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Abstract This is the first part of an analysis examining the initial perceptions and evolving realities of the Russia-Ukraine war, which began in February 2022. Early Western media and political narratives were optimistic about Ukraine’s military resilience and potential victory, highlighting heroic resistance, Western support, and Russian operational failures. However, the reality has been more complex, as Ukraine faced significant challenges, including numerical and equipment inferiority, underfunding, limited combat brigades, and a lack of strategic reserves. Despite these hardships, Ukraine managed to resist Russia’s initial advances, as exemplified by symbolic events such as the defence of Snake Island. The article explores the human and economic costs of the ongoing war. Ukraine requires an estimated $524 billion in reconstruction funding, following a 30% drop in GDP in 2022 and ongoing economic hardships. Western aid has been substantial, exceeding €400 billion, but the conflict’s economic fallout also burdens donor countries, causing inflation and growth slowdowns. Key Words: Realism, War, Ukraine Introduction At the very beginning of the ‘Special Military Operation’ – an invasion of Ukraine by Russia - most academics, policymakers, political leaders, and media pundits were hugely impressed by Ukraine’s initial military response. Most were genuinely of the opinion that Russia was weak, economic sanctions would cripple its economy, President Putin had little to no public support, and that with enormous help from the U.S. as well as most EU Member states, Ukraine would not only resist the attack but ultimately win the war with Russia on its own territory and perhaps even facilitate the government change in Kremlin. Any skeptical views regarding the possible Ukrainian victory were swiftly silenced and dismissed as pro-Putin propaganda or even deliberate disinformation, therefore suggesting that any sceptics are more or less Putin’s agents. Let’s look at some media titles from March 2022 onward (the war started on 24 February, 2022). Overenthusiastic narrative At the outset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, many initial media reports and analyses were pessimistic, predicting a swift Russian victory based on military disparities. However, by March 2022, as Ukrainian forces demonstrated unexpected resilience — repelling advances on Kyiv and inflicting significant losses on Russian troops—some Western media outlets began publishing more enthusiastic and optimistic pieces about Ukraine's potential to prevail. These often-highlighted Ukrainian morale, Western support, and Russian operational failures. Below, the reader will find several examples from that early period, drawn from a range of sources including news articles and opinion pieces. Admittedly, media coverage of this topic is inherently biased, with Western outlets generally favouring Ukraine's perspective. In contrast, Russian state media promoted the opposite narrative (e.g., RIA Novosti's premature victory declaration on February 28, 2022, which was quickly retracted). One of the events that genuinely inspired the world at the very beginning of the war was the so-called Snake-Island Campaign. Snake Island is a tiny (0.17 km²) Ukrainian outpost in the Black Sea, about 48 km off the coast of Odesa. Despite its size, the island is geostrategically vital: it hosts radar stations, enables missile launches, and controls maritime routes for grain exports from Odesa. Russian control threatened Ukraine's southern coast and Black Sea shipping.[1] On the invasion's first day, the Russian cruiser Moskva (Black Sea Fleet flagship) radioed: "Snake Island, this is a Russian warship. I repeat: put down your arms... or you will be bombed." The 13 Ukrainian border guards replied: "Russian warship, go f… yourself." Russians captured the island via helicopter assault; defenders were taken POW but later exchanged and awarded Ukraine's Hero of Ukraine title. Consequently, legacy media began painting a rather rosy picture of the Ukrainian campaign. Below, the reader will find several examples: - The Atlantic - "Ukraine Is Winning. Don't Let Up Now." (March 28, 2022). This opinion piece by Eliot A. Cohen expressed strong optimism about Ukraine's battlefield performance, crediting heroic resistance and Western aid while critiquing Russia's weaknesses. Key quotes: "Truly magnificent Ukrainian resistance — heroic and clever at once — backed by Western arms and intelligence accounts for much of this." and "If Ukraine prevails, its example will be at least a partial deterrent to further adventures by Russia, and perhaps by China." The article urged continued support to secure a Ukrainian victory. [2] - The Washington Post - "Ukraine-Russia talks stir optimism, but West urges caution" (March 29, 2022). This news report highlighted positive developments from peace talks in Istanbul, where Russia pledged to reduce military operations around Kyiv, fostering hope for a resolution favourable to Ukraine. It noted enthusiasm around Ukraine's proposals for neutrality with security guarantees, though tempered by skepticism. A key optimistic element: The talks "stirred a glimmer of hope" amid Ukraine's successful defence, with Ukrainian negotiators pushing for international backing to end the conflict on terms that preserved sovereignty. [3] - Associated Press (AP) - "Russia says it will cut back operations near Ukraine capital" (March 29, 2022). This wire report conveyed optimism following Russia's announcement of scaling back assaults on Kyiv and Chernihiv, interpreting it as a sign of Ukrainian leverage in negotiations. Key quote: "Russia announced Tuesday it will significantly scale back military operations near Ukraine’s capital and a northern city, as the outlines of a possible deal to end the grinding war came into view at the latest round of talks." It portrayed this as a potential turning point, with Ukraine's delegation outlining a framework for neutrality backed by guarantor nations.[4] - Deutsche Welle (DW) - "Ukrainians have won the information war" (March 7, 2022). While primarily focused on the information domain, this article by historian Margaret MacMillan extended optimism to the broader conflict, arguing that Ukraine's narrative success bolstered its military position. Key quote: "The Ukrainians have won the information war... This is helping them win support around the world, which in turn is translating into real help on the ground." It emphasized global sympathy, fuelling aid that could tip the scales toward Ukrainian victory.[5] - In a rather absurd tone, the Polish media reported that a Kiev female resident destroyed a Russian military drone with a jar of pickles when enjoying a cigarette on her balcony.[6] Reality on the ground was somewhat different, however. In fact, as Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, rightly observed, before the invasion by Russia, the Armed Forces of Ukraine faced several significant challenges: 1. Numerical and Equipment Inferiority: As of the end of 2021, the Russian army was about five times larger than the Ukrainian army, with four times more tanks and armoured combat vehicles, 3.4 times more artillery, and 4.5 times more attack helicopters. The Ukrainian Navy was notably weaker, lacking aircraft carriers, destroyers, corvettes, or submarines.[7] 2. Underfunding and Stagnation: Despite politicians declaring that more than 5% of GDP was allocated to security and defence, less than half of the allocated budget went to the Ministry of Defence. There was no increase in funding for developing and procuring weapons and equipment, with most money going to financial support for the military personnel. This led to stagnation, with a lack of finances for development and combat readiness, personnel outflow, and understaffed military units. 3. Limited Combat Brigades: At the time of appointment of the author as Commander-in-Chief in August 2021, there were only 24 combat brigades in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with 12 already engaged in combat in the East and South. Only 12 combat brigades remained available for deployment in the event of aggression. 4. Insufficient Modern Weapons: Ukraine had very few modern weapons compared to Russia. The total need for funds to repel aggression, including replenishing missile and ammunition stocks, was estimated at hundreds of billions of hryvnias, which the Armed Forces did not have. 5. Lack of Strategic Reserves and Preparedness: The Armed Forces were unable to create sufficient strategic reserves, which are crucial in a strategy of defeat. Ukraine was significantly inferior in personnel, weapons, and military equipment, and lacked the preparation to meet the scale of the impending invasion. These challenges left Ukraine vulnerable and enabled Russia to pursue a strategy of defeat through swift, decisive military action. Reality on the ground – how much has the war cost so far? Russia's invasion has imposed staggering financial burdens on Ukraine and its Western allies through December 2025. Available reports evaluate these costs, encompassing direct damages, economic contractions, and international aid expenditures, drawing from economic assessments and aid trackers. Ukraine has endured profound economic devastation. According to the World Bank's February 2025 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, the country requires an estimated $524 billion for reconstruction over the next decade, reflecting cumulative physical damages from infrastructure destruction, housing losses, and disrupted industries.[8]     Source: UKRAINE FOURTH RAPID DAMAGE RDNA4 AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT. (2025, February). World Bank Group. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099022025114040022/pdf/P180174-ca39eccd-ea67-4bd8-b537-ff73a675a0a8.pdf The war has apparently obliterated key sectors: agriculture, energy, and manufacturing suffered massively, with export routes like Black Sea ports blocked, leading to a 30% GDP contraction in 2022 alone. By mid-2025, Ukraine's GDP remained 25-30% below pre-war levels, with annual losses projected at $40-50 billion due to reduced output and trade.[9] Military expenditures have surged, consuming over 50% of the national budget, totalling around $100 billion since 2022, funded partly through domestic borrowing and inflation, which peaked at 26% in 2022. [10] Humanitarian costs, including the displacement of 6 million refugees and internal migrants, add billions in social support.[11] Overall, projections estimate Ukraine's total war-related economic harm at $2.4 trillion by 2025, though this likely understates indirect effects like human capital loss and environmental damage.[12] Western nations, primarily the United States and European Union members, have shouldered high costs through aid and indirect economic repercussions. Total bilateral aid from Western donors exceeded €400 billion ($430 billion) by June 2025, including military, financial, and humanitarian support.[13] The U.S. has committed $175 billion in appropriations, with $130.6 billion spent by August 2025, including $66.9 billion in military assistance like weapons and training.[14] EU institutions and member states provided nearly $197 billion, encompassing $63.2 billion from EU budgets and refugee support for 8 million arrivals.[15] The UK itself pledged £12.8 billion, with £7.8 billion for the military.[16] Beyond aid, the war triggered economic shocks in the West. Energy prices soared due to sanctions on Russian oil and gas, contributing to EU inflation averaging 8-10% in 2022-2023 and to a 0.5-1% reduction in annual GDP growth.[17] The U.S. faced similar inflationary pressures, with global growth slowing to 3.1% in 2022, partly from supply disruptions.[18] Proximity to the conflict amplified costs for Eastern EU states, with cumulative GDP shortfalls estimated at €200-300 billion across Europe by 2025.[19] All in all, the war's financial toll surpasses $3 trillion combined for Ukraine and its supporters, straining budgets and exacerbating global inequalities.[20] Sustained aid is vital for Ukraine's resilience, but escalating costs underscore the need for diplomatic resolutions to mitigate further economic fallout. To be continued… References [1] Colibășanu, A., Crowther, A., Hickman, J., & Scutaru, G. (2022, September 27). The Strategic Importance of Snake Island. CEPA. https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/the-strategic-importance-of-snake-island/ [2] Cohen, E. A. (2022, March 28). Don’t Let Up Now. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/west-strategy-against-russia-ukraine-war/629387/ [3] Fahim, K., Stern, D. L., Lamothe, D., & Khurshudyan, I. (2022, March 29). Don’t Let Up Now. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/29/ukraine-russia-turkey-negotiations/ [4] Jones, T. (2022, March 30). Optimism, pessimism or skepticism? News outlets focus on the right thing in Russia-Ukraine coverage. Poynter. https://www.poynter.org/commentary/2022/optimism-pessimism-or-skepticism-news-outlets-focus-on-the-right-thing-in-russia-ukraine-coverage/ [5] Haas, B. (2022, March 7). Ukrainians have won the information war. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/ukrainians-have-won-the-information-war-historian-margaret-macmillan/a-61022603 [6] Wawrzusiszyn, D. (2022, March 8). To były pomidory, a nie ogórki. Znaleziono Ukrainkę, która strąciła drona słoikiem. Na:Temat. https://natemat.pl/400859,znaleziono-ukrainke-ktora-stracila-drona-sloikiem-z-ogorkami [7] Zaluzhnyi, V. (2025, November 29). Politics and War. Reality vs Expectations. LIGA.Net. https://www.liga.net/en/politics/opinion/politics-and-war-reality-vs-expectations#comment-list-4601543 [8] Ukraine. (2025, December 9). World Bank Group. https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/ukraine [9] Gorodnichenko, Y., & Vasudevan, V. (2025, July 27). The (projected) cost of Russian aggression. CEPR. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/projected-cost-russian-aggression [10] Samoiliuk, M. (2025, December 8). Ukraine War Economy Tracker. Centre For Economic Strategy. https://ces.org.ua/en/tracker-economy-during-the-war/ [11] Rogoff, K. (2025, December 9). The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2022/03/the-long-lasting-economic-shock-of-war [12] Gorodnichenko, Y., & Vasudevan, V. (2025, July 27). The (projected) cost of Russian aggression. CEPR. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/projected-cost-russian-aggression [13] Davis Jr., E., & Wolf, C. (2025, March 11). The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War. U.S.News. https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/these-countries-have-committed-the-most-aid-to-ukraine [14] U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine. (2025, March 12). U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/releases/2025/01/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine [15] EU Assistance to Ukraine (in U.S. Dollars). (2025, November 19). Delegation of the European Union to the United States of America. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-states-america/eu-assistance-ukraine-us-dollars_en?s=253 [16] Mills, C. (2025, July 17). Military assistance to Ukraine (February 2022 to January 2025). UK Parliament. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9477/ [17] The cost of EU Member States’ proximity to the war. (2025, November 17). European Commission. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/cost-eu-member-states-proximity-war_en [18] Jenkins, B. M. (2023, March 7). Consequences of the War in Ukraine: The Economic Fallout. European Commission. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-the-economic-fallout.html [19] The cost of EU Member States’ proximity to the war. (2025, November 17). European Commission. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/cost-eu-member-states-proximity-war_en [20] Rogoff, K. (2025, December 9). The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2022/03/the-long-lasting-economic-shock-of-war

Fighters aligned with the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group in southern Yemen, raised their flags in the provinces of Hadramout and Marah in early December. The seizures mean the STC now controls all eight of the provinces that make up the south of the country. The new status quo looks like a fait accompli for the creation of a separate southern state. It has left Yemen’s internationally recognized government, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), squeezed between a pole in the south and a state run by the Iran-backed Houthi militia in the north. The STC taps into memories of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen which, until 1990, gave southerners their own state. Yemen’s 1990 unification produced one flag, but many people in the south never felt they joined a shared political project. These grievances led to a brief civil war in 1994. This war ended with northern victory, purges of southern officers and civil servants, and what many in the south still describe as an occupation rather than integration. Yemen unified in 1990, with Sana'a as its capital. FANACK, CC BY-NC-ND By the mid-2000s, retired officers and dismissed civil servants in the south were marching for pensions and basic rights. Those protests turned into al-Hirak al-Janoubi, a loose southern movement running from reformists to hardline secessionists. And when the 2015 Saudi-led intervention began against the Houthis, which had seized the Yemeni capital of Sana'a the previous year, southern fighters were folded into a campaign to restore a “national” government that had never addressed their grievances. The STC was formed in 2017 to try and give this crowded field in the south a recognisable leadership. It has a formal president, Aidarus al-Zubaidi, and councils. But in practice it sits at the centre of a web of armed units, tribal groups and businessmen. Through sustained financial and material backing for the southern armed groups, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) emerged as the midwife of the organisation’s creation. Against the backdrop of widespread failed governance in Yemen, the STC project seems to deliver relatively well on security and public services. In April 2022, several years after the STC’s formation, the PLC was created to unite the forces fighting the Houthis. Yemen’s Saudi Arabia-based president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, resigned and handed his powers over to an eight-member body backed by Riyadh. The PLC was designed to bridge the various tribal, ideological and political divides in the country. It also aimed to create a platform to coordinate governance and statecraft with a view to engaging the Houthis through diplomacy. But as it mixes northern and southern leaders, including those from the STC, the PLC has never emerged as a viable hub to merge competing agendas. The inability of the PLC to deliver on its promise to consolidate governance across Yemen has incrementally eaten away at its legitimacy. A Gulf proxy war Yemen has turned into a quiet scorecard for two Gulf projects. Saudi Arabia intervened to defeat the Houthis, rescue a unified Yemeni state and secure its own borders. The UAE went in to secure reliable partners, access to ports and sea lanes and control of resources as part of its regional policy. A glimpse at a map of Yemen today shows it is the UAE whose vision seems to have been realised. Through the STC and a web of allied units, the UAE has helped stitch together a power base that runs across nearly all of former South Yemen. STC-aligned forces hold the city of Aden, sit on much of Yemen’s limited oil production and control long stretches of the Arabian and Red Sea coasts. Pink or blue shaded areas depict territory controlled by the PLC or allied forces, yellow or orange depict territory controlled by the STC or allied forces, green depicts areas controlled by the Houthis. NordNordWest / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-NC-SA Key national infrastructure in southern Yemen is now guarded by men whose salaries, media platforms and external ties flow through Abu Dhabi. In return, the UAE enjoys a loyal surrogate on the Gulf of Aden and the approaches to the Bab al-Mandab strait. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has been left propping up a fragile PLC. The Houthis remain the nominal enemy for everyone. But, in reality, UAE-aligned units have poured more bandwidth into sidelining Saudi-backed rivals in southern Yemen than engaging the insurgent-turned-state in the north. The UAE now holds leverage over Yemen’s crown jewels in the south, while Saudi Arabia shoulders the burden of the narrative of a “united Yemen” with few dependable allies inside the country. Two-and-a-half Yemens For decades, neighbours Saudi Arabia and Oman as well as most foreign capitals have sworn by a single Yemeni state. The UAE-backed STC project cuts directly across that line, with an entrenched southern order making a formal split far more likely. If Yemen is carved in two, the Houthi structure in the north does not evaporate; it gains borders, time and eventually a stronger claim to recognition. That would cement a heavily armed ideological authority at the mouth of the Red Sea, tied to Tehran and Hezbollah and ruling over a population drained by war and economic collapse. Yet, confronted with the multilayered network created by Iran and the UAE in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has few cards to play. It may eventually be forced to concede to a UAE-backed government-in-waiting in the south while the north settles into Houthi rule and territory held by the PLC gets increasingly squeezed. Oman keeps arguing for a shared table that brings all parties – including the Houthis – into one system. But every new southern flag raised undercuts that goal. For outside powers, a southern client that keeps ports open and hunts Islamist militants is tempting. The price is to freeze northern Yemen as a grey zone: heavily armed, ideologically rigid and wired into regional confrontation. That outcome cuts against the very unity project Saudi Arabia and Oman have endorsed for years. What is left today are two-and-a-half Yemens – with the half, territory administered by the PLC, looking the least sustainable moving forward.

