest across the south. All hell broke loose in 1958 when the elected government of Sudan was overthrown by Brigadier General Ibrahim Abboud. It was under his regime that the tense situation in the south blew into an outright civil war. It was an assumption in the north that the North–South problem could be solved by assimilating the southerners, who were predominantly non-Arab Christians and animists, with Arab-Islamic influence in the north. Abboud, being a dictator, took it to the extreme: he banned Sunday holidays in the south, prohibited religious gathering outside churches, expelled missionaries from the south, and eventually the situation became dire. He was overthrown in 1964 and civilian rule returned to Sudan, but it didn’t last long, and in 1969 there was a coup by Gaafar Muhammad al-Nimeiri and he became the new dictator. By the time the armed conflict ended in stalemate in 1972, anywhere from 500,000 to 1 million people had been killed. The Addis Ababa Agreement brought an end to the conflict; this treaty established the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region, which gave southerners some degree of autonomy. The Addis Ababa Agreement couldn't bring lasting peace and within a decade of signing the agreement a second civil war broke out and oil played a crucial role in it. Oil was discovered in Sudan in 1959, but the north had negligible amounts of oil; most oil fields were in the south. Al-Nimeiri wanted to take control of those fields. In order to achieve this objective, he used certain tactics. In January 1982, Nimeiri announced that a referendum would be held in the south on the decentralization issue, but only in Equatoria Province. Some southern politicians immediately viewed this plan as an effort to divide the south and claimed that the plan was contrary to the 1972 autonomy agreement. These politicians were arrested on charges of forming an illegal political organization. In response to this, the separatist group Anya-nya II started attacking police stations and army barracks. There was also the Bor Mutiny in which the southern soldiers refused to leave and move to the northern garrison as part of the government’s rotating policy. These southerners threatened to fire against the newly arrived northern soldiers. On September 8, 1983, sharia, or Islamic law, went into effect in Sudan. The penal code was amended to conform to the precepts of the Qur՚ān. Some offenses, such as theft, were punished by amputation, while alcohol and gambling were prohibited. The south, with its varied religious traditions, strongly opposed the Islamization of Sudan. However, with two-thirds of Sudan’s land and population in Arab-Muslim possession, the north controlled the country. In 1984, Nimeiri proclaimed a state of emergency because of increasing rebel attacks from different rebel groups as these attacks were threatening his regime. His policies had negative impacts on Sudan, and, in 1985, he was ousted from power by General Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dahab in a bloodless coup. Later on, General Abdel Rahman relinquished his power and gave it to the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. In May 1986, the new Khartoum government led by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) led by Col. John Garang met for negotiations to end the conflicts. In February 1989, a peace plan was approved by the al-Mahdi government, but later in that year Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir came to power by overthrowing Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. Al-Bashir’s regime dissolved the parliament and banned political parties. The SPLA, initially seeking a unified “New Sudan” with secular governance, later shifted toward secession mostly because of al-Bashir’s policy. The second war lasted until 2005, marking it infamously as the longest civil war in modern history. A 2005 peace agreement ended the conflict and the 2011 referendum ultimately led to South Sudan's independence. It is estimated that 1 to 2.5 million lives were lost during Sudan’s second civil war. While both the Civil wars were fought on the North-South Muslim-Christian divide, there were also numerous ethnic groups who were caught during these wars. In South Sudan, communities such as Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Bari held their own grievances rooted in exclusion, land and resources. In the North, groups like Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa in the Darfur region; the Nuba people in South Kordofan and the Beja in the East have their own patterns of neglect. Even though religion played an important role, but we can't rule out the importance of ethnicity in these brutal conflicts. Source: BBC & Instagram/Geopolitical Futures The Darfur Genocide — A Dark Chapter in Sudan's History Darfur is a province in the western part of Sudan. During the second civil war, Darfuri rebels launched attacks on Sudanese government military targets. The Sudanese government assumed that Black African people- Fur, Maselit and Zaghawa in Darfur had supported these rebels and they reacted by arming militias — the Janjaweed — to attack those same innocent people. The Janjaweed militias were brutal; they used “scorched earth” tactics to target those Black people. The results were catastrophic: thousands of people were murdered, and millions were forced to flee their homes. When refugees from Darfur were interviewed, they said that after government air raids on villages, the Janjaweed used to attack their village, slaughter men, rape women and steal whatever they found. In July 2004, the US Congress declared atrocities in Darfur to be genocide and in July 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued indictments against then President al-Bashir. In 2014, these same Janjaweed militias were incorporated into the paramilitary forces known as the Rapid Support Forces. It is estimated approximately 200,000 people were killed and more than 2 million displaced during the Darfur Genocide. Third Civil War Omar al-Bashir ruled as dictator of Sudan up until 2019, when he was overthrown by a coup jointly organized by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). RSF is the most powerful paramilitary group formed during Bashir's regime. The roots of RSF can be traced back to the Janjaweed militia which committed the heinous Darfur genocide. With support from Bashir, RSF was organized and it was employed as border security guard, mercenaries to fight wars in Yemen, to suppress any civil protest or rebellion rising against him, and most importantly it acted as a counterweight to SAF. Bashir was a dictator and a military officer; he knew that his regime was also threatened by a military coup. In 2019, there were civilian protests against the dictatorial regime of al-Bashir. Contrary to al-Bashir’s belief, RSF didn't protect him and with SAF organized a coup and overthrew his government. They established a transitional government and a new constitution. SAF’s General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led the transitional government while RSF’s General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as “Hemedti”, was appointed as Deputy. Abdalla Hamdok, an economist and development expert, was chosen as Prime Minister. Hamdok tried to fix Sudan's problems, but al-Burhan and Hemedti orchestrated a coup against him in October 2021. But there were protests, the IMF and World Bank paused funding, so Hamdok was reinstated back in power in November 2021. But it was short-lived; he resigned again in February 2022 because the terms of reinstating were predatory for civilian leaders. With his resignation, Burhan and Hemedti, two strongman leaders, were left to transit Sudan into a democratic nation. Negotiations culminated in a December 2022 deal; it laid the groundwork for a two-year transition to civilian leadership and national elections. There were protests because of the timeline and it was brutally cracked down as you expect from a strongman. A major sticking point emerged: there was a proposition in the deal that RSF would be incorporated into SAF. The suspicions were that both generals wanted to hang on to their positions of power, unwilling to lose wealth and influence. As months passed, the power struggle between both of them increased and it stalled the country's transition efforts. On April 15, 2023, everything went loose as a series of explosions shook Khartoum, along with heavy gunfire. SAF and RSF leadership accused each other of firing first. The involvement of foreign powers in this conflict has worsened the situation. It is believed that RSF has strong backing of UAE and Libyan strongman General Khalifa Haftar, while SAF has strong backing of Egypt and to some extent Iran. RSF controls almost the western half of Sudan including the Darfur region and controls the gold mines of the region. This gold is allegedly smuggled into the UAE and sold throughout the world. SAF controls most of the north and east part of Sudan including Sudan's capital Khartoum. Several NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, have documented evidence of numerous mass atrocities committed throughout the conflict prompting accusations of ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Humanitarian access remains a crucial concern for many international actors, including the United States, which called on the UN Security Council to authorize aid deliveries through Chad. The situation has been grim since war broke out. As of November 2025, nearly twelve million people have been forcibly displaced, according to the UN refugee agency. More than 7.2 million of them are internally displaced within Sudan, while over 4.2 million are refugees, asylum seekers or “returnees” who have fled or returned to neighboring countries. The number of people killed in the conflict is unknown due to restricted media access, but researchers’ estimates vary between 20,000 and 150,000 fatalities. In early November 2025, the RSF announced it had agreed to a humanitarian truce proposed by the US, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt. However, the army said it would be wary of agreeing to a truce, accusing the RSF of not respecting ceasefires. UN health chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has also lamented that there is less global interest in the conflict in Sudan, and other recent conflicts in Africa, compared to crises elsewhere in the world. As of late November 2025, both parties are still waging war and millions of innocent Sudanese are suffering.  Conclusion Sudan as a nation-state was a colonial product; its leaders couldn't build stable institutions; they weren't able to properly define the idea of Sudanese nationalism. All of these led to power struggles, political instability, civil war and the fracturing of the nation into two parts. They could learn from countries of Asia; they were once colonies of European powers. Many of them were able to address the same problems which Sudanese politicians couldn’t. Those countries defined the idea of nationalism, built strong institutions and in turn it brought political stability and economic prosperity. Lasting peace can only happen in Sudan once stable institutions are formed; until then, Sudan will be stuck in this vicious cycle. Sources BBC News. Sudan conflict explainer. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjel2nn22z9o BlackPast.org. First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972). https://blackpast.org/global-african-history/first-sudanese-civil-war-1955-1972/ BlackPast.org. Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005). https://blackpast.org/global-african-history/second-sudanese-civil-war-1983-2005/ Council on Foreign Relations. Power struggle in Sudan: Global Conflict Tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan Council on Foreign Relations. To what extent is Sudan’s humanitarian crisis escalating? https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-extent-sudans-humanitarian-crisis EBSCO Research Starters. First Sudanese Civil War erupts. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/first-sudanese-civil-war-erupts EBSCO Research Starters. Sudanese Civil War resumes. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/sudanese-civil-war-resumes Holocaust Memorial Day Trust. Darfur genocide. https://hmd.org.uk/learn-about-the-holocaust-and-genocides/darfur/genocide/ World History Edu. Major facts about the Second Sudanese Civil War. https://worldhistoryedu.com/history-major-facts-about-the-second-sudanese-civil-war-1983-2005/ World History Edu. History of the First Sudanese War: How and when did it erupt? https://worldhistoryedu.com/history-of-first-sudanese-war-how-and-when-did-it-erupt/

Drug trafficking is the illegal trade, in large quantities, of drugs or narcotics (RAE, 2025). However, while this definition is accurate, it is insufficient to describe the complexity of a global phenomenon that transcends borders and involves the production, purchase, and distribution of illicit substances. Drug trafficking has developed hand in hand with global trade and interconnection (Saldaña, 2024). In other words, the evolution of drug trafficking is closely linked to globalization, which has strengthened the logistical, technological, and financial networks that enable its expansion. Therefore, more than isolated crime, drug trafficking must be understood as a transnational system of power that feeds on globalization itself. Drug Trafficking as a Transnational System of Power Drug trafficking is described by some authors as a profoundly complex transnational phenomenon resulting from globalization (Luna Galván, Thanh Luong, & Astolfi, 2021). This phenomenon involves and connects global networks of production, logistics, financing, and consumption, all made possible by economic interdependence, information technologies, and established global logistical routes. These authors analyze drug trafficking from a multidimensional perspective, identifying seven interrelated spheres that sustain this activity: the economic (money laundering and investment diversification), institutional (corruption and institutional capture), organizational (organized criminal networks and advanced logistics), social (presence in territories with state vacuums and community legitimization), technological (use of cryptomarkets, encryption, and innovation), geopolitical (route adaptability and resilience against state policies), and cultural (narratives and subcultures that normalize illicit practices) (Luna Galván, Thanh Luong, & Astolfi, 2021). These dimensions form a web of relationships in which criminal groups not only control the flow of drugs but also influence economic and political structures. As Interpol (n.d.) warns, this global network undermines and erodes the political and economic stability of the countries involved, while also fostering corruption and generating irreversible social and health effects. Furthermore, drug trafficking is intertwined with other crimes — such as money laundering, corruption, human trafficking, and arms smuggling — thus forming a globalized criminal ecosystem, a global issue and a national security concern for nations worldwide. Origins and historical context There are records of the use of entheogenic drugs for ritual or medicinal purposes in Mesoamerican cultures — such as the Olmecs, Zapotecs, Mayas, and Aztecs (Carod Artal, 2011) — as well as in Peru (Bussmann & Douglas, 2006), the Amazon region, and even today among the Wixárika culture in Mexico (Haro Luna, 2023). Likewise, there was widespread and diverse drug use among the ancient Greeks and Romans, including substances such as mandrake, henbane, belladonna, cannabis, and opium, among others (Pérez González, 2024). However, modern drug trafficking can trace its origins to the First Opium War (1839–1842) between the Chinese Empire (Qing Dynasty) and the British Empire, marking the first international conflict directly linked to the drug trade. During the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century, several drugs —such as heroin, cocaine, cannabis, and amphetamines — made their debut in the pharmaceutical field, being used in medicines and therapeutic remedies (López-Muñoz & Álamo González, 2020). This period is considered the pharmaceutical revolution, characterized by the emergence of researchers, research centers, and major discoveries in the field. During that time, the term “drug” began to be associated with “addiction.” The pharmaceutical revolution had its epicenter in Germany; however, it was the British and Americans who promoted its expansion (Luna-Fabritius, 2015) and contributed to the normalization of psychoactive substance consumption. Military promotion, use and dependence Armed conflicts — from the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865) to the First World War (1914–1918) — played a key role in spreading and promoting the military use of psychoactive substances. For instance, stimulants such as alcohol, cocaine, amphetamines, and methamphetamines were used to combat sleep, reduce fatigue, boost energy, and strengthen courage, while depressants like opium, morphine, and marijuana were used to relieve combat stress and mitigate war trauma (Marco, 2019). The dependence that developed led to a process of expansion among the civilian population, which entered a period of mass experimentation that often resulted in substance abuse and chemical dependency (Courtwright, 2001). In response, the first restrictive laws emerged, particularly in the United States (López-Muñoz & Álamo González, 2020). However, the high demand for certain substances, such as opium, gave rise to the search for markets capable of meeting that demand. Thus, Mexico — influenced by Chinese immigration that introduced the habit of smoking opium in the country — became, by the 1940s, the epicenter of poppy cultivation and opium processing in the region known as the Golden Triangle (Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua). It became the main supplier for drug markets in the United States and other parts of the continent, at times providing up to 90% of the demand during periods of shortage (Sosa, 2025). Even during World War II (1939–1945) — when the traditional supply of heroin and morphine to Europe was disrupted — Mexico strengthened its role in the illicit trade by providing smoking opium and processed morphine or heroin. These developments, alongside the implementation of opiate regulations in Mexico, helped consolidate and structure Mexican drug trafficking, which has persisted for more than sixty years (Sosa, 2025). Social expansion and regulatory restrictions The end of World War II brought stricter restrictions and regulations, but that did not prevent socio-cultural movements such as the hippie movement (in the 1960s) from adopting the use of marijuana, hashish, LSD, and hallucinogenic mushrooms (Kiss, 2025) without facing severe repercussions. That same hippie movement — which promoted pacifism and opposed the Vietnam War (1955–1975) — in one way or another encouraged drug use among young people. Moreover, the demand for substances by returning veterans led to the internationalization of drug markets, fostering, for example, the heroin trade from Southeast Asia (Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) (Saldaña, 2024). The Nixon administration and the US “War on Drugs” The dependency became so severe that it was considered a public health emergency in the United States. On June 18, 1971, Richard Nixon declared the “War on Drugs” at an international level, labeling drug trafficking as “public enemy number one” (Plant & Singer, 2022). Nixon’s strategy combined international intervention with increased spending on treatment and stricter measures against drug trafficking and consumption (Encyclopedia.com, n.d.), along with the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973. Although the War on Drugs was officially declared in 1971, it had a precedent in 1969 with the failed Operation Intercept, whose goal was to combat marijuana trafficking across the U.S.