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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The pressure exerted by Trump on Mexico has prompted a shift in the López Obrador government's anti-drug strategy, which now operates under the logic of negotiation imposed by Trumpism. In the Obradorist ideology, it was unthinkable to launch a new war against the narcos—partly because there is now suspicion that deals were made with organized crime, and partly because opposition to such a war was one of the key narratives that propelled former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to power. He consistently and harshly criticized the confrontation initiated by President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012). The “hugs, not bullets” policy of the former Mexican president empowered the drug cartels, and its effects spilled onto the streets of the United States, where designer drugs (fentanyl, methamphetamines) proliferated like never before. However, the electoral campaign and Donald Trump’s return to the White House spotlighted the drug trafficking issue, highlighting that it was costing 100,000 American lives a year. That surely struck a chord with the average American and hurt the Democratic Party’s candidate. “Donald Trump embodies what I want for my country,” said a white woman from the Midwest—a sentiment echoed by many who witnessed the destructive effects of these drugs in neighborhoods in Chicago, Philadelphia, or Los Angeles. This segment of the population turned out en masse to vote for Trump, joining millions of others who, for ideological, political, or economic reasons, gave the New York politician a sweeping victory. That resounding win shook the status quo—just look at the turmoil in global stock markets—but it also generated Trump’s own agenda with his trade partners. One key item: declaring war on the Mexican cartels, which he elevated to the status of “terrorist organizations” that must be destroyed. It was a powerful message for President Claudia Sheinbaum, who had not made the direct confrontation with the cartels a priority. She likely saw them as part of the structure López Obrador had built for the first stage of the so-called Fourth Transformation, and believed it best not to disturb them beyond occasional arrests and seizures. Sheinbaum had been inclined to continue that routine agenda in dealings with her main trading partner. However, Trump’s victory and his increasingly aggressive rhetoric against the cartels led to a direct confrontation with criminal organizations. Trump increased the pressure by deploying spy ships in Pacific waters off the Baja California coast. Mexican skies saw surveillance aircraft capable of capturing images of homes in the Golden Triangle—the border region between the states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango, traditionally a haven for drug lords. Additionally, the U.S. security agency presence in Mexico was reinforced. Thus, the indulgent and criminal “hugs, not bullets” policy began to fade, leaving cartel leaders stunned. They have responded with a forward-escape strategy, creating an atmosphere of persecution and violence across different regions of the country—costing thousands of Mexican lives and pushing the public’s fear perception beyond 61%, according to INEGI. The myth López Obrador promoted—that “fentanyl is not produced in Mexico”—collapsed when Omar García Harfuch, the Public Security Secretary, recently stated that more than 800 laboratories have been destroyed. The problem, however, isn’t just the cartels and their capacity to produce and distribute drugs on American streets. It also includes the entire political scaffolding that enables the business to function efficiently—something it could not have achieved without the complicity of politicians with drug lords or intermediaries. And while one might think Trump would be pleased with the results of his pressure, that’s not the case. He bluntly stated that the Mexican government merely wants to make him “happy”—by sealing the northern border, making arrests and deporting drug lords, destroying labs, and even allowing U.S. agents to collaborate with Mexico’s national security system. They’ve even permitted spy flights and menacing naval patrols in Pacific waters. But even with these surprising results, the pressure continues—both publicly and diplomatically. Kristi Noem, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, recently met with President Sheinbaum at the National Palace. Beyond the formal courtesies, the headline came when Noem, upon returning to the U.S., revealed that she had handed Sheinbaum a list of requests to continue strengthening the good relationship between the two countries. President Sheinbaum was stunned when tariffs became a reality. Although Mexico and Canada weren’t mentioned in Trump’s public list of targeted countries, that was because the tariffs had already been decided before the press conference: a 25% tariff would apply to imports of steel and aluminum, as well as to products not covered by the USMCA—representing roughly 50% of Mexico’s exports to the U.S. In short, Trump’s pressure on Mexico has altered the policy upheld by Obradorism and now operates under the logic of Trump-style hard negotiation: “If the adversary yields at the first push, you can keep pressuring and gain more.” Some say that the list handed over through diplomatic channels includes the names of many currently serving politicians. That’s the reality, amid an anti-crisis narrative that tries to sell the idea that defeats are victories and losses are gains. And now, the time has come to find out where President Sheinbaum draws her red line.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Israeli army seeks to mobilize 30,000 reservists for a new expansion of its offensive on Gaza. UN-affiliated organizations warn of famine and disease in an enclave where clean drinking water is scarce. The Israeli security cabinet has approved a plan to intensify the operation in Gaza, which includes capturing or seizing additional areas across the Palestinian coastal territory and expanding the area controlled by the IDF. Government members, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, are already using the term “occupation” to clarify the plans for Gaza. Although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not specified which parts of the territory are involved in the new escalation, anonymous military sources have claimed that the goal is to occupy the entire Gaza Strip. The idea put forth by the Zionist regime, in any case, is to seize the territory and not return it in the future. Hamas has rejected this plan and continues to pursue “a comprehensive agreement that guarantees the safety and protection of our people,” according to one of its senior officials. The announcement includes the destruction of “all infrastructure above and underground,” according to Israeli Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir. The meeting followed IDF orders to mobilize 30,000 reservists last Saturday. Israel is thereby increasing pressure on Gaza during the same month that U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to visit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, where he will present his colonization plans aligned with the wishes of the Tel Aviv regime. The plan also entails a new forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to the south of Gaza, expected to last for months. The government of Netanyahu — who is considered a suspected war criminal by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) — faces internal resistance from the Hostage and Missing Families Forum, which has protested what they see as prioritizing territorial conquest over the return of prisoners captured by Hamas on October 7. Fifty-nine people remain held by the Gaza government after Israel unilaterally broke the ceasefire on March 18. The Forum mentioned before, criticized the Gaza occupation plans, referring to them as the “Smotrich-Netanyahu Plan for the Sacrifice of Hostages,” according to a public statement. The main debate within the security cabinet focused on whether to open routes for humanitarian aid — routes that have been closed since early March, two weeks before the ceasefire collapsed. According to Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Itamar Ben Gvir — also subject to ICJ arrest warrants — argued for keeping all aid routes closed: “I don’t understand why we have to give them anything; they have enough food there. We should bomb Hamas’s food reserves,” the outlet quoted. The Chief of Staff called the idea “dangerous.” According to the same leaks, Ben Gvir also proposed “bombing food warehouses and generators.” The International Criminal Court has reminded that blocking humanitarian aid may constitute a war crime. The Israeli government has leaked to the press that under the new escalation, humanitarian aid would be allowed in only through “international organizations and private security contractors.” On Sunday, May 4, the Country Humanitarian Team (CHT), under the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), reported that for nine weeks Israeli authorities had blocked all supplies from entering Gaza: “Bakeries and community kitchens have shut down. The warehouses are empty. Children are starving.” Two days earlier, UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell expanded on the critical situation in Gaza: “In the past month, more than 75% of households have reported increased difficulty accessing water. Families don’t have enough to drink, cannot wash their hands when needed, and often must choose between showering, cleaning, or cooking,” Russell said in a statement. UNICEF also warned of the prevalence of acute watery diarrhea, especially dangerous for children: “Over 9,000 boys and girls have received treatment for acute malnutrition,” the organization added. At the end of April, during ICJ hearings related to South Africa’s case against Israel, Claire Nicolet, Head of Emergencies at Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), stated that “Israeli authorities are not only using aid as a bargaining chip but also as a weapon of war.” Since October 7, 2023, 52,567 Palestinians have been killed and 118,610 injured as a result of Israeli attacks, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. Of those fatalities, 2,459 occurred after the March ceasefire was broken. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском India and Pakistan have seen the scenario play out before: a terror attack in which Indians are killed leads to a succession of escalatory tit-fot-tat measures that put South Asia on the brink of all-out war. And then there is a de-escalation. The broad contours of that pattern have played out in the most recent crisis, with the latest step being the announcement of a ceasefire on May 10, 2025. But in another important way, the flare-up – which began on April 22 with a deadly attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir, in which 26 people were killed – represents significant departures from the past. It involved direct missile exchanges targeting sites inside both territories and the use of advanced missile systems and drones by the two nuclear rivals for the first time. As a scholar of nuclear rivalries, especially between India and Pakistan, I have long been concerned that the erosion of international sovereignty norms, diminished U.S. interest and influence in the region and the stockpiling of advanced military and digital technologies have significantly raised the risk of rapid and uncontrolled escalation in the event of a trigger in South Asia. These changes have coincided with domestic political shifts in both countries. The pro-Hindu nationalism of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has heightened communal tensions in the country. Meanwhile Pakistan’s powerful army chief, Gen. Syed Asim Munir, has embraced the “two-nation theory,” which holds that Pakistan is a homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims and India for Hindus. This religious framing was even seen in the naming of the two countries’ military operations. For India, it is “Operation Sindoor” – a reference to the red vermilion used by married Hindu women, and a provocative nod to the widows of the Kashmir attack. Pakistan called its counter-operation “Bunyan-un-Marsoos” – an Arabic phrase from the Quran meaning “a solid structure.” The role of Washington The India-Pakistan rivalry has cost tens of thousands of lives across multiple wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971. But since the late 1990s, whenever India and Pakistan approached the brink of war, a familiar de-escalation playbook unfolded: intense diplomacy, often led by the United States, would help defuse tensions. In 1999, President Bill Clinton’s direct mediation ended the Kargil conflict – a limited war triggered by Pakistani forces crossing the Line of Control into Indian-administered Kashmir – by pressing Pakistan for a withdrawal. Similarly, after the 2001 attack inside the Indian Parliament by terrorists allegedly linked to Pakistan-based groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage engaged in intense shuttle diplomacy between Islamabad and New Delhi, averting war. And after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which saw 166 people killed by terrorists linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba, rapid and high-level American diplomatic involvement helped restrain India’s response and reduced the risk of an escalating conflict. As recently as 2019, during the Balakot crisis – which followed a suicide bombing in Pulwama, Kashmir, that killed 40 Indian security personnel – it was American diplomatic pressure that helped contain hostilities. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo later wrote in his memoirs, “I do not think the world properly knows just how close the India-Pakistan rivalry came to spilling over into a nuclear conflagration in February 2019.” Where is Kashmir?  A diplomatic void? Washington as peacemaker made sense: It had influence and a vested interest. During the Cold War, the U.S. formed a close alliance with Pakistan to counter India’s links with the Soviet Union. And after the 9/11 terror attacks, the U.S. poured tens of billions of dollars in military assistance into Pakistan as a frontline partner in the “war on terror.” Simultaneously, beginning in the early 2000s, the U.S. began cultivating India as a strategic partner. A stable Pakistan was a crucial partner in the U.S. war in Afghanistan; a friendly India was a strategic counterbalance to China. And this gave the U.S. both the motivation and credibility to act as an effective mediator during moments of India-Pakistan crisis. Today, however, America’s diplomatic attention has shifted significantly away from South Asia. The process began with the end of the Cold War, but accelerated dramatically after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. More recently, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have consumed Washington’s diplomatic efforts. Since President Donald Trump took office in January 2025, the U.S. has not appointed an ambassador in New Delhi or Islamabad, nor confirmed an assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian Affairs – factors that must have hampered any mediating role for the United States. And while Trump said the May 10 ceasefire followed a “long night of talks mediated by the United States,” statements from India and Pakistan appeared to downplay U.S. involvement, focusing instead on the direct bilateral nature of negotiations. Should it transpire that Washington’s role as a mediator between Pakistan and India has been diminished, it is not immediately obvious who, if anyone, will fill the void. China, which has been trying to cultivate a role of mediator elsewhere, is not seen as a neutral mediator due to its close alliance with Pakistan and past border conflicts with India. Other regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia tried to step in during the latest crisis, but both lack the power clout of the U.S. or China. This absence of external mediation is not, of course, a problem in itself. Historically, foreign interference – particularly U.S. support for Pakistan during the Cold War – often complicated dynamics in South Asia by creating military imbalances and reinforcing hardline positions. But the past has shown external pressure – especially from Washington – can be effective. Breaking the norms The recent escalation unfolded against the backdrop of another dynamic: the erosion of international norms since the end of the Cold War and accelerating after 2001. America’s “war on terror” fundamentally challenged international legal frameworks through practices such as preemptive strikes against sovereign states, targeted drone killings and the “enhanced interrogation techniques” of detainees that many legal scholars classify as torture. More recently, Israel’s operations in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria have drawn widespread criticism for violations of international humanitarian law – but have resulted in limited consequences. In short, geopolitical norms have been ebbed away and military actions that were once deemed red lines are crossed with little accountability. For India and Pakistan, this environment creates both opportunity and risk. Both can point to behaviors elsewhere to justify assertive actions that they have undertaken that, in previous years, would have been deemed a step too far – such as attacks on places of worship and sovereignty violations. Multi-domain warfare But what truly distinguished the latest crisis from those of the past is, I believe, its multi-domain nature. The conflict is no longer confined to conventional military exchanges along the line of control – as it was for the first five decades of the Kashmir question. Both countries largely respected the line of control as a de facto boundary for military operations until the 2019 crisis. Since then, there has been a dangerous progression: first to cross-border airstrikes into each other’s territories, and now to a conflict that spans conventional military, cyber and information spheres simultaneously. Reports indicate Chinese-made Pakistani J-10 fighter jets shot down multiple Indian aircraft, including advanced French Rafale jets. This confrontation between Chinese and Western weapons represents not just a bilateral conflict but a proxy test of rival global military technologies – adding another layer of great-power competition to the crisis. In addition, the use of loitering drones designed to attack radar systems represents a significant escalation in the technological sophistication of cross-border attacks compared to years past. The conflict has also expanded dramatically into the cyber domain. Pakistani hackers, claiming to be the “Pakistan Cyber Force,” report breaching several Indian defense institutions, potentially compromising personnel data and login credentials. Simultaneously, social media and a new right-wing media in India have become a critical battlefront. Ultranationalist voices in India incited violence against Muslims and Kashmiris; in Pakistan, anti-India rhetoric similarly intensified online. Cooler voices prevailing … for now These shifts have created multiple escalation pathways that traditional crisis management approaches weren’t designed to address. Particularly concerning is the nuclear dimension. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is that it will use nuclear weapons if its existence is threatened, and it has developed short-range tactical nuclear weapons intended to counter Indian conventional advantages. Meanwhile, India has informally dialed back its historic no-first-use stance, creating ambiguity about its operational doctrine. Thankfully, as the ceasefire announcement indicates, mediating voices appear to have prevailed this time around. But eroding norms, diminished great power diplomacy and the advent of multi-domain warfare, I argue, made this latest flare-up a dangerous turning point. What happens next will tell us much about how nuclear rivals manage, or fail to manage, the spiral of conflict in this dangerous new landscape.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In December 2024, Cambodia reached a key point in its foreign policy. Japan delivered a group of patrol boats to Cambodia as part of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) regional initiative. This clearly showed that security cooperation between the two countries is growing stronger. In April 2025, Japan is expected to take another big step by becoming the first foreign country allowed access to Cambodia’s strategically important Ream Naval Base — a facility that has been upgraded by China since 2022.These events, happening just months apart, seem to show Cambodia’s effort to expand its foreign partnerships after relying on China for a long time. The handover of Japanese vessels, while China is leading the base's modernization, is more than just a friendly act from Tokyo. It is a smart move by Cambodia, showing how it is trying to use the rivalry between big powers to strengthen its own security and independence. But can Cambodia really protect its sovereignty by trying to balance the interests of powerful countries? Or is this idea of multiple partnerships just an illusion — hiding the fact that Chinese influence continues to grow? The answers to these questions may shape the future of regional security in Indochina. In August 2023, Hun Manet became Cambodia’s new Prime Minister, replacing his father Hun Sen, who had ruled for nearly 40 years. Unlike his father, Hun Manet has a Western education — he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and earned a PhD in economics from the University of Bristol. His background gave some hope to Western diplomats that Cambodia’s foreign policy might move in a direction closer to their values. These hopes were partially fulfilled when Hun Manet’s first major foreign policy statement reaffirmed Cambodia’s commitment to diversifying its international relationships while strictly adhering to the principle of neutrality. This stance was particularly significant, given Cambodia’s longstanding perception among Western analysts as a pro-China state. For years, the Khmer elites have consistently voiced support for the PRC on the international stage, receiving in return substantial investment and infrastructure aid. However, these actions have occasionally strained Cambodia’s ties with neighboring countries — a dynamic noted by officials within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Cambodia has been a member since 1999. A striking example is the discord surrounding the South China Sea territorial disputes. When affected countries sought to use ASEAN as a platform to pressure Beijing, Cambodia opposed the effort, effectively blocking the adoption of a joint statement in autumn 2024 — something unprecedented in ASEAN’s 45-year history. With a few exceptions, the Khmer elites traditionally supported a policy of non-alignment during the Cold War and, afterward, a neutral stance on foreign affairs. Former Prime Minister Hun Sen himself emphasized that Cambodia seeks ties not only with China, but with all countries, considering this the most beneficial foreign policy path for a developing nation. Among Phnom Penh’s close partners is Japan, which conducts an active foreign policy in the region and stands as one of the Kingdom’s largest economic donors. At the same time, it is important to note that Hun Sen described relations with China as "unbreakable" and consistently rejected external criticism, highlighting only the positive aspects of Cambodia’s deepening ties with Beijing. In the first half of December 2024, Cambodia and Japan signed an agreement on the transfer of military patrol boats to Phnom Penh as part of Japan’s FOIP (Free and Open Indo-Pacific) initiative. Cambodia became the first ASEAN country to receive such assistance. However, the Kingdom has no intention of turning its back on China. The principle of neutrality, which underpins the country’s foreign policy, means that partnership with Japan does not contradict friendship with the PRC. Rather, the combination of the two reflects a strategy of multi-vector diplomacy, enabling Cambodia to benefit from relationships with a variety of partners. This approach is supported by several factors. First, Prime Minister Hun Manet has repeatedly affirmed his commitment to an "independent and neutral foreign policy based on the rule of law, mutual respect, and adherence to the principles of the UN Charter." In his words, this policy aims "to promote national interests, strengthen