The recently released Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) has upended what had been the decades-long consensus about American foreign policy. Most notable in it is the Trump Administration’s prioritization of the Western Hemisphere as an American security concern, its deemphasis on defending America’s traditional European allies, its identification of China as far more of a threat than Russia, and its determination not to be drawn into conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. But while the 2025 Trump Administration National Security Strategy breaks with much of previous American foreign policy, the logic behind it is not something completely new. Even though the document makes no mention of him, the policy outlined in the NSS comports with what John Mearsheimer described in his influential book, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, which was first published in 2001 and updated in 2014. In his book Mearsheimer declared that no nation has ever achieved global hegemony. According to Mearsheimer, America is the only country that has achieved predominant influence in its own region (the Western Hemisphere) and has also been able to prevent any other great power from dominating any other region. Mearsheimer wrote, “States that achieve regional hegemony seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peers” (2014 edition, p. 41). Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy has, whether knowingly or not, adopted these aims as well. It discusses the various regions of the world in the order of their priority for the Trump Administration: the Western Hemisphere first, followed by Asia (or Indo-Pacific), Europe, the Middle East, and lastly Africa. With regard to the Western Hemisphere, the NSS unambiguously calls for the restoration of “American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere,” and states, “We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.” This is very much in keeping with what Mearsheimer described as America being a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. As for the other four regions of the world, though, the Trump Administration seeks either to prevent any other great power from becoming predominant — or it doesn’t see this as a possibility that needs to be worried about. According to the NSS, the Middle East was a priority in the past because it was the world’s most important energy supplier and was a prime theater of superpower conflict. Now, however, there are other energy suppliers (including the U.S.) and superpower competition has been replaced by “great power jockeying” in which the U.S. retains “the most enviable position.” In other words: the Trump Administration does not see any other great power as able to become predominant in this region which is now less strategically important than it used to be anyway. Similarly, the NSS does not see any other great power as even seeking to become predominant in Africa. The NSS thus sees America’s main interests there as mainly commercial. By contrast, China is seen as a threat in the Indo-Pacific region. The NSS, though, discusses Chinese threats in the economic and technological spheres before turning to the military one. A continued U.S. military presence in the region is seen as important for preventing Chinese predominance. But Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia are all enjoined by the NSS to increase their defense spending in order to counter this threat. The NSS also identifies “the potential for any competitor to control the South China Sea” as a common threat that not only requires investment in U.S. military capabilities, “but also strong cooperation with every nation that stands to suffer, from India to Japan and beyond.” Unlike the Middle East and Africa, then, the NSS does identify a rival great power as striving for predominance in the Indo-Pacific region. Countering it, though, is not seen as just being America’s responsibility, but also that of other powerful states in the region. The strangest section in the 2025 NSS is the one on Europe. While acknowledging that “many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat,” the NSS envisions America’s role as “managing European relations with Russia” both to “reestablish conditions of strategic stability” and “to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.” This is very different from the decades-long U.S. policy of seeing America’s role as defending democratic Europe against an expansionist Soviet Union in the past and Putin’s Russia more recently. Indeed, the NSS’s claim that the European Union undermines “political liberty and sovereignty” and its welcoming “the growing influence of patriotic European parties” (in other words, anti-EU right wing nationalist ones) suggests that it is not Russia which the Trump Administration sees as a rival, but the European Union. The 2025 NSS does call for a “strong Europe…to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.” The NSS, though, seems to envision the European Union as either greater than or equal to Russia in threatening to dominate European nations. In his book, Mearsheimer did not envision the European Union as a potential great power rival to the U.S. Indeed, there isn’t even an entry for it in the book’s index. The way that the NSS envisions the world, though, comports with how Mearsheimer described America’s great power position: predominant in the Western Hemisphere and able to prevent any other great power from becoming predominant in any other region of the world. Mearsheimer, though, is a scholar who described the position in the world that he saw the U.S. as having achieved and which would seek to maintain. The 2025 NSS, by contrast, is a policy document laying out how the Trump Administration believes it can best maintain this position. And there is reason to doubt that it has done so realistically. Keeping non-Hemispheric great powers out of the Western Hemisphere will not be easy when there are governments there that want to cooperate with them. Further, devoting American resources to being predominant in Latin America when this will be resented and resisted could not only take away from America’s ability to prevent rival great powers from becoming predominant in other regions, but could counterproductively lead Latin American nations than have already done so to increase their cooperation with external great powers which the Trump Administration wants to avoid. Further, the Trump Administration’s efforts to reduce the influence of the European Union runs two risks: the first is that such an effort will succeed, but that the rise of anti-EU nationalist governments throughout the old continent results in a Europe less able to resist Russian manipulation and incursion. The second is that Trump Administration efforts to weaken the European Union backfire and result not only in a Europe united against American interference but unnecessarily emerging as a rival to the U.S. It would be ironic indeed if pursuing the NSS’s plan for upholding what Mearsheimer described as America’s ability to predominate over the Western Hemisphere combined with an ability to prevent any rival from predominating over any other region ended up undermining America’s ability to do either.

In the 21st century, the maritime security environment in Northeast Asia is changing more rapidly than ever, with information superiority and covert operational capabilities at sea emerging as core components of national security. At the heart of this shift lies the submarine force, which possesses both strategic deterrence and surveillance/reconnaissance capabilities. As China, Japan, and North Korea advance their submarine technology, South Korea finds itself in a situation demanding independent maritime strategic assets to counter these developments. The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) submarine force, which initially relied on foreign technology, has now grown into a submarine technology powerhouse capable of indigenous design and construction. The introduction of the KSS-III Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarine, in particular, has equipped South Korea with SLBM operational capability and advanced AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion) and electric propulsion technology, establishing a strategic-level submarine force.  This technological advancement not only strengthens national defense but also elevates the international status of the Korean defense industry, leading to enhanced export competitiveness. Concurrently, amidst the military expansion of surrounding countries, the need for nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs)—which offer far greater strategic survivability and sustained operational capability—is being raised in South Korea. Despite the high cost, the SSN is a strategic asset that provides overwhelming stealth, range, and operational endurance in the long run.  This article will comprehensively examine the importance and technical characteristics of submarines, followed by an analysis of South Korea's submarine force development, its international standing, and comparisons with neighboring countries. Furthermore, it will explore the implications of the nuclear submarine acquisition debate for South Korea's future security strategy. 1. The Importance of Submarines  The submarine is an extremely important weapon system in the defense industry from strategic, technological, and economic perspectives.  1) Strategic Deterrence and Control: Submarines act as a strategic deterrent to covertly check the enemy's maritime activities and protect a nation's sea lines of communication and security. The strategic deterrence of a submarine is based on its 'stealth' and 'lethality'.  - Stealth (Psychological Pressure): A submarine can move and be deployed secretly underwater without being exposed to the enemy, placing psychological pressure on the enemy's maritime operations and strategic weapon deployment during peacetime. Because it is extremely difficult for an attacking enemy to predict or neutralize the submarine's location, the enemy always harbors the fear of a potential strike. - Lethality (Retaliatory Capability): If the enemy attempts an actual invasion or provocation, the submarine can conduct a sudden and precise strike with high-power weapons like torpedoes or missiles. Specifically, a Strategic Nuclear Submarine (SSBN), equipped with strategic weapons like the SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile), provides a 'second-strike capability' to retaliate against the opponent's core targets at any time. - Maximizing Deterrence: The mere existence of strategic submarines maximizes the 'psychological deterrent effect', making the enemy's political and military leaders hesitate to initiate an attack. Due to the nature of submarines being covertly deployed anywhere in the ocean, the enemy is constantly exposed to threats, making it difficult to attempt military provocations recklessly. In essence, the core principle of strategic deterrence is the creation of a 'deterrence effect through uncertainty', combining the submarine's covert and unpredictable operational methods, its powerful striking capabilities, and the psychological fear it instills.  2) Enhancing National Defense and Economic Effects: The development of advanced submarines is central to a nation's naval power. It enhances defense self-reliance by securing indigenous design and construction technologies and promises enormous economic benefits through overseas exports. - Asymmetric Warfare Power: With its stealth and lethality, the submarine wields the most potent deterrent force and asymmetric warfare effect among all maritime forces. When surface fleet power is relatively insufficient, an advanced submarine can effectively check large enemy vessels or aircraft carriers and deny access to maritime domains. - Advanced Mission Capabilities: Advanced submarines are deployed for various missions, including long-duration submerged operations, strategic surprise, and special warfare support, utilizing cutting-edge technologies like next-generation guided missiles and sophisticated sonar/navigation systems that make detection and tracking difficult. - Increased Defense Industry Competitiveness: When advanced submarines are developed and operated with indigenous technology, it not only boosts the nation's defense industry capacity and technological self-reliance but also significantly increases related industry development and economic effects. In short, the advanced submarine is the qualitative and strategic linchpin of national naval power, encompassing defense, offense, intelligence deterrence, and the securing of cutting-edge technology. 3) Driving Advancement in Overall Defense Technology: The development of highly sophisticated weapon systems (e.g., SLBMs, advanced sonar, low-noise technology, etc.) also promotes the advancement of overall cutting-edge defense technologies. - SLBM Development: Developing SLBMs is not just missile technology; it complexly requires materials engineering to withstand the extreme pressure of the underwater launch environment, precise guidance systems, and miniaturized propulsion technology. The technology secured during this process naturally transfers to other fields, such as space launch vehicles and precision strike weapons. - Advanced Sonar Technology: The process of increasing the precision of underwater acoustic detection advances capabilities in signal processing, AI-based pattern recognition, and big data analysis. Such technology can also be utilized in civilian sectors, including marine resource exploration, underwater communication, and seismic detection systems. - Low-Noise Technology Development: The ripple effect of low-noise technology development is even greater. Vibration reduction in propulsion systems, special hull coatings, and hydrodynamic optimal design enhance the competitiveness of the shipbuilding industry as a whole. Propeller noise reduction technology, in particular, contributes to improving the fuel efficiency of commercial vessels and protecting the marine ecosystem. Furthermore, the process of developing these advanced technologies fosters high-level research personnel, strengthens industry-academia-research cooperation networks, and promotes the domestic production of materials, components, and equipment. Consequently, the single weapon system of a submarine has the effect of elevating the nation's overall scientific and technological capabilities to the next level. 4) High Competitiveness and International Credibility: The limited number of nations capable of manufacturing submarines ensures high competitiveness and international credibility in the global defense market. Currently, only about 12 countries are capable of independently designing and building submarines: the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K., France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Spain, India, Japan, and South Korea. This technical rarity offers several strategic advantages. - Favorable Negotiation Power: Due to the high barrier to entry, a limited supplier market is formed, securing favorable negotiation power during exports. - Proof of Overall Defense Technology: Submarine construction capability serves as proof of comprehensive defense technology, raising the credibility of other weapon systems. South Korea, in particular, has demonstrated strengths in technology transfer and localization by successfully achieving domestic production after introducing German technology. This establishes South Korea as an attractive partner for middle-power countries that desire advanced submarines but find self-development difficult. The interest shown by nations like Indonesia and the Philippines in South Korean submarines is within this context. - Sustainable Economic Effects and Strategic Ties: Submarine projects lead to long-term follow-up businesses, including maintenance, upgrades, and crew training, ensuring sustained economic effects and strengthening strategic ties between nations. As such, the submarine is considered a core capability of the defense industry in terms of national security, industrial competitiveness, technological innovation, and economic benefits. 2. Technical Characteristics of Submarines The technical characteristics of submarines can be broadly divided into three key domains: stealth and survivability, propulsion and power systems, and weapons and combat systems. 2.1. Stealth & Survivability This is the technology area most directly tied to the fundamental purpose of submarines. In underwater environments, radar (radio-wave detection) cannot be used, so detection relies on sonar (sound-wave detection). While radar can detect surface targets from up to 500 km, sonar detection of a quiet, stealthy submarine is typically limited to around 30 km. - Acoustic Quieting Technology is essential for avoiding enemy sonar detection. Submarine noise reduction involves suppressing mechanical noise (machinery vibration), flow noise, structural vibration, and propeller noise through an integrated set of technologies. This is not just a matter of equipment but a comprehensive quieting process that spans the entire lifecycle of a submarine—from design and manufacturing to operation and maintenance. - Non-Acoustic Stealth Technology minimizes physical signatures other than sound—such as magnetic fields, heat/infrared emissions, radar/optical reflections, and surface disturbances—to prevent detection by non-acoustic sensors. Figure 1. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) sonar system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.2. Propulsion & Power System This system is key to determining a submarine's range and submerged operational endurance. It is broadly divided into conventional (non-nuclear) and nuclear propulsion. 1) Conventional Submarines (Diesel-Electric) - Diesel-Electric System: This is the traditional method where a diesel engine powers a generator to charge batteries, and an electric motor provides propulsion. It is favored for its cost-effectiveness and quietness, making it the standard for small and medium-sized submarines. However, because the diesel engine requires oxygen from the atmosphere, the submarine must periodically surface or use a snorkel, which severely limits continuous submerged endurance (to a maximum of about 3 days). Submarines equipped with the latest Lithium-ion batteries can extend this submerged time up to 7 days. - Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP): An innovative technology that produces power underwater without relying on an external oxygen supply. The main types include the Fuel Cell (PEMFC), Stirling Engine, and Closed-Cycle Diesel. AIP is used in conjunction with the diesel-electric system and significantly extends submerged endurance, often up to 3 weeks. Because it is cheaper than nuclear power while offering high strategic value, many nations have adopted it. - Hybrid Propulsion System (Cutting-Edge Technology): The integrated operation of three systems—the diesel generator, Fuel Cell AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion), and Lithium-ion batteries—allows for continuous submerged operation for up to 4 weeks. South Korea's Dosan Ahn Changho-class (KSS-III) utilizes the integrated operation of these three systems: a diesel generator, Fuel Cell AIP, and Lithium-ion batteries. Excluding nuclear power, the current cutting-edge technology is considered to be the Fuel Cell AIP + Lithium-ion battery hybrid system. Each propulsion system is selected based on operational range, mission sustainability, cost-effectiveness, and technological sophistication. South Korea is actively pursuing the development of next-generation submarines that combine both AIP and Lithium-ion battery technologies. However, the maximum continuous submerged endurance (up to 4 weeks) is only achievable when operating at low speeds (5–10 knots, or approx. 9–18 km/h). When operating at maximum speed (around 20 knots, or approx. 37 km/h), the battery consumption is extremely high, causing the submerged time to sharply decrease: - Older Submarines: Can sustain maximum speed for only 1–2 hours. - Li-ion/AIP Submarines: Can sustain maximum speed for 3–6 hours. After high-speed maneuvering, the submarine requires snorkeling for recharging, which significantly increases the risk of detection by the enemy. Figure 2. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) lithium battery system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) Figure 3. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) fuel cell AIP system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2) Nuclear-Powered Submarines (SSN/SSBN) Nuclear-powered submarines use nuclear fission reactors to generate steam, which drives turbines and provides virtually unlimited propulsion. Because they do not require refueling for months, their submerged endurance and operational range are effectively unlimited, enabling them to operate anywhere in the world. Only a small group of states—including the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and India—possess such submarines. Nuclear propulsion is used in both strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN: nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads) and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN: fast attack submarines powered by nuclear reactors). However, nuclear submarines are extremely expensive to build and operate, require large hull sizes (especially SSBNs), and demand sophisticated reactor noise-management technologies. Compared to conventional submarines, nuclear submarines can operate at much higher sustained speeds for long periods. Their average top speed is typically 25–30 knots (46–55 km/h), while specialized Soviet/Russian designs such as the Alfa-class have demonstrated speeds exceeding 40 knots in trials. This makes nuclear submarines more than twice as fast as most conventional submarines, with the added advantage of being able to maintain high speeds for extended durations without limitations. 