–Mexico border (M. Brecher, 1972). As part of his international strategy, Nixon launched several operations such as Operation Condor with Mexico (1975 and 1978), Operation Stopgap in Florida (1977), and Operation Fulminante, carried out by Colombian President Julio César Turbay in 1979. Most of these efforts were aimed at combating marijuana trafficking. The results were mixed, but the consequences were significant, as drug traffickers resisted and adapted — giving rise to a more active and violent generation and marking the consolidation of modern drug trafficking. The Consolidation of Modern Drug Trafficking: Colombia and Reagan Era. During the 1980s and 1990s, drug trafficking evolved into a highly organized industry. Figures such as Félix Gallardo [1], Amado Carrillo Fuentes [2], Pablo Escobar [3], Carlos Lehder [4], Griselda Blanco [5], Rafael Caro Quintero [6], and later Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera [7], among others (Wikipedia, 2025), symbolized the growing power of the cartels in Colombia and Mexico. During this period, criminal organizations consolidated their operations, and the profits from drug trafficking fueled violence and corruption. Moreover, the struggle for power — not only in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, or the United States but also in other regions of Latin America — and the competition for markets led to greater sophistication, as well as the construction of infrastructure and distribution networks. Pablo Escobar’s famous phrase, “plata o plomo” (“silver or lead”), reflects the immense power and influence that drug traffickers wield, even over governments and authorities. Colombia, through the Cali and Medellín cartels, dominated the production and export of cocaine via a triangulation network that connected through Mexico or the Caribbean, with the final destination being the United States, where the Reagan administration (1981–1989) intensified the War on Drugs, focusing on criminal repression rather than public health. The Reagan’s War on Drugs was characterized for setting aggressive policies and legislative changes in the 1980s which increased the law enforcement and the punishment, as a consequence the prison penalties for drug crimes skyrocketed from 50,000 in 1980 to more than 400,000 by 1997 (HISTORY.com Editors 2017) Mexican cartels consolidation and Mexico’s transition to a consumer nation Around the same time, on the international arena, following the fragmentation of the Guadalajara Cartel in the 1980s, the emergence of new Mexican cartels — the Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Tijuana Cartel, and Juárez Cartel — combined with the downfall of Colombia’s Cali and Medellín cartels in the mid-1990s, catapulted Mexican cartels into prominence. They seized control of trafficking routes and diversified their operations, thus consolidating their role in the global drug market. Later, the September 11, 2001, attacks altered U.S. security policy, affecting border transit, increasing security measures, and tightening inspections along the southern border with Mexico (Rudolph, 2023) — one of the main drug distribution routes into the United States. Although some studies suggest that U.S. security policies at land ports of entry had only marginal pre- and post-9/11 effects (Ramírez Partida, 2014), in reality, these measures significantly impacted Mexico more than the US. Mexico transitioned from being primarily a producer, distributor, and transit country for drugs to also becoming a consumer nation. In 2002, more than 260,000 people were reported to use cocaine, whereas today the number exceeds 1.7 million addicts, according to data from the federal Secretariat of Public Security (Alzaga, 2010). Likewise, the ENCODAT 2016–2017 survey shows that the percentage of Mexican adolescents who had consumed some type of drug increased from 1.6% in 2001 to 6.4% in 2016 (REDIM, 2025). By disrupting one of the main drug distribution routes to the United States, the situation led to drugs being redistributed and sold within Mexican territory. This, combined with the country’s social and economic conditions, facilitated the recruitment of young people by organized crime groups (Becerra-Acosta, 2010) for the domestic distribution of drugs. Mexico and the Contemporary War on Drug Trafficking The escalation of violence caused by the power struggle among Mexican cartels became so critical that President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) declared an open war against organized crime on December 10, 2006 (Herrera Beltrán, 2006). His strategy involved deploying the armed forces throughout Mexican territory, as well as obtaining financial aid, training, and intelligence through the Mérida Initiative from the United States to support the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico and Central America (Embassy of the United States in Mexico, 2011). His successor, Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018), shifted the focus toward prevention and civil protection, although he continued the militarization process and the transformation of police institutions (BBC News, 2012). The strategies of Calderón and Peña Nieto — often grouped together — while questioned and criticized (Morales Oyarvide, 2011), achieved significant arrests, including figures such as “La Barbie,” “La Tuta,” “El Menchito,” “El Chapo,” “El Marro,” and “El Ratón.” They also eliminated key figures like Arturo Beltrán Leyva, Ignacio Coronel Villarreal, Antonio Cárdenas Guillén, Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, and Nazario Moreno González. Later, during the presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024), the strategy shifted once again toward a stance of “hugs, not bullets,” showing clear signs of passivity that allowed cartel expansion (Fernández-Montesino, 2025). His successor, Claudia Sheinbaum (2024–2030), on the other hand, has navigated both internal and external pressures (particularly from the United States), seeking to balance intelligence, coordination, and attention to structural causes (Pardo, 2024), although continued militarization suggests a hybrid strategy remains in place. Fentanyl and synthetic drugs: The future of drug trafficking The president of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Jallal Toufiq, said that “the illicit drug industry represents a major global public health threat with potentially disastrous consequences for humankind.” In addition, the 2024 INCB Annual Report found that illicit synthetic drugs are spreading and consumption is increasing, moreover, these could overtake some plant-based drugs in the future. (International Narcotics Control Board 2025) The press release before mentioned also points out that Africa, Middle East, East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific drug markets are increasing, while production in Central America, Peru, Colombia and the Caribbean keeps on developing. On the other hand, the opioid crisis (fentanyl) remains a serious problem for North America and the cocaine keeps affecting Europe with a spillover Africa. (International Narcotics Control Board 2025). The fentanyl crisis in North America is well documented. Data show an increase of 540% in overdose deaths between 2013 and 2016 (Katz 2017), with 20,100 deaths in the USA, while by 2023, the number increase to 72,776 deaths (USA Facts 2025). On the other hand, Canada has reported 53,821 deaths between January 2016 and March 2025 (Government of Canada 2025), while Mexico reported only 114 deaths from 2013 to 2023 (Observatorio Mexicano de Salud Mental y Adicciones 2024). These figures reveal not only the unequal regional impact of the synthetic opioid crisis but also the ongoing adaptation of organized crime networks that sustain and expand these markets. Evolution and Diversification of Organized Crime The phenomenon of adaptation, evolution, and diversification of new illicit markets is not an isolated issue. Experts such as Farah & Zeballos (2025) describe this in their framework Waves of Transnational Crime (COT). The first wave is represented by Pablo Escobar and the Medellín Cartel, pioneers in moving tons of cocaine to the U.S. market through Caribbean routes. The second wave is represented by the Cali Cartel, which perfected the model and expanded trafficking routes through Central America and Mexico — still focusing on one product (cocaine) for one main market (the United States). The third wave is characterized by the criminalization of criminal structures, the use of armed groups (such as the FARC in Colombia), and the use of illicit production and trafficking as instruments of state policy, with clear effects on public policy functioning. At this stage, there is product diversification, with the main market remaining the U.S., but expansion reaching Europe (Farah & Zeballos, 2025). Finally, the fourth wave — the current stage — is defined by total diversification, a shift toward synthetic drugs, and global expansion, involving extra-regional groups (Italian, Turkish, Albanian, and Japanese mafias), where many operations function “under government protection.” This fourth wave offers clear examples of collusion between criminal and political spheres, which is not new. However, the arrest of Genaro García Luna (Secretary of Public Security under Calderón), the links between high-profile Mexican politicians and money laundering or fuel trafficking (Unidad de Investigación Aplicada de MCCI, 2025), and even Trump’s statements claiming that “Mexico is largely governed by cartels” (DW, 2025) reveal a reality in which drug trafficking and criminal organizations are no longer merely producers and distributors of illicit substances. Today, they possess the power and capacity to establish parallel governance systems, exercise territorial control, infiltrate institutions and local economies, and even replace core state functions (Farah & Zeballos, 2025). Future Perspectives and Challenges Currently, drug trafficking and organized crime represent structural threats. It is well known and widely studied what drug trafficking means for public security and health, but it has now also become a threat to politics, democracy, and the rule of law. With divided opinions, many analysts argue that the war on drugs has failed — in addition to being costly and, in many cases, counterproductive (Thomson, 2016). Punitive strategies have generated more violence without truly addressing the social causes behind the phenomenon (Morales Oyarvide, 2011). In this context, a paradigm shift is necessary: drug trafficking should not be approached solely as a security issue, but also as a public health and social development problem. Drug use has been a historical constant, and its total eradication is unrealistic. The key lies in harm-reduction policies, international cooperation, and inclusive economic development. Moreover, organized crime demonstrates adaptive resilience, making its eradication difficult — especially given that its operational capacities are so diversified, it maintains alliances with groups worldwide, and globalization and new technologies continually help it reinvent itself. Furthermore, even political and economic tensions among the United States, Mexico, Canada, and China are now intertwined with the trade of synthetic drugs — particularly fentanyl —, revealing the geopolitical magnitude of the problem (Pierson, 2024). Conclusion In summary, drug trafficking has ceased to be a marginal activity and has become a transnational structure capable of influencing politics, the economy, and society. Its persistence can be explained not only by the profitability of the business but also by social inequality, institutional corruption, and sustained global demand. History demonstrates that repression has not eradicated the problem but rather transformed it. Today, it is essential to rethink drug policies from a comprehensive approach that integrates security, public health, education, and international cooperation. Only through a multidimensional strategy will it be possible to contain a phenomenon that — more than an illicit economy — constitutes a global form of parallel governance that challenges the very foundations of the modern state. Notes[1] Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, also known as “El Jefe de Jefes” (“The Boss of Bosses”), “El Padrino” (“The Godfather”), or “The Drug Czar”, was one of the founders of the Guadalajara Cartel. [2] Amado Carrillo Fuentes, known as “El Señor de los Cielos” (“The Lord of the Skies”), was the former leader of the Juárez Cartel. [3] Pablo Escobar was the founder and former leader of the Medellín Cartel. [4] Carlos Lehder was the co-founder of the Medellín Cartel. [5] Griselda Blanco, known as “The Black Widow,” “The Cocaine Queen,” or “La Patrona” (“The Boss”), was a founder of the Medellín Cartel. [6] Rafael Caro Quintero, known as “El Narco de Narcos” (“The Drug Lord of Drug Lords”), was one of the founders of the Guadalajara Cartel. [7] Joaquín Guzmán Loera, known as “El Chapo,” was the former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel. ReferencesAlzaga, Ignacio. 2010. 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Sudan has been embroiled in a civil war between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces since April 2023, sparked by a power struggle between the two parties. The war has displaced more than 14 million people. Over half the population of about 50 million is facing acute levels of hunger. Several mediation initiatives have been launched since the start of the war, with limited success. The African Union has also been unable to get the main warring parties to agree to a permanent ceasefire. The four countries leading the main peace mediation effort (known as the Quad) are the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They issued a joint statement in September 2025, calling for a ceasefire in Sudan and offering a roadmap to end the internal conflict. I’ve been researching Sudan for over a decade, and in my view, these countries’ capacity to deliver a final political settlement for Sudan is severely constrained. The prospects for peace rest on the resolution of three factors: • the sharp differences between the Sudanese army and the Quad over who should participate in post-war politics• a widening rift between the main protagonists in the war on the terms of ending it• internal divisions within the Quad – particularly between Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia – over how to balance support for the army, curb Islamist influence and manage competing regional interests. The Quad’s plan called for an immediate ceasefire, a three-month humanitarian truce and an inclusive political process to resolve disputes within nine months. The statement was initially welcomed by the Rapid Support Forces and Sudan’s army leaders. However, follow-up meetings between the Quad and representatives of the warring parties have failed to translate any of these proposals into action. Meanwhile, the paramilitary troops and their allies captured the city of El-Fasher in North Darfur after a bloody 500-day siege. This was the army’s last major stronghold in Darfur. Darfur encompasses nearly 20% of Sudan’s territory. It borders Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. The capture has fuelled concerns of a de facto partition of the country in the western region. Against this backdrop, the Quad’s latest initiative seems unlikely to achieve more than a fragile ceasefire. The obstacles Efforts to broker peace in Sudan are hindered by three key challenges. 1. Diverging agendas between the Quad and the Sudanese army Despite broad similarities between the Quad’s roadmap and a proposal the army submitted in March 2025 to the United Nations, key differences remain. The core disagreement lies in the design of the political process to follow the ceasefire. The Quad insists that Islamist factions should be excluded from consultations over fears that these factions have close ties to terrorist groups and Iran. The army’s proposal, by contrast, opposes the exclusion of any party. The military leadership has alliances with elements of the former Islamic Movement. Its fighters still help stabilise the army’s frontlines. 2. A widening gap between the army and Rapid Support Forces on the terms of ending the war The army’s roadmap implicitly allows the paramilitary troops to remain in parts of Darfur for up to nine months, provided that local authorities consent. However, it also requires the withdrawal of the group from El-Fasher and North Kordofan. The Rapid Support Forces’ behaviour on the ground reveals a very different mindset. Rather than preparing to withdraw, the group has expanded militarily in North Kordofan and intensified its drone attacks on Khartoum and other regions. At its core, the dispute reflects conflicting end goals. The paramilitary group seeks to enter negotiations as an equal to the army. It wants a comprehensive restructuring of the armed forces. The army insists that it should be the only unit that supervises any reform of Sudan’s military institutions – the very issue that triggered the outbreak of war in 2023. 3. Internal divisions within the Quad The Quad’s own cohesion has been undermined by internal rifts that have derailed several meetings. The most visible divide lies between Egypt and the UAE. Cairo leans towards the army, seeing it as the guarantor of Sudan’s state institutions against collapse. Abu Dhabi prioritises dismantling the influence of Islamist leaders as the main precondition for peace. Saudi Arabia is wary of Emirati involvement, especially since the Sudanese army has repeatedly rejected UAE mediation and the Rapid Support Forces has attacked Egyptian policy towards Sudan. Washington has tried to manage these tensions by limiting direct mediation roles for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE while keeping them within the broader negotiation framework. These nations have significant leverage over the warring factions. How Sudan got here Sudan’s fragile transition began after the ousting of long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir in 2019. An uneasy power-sharing arrangement between the army and civilian leaders collapsed in 2021 when army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, jointly seized control in a coup. Their alliance fractured two years later and sparked the 2023 civil war. Despite international pressure, neither side has given in or gained a decisive advantage since. The conflict has been devastating for Sudan’s population of 50 million. Death toll reports since the start of the war have varied between 20,000 and 150,000 people. The country is facing the world’s worst displacement crisis, and health and education systems have collapsed. Further, more than 12 million girls and women, and an increasing number of men, are at risk of sexual violence. Is breakthrough still possible? Despite existing divisions, shifting dynamics on the ground could still produce a limited breakthrough. The worst scenario for the military would be the paramilitary group’s renewed advance into territories it had been pushed out of. That prospect might push army leaders to accept a preliminary ceasefire. This would allow the army to regroup and consolidate existing positions without conceding ground politically. For the Rapid Support Forces, the calculation is different. After spending more than 18 months battling to capture El-Fasher, the group recognises that advancing further towards the capital would come at a high human and political cost. A temporary truce, therefore, could allow it to entrench its governance structures in Darfur and strengthen its military presence there. In this sense, a short-term ceasefire remains the most practical outcome for both sides. Washington’s eagerness to secure conflict-ending deals is likely to push the Quad towards this scenario. But a final political settlement in Sudan remains distant. For now, the most any diplomatic initiative can achieve is to pause the fighting, not to end the war, as it remains difficult to bridge the political gaps between Sudanese powers. 