existing friendships, and build more solid ties." Second, Phnom Penh consistently accepts aid from all willing donors, including Australia through the Cambodia-Australia Partnership for Resilient Economic Development (CAPRED), the United States, Japan, and, of course, China. In 2023, marking the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations with Japan, Cambodia elevated bilateral cooperation to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. With this move, Japan joined a narrow circle of Phnom Penh’s strategic allies — a status previously held solely by China between 2010 and 2023 — advancing from basic diplomatic engagement and standard strategic partnership. Although China surpassed Japan in aid volume back in 2007, Tokyo remains a vital partner for Phnom Penh. Between 1994 and 2021, Japan implemented 210 investment projects in Cambodia totaling $3.1 billion. In 2024, bilateral trade between Japan and Cambodia reached $40.94 billion, placing Tokyo as the Kingdom’s fifth-largest trading partner. This robust economic cooperation underscores Japan’s strategic importance to Cambodia and highlights Phnom Penh’s efforts to diversify its international relationships, avoiding overreliance on any single partner. Despite Japan’s recent delivery of patrol boats to Cambodia, Phnom Penh’s most robust military cooperation remains with China. Between 2016 and 2024, China and Cambodia conducted six joint military exercises under the name “Golden Dragon” (នាគមាស), with each iteration featuring an increase in the number of troops, weaponry, and military equipment involved. Even amid the global threat of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Phnom Penh proceeded with the fourth iteration of these drills, involving nearly 3,000 soldiers — ten times more than in 2016. [1]. The drills also included dozens of combat helicopters, armored vehicles, and various transport assets. This continuous military support from Beijing underscores Cambodia’s growing reliance on Chinese involvement in strengthening its armed forces. Meanwhile, after seven years of joint military exercises with the United States, Cambodia suspended this cooperation in 2017, officially citing scheduling conflicts due to national elections. However, in June 2024, during a meeting between Hun Sen and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Cambodia announced the resumption of military cooperation with Washington. Furthermore, the U.S. agreed to revive joint military drills and to once again accept Cambodian cadets for training at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. For the United States, the primary point of contention has been the Chinese-built Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, despite Phnom Penh’s repeated assurances that the facility is intended solely for use by the Royal Cambodian Navy. Rumors about the base’s development first surfaced in 2018, sparking increased tensions between Phnom Penh and Washington. At the time, however, the U.S. lacked concrete evidence to formally accuse Cambodia of intending to host Chinese military forces on its territory, and American officials limited their response to diplomatic messages expressing concern. In August 2018, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that he trusted Cambodia’s assurances that the base would be used exclusively by its own navy, and he praised the Kingdom for its “firm defense of national sovereignty.” In early December 2024, a U.S. Navy vessel arrived in Cambodia in the first port call in eight years — a visit made possible after a prolonged period of strained relations due to sustained American criticism of Cambodia’s human rights record. Cambodia’s Ministry of National Defense stated that the visit was arranged following a request from the United States and would help to “strengthen and expand the bonds of friendship, as well as enhance bilateral cooperation” between the two countries. *** In recent years, the Asia-Pacific region has become a stage for intensifying geopolitical competition, directly impacting Cambodia’s security environment and foreign policy choices. The strategic interests of major powers such as the United States and China increasingly intersect in the region, prompting smaller states — including Cambodia — to explore new pathways for safeguarding their independence and national security. In response to these shifts, Phnom Penh has sought to strengthen its defense capabilities and diversify international partnerships, as reflected in the agreement with Japan on the transfer of military vessels. This move not only enhances bilateral relations with Tokyo but also signals Cambodia’s intent to play a more active role in regional security affairs. Such involvement could enable Cambodia to navigate between competing global powers and maintain its independence amid mounting pressure from both China and the United States.Russia, as one of Cambodia’s traditional partners, may also seek to bolster its regional presence by intensifying diplomatic engagement and offering avenues for cooperation in defense, security, and military technology. This would help Phnom Penh better balance its external relations and maneuver between great powers more effectively. For Moscow, it presents an opportunity not only to deepen ties with Cambodia, but also to expand its influence in Southeast Asia and counter the growing presence of Western actors in the region. 1. Phan Thi Hai Yen. (2024). Cambodia's Strategic Embrace of China: Military Cooperation and Its Implications. ISRG Journal of Arts Humanities & Social Sciences (ISRGJAHSS), II(V), 191–198.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Amid the rapidly shifting dynamics in Syria and Iraq, international and regional warnings about the resurgence of ISIS have resurfaced, driven by mounting evidence of the group’s reorganization and its exploitation of the security vacuum left by military collapses and political instability. Since late 2024, multiple reports have pointed to a noticeable uptick in ISIS activity, an increase in the frequency of its attacks, and a growing ability to maneuver and recruit—fueled by weak regional coordination and diverging priorities among key international actors. Far from being ideologically defeated, ISIS appears to be reshaping itself within a volatile landscape, threatening to usher in a new phase of instability. Against this backdrop, the following analysis explores the main features of the group’s resurgence, the dynamics of its territorial re-expansion, and the regional and international efforts to contain it—seeking to unpack the nature of this renewed threat and assess its potential implications. International Warnings Over the Growing Threat of ISIS A series of international and regional statements and warnings issued since late 2024 reflect mounting concerns over the reemergence of the terrorist group ISIS on the regional scene, amid fragile security conditions and a diminished capacity to contain unconventional threats. In December 2024, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, in a phone call with the UK Minister of State for the Middle East and North Africa, Hamish Falconer, revealed alarming signs of ISIS regrouping. He noted that the organization had managed to seize large stockpiles of weapons following the collapse of Syrian army units that abandoned their arsenals—enabling ISIS to expand its territorial presence in parts of Syria. This alarming development has not only been flagged by Iraq but has also featured prominently in international reports. On February 10, 2025, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism, during a briefing before the Security Council, confirmed that ISIS continues to demonstrate a striking ability to adapt and evolve its tactics, despite ongoing security and military pressure from member states and international and regional partners. The 20th report of the UN Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIS to international peace and security emphasized that the group has not been ideologically defeated; rather, it is restructuring itself within the security and political voids present in Syria, Iraq, and other areas. In the same context, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned in March 2025 of a "real danger" posed by ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, pointing to the lack of political settlements and the breakdown of certain internal security structures as conditions conducive to the group's return. His warning echoed the concluding statement of the meeting of foreign ministers from Syria’s neighboring countries, held in Amman, Jordan, on March 9, 2025. The ministers expressed deep concern over the escalating ISIS threat and underscored the need to strengthen regional cooperation mechanisms—particularly in intelligence sharing and coordinating security operations along Syria’s borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In a joint press conference following the meeting, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stressed that "combating ISIS is no longer a local issue, but a collective responsibility that demands effective regional readiness and robust international support." He highlighted that the group’s threat has grown not only in terms of manpower but also in terms of military capabilities, and that its reach is now expanding beyond border areas into the Syrian heartland itself. These developments indicate that, despite the significant blows dealt to it in recent years, ISIS continues to benefit from the fluid geopolitical landscape in Syria—one that creates security gaps the group can exploit to reposition and reorganize itself. Furthermore, the conflicting priorities among international and regional actors in the Syrian file are hindering the formation of a unified front to confront this renewed threat. This fragmentation makes the challenge far more complex and reinforces the notion that the battle against ISIS remains far from over—both on the ground and within the broader framework of collective security. Signs of Escalation ISIS continues to consolidate its presence in Syria through its deployment across two geographically separate yet strategically interconnected regions—demonstrating the group’s persistent ability to exploit security gaps and divergences among local and international actors. The first area lies in Syria’s northeastern region, known as al-Jazira, which is nominally under the control of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite this control, ISIS has maintained a notable presence in the southern desert of al-Hasakah province, geographically linked to the northeastern outskirts of the city of Al-Bukamal, particularly around the town of Al-Baghuz—the group’s last urban stronghold before its official collapse. This geographic footprint extends beyond Syria’s borders into Iraq, specifically into the Hadar desert in Nineveh province. Although concrete barriers now separate the two countries, ISIS has retained a clear ability to move across the border, as confirmed by testimonies from residents in the rural areas of al-Hasakah—rekindling memories of the "parallel state" dynamic the group sought to establish during its peak between 2014 and 2017. The year 2024 saw a marked increase in ISIS activity within Syria. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the group carried out 491 operations throughout the year. In its report released on December 30, 2024, the Observatory noted that ISIS has successfully exploited political and military turmoil to reorganize and launch targeted attacks. In line with this, the Soufan Center reported on December 18 that ISIS attacks had tripled in frequency compared to 2023. Meanwhile, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on July 17 that the group claimed responsibility for 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria during just the first half of 2024—clearly reflecting a strategy aimed at “escalating operational activity to compensate for structural decline.”  