2.3. Weaponry & Combat Systems This category encompasses the submarine’s offensive capabilities and intelligence-gathering functions. Submarine weapons and combat platforms can be divided into four major types: 2.3.1. Launch Weapons Launch weapons are categorized as follows: - Torpedoes: Underwater weapons fired from a submarine’s horizontal launch tubes, used to attack underwater targets such as other submarines, surface ships, and mines. - Missiles: This includes anti-ship missiles (ASM) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) designed to strike surface or land targets. Some missiles are launched through Vertical Launch Systems (VLS). - Nuclear Weapons: The primary example is the SLBM (Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile), equipped with a nuclear warhead. These form the core of a nation’s strategic nuclear deterrence capability. Table 1. Types of Launch Weapons Table 2. Ballistic/Guided Missiles Table 3. Submarine-Launched Weapon Systems Figure 4. Weapon systems of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class (Jangbogo-III): Torpedoes/Mines (Horizontal Launch) and Missiles (Vertical Launch) (Source: Hanwha Ocean) Figure 5. Vertical Launch System of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class (Jangbogo-III) (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.3.2. Underwater Drones / Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV/AUV) Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) are unmanned underwater platforms deployed from submarines. They can perform missions such as intelligence collection, reconnaissance, mine detection, and even underwater attacks. In the latest technology trends, AUVs serve as important auxiliary assets for submarines, used for tasks such as detecting specific targets, locating and neutralizing naval mines, and tracking enemy submarines. Figure 6. Combat Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.3.3. Electronic Warfare Systems A submarine’s electronic warfare (EW) systems defend against enemy detection through electronic surveillance countermeasures. By transmitting deceptive or disruptive signals, these systems help conceal the submarine’s presence and significantly enhance survivability. Capabilities such as electronic deception, electronic jamming, and counter sonar/radar measures enable the submarine to evade enemy tracking and maintain strategic advantage. In addition, electronic attack (EA) capabilities can inflict direct damage on enemy military assets by disrupting or degrading their electronic systems. 2.3.4. Naval Mines Naval mines are explosive devices used by submarines to block enemy sea routes or hinder the approach of surface vessels. Submarines can deploy underwater mines or launch them from dedicated systems, allowing them to disrupt maritime traffic and defend against the movement of hostile fleets through area denial tactics. 3. Economic Impact of Submarine Strategy Submarine capabilities are not only crucial for military security but also represent a high-value industry that generates substantial direct and indirect economic effects for the nation. 3.1. Direct Industrial Impact (Manufacturing and Employment) Submarine construction is a highly technology-intensive, large-scale project, creating significant economic effects for the shipbuilding and defense industries: • Development of high-value shipbuilding: Submarines require extremely high precision and complex construction within much tighter spaces than commercial ships. The construction process itself represents the pinnacle of shipbuilding technology, directly enhancing the competitiveness and qualitative growth of the shipbuilding industry. • Job creation: Building a single submarine involves thousands of workers over several years, from design and component production to final assembly and sea trials, creating a large number of highly skilled technical jobs. • Activation of component and partner industries: Submarines consist of numerous precision components (sonar systems, propulsion units, special alloys, batteries, etc.), which stimulates supply chains largely composed of small and medium-sized defense companies and elevates technological capabilities across the sector. 3.2. Indirect Economic Impact (Security and Exports) The existence of a submarine fleet generates invisible economic benefits and opportunities: • Reduction of national security costs: Submarines are one of the most effective tools of asymmetric deterrence — a military strategy where a country at a disadvantage in conventional forces or numbers neutralizes an adversary’s attack intentions and deters war through unique and unpredictable means. Maintaining submarine capabilities helps prevent potential economic damages in crises (trade disruptions, destruction of industrial facilities) and raises the cost of potential aggression, effectively reducing national security expenditures. • Protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs): As a highly trade-dependent nation, Korea relies critically on maritime routes. Submarines deter hostile naval forces threatening these routes during crises and protect major trade arteries, ensuring the continuity of economic activity. • Opportunities for defense exports (K-Defense): o Demonstrating Korea’s ability to independently design, build, and operate submarines (Dosan Ahn Changho-class / Jangbogo-III KSS-III) establishes technological credibility in global markets. o This capability generates high-value defense export opportunities, not only for the submarines themselves but also for related components, maintenance, and training systems (Korea has already exported submarines to Southeast Asia). In conclusion, submarine capabilities serve as a form of national security insurance while fostering domestic advanced technology industries and opening export markets, providing significant economic value as a future growth engine. 4. History of South Korea’s Submarine Forces Although the history of the Republic of Korea Navy’s submarines is relatively short, it has made significant leaps in both independent technological development and force enhancement. The following outlines the chronological development and progress of Korea’s submarine forces. Figure 7. Timeline of Submarine Acquisition and Operations of the Republic of Korea. Note: SSM: Submersible Ship Midget (small submarine), KSS: Korea Submarine System (the systematic development plan for the ROK Navy’s submarine force) 4.1. Early Stage (1975–1990): Direct Acquisition of Cosmos-class and Foundation of Submarine Forces Starting in 1975, the ROK Navy acquired seven small Italian-made Cosmos-class submarines (70-ton class) for intelligence missions and special operations, laying the foundation for Korea’s underwater capabilities. These submarines were primarily used for special operations, such as special forces infiltration, mine-laying, and intelligence gathering, rather than as conventional warships. Crew members of the Cosmos-class submarines later became key personnel in the development of the Dolphin-class indigenous submarines in the early 1980s. 4.2. Formative Stage (1983–1991): The Dolphin-class Small Submarine Era In the beginning in 1977, the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) started developing a submarine modeled after Italy’s Cosmos-class. Construction took place at Tacoma Korea’s Masan Shipyard, and a total of three submarines were commissioned starting in 1983. This marked Korea’s first domestically built submarines, and the experience gained became the foundation for developing South Korea’s own underwater weapons. Based on operational results from the first submarine delivered in 1984, the second and third units were designed and built, being commissioned in 1990 and 1991, with reinforced pressure hulls and improved armament: SSM-051 1985 commissioned, 2003 decommissioned, SSM-052 1990 commissioned, 2016 decommissioned, SSM-053 1991 commissioned, 2016 decommissioned. The experience with the Dolphin-class played a critical role in advancing domestic submarine construction technology, serving as the stepping stone for the introduction and deployment of medium- to large-sized submarines. Table 4. Specifications of the Dolphin-class Submarines (Source: Namuwiki) 4.3. Development Stage (1992–2006): Introduction and Localization of the Jangbogo-class (Jangbogo-I) In 1987, the ROK Navy signed a contract with the German company HDW for three Type 209 submarines (license for design acquisition), officially launching the Jangbogo-class (KSS-I) 1,200-ton program. Among these, one submarine was delivered as a complete unit from Germany in 1992, while the other two were assembled and constructed at Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering’s Okpo shipyard using imported German parts, delivered in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Subsequently, six additional submarines were built, bringing the total to nine in service by 2001. This program was not merely an import project; the core goal was to transfer German technology and secure domestic assembly and construction capabilities. It laid the foundation for Korea’s submarine technology independence and advanced development. Leveraging the experience gained from constructing the Jangbogo-class, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) signed a contract in 2011 to build three 1,400-ton submarines for Indonesia. Known as the DSME1400, these submarines are named the Nagapasa-class in the Indonesian Navy, marking Korea’s advancement in export capabilities. Table 5. Specifications of the Jangbogo-class Submarine (Source: Namuwiki). Note: A batch refers to a group of submarines of the same model built in series, with incremental performance improvements applied in each production run. Table 6. Development Stages of the Jangbogo-Class Submarine 4.4. Leap Period (2007–2020): Son Won-il Class (Jangbogo-II) and AIP Technology In 2000, the Republic of Korea Navy signed a contract with Germany’s HDW to acquire three Type-214 submarines under a design-license arrangement, launching a full-scale 1,800-ton Son Won-il–class program with Hyundai Heavy Industries. The first submarine, Son Won-il, was delivered in 2007, and an additional six submarines were subsequently built by Hyundai Heavy Industries and Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). The key feature of the Son Won-il class is its AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) system, which uses fuel cells to allow submerged operations for 2–3 weeks without surfacing. Construction was divided between Hanwha Ocean (formerly DSME) and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries. The vessels are named Son Won-il, Jeong Ji, An Jung-geun, Kim Dae-geon, Hong Beom-do, Yu Gwan-sun, Yun Bong-gil, Ahn Chang-ho, and Baekdusan. Table 7. Specifications of the Son Won-il Class Submarines (Source: Namuwiki) Table 8. Development Stages of the Son Won-il-Class Submarine   Over time, the armament and electronic systems have progressively advanced. Below is a simplified cross-sectional diagram of the HDW Type 214, which was used as a reference for the construction of the Son Won-il class submarines. The diagram helps to easily understand the complex internal structure by showing the main components. Here, the Fuel Cell Plant represents the AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) technology. Figure 8. Simplified cross-section of the Type 214 Submarine (Source: TKMS) Figure 9. Cross-section of the Son Won-il-class Submarine (Source: Defense Mirror) 4.5. Independent Period (2021–Present): Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class (Jangbogo-III) Indigenous Design Achievements of Complete Domestic Design In December 2012, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) signed a contract with Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) for the construction of two Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class submarines. The contract amount for the two submarines was approximately 1.675 trillion KRW (1.14 billion USD). The project was based on the construction experience of the Jangbogo-class and Son Won-il-class submarines, as well as the technology transferred from HDW and the experience in developing the DSME-1400 submarine (Nagapasa-class submarine) based on the Type 209 design. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho (launched in August 2021) is the first submarine fully designed, built, and equipped with its own weapon systems by South Korea. It has a displacement of 3,000 tons, making it a large submarine. It is the first in the world to be equipped with lithium-ion batteries, enabling long-term submerged operations without the need for an AIP system. Strategic Weapon Deployment Capability The most notable feature of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class is the vertical launch system (VLS) with 6 launchers (Batch-II will have 10 launchers), which allows the operation of the Hyunmoo-4-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). This capability is considered the most powerful strategic strike capability among non-nuclear nations. Currently, the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho, Kim Jong-seo, and Yun Bong-gil have been commissioned, with a total of 9 submarines planned: 3 from Batch-I, 3 from Batch-II, and 3 from Batch-III. Table 9. Specifications of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class Submarine (Source: Namuwiki)   The following is information on the improvement projects for Batch 2 and Batch 3. Table 10. Development Stages of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class Submarine   Over time, the missile payload and electronic systems continue to evolve. Below is a cross-sectional diagram of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class submarine, including a comparison of its size with the North Korean Romeo-class and the German Type 214 submarines. It also includes the proposed diagram by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (now Hanwha Ocean) for the BrahMos missile-equipped version, which was part of their bid for the Indian next-generation submarine construction project. Figure 10. Cross-sectional Diagram of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class Submarine (Source: Naval News) 4.6. Comparison of 3 Generations of ROK Submarines Table 11. Development Stages of South Korean Submarines 5. Exports and International Status The history of South Korean submarines follows a trajectory of introduction, indigenization, technological accumulation, advancement, and international expansion. In 2011, South Korea became the first Asian country to export submarines by selling three Jangbogo-class derivative Nagapasa-class submarines to Indonesia for 1.1 billion USD. Currently, South Korea owns 18 submarines, making it the 8th largest submarine-owning country in the world. When it comes to conventional (diesel-electric) submarines, South Korea is regarded as one of the top global powers, along with Germany and Japan. Current Submarine Power Rankings 1. United States (68 nuclear submarines) - Overwhelming leader 2. Russia (45 nuclear submarines + 20+ diesel submarines) 3. China (12 nuclear submarines + 50+ diesel submarines) 4. United Kingdom (11 nuclear submarines) - Entirely nuclear-powered submarines 5. France (10 nuclear submarines + diesel) 6. India (2 nuclear submarines + 15 diesel submarines) 7. Japan (22 diesel submarines) 8. South Korea (18 diesel submarines) 9. Germany (6 diesel submarines, export power) 10. Sweden (5 diesel submarines, technological powerhouse) Detailed Classification by Country A. Nuclear Submarine Exclusives B. Nuclear + Conventional Submarine C. Conventional Submarine   The following are the rankings of the leading countries in conventional submarine exports: 1. Germany - 100 years of tradition, top exporter 2. Japan - Highest technological capabilities 3. South Korea - Only country with VLS/SLBM capability 4. Sweden - Specializes in stealth technology 5. France - Combines nuclear and diesel capabilities The following compares the key features of export submarines from each country. Table 12. South Korean KSS-III Competitor Submarines Export Competitiveness Evaluation Top Exporting Countries 1. Germany - Type 209/214 series, more than 100 units exported 2. France - Scorpène, 16+ units (additional orders in progress) 3. South Korea - 3 units exported, actively competing in various tenders Latest Trends • Lithium-ion Batteries: South Korea (Jang Yeong-sil class), Japan (Taigei class), France (Scorpène Evolved) • VLS (Vertical Launch System): South Korea (SLBM), Sweden (Cruise Missiles) • Stealth Technology: Germany (Diamond hull), Sweden (Ghost), Japan (Low noise) Hanwha Ocean, the builder of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class KSS-III submarines, and the South Korean government are actively engaging with the following countries for submarine exports: • Canada: The Canadian Navy's Submarine Replacement Program (CSCP) is a major project worth up to 40 billion USD (with an acquisition cost of about 14 billion USD and operation and maintenance costs of around 27 billion USD). Canada plans to introduce 12 new submarines. The KSS-III, at 4,000 tons, is considered a strong candidate due to its suitability for Canada’s operational environment (including the Arctic). South Korean defense companies are offering technical cooperation and local construction options in an effort to secure the deal. • Poland: Poland is pursuing the Orka project to modernize its navy, aiming to acquire 3 new submarines project worth about 14 billion USD. The KSS-III is consistently mentioned as one of the main contenders by the Polish government. • Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries: The Philippines is focused on strengthening its naval power to counter China. Other Southeast Asian nations are also looking to enhance maritime security through submarine acquisitions. South Korea, having previously exported submarines (e.g., the Nagapasa-class to Indonesia), is actively pursuing KSS-III sales in the region. 6. Comparison of the Latest Submarine Capabilities of Countries Surrounding South Korea This section examines the key features of the latest submarine technologies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Japan. Table 13. Comparison of the latest submarines of South Korea and neighboring countries Overall Assessment • Military Ranking: Evaluated as top-tier in Asia in the order of China > Japan > South Korea > North Korea. • Advanced Technology: Japan, South Korea, and China are rapidly advancing in technological innovation, while North Korea focuses on strategic threat capabilities. • Operational Capability: Japan and South Korea excel in maritime route defense and blockade capabilities, whereas China’s strength lies in ocean-going and strategic power projection. Asian military experts particularly regard South Korea’s KSS-III, Japan’s Soryu-class/Taigei-class, and China’s latest submarines as the pinnacle of their respective national defense technologies. North Korea, while still relatively underdeveloped, raises the threat level through the public display of its strategic nuclear-powered capabilities. 7. Future Prospects: Development of Nuclear-Powered Submarines South Korea is considering the development of next-generation submarines over 4,000 tons in the 2030s, with nuclear-powered submarines being a key option under discussion. In the past, in 2003, the basic design for a 4,000-ton reactor was completed, but at that time, cooperation with the United States was essential due to restrictions such as the Korea–U.S. nuclear agreement (“123 Agreement”). Recently, with the revitalization of Korea–U.S. shipbuilding cooperation through Hanwha Ocean and Philly shipyards, the possibility of acquiring nuclear submarine technology has increased. In particular, following the official U.S. approval of South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine construction at the 2025 APEC Summit, technical, fuel, and policy cooperation with the U.S. is expected to move forward in earnest for South Korea’s project. 1. Scope of Future Cooperation • The U.S. has agreed to share key technologies for South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines. • Cooperation will also include securing nuclear fuel for propulsion (highly enriched uranium or HALEU – high-assay low-enriched uranium) and the design and fabrication of small reactors for submarine use. • Both countries have agreed to expand mutual investment and technical collaboration in shipbuilding, marine plants, and submarine construction industries. 2. Technology Transfer and Conditions • South Korea has requested U.S. approval and supply for submarine propulsion nuclear fuel, and the U.S. is reported to have approved the use of nuclear fuel for South Korea’s submarine construction. • However, based on currently available information, this does not automatically include the full transfer of submarine reactor design or propulsion systems; the scope and method of technology transfer (joint development vs. full transfer) are still under discussion. • If South Korea transitions to third-country technology transfer or domestic development under U.S. cooperation, there could be restrictions linked to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 123 Agreement. 3. Potential Timeline • According to the fact sheet released at the APEC Summit, this cooperation is linked to investment in the shipbuilding industry, and South Korea is reported to have pledged around US$150 billion to U.S. shipbuilding. • South Korean government reports indicate the goal is to secure four or more medium-sized (approximately 5,000-ton or larger) nuclear-powered submarines by the mid-2030s. • However, specific milestones such as design completion, project start, construction, and delivery dates have not been officially finalized, and Korean officials have stated that detailed schedules are still under coordination. 8. Comparison of Nuclear Submarines and Conventional Submarines & the Importance of Nuclear Submarines Nuclear submarines can be broadly divided into two types based on their primary missions: 1) Strategic Nuclear Submarine (SSBN: Ship Submersible Ballistic missile Nuclear) • Primary Mission: Equipped with ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carrying nuclear warheads, SSBNs patrol covertly for extended periods to maintain nuclear deterrence. This means deterring adversaries from using nuclear or major conventional attacks by maintaining the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons, thereby preventing war. • Characteristics: Large in size, prioritizes extreme stealth and long-range operational capability. 2) Torpedo-Attack Nuclear Submarine (SSN: Ship Submersible Nuclear) • Primary Mission: Engage enemy submarines (Sub Hunter) or surface ships (Ship Killer), conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), support special operations forces, or carry out land-attack missions using cruise missiles. • Characteristics: Smaller and faster than SSBNs, emphasizes agility and maneuverability. Summary: • SSBN: Strategic missions with nuclear missiles. • SSN: Tactical attack missions with torpedoes and cruise missiles. 