India is the fastest-growing major economy in the world, and according to the Global Firepower Index, the Indian Armed Forces are the 4th strongest in the world. But when we look at SIPRI data, we can find that since 2011, India has been the largest defence equipment importer in the world. If we look at India's neighborhood, it's been very hostile since Independence. India fought four major wars with Pakistan — 1948, 65, 71, and 99 — and many skirmishes, Operation Sindoor being the most recent one. With China, it fought a war in 1962 and many skirmishes, the most recent one in Galwan valley in the early 2020s. This kind of environment, and India being a rising global power, demands it to have some self-sufficiency in weapons manufacturing. A Brief History of Defence Policy At Independence, India enjoyed an early advantage over non-western states. India was the crown jewel of the British Empire, and to sustain control over it, Britain established lots of arms factories. But when India got independence, everything changed. Jawaharlal Nehru was sworn in as the first Prime Minister. He was a member of the Fabian Society and strongly believed in socialism, so he got everything centralized and worked in similar way as the Soviet Union. There was private participation, but it was limited to only small-scale industries. Defence was the government arena. There were DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation), DPSUs (Defence Public Sector Undertakings), and Ordnance Factories. DRDO was responsible for designing, the DPSUs made complex weapon systems, while Ordnance Factories made ammunition, firearms, artillery shells, etc. However, this highly centralised socialist model, though well-intentioned, restricted the flexibility to build upon the industrial base India had inherited from the British era. In 1991, India initiated LPG (Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation) reforms to liberalize the economy. Private players were allowed in the defence sector from 2001 onwards, but there wasn't a lot of momentum for the next 15 years. Momentum began to rise only after 2014 when reforms and policy incentives actively encouraged private participation. Current Reforms Since assuming power in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has made a determined attempt to strengthen the Indian arms industry and transform the country’s image from the world’s largest arms importer to a major exporter of defence equipment. To realize this goal, the government has announced many reform measures under the ‘Make in India’ initiative and ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan’ (self-reliant India mission). These measures cover virtually every facet of the Indian defence economy, spanning structures, acquisition processes, industrial regulations, and budgetary provisions. During the 1999 Kargil War and 2001 Operation Parakram, India found operational constraints, and there was a recommendation to create a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who would function as the head of all three services. In 2019, the government created the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), which is touted as the most significant defence reform since Independence. Among all the responsibilities, the CDS is also assigned the task of “promoting the use of indigenous equipment by the Services.” The Department of Military Affairs (DMA), which works under the guidance of the CDS, made a list of 500 pieces of equipment that should be produced indigenously. These lists include several big-ticket items such as missiles, fighter aircraft, helicopters, warships, radars, and a range of munitions. The government also announced the long-overdue corporatisation of the OFs that were earlier functioning as government arsenals. The decision involved converting 41 OFs into seven distinct DPSUs. As corporate entities, the new DPSUs will enjoy greater autonomy in decision-making and be accountable for their performance. However, while corporatisation has begun to improve accountability, the impact of these changes is still uneven, and many DPSUs continue to face legacy inefficiencies. As the government wanted to increase the acquisition of arms made in India, it announced the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) in 2016. The DPP-2016 emphasized indigenisation by giving primacy to the domestic industry over foreign contractors. It also made an attempt to decrease procurement timelines and increase the overall effectiveness of the procurement process. To enhance the role of the private sector in defence production, the DPP-2016 also simplified the ‘Make’ procedure and created space for new Strategic Partnership (SP) guidelines, which were separately released in 2017. In 2020, the government announced the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP). Building on the DPP-2016, the DAP-2020 focused on higher levels of indigenisation and innovation through the participation of Indian industry, including startups and small and medium enterprises. New outfits like the Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) and the Defence Innovation Organisation (DIO) have been created to encourage start-ups and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) to promote defence industrialisation. The government has also introduced several measures to improve the ease of doing business in the defence manufacturing sector. It streamlined the industrial licensing process for the private sector. It also focused on liberalising the defence foreign direct investment (FDI) regime by enhancing the earlier foreign equity cap from a maximum of 26 percent under the automatic route, first to 49 percent and subsequently to 74 percent. The government has also brought out a standard operating procedure to formalise the process of defence export authorisation; allowed the private sector to use government-run facilities to test their equipment; launched two defence industrial corridors; and created a dedicated web portal, SRIJAN, so that the DPSUs and the armed forces can upload previously imported items for indigenisation by domestic entities. Impact of the Policy Following several reforms, the defence industry has made certain progress. The most visible indicator of this progress is the near-continuous increase in production turnover.  The value of defence production has surged to a record high of ₹1,27,434 crore (~$15.2 billion), marking an impressive 174% increase from ₹46,429 crore in 2014-15, according to data from all Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), other public sector units manufacturing defence items, and private companies. The Ministry of Defence has signed a record 193 contracts in 2024-25, with the total contract value surpassing ₹2,09,050 crore (~$24.8 billion), nearly double the previous highest figure. Of these, 177 contracts, accounting for 92 percent, have been awarded to the domestic industry, amounting to ₹1,68,922 crore (~$20.1 billion), which is 81 percent of the total contract value. Defence exports have surged from ₹686 crore in FY 2013-14 to an all-time high of ₹23,622 crore (~$2.76 billion) in FY 2024-25, marking a 34-fold increase over the past decade. India is now exporting arms, ammunition, and related items to over 85 countries, with 100 Indian firms participating in international sales. Some of the major items exported include “Dornier-228, 155 mm Advanced Towed Artillery Guns, BrahMos Missiles, Akash Missile System, Radars, Simulators, Mine Protected Vehicles, Armoured Vehicles, PINAKA Rockets & Launchers, Ammunitions, Thermal Imagers, Body Armours, besides Systems, Line Replaceable Units and Parts & components of Avionics and Small Arms.” Challenges Even though India has made noticeable progress, challenges still persist. According to SIPRI, in 2011 India was responsible for 14% of global arms imports — making it the largest importer. Fast forward to 2024, it still accounts for 8.3% of global arms imports — the second largest, just behind war-torn Ukraine. While this decline in share indicates progress, the absolute value of imports remains high due to India’s expanding defence budget and modernisation drive. Even though the industry has grown, it hasn't fully absorbed the appetite for equipment required by the armed forces. On the export front, despite registering a noticeable increase in international arms sales, the industry is far from the target set by the government. The biggest challenge in meeting the government’s export target comes from the DPSUs, which have been rising slowly to the expectations. Some recent attempts to export major systems have not met with success. It faces tough competition from countries like Turkey (~$7.2 billion in defence exports for 2024), South Korea (~$20 billion in defence exports for 2024) and Israel(~$14.8 billion in 2024). The Indian defence industry, despite having a large production and R&D base, lacks the technological depth to design/manufacture major systems and critical parts, components, and raw materials, which are eventually imported. Moreover, the reforms announced by the Modi Government haven't been implemented fully. Given India’s bureaucratic system, overcoming the delays in implementation will remain a key challenge in the foreseeable future. Global Parallels in Defence Industrialisation India's transition from a state-dominated, import-reliant defence ecosystem to a more hybrid, self-reliant model invites comparisons with other emerging powers that have successfully navigated similar paths. South Korea offers a stark contrast through its aggressive export-oriented strategy: starting in the 1970s amid threats from North Korea, Seoul invested heavily in R&D (allocating over 4% of GDP annually in recent years) and leveraged chaebol conglomerates like Hyundai and Hanwha to build integrated supply chains, transforming from an importer to a top-10 global exporter with $20 billion in annual sales by 2024, including K9 howitzers and T-50 trainers. Turkey, facing NATO dependencies and regional instabilities, adopted agile policies under its Defence Industry Agency (SSB), mandating high domestic content (up to 70% in major programs) and integrating SMEs via incentives and technology transfers, propelling exports to $7.2 billion in 2024 through platforms like Bayraktar drones. Israel, constrained by size and hostile neighbors, pioneered a niche innovation ecosystem via public-private partnerships, mandatory military service feeding talent into firms like Rafael and IAI, and venture capital-driven R&D, yielding $14.8 billion in exports focused on high-tech systems such as Iron Dome. Unlike India's historically centralized DPSUs and gradual private inclusion, these models emphasize export discipline, rapid policy iteration, and SME/startup ecosystems—lessons India could adapt by accelerating iDEX funding, enforcing stricter local content in DAP procurements, and fostering chaebol-like consortia to bridge technological gaps and compete globally. Conclusion The Narendra Modi government has sought to break the inertia of snail-like defence reforms that were going on since India's Independence. Under the banner of Atmanirbhar Bharat, it has pushed to cut imports and boost local production. Defence exports have begun to grow. More importantly, private companies and start-ups have entered what was once a tightly guarded public sector preserve. A more competitive ecosystem is slowly taking shape. Yet the road to self-reliance remains long. If India can integrate private innovation with public manufacturing and reduce bureaucratic delays, it could transform from being the world’s largest importer to a key global supplier in the multipolar era. Sourceshttps://www.orfonline.org/research/india-s-defence-industry-achievements-and-challengeshttps://www.orfonline.org/research/a-decade-of-defence-reforms-under-modihttps://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2116612https://indiasworld.in/reforming-defence-production-faster-and-deeper/https://theprint.in/defence/india-second-largest-arms-importer-after-ukraine-reliance-on-russia-declines-says-sipri-report/2541373/https://www.pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails.aspx?NoteId=154617&ModuleId=3https://www.cnbc.com/2024/12/04/as-global-defense-spending-surges-south-korean-arms-makers-look-like-a-clear-winnerhttps://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/02/04/turkeys-defense-exports-hit-record-high-of-7.1-billion-in-2024/https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2025/06/05/israel-announces-defense-export-record-15-billion-in-2024/https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php

Since the 1970s, the US-China relationship has been defined by a combination of cooperative and competitive objectives. Competitive interests, however, have prevailed, resulting in a rising competition between the two countries. (Pillsbury, 2015) Candidates in the 2016 presidential election treated China as an adversary, with Donald Trump's China-bashing becoming a trademark of his campaign. Rivalry with China has become the organising premise of American foreign policy under Trump's administration. Republicans and Democrats differ on most issues, but they agree on the need to change America's approach towards China. This has sparked speculation about whether the US-China relationship has devolved into a possibly violent clash or a new Cold War. The Trump administration has openly announced a shift in US policy towards China, with Matt Pottinger claiming that the US has modified its China policy to emphasise competition. Former Vice President of Trump Pence stated that the United States will combat China aggressively on all fronts, including economic, military, diplomatic, political, and ideological. This statement is regarded as "the declaration of a new Cold War." (Pence’s, 2018) Former Trump advisor Stephen K. Bannon has declared economic war on China, blaming its exports on the American working and middle classes. Many people agree that China is economically dominating America, and the US government and industry have done little to solve the situation. Globalists such as Madeline Albright, Tom Friedman, and Fareed Zakaria have grown increasingly concerned about China's lack of reciprocity in economic dealings with the United States. David Lampton, a pro-engagement advocate, has criticised China's WTO membership for increasing bilateral trade surpluses. (Staff R. , 2017) The second stage began when Donald Trump determined to halt Chinese commercial and technological advancements, renouncing liberal internationalism in favor of a new grand strategy against China. (Drezner D. R., 2021) The growing view of Xi Jinping as a harsh leader with an aggressive foreign policy contributes to the sense of an ideological clash. China and the United States have initiated an unconstrained war for bilateral, regional, and global dominance, ushering in a new age of strategic conflict that has yet to be fully defined. (Rudd, 2020) The US-China conflict appears to be a Cold War, and any return to a pre-2017 environment of "strategic engagement" with Beijing is no longer politically viable. (Rudd, 2020)However, (Zakaria, 2019) does not feel that the liberal international order has deteriorated as much as is widely assumed, and China is far from a grave threat to the liberal international system. Despite the best intentions of both countries, the US-China relationship is more likely to devolve into economic and military competition. (Lake, 2018) China's strategy aims to modernize its industrial capacity and secure its position as a global powerhouse in high-tech industries. The strategy aims to reduce reliance on foreign technology imports, increase Chinese-domestic content of core materials, and upgrade its dominant position in major strategic industries, such as pharmaceutical, automotive, aerospace, semiconductors, and most importantly, IT and robotics. The 14th Five-Year Plan of China (2021-2025) emphasizes high-quality growth driven by green and high-tech industries, service sectors, and domestic consumption. The US judged China's old growth model as generating a somewhat balanced win-win relationship between the two economies, based on "comparative advantage" and "cost-benefit" evaluations. However, Beijing's new growth model, particularly the "Made in China 2025" aspiration, is perceived as competition with the US service and knowledge economy, resulting in trade and high-tech warfare between the two countries since 2018. (Bernal-Meza L. X., China-US rivalry: a new Cold War or capitalism’s intra-core competition?, 2021) The US business community, once a staunch supporter of engagement, has complained that China has hacked American industrial secrets, created barriers to American firms investing in China, enforced regulations that discriminate against foreigners, maintained high tariffs that should have been reduced decades ago, and blocked American Internet businesses. In a rare joint statement by the allies, the intelligence chiefs of the Five Eyes countries convened on Tuesday to charge China with stealing intellectual property and using artificial intelligence to hack and spy on the countries. (Bing, 2023) The officials from the United States,Britain,Canada,Australia and Huawei,for example,has tight relations with the Party and has been accused of stealing intellectual property as well as spying on Western countries. The United States is concerned about Huwaie's 5G supremacy, which is why it’s CEO, Meng Wan Zhou, was arrested in Canada. Indeed, its importance was highlighted when the United States imposed restrictions restricting, and in some cases prohibiting, Chinese telecoms operations in the American market, and launched a global effort to persuade friends, partners, and others to follow suit. Thus, while President Trump allowed one company (ZTE) a respite from what appeared to be a ban that would put it out of business, later American limitations on Huawei threatened to destroy China's premier international technology company's global viability. (Goldstein, 2020) When it comes to both green technology and chips, it is now at the center of American politics. The CHIPS Act, approved by Congress last year, included $52 billion in grants, tax credits, and other subsidies to stimulate American chip production. That's the kind of industrial policy that would make Hamilton gape and clap. Over the next few years and decades, China will pour vast sums of money into its own industrial strategy programmes, spanning a wide spectrum