This upward trend reinforces the growing assumption that ISIS is leveraging fragile security conditions not only to expand its territorial influence but also to challenge other extremist groups—most notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northern Syria. HTS has faced internal challenges linked to the novelty of its governance experiment and has been weakened by surprise attacks that undermine its structure and heighten insecurity in its areas of control. ISIS, in turn, appears intent on diffusing HTS’s efforts, exacerbating divisions among factions, and exploiting public discontent with local elites. These developments have also triggered serious concerns over potential spillover effects in Iraq, especially given the deeply interwoven geographic linkages between the Syrian and Iraqi theaters of operation. The cross-border mobility of ISIS operatives could reactivate dormant cells in Iraq’s western and northern provinces—particularly given the thousands of radicalized individuals currently held in Iraqi prisons, making these facilities potential targets for jailbreaks or attempts to reassert control, as seen in the earlier Ghweran prison attack in al-Hasakah. In light of this complex battlefield landscape, the fight against ISIS is far from over. The group—demonstrating notable tactical agility—is reconstituting itself within existing voids, capitalizing on fragmentation, and continually seeking new pathways for resurgence through the shifting terrain of regional geopolitics. The inability of certain local and regional powers to formulate a sustainable, collective counterterrorism strategy only further emboldens the group’s ambitions. Contours of a New Phase in the War Against ISIS The final months of 2024 and early 2025 witnessed a series of high-profile operations targeting senior ISIS leaders, signaling a tactical shift in the counterterrorism strategies adopted by international and regional powers. This shift marks the beginning of a new phase in the fight against ISIS—one that moves beyond random strikes to a focused campaign against the group’s leadership infrastructure. On December 20, 2024, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced a precision airstrike in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor province, initially claiming it had killed ISIS’s leader, known as “Abu Yusuf.” However, CENTCOM later revised its statement, clarifying that the target was not the overall leader but a senior commander named Mahmoud “Abu Yusuf,” along with two of his aides. This correction reflects the complex intelligence challenges involved in identifying high-ranking ISIS figures, especially in an environment riddled with infiltration and security deception. In a related development, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani announced in March 2025, via a post on the platform X, the killing of one of the group’s most dangerous operatives: Abdullah Maki Masleh Al-Rifai, known as “Abu Khadijah,” who held the title of “Wali of Iraq and Syria” within ISIS's organizational structure. His elimination, the result of coordinated efforts between Iraqi intelligence and the Joint Operations Command—supported by the international coalition—demonstrates the effectiveness of multi-layered coordination in tracking down the group’s hidden leadership. On the European front, France returned to active operations against ISIS in Syria for the first time in over two years. In December 2024, French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced that French warplanes had conducted precision strikes on ISIS positions inside Syrian territory. He emphasized that the operation, carried out the previous Sunday, underscored France’s continued commitment to counterterrorism efforts in the Levant. This marked France’s first such strike since September 2022—indicating a potential reactivation of its counterterrorism role and a broader effort to reassert European engagement in Syria, a file that has largely been dominated by the U.S., Russia, and Turkey. These three operations—American, Iraqi, and French—reflect what appears to be a renewed “leadership decapitation campaign” targeting ISIS commanders amid rising concerns over the group’s resurgence in Syria and Iraq. Yet, while such strikes carry strategic importance, they cannot substitute for broader efforts to dismantle the ideological, organizational, and financial foundations that allow ISIS to regenerate. Killing leaders may temporarily weaken the group’s capabilities, but it does not ensure its eradication unless accompanied by comprehensive political and security solutions that address the roots of extremism and the institutional fragility on which the group thrives. In a notable development suggesting a qualitative shift in how regional states are approaching the terrorism file, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria announced in February 2025 the establishment of a joint cooperation mechanism to confront ISIS. The agreement emphasizes close coordination between foreign and defense ministries and intelligence agencies, covering areas such as border security, intelligence sharing, and joint military operations. This move reflects a shared recognition that the terrorist threat transcends borders and demands coordinated frameworks that go beyond bilateral interests toward a collective regional security logic. This agreement laid the foundation for a broader process that culminated in a high-level five-party summit on March 8, 2025. The meeting brought together foreign and defense ministers, senior military commanders, and intelligence chiefs from the four founding countries, with Lebanon later joining the process. From the Turkish side, the meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın—highlighting Turkey’s strategic investment in this forum as a platform for reshaping the security landscape in northern Syria and Iraq. More broadly, this nascent regional alliance reflects a growing inclination to reduce dependence on Western powers in managing regional security issues. Instead, it seeks to establish a “new security architecture” led by Middle Eastern nations themselves—reviving the role of Arab and regional capitals in controlling border zones and reclaiming areas that ISIS may seek to exploit as fallback havens for regrouping and redeployment. Conclusion The available data indicates that ISIS is entering a new phase of reactivation and repositioning in the Syrian theater, capitalizing on the security and political collapse following the fall of central authority, and on the conflicting agendas of regional and international actors. Despite targeted strikes against some of its leaders, the group continues to demonstrate its operational adaptability and its ability to evolve amid shifting field dynamics. The resurgence of ISIS attacks and its expansion into ungoverned spaces signal a complex phase of confrontation—one that demands more than just military maneuvers. The success of the war against ISIS in Syria depends not only on precision strikes but also on the establishment of effective regional security partnerships and the activation of political and developmental pathways that address the root causes of extremism. As the group seeks to exploit divisions, its complete disappearance will hinge on the creation of a comprehensive deterrence architecture—one that goes beyond temporary fixes and moves toward sustainable strategies that tackle the structural foundations of militancy, not just its symptoms.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Sudan’s war, now entering its third year, has taken another unexpected turn. In March 2025, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), also known as the Janjaweed, withdrew from Khartoum, abandoning the presidential palace and airport. This retreat marks a significant contrast to the paramilitary group’s earlier victory when troops stormed the capital in April 2023. The fall of Khartoum is a turning point. But, based on my research into Sudan’s political turmoil over the past three decades, I don’t believe recent developments mark the war’s final chapter. What began as a power struggle between two military factions is now transforming into a much wider conflict, marked by deepening fragmentation and the rise of armed civilian groups. Across the country, new militias are emerging, many formed by civilians who once had no part in the war. The army encouraged civilians to fight, but now it faces a growing number of independent armed groups. In cities and rural areas alike, civilians have taken up arms. Some are fighting alongside the army, answering calls from the military leadership, including army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to defend their neighbourhoods and families. Others have formed self-defence units to protect against looting and violence. Some have joined breakaway militias that have their own agendas. These groups don’t share a single goal. Some fight for self-defence, others for political power. Some for revenue and wealth. Others are seeking ethnic control – Sudan’s population has 56 ethnic groups and 595 sub-ethnic groups. This is what makes Sudan’s war even more dangerous: fragmentation is creating multiple mini-wars within the larger conflict. How the Rapid Support Forces lost Khartoum Several key factors forced the RSF to retreat from Khartoum after it claimed control of the Sudanese capital city two years earlier. • Internal fractures: The RSF, built on tribal loyalty, struggled to hold together as the war dragged on. Many factions felt sidelined by its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. • Civilian resistance: The RSF’s reliance on brutality backfired, alienating even those who might have supported them. Instead of consolidating control, they turned civilians into enemies. The RSF relied on terror – looting, mass killings and sexual violence. Instead of gaining control, they provoked fierce resistance. Armed civilians, originally taking up arms in self-defence, have become an informal militia network working against the RSF. • Foreign intervention: Reports suggest Egyptian airstrikes and tactical support helped the army take Khartoum. Additionally, Turkish-made Bayraktar drones weakened RSF positions. With supply lines cut, the RSF had no choice but to retreat. Khartoum was not just a battlefield defeat for the RSF. It was a turning point in how the war is fought – it’s no longer a military struggle but a battle involving armed civilians across Sudan. Based on reports from humanitarian organisations, conflict monitors and local testimonies, a clearer picture has emerged of a growing number of armed groups operating across Sudan. These groups have formed in response to the escalating conflict. Recent analyses highlight that arms trafficking and intensified community mobilisation have accelerated within the past two years. Neighbourhood defence units have emerged in urban areas like El-Gezira in central Sudan, El-Fasher in North Darfur, Al-Dalang in South Kordofan, El-Obeid in North Kordofan, Babanusa in West Kordofan and Khartoum. They were initially formed to protect residential zones from the RSF but have since expanded their roles and increasingly operate outside the oversight of the army. Tribal and regional militias have also become more prominent, particularly in Darfur and Kordofan. In these regions, entrenched ethnic and political rivalries have intertwined with the current war. Some of these militia groups have aligned with the army. Others remain independent, pursuing their own agendas, which include securing territory. In Darfur, growing anger at Hemedti’s favouritism towards his own tribe (Rizeigat) led to defections. Internal divisions within the RSF have played a major role in its recent losses. Some former RSF fighters have formed their own militias. The RSF was never a unified force, but a tribal alliance dominated by the Dagalo family and Rizeigat elites. Initially, gold revenues secured loyalty, but as the war has dragged on, internal fractures have deepened. Another ethnic-linked group is the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North. It has expanded its control in Kordofan and Blue Nile, two resource-rich regions in southern Sudan. The group allied with the RSF to push its own agenda, which includes securing greater autonomy for these regions and promoting a secular political framework that challenges Khartoum’s Islamist-leaning governance. Other ethnic militias also operate in eastern Sudan, supported by neighbouring countries such as Eritrea, further escalating the situation. Islamist-linked militias are also on the rise. The main example of these groups is El Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade, which emerged as a key player supporting the army against the RSF. Reports link the group to remnants of the Omar al-Bashir regime (1993-2019) – the dissolved Popular Defence Forces. This was a paramilitary group established in the mid-1980s to defend Arab tribes and support the military. It flourished under the al-Bashir regime. What next? While the RSF’s retreat from Khartoum is a major victory for the Sudanese army, it doesn’t mean stability is returning. Instead, Sudan is now facing a dangerous new reality: the rise of civilian militarisation. If not reined in, these groups could evolve and establish de facto warlord-run territories where local commanders wield unchecked power. This would undermine any prospects for centralised governance in Sudan. With militias multiplying and no clear political solution, Sudan risks becoming a battlefield of warring factions. Meanwhile, international mediators are struggling to find a solution while foreign interference continues. The United Arab Emirates, a major RSF backer, still supports Hemedti financially, ensuring he remains active in Sudan’s gold trade.