8.1. Nuclear-Powered Submarines vs. Conventional (Diesel-Electric) Submarines – Propulsion Comparison The most fundamental difference is in the power source: • Nuclear propulsion: Uses a reactor; heat from nuclear fission boils water to produce steam, which drives turbines to generate propulsion and electricity. • Diesel-electric submarines: Operate differently on the surface/snorkeling versus submerged. o Surface / Snorkeling: Diesel engines are run to propel the submarine or charge the batteries. The submarine must surface or use a snorkel to intake air and expel exhaust gases, reducing stealth. o Submerged: Diesel engines are turned off; the submarine runs solely on large charged batteries powering electric motors. This allows for very quiet, stealthy operation, but operational endurance is limited. Once the batteries are depleted, the submarine must surface to run diesel engines and recharge. Table 14. Comparison of Nuclear Submarine and Conventional Submarine Specifications Key Points • A nuclear-powered submarine is similar to an aircraft carrier: it provides long-range, high-endurance capability and serves as a powerful tool for global power projection. It is designed to dominate the open ocean. • A conventional submarine is comparable to a coastal patrol craft or a hunter-killer submarine: a stealthy and cost-effective weapon optimized for controlling regional waters and coastlines. Its greatest advantage is extremely low noise during battery-powered operation, making it a deadly threat in shallow waters—like “a hole in the water.” • Choosing a submarine type is not about absolute superiority, but about selecting the model best suited to a country’s strategic goals, budgetary limits, and geographic operational environment. 8.2. Maintenance Comparison Between Nuclear-Powered and Conventional Submarines Which force should a nation prioritize: Nuclear submarines, the backbone of strategic deterrence thanks to their unlimited underwater endurance, or conventional submarines, which offer excellent cost-effectiveness and are easier to field in larger numbers? One of the core factors in this decision is operational cost-efficiency. Beyond construction cost, the long-term burden of decades of maintenance, training, reactor refueling, and life-cycle logistics must be considered. The comparison below outlines these sustainment requirements. Table 15. Maintenance Comparison: Nuclear vs. Conventional Submarines 8.3. Total Life-Cycle Cost Comparison Between Nuclear-Powered and Conventional Submarines Let us compare two submarines of similar class size as examples: • Dosan Ahn Changho–class (KSS-III, South Korea) — conventional (diesel-electric + AIP) • Virginia-class (SSN, United States) — nuclear-powered Between these two types, the Total Lifetime Cost is 3 to 4 times higher for the nuclear-powered submarine. Below, we analyze the causes of this massive cost difference using concrete figures. Table 16. Total Life-Cycle Cost Comparison: Nuclear Submarine vs. Conventional Submarine 8.4. Importance of Nuclear-Powered Submarines for the Republic of Korea Navy Despite the enormous cost gap shown earlier, the South Korean government has strong reasons for wanting to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. These reasons are rooted in national security, strategic autonomy, and enhanced maritime defense capability. Key strategic motivations include: 1) Responding to North Korea’s SLBM Threat North Korea: Developing the Sinpo-class SSBN (armed with SLBMs). If a North Korean SLBM submarine hides in the deep waters of the East Sea, it becomes impossible to track with conventional submarines. Only nuclear-powered submarines can conduct continuous 24-hour tracking due to their unlimited underwater endurance 2) Monitoring Chinese Submarine Activity: China has ~12 nuclear submarines + ~50 diesel-electric submarines and is increasing activity in the East China Sea and Western Pacific. To monitor Chinese submarines operating in the open ocean, nuclear-powered submarines are essential 3) Strengthening Strategic Deterrence: Current South Korean SLBM range: ~500 km, requiring operations near the Korean Peninsula. A nuclear submarine can launch from anywhere in the Pacific, drastically expanding deterrence. Provides a “survivable second-strike capability”—a retaliatory force that cannot be located or neutralized 4) National Prestige: Nations that operate nuclear submarines are considered major military powers. Only six countries currently possess them. Strengthens technological sovereignty and diplomatic leverage South Korea’s desire to operate nuclear-powered submarines is driven by strategic and security needs that far outweigh cost considerations. For over 30 years, South Korea has pursued nuclear submarine capabilities as part of a long-term defense strategy, aiming to achieve: enhanced nuclear deterrence, increased strategic autonomy, breakthroughs in defense technology, effective countermeasures against the expanding submarine forces of North Korea and China. Nuclear-powered submarines are seen as essential platforms capable of long-duration, high-speed, and highly covert operations—capabilities that are crucial in Korea’s security environment. Figure 11. Conceptual Cross-Section of the Korean Nuclear-Powered Submarine (KSS-N) Conclusion The Republic of Korea began with the small Dolgorae-class submarines in 1983, and in 42 years has risen to become the world’s 8th-largest submarine operator and one of the “Big Three” diesel-electric submarine powers (Germany, Japan, Korea). The Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (KSS-III), in particular, is the world’s only diesel-electric submarine equipped with 10 VLS cells for SLBMs, and with its combination of AIP and lithium-ion batteries, it possesses some of the strongest underwater endurance and operational capability in the world. It has proven its real-world combat performance by eluding detection from a U.S. aircraft carrier during the RIMPAC exercises, and has demonstrated strong export competitiveness—Korea has already secured a 1.1 billion USD contract with Indonesia, and is competing for additional tenders in Canada, Poland, and the Philippines. Despite the overwhelming cost burden of nuclear-powered submarines, they remain essential for South Korea to counter North Korea’s SLBM-equipped SSBNs, and China’s expanding submarine fleet. Only nuclear-powered submarines can perform unlimited submerged operations and maintain high-speed, long-duration tracking of North Korean SSBNs 24/7. They also allow South Korea to exercise strategic deterrence across the entire Pacific, not just near the Korean Peninsula. While challenges remain—such as restrictions from the U.S.–Korea 123 Nuclear Agreement and various technological barriers—ongoing Korea–U.S. naval cooperation through Hanwha Ocean’s Philadelphia Shipyard significantly increases the likelihood of acquiring nuclear-submarine technology. Securing 4 to 6 nuclear-powered submarines would mark a transformational leap for the ROK Navy and a historic turning point in Korea’s rise as a true maritime power. South Korea’s submarine industry is not just a weapons program—it is an advanced technology sector and a driver of economic growth. It represents a core capability for self-reliant defense and national security. Based on its world-class diesel-electric submarine expertise, if Korea succeeds in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines as well, it will firmly establish itself as one of the world’s top five submarine powers. As history teaches that “those who command the seas command the future”, the continued advancement of South Korea’s submarine capabilities will serve as the foundation for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in the 21st century.

According to the IEA by 2024, more than 20% of new cars sold worldwide were electric, exceeding 17 million and positioning China as the leader in the market with more than 11 million sales. In comparison, the European and US markets also saw a growth in the sector, but not comparable to the Chinese counterpart. Figure 1: Global EV sales, 2014-2024. Source (IEA, 2025) Figure 2: EVs registrations share in China, US and Europe: 2018-2023. Source: IEA, 2025. On the other hand, autonomous vehicles, whose market value size was estimated at USD 68.09 billion in 2024, are also trending worldwide, North America being the largest market in 2024 (market share of 37.1% and passenger vehicles leading the market with 69% of the global revenue), while the Asia Pacific region is the fastest-growing market. Figure 3: Autonomous Vehicle Market. Source: Grand View Research. (Grand View Research, 2025) Recently, despite the data and market share, discussions and analysis of the vehicle industry have moved into new concerns related to security risks, trade protectionism and unfair competition. Why? Because the vehicle industry has evolved and adopted new technologies, at the same time, concerns have shifted accordingly. These changes have relied on or prioritized human convenience and connectivity over everything else. A New Security Paradigm for Mobility: Are Connected Cars Data Weapons A simple answer is no, but there are elements that can change the answer into a yes in the future. Vehicles are evolving into connected machines, with software-driven platforms, sensors, cameras, connectivity modules and AI systems. Thus, the vehicle industry is entering a new era where data is key, and whoever controls it, is likely to control the market itself. As mentioned before, vehicle-related security risks have sparked discussions in recent years. Nowadays, practically any vehicle sold has a certain degree of connectivity, naturally this leads to a continuous and massive collection of information (sensitive or not), including for example: real-time location, driving patterns, biometric data, audio recordings, images from the Advanced Driver-Assistance Systems (ADAS) and more. For common people this might pass unnoticed but for governments, the fact of collecting and storing data or having the possibility to do so has become a critical point and a threat to their national security. After all, fear is real, and the more connected a vehicle is, the higher the chances that it can become a surveillance device, for example. The speculations can grow as much as our/their imagination leaves them, but after all, security risks and fear related to them exist. In line with the security risks, the possibility of software backdoors hidden in operating systems or telematic units is another possibility. Naturally, if exploited this possibility, these vulnerabilities could allow a remote shutdown of vehicles or fleets, manipulation of navigation systems or even data extraction could occur. In simple terms, this could open the door to cyberattacks, including the potential loss of control of a vehicle. Once again, the possibility of these ideas has reshaped and changed the paradigm of connected vehicles Actual measures and global regulatory trends As governments start recognizing these security threats associated with connected vehicles, many have begun implementing several regulations to protect their national security. For instance, the UK, Israel, the USA and the EU are among the most active actors. One of the branches of the economic war between the US and China is exactly the mobility industry, the fierce competition between both nations has tightened the nationalist policies of President Trump, in fact the US has rapidly adopted a national-security lens for automotive imports. There have been discussions in Congress and even the Commerce Department has proposed rules allowing Washington to prohibit connected car technologies linked to foreign adversaries. In addition, there is huge pressure over the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), specifically in the encouragement to revise the vehicles entering the US and the promotion of US vehicle-manufacturing companies. For those reasons, the US had imposed tariffs on Chinese-made vehicles (from 25% up to 100% on 2024 during Biden’s administration and later a 35.5% extra tariff on Chinese-made EVs) and had set several rules in line with the USMCA, to limit or protect the American market from Chinese vehicles, as it argued that China is taking advantage of the USMCA by using Mexico or Canada as the entry points to the American market, avoiding tariffs and minimizing costs. According to experts, this Chinese circumvention of US tariffs can occur in three main ways. First through transshipment – products enter Canada or Mexico and then they are shipped to the USA. The second way is by incorporating the Chinese products into the North American supply chains. And the third way is through direct Chinese investments in manufacturing facilities in Mexico or Canada. At the same time, across the Atlantic the EU has also been working on tightening regulations through the Cyber Resilience Act, as well as strengthening the General Safety Regulations, both focusing on the application of rigorous standards to vehicle cybersecurity, data governance, and supply-chain transparency. Also in Europe, recently, a British newspaper reported that military and intelligence chiefs had been ordered not to discuss official business while riding in EVs, and cars with Chinese components had been banned from sensitive military sites. In addition, the former head of the intelligence service MI6 claimed that Chinese-made technology, including cars, could be controlled and programmed remotely. Consequently, the UK has begun evaluating supply chains for hidden dependencies in infotainment systems, telematics, and semiconductors. In the same line, Israel has adopted rigid measures, the Israeli army has begun withdrawing Chinese-made vehicles from officers, citing espionage concerns. Other measures implemented include auditing imported vehicles to ensure no remote-access pathways existence, plus the encouragement of local automakers and tech firms to develop secure telematics modules to minimize foreign reliance. What is China’s role in this new paradigm? To understand the role of China in the EVs and connected vehicles is important to highlight the low labor costs in China, coupled with government subsidies and a well-structured and established supply chain, these three factors gave the Chinese firms huge advantages over their competitors. However, those are not the only factors involved in the equation, the promotion of EVs over internal combustion vehicles and the adoption and development of technologies that turn “simple” vehicles into connected vehicles are important to mention too. All these factors have been well capitalized by Chinese firms, in consequence, China has become the world’s largest EV exporter and somehow a threat for the West. As mentioned throughout the article, the security risks have sparked discussions and concerns, and it is fair, as Chinese-made vehicles have become competitive and technologically well-connected, much, that nowadays are in conditions to fight for the global automotive market. Therefore, there is a clear sense of concern among Western governments, especially in conditions of a politicized world that we live in nowadays. Naturally Beijing argues that bans and investigations on their Chinese-made vehicles are forms of economic protectionism and rejects any claims related to espionage, data leaks or misuse. While, it has also responded by tightening its own domestic rules: foreign vehicles are prohibited from accessing sensitive regions, including areas near government buildings and military facilities. Benefits and challenges for other key players and global automakers Automakers from Korea, Japan or the European and American are being directly benefited from the rising Chinese scrutiny of connected cars, meaning that new export and investment opportunities could be achieved by them. If these countries can materialize transparent software supply chains, strong cybersecurity frameworks, and local data-storage compliance, their advantage would increase. Specifically Korean and Japanese firms – which are proven reliable players with a strong presence worldwide and strengths in battery technology and infotainment systems –, can position themselves as trusted suppliers in those markets that are worried about Chinese-made vehicles and their possible espionage or security risks. On the other hand, however, there are big challenges ahead. If each country or region decides to have proper regulations, major hurdles will appear. For example; compliance costs will rise as automakers must meet different cybersecurity rules across regions; the technology surrounding software auditing, and the transparency of the supply chains itself will require significant investments; the supply chain and design of vehicles will be affected and in consequence production cost will increase; and, if there are different digital standards or rules, it is likely that there could be some limitations in the global interoperability. Conclusions While the rapid growth of EVs worldwide can be considered a good sign for sustainability goals – as they displaced over 1 million barrels per day of oil consumption in 2024 –. Recently there have appeared certain concerns related to security risks – proven or not – trade protectionism and unfair competition. On top of that, the transformation of cars into fully connected digital platforms has created a new paradigm, in which certain nations – mostly western nations – have started to be worried and rethinking their mobility through the lens of national security. In consequence, governments have tightened rules related to data, cybersecurity and foreign software dependencies. This new vision is already changing and transforming the vehicle industry, while the most affected, being the Chinese firms – due the natural competition and geopolitical reasons – there are other global automakers that, if they take the chance, could become key players – as far as they prioritize transparency in supply chains, security and technological trust. The new paradigm has shifted what used to be an ordinary, everyday product into a critical national infrastructure that must be subject to regulation. Finally, this paradigm also highlights the importance of data sovereignty and how important it has become and will be in the future. Referencias Carey, N. (2025, December 2). China floods the world with gasoline cars it can't sell at home. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/investigations/china-floods-world-with-gasoline-cars-it-cant-sell-home-2025-12-02/ European Commision. (2025, March 5). Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector . Retrieved from European Commision: https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/89b3143e-09b6-4ae6-a826-932b90ed0816_en Financial Post. (2025, December 11). Why China's EVs are dangerous to Canada: CVMA. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WV7bn29lpOQ Grand View Research. (2025). Autonomous Vehicle Market (2025 - 2030). Retrieved from Grand View Research: https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/autonomous-vehicles-market IEA. (2025). Trends in electric car markets. Retrieved from IEA: https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2025/trends-in-electric-car-markets-2 Introvigne, M. (2024, February 6). Should Chinese Electric Cars Be Banned in the West? Retrieved from Bitter Winter: https://bitterwinter.org/should-chinese-electric-cars-be-banned-in-the-west/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=11726773838&gbraid=0AAAAAC6C3PdZ9Jx_edcTzlW0hHoO8yN2D&gclid=CjwKCAiA3L_JBhAlEiwAlcWO59TNJrosoZkG7MwAid0bRuGKs5KY0P7csiXimfUzLlbYshtFMafkdxoCqvQQAvD_Bw Leggett, T. (2025, June 10). China's electric cars are becoming slicker and cheaper - but is there a deeper cost? Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy8d4v69jw6o Meltzer, J. P., & Barron Esper, M. (2025, September 23). Is China circumventing US tariffs via Mexico and Canada? Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-china-circumventing-us-tariffs-via-mexico-and-canada/#:~:text=Chinese%20intermediate%20goods%20used%20in,to%20the%20production%20of%20new: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-china-circumventing-us-tariffs-via-mexico-and-canada/#:~:text=Chinese%20intermediate%20goods%20used%20in,to%20the%20production%20of%20new Navarrete, F. (2024, May 21). Aranceles de EU a autos chinos ponen en aprietos a México. Retrieved from El Financiero: https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/empresas/2024/05/21/aranceles-de-eu-a-autos-chinos-ponen-en-aprietos-a-mexico/ Oertel, J. (2024, January 25). European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://ecfr.eu/article/security-recall-the-risk-of-chinese-electric-vehicles-in-europe/: https://ecfr.eu/article/security-recall-the-risk-of-chinese-electric-vehicles-in-europe/ Radio biafra. (2025). Fearing data leaks, Israel bans Chinese-made cars for army officers. Retrieved from Radio biafra: https://radiobiafra.co/ Schuman, M. (2025, November). China’s EV Market Is Imploding. Retrieved from The Atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2025/11/china-electric-cars-market/684887/ Zhang, Z. (2025, December 4). China’s EV dominance sparks EU retaliation. Retrieved from East Asia Forum: https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/12/04/chinas-ev-dominance-sparks-eu-retaliation/

With its fragmented production process, European defence procurement is inefficient and uncompetitive in comparison to the United States. A new approach, prioritising cross-country collaborations, could improve things, but would not be without its own challenges. Introduced in March 2024, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) forms the centrepiece of European Defence Industrial Policy. The strategy aims to strengthen the competitiveness and readiness of the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB) through greater inter-state collaboration. It includes some ambitious targets, all of which are designed to allocate more resources to the EDTIB. For example, by 2030 the goal is for 50% of defence procurement budgets and at least 40% of defence equipment procurement to come through collaboration. There is also a designated €1.5 billion budget for European defence industry ‘readiness’. The background to all of this is British and European rearmament (readiness), largely in response to the increasing threat of Russia (following its acquisition of Crimea and its illegal military operations in Ukraine). European defence spending increased from €343 billion in 2024 to €381 billion in 2025. Figure 1 shows 2024 defence spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) by European country. Taking 2% as a target, Italy, Spain and Portugal are below the threshold. Poland – which shares a border with war-torn Ukraine – spent more than double the target last year, at 4.15%. At the same time, last year Russia spent an estimated 7.05% of its GDP on ‘defence’. Figure 1: European defence spending as a share of GDP, 2024. Source: NATO & SIPRI. Note: NATO members have agreed a new benchmark for defence spending, targeting 5% of GDP by 2035. How do inefficiencies in the European defence market affect spending? Inefficiencies within the European defence market shape spending patterns. For example, there are cases of duplication of defence R&D, fragmented national defence markets, ‘off-the-shelf’ procurement from non-EU suppliers, and a general failure to exploit economies of scale and learning. Compared with the US market, for instance, Europe is neither efficient nor competitive. This inefficiency is reflected in Europe producing three different types of combat aircraft: the Eurofighter Typhoon, the French Rafale and the Swedish Gripen. Each type supplies national and export markets: 782 Typhoons, 710 Rafales, and 369 Gripen aircraft had been ordered or delivered as of October 2025. So, if each European nation had agreed to buy one type of combat aircraft, total output would have been around 1,800 units. Common procurement would also have reduced production costs by an estimated 10-20%. In contrast, the American F-35 combat aircraft has a total planned output of 3,556 units – almost twice the total for Europe. What about sixth-generation aircraft? The sixth-generation fighter aircraft market already looks highly competitive. By 2027, Europe plans to build the Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS), with France, Germany and Spain all taking part in the project. At the same time, the UK is developing the Tempest combat aircraft jointly with Italy and Japan, with the first flight also due in 2027. Meanwhile, across the pond, in March 2025, the United States announced that Boeing would be developing the F-47 Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter. It is designed to replace the F-22 aircraft, with the first flight planned in 2028. There have already been 185 orders. For public policy purposes, there are questions as to whether Europe can afford to fund two similar combat aircraft projects. In one sense, the answer must be that Europe and the UK can afford to pay the price of having two separate independent developments. Even so, there are other policy options (with differing costs). On the one hand, European countries could collaborate further and undertake the project with great cost-sharing. On the other hand, they could simply buy American aircraft. Further collaboration is economically and politically attractive. Economically, more nations joining a project would lead to greater sharing regarding R&D and the pooling of production orders. But this assumes all else remains unchanged – which is unlikely. Further collaboration is costly, as each partner nation demands its share of high technology on the project – namely, a share of the advances in airframe, engine and avionics (aviation-specific electronics), and duplicate flight test centres. Similarly, partners will each demand a share of the production work, leading to duplicate final assembly lines and adding to total costs (although these could still be less than a national-level initiative would cost). At the same time, and perhaps most importantly, more collaborative partnerships could lead to cost sharing and cost savings. This is likely to mean lower prices for each partner nation compared with an independent, single-nation solution. But problems can also come from further collaboration. The number of partner nations will rise from three to six, increasing transaction costs. More difficult will be the process of selecting the ‘winning project’ and the inevitable ‘national champion’ – namely, a choice between BAE Systems in the UK and Dassault of France. In an ideal world, sharing design work between two world-class firms should produce an outstanding design. But in reality, the outcome is likely to be a compromise, with equal sharing of development work on the aircraft, which might not be an efficient solution. Even so, some inefficiencies are the price of further collaboration. An alternative solution would be for European governments to buy American units. The options here are to buy off-the-shelf, either completely or with some form of ‘offset’ (a type of compensation arrangement made between a supplier and the purchasing government) offering varying amounts of work to the importing nation. Again, these options involve different benefits and costs. For example, direct imports involve foreign currency payments while an offset provides some jobs and the retention of domestic industrial capability for the importing nation. Another possibility is a negotiation similar to the F-35, where the UK was a ‘level 1 partner’ with a 15% share of the programme. A similar deal might be negotiated for the purchase of the US F-47, with the UK enjoying similar benefits. Where next in an ideal world for European defence? European defence industrial policy must address the choice of the next-generation combat aircraft. A simple solution would be to continue with the FCAS and UK-led Tempest projects as separate independent ventures. But the new EDIS framework, with its commitment to European solutions, suggests a better option would be to seek a new collaboration between the FCAS and Tempest. These seem like similar aircraft, and creating a new collaboration involving six partner nations could be beneficial. Such a collaboration would offer cost savings in both R&D and production. Fixed R&D costs would be shared between six nations rather than three, and production orders would be considerably increased (possibly even doubled). This could allow for further economies of scale and learning, and at least a 10% unit cost savings (PwC, 2021; Mueller, 2025). Indeed, production numbers for the FCAS have been estimated at 200-300 units and a merger with the Tempest could double this to 400-600 units (Mueller, 2025). There would, however, still be transaction costs associated with the six-part collaboration. This is not a unique problem. For example, the Airbus Atlas military transport aircraft is a seven-nation collaboration, and the Eurofighter Typhoon involves four partner countries. Conclusion A possible merger between the FCAS and Tempest programmes might be a way forward for both projects. It would create a large military-industrial-political complex whose true economic benefits and costs would still need to be assessed. It would also be a centrepiece of the new European defence industrial policy, and might attract new export customers from the European Union (EU) and elsewhere. A more ambitious target is the formation of a European Army, Navy and Air Force. But this would require a single European decision-making mechanism replacing the current arrangement of individual European Member States. It would allow common procurement policies and large-scale purchasing for land, sea and air weapons. This is certainly a long run dream but could be one worth pursuing. Removing the inefficiencies in European defence markets described above by creating a single European market for defence equipment could create substantial gains, both economically and in terms of security.

Abstract This paper analyses the escalating tensions between the United States and Venezuela as of 2025, focusing on the Caribbean regional security complex. Under President Donald Trump, U.S. - Venezuela relations have sharply deteriorated, marked by increased military deployments, including the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, and over 4,000 troops near Venezuela. Operation Southern Spear targets alleged narco-terrorist groups linked to Venezuela, with numerous airstrikes on suspected drug-smuggling vessels resulting in significant casualties. Despite official claims of counternarcotics objectives, critics question the legality and evidence supporting these actions. Venezuela, backed by Russian arms and military support, has mobilised substantial forces and prepared for guerrilla resistance. The potential for full-scale conflict remains elevated but uncertain, complicated by domestic U.S. opposition, legal constraints, and regional diplomatic backlash. Additionally, Venezuela's rare earth mineral deposits add a strategic dimension to the conflict amid global supply chain concerns. The study highlights the multifaceted geopolitical, military, and economic factors shaping this volatile confrontation. Key Words: the U.S., Venezuela, Regional Security Complex Introduction Recently, the U.S.-Venezuela relations have deteriorated significantly under President Donald Trump, marking a continuation of longstanding tensions rooted in U.S. opposition to the socialist government led by President Nicolás Maduro, including past sanctions and diplomatic isolation. [1] The year 2025 has seen a sharp escalation in U.S. military posturing framed as a counternarcotics campaign, with Trump signing a secret directive in August authorising Pentagon forces against select Latin American drug cartels, including those allegedly tied to Venezuelan entities.[2] This has involved designating groups like Tren de Aragua (TdA) as a foreign terrorist organisation in February and the Cartel de los Soles as a transnational terrorist group in July, with unsubstantiated claims linking them to Maduro's regime in drug trafficking operations targeting the U.S.[3] Recent developments alarmingly include a U.S. military build-up in the Caribbean since August 2025, featuring assets such as Aegis-class destroyers, nuclear-powered submarines, the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, over 4,000 troops deployed off Venezuela's coast, an additional 5,000 on standby in Puerto Rico, F-35 fighter jets, MQ-9 Reaper drones, and B-52 bomber demonstration flights over Caracas. Starting in September, the U.S. has conducted at least 16 airstrikes on suspected drug-running boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific waters, resulting in at least 67 deaths. However, critics argue that these lack sufficient evidence of drug ties and raise concerns over extrajudicial killings.[4] Administration officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, have emphasised that these operations are limited to maritime counternarcotics and intelligence gathering, with no current plans for strikes inside Venezuela itself, citing a lack of legal justification for land-based actions under existing Justice Department opinions. However, the administration is seeking a new legal opinion to potentially authorise future land strikes without congressional approval, aligning with Trump's hints that Maduro's leadership is nearing its end.[5] On November 6, 2025, the U.S. Senate rejected a bipartisan resolution under the 1973 War Powers Act that would have required congressional authorisation for any military attack on Venezuela, failing by a 51-49 vote, with only two Republicans — Sens. Rand Paul and Lisa Murkowski — joining Democrats in support.[6] Some have interpreted this vote as giving tacit approval to Trump's "America First" doctrine, which critics compare to past interventions in Panama (1989) or Iraq (2003), warning of risks like regional instability or failed regime change efforts. Economically, the intensified U.S. pressure has led to a surge in Venezuelan bond prices, reflecting investor speculation on the potential for regime change amid the country's $150 billion in defaulted debt and interest payments.[7] Broader implications include debates over Trump's endgame, with experts suggesting limited strikes to pressure elites around Maduro rather than a full invasion. However, this could echo U.S. misadventures in Afghanistan or Libya.[8] From Venezuela's perspective and allied views, these actions represent an imperialistic push to undermine the Bolivarian Revolution, potentially through fabricated pretexts or assassinations, with international actors like China and Russia conducting joint exercises in the region to counter U.S. moves.[9] Congressional Democrats have voiced scepticism over the campaign's legality and transparency, while Republicans largely support executive authority in combating drug threats.[10] Source: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/instability-venezuela The U.S. military build-up towards Venezuela Diplomatic relations were terminated in 2019 following the United States' recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's interim president. Consequently, as reported by the media, several South American nations, including Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, have also acknowledged Mr. Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela.[11] In response to President Trump's recognition of the opposition leader, President Maduro severed diplomatic relations with the United States and mandated that its diplomatic personnel vacate Venezuela within 72 hours. He accused Washington of attempting to govern Venezuela remotely and alleged that the opposition was endeavouring to orchestrate a coup. Consequently, the U.S. embassy in Caracas remains closed. The United States continues to recognise the National Assembly elected in 2015, but ceased to acknowledge Guaidó's presidential claim in 2023. The U.S. government maintains that neither Maduro nor his affiliates represent the legitimate Venezuelan government. [12] Furthermore, the United States has markedly augmented its military presence in the Caribbean Sea as part of "Operation Southern Spear," purportedly to address drug trafficking. This initiative includes the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier and thousands of military personnel, constituting the largest military deployment to the region in several decades.[13] As reported by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, recent operations have primarily targeted vessels suspected of drug smuggling. The initial attack was recorded on September 2 in the Caribbean, and since then, the frequency of these attacks has increased, extending into the Eastern Pacific.[14]    Reports suggest the strikes in the Caribbean have occurred near the Venezuelan coast. Previous analysis by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) described a potential U.S. surveillance operation off the coast, which the United States has purportedly established to detect and target potential drug traffickers before they integrate with the dense maritime traffic of the Caribbean.[15] Until late summer, the deployment of U.S. Navy ships to the Caribbean was relatively limited compared to previous years. However, as illustrated in Figure 2, this situation changed in August when the administration initiated a significant increase in forces to combat drug smuggling. Deployment levels further escalated with the arrival of the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group (CSG).[16]    Recent deployments have also involved larger vessels, which bring substantial firepower and additional combat capabilities. A rudimentary method to quantify the enhancement in capability is to examine the displacement of the deployed ships. Figure 3 illustrates the significant increase in the displacement of deployed ships since the commencement of the second Trump administration. The initial major increase occurred with the deployment of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group; the arrival of the Ford CSG nearly doubled the number.[17]   Since September 2025, the U.S. has conducted a series of airstrikes on boats in the Caribbean and Pacific, which it claims are drug-trafficking vessels operated by "narco-terrorist" organisations like the Tren de Aragua gang.[18] On Monday, September 15, President Trump announced that, under his directive, United States military forces executed a second kinetic strike against drug trafficking cartels and narco-terrorists identified as extraordinarily violent within the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. This strike was conducted while these confirmed narco-terrorists from Venezuela were in international waters, transporting illegal narcotics intended for the United States, which he described as a deadly weapon poisoning Americans. In the same announcement, President Trump asserted that these extremely violent drug trafficking cartels pose a threat to U.S. national security, foreign policy, and vital U.S. interests.[19] The strike on September 15 resulted in the deaths of three individuals aboard the vessel. Subsequently, on Friday, September 19, U.S. military forces executed an additional strike. President Trump asserted that, under his directive, forces conducted a strike against a designated terrorist organisation involved in narco-trafficking. Intelligence confirmed that the vessel was transporting illicit narcotics and was en route to harm Americans. The strike resulted in the deaths of three male narco-terrorists. It remains unclear which group within the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility was targeted in the third airstrike.[20] On September 2, 2025, the United States military conducted its initial strike, resulting in the deaths of 11 individuals suspected of narco-terrorism. Following the third strike, the cumulative number of suspected drug traffickers killed reached 17. By mid-November 2025, at least 20 strikes had been announced, resulting in over 80 deaths, with most occurring in the Caribbean and several expanding to the Pacific off South America's coast.[21] U.S. officials, including President Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, have justified the actions as part of a counternarcotics campaign against groups like TdA and the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), framing them as an "armed attack" on the U.S. and releasing videos of some strikes.[22] Maduro's government has denounced the U.S. actions as acts of aggression and "regime change through military threat," launching its own "massive mobilisation" of troops and military exercises in response.[23] Additionally, the Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, who is in the midst of a spat with Donald Trump over the boat strikes and tariffs, said: "The attack on another boat in the Pacific … killed people. It is murder. Whether in the Caribbean or Pacific, the U.S. government strategy breaks the norms of international law." Interestingly, María Corina Machado, a prominent Venezuelan politician and opposition leader, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2025 for her "unwavering commitment to promoting democracy and human rights in Venezuela", according to The Nobel Prize.[24] Following her award on October 10, 2025, Machado has called for increased international support, urging U.S. leaders like Donald Trump to intensify pressure on Maduro to facilitate a democratic transition, including by calling for military intervention.[25] The military build-up has fueled speculation of a potential U.S. invasion, though President Trump downplayed the possibility, saying he "doubts it". Experts disagree on the likelihood of a full-scale invasion, noting the U.S. has previously opted for sanctions and diplomatic pressure over direct military action. War Speculation As of mid-November 2025 (when this analysis is written), the likelihood of a full-scale war between the United States and Venezuela remains elevated but not imminent or inevitable.[I] While tensions have escalated dramatically through U.S. military build-up and operations in the Caribbean, several restraining factors—including domestic U.S. opposition, legal hurdles, and high risks of failure would suggest a medium probability of limited escalation to airstrikes or missile attacks on Venezuelan targets, but a lower chance of a ground invasion or prolonged conflict. As mentioned above, the U.S. did launch "Operation Southern Spear" on November 13, a joint task force under U.S. Southern Command aimed at defending against "narco-terrorists" allegedly tied to Venezuela.[26] The arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group on November 11 has shifted the focus toward potential anti-Maduro operations, supported by a build-up of over a dozen warships, an attack submarine, amphibious vessels, roughly 15,000 troops (including Marines in joint exercises with Trinidad and Tobago), 10 F-35 fighter jets, drones, and special operations forces in the region and Puerto Rico. [27] President Trump has authorised CIA covert operations in Venezuela and, on November 14, stated he has "sort of made up my mind" on military options after briefings from top officials like Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. [28] He has suggested "the land is going to be next" after maritime strikes, hinting at ground operations or strikes on Venezuelan soil, such as military facilities, drug routes, or even targeting Maduro directly.[29] However, Trump has also mentioned possible discussions with Maduro and expressed caution about actions that could fail or entangle U.S. troops. In response, Venezuela has mobilised around 200,000 military personnel, civilians, and militias in large-scale exercises, deploying aging Russian-made equipment like 5,000 Igla missiles and preparing for guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and "anarchization" strategies to make the country ungovernable for invaders[30] Maduro has warned that U.S. intervention would turn Venezuela into "another Gaza, Afghanistan, or Vietnam," emphasising national resistance.[31] What could enhance the likelihood of a war between the U.S. and Venezuela? The U.S. holds overwhelming advantages in air, sea, and missile capabilities (e.g., up to 170 Tomahawk missiles in the region, stealth bombers for long-range strikes), making initial air or missile campaigns feasible without ground forces.[32] Venezuela's forces are numerically larger on land but poorly trained, under-equipped, and focused on internal control, with limited operational aircraft and inoperable submarines.[33] Experts note that this imbalance could encourage U.S. escalation, similar to the 1989 invasion of Panama.[34] Trump's administration views the situation as an "armed attack" on the U.S. via drugs and migration, with regime change as a potential endgame to disrupt flows and secure oil deals.[35] The Senate's rejection of a War Powers Act resolution earlier in November gives tacit executive leeway. Analysts describe the region as "on the brink," with the carrier deployment starting a "shot clock" for action before unsustainable costs mount.[36] There are several arguments against a potential war. According to YouGov.US, polls show that 55% of Americans oppose a U.S. invasion, with only 15% in support, including majorities among Democrats, Independents, and even some Republicans.[37] Apparently, Trump's anti-war coalition, including figures like Vice President JD Vance and Hegseth, is sceptical of foreign entanglements.[38] According to experts, there is no current legal justification for land strikes, as the War Powers Act's 60-day limit has expired and Congress is pressing for transparency.[39] Regional leaders (e.g., Brazil's Lula, Colombia's Petro, Mexico's Sheinbaum) condemn the build-up as aggression, suspending intelligence sharing and evoking "gunboat diplomacy." What is more, the UN and human rights criticisms label U.S. actions as potential extrajudicial killings, risking broader isolation.[40] A full invasion could require 50,000 - 150,000 troops, facing guerrilla resistance in challenging terrain and leading to a failed state or protracted insurgency (comparisons to Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya). Experts warn it won't solve drug or dictator issues, damaging U.S. credibility in Latin America (e.g., falling favourability ratings) and diverting from diplomatic alternatives. What about Russia? – Is there the potential for another Cuban Missile Crisis? Russia has been Venezuela's primary arms supplier since the early 2000s under former President Hugo Chávez, providing a wide array of military equipment that forms the backbone of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) and plays a central role in its defence strategy amid escalating U.S. - Venezuela tensions in 2025.[41] This arsenal, largely Soviet-era designs manufactured or upgraded by Russia, distinguishes Venezuela's military from others in Latin America, which typically rely on U.S. or European weaponry, and is intended to deter external aggression, particularly from the U.S., through asymmetric warfare capabilities.[42] Among the most critical for countering U.S. air and naval superiority are Russian-derived air defence and missile systems. In this category, according to media, the key assets include: 12 batteries of S-300 long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), nine Buk-M2E medium-range SAMs, 44 S-125 Pechora-2M short-range SAMs, and thousands of portable Igla-S shoulder-fired SAMs (with up to 5,000 units reported in some estimates).[43] The S-300 and Buk systems are positioned to protect key sites like oil facilities and radar installations, potentially threatening U.S. aircraft, helicopters, and drones at various altitudes. Igla-S launchers are distributed to regular troops and the Bolivarian Militia for low-altitude defence.[44] As for the aircraft and anti-ship capabilities, experts estimate around 20-30 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 multirole fighter jets, armed with Kh-31 "Krypton" anti-ship and anti-radar missiles, serve as the core of Venezuela's air force. [45] These jets, equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles, could challenge U.S. naval vessels in the Caribbean by launching sea-skimming attacks, forcing U.S. forces to operate under heightened risk. Russia has also provided Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters for transport and attack roles.[46] As for ground and artillery systems, Venezuela fields 92 T-72B1 main battle tanks, 123 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, Msta-S self-propelled howitzers, and Smerch multiple rocket launchers.[47] Infantry weapons include Kalashnikov rifles (e.g., AK-103) and Dragunov sniper rifles, with a new factory opened in July 2025 for producing Kalashnikov munitions to sustain supply.[48] Finally, as for other support systems, Russian radar arrays and electronic warfare tools, integrated with Chinese communications, enable jamming of U.S. signals, creating a contested electromagnetic environment.[49] These systems contribute to Venezuela's overall force of about 150,000 active personnel, plus a Bolivarian Militia estimated at 220,000 - 1 million (with government claims up to 8 million), which could use Russian arms for guerrilla-style resistance.[50] Amid heightened U.S. pressure, President Nicolás Maduro drafted a letter in October 2025 requesting additional Russian missiles, radars, drones, upgraded aircraft, and other support directly from Vladimir Putin.[51] According to the media, a Russian Ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane, linked to military or Wagner Group operations, landed in Caracas in late October to deliver cargo, potentially including arms or parts.[52] Russia has also allegedly assisted in maintenance and opened a Kalashnikov munitions factory in Venezuela in July 2025. However, experts caution that Russia's commitments may be limited due to its focus on Ukraine, economic strains, and reliance on allies like China and Iran for broader support, suggesting more symbolic gestures (e.g., past bomber deployments in 2018-2019) than substantial reinforcements.[53] This aid seems to be part of a multipolar strategy involving China and Iran, but Russia's role remains pivotal in sustaining Venezuela's deterrent posture. Conclusion What about Venezuela's rare earths? Venezuela does have deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), though they are not among the world's largest or most developed reserves. Known occurrences include the Navay phosphate deposit in southwestern Venezuela, where phosphorites contain REE concentrations averaging around 208 parts per million, with potential for extraction as a byproduct of phosphoric acid production.[54] Additional deposits occur in the Amazon Basin and the Guiana Shield, particularly in the Bolívar and Amazonas states, where REEs are found alongside other critical minerals, such as coltan (a source of tantalum), tin, and tungsten.[55] These areas feature preliminary survey results indicating reserves of around 43 million tons of ore with REE oxide concentrations averaging 1.5%, though much of the extraction is informal and unregulated.[56] Historically, Venezuela has exported small amounts of REE compounds, such as $27,600 worth in 2003, but current production is limited and often tied to illicit mining.[57] REEs play a minor but notable role in the ongoing tensions between the U.S. and Venezuela, primarily as part of broader competition over critical minerals rather than as a central driver of the conflict. The main issues in US-Venezuela relations remain oil sanctions, political disputes over the Maduro regime, and human rights concerns, but Venezuela's mineral resources—including REEs and coltan—have drawn international attention amid global supply chain vulnerabilities.[58] The U.S. defence and technology sectors rely on these materials for applications such as fighter jets, missiles, and electronics, and Venezuela's deposits are seen as potential alternatives to China's dominant supply, especially after China's recent export restrictions heightened Western diversification efforts.[59] Mining in these areas is often controlled by armed groups like the ELN and FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) dissidents—designated as terrorist organisations by the U.S.—leading to smuggling, environmental damage, and human rights abuses that complicate international involvement.[60] Some analysts suggest that U.S. policies, including sanctions and border measures, may indirectly aim to secure access to these resources to counter China's influence, viewing Venezuela's alliances with Beijing as a strategic threat in the context of rare-earth dependencies.[61] However, REEs are not the primary motivator compared to oil, and their extraction remains largely illicit rather than a formalised point of diplomatic contention.[62] Notes [I] Importantly, on November 29, 2025, President Donald Trump declared that the airspace "above and surrounding" Venezuela should be considered "closed in its entirety. See more at: https://www.politico.com/news/2025/11/29/trump-venezuelan-airspace-military-00670743 References [1] U.S. Relations With Venezuela. (2024, July 18). U.S. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/ [2] U.S. Confrontation With Venezuela. (2025, July 11). Global Conflict Tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/instability-venezuela [3] The United States Continues Its Attempt to Overthrow Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution: The Forty-Fifth Newsletter (2025). (2025, November 6). Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. https://thetricontinental.org/newsletterissue/us-threats-venezuela/ [4] Bertrand, N., Hansler, J., Lillis, K. B., Cohen, Z., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 7). Trump admin tells Congress it currently lacks legal justification to strike Venezuela. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/06/politics/trump-venezuela-legal-congress-land [5] War looms in Venezuela as Trump tests an “Americas First” doctrine. 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America’s Navy. https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/4044322/operation-southern-spear-latest-development-in-operationalizing-robotic-and-aut/ [14] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [15] Ibidem. [16] Ibidem. [17] Ibidem. [18] Ducharme, J. (2025, September 22). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. Orion Policy Institute. https://orionpolicy.org/airstrikes-on-drug-traffickers-in-the-caribbean/ [19] Ibidem. [20] Madhani, A. (2025, September 19). Trump says U.S. has carried out another fatal strike targeting alleged drug-smuggling boat. CNBC. https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/trump-us-strike-drug-smuggling-boat/3694397/ [21] Flaherty, A., & Pereira, I. (2025, November 17). Timeline: US strikes on alleged drug boats. CBCNews. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-us-strikes-alleged-drug-boats/story?id=126940218 [22] Jaffe, A. (2025, October 30). Assessing the Facts and Legal Questions About the U.S. Strikes on Alleged Drug Boats. FactCheck.Org. https://www.factcheck.org/2025/10/assessing-the-facts-and-legal-questions-about-the-u-s-strikes-on-alleged-drug-boats/ [23] Lowell, H., & staff, G. (2025, October 23). US military kills five people in strikes on alleged drug-trafficking boats in Pacific. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/oct/22/military-boat-strike-pacific-pete-hegseth [24] Maria Corina Machado Facts. (2025, November 20). The Nobel Prize. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2025/machado/facts/ [25] Nobel Peace Prize Winner: US Escalation Is “Only Way” to Free Venezuela. (2025, October 31). Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2025-maria-corina-machado-weekend-interview/?embedded-checkout=true [26] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [27] Ibidem. [28] Klein, B., Liptak, K., Britzky, H., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 17). Trump has suggested he’s made a decision on Venezuela military operations. Here’s what we know. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/15/politics/venezuela-trump-military-what-we-know [29] Reuters. (2025, November 12). Venezuelan military preparing guerrilla response in case of US attack. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelan-military-preparing-guerrilla-response-case-us-attack-2025-11-11/ [30] Venezuela announces ‘massive mobilization’ of military forces as America’s largest warship sails into region. (2025, November 12). CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/11/americas/venezuela-military-mobilization-us-buildup-intl-latam [31] Venezuelan military preparing guerrilla response in case of US attack. (2025, November 12). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelan-military-preparing-guerrilla-response-case-us-attack-2025-11-11/ [32] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [33] Ibidem. [34] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [35] Vidaurri, M., Marckwardt, J., & Gedan, B. N. (2025, November 14). A War in Venezuela Would Not Solve Latin America’s Drug and Dictator Problems. STIMSON. https://www.stimson.org/2025/a-war-in-venezuela-would-not-solve-latin-americas-drug-and-dictator-problems/ [36] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [37] Rossell Hayes, A., & Orth, T. (2025, October 31). The U.S. Navy deployment near Venezuela has become even less popular in the past month. YouGov.US. https://today.yougov.com/international/articles/53298-the-us-navy-deployment-near-venezuela-has-become-even-less-popular [38i] Klein, B., Liptak, K., Britzky, H., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 17). Trump has suggested he’s made a decision on Venezuela military operations. Here’s what we know. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/15/politics/venezuela-trump-military-what-we-know [39] Vidaurri, M., Marckwardt, J., & Gedan, B. N. (2025, November 14). A War in Venezuela Would Not Solve Latin America’s Drug and Dictator Problems. STIMSON. https://www.stimson.org/2025/a-war-in-venezuela-would-not-solve-latin-americas-drug-and-dictator-problems/ [40] Tisdall, S. (2025, November 16). The US is now a rogue state - look at its extrajudicial killings off Venezuela’s coast. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/nov/16/us-rogue-state-extrajudicial-killings-venezuela [41] Padinger, G. (2025, November 14). How Venezuela’s aging Soviet-era military stacks up against US forces in the Caribbean. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/13/americas/venezuela-military-us-tensions-explainer-intl-latam [42] Frazier, A. (2025, October 20). What U.S. Forces Face as Venezuela Puts Russian-Armed Military on Wartime Alert. MIlitary.Com. https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/10/20/what-us-forces-face-venezuela-puts-russian-armed-military-wartime-alert.html [43] Ibidem. [44] Padinger, G. (2025, November 14). How Venezuela’s aging Soviet-era military stacks up against US forces in the Caribbean. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/13/americas/venezuela-military-us-tensions-explainer-intl-latam [45] Frazier, A. (2025, October 20). What U.S. Forces Face as Venezuela Puts Russian-Armed Military on Wartime Alert. MIlitary.Com. https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/10/20/what-us-forces-face-venezuela-puts-russian-armed-military-wartime-alert.html [46] Ibidem. [47] Padinger, G. (2025, November 14). How Venezuela’s aging Soviet-era military stacks up against US forces in the Caribbean. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/13/americas/venezuela-military-us-tensions-explainer-intl-latam [48] Bayoumi, I., & Magid, S. (2025, November 4). Facing the threat of US strikes, Maduro has requested Russia’s help. He shouldn’t expect much. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/facing-the-threat-of-us-strikes-maduro-has-requested-russias-help-he-shouldnt-expect-much/ [49] Frazier, A. (2025, October 20). What U.S. Forces Face as Venezuela Puts Russian-Armed Military on Wartime Alert. MIlitary.Com. https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/10/20/what-us-forces-face-venezuela-puts-russian-armed-military-wartime-alert.html [50] Romero, S. (2025, November 5). How Venezuela’s Military Might Respond to U.S. Attacks. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/05/us/venezuela-military-maduro-coup.html [51] Bayoumi, I., & Magid, S. (2025, November 4). Facing the threat of US strikes, Maduro has requested Russia’s help. He shouldn’t expect much. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/facing-the-threat-of-us-strikes-maduro-has-requested-russias-help-he-shouldnt-expect-much/ [52] Romero, S. (2025, November 5). How Venezuela’s Military Might Respond to U.S. Attacks. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/05/us/venezuela-military-maduro-coup.html [53] Bayoumi, I., & Magid, S. (2025, November 4). Facing the threat of US strikes, Maduro has requested Russia’s help. He shouldn’t expect much. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/facing-the-threat-of-us-strikes-maduro-has-requested-russias-help-he-shouldnt-expect-much/ [54] Linares, E., Velasquez, G., Manrique, J., Monsalve, J., Lo Mónaco, S., & Shumlyanskyy, L. (2026). REE + Y signatures of the Navay phosphate deposit, SW Venezuela: Seawater paleoredox conditions and diagenetic implications. Journal of South American Earth Sciences, 129. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsames.2023.104532 [55] Venezuela’s rare earth rush. A growing supply chain risk. (2025, November 12). Southern Pulse. https://southernpulse.substack.com/p/venezuelas-rare-earth-rush [56 Killeen, T. J. (2024, July 12). Industrial minerals in the Pan Amazon. MONGABAY. https://news.mongabay.com/2024/07/more-industrial-minerals-on-brazils-borders-with-ecuador-venezuela-and-colombia/ [57] Rare-Earth Metal Compounds in Venezuela. (2025, November 25). OEC. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/rare-earth-metal-compounds/reporter/ven [58] Garcia, J. (2025, October 26). Trading Oil for Influence. The Heights. https://bcheights.com/224288/opinions/column/trading-oil-for-influence/ [59] Russell, M., & Ellner, M. (2025, November 15). The US War on China, Venezuela, and the Global Left. Common Dreams. https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/us-war-china-venezuela [60] bus, B. (2025, November 7). ‘Drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping’: the lawless rush for rare earth minerals in Venezuela. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/07/drug-trafficking-extortion-kidnapping-the-lawless-rush-for-rare-earth-minerals-in-venezuela [61] Giunta, C. (2015, May 6). Follow the Minerals: Why the US is Threatened by Venezuela’s ‘Blue Gold.’ Venezuelanalysis. https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/11372/ [62] Blakemore, R., Harmon, A., & Engelke, P. (2025, November 19). Critical minerals in crisis: Stress testing US supply chains against shocks. Venezuelanalysis. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/critical-minerals-in-crisis-stress-testing-us-supply-chains-against-shocks/

Donald Trump’s campaign against Venezuela escalated recently with the US president announcing that the country’s airspace should be considered “closed”. This is a move that has preceded US military interventions in the past, perhaps most notably in Iraq in 2003. It remains to be seen whether Trump’s declaration will be followed by military action or is just a means of raising the pressure on the Venezuelan leader, Nicolás Maduro, in an attempt to force him from office. But regardless of what happens next, what has been notable is the reaction of China. In a December 3 briefing, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said that closing Venezuelan airspace would violate international norms and infringe on national sovereignty. Jian added that China rejects interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs “under any pretext” and called on all parties to keep Latin America a “zone of peace”. This stance is no great surprise. China has developed strong relationships with several Latin American countries, including Venezuela, as part of a broader strategy to expand its presence in regions long dominated by the US. Trump’s threats of military action could jeopardise the influence China has built there. China has been involved in Latin America for centuries. But its ties to the region have grown rapidly over the past 25 years or so, with China becoming an indispensable partner to many Latin American countries. Brazil is a clear example of this indispensability. The election of Jair Bolsonaro’s right-wing government in 2018 led to expectations that Brazil would tilt towards Washington. However, such expectations were soon dampened due to China’s role as a major consumer of Brazilian goods. By 2020, China was Brazil’s largest trading partner, accounting for over 30% of total exports from the country. Ties between Brazil and China have only deepened under Bolsonaro’s successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. This has been helped by the intensification of the US-China trade war, which has seen Brazil become a crucial alternative source of agricultural products such as soybeans that China has historically imported from the US. This relationship has enabled China to exert economic pressure on the US. Brazil’s large soybean exports to China have increased the global supply, which has suppressed prices for all suppliers – including those in US. China has been a similarly indispensable partner to Venezuela since the days of Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, who took power in the Latin American state in 1999. Chávez was a keen advocate of a multipolar international order, a concept that has gained traction as Beijing’s political and economic power has grown. Over the years, China has become the main destination for Venezuelan oil. In 2024, China bought around 268,000 barrels of oil from Venezuela on average every day – a figure that, in reality, is likely to be higher as Venezuelan oil is routinely mislabelled to bypass US sanctions. Venezuelan oil is key for China. Beijing has been attempting to diversify its sources of natural resources in recent years as part of efforts to retain its global advantage in cheap manufacturing and wean itself off a dependency on Middle Eastern oil. Trump’s threats to intervene militarily in Venezuela may, at least in part, be aimed at challenging Chinese interests. Indeed, the White House issued an official statement on December 2 affirming the Trump administration’s commitment to the Monroe Doctrine. Signed in 1823, the doctrine said the US would reject other countries’ influence in Latin America. A new “Trump Corollary” to the doctrine states that “the American people – not foreign nations nor globalist institutions – will always control their own destiny in our hemisphere”. Challenging Chinese influence Any US military action in Venezuela will probably increase paranoia across the region. Trump warned recently that any country he believes is making illegal drugs destined for the US is vulnerable to a military attack, and singled out Colombia. On December 2, Trump told reporters at the White House that he “heard” Colombia was “making cocaine”. “They have cocaine plants”, he added. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, hit back immediately on social media, saying: “To threaten our sovereignty is to declare war”. But China is unlikely to step in militarily to defend countries in Latin America from US aggression. While China has used its developmental influence there to pursue some political objectives – most notably persuading El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Honduras to renounce diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in recent years – its engagement with Latin America has largely been transactional. China’s strategy in Latin America is driven primarily by economic considerations, and Beijing has generally been reluctant to enter into formal alliances with states there. This hesitance to commit to defending its partners could strain relations with countries in the region that may expect Beijing to support them in the event of a crisis. However, Trump’s Latin America campaign does provide China with some opportunities. Just as European countries concerned about Russia’s expansionist intentions have become a key market for American arms, it’s possible that Latin America becomes a lucrative destination for Chinese weaponry. Venezuela is already buying Chinese arms, varying from riot control equipment to missiles and – possibly in the future – fighter jets. China has also sold military equipment to Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador. The US appears to be taking an increasingly active interest in Latin America. As outlined in its recently published National Security Strategy, the Trump administration is looking to readjust the US’s “global military presence to address urgent threats” in the western hemisphere. Having carefully built up its influence in Latin America over many years, China’s leadership will be keeping a keen eye on how events unfold there in the months ahead.

Introduction An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or unmanned aircraft system (UAS), commonly known as drone, is an aircraft without a human pilot, crew or passenger on board, but rather controlled remotely or autonomously. Drones can be seen as cutting-edge technologies with tremendous ramifications across various fields, including military, security, economics, and logistics – ranging from lightweight consumer drones to advanced autonomous combat platforms – that have transformed global security economics and technological developments. Their proliferation marks a shift in the conduct of warfare, industrial processes, and urban infrastructure design. In this context, this article aims to analyze these dynamics across three domains: geopolitical and security implications, economics and industrial processes, and future technological transformation. I. Geopolitical and Security Perspective: "Game Changers" The Dawn of the Unmanned Warfare Era The past decade — and especially during the conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Caucasus —has showcased an irreversible shift toward unmanned warfare. Low-cost drones have enabled nations and non-state actors to conduct reconnaissance, precision strikes, and electronic warfare at a fraction of traditional military costs. The democratization of drone warfare erodes conventional military hierarchies by giving smaller nations and even non-state groups asymmetric capabilities (Kania, 2020), (Vision of Humanity, 2024). Figure 1: Use of drones by type. A major consequence of this shift is the emergence of continuous aerial presence, which fundamentally alters operational rhythm and tempo. Previously, only major powers could afford persistent surveillance through manned aircraft or satellites. Today, even insurgent groups can deploy swarms of commercial drones to maintain near-constant observation of enemy movements. This constant presence of drones on the battlefield forces militaries to make decisions much faster and operate as if they are always being watched. As drone technology becomes cheaper and more widely available, it also becomes easier for states or groups to launch low-risk, hard-to-trace attacks without putting their own people in danger. This reduces the barrier to starting or escalating conflicts and makes the overall situation far more unpredictable. On the other hand, despite automation, drone warfare remains heavily dependent on human adaptation, moreover, in practice, drones’ use is constrained by weather, terrain, and limited night capability (Newton, 2025). Nonetheless, and as seen in the Ukraine War, the adaptation, development and improvement of the designs and systems have skyrocketed and shortened from months to weeks. A Paradigm Shift in Modern Warfare Traditional doctrines built around armored vehicles, manned aircraft, and centralized command structures are giving way to distributed, networked, and automated operations. Drones allow for constant ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), rapid kill chains, and battlefield transparency that reduces the effectiveness of concealment and mass maneuver (Biddle & Oelrich, 2016). Swarm technology further accelerates this shift by overwhelming air defenses through algorithmic coordination. On a broader strategic level, unmanned systems are transforming operational art, forcing militaries to rethink how they structure campaigns. Instead of relying on a small number of high-value manned platforms, modern forces must integrate thousands of expendable, semi-autonomous assets into a coherent command-and-control ecosystem. This shift elevates the importance of data fusion, algorithms, and electronic warfare, as success increasingly depends on which side can process information more effectively rather than which side has heavier armor or more firepower. Furthermore, the psychological effects of drone warfare — constant monitoring, unpredictable strikes, and the invisibility of operators — alter the morale and behavior of both soldiers and civilians. In this sense, unmanned warfare not only changes tactics but reshapes the human dimension of conflict. Evolution of Defense Strategies States now are prioritizing anti-drone systems (C-UAS), electronic warfare, and resilient supply chains. Defense strategies emphasize dispersion, decoys, deception, and multi-layered air defense, recognizing that the cost ratio favors attackers using cheap drones against expensive assets. Militaries increasingly incorporate AI-enabled targeting, autonomous perimeter defense, and drone-versus-drone combat (Mehta, 2022). The rapid evolution of offensive drone capabilities has forced governments to pursue a new generation of integrated counter-unmanned systems, blending kinetic interceptors, directed-energy weapons, radio-frequency jamming, and cyber tools. However, the challenge is not merely technological — it is organizational. Modern militaries must revise procurement cycles, adopt flexible doctrine, and restructure units to counter the fast-changing drone threat. For example, some nations are creating dedicated “drone defense battalions” or embedding electronic warfare teams at lower echelons of command. Once more the Ukraine War is a good example: Ukraine’s early-warning systems (so called, “drone walls”) use layered reconnaissance UAVs to identify threats and enhance battlefield visibility, unfortunately, these are highly vulnerable to electronic warfare and radar destruction. More examples include the fiber-optic FPV drones as countermeasure of jamming, or decoy drones to lure air defenses and absorb munitions. (Newton, 2025) The rise of drone warfare also places huge demand on secure communications and resilient digital infrastructure; adversaries increasingly target supply chains, software vulnerabilities, and satellite links that control unmanned systems. Thus, the evolution of defense strategies represents a multi-domain effort that spans hardware, software, organizational culture, and national-level industrial capacity. Major Countries' Competition in Drone Weapon Development The United States, China, Israel, Turkey, and Iran dominate the global drone arms race, while Russia and Ukraine deserve a special mention too. • USA: it focuses on high-tech autonomous systems, for example the MQ-25, Collaborative Combat Aircraft. In addition, according to the Federal Aviation Administration they have an estimated 822,039 drones registered as of July 2025. (FAA, 2025)• China: leads in export volume, offering cost-competitive platforms like the Wing Loong series (Fischer, 2020).• Turkey: gained strategic influence through the Bayraktar TB2, proven in multiple regional conflicts like the Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 or its use for strategic communications for Ukraine during the ongoing conflict. (Péria-Peigné, 2023)• Israel: its research, development and production of innovative drone technology and exports roughly $500 million worth of UAV-related products per year, have positioned Israel as a world leader in the area. Israel is well known for its indigenous and competitive manufacturing UAVs like the Hermes 450, the Searcher Mk II and the Heron. (Sadot, s.f.)• Iran: their Shahed-136 drone is a low-cost drone that has gained attention internationally as it has shown affordability, precision, long-range, and cheapness during the Ukraine War – deployed by Russia. (Kesteloo, 2025)• Ukraine: has emerged as a leader in tactical warfare, including mass quantities of low-cost First-Person View (FPV) drones for frontline and deep-strike operations. But also, it has implemented “Spider’s Web” operations, which strike deep inside Russia, while using low-cost assets but with strategic and punctual strikes. Ukraine has also expanded into the maritime domain with unmanned surface vessels (USVs) using them with a kamikaze-style operation targeting ships and critical offshore infrastructure in the Black Sea. (Newton, 2025)• Russia: the war has institutionalized an UAV doctrine with mass deployment of FPV drones (Newton, 2025) and the creation – similar to Ukraine – of an Unmanned System Force (USF) aiming to encompass aerial, land and surface drones. (Altman, 2025) II. Economic & Industrial Perspective: “Flying Industrial Revolution” Future Logistics and Delivery Systems Beyond the battlefield, drones are reshaping global economies and enabling new industrial ecosystems. For instance, drones are rapidly transforming last-mile delivery by reducing transportation time, bypassing road congestion, and enabling access to remote or disaster-affected areas. Companies like Amazon, Wing, and Zipline have already demonstrated how unmanned aircraft can deliver medical supplies, parcels, and consumer goods more efficiently than traditional vehicles. As autonomous navigation, battery technology, and payload capacity continue to improve, drones are expected to become critical components of global supply chains, especially in regions where infrastructure is limited or demand for ultra-fast delivery is increasing. Global drone delivery is expected to reach multi-billion-dollar scale by 2030 (PwC, 2023). In the longer term, logistics networks are expected to evolve into hybrid ground–air systems, where drones work alongside autonomous ground vehicles and smart warehouses. These systems could drastically reduce operational costs by automating pickup, sorting, and delivery processes. Integrating drones with AI-driven inventory management and predictive delivery algorithms will allow companies to anticipate demand and route products dynamically. As eVTOL cargo aircraft mature, the concept of “airborne logistics hubs” may also emerge, enabling rapid long-distance transport between distribution centers without the need for airports. Together, these developments point toward a future where aerial logistics are not just an add-on, but a central pillar of modern supply chains. Improving Industrial Efficiency Across agriculture, energy, construction, and mining drones significantly improve efficiency by automating tasks that previously required expensive equipment or manual labor. By replacing manned inspection systems, drones can reduce labor costs, increase safety, and provide data of unprecedented detail (McKinsey, 2022). For example, farmers use drones for precision spraying and crop monitoring, reducing fertilizer and water usage. Energy companies deploy unmanned systems for pipeline inspections and powerline surveys, minimizing downtime and enhancing worker safety. Construction and mining firms rely on drones for site mapping, progress tracking, and 3D modeling, improving project accuracy while lowering operational costs. Beyond task automation, drones are becoming essential to data-driven industrial optimization. Equipped with thermal sensors, LiDAR, and multispectral cameras, unmanned systems can capture high-resolution data that feeds directly into AI analytics platforms. This allows companies to detect inefficiencies, predict equipment failure, and optimize resource allocation in real time. As industries move toward digital twins — virtual models of physical assets — drones will play a key role in continuously updating these systems with accurate spatial and environmental data. The result is a more responsive, efficient, and resilient industrial ecosystem that leverages aerial automation for competitive advantage. Regulatory Environment and Market Growth Regulation remains the single most influential factor shaping the global drone market. Governments are gradually introducing frameworks to enable Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations, Remote ID tracking, and certification standards for commercial drones. Regions like the European Union have adopted unified risk-based rules through EASA, while the United States continues to refine its Part 107 and UTM integration policies through the FAA. These regulatory milestones are essential for scaling commercial drone usage, as they provide clarity to manufacturers, operators, and investors. As regulatory frameworks mature, they are also becoming a competitive advantage for regions that adopt them early. Countries that implement drone-friendly ecosystems — such as Singapore, the UAE, and Rwanda — are rapidly emerging as hubs for drone research, testing, and deployment. This regulatory momentum encourages multinational companies to establish operations in these markets, accelerating local innovation and talent development. Furthermore, harmonized international standards will make it easier for drone manufacturers to reduce production complexity and expand globally. Ultimately, the pace of market growth will depend not just on technological advancement but on how effectively governments balance innovation with safety, privacy, and public acceptance. Investment Trends Investment in drone-related technologies has surged, driven by the convergence of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. Venture capital firms increasingly fund companies developing autonomous navigation systems, UTM software, battery technology, and specialized industrial drones. Defense investors continue to expand their portfolios into dual-use drone companies, reflecting growing geopolitical interest and national security incentives. Meanwhile, major tech firms and automotive companies are exploring opportunities in cargo drones, eVTOL aircraft, and autonomous mobility ecosystems. Beyond private investment, government funding and public–private partnerships are accelerating drone adoption globally. Many nations are launching test corridors, innovation hubs, and subsidies to attract drone startups and support local manufacturing. This trend is particularly strong in Asia and the Middle East, where governments see drones as strategic tools for digital transformation and economic diversification. As markets mature, investment is shifting from hardware-heavy startups toward software, analytics, and integrated airspace management solutions — reflecting a broader transition from drone manufacturing to drone ecosystems. This shift signals a long-term, sustainable evolution of the drone industry from early experimental phases to full-scale commercial and civil integration. III. Future Technologies The Need for Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) As drones and future eVTOL air taxis multiply, low-altitude airspace will become increasingly crowded. To prevent collisions and maintain order, UTM frameworks — already being developed by NASA, the FAA, EASA, and ICAO — aim to coordinate autonomous flights using real-time tracking, automated route planning, and digital air corridors (Kopardekar, 2016). These systems will act as the “air-traffic control of the future,” but designed for far larger numbers of smaller, faster-moving vehicles. In addition, as demand grows, it is likely that UTM will evolve into a fully automated, AI-driven airspace ecosystem capable of managing thousands of simultaneous flights with minimal human oversight. Future systems could incorporate weather prediction, dynamic rerouting, and AI-powered detect-and-avoid features, which more than a technical upgrade, would transform the air mobility in the cities worldwide. Global Standardization Competition The need for standard UTM, drone certifications, communication systems, and detect-and-avoid technology is critical, but it also represents a geopolitical contest. The U.S., the European Union, and China are each developing distinct technological ecosystems, hoping their standards will dominate global markets. Whichever region’s standards become the international norm will shape supply chains, aircraft design, and regulatory practices for decades. This competition mirrors earlier battles over telecommunications and 5G. Nations that establish widely adopted drone standards will gain strategic advantages, including influence over global manufacturing, software ecosystems, and aviation governance. As a result, UTM and drone certification are no longer just technical debates — they have become instruments of national power, economic leverage and somehow geopolitical importance. Urban Safety and Privacy Issues In addition, another major concern for cities is the widespread adoption of drones itself, which translates into surveillance risks, noise pollution from frequent flights, and vulnerability to cyberattacks that could compromise flight controls. Therefore, urban areas need strict rules governing data collection, flight paths, and liability in case of accidents to maintain public trust and safety. In the future, cities will also require integrated emergency response protocols, stronger cybersecurity defenses, and digital identity systems for all unmanned aircraft. Public engagement and transparent oversight will play a major role in ensuring that drones enhance urban life without creating new forms of intrusion or risk. Managing these challenges will be essential for the successful adoption of unmanned urban mobility. Integration with Future Urban Infrastructure In line with the previous section, smart cities could incorporate drones into their core infrastructure. For example, vertiports, rooftop landing pads, sensor-equipped air corridors, and digital twins could enable efficient navigation and real-time monitoring. In addition, drones will become essential for urban mobility and public services – from medical or any goods deliveries to emergency response like fire unit responses. As cities evolve, this integration will create a hybrid transportation ecosystem, where ground vehicles, aerial drones, and automated control systems would operate in sync. Urban planning will increasingly consider airspace as a valuable layer of infrastructure, much like roads or power grids. Therefore, collaboration between governments, industry, and technology providers to design cities capable of supporting high-density autonomous air mobility is required. Conclusion Unmanned systems are redefining the global balance of power, transforming industrial processes, and reshaping urban futures. The convergence of autonomy, AI, and networked airspace introduces both unprecedented opportunity and profound risk. Geopolitically, drones dilute traditional military dominance; economically, they catalyze a new airborne industrial revolution; technologically, they push societies toward complex management of shared automated airspace. Future policy, regulation, and innovation will determine whether unmanned systems become drivers of prosperity or vectors of instability. References Altman, H. (2025, November 13). Russia Creates New Military Branch Dedicated to Drone Warfare. 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Global Military Drone Race Intensifies as Nations Rush to Copy Iran’s Shahed Design. Medium. https://medium.com/@hayekesteloo/global-military-drone-race-intensifies-as-nations-rush-to-copy-irans-shahed-design-404badf482fb Kopardekar, P. (2016). Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of Operations. NASA Ames Research Center. McKinsey & Company. (2022). The Commercial Drone Market Outlook: Insights on Market Growth, Industrial Adoption, and Regulation. McKinsey Robotics & Automation Practice. Mehta, A. (2022). Counter-Drone Systems and the Future of Air Defense. Defense News. Newton, M. (2025, November 3). How Are Drones Changing War? The Future of the Battlefield. Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). https://cepa.org/article/how-are-drones-changing-war-the-future-of-the-battlefield/ Péria-Peigné, L. (2023, April 17). TB2 Bayraktar: Big Strategy for a Little Drone. IFRI. https://www.ifri.org/en/memos/tb2-bayraktar-big-strategy-little-drone PwC. (2023). Clarity from Above: Global Drone Market Analysis. PwC Global. Roland Berger. (2022). Urban Air Mobility: The Rise of the Drone Economy. Roland Berger Strategy Consultants. Rwanda Civil Aviation Authority. (2021). Regulatory Framework for Drone Delivery and BVLOS Operations. Government of Rwanda. Sadot, U. (n.d.). Proliferated Drones: A Perspective on Israel. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). https://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-israel/ Schmidt, E., Work, R., & Clyburn, M. (2021). Final Report: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. U.S. Government Printing Office. Singer, P. W. (2009). Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. Penguin Books. Statista. (2023). Global Drone Market Value and Investment Trends. Statista Market Outlook. Vision of Humanity. (2024, June 13). How Drones Have Shaped the Nature of Conflict. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/how-drones-have-shaped-the-nature-of-conflict/ Wing (Alphabet). (2023). Autonomous Delivery Networks and Future Logistics. Wing Technical Publications. Zipline. (2022). Operational Impact of Automated Medical Delivery by Drone. Zipline International Case Studies.

When we hear the word Pyramids, the first country to come to our mind is mostly Egypt and its marvelous Pyramids of Giza. But there is one country down south known as Sudan which has significantly more pyramids when compared to Egypt, albeit smaller in size compared to Egyptian pyramids. This country is marred with power struggles, civil war and genocide because of multiple reasons including geographic, social, historical and economic reasons. Since April 2023, the country has been going through its brutal third civil war. Origin of Modern Sudan The history of modern Sudan can be traced back to the beginning of the 19th century. In the year 1820, the Governor of Ottoman-Egypt Muhammad Ali-Pasha sent his army to conquer Sudan and from 1821–1885 it was ruled by the Ottoman-Egyptian rulers. In 1881, Muhammad Ahmad launched a revolt against the Egyptians and established the Mahdist State, which ruled Sudan between 1885–1899. Later, when the British conquered Egypt during the Scramble for Africa, they also conquered Sudan and both countries came under British jurisdiction. Sudan got independence from the British in 1956 after several anti-colonial movements. North–South Civil War Sudan has till now fought two civil wars and is currently fighting its third civil war. The seeds of the first and second civil wars can be traced back to British colonial rule of Sudan. When the British took control over Sudan, they found that the northern and southern regions of Sudan were culturally diverse. Their so-called aim was to preserve the southern culture from the north, and they developed certain policies collectively referred to as the British Southern Policy. Under these policies, the southern provinces (Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal) were closed off to northerners, except for those on government business. Greek, Syrian and Jewish traders were encouraged to open businesses in the south. The Arabic language, lifestyle and even names were discouraged. Christian missionaries were encouraged while at the same time Muslim proselytizing was banned. Source: New York Times The result of these policies wasn’t good; the southerners lagged behind northerners in every aspect from education to economic development. Northerners tended to view southerners as backward and uncivilized. In 1946, the British reversed their policy and began to reintegrate the south with the north. By this time, anti-colonial movements had taken a strong hold in the north and were asking for British withdrawal. Negotiations for the transition to independence largely bypassed the south. Mistrust in the northern government increased when, in 1954, the newly elected transitional government, dominated by the north, began the process of “Sudanization” of government institutions. A total of 800 posts were vacated by the British but only six went to southerners. Although the root cause was that the southerners to some extent lacked the required qualifications to fill these posts — and it was because of the British Southern Policy — the southerners viewed this as domination and discrimination by the north. Tensions were already high, but they escalated in 1955, just prior to Sudan's declaration of independence. Southern soldiers in the Sudanese army stationed in Torit mutinied against their northern commanders. The immediate cause was the transfer of these southern units to the north, which was seen as a move towards further domination and suppression by the northern government. Although the Torit mutiny was quickly suppressed, it sparked widespread unrest across the south. All hell broke loose in 1958 when the elected government of Sudan was overthrown by Brigadier General Ibrahim Abboud. It was under his regime that the tense situation in the south blew into an outright civil war. It was an assumption in the north that the North–South problem could be solved by assimilating the southerners, who were predominantly non-Arab Christians and animists, with Arab-Islamic influence in the north. Abboud, being a dictator, took it to the extreme: he banned Sunday holidays in the south, prohibited religious gathering outside churches, expelled missionaries from the south, and eventually the situation became dire. He was overthrown in 1964 and civilian rule returned to Sudan, but it didn’t last long, and in 1969 there was a coup by Gaafar Muhammad al-Nimeiri and he became the new dictator. By the time the armed conflict ended in stalemate in 1972, anywhere from 500,000 to 1 million people had been killed. The Addis Ababa Agreement brought an end to the conflict; this treaty established the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region, which gave southerners some degree of autonomy. The Addis Ababa Agreement couldn't bring lasting peace and within a decade of signing the agreement a second civil war broke out and oil played a crucial role in it. Oil was discovered in Sudan in 1959, but the north had negligible amounts of oil; most oil fields were in the south. Al-Nimeiri wanted to take control of those fields. In order to achieve this objective, he used certain tactics. In January 1982, Nimeiri announced that a referendum would be held in the south on the decentralization issue, but only in Equatoria Province. Some southern politicians immediately viewed this plan as an effort to divide the south and claimed that the plan was contrary to the 1972 autonomy agreement. These politicians were arrested on charges of forming an illegal political organization. In response to this, the separatist group Anya-nya II started attacking police stations and army barracks. There was also the Bor Mutiny in which the southern soldiers refused to leave and move to the northern garrison as part of the government’s rotating policy. These southerners threatened to fire against the newly arrived northern soldiers. On September 8, 1983, sharia, or Islamic law, went into effect in Sudan. The penal code was amended to conform to the precepts of the Qur՚ān. Some offenses, such as theft, were punished by amputation, while alcohol and gambling were prohibited. The south, with its varied religious traditions, strongly opposed the Islamization of Sudan. However, with two-thirds of Sudan’s land and population in Arab-Muslim possession, the north controlled the country. In 1984, Nimeiri proclaimed a state of emergency because of increasing rebel attacks from different rebel groups as these attacks were threatening his regime. His policies had negative impacts on Sudan, and, in 1985, he was ousted from power by General Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dahab in a bloodless coup. Later on, General Abdel Rahman relinquished his power and gave it to the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. In May 1986, the new Khartoum government led by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) led by Col. John Garang met for negotiations to end the conflicts. In February 1989, a peace plan was approved by the al-Mahdi government, but later in that year Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir came to power by overthrowing Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. Al-Bashir’s regime dissolved the parliament and banned political parties. The SPLA, initially seeking a unified “New Sudan” with secular governance, later shifted toward secession mostly because of al-Bashir’s policy. The second war lasted until 2005, marking it infamously as the longest civil war in modern history. A 2005 peace agreement ended the conflict and the 2011 referendum ultimately led to South Sudan's independence. It is estimated that 1 to 2.5 million lives were lost during Sudan’s second civil war. While both the Civil wars were fought on the North-South Muslim-Christian divide, there were also numerous ethnic groups who were caught during these wars. In South Sudan, communities such as Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Bari held their own grievances rooted in exclusion, land and resources. In the North, groups like Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa in the Darfur region; the Nuba people in South Kordofan and the Beja in the East have their own patterns of neglect. Even though religion played an important role, but we can't rule out the importance of ethnicity in these brutal conflicts. Source: BBC & Instagram/Geopolitical Futures The Darfur Genocide — A Dark Chapter in Sudan's History Darfur is a province in the western part of Sudan. During the second civil war, Darfuri rebels launched attacks on Sudanese government military targets. The Sudanese government assumed that Black African people- Fur, Maselit and Zaghawa in Darfur had supported these rebels and they reacted by arming militias — the Janjaweed — to attack those same innocent people. The Janjaweed militias were brutal; they used “scorched earth” tactics to target those Black people. The results were catastrophic: thousands of people were murdered, and millions were forced to flee their homes. When refugees from Darfur were interviewed, they said that after government air raids on villages, the Janjaweed used to attack their village, slaughter men, rape women and steal whatever they found. In July 2004, the US Congress declared atrocities in Darfur to be genocide and in July 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued indictments against then President al-Bashir. In 2014, these same Janjaweed militias were incorporated into the paramilitary forces known as the Rapid Support Forces. It is estimated approximately 200,000 people were killed and more than 2 million displaced during the Darfur Genocide. Third Civil War Omar al-Bashir ruled as dictator of Sudan up until 2019, when he was overthrown by a coup jointly organized by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). RSF is the most powerful paramilitary group formed during Bashir's regime. The roots of RSF can be traced back to the Janjaweed militia which committed the heinous Darfur genocide. With support from Bashir, RSF was organized and it was employed as border security guard, mercenaries to fight wars in Yemen, to suppress any civil protest or rebellion rising against him, and most importantly it acted as a counterweight to SAF. Bashir was a dictator and a military officer; he knew that his regime was also threatened by a military coup. In 2019, there were civilian protests against the dictatorial regime of al-Bashir. Contrary to al-Bashir’s belief, RSF didn't protect him and with SAF organized a coup and overthrew his government. They established a transitional government and a new constitution. SAF’s General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led the transitional government while RSF’s General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as “Hemedti”, was appointed as Deputy. Abdalla Hamdok, an economist and development expert, was chosen as Prime Minister. Hamdok tried to fix Sudan's problems, but al-Burhan and Hemedti orchestrated a coup against him in October 2021. But there were protests, the IMF and World Bank paused funding, so Hamdok was reinstated back in power in November 2021. But it was short-lived; he resigned again in February 2022 because the terms of reinstating were predatory for civilian leaders. With his resignation, Burhan and Hemedti, two strongman leaders, were left to transit Sudan into a democratic nation. Negotiations culminated in a December 2022 deal; it laid the groundwork for a two-year transition to civilian leadership and national elections. There were protests because of the timeline and it was brutally cracked down as you expect from a strongman. A major sticking point emerged: there was a proposition in the deal that RSF would be incorporated into SAF. The suspicions were that both generals wanted to hang on to their positions of power, unwilling to lose wealth and influence. As months passed, the power struggle between both of them increased and it stalled the country's transition efforts. On April 15, 2023, everything went loose as a series of explosions shook Khartoum, along with heavy gunfire. SAF and RSF leadership accused each other of firing first. The involvement of foreign powers in this conflict has worsened the situation. It is believed that RSF has strong backing of UAE and Libyan strongman General Khalifa Haftar, while SAF has strong backing of Egypt and to some extent Iran. RSF controls almost the western half of Sudan including the Darfur region and controls the gold mines of the region. This gold is allegedly smuggled into the UAE and sold throughout the world. SAF controls most of the north and east part of Sudan including Sudan's capital Khartoum. Several NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, have documented evidence of numerous mass atrocities committed throughout the conflict prompting accusations of ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Humanitarian access remains a crucial concern for many international actors, including the United States, which called on the UN Security Council to authorize aid deliveries through Chad. The situation has been grim since war broke out. As of November 2025, nearly twelve million people have been forcibly displaced, according to the UN refugee agency. More than 7.2 million of them are internally displaced within Sudan, while over 4.2 million are refugees, asylum seekers or “returnees” who have fled or returned to neighboring countries. The number of people killed in the conflict is unknown due to restricted media access, but researchers’ estimates vary between 20,000 and 150,000 fatalities. In early November 2025, the RSF announced it had agreed to a humanitarian truce proposed by the US, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt. However, the army said it would be wary of agreeing to a truce, accusing the RSF of not respecting ceasefires. UN health chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has also lamented that there is less global interest in the conflict in Sudan, and other recent conflicts in Africa, compared to crises elsewhere in the world. As of late November 2025, both parties are still waging war and millions of innocent Sudanese are suffering.  Conclusion Sudan as a nation-state was a colonial product; its leaders couldn't build stable institutions; they weren't able to properly define the idea of Sudanese nationalism. All of these led to power struggles, political instability, civil war and the fracturing of the nation into two parts. They could learn from countries of Asia; they were once colonies of European powers. Many of them were able to address the same problems which Sudanese politicians couldn’t. Those countries defined the idea of nationalism, built strong institutions and in turn it brought political stability and economic prosperity. Lasting peace can only happen in Sudan once stable institutions are formed; until then, Sudan will be stuck in this vicious cycle. Sources BBC News. Sudan conflict explainer. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjel2nn22z9o BlackPast.org. First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972). https://blackpast.org/global-african-history/first-sudanese-civil-war-1955-1972/ BlackPast.org. Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005). https://blackpast.org/global-african-history/second-sudanese-civil-war-1983-2005/ Council on Foreign Relations. Power struggle in Sudan: Global Conflict Tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan Council on Foreign Relations. To what extent is Sudan’s humanitarian crisis escalating? https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-extent-sudans-humanitarian-crisis EBSCO Research Starters. First Sudanese Civil War erupts. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/first-sudanese-civil-war-erupts EBSCO Research Starters. Sudanese Civil War resumes. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/sudanese-civil-war-resumes Holocaust Memorial Day Trust. Darfur genocide. https://hmd.org.uk/learn-about-the-holocaust-and-genocides/darfur/genocide/ World History Edu. 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