of cutting-edge technology. According to one Centre for Strategic and International Studies researcher, China already spends more than 12 times as much of its GDP on industrial programmes as the United States. (BROOKS, 2023) Certain social media sites, such as Facebook and Google, are prohibited in China.In the United States, there is a restriction on TIKTOK and WECHAT. To counter China, the United States has implemented a number of statutes, including the: 1.COMPETES Act 2020.: The House Science, Space, and Technology Committee decided to advance the America Competes Act of 2022, which intends to improve America's scientific and technology efforts in the twenty-first century in order to compete with China in vital fields. The bipartisan Act is divided into eleven sections, with Division K headed "Matters Related to Trade." Trade Adjustment Assistance, Import Security and Fairness Act, National Critical Capabilities Review, Modification and Extension of Generalized System of Preferences, Reauthorization of the American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016 and Other Matters, and Temporary Duty Suspensions and Reductions are the seven sections of the Act. President Joe Biden has indicated his support for the Act, arguing that it will strengthen America's supply chains and reenergize the economy's innovation engine, allowing it to compete with China and the rest of the globe for decades to come. 2.Chips and Science Act 2022: President Joe Biden signed the Chips and Science (or CHIPS) Act into law, promising local semiconductor producers more than $50 billion to expand home output and "counter China." (Cosgrove, 2023) 3.The United States passed the Inflation Reduction Act 2022: Although China now dominates clean technology manufacturing, the Inflation Reduction Act contains provisions geared primarily at strengthening the United States' clean energy supply chain. Furthermore, the global transition to clean technology such as solar panels and electric vehicles is unavoidable and ongoing as they become more affordable than fossil-fueled alternatives and countries take action to achieve their Paris climate obligations. (NUCCITELLI, 2023) CHIP War After failing to achieve an agreement with Chinese regulators, Intel cancelled a $5.4 billion takeover deal with Israel-based Tower Semiconductor. China is one of Intel's most important markets, and on July 3, Beijing announced a license requirement for exporters of gallium and germanium, rare-earth metals used in semiconductor manufacturing. The chip war is mostly motivated by the United States' concerns about China's military exploitation of semiconductor technology. However, China's military sector has a key weakness: most of its cutting-edge applications rely on foreign technological inputs, particularly microprocessor exports. China will be the world's largest buyer of semiconductor manufacturing equipment in 2021, accounting for 26% of worldwide demand. Biden established an export license requirement in October 2022, limiting China's access to semiconductor innovations manufactured by US corporations. In July 2023, Japan officially prohibited the sale of 23 types of semiconductor equipment to China, which is significantly more widespread than the US restriction, impeding China's development of advanced chips and basic chips used in technology such as automobiles and smartphones. The Netherlands Standing Committee on Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation said in September that it will begin limiting its semiconductor technology exports to China. According to Nikkie Asia, this new legislation would prohibit the Dutch ASML from exporting innovative chip manufacturing methods without first getting government-approved licenses. (CHENG TING-FANG, 2023) These export limitations have pushed Beijing to retaliate, with China's most recent regulation on gallium and germanium shipments serving as a direct retaliation to the US' global allies. According to the New York Times Magazine, Taiwan manufactures more than 90% of the world's most advanced microchips and could risk armed confrontation if China goes on the offensive in the future. (Palmer, 2023) Former national security advisor Robert O'Brien, on the other hand, believes that in the case of an impending invasion,the US would destroy Taiwan's semiconductor manufacturers rather than allow them to fall into the hands of China. The chip battle has further pushed Taiwan into an awkward position in the changing geopolitical landscape. (Carr, 2023) The Biden administration intends to restrict shipments of advanced artificial intelligence chips designed by Nvidia to China as part of a broader set of actions aimed at preventing Beijing from gaining advanced US technologies to enhance its military. The action is intended to address regulatory gaps and limit China's access to advanced semiconductors, which might feed AI advances and sophisticated computers crucial to Chinese military purposes. Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, emphasised that the administration's goal is not to harm Beijing economically. (Alexandra Alper, 2023) In the words of Lampton, "There was a widespread public perception that the Sino-American economic playing field had been unfair to Americans, with the assertion that the American economy was hollowed out, in part due to overt and covert technology transfer to China" (Lampton, 2015) . China's new growth strategy is leading to more rivalry than complementarity in the China-US economic partnership. The fact that "China's achievement in moving up in the global supply and value chains has led to Beijing's larger share of global surplus and the reduction of the profit margin for traditional core states" has disturbed the United States. (Li X. , 2020) As Lenin would have argued, the dynamics of the US-China rivalry are an inter-imperial rivalry driven by inter-capitalist struggle. Competition for the global market could quickly escalate into escalating confrontations of zones of influence, if not war. Conclusion The US-China rivalry is characterised by a complex interplay of economic, technological, and ideological issues. Although the relationship resembles a new Cold War, some argue that it is best understood as a capitalist intra-core competition driven by inter-imperial rivalry. As Lenin foresaw, competition for global markets may escalate into conflicts over areas of control. The contest is likely to last and have an impact on the global order for many years to come since both nations have made large investments in industrial strategy and technology. Advanced semi-conductors and AI chips are necessary for the next race for technological supremacy. 6G telecom and quantum computing. The globe was forced to protect the supply chain for rare earth materials due to this high-tech rivalry. Since they are currently the epicentre of the world's military and economic might. For many years to come, its influence will shape international politics, trade disputes, and technological advancements. Global struggle for these minerals is anticipated in the twenty-first century, much like the wars for oil and gas in the twentieth. Rare earths will be the focus of the twenty-first century. Mineral-rich nations like Brazil, India, Australia, and Vitenam will also become strategically significant for other reasons. As competition for these resources intensifies, international relations will shift and geopolitical alignment will result. 5Gs is no longer the focus of this new technical cold war. It now comes down to controlling the basic materials that enable technology. For this reason, JD Vance adds, "Give us your financial resources, and we'll take care of you." In the trade and technology conflict that has intensified since the Biden Administration increased the restrictions on sales of cutting-edge American technology to China, the Pentagon has designated rare earth as a strategic mineral that is essential for US defence.In response to US technology sanctions, China restricted the export of rare earth materials.It has nothing to do with economics, but rather with military supremacy on a worldwide scale. This is how the US sees the discovery of these rare earth minerals. Donald Trump is threatening Canada, Greenland, and Ukraine for this reason. Due to their large stockpiles of rare earth materials, they are able to protect the global supply chain in this way.Interestingly, however, China produces 63% of rare earth minerals and refines 83% of them. It can store 44 million metric tonnes of reserves in this manner. The US would still have 4-5 million tonnes of metric reserves if it were to seize the deposits of Greenland, Canada, and Ukraine.Thus, they are negligible compared to 44 million metric tonnes in China. If China wisely controls its rare earth export strategy, it will be powerful enough to remind the world of its might without being overly harsh. Then it can demonstrate that Beijing is just as adept at using resources as Washington is at using dollars or sanctions. However, if the world manages to get past it or if China's grip wanes, its greatest advantage may begin to diminish. The next few months are critical because tanks and missiles are not being used in the largest power fight this time. Minerals and magnets will be used to combat it. Bibliography Alexandra Alper, K. F. (2023, October 18). Biden cuts China off from more Nvidia chips, expands curbs to other countries. 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Abstract This paper examines the NATO nuclear sharing arrangement, focusing on its benefits and challenges within the U.S.-EU security framework. Nuclear sharing involves the U.S. deploying B61 nuclear bombs in select European NATO countries, with host nations providing delivery systems and infrastructure while the U.S. retains full control, ensuring compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The arrangement strengthens NATO's deterrence posture, promotes alliance cohesion, and supports non-proliferation by dissuading the development of independent nuclear arsenals. Recent geopolitical tensions, especially Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have intensified calls for expanding sharing to countries like Poland, enhancing deterrence on NATO's eastern flank. Exercises such as Steadfast Noon validate operational readiness and signal resolve. Critics, however, highlight legal and escalation risks, potential NPT violations, and domestic opposition in host countries. Despite these issues, nuclear sharing remains a crucial component of Euro-Atlantic security, adapting to evolving threats while balancing deterrence, alliance unity, and non-proliferation goals.  Key Words: International Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nuclear Sharing, Alliances Introduction Nuclear sharing is a cornerstone of NATO's deterrence strategy, designed to distribute the benefits, responsibilities, and risks of nuclear deterrence across the Alliance. Under these arrangements, the United States deploys a limited number of B61 nuclear gravity bombs at bases in several European NATO member states. At the same time, those host countries provide the necessary infrastructure, security, and dual-capable aircraft (DCAs) to deliver weapons in a crisis. The weapons remain under full U.S. custody and control at all times, in compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). A nuclear mission can only be authorised after explicit political approval from NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which includes all NATO members, and the U.S. President (and potentially the UK Prime Minister). This setup ensures collective decision-making and underscores the U.S.'s extended deterrence commitments to its allies, helping prevent nuclear proliferation by giving non-nuclear states a stake in the Alliance's nuclear posture without independent arsenals.[1] The arrangements originated in the Cold War era, with the first U.S. atomic weapons arriving in Europe in 1954. By the 1960s, they were formalised through the NPG to allow non-nuclear allies input on nuclear policy. Today, approximately 100 B61 bombs are forward-deployed in Europe, hosted by five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Seven NATO allies contribute DCA, including F-16s and F-35s, which serve dual roles in conventional operations and as potential nuclear delivery platforms. France and the UK maintain independent nuclear forces that complement the US-led sharing but operate outside the formal NATO structure. While the question references the EU, nuclear sharing is strictly a NATO framework; all host countries are EU members except Turkey, creating significant overlap but no direct EU-level involvement.[2] These arrangements serve multiple purposes: they enhance Alliance cohesion, provide tools for managing escalations in conflicts, and signal resolve to adversaries, such as Russia. Recent geopolitical tensions, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have prompted discussions about expanding sharing to strengthen deterrence on NATO's eastern flank.[3] Poland, a NATO member since 1999, has long advocated for a stronger role in the Alliance's nuclear mission amid heightened Russian threats, particularly following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In June 2023, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki first publicly expressed interest in hosting U.S. nuclear weapons under NATO's sharing policy, arguing it would bolster deterrence without violating the NPT. This push intensified in early 2025, driven by concerns over U.S. reliability under the second Trump administration and Russia's aggressive posture.[4]   On March 13, 2025, President Andrzej Duda explicitly urged the U.S. to deploy nuclear warheads on Polish territory, stating in interviews that NATO infrastructure—including nuclear assets — should "shift east" to match the eastward expansion of the Alliance's borders since 1999. He emphasised that such a move would enhance security guarantees and deter future Russian aggression, while also praising France's potential extension of its "atomic umbrella" as a complementary option. Duda's proposal carried domestic political weight, positioning Poland's conservative opposition as pro-U.S. ahead of the May 2025 presidential election, where candidates debated transatlantic ties versus European autonomy.[5] Proponents argue Poland is an ideal candidate: it spends 4.7% of GDP on defence (exceeding NATO's 2% target), has built one of Europe's strongest militaries, and hosts significant U.S. rotational forces. Analysts suggest that deployment could involve adapting Polish F-35s for DCA roles or constructing secure storage facilities. However, logistical and political hurdles remain, including a potential Russian backlash and the need for NPG consensus.[6] As of October 2025, however, no U.S. nuclear weapons have been deployed to Poland, and the proposal remains under discussion without a formal U.S. commitment. Instead, Poland has deepened integration through participation in NATO's annual Steadfast Noon nuclear exercise, which began on October 13, 2025, across Belgium, the Netherlands, and the North Sea — testing procedures for credibility and safety. Poland joined as a full participant alongside Finland, Germany, and the U.S., signalling growing involvement in nuclear planning but stopping short of hosting assets. Alternatives like a dedicated U.S. "nuclear umbrella" declaration for Poland have been floated to avoid escalation without physical deployment.[7] What academics say Academic experts agree that Nuclear sharing is a cornerstone of NATO's defence strategy. This arrangement refers to an agreement according to which the United States deploys non-strategic nuclear weapons on allied territory while maintaining ownership and peacetime custody.[8]This allows selected NATO members to participate in nuclear planning and provide delivery systems, creating a framework that extends American nuclear deterrence across the Alliance. The operational structure of nuclear sharing involves dual-key arrangements in which both U.S. and host-nation authorisation are required for weapon employment. The United States maintains absolute control and custody of its nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe, while Allies provide military support for the DCA mission with conventional forces and capabilities. Nuclear sharing arrangements play a vital role in the Alliance's interconnection and remain a key component of security guarantees and the indivisibility of security across the entire Euro-Atlantic area.[9] These arrangements are coordinated through NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, ensuring multilateral consultation on nuclear policy and targeting decisions. Currently, only five European NATO members have signed bilateral nuclear-sharing agreements with the U.S. These are: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, under which the U.S. stores B61 nuclear gravity bombs at their airbases and their dual-capable aircraft can deliver them in a NATO context. These arrangements, dating back to the Cold War and reaffirmed in subsequent treaties, involve approximately 100 U.S. warheads as of 2025.[10] Nuclear sharing serves multiple strategic purposes within the alliance framework. It strengthens extended deterrence by visibly integrating allied forces into NATO's nuclear posture, thereby reassuring front-line states of American commitment.[11] Experts claim that these arrangements helped prevent nuclear proliferation by reducing incentives for European allies to develop independent arsenals during the Cold War.[12] Additionally, nuclear sharing distributes the political and operational burdens of nuclear responsibility across participating members rather than concentrating them solely with the United States. However, nuclear sharing faces significant criticisms. Legal scholars argue that forward-deploying U.S. weapons on non-nuclear states potentially contravenes the Non-Proliferation Treaty's spirit, creating ongoing diplomatic tensions with Russia and other nations.[13] Domestic opposition within host countries and concerns about the escalation of crises further complicate these arrangements.[14] Despite these challenges, nuclear sharing remains integral to NATO's deterrence strategy, particularly as renewed great-power competition has reinforced alliance solidarity and commitment to collective defence in the contemporary security environment. Benefits of Nuclear Sharing Firstly, official sources from NATO and the U.S. government consistently highlight the benefits of their efforts in preserving peace, deterring aggression, fostering unity, and aligning with global non-proliferation norms. The primary official argument for nuclear sharing is its role in bolstering NATO's deterrence posture against evolving threats, particularly from nuclear-armed adversaries like Russia. NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept and related documents emphasise that the Alliance's nuclear capabilities, including U.S. forward-deployed weapons, serve to "preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression". [15] The 2024 Washington Summit Declaration reaffirms this, stating that "nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of Alliance security" and that NATO's capabilities provide the "supreme guarantee" for all members.[16] By integrating U.S. nuclear assets with European contributions, such as DCA from seven Allies, these arrangements complicate adversaries' planning and enhance crisis management. As noted in NATO's factsheet, "nuclear sharing provides military and political tools for deterrence and can be used to manage escalation in a crisis," with DCA serving as a "visible and valuable instrument for strategic communications" to signal resolve.[17] Accordingly, in a security environment marked by Russia's integration of nuclear forces into its military strategy and threats against Allies, nuclear sharing ensures credible deterrence without provoking conflict. NATO’s former Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg argued that "the purpose of NATO's nuclear weapons is not to provoke a conflict but to preserve peace, deter aggression and prevent coercion," underscoring that arrangements like those involving Germany are vital for the "security of the whole alliance".[18] The U.S. State Department echoes this rationale, claiming that with NATO "numerically outgunned on the central front," nuclear sharing maintains a "nuclear deterrent posture sufficient to deter the Soviet aggression," a logic that persists against modern threats.[19] Against this backdrop, exercises like Steadfast Noon[1] Further strengthen this by simulating nuclear scenarios, ensuring "the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission".[20] Overall, according to official sources, these mechanisms help preserve stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, and adapt to challenges posed by actors such as China and North Korea. Secondly, nuclear sharing fosters unity and shared responsibility among NATO members, distributing the benefits, risks, and political burdens of deterrence more evenly among them. NATO's publications explicitly state that these arrangements "ensure that the benefits, responsibilities and risks of nuclear deterrence are shared across the Alliance," demonstrating "unity and cohesion amongst all Allies" through joint decision-making in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).[21] This shared approach, as NATO sources claim, reinforces the indivisibility of security, as outlined in NATO's nuclear policy: "Nuclear sharing arrangements play a vital role in the interconnection of the Alliance and remain one of the main components of security guarantees and the indivisibility of security of the whole Euro-Atlantic area".[22] The 2024 Summit Declaration commits to "modernising its nuclear capabilities" and "strengthening its nuclear planning capability," ensuring broader participation to "demonstrate Alliance unity and resolve".[23] By involving European Allies in Allied dual-capable aircraft (DCA) missions and infrastructure, nuclear sharing is intended to help mitigate disparities in capabilities, promote equitable burden-sharing, and prevent fragmentation within the Alliance. Thirdly, NATO posits that nuclear sharing supports non-proliferation efforts. Contrary to criticisms, official sources argue that nuclear sharing advances non-proliferation by reducing incentives for Allies to pursue independent nuclear programs. NATO's review of the NPT at 50 years notes that these arrangements "have contributed to security in Europe and non-proliferation as Allies under the U.S. nuclear umbrella have not felt pressure to develop their own weapons".[24] Codified during the 1960s negotiations, they comply fully with the Treaty, as both the U.S. and the USSR ensured that no prohibitions were placed on such setups.[25] The U.S. State Department details this compromise, which allowed for "wartime nuclear sharing" without requiring peacetime transfer, thereby reassuring allies like West Germany and dissuading proliferation.[26] Post-Cold War reductions — over 90% in NATO's nuclear stockpile — align with NPT Article VI disarmament goals while maintaining deterrence.[27] This balance facilitates peaceful nuclear cooperation under the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, thereby strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.[28] Finally, according to the U.S. State Department, nuclear sharing underscores the U.S. commitment to European security, countering fears of "decoupling" where allies doubt American resolve. The State Department describes it as addressing whether the U.S. would "sacrifice Chicago to save Hamburg," by making nuclear weapons available for Europe's defence.[29] NATO's policy affirms that U.S. strategic forces, supplemented by forward-deployed assets, provide the "supreme guarantee," with Allies contributing to ensure integration across domains.[30] To sum up, official arguments portray nuclear sharing as indispensable for deterrence, cohesion, non-proliferation, and transatlantic solidarity. These arrangements, according to Western policy-makers and experts, have sustained European stability for decades, with ongoing modernisation ensuring their relevance in an unpredictable world. Nuclear Sharing in the Face of an Ongoing War in Ukraine Nuclear sharing has allegedly bolstered NATO's overall deterrence posture, helping to prevent Russian escalation in Ukraine, including potential nuclear use. NATO's nuclear capabilities, including U.S. forward-deployed weapons in Europe, are described as essential to "preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression" in the face of Russia's nuclear threats and integration of nuclear forces into its strategy.[31] This has indirectly supported Ukraine by signalling to Russia that any significant escalation — such as nuclear strikes or attacks on NATO territory — would invoke a collective response, thereby limiting Russia's options in the conflict. Russia's invasion has been accompanied by nuclear sabre-rattling to deter Western intervention, but nuclear sharing has helped counter this by maintaining credible deterrence without direct NATO involvement in Ukraine.[32] In that sense, the already mentioned exercises like Steadfast Noon simulate nuclear scenarios, reinforcing the "credibility, effectiveness, safety and security" of the deterrent, which has been crucial amid threats from Russia, China, and North Korea. Analysts note that this has made Russian nuclear signalling less credible over time, allowing the West to provide advanced weapons to Ukraine that were initially considered taboo.[33] However, Russia's threats have still delayed and limited the scale of Western aid, such as restrictions on long-range strikes into Russia, due to fears of crossing "red lines".[34] As mentioned before, nuclear sharing agreements have arguably fostered greater unity among NATO allies, enabling sustained military and economic support for Ukraine. By sharing the "benefits, responsibilities and risks of nuclear deterrence," nuclear sharing demonstrates Alliance solidarity and the "indivisibility of security" in the Euro-Atlantic area.[35] This has reassured European allies, particularly those near Russia, allowing them to commit resources to Ukraine without fearing abandonment. For example, Poland's push to join nuclear sharing reflects heightened threat perceptions from the war, aiming to strengthen deterrence and defence in a hostile environment. NATO's support, including intelligence sharing and strategic communications, has, at least in the eyes of Western policy-makers, deterred Russian use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in Ukraine.[36] Without reassurance from nuclear sharing of U.S. commitment — countering fears of "decoupling" — it might have been harder for Europe to maintain this level of involvement.[37] From Russia's perspective, nuclear sharing exacerbates tensions, viewing it as part of NATO's eastward expansion that provoked the invasion.[38] Putin has used this to support claims behind "Russia's Special Military Operation" in Ukraine, framing Ukraine's potential NATO integration as a threat that could place U.S. nuclear weapons near Russia's borders, similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis in reverse. This rationale has fueled Russian nuclear threats, which aim to limit Western aid and prolong the conflict by raising escalation fears.[39] The war has heightened nuclear risks, with some analysts arguing it presents greater dangers than the Cuban Missile Crisis due to the potential for miscalculation.[40] Russia's deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus as a counter to NATO's sharing arrangements has further escalated postures.[41] Recent decisions by the U.S., UK, and France to allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles against Russian targets have prompted Putin to warn of a direct NATO-Russia war, indirectly tying into nuclear sharing's role in deterrence dynamics.[42] This has possibly complicated peace efforts, as Russia perceives Western escalation as existential, making negotiations harder. As mentioned earlier, nuclear sharing has arguably helped mitigate proliferation risks during the war. By providing a shared nuclear umbrella, it reduces the incentives for allies like Poland and Germany to pursue independent nuclear programs, thereby supporting the NPT.[43] Possibly then, the invasion has not sparked widespread proliferation, partly because NATO's deterrent reassures members. Interestingly, however, the debates over a "European nuclear deterrent" independent of the U.S. — spurred by uncertainties such as potential shifts in U.S. policy under Trump — could undermine this if not managed effectively.[44] The war has also renewed focus on modernising nuclear sharing, with NATO committing to enhancing capabilities at the 2024 Washington Summit.[45] This has indirectly affected Ukraine by diverting Russian resources and attention, though some argue it prolongs the stalemate without a decisive victory. In summary, nuclear sharing has possibly acted as a stabilising force for NATO, enabling robust support for Ukraine and deterring Russian nuclear escalation. However, it has also contributed to heightened tensions and Russian intransigence, complicating pathways to peace. As the war persists into 2025, proposals to expand sharing (e.g., to Poland) reflect its evolving role in countering ongoing threats. Conclusion The "Steadfast Noon" exercises are arguably a clear signal to any potential adversary, including Russia, that NATO is prepared to defend all its members against any threats, including nuclear ones. Such exercises involve the use of American non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, although no real combat weapons are used during the drills. The exercises serve not only to practice deterrence against possible nuclear attacks but also to prepare for the potential use of nuclear weapons by NATO if necessary. The fact that these exercises involve nuclear deterrence indicates that NATO's defence strategy includes readiness to escalate to a nuclear response if provoked by a nuclear attack. The locations of these nuclear weapons are not publicly disclosed. Still, there is speculation about their presence in countries like Poland, particularly in light of recent secret agreements that allow foreign troops to enter Polish territory. On the other hand, one should also consider potential downsides, especially for countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Nuclear sharing for potential allied use in wartime poses significant risks despite its deterrence aims. One major downside is its incompatibility with the NPT, which violates Articles I and II.[2] Enabling the indirect transfer of control to non-nuclear states undermines global non-proliferation efforts and draws criticism from states such as China. This arrangement also heightens proliferation risks, as peacetime training and exercises normalise nuclear readiness, potentially inspiring similar setups in Asia-Pacific regions like Japan and South Korea, escalating regional tensions.[46] Security concerns include increased escalation dangers, where limited nuclear use could spiral into full-scale war, especially amid vulnerabilities at host bases like Incirlik in Türkiye during political instability. Expanding sharing, such as to Poland, fuels arms races with Russia and exposes more European sites to attacks, without adding credible deterrence given NATO's conventional superiority. Politically, it breeds divisiveness within NATO, fostering resentment among allies and diverting resources from conventional forces, while eroding U.S. control and complicating disarmament. Domestically, host nations face public backlash and moral burdens from anti-nuclear norms, straining alliance cohesion. Russia's objections in NPT forums further highlight how sharing provokes international backlash, risking broader conflicts. Notes [1] On Monday (October 13 2025), NATO began its annual nuclear deterrence exercise Steadfast Noon. The exercise is a long-planned, routine training activity and part of NATO’s broader efforts to maintain readiness and ensure transparency around its nuclear posture. It is not linked to any current world events, and no live weapons are used.[2] Article I - Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Article II - Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. See more at: https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html References [1] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (2022, February). NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[2] Kristensen, H. M., Korda, M., Johns, E., & Knight-Boyle, M. (2023, November 8). Nuclear weapons sharing, 2023. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-11/nuclear-weapons-sharing-2023/[3] Johns, E. (2025, October 10). 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Introduction   The 21st century global politics has now taken a new shape with the advent of artificial intelligence (AI). The traditional nature of great power rivalry revolves around military maneuvers, defensive-offensive moves, and weapons deployment to challenge each other, maintaining their respective hegemony over the international arena. The revival of artificial intelligence has reshaped the conventional great power game.(Feijóo et al. 2020) From now onwards, whenever the strategic circles discuss the security paradigm, AI has to be its part and parcel. The emergence of AI has altered the status quo, where major powers are now shifting towards AI-based technology. As the most basic function of AI is to create such machines and platforms that can perform tasks more proficiently than humans, it has the ability to enhance decision-making, increase efficiency, and reduce the likely risk of human errors. But at the same time, risks are also lingering.   The United States (US) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are considered to be the main players of great power politics. Their rivalry has long been centered around territorial conflicts and maritime contests. With the PRC claiming most of the territories in the South China Sea and East China Sea, the US, under its Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022), has challenged the Chinese assertion.(Hassan and Ali 2025) But what the world has witnessed is that both economic hegemons have been avoiding any direct military conflict with each other. The most prominent area where both the US and the PRC are now in a continuous competition is the technological domain. China has always maintained an edge over the US in the respective field due to the fact that it holds most of the world’s known rare earth minerals—a key to technological superiority. Through trade barriers, i.e., tariffs, quotas, etc., and restricting trade with prominent Chinese companies, the US has always tried to contain technological developments in China.(Wang and Chen 2018)   “The reality is that both China and the United States are focused on getting the infrastructure necessary to win the so-called AI race. Now, whether it’s actually a race is a separate question, but data, energy, and human capital are all critical inputs to this. The massive investment infrastructure is top of mind for leaders in both countries as they seek to do it. China’s access to the advanced technology and semiconductors is going to be a key cornerstone in this regard.”(Sacks, 2025) US and China have placed AI at the center of their national policies and global strategies. Both have been introducing various policy papers, strategies, and action plans for the advancements in the field of artificial intelligence and how to counter the side. Now, the international arena is witnessing two parallel AI setups: one created by the US and the other by China. As both are tremendously investing in research, development, and innovation in artificial intelligence, their national narratives and global plans are competing with each other, further exacerbating the international AI landscape.   This paper aims to critically analyze key policies highlighted under the national action plans and strategies launched by the US and the PRC, respectively. Applying the theoretical lens of constructivism, which deals with the role of ideas, norms, and values in shaping the international system, the paper will demonstrate key differences between the AI strategies of the US and China and how their ideological beliefs shape their respective AI policies. Moreover, the analysis will provide expert views on the future landscape of the AI race, its relation to the Great Game, and its political, economic, and military repercussions for the rest of the world. Furthermore, the analysis will mostly rely on expert interviews, key excerpts from official administrative documents, and research findings. This study will also provide insights into the Trump 2.0 administration’s policy outlooks vis-à-vis Beijing’s National AI policy.   America’s AI Action Plan 2025   President Trump unveiled his administration’s national strategy on artificial intelligence on 23rd July 2025. Entitled as “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan”, this strategy is a long-term road map to counter and contain China’s growing profile in the tech world, in particular the AI.(White House, 2025) The title of the strategy explicitly announces that the US has entered into the global AI race. Under this strategy, the United States does not want to eliminate China, rather the US desires to lead the AI world as a core nation, while the PRC should operate as a periphery nation. On July 15 2025, while addressing the AI Summit in Pittsburgh, President Donald Trump stated, “The PRC is coming at par with us and we would not let it happen. We have the great chips and we have everything great. And, we will be fighting them in a friendly fashion. I have a great relationship with President Xi and we smile at the back and forth, but we are leading…...”(AFP, 2025)   America’s AI Action Plan: Key Pillars   A. Accelerate AI Innovation   This first pillar of the AI national strategy by the US deals with the fact that AI should be integrated into every sector of American lives. From the grassroots level to the national or international level, the US should be a leading AI power. AI innovation states that any type of barrier, i.e., legal, regulatory, or domestic constraints, must be eradicated at first to promote, enhance, and boost AI innovation in the US. The strategy clearly states the innovation in artificial intelligence to be the fundamental step towards AI global dominance. The American beliefs, values and norms hold much significance in this regard. This strategy laid down the framework where AI platforms and models should have to align with the US democratic principles, including free speech, equality, transparency, and recognition. This means that the US AI action plan will operate under the umbrella of capitalist ideology.(White House, 2025)   Another most important feature in the field of AI innovation is the conglomeration of public-private ventures. Both the governmental authorities and public institutions are provided with such policies and frameworks to integrate AI platforms into their day-to-day operations. Creating an AI ecosystem is the cornerstone of this strategy.(White House, 2025) It aims to build an American workforce mastered in AI capabilities, defense forces and their key platforms integrated with AI, and provide a secure and safe environment to national and international investors, thus encouraging them to increase their investments in the US. Last but not least, the development of various departments countering the unethical use of AI, i.e., deep fakes, thus securing the national sovereignty and integrity of the homeland.   Principal Deputy Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Lynne Parker, while highlighting the significance of the US 2025 AI Action Plan, stated, “The Trump Administration is committed to ensuring the United States is the undeniable leader in AI technology. This plan of action is our first move to enhance and preserve the US AI interest, and we are eager to receive our public perception and viewpoints in this regard.”(House, 2025) The AI innovation drive is indicative of the US being a liberal-democratic and entrepreneurial society. It has an innovation culture that focuses on open research, leadership in the private sector, and ethics based on its national myth of freedom, individualism and technological optimism.   B. Building the AI Infrastructure   This is the most crucial pillar of the US AI Action Plan 2025. From propagating the idea of AI innovation, the next step is to build a strong, secure, and renowned infrastructure to streamline the policy guidelines highlighted in the national AI strategy. This includes the development of indigenous AI factories, companies, data facilities, and their integration into the American energy infrastructure. The most significant step highlighted in this pillar is the construction of indigenous American semiconductor manufacturing units.(White House, 2025) Now what does it mean? As of today, China is considered to be the center of semiconductor manufacturing. Semiconductors are the basic units of any technology, i.e., weapons, aircraft, smartphones, etc. The US has long been importing semiconductor chips from China. Integration of the US energy infrastructure with that of the AI facilities is the ultimate objective of this strategy. Immense energy-producing units, i.e., electricity, under the ‘National Energy Emergency Act’ would be established to provide a continuous supply of electricity to AI data centers and facilities without any hindrance.(House, 2025)   But the Trump 2.0 administration, under its protectionist policies, aspires to restrict imports from China and build a domestic semiconductor processing unit. Highlighting the American dependence on Chinese chips, the American chemist and politician John Moolenaar stated, “The Trump administration has made one thing abundantly clear: we must reassert control over our own economic destiny. That’s not isolationism; that’s common sense. The Chip Security Act, outbound investment restrictions, and stronger export controls—those aren’t closing ourselves off. They are about ensuring America isn’t subsidizing or facilitating our own decline. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using American capital to fund aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and AI systems that target our allies and threaten our freedoms.”(Moolenaar, 2025)   The norm of decentralized innovation is applied in developing the infrastructure, and it empowers universities, startups, and private corporations. This is an expression of confidence in market mechanisms and civil liberties, which is in line with its social values of open innovation and competition.   C. AI Diplomacy and Security   The last pillar of the US AI national action plan is to collaborate with international partners and allies. This simply means to export American AI technology to strategic partners and those with common interests. This will, as a result, give rise to new types of groupings known as ‘AI Alliances.”(White House, 2025) The Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), QUAI AI Mechanism, and US-EU Trade and Technology Council are some of its best manifestations. Like the security and defense partnerships, the AI alliances will enable the US and the West to encircle the PRC in the tech world, where strong western collaborations and partnerships would hinder the PRC from becoming the tech giant or from excelling in AI production. It Encourages responsible AI governance and a democratic form of AI standards of the US, which are based on its self-perception as a global governor of the liberal values.   Thus, in order to enhance AI-related exports to allies, the US has established various institutions, including the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The US AI diplomacy aims to counter China’s growing footprints in the international bodies and institutions.(State 2023) As these global bodies are a key to spreading particular norms and values, shaping the public perception, and framing the global order, the US wants to challenge Chinese entrenchments in these organizations through political and diplomatic coalitions and groupings. Doing this, the West will be able to propagate their version of the global AI order. This means capitalism vs. communism will now be clearly visible in the global AI race between the economic hegemons.   The US Vice President J.D. Vance, while addressing the European Union (EU) leaders in Paris explicitly stated, “The US really wants to work with its European allies. And we wish to start the AI revolution with an attitude of cooperation and transparency. However, international regulatory frameworks that encourage rather than stifle the development of AI technology are necessary to establish that kind of trust. In particular, we need our European allies to view this new frontier with hope rather than fear.”(Sanger 2025) In case of security, the strategy aims to establish various AI Safety Institutes (AISIs) to reduce or eliminate the risk of AI-related accidents, which include errors in AI platforms, most specifically in the AI-operated weapon systems, and the unethical use of AI programs, i.e., generative AI or LLMs. Similarly, the strategy emphasized the danger posed by the non-state actors. These violent actors must be restrained from acquiring such advanced yet sophisticated technology.(White House, 2025)   China’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan   For the first time in July 2017, the PRC launched its long-term national AI vision 2030, entitled “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” which is comprised of all the policies, guidelines, and measures to be taken by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to foster its AI developments.(Council 2017) China’s AI 2030 vision is none other than the extension of the idea that President Xi Jinping circulated in 2012 regarding China’s future role in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). This strategy aims to strengthen China’s AI footprints in the international arena. Ranging from investments to infrastructure, this plan of action explicitly declared to develop the PRC into the hub of AI innovation and investment by 2030. This plan of action is determined to bring about a profit of $160 billion by 2030.(O’Meara 2024) While addressing the Politburo Study Session on 25th April 2025, the Chinese President Xi Jinping noted, “To gain a head start and secure a competitive edge in AI, it is a must to achieve breakthroughs in basic theories, methodologies, and tools. By leveraging AI to drive the transformation of scientific research paradigms, we can speed up achieving breakthroughs in scientific and technological innovation in all sectors.”(Agency 2025)   China’s AI Vision 2030: Key Objectives   A. AI Leadership (2020)   The PRC has successfully accomplished this objective. Under this pillar, China has established significant AI infrastructure, including key facilities and data centers, coming at par with the US. Within this, the CCP urged the academic institutions to promote, enhance, and foster research in the AI domain, which resulted in the major developments in the sectors of big data, swarm intelligence, and super artificial intelligence.(Council 2017) China has successfully established its domestic AI industrial complex worth $22 billion. Various educational institutions, i.e., Tsinghua, Peking, etc., and major companies, i.e., Baidu, iFlyTek, etc., have now completely transformed into AI hubs where research, innovation, and practices are conducted through highly advanced AI platforms.   Commenting on the US-China AI leadership contest, Dr. Yasar Ayaz, the Chairman and Central Project Director of the National Center for AI at NUST, Islamabad, explicitly remarked, “Efficiency is the new name of the game now. Chinese AI inventions and developments clarify the fact that even with the smaller number of parameters, you could achieve the same kind of efficiency that others with an economic edge are achieving.”(Ayaz 2025) The AI leadership symbolically builds the socially constructed narrative of the Chinese Dream and national rejuvenation into the need to overcome the century of humiliation and take its place in the world order. Here, AI leadership is not just a technical objective but a discursive portrayal of the Chinese self-concept of being a technologically independent and morally oriented civilization.   B. AI Technology (2025)   The second most important objective of China’s AI Vision 2030 is to reach a level of tech supremacy in the international arena by 2025. Major work areas include localization of chip industries, advancements in semiconductors and robot manufacturing, etc. The first phase of 2020 basically laid the infrastructural foundation of the plan, while this phase deals with the development and innovation of key AI-operated platforms, including robots, health equipment, and quantum technology.(Council 2017) Another most crucial feature of the 2025 phase is to establish various AI labs throughout mainland China. This would result in the integration of AI into different public-private sectors, i.e., finance, medical, politics, agriculture, etc. Last but not least, a civil-military collaboration is described to be a cornerstone in this regard.   The AI-operated platforms would be utilized by both civil and military institutions, thus preserving the PRC’s national security and safety. Giving remarks over China’s technological edge, Syed Mustafa Bilal, a technology enthusiast and research assistant at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), added, “China, which for the longest time has been criticized for having a technologically closed-off ecosystem, is now opting for an open-source approach. That was evident by the speeches of Chinese officials at the Global AI Action Summit, in which they tried to frame China’s AI strategy as being much more inclusive as compared to the West. And one illustration of that is the ironic way in which deep search is currently furthering OpenAI's initial selfless objective of increasing AI adoption worldwide.”(Bilal 2025) Thus, the AI vision of China reflects ideational promises of social order, central coordination, and a moral government, ideals that are based on its political culture and civilization background.   C. AI Innovation Hub (2030)   By 2030, China aims to be at the epicenter of global AI innovations, development, and investments. The PRC’s political, economic, and defense institutions will be governed under AI overhang. The most significant feature of this phase is to counter the US-led AI order by challenging the US and the West in various international bodies like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The main tenet of China’s 2030 vision is to transform it into a completely AI-driven economy—an AI economic giant.(Council 2017) As the PRC is ruled by the communist regime of President Xi Jinping, China aspires to counter the Western-led AI order through instigating its communist values, including high surveillance, strict national policies, and population control. By avoiding a completely liberal, free speech AI environment in mainland China, the CCP aims to come on par with the US by having authoritative control over its people, thus maintaining its doctrine of ‘techno self-reliance.’   Giving his insights on the new global AI order and the ideological rift between the US and China, Dr. Wajahat Mehmood Qazi, advisor on AI and digital transformation to the private tech companies and faculty member at the COMSATS University, Lahore, explicated, “Yes, there is a digital divide, but the interesting part over here is this: the world is evolving, so this big divide is no more about the decentralization or the centralization. If we look at how China is promoting openness by releasing its foundation models, at the same time the ecosystem of their LM models or AI is still in close proximity. Whereas, the western world is having a different narrative. They are talking about the openness of the models, but at the same time it’s more market-driven. In my view, we are entering into a world where innovation requires openness and closed methods simultaneously.”(Qazi 2025)   The concept of innovation with Chinese features is used to describe a socially constructed attempt to exemplify another approach to technological modernity, which combines dictatorial rule and developmental prosperity. It is a mirror image of self-concept in China as a norm entrepreneur that wants to legitimize its system of governance and impact the moral and technological discourse of AI at the global scale.   Conclusion   The constructivist perspective informs us that the competition between Washington and Beijing is not predetermined; it is being conditioned by the perceptions, suspicion, and competing versions that can be rebuilt through dialogue and mutual rules. The ideological divide can be overcome by creating inclusive tools of AI governance, with transparency, ethical principles, and shared responsibility in their focus. The common ground created through the establishment of a mutual conception of the threats and the ethical aspects of AI will enable the United States and China to leave the zero-sum game on AI and enter into a model of normative convergence and accountable innovation. Constructivism thereby teaches us that cooperation in AI is not just a strategic requirement but also a social option, which is constructed on shifting identities and the recognition of global interdependence with each other.   The great power competition is now in its transformative phase, bypassing the traditional arms race for a more nascent yet powerful AI race. In the context of the US-China contest, administrations on both sides are trying their utmost to launch, implement, and conclude critical national strategies and formulations in the field of artificial intelligence. Both are moving forward at a much greater pace, thus developing advanced technologies in the political, economic, and military domains. Be it China’s Deep Seek or the Western Chat GPT, be it Trump’s Stargate project or Xi’s AgiBot, both are investing heavily into the tech-AI sector. Despite this contest, both economic giants also need joint efforts and collaborations in various matters of concern. Until now, it’s been very difficult to declare which will lead the global AI order. The chances of a global AI standoff are there.ReferencesAFP. 2025. “Trump Vows to Keep US Ahead in AI Race with China.” The News International. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1328672-trump-vows-to-keep-us-ahead-in-ai-race-with-china.Agency, Xinhua News. 2025. “20th Collective Study Session of the CCP Central Committee Politburo.” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 1–3.Ayaz, Dr. Yasar. 2025. “Global AI Rivalry: U.S vs China.” PTV. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_82MMzI_g2c&t.Bilal, Syed Mustafa. 2025. “Global AI Rivalry: U.S vs China.” PTV. 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Bauer, Erik Bohlin, Bronwyn Howell, Rekha Jain, Petrus Potgieter, Khuong Vu, Jason Whalley, and Jun Xia. 2020. “Harnessing Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Increase Wellbeing for All: The Case for a New Technology Diplomacy.” Telecommunications Policy 44 (6). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2020.101988.Hassan, Abid, and Syed Hammad Ali. 2025. “Evolving US Indo-Pacific Posture and Strategic Competition with China.” Policy Perspectives 22 (1). https://doi.org/10.13169/polipers.22.1.ra4.House, White. 2025. “Declaring a National Energy Emergency – The White House.” Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/declaring-a-national-energy-emergency/.House, White. 2025. “Public Comment Invited on Artificial Intelligence Action Plan – The White House.” Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/02/public-comment-invited-on-artificial-intelligence-action-plan/.Moolenaar, John. 2025. “The 2025 B.C. 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The fall of Kabul with the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 was not an end to the long standing Afghan crisis but rather turned into a more complex challenge for Afghans at large & for Taliban leaders alike. The Taliban had to transform from a nimble insurgency to a functioning state. Nearly three years on, it is clear that the group’s strategy for maximizing relevance is not based on building a prosperous nation but on a dangerous and calculated paralysis. Both internally, through draconian social policies and externally through provocative engagements, the current regime is placing its ideology above the interests of the general populace. This approach, recently highlighted by a deadly skirmish with nuclear-armed Pakistan, threatens to freeze Afghanistan in a state of perpetual crisis, sacrificing its people’s future for the regime’s ideological purity and survival.   The Pakistan Conundrum: A Calculated Maneuvering.The recent escalation along the Durand Line with Pakistan served as a stark reminder of the Taliban’s precarious external posture. The exchange of fire, which included airstrikes within mainland Afghanistan and mortar shelling, resulting in casualties on both sides, was not a fight among equals.  Pakistan possesses one of the world's largest and most battle-hardened militaries, backed by a nuclear arsenal. Its conventional military capabilities from a modern air force to sophisticated artillery and armour can not be compared with the Taliban’s minimal and largely infantry-based forces, who possess no air force, limited air defence, and very basic command and control structures.   For the Taliban to engage in such a conflict, even briefly, seems suicidal. However, this is where their insurgency mindset becomes apparent. Their power does not lie in matching Pakistan’s might but in leveraging asymmetry. A direct, conventional war is unwinnable, but a low-intensity conflict along the border, leveraging their ideological kinship with Tehreek i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) factions is a tool of influence. The subsequent ceasefire agreement, brokered through backchannel dialogues involving Turkiye & Qatar was a tactical retreat, not a strategic surrender.   Immediately after the truce, the Taliban leadership felt compelled to issue clarifications to its own population. This narrative management is crucial. It underscores the regime’s primary audience, its own hardline base and the wider Afghan populace, which remains afraid of foreign domination. The entire episode was a high-stakes performance, demonstrating defiance to solidify internal legitimacy while avoiding a full-scale war that would be catastrophic for the fledgling regime. The costs of such a war for Pakistan would be significant—economic disruption, a massive refugee crisis, and further destabilisation of its own restive western regions. For Afghanistan, it would be existential, leading to immediate state collapse and humanitarian catastrophe.   Internal Paralysis: The War on Half the Population   The Taliban’s internal policy is catastrophically self-sabotaging too. The most glaring example of state paralysis is the systematic eradication of women’s rights, particularly the access to education. By banning girls from secondary school and university, the Taliban are not just enforcing a brutal societal code, they are actively paralysing the state’s potential.   This policy effectively keeps away half of the nation’s human capital. It ensures a future with fewer doctors, engineers, teachers, and administrators, crippling almost all long-term economic development or social progress. The health system, already on life support, cannot function without female staff in a gender-segregated society. This is not merely repression, it is institutionalised crime against humanity. The regime, by its own decree, is preventing itself from building the skilled workforce necessary for society to function smoothly. This creates a controlled, paralysed society where the regime’s ideological control is prioritised over the state’s functional capacity.   The Geopolitical Tightrope: Beijing and Moscow’s Cautious Gaze   The Taliban’s isolation is not absolute. Its relationships with China and Russia are pragmatic alliances of convenience, yet they are tied with unspoken conditions. Beijing is primarily interested in stability which eventually leads to integrating Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative, particularly as an extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China values the Taliban’s promise to not host Uyghur separatists and offers economic and diplomatic engagement in return. However, the ongoing internal instability which has already cost a huge oil extraction deal, &  ties to groups like TTP, which threaten Pakistan, makes Beijing stay on alert.   Similarly, Russia seeks to use the Taliban as a barricade against the spread of ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), which it sees as a threat to its interests in Central Asian allies. It engages with the Taliban for intelligence sharing but like China, it withholds full diplomatic recognition. Both powers are playing a long game, providing just enough engagement to keep the Taliban engaged and prevent complete state failure, but not enough to legitimize its worst excesses. They are investing in the idea of a stable Afghanistan, not necessarily in the Taliban’s model of governance.   The Thirst for Recognition and the umbrella of sanctions   Taliban’s central quandary, the desperate thirst for international recognition to get away from sanctions. The frozen assets abroad, the collapse of the formal banking sector and the aid-dependent economy are a direct result of the regime’s policies. The international community’s conditions for recognition, forming an inclusive government, respecting human rights, and severing ties with terrorist groups are precisely what the Taliban’s base rejects.   Therefore, they have chosen a path of managed paralysis, maintaining a firm grip on power through internal suppression and external defiance, hoping to wait out the international community and force a recognition on their own terms. They are betting that the world’s fear of a completely failed state, a haven for terrorists and a source of uncontrollable refugee flow will eventually outweigh its principled objections to their governance.   Conclusion   In an era defined by profound global realignment, sustainable statecraft necessitates avoiding international isolation, a burden no state can long bear. The Taliban’s current orientation however, blatantly violates this principle, presenting a multi layered threat to regional stability and global security. Central to this crisis is the regime’s unwavering prioritization of a rigid ideology over the sustainability of global security and the welfare of its own population. This doctrinal commitment manifests in a dangerously irresponsible foreign policy, including active support for transnational terrorist groups like the Tehrik i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). By engaging in war-mongering with a nuclear-armed Pakistan, the Taliban not only invites an existential retaliatory war that could draw in global powers but also demonstrates a reckless disregard for regional security balance. This external belligerence is compounded by a foreign policy confined to the conditional alignment with only Russia and China only, a model not suitable for navigating the transitional nature of contemporary global power dynamics.   The consequences of this ideological inflexibility are catastrophically domestic too. The Afghan people bear the harshest price, suffering under a reign of terror and a collapsing economy. A profound food security crisis has left millions malnourished and desperate. This immense internal suffering does not merely constitute a humanitarian tragedy, it actively generates a threat to global peace. A starving, disenfranchised, and radicalized population becomes a fertile recruiting ground for international terrorist networks. As misery deepens, the potential grows for Afghanistan to export not just ideological inspiration but also a desperate, battle-hardened cadre of extremists, who could destabilize far beyond its borders. Thus, the Taliban’s preference for ideology over pragmatic statecraft creates a vicious cycle. This path is unsustainable, promising only further devastation for Afghanistan and heightened peril for the world.References CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE.(2023).Russia’s Growing Ties With Afghanistan Are More Symbolism Than Substancehttps://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/09/russias-growing-ties-with-afghanistan-are-more-symbolism-than-substance?lang=enHUMAN RIGHTS WATCH.(2024Taliban’s Attack on Girls’ Education Harming Afghanistan’s Futurehttps://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/17/talibans-attack-girls-education-harming-afghanistans-futureLOWY INSTITUTE.(2025).Afghanistan must tread a narrow path to stabilityhttps://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/afghanistan-must-tread-narrow-path-stabilityNiKKEI ASIA. (2025).Taliban cancel oilfield deal with Chinese in Afghanistan's northhttps://asia.nikkei.com/economy/taliban-cancel-oilfield-deal-with-chinese-in-afghanistan-s-northSCIENCE DIRECTUpdate on the state of food security and safety in Afghanistan: A reviewhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2949824425001545WILSON CENTER.(2024)Mining for Influence: China's Mineral Ambitions in Taliban-Led Afghanistanhttps://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/mining-influence-chinas-mineral-ambitions-taliban-led-afghanistan

Introduction Hegemony is the core principle in International Relations. It has been conceptualized through military strength, economic influence, and ideological control. The theory of cultural hegemony by Antonio Gramsci is based on assuming control but not necessarily through force, whereas realist theorists such as John Mearsheimer stress the relevance of military strength for ensuring global dominance (Mearsheimer 2001). The 21st century, though, brought into being a different era of transformation and technological breakthroughs that turned the existing arrangements on their head. With the advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI), cyber war, and space technology, great powers are transforming from traditional soldiers to cyberspace warriors. AI and other cyber tools are altering the strategic equation between major powers, providing avenues for countries like China and Russia to undermine US hegemony (Rooney et al. 2022). Hegemony in the past had been founded on military superiority, but at present, academics have discovered that technological hegemony is leading the way. Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) and AI have captivated researchers because they can transform war. Cyberspace has become the new battleground of power. The US and China are competing for cyber hegemony (Akdaǧ 2025). Space is increasingly regarded as a new battleground in geopolitics. The US Space Force and China’s BeiDou system illustrate how nations weave surveillance and communication in their strategic decision-making (O’Hanlon 2020). Thus, new technologies are reshaping the China-US rivalry. To counter this, countries are investing in tech-based industries, which will change the way human thinks. The analysis will explore whether emerging technologies can efficiently replace traditional tools of hegemony or not. Joseph Nye’s concept of smart power provides a critical framework in this modern era, where influence may flow from military boots to silicon chips. Global powers are moving towards influence and deterrence-based tech models, supplementing hard power. However, this transition has its risks, such as overdependence and ethical concerns. The paper argues that a complete transformation is not happening, but there will be dual-track hegemony where military and technology will coordinate to dominate. Policy implications of this shift are profound. Global powers must collaborate to draft international norms for AI and cyberwarfare, developing nations must develop their technology rather than dependency on global powers, as it will be easier for them to surveil and dominate, and international institutions must proactively govern the techno-political landscape to prevent destabilization. This study will use a qualitative approach, and it will be a case-based methodology combining theoretical perspectives of philosophers. This analysis is important as it delves into the transformation of the mechanics of global power from military hegemony to technology-oriented hegemony. It uses secondary sources like policy briefs, think tank reports, books, etc. Finally, this analysis concludes that soldiers may never be the first line of every fight, but the battle for global supremacy is firmly human-hinged in decisions on technology, ethics, and governance. Hegemony is a core concept in International Relations, grounded in military capacity, economic influence, and institutional influence. Historically, great civilizations like the Roman and British empires attained hegemony by dominating in naval power, making alliances and expanding their territories. In the post-World War II era, the US built dominance through overseas military bases and nuclear deterrence. Historical Foundations of Traditional Hegemony The Roman Empire, a classic example of past hegemony, attained this power by constructing roads, forts, and legions in the world's islands. Later, the British Empire sustained its dominance by modernizing the Royal Navy and the global trade network. The post-World War II era saw the hegemony of the United States with overseas military bases and security alliances. John Mearsheimer, in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, says that according to great powers, hegemony is the best way to ensure their security (Mearsheimer 2001). Limitations of Traditional Hegemony The primary limitation of the traditional hegemonic model is the risk of overreach, entering into too many overseas agreements that become economically and politically unsustainable. Imperial overstretch, a model proposed by Paul Kennedy, explains the collapse of empires when they are unable to maintain their economy due to huge global aims (Kennedy 1988). Concurrently, we can see that after so many years have passed in the Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq wars, the US is spending trillions. Approximately $3.68 trillion was spent on Iraq and Afghanistan (Costs of War | Brown University 2025). This highlights that military dominance can be costly and unsustainable. Mearsheimer, in an interview at the New York Times, claimed that ‘the United States is responsible for causing the Ukraine crisis’. Lack of legitimacy and local resistance is another great flaw in the traditional hegemonic pattern. For example, in Vietnam, soldiers used their knowledge of geography to push back against America's advanced weapons. Similarly, in Afghanistan and Iraq, foreign-led missions struggled with local insurgents. The New Tools of Technological Hegemony Cyber Power Cyber power has rapidly become a strategic field where states project their influence far beyond the geographic borders, often without soldiers. Cyber operations are dominating in this digital age, and the SolarWinds hack shows how states can achieve global influence through an Information Technology (IT) infrastructure breach. In March 2020, Russian hackers placed a secret backdoor in SolarWinds’ Orion software. This infected around 18000 users, including US major government departments (Cybersecurity 2021). The cyberattacks went undetected for several months, revealing vulnerabilities in the digital network. It was the worst cyber-espionage attack ever, an analyst described. Iran's 2019 cyberattack on the oil infrastructure of Saudi Arabia shows that the acquisition of digital superiority can help influence norms, command the critical infrastructure, and set global political narratives without foreign boots on the ground. To address this vulnerability, it is essential to know cyber deterrence theory. It discusses capability, attribution, and resolution. States should advance digital tools, modify their tracking system and enhance communication and transparency. The most lethal weapon today may not fire a projectile-it fires packets. This metaphor illustrates that state actors can erode adversary national infrastructure, banks and election systems without traditional warfare. The US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III described the integrated Deterrence that integrates cyber with land, sea, and space under a unified strategy (Masitoh, Perwita, and Rudy 2025). Cybersecurity experts say that cyberpower is now a geopolitical power. And cyber warfare is not a sideshow; it’s a frontline strategy. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data AI’s strategic significance for national security has been emphasized by leaders like Jason Matheny, CEO of RAND Corporation. He warns that AI could make it easier to make harmful weapons and dangerous technologies (Matheny 2024). The 2023 report of RAND on AI and Geopolitics argues that AI may be the next frontier in US-China rivalry (Pavel et al. 2023). ChatGPT and Bard, like generative AI models, have humanitarian strategic applications, which makes fake news so believable that it feels like fact. This capability of AI can transform propaganda into scalable digital warfare. Beyond surveillance, AI has transformed military operations tactics. Military applications like drone swarming, algorithmic targeting, and predictive ISR create scenarios where the frontline shifts from kinetic zones to data centers. AI diplomacy is becoming the new foreign aid. Financial Times article notes that tech giants are deploying AI mechanisms in Africa not only for development but for their advantage as an influence tool. Thus, AI and big data are a new form of informational hegemony. Space Militarization and Satellite Dominance Space militarization emerged during the Cold War. States like the US, China, Russia, India, and Japan have developed anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities (Samson and Cesari 2025). General John Jay Raymond at the US Space Command Launch said that, “Outer space is now recognized as a domain of military operations” (Raymond 2021). China’s 2007 ASAT test, which destroyed its own Fengyun-1C weather satellite, is still a thorn in the eyes of major powers. Russia has also launched missions like Kosmos-2553. Evolution from GPS to GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite Systems) reflects strategic change. The US has GPS, China has BeiDou, Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite constellation, and Europe has Galileo; each system highlights the sovereignty in digital positioning. China’s counterpart doctrine states in its 2021 Space White Paper that space-based assets are not crucial for renaissance only but for strategic deterrence without deploying soldiers or causing deaths of your military men (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2022). Undersea Cables and Digital Infrastructure Control Undersea cables carry over 95% of global data transmission (Sherman 2021). Disruption or surveillance of these cables can impact the worldwide flow of data and diplomatic communications. In developing countries like Pakistan, Kenya, and Ecuador, Huawei-funded infrastructure provides smart city services. Cable route is not just wiring undersea, it is influenced by encryption. The US and EU have Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud, like surveillance platforms. Cable-Landing zones (CLZs) are the chokepoints used for manipulation, Cloud interconnection policies allow control of traffic flow, and Surveillance software and firmware installed at data centers can be remotely controlled, bypassing local safeguards. Blocking connections can slow or disrupt foreign economic leverage. Digital infrastructure has become a domain for hegemony that is more insidious in strategic potential. This map exposes the physical foundations of digital power. Nations with greater cable landing nodes, like the U.S. and China, wield asymmetric influence, not through soldiers, but through network control. Disruption or surveillance of these cables can cripple economies or governance. Regional chokepoints also reflect strategic leverage in geo-economics and cyber diplomacy, making this infrastructure as consequential as traditional military bases. Figure 1: This map shows the physical foundations of digital power, nations with greater cable landing nodes, like the U.S. and China, wield asymmetric influence, not through soldiers, but through network control.Superpowers’ Technological Footprint United States Silicon Valley is the heart of US technological hegemony, and some other government agencies, like Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), are contributing to maintaining US technological hegemony. Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs), drones, and defense-grade AI-powered decision-support systems are a tech-military hybrid force. Furthermore, the US controls major pillars of technology like operating systems (Microsoft, Apple, Google dominate desktops and mobile devices), and Satellites. Advanced technologies have enabled remote force projection like drone strikes, executing surgical operations, Cyber Command operations from SolarWinds retaliation, deployment of Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) and Space Based Kill Assessment (SKA), enhancing deterrence. China Made in China 2025 vision aims to displace US techno-hegemony. China’s centralized Social Credit System reflects a template of techno-surveillance hegemony. Beijing is now selling surveillance systems to developing countries, highlighting its tech supremacy. China is controlling telecommunications architecture by promoting Huawei’s 5G worldwide. China’s cyber army, the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), specializes in offensive and defensive cybertech warfare (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2019). China’s Digital Silk Road links infrastructure investments in Asia and Africa with national encryption systems and cloud data centers. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in a bilateral dialogue, said that ‘our fiber networks and data exchanges are now integrated with Beijing’s national infrastructure policy’. Thus, acquiring such a position in technology will prove China’s hegemony and can make it a superpower, making the world again a bipolar one. China’s strategic doctrine focuses on autonomous systems and digital authoritarian export over occupancy and geopolitical projection, respectively. Russia Russia’s global strategy remains rooted in a hybrid doctrine that combines cyber tools, space capabilities and disinformation operations. The Gerasimov Doctrine, Vladimir Putin’s strategic vision, emphasizes the blend of political, cyber, and economic tools to achieve strategic goals without casualties. The Ukraine conflict is a great example of cyber dominance. Russia has cyber units such as APT28 (Fancy Bears), Satellite Spoofing and Jamming, and the Internet Research Agency (IRA), which have executed targeted hacks against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), disrupted Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, and led disinformation campaigns. Russia’s power formula centers on dense cyber capacity, economic coercion, and unpredictability (making deterrence harder). Risks and Criticism of Tech-Based Hegemony Technology provides tools for security and influence, but overdependence causes strategic vulnerability, which leads to ethical dilemmas and raises questions about digital sovereignty. Overdependence and System Vulnerability A fundamental flaw of technological hegemony is its fragility. Systems are dependent on infrastructure (cloud servers, AI control nodes, etc.). The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) says that lethal autonomous weapons are the cause of escalation in conflicts (CCW 2022). Take the SolarWinds breach of 2020, in which an update exposed thousands of sensitive pieces of information. Ethical Concerns China, Ethiopia, and some other states have AI-powered surveillance regimes. China exports networked camera systems and facial recognition tools to states that use them to suppress dissent. A senior researcher at Amnesty noted that, ‘delegating life and death decisions to software is ethically unjustifiable’. Global South Dependency and Digital Colonialism Due to technological influence, digital dependency has increased in the Global South. Digital dependency without regulatory safeguards leads to digital colonialism. Countries lacking advanced technology are reliant on digital ecosystems developed by superpowers. It is said by Dr Ruha Benjamin that ‘when code becomes law, and pipelines become policy enforcers, sovereignty is outsourced’. Hegemony Without Consent Soldiers are a visible force, but technology imposes itself quietly via platforms, which results in domination without democracy. Tech-enabled coercion doesn’t need tanks; it needs standards embedded in devices, laws baked into algorithms. This contradicts liberal norms of International Relations (IR), where hegemony should rest on consent for international legitimacy (Sakumar, Broeders, and Kello 2024). Future Power Projections: Domain-wise Breakdown There are five interconnected domains of future power projections: land, air, sea, cyber, and space. Land Domain In traditional combat, troops were used to counter enemy force, but now in the third digital era, surveillance grids, AI-powered motion detection systems, and autonomous land robots are replacing soldiers. The Israeli military is testing unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), which they have named Jaguar, to patrol borders, and this will reduce human casualties. The diagram illustrates the interaction or the coordination between a human coordinator and an autonomous weapon system (AWS), and the target within a given environment. At first, the operator gives a high-level command which activates the controller, and the system provides feedback to the operator, such as mission success or failure. The controller is the brain of this system. It monitors the environment, processes data and controls the weapons. It operates in loops, evaluating the environment and updating the decision. Once the target is detected autonomously, the gun acts, which includes missile launch or gunfire. This entire process takes place in a dynamic environment. Figure 2: The coordination between a human coordinator and an autonomous weapon system (AWS) Air Domain Traditional manned fighter jets were dominating in aerial combat. Now, aerial dominance is shifted towards hypersonic weapons and AI-enabled drone swarms. Russia’s Zircon and China’s DF-ZF are hypersonic missiles that can travel at Mach 5+ speeds. AI drone swarms are rendering conventional missile defense systems obsolete. The US Air Force’s “Golden Horde” project and China’s GJ-11 stealth drone exemplifies this shift. Sea Domain Sea powers used to refer to blue-water navies and submarine fleets. They remain the core of maritime protection, but unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are quickly supplanting aircraft carriers. UUVs are being used to surveil for months on their own, and they will not be detected. Subsea data cables, which transport 95% of internet traffic, are a strategic resource; such cables are undersea digital arteries. Securing the sea in the 21st century means controlling what is beneath it. The diagram illustrates major elements of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). It is an important element in current naval battles and marine monitoring. The GPS/RF module is situated at the top of the AUV, through which the vehicle can position itself beneath the water. The propeller motor is the mobility unit of an AUV, driven by lithium-ion batteries. It provides thrust and directional movements. An electronic aid container serves as a housing store; it includes an onboard computer, a mission processor, a power distribution unit, and communication interfaces. AUVs have sensors which detect how deep the AUV is in the water column by measuring hydrostatic pressure. Acoustic Doppler Current Profile (ADCP), is a sonar device that uses Doppler shift in acoustic signals to measure the speed of water currents. An AUV manage its vertical position with a buoyancy tank. AUVs use an inertial navigation system; they determine the position of the AUV based on prior data. AUVs also contain forward-looking (Sound Navigation and Ranging) SONARs and Altimeters that scan and detect any obstacles in front of them and maintain a safe height from the seabed, respectively. Transducers are the mouth and ears of AUVs; they transmit and receive acoustic signals. They are crucial for clandestine communication and sensing of the environment. These AUVs are extremely crucial in contested sea areas such as the South China Sea or the Arctic. Therefore, AUVs are revolutionizing maritime operations by enlarging surveillance, exploration, and undersea warfighting capabilities. As technology evolves, AUVs will define the future of naval strategy and oceanographic study. Figure 3: Major elements of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). Cyber Domain Cyberspace has no borders. Global powers like the US, China and Russia have developed cyber command units to disrupt the power grids of the opposite side. Russia’s cyber interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, China’s alleged breach of U.S. personnel databases (OPM hack), and the Stuxnet worm targeting Iran’s nuclear program exemplify how software has become a strategic weapon. According to NATO’s 2025 Cyber Doctrine, ‘A cyberattack triggering Article 5 [mutual defense] is not just theoretical—it’s a matter of time.’ Space Domain Traditionally, space power was limited to spy satellites, but now anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), Starlink and military satellite systems have transformed into a combat zone. The US created its Space Force in 2019 to dominate in space militarization. In the Ukraine war, SpaceX’s Starlink became crucial for Ukrainian battlefield communication, prompting Elon Musk to limit military use to avoid escalation. Table 1 (figure 4): Old model versus new model comparison in each domain of future power projection. Done by the author. Domain Old Model New Model Land Troop deployment - Armored divisions - Occupation warfare AI-enabled surveillance grids - Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) - Real-time satellite + sensor networks Air Fighter jets - Airbases - Strategic bombers Hypersonic missiles (e.g., DF-ZF, Zircon) - Drone swarms with AI autonomy - Human-out-of-loop air dominance Sea Naval fleets - Aircraft carriers Submarines Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (ORCA UUV) - Seafloor cable warfare - Autonomous maritime surveillance Cyber (No traditional equivalent) State-sponsored hacking - Data theft & disinformation ops - Cyber jamming, spoofing in kinetic war Space Reconnaissance satellites Missile early-warning systems ASAT weapons (China, Russia tests) - Satellite internet constellations (Starlink) - Real-time warfighting integration (JADC2) Can Technology Fully Replace Military Power? The emergence of advanced technologies like AI, autonomous weapons and space militarization has sparked the debate about whether technology can replace military power, wholly or not? Strategic autonomy, in which a nation’s ability to defend its interests independently requires both technology and military. Technology acts as a critical enabler but not a substitute. AI can analyze satellite data in seconds, but only trained personnel can conduct peacekeeping missions in fragile regions. Modern warfare is shifting towards grey zone conflicts that fall below the threshold of open combat. Russian operations in Crimea in 2014 blended cyberattacks and physical deployments of troops, due to which the line between technology and military became blurry. This incident shows that technology without boots is of no advantage. In addition, technology needs regular upgrades and educated users, and excessive reliance upon these systems may cause interruptions such as electronic warfare (EW) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks. In a time of humanitarian crisis, disaster response, and counterinsurgency, forces are indispensable. To defeat an enemy or to dominate, one must employ both technology and an educated military. Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) have altered the character of air war. Great powers are investing heavily in military AI and quantum communication to improve battlefield awareness, minimize human loss of life, and enhance decision-making, but note that international decisions do not depend on a machine. They don't aim to replace the military, but they want to develop their technology. Thus, the emerging model of global power is not soldiering versus technology, but it is soldiers plus technology. It is known as dual-track hegemony, and a nation that acquires it will dominate shortly. A tech-savvy soldier, supported by AI and robotics, is the face of tomorrow’s war. Conclusion The United States, China and the EU are global powers of the modern era. These states possess the technological capital and military infrastructure that shape the regulation of engagement in cyberspace and AI. Firstly, they must strengthen international norms for cyber operations and AI governance. UNGGE has made some progress relevant to this, but this needs a broader enforcement mechanism like the Geneva Conventions. Secondly, global powers must invest in ethical and auditable technology. As AI is dangerous due to biased surveillance systems, facial recognition abuses, and it is also used in predicting policies, which is a major ethical concern. Algorithmic transparency, data protection, and privacy rights must be enforced as soon as possible. Lastly, multilateralism must extend to outer space. As space is becoming a battlefield, complicating geopolitical rivalry, to counter it, multilateralism must be encouraged. For developing countries like Pakistan, Indonesia, or Nigeria, the emergence of technological hegemony is both a threat and an opportunity. These countries should enforce digital sovereignty policies. These nations should avoid digital dependency, as it will be easier for global powers to surveil and dominate. Emerging powers should build defensive cyber infrastructure instead of offensive. They should build secure networks and legal protection against espionage on their own. Defensive strategy will serve as a strategic safeguard and can be used as a pawn in great power rivalries. Emerging powers should pursue a multilateral coalition among Muslim majority states to enhance their connectivity and ties. South-south cooperation must be promoted. The UN, G20 and other international bodies must move towards digital governance mechanisms instead of vague declarations. UN should form a Global Charter on Tech Governance, similar to a Digital Magna Carta. The charter should have ethical limits on the establishment and use of Artificial Intelligence and Lethal Autonomous Weapons. They should increase their coordination with the G20 to amplify these efforts. G20 should create a Tech and Ethics working Group, which can bridge the trust gap between Developed and developing countries in the digital arena. Global order continues to evolve in the 21st century, and the foundations of power projection are rewritten. There is a paradigm shift from boots to bots. This research demonstrates that while technology has transformed, it cannot entirely replace traditional modes of combat. Technology can only help the military to dominate in a region or conflict, but cannot fully replace it. There will be dual track hegemony, and the one who will acquire this hegemony will control world islands, and controlling world islands means ruling the world. 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