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Signed in 2024, the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has reshaped regional dynamics, potentially granting Ethiopia sea access via Berbera in exchange for Somaliland’s recognition. This move challenged Somalia’s territorial integrity and prompted Mogadishu to align itself with Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti against Ethiopia. While the crisis reflects Ethiopia’s strategic push for a maritime presence, it also captures Somaliland’s long-standing quest for independence. In the wider Red Sea region, regional tensions are exacerbated by extra-regional actors which include the UAE, Turkey, France, and Saudi Arabia, all of which have their own interests therein. Although, external actors do not directly cause conflict, their involvement emboldens local actors and escalates rivalries. Hence, the Red Sea region has a growing importance in contemporary global geopolitics. Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU: Geopolitical Ambitions and the Quest for Recognition The year 2024 began with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The latter, formerly British Somaliland, was part of Somalia, from which it unilaterally seceded after Siad Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991. Since then, Somaliland has been self-ruled and is considered a de facto state. However, the Hargheisa authority does not enjoy any international legal recognition. If implemented, the agreement with Addis Ababa would give Somaliland its first significant de jure recognition. In return, the Hargheisa authorities would grant Ethiopia access to the sea through the port of Berbera and the concession of a coastal area for military use. The situation revolves around three key regional players: Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland. Each of these actors has engaged in activities driven by its own objectives and strategic priorities. Ethiopia’s decision is influenced by several practical economic and strategic factors. Following the Eritrean War in the early 1990s, Ethiopia lost its Red Sea ports and became the world’s most populous landlocked country. Since 1998, Djibouti’s ports have handled 95 per cent of trade to and from Addis Ababa. Sea access through Djibouti costs Ethiopia between $1.5 and $2 billion annually which Ethiopia’s rulers, since 2019, begun to express more strongly that they consider this spending excessive and unsustainable in the medium to long term. To reduce Addis Ababa’s dependence on Djiboutian ports, the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed believes it is necessary to find a viable alternative. Before the MoU, Ethiopia had considered several alternatives to Djibouti, including Eritrea, Somalia, and Kenya. The idea of developing an economic and trade corridor between Addis Ababa and the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden began to take shape in the final months of 2023. Somaliland’s main port has been operated by the Emirati company – DP World since 2015, which has developed its infrastructure and increased its cargo transit capacity. Ethiopia estimates that it can divert between 12 and 15 per cent of the total volume passing through Djibouti’s ports to Berbera and, in the long term, connect its industrial zones to several trade corridors. From a strategic point of view, Ethiopian assessments are influenced by Addis Ababa’s national role conception. Ethiopia sees itself as the leading regional power because of its history and traditional economic and political weight in the region. Consequently, Ethiopian elites perceive the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden as their natural strategic spheres. For this reason, the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs recently announced the ‘Grand Strategy of the Two Waters.’ The new agenda aims to expand the sphere of national interest and action eastwards towards the sea, unlike in the past when the focus of Ethiopia’s strategic projection was mainly on the Nile Basin. Indeed, Ethiopia’s ambitions as a regional power are challenged by its lack of a maritime gateway. For Addis Ababa, having a presence in the Red Sea would provide two strategic benefits: first, it would strengthen its standing in the region; second, it would bolster Ethiopia’s international role by enhancing cooperation in multilateral anti-piracy efforts. In short, the Ethiopian government sees maritime projection as a strategic resource and a gateway to the geopolitics of the coming decades, which will focus on Asia and the Indo-Pacific in particular. Therefore, one of the key clauses of the MoU allows Ethiopia to establish a military outpost in Lughaya, a town overlooking the Gulf of Aden, for at least fifty years. According to Ethiopian plans, the naval base will become the headquarters of the nascent Ethiopian navy. For Somaliland, the MoU represents a further step on the difficult path to independence. In the past year, the issue of Somaliland’s independence has gained renewed attention and relevance. This pursuit of self-determination is deeply rooted in a historical context that stretches back to the 19th century, predating the regime of Siad Barre. The Somalilanders’ path began during a pivotal time when the British Empire established agreements with various Somali clans, particularly the Gadabuursi, Issa, and Habr Awal. In 1884, the region was officially designated as British Somaliland, a protectorate that enjoyed a measure of autonomy and governance, distinguishing it from the colonial dominance exerted by Italian authorities in southern Somalia. Following the unification of Somaliland with the Trust Territory of Somalia in 1960, the social, economic, and political conditions of the people of Somaliland began to deteriorate, leading to widespread discontent and a strong desire for independence. Over time, the Siad Barre regime cast a long shadow over Somaliland, leading to widespread discrimination and marginalisation. The political and economic machinations of the central government often neglected the aspirations of the Somaliland people, fuelling a growing sense of injustice. In this context, collective memory became a powerful cornerstone of identity, highlighting the stark contrasts between Somaliland’s struggles and Somalia’s divergent trajectories in the turbulent post-Siad Barre era. Hargheisa’s quest for independence is rooted in historical grievances and reflects the unique identities and trajectories of its people. The Somaliland narrative often draws comparisons with the current situation in the rest of Somalia. Over the past three decades, this de facto state has made significant progress towards sustainable institutional and administrative development albeit on a very limited budget. The democratisation process is also crucial to further the development of Somaliland’s independence. The recent national elections held last November demonstrated the political maturity of all parties involved. The peaceful transfer of power from the defeated government to the electoral process is a remarkable event in the region and stands out as one of the few such instances in the continent. The achievements of the institution-building process in Somaliland are even more striking when compared to the path taken by Somalia. Somalia’s Diplomatic Counterbalance and the Emergence of an Anti-Ethiopian Block  The signing of the MoU by Ethiopia and Somaliland raised concerns among regional actors, particularly Somalia. As Somaliland is formally and legally recognised as an integral part of Somalia, there were fears that Hargeisa’s claims to independence were gaining momentum. Mogadishu was particularly concerned that Ethiopia’s official recognition of Somaliland’s claims could trigger a domino effect, leading other regional and extra-regional actors to follow suit. Therefore, Somalia saw Ethiopia’s actions as a deliberate act of intimidation that threatened its territorial integrity at a sensitive time for its political future. Somalia faces several challenges, including the struggle to establish an effective institutional framework, particularly with regard to the relationship between the central government and the federal states, and also the fight against the terrorist group – al-Shabaab. In response to the MoU, the Somali executive, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, launched an intense diplomatic campaign to prevent its implementation and recognition by the international community. Somalia has sought support from regional organisations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), and the African Union (AU). In doing so, Somalia has consolidated alliances with both regional and extra-regional actors. As a result, the dynamics between these three actors – Somalia, Ethiopia, and Somaliland have become increasingly intertwined. Mogadishu’s natural anti-Ethiopian partners are two of Addis Ababa’s historical rivals: Eritrea and Egypt. Compared to 2018, the year of normalisation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the situation today is very different. The positions of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed quickly diverged following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement (2022), which ended the two-year conflict in Tigray. Eritrea, which had supported the Ethiopian military campaign, refused to negotiate with the Tigrayan authorities, represented by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The distance between the two leaders has widened as Ethiopia’s claims to the sea have grown. Indeed, Asmara fears that Ethiopia is eyeing its ports, a fear fuelled by the rhetoric of Abiy and other Ethiopian leaders. Conversely, Isaias has used his leadership and many regional relationships to foster a kind of ‘anti-Ethiopian coalition’. One significant change has been Egypt’s increasing involvement in the region. Mogadishu’s rapprochement with Cairo was formalised in August 2024 with the signing of a defence agreement. This agreement centres on Egypt’s intention to support Somalia’s request for the withdrawal of all Ethiopian troops currently stationed in Somalia as part of the African Union peacekeeping mission (formerly known as Atmis, replaced by the Aussom mission on 1 January 2025). The strengthening of Somali-Egyptian relations, supported by Asmara and involving Djibouti through a security cooperation agreement, has consolidated an anti-Ethiopian bloc. This alignment represents a significant shift in the regional balance and illustrates Egypt’s changing Africa policy. Since 2020, Egypt has reaffirmed the importance of its southern relations. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has gradually reassessed Egypt’s African relations and promoted a geopolitical strategy that emphasises a north-south axis, rather than the east-west axis that dominated in previous decades. The Red Sea region, including the Nile Basin, is now a key part of this new strategic framework, which is shaped by Egypt’s historical rivalry with Ethiopia. Between the two states, the balance on the Nile has changed. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has given Ethiopia a strategic advantage over Egypt. Egypt therefore had to adapt its approach to the ongoing dynamics by deciding to expand the areas of contention toward the sea. Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia therefore provided an opportunity to increase Egypt’s footprint in the region. Regional Tensions and Extra-regional Actors in the Red Sea The MoU signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland has opened a new phase in tensions. The focus of regional tensions is shifting to the coastal areas, particularly the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are marked by a number of security and defence agreements. Common strategic interests underpin the alignment of the anti-Ethiopian bloc, which includes Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Egypt. Somalia views any legal recognition of Somaliland’s independence as an existential threat. For Djibouti, the economic damage from increased trade through Berbera is marginal but potentially devastating to its fragile internal balance of power. Eritrea perceives Ethiopia as an ongoing threat, and the current Ethiopian government is seen by Asmara as highly unreliable, raising concerns about a potential escalation of violence along their shared borders. Finally, for Egypt, the assessment of its regional position is of particular importance. Traditionally, Cairo has regarded the waters between Suez and Aden as its ‘lake’. As a result, like Addis Ababa, it regards the entire region as part of its sphere of influence. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey are among the most active players in the region. The UAE has supported the MoU to capitalise on investments in Berbera and Addis Ababa. Turkey, on the other hand, has taken a more balanced approach, thanks to its strong political and commercial ties with Ethiopia and Somalia. For Ankara, however, Somalia’s integrity must not be questioned. Following their rapprochement in 2021, the UAE and Turkey have maintained good relations. Despite their different strategies and some disagreements, both nations share a common interest in maintaining a central role in regional affairs. Other extra-regional players, such as France and Saudi Arabia, are also active in the background. France supports the MoU as part of its ongoing efforts to increase its presence in East Africa, which began at the same time as its withdrawal from the Sahel region. Its base in Djibouti is destined to become more central to French policy as French military presence in West Africa is being reduced. French officials see this increased influence in regional affairs as essential to France’s future interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, whose geopolitical focus is shifting from the Gulf to the Red Sea, opposes the implementation of the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland. It seeks to counter regional projects promoted by the UAE. This might be as a result of the long-standing political rift between the two Gulf monarchies. Extra-regional actors do not directly cause an increase in regional conflicts. Rather, it is local actors who, feeling empowered by their connections with these extra-regional partners, perceive their environment as more permissive and gain the confidence to take assertive actions that they may not have considered before. Understanding these dynamics sheds light on why Ethiopia and Somaliland decided to sign the MoU at this historic moment. This perspective also helps to explain other regional crises, such as the civil war in Sudan and the conflict in Tigray. The different transformations in the international system have created a context in which local actors can seek multiple forms of external support. Increased alignment and overlap between local and regional rivalries has increased the willingness of actors to take assertive action, leading to a general increase in inter- and intra-state tensions. However, the flexible nature of alliances can also mitigate the risk of the trickle-down effect that often accompanies such alliances. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0): https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The South China Sea (SCS) is a strategic region in international geopolitics and a hotspot of disputes involving sovereignty, economy, and security. This text analyzes the positions of two key actors in the region — China and the Philippines — whose growing tensions have been a defining factor in the evolution of the conflict. Located in Southeast Asia, the SCS borders China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, and connects the Pacific to the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca, one of the busiest maritime routes. Its wealth in fishery and energy resources has intensified disputes over the Pratas, Macclesfield, Paracel, and Spratly Archipelagos, which are claimed entirely or partially by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In this context, the SCS holds significant geopolitical importance. From the classical perspective of Alfred T. Mahan, maritime control is essential for a country to consolidate itself as a power, as it enables access to strategic resources, trade routes, and the projection of military power. Today, this remains a key factor of political, economic, and military influence in the macro-region that authors such as Ulises Granados (2022) refer to as the Indo-Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, from the perspective of critical geopolitics, the SCS conflict is a dispute rooted in the construction of geographic and political meanings. According to Gerard Toal, space is not fixed but rather a construction shaped by power relations and discourses. One example is its naming: China calls it the South Sea, the Philippines refer to it as the West Philippine Sea, and Vietnam calls it the East Sea. Each name not only reflects a territorial claim but also a geopolitical imaginary. Interests in the SCS date back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when Japan exerted control over some areas through the state and its corporations. However, after World War II, sovereignty over these territories remained undefined, leading to competing claims from neighboring countries. During the Cold War, the United States strengthened its alliance with the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations to contain communism, while China consolidated its presence in areas like the Paracel Islands. This context has been key in shaping the current competition over the sea. The Chinese government claims sovereignty in the SCS based on historical precedents going back to the Han dynasty. Beijing argues it recovered the Spratly and Paracel Islands after World War II, invoking the Cairo Declaration (1943) and the Potsdam Declaration (1945), which called for the return of territories occupied by Japan. In 1958, China issued the Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea, incorporating the Pratas (Dongsha), Paracel (Xisha), Macclesfield (Zhongsha), and Spratly (Nansha) Islands into its sovereign territory. Later, in 2009, it reaffirmed its claim through the Nine-Dash Line (NDL), a delimitation drawn in 1947 that encompasses nearly 80% of the SCS. Although this line is not clearly defined in international law, Beijing maintains that it holds sovereign rights within it and that disputes should be resolved without intervention from extra-regional actors — a stance that contrasts with the Philippines’ actions, which have sought international support to strengthen their position. From China’s perspective, its claims in the SCS are essential to its sovereignty and national security. For this reason, it has increased its naval, paramilitary, and civilian presence. Maritime projection and control of trade routes are also key aspects of its strategy to advance initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which is fundamental to its regional and international economic growth. In contrast, the Philippines has claimed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands since the 1970s and has resorted to legal and media avenues to denounce China. In 1995, it protested China’s construction of structures on Mischief Reef, and in 1997, it stationed the Sierra Madre ship in the Spratlys. Today, the Philippine Navy maintains operations in the area. Moreover, in 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes. However, tensions escalated in 2009 when China reaffirmed the Nine-Dash Line. In response, in 2013, the Philippines brought the case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), arguing that China was violating the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and asserting its rights over exclusive economic zones. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled in favor of the Philippines, concluding that China's claims lacked legal basis under international law. However, China rejected the ruling, stating that it does not reflect its interpretation of territorial sovereignty based on its history and legal frameworks. Moreover, Beijing considered the Philippine complaint a unilateral action. In 2024, the Philippines enacted the “Maritime Zones Law” and the “Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act,” which define its maritime rights in the South China Sea. In response, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected both laws, arguing they violate its sovereignty. From the Philippine perspective, China’s actions represent a challenge to its security, prompting it to seek support from ASEAN for a joint response in the SCS. However, the bloc’s positions are divided: the Philippines actively denounces China, Vietnam takes a more pragmatic approach, and Malaysia avoids confrontation. These differences have led ASEAN to adopt a moderate stance, prioritizing diplomacy over conflict. In summary, the Philippines is strengthening its alliance with the United States under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which ensures assistance in the event of an attack in the Pacific, including the SCS. This cooperation aligns with the U.S. geopolitical strategy in Asia, which has evolved from Obama’s “Asia Pivot” to the “Indo-Pacific” vision, focused on a “rules-based order” and the security of trade routes. However, the exclusion of China has led to perceptions that this strategy is a containment mechanism against the world’s second-largest economy. For example, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi argues that the U.S. strategy aims to “besiege and contain China” through alliances that promote confrontation. He also claims it undermines regional cooperation, while the Asian giant promotes a “community with a shared future in the Asia-Pacific” based on integration and stability. Thus, China employs the concept of the Asia-Pacific and, although it remains cautious in its rhetoric, insists that its approach prioritizes cooperation and avoids a bloc-based logic in the region. In this context, during Balikatan, a joint military exercise between the U.S. and the Philippines in April 2024, Washington deployed Typhon missile systems in the northern part of the country. By the end of the year, Manila expressed interest in acquiring them, which Beijing perceived as a threat. In 2025, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. stated he would reconsider the U.S. military presence if China ceased its territorial claims. China has not officially responded, and these remarks could be part of Philippine political rhetoric, reflecting its perception of threat in the region. Additionally, the Philippines has strengthened security cooperation with Japan, which also faces territorial disputes with China. In 2024, they signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement to facilitate military deployments, and Japan supported the modernization of the Philippine Navy. In 2025, both nations reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. While Manila strengthens its position through strategic alliances, Beijing views this as an attempt to internationalize the conflict. Another point is that the Philippines’ approach varies depending on the administration in power. During Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency (2016–2022), Manila prioritized closer ties with Beijing, favoring economic cooperation. In contrast, the arrival of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in 2022 strengthened the alliance with the United States, increasing defense and security cooperation, but also escalating tensions with China. On the other hand, while the U.S. has expanded its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, Trump’s first term (2017–2021) had a more isolationist approach compared to the Obama (2009–2017) and Biden (2021–2025) administrations. The Philippine government hopes to maintain the agreements reached in 2024, although their continuity will depend on how the new Trump administration (2025–) manages its Indo-Pacific strategy. Moreover, the Philippines cannot fully align with just one actor, as both China and the U.S. are essential to its economy. The United States is its main export market, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority, while China is its largest source of imported goods, top investor, infrastructure partner, and shares agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Therefore, while Manila strengthens its defense cooperation with the U.S. and maintains strategic interests in the South China Sea, its relationship with China remains crucial due to its economic importance. Final Considerations From a geopolitical perspective, cooperation between the Philippines and the United States seeks to counterbalance China's presence in the region, while China reinforces its position in the SCS for sovereignty and security reasons. In this context, the relationship between Manila and Washington, along with the stance of ASEAN members, will be decisive in the evolution of the conflict. Thus, the dispute in the South China Sea reflects a geopolitical competition between regional and extra-regional actors for control of strategic areas, where each defends its own interests. Although none of the parties appear to seek open conflict, increasing militarization and patrols have raised the risk of incidents that could escalate tensions. In this context, the future will depend on the willingness of actors to negotiate concessions, although the lack of consensus and divergent interests make a definitive solution unlikely in the short term. In this way, Alfred T. Mahan’s theories on maritime power remain relevant in the SCS, although their application is not absolute. Beyond the control of sea routes, the competition also unfolds through the construction of narratives by regional and external actors. The way these narratives shape alliances and perceptions will be key in defining power dynamics in the region.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The first half of the 2020s dramatically changed the situation in Sahel. Military coups in Mali (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) brought the military to power. In Niger, the military junta that came to power, the National Council for the Protection of the Homeland led by Abdurahmane Tchiani, faced fierce criticism, sanctions, and a de facto economic blockade of the country by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In addition, ECOWAS has threatened military intervention, with the stated aim of restoring deposed President Mohamed Bazoum. In many ways, the risk of more military coups in countries in the region drove the organization, causing particular concern for Nigeria, its chairman at the time. Abuja positioned itself as a leader in the region, particularly in ECOWAS, so it was important for it to preserve the integrity of the organization and the status quo in neighboring countries. Pressure from France, in turn, also had a corresponding effect. Paris has significant economic interests in Niger due to the country's large uranium reserves to support French nuclear power plants. As a result, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger began a process to create a military alliance aimed at the common defense of the three countries, including the fight against terrorism and separatism. As a result, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was created on September 16, 2023, and transformed into a confederation on July 6, 2024. Thus, the range of cooperation between the three countries was broadened: now it covers not only military-political but also socio-economic spheres. Already on January 28, 2024, the AES countries announced their intention to leave ECOWAS, but since immediate withdrawal from the organization was not possible, they formally remained in the organization for another year, during which time the ECOWAS member states tried to find a compromise with the AES. On January 28, 2025, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formally announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS. This political process in the Sahel significantly changes the balance of power in the region. Why did the AES countries witdraw from ECOWAS? The reasons for the withdrawal of states from the organization are related to the problems of separatism and terrorism in the region. In early 2012, at the height of the civil war in Libya, Libyan Tuaregs formed the “National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad” (MNLA) and moved to Mali to rebel against the government in order to create an independent Tuareg state. After the military coup in Mali in March 2012, the rebels took advantage of the situation and proclaimed the “Independent State of Azawad” in the north of the country. They were supported in this by fighters from the Ansar al-Din Front, who were in contact with Al-Qaeda. However, after the declaration of independence of Azawad, the Islamists did not accept the secular status of this unrecognized state, which led to contradictions with the MNLA. As a result of fighting between the Islamists and secular rebels, the latter were defeated and went underground. The entire territory of Azawad came under the control of radical Islamists. The Islamization of the movement, as well as Islamist attacks on southern Mali, forced France to intervene, as it could destabilize the situation in the region. Operation Serval was announced. ECOWAS, under Article 3 of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance Defense, signed in Freetown on May 3, 1981, was obliged to provide assistance to Mali for anti-terrorist operations Accordingly, and also referring to UNSC Resolution №2085, ECOWAS launched the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). As a result, France and ECOWAS managed to liberate all the towns captured by the militants by February 2013, after which the ECOWAS mission was placed under the auspices of the UN. The UN operation was called the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and was peacekeeping in nature. But these efforts were not enough to destroy extremist groups in Mali. Militants began to use guerrilla warfare methods, and a wave of terror began in the country's cities. Neither the UN mission nor the new French Operation Barkhan (2014–2021) were able to stop terror in the country. The situation worsened after a new radical Islamist group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), a regional branch of al-Qaeda, appeared on the scene in 2017. It has operated not only in Mali, but also in Burkina Faso and Niger. Over the past few years, separatists of the Azawad Liberation Front have been in contact with JNIM, which could lead to the consolidation of anti-government forces and, as a result, further strengthen the terrorists' position in the country. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2025, while the number of conflict-related deaths in the Sahel per year in 2017 was about 5,400, it will be 25,000 in 2024. Both ECOWAS and France were powerless against this threat. The fight against guerrilla insurgents required special tactics and a great deal of manpower, but neither France nor ECOWAS had these tools. Although ECOWAS had repeatedly deployed troops to war-torn countries (e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc.), it had no experience in fighting terrorism. In the Sahel, ECOWAS forces faced Islamists using sabotage and terrorism. In addition, ECOWAS is primarily an organization aimed at solving economic problems, so the vast majority of its resources are deployed in solving economic problems rather than military ones. However, for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the first priority is to eliminate separatist and terrorist groups, hence these countries give priority to security cooperation within the organization. Since ECOWAS did not provide sufficient assistance due to its inability to carry out the combat mission (in Burkina Faso and Niger ECOWAS did not conduct any anti-terrorist operations at all), the three countries preferred to create their own military alliance, which is focused on the fight against separatism and terrorism, takes into account all the peculiarities of the fight against guerrillas and corresponds to the common interests of the three countries. This is the reason for the withdrawal of the AES countries from the Economic Community. Apollinaire Joachim Kyélem de Tambèla, Prime Minister of Burkina Faso, in his statement of 30 January 2024, noted that for almost a decade, the three countries have been confronted by criminal groups supported, financed and equipped by their partners, with the indifference of some neighbouring countries and subregional organizations, including ECOWAS. It can be concluded that the Sahel countries are disillusioned with the ECOWAS policy on security issues in the region. What does the future hold for the "Sahel trio"? At the end of January 2025, the AES countries announced the creation of a 5,000-strong joint force contingent to fight terrorism, thus fulfilling the military alliance's primary objective of coordinated counterterrorism organization in the region. This has raised the profile of the military in power in the three countries. The course taken by the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger resonated with the public. On January 29, 2025, following the official announcement by the President of the ECOWAS Commission of the withdrawal of the AES countries, the people of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger took to the streets to celebrate. In the event of successful counter-terrorism operations in the region, popular support will increase, which will help to consolidate the power of the military and, as a result, stabilize the political situation in these countries at least in the medium term. However, for the final stabilization of the situation in the region, it is necessary to eliminate the terrorist threat, as well as to create strong and combat-ready armed forces. Not only the stabilization of the political but also the socio-economic situation in the Sahel countries depends on this. In contrast to the politico-military sphere, socio-economic ties with ECOWAS remain. Although the AES countries have also left ECOWAS, some key provisions of the organization remain in force. For instance, according to the official ECOWAS statement on the withdrawal of the AES countries dated January 29, 2025, passports and identity cards with the ECOWAS emblem remain in place, goods and services from the AES countries have access to the ECOWAS market under the same conditions, visa-free travel is maintained, and civil servants from the AES working in ECOWAS institutions are supported and retained in their positions. However, the same document notes that these conditions are temporary. Permanent terms of cooperation with the three countries will be adopted at a future Summits of Heads of State. The socio-economic situation in the Sahel countries is very difficult. According to the World Population Review, the percentage of the population below the poverty line is 45.5% in Niger, 44.6% in Mali and 43.2% in Burkina Faso. Although the states are rich in natural resources, they are unable to realize their full potential due to poor infrastructure. Continued investment in the economies of the three countries is needed, but the investment climate is deteriorating due to the terrorist threat. Economic difficulties can be overcome by joint efforts. The confederative beginnings of the AES provide an opportunity to begin the process of economic integration. The Sahel countries are seeking to establish an economic and monetary union, which will lead to a new currency called the Sahel. The logical continuation of these actions could be the exit from the franc zone. Thus, the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS could stabilize the political situation in the Sahel countries due to massive support for the AES exchange rate, while plans to create a single currency and leave the franc zone could strengthen the economic independence of the three countries. The Changing Regional Order in West Africa  For almost a century and a half, West Africa has been part of the French zone of influence. Ever since French troops established their control over these lands, all political and socio-economic processes in the region have taken place with direct French participation. However, over the past few years, France has significantly lost its influence in West Africa. The turning point in this was the failure of the anti-terrorist operation “Barkhan” in Mali, as a result of which France had to withdraw its troops from the country. After a series of military coups in the Sahel, which were largely anti-French in nature, Paris' position weakened further. French troops left Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Senegal. The final blow was the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS and the creation of the Confederation of Sahel States. This was particularly dangerous for France because the AES showed an alternative development alternative to West African countries. Now it is not only the pro-French ECOWAS that is acting as an integrationist grouping in West Africa, but also the AES. Already Chad is attempting rapprochement with the AES countries. On February 21–22, 2025, Chadian President Mahamat Déby attended The Panafrican Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou. In addition, the Central African head of state met with his Burkina Faso counterpart, Captain Ibrahim Traoré. During the dialog, the two sides discussed the fight against neo-colonialism and security challenges in the region. The French newspaper Le Monde regarded this as a possible rapprochement between Chad and the AES. Although Ghana acts more as an intermediary in the negotiations between the AES and ECOWAS, it has also made attempts to move closer to the AES countries. Thus, President John Dramani Mahama visited the AES countries from March 8–10, 2025. During his visit, he discussed with the Heads of State the strengthening of bilateral cooperation and security issues in the Sahel. The authority of the AES in Africa is gradually growing, which may encourage some countries in the region to move closer to the Confederation. On January 29, 2025, new AES passports were introduced and the flag of the Confederation of Sahel States was approved on February 22. All these measures should help strengthen the organization's position in the region.  Not only France, but also the United States is losing its former regional positions. In 2012, American troops were sent to Niger to fight terrorism, but after the coup in Niger in 2023, the military that came to power demanded that Washington withdraw its military contingent from the country. The United States had to make concessions. By early August 2024, all U.S. military personnel had been withdrawn from Niger, and military bases were placed under the control of local militaries. Russia is one of the actors whose regional positions are being strengthened. Moscow has been particularly active in cooperating with Mali. Since gaining independence in 1960, the Republic has signed a number of important economic agreements with the USSR and, after its collapse in 1991, with Russia. At the current stage of Russian-Mali relations, the range of cooperation has been significantly expanded: it also covers the military and political sphere. Thus, an agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed in 2003, in 2009 - Memorandum on cooperation in the field of combating terrorism and transnational organized crime, and in 2019 an Intergovernmental Agreement on Military Cooperation. Russia can be characterized as the main partner of the Sahel trio. Thus, it supported the initiative to create a Confederation of Sahel States. At the end of December 2024, Russian Ambassador to Mali Igor Gromyko said that Russia confirms its intention to continue to provide the necessary support to the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States, including assistance in improving the combat effectiveness of the national armed forces, training of military and law enforcement personnel, as well as to develop mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation with these states, and added that the establishment of the AES is an important step in the fight against terrorism in the region. It is for the implementation of these tasks that the African Corps under the Russian Ministry of Defense was established at the end of 2023 on the basis of the private military company Wagner, which aims to fight terrorism in the region. This is an important step toward consolidating Russia's position in West Africa. Russia is gradually pushing France out of the Sahel, and this is expressed not only in the military-political sphere, but also economically. The Russian Federation has signed a number of economic and trade agreements with the AES countries, which have seriously affected French companies and businesses in the Sahel. The most painful blow, perhaps, was the ban on uranium mining for the French company Orano in Niger, one of the largest uranium producers in the world. For France, uranium ore from Niger supplied a number of nuclear power plants. Since then, Russian companies have been invited to mine in Niger, including the French company Orano, one of the largest uranium producers in the world. For France, uranium ore from Niger supplied a number of nuclear power plants. Russian companies have since been invited to mine minerals in Niger, which include uranium. At the end of February 2025, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Exploration and Mining, which provides for the development of bilateral cooperation to strengthen Niger's mineral exploration and mining potential. China is also increasing its influence in the region. According to the China Global Investment Tracker, Chinese direct investments in Mali amounted to $600 million in 2023–2024 and $700 million in Niger. They were mainly directed to the metallurgical and oil sectors, as well as nuclear power. Military cooperation occupies an important place in China's relations with the Sahel countries. Thus, in July 2023, it became known about the signing of a contract for the supply of Chinese arms to Niger in the amount of $4.2 million. Although it is mainly light weapons (rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, rocket systems, etc.), the fact that there is a defense agreement greatly enhances China's authority in the region. Another actor that has increased its influence in the Sahel is Turkey. Ankara emphasizes military cooperation with the AES countries. So, in 2022, the Malian Armed Forces received unmanned aerial vehicles Bayraktar TB2, which are to be used in the fight against terrorism in the region. The diplomatic forum held in Antalya from March 1–3, 2024, highlighted the problems of the Sahel region. The forum was attended by representatives of the AES countries who criticized ECOWAS. In particular, Mali's Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop said that ECOWAS was inadequately addressing regional problems and that it had not responded to crises in the region but opposed the new foreign policy of the Sahel countries. In addition, the Minister noted that the harsh sanctions imposed on the AES countries had no legal basis, while cooperation within the framework of the AES appeared to be a solution to regional problems. *** The withdrawal of the AES countries from ECOWAS led to a transformation of the regional order in West Africa: an alternative to ECOWAS emerged in the form of the Confederation of Sahel States. The AES is not as capable as ECOWAS, but it is growing rapidly. There are already countries showing interest in the AES. Plans for economic integration will only strengthen the position of the organization, which will lead to the AES competing with ECOWAS. It remains to be seen whether this competition will turn into a confrontation. Russia, in turn, by supporting the military that came to power as a result of coups, is gradually pushing France out of the region. This is a serious challenge for French foreign policy, which will be extremely difficult to overcome at least in the medium term. The political vacuum created by the withdrawal of France and the United States from the Sahel has been filled not only by Russia, but also by China and Turkey. These countries are increasingly consolidating their influence in the region and seeking access to resources. There have been regular Islamist and separatist attacks on the armed forces of the three countries. The threat from jihadist groups is increasing. In order to finally stabilize the established regional order, it is necessary to destroy terrorist and separatist cells that threaten the current regimes of the AES countries, which will determine political stabilization in the three countries and the development of socio-economic projects. The Sahel countries are likely to continue cooperative efforts to combat terrorism and expand defense cooperation with Russia, Turkey, and China.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As the Middle East braces for another escalation of conflict, Tehran finds itself cornered by Donald Trump’s coercive diplomacy, facing the stark choice between strategic concession or regional confrontation. Donald Trump’s return to the presidency has reignited US–Iranian hostilities, transforming Yemen into a strategic flashpoint. His administration’s doctrine of militarised diplomacy, cloaked in zero-sum calculations, has elevated the Houthis from a peripheral proxy to a principal trigger for escalation. By explicitly linking Houthi missile fire to Iranian command, Trump has effectively nullified Tehran’s longstanding strategy of plausible deniability.  Historically, Iran’s use of proxies has relied on operating within a grey zone; projecting influence while avoiding direct confrontation. Trump’s return seeks to dismantle this strategic ambiguity, reclassifying all proxy activity as acts of Iranian statecraft. The US military has launched its most expansive campaign under United States Central Command (CENTCOM) against the Houthis since the Red Sea crisis began in late 2023, targeting ballistic missile infrastructure, drone depots, and senior leadership in Yemen. The operation, launched on 15 March, marked a strategic shift, following Trump’s re-designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation and his vow to “rain hell” on their positions if the attacks continued. Trump’s rhetoric has escalated accordingly, and he has warned: “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of Iran.”  This traps Tehran in a paradox: either abandon the Houthis, risking both reputational credibility and strategic depth, or absorb the full brunt of US retaliation. Neither option is strategically tenable. Recognising the stakes, Iran has reportedly urged the Houthis, via Omani intermediaries and back channel diplomacy in Tehran, to scale down their maritime attacks, particularly in the Red Sea. However, Houthi leadership has publicly dismissed such appeals, reaffirming their commitment to targeting Israeli shipping and rejecting external interference in their operational decisions. Their resistance is fuelled by ideological conviction, conflict-tested resilience, and an expanding sense of regional purpose.  Since the beginning of the recent Israel-Hamas conflict, and amid Hezbollah’s decline, Hamas’s isolation, and Syria’s collapse, the Houthis have emerged as Iran’s most assertive proxy. Their attacks on Red Sea shipping and missile strikes against Israel, while mostly intercepted, nonetheless embarrass Arab regimes and stretch Israeli and American defensive postures.  The renewed Gaza conflict, triggered by Israel’s March 2025 bombing that killed five Hamas leaders and over 400 civilians, according to the Gaza Health Ministry, has collapsed the fragile ceasefire and reignited a multifront war involving Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. With Gaza’s death toll now exceeding 50,000, Hamas frames its actions as part of a broader resistance to Israeli aggression. This development has galvanised regional anger and contributed to a broader mobilisation among Iran-aligned actors. Hezbollah has resumed intermittent rocket fire along the Lebanese border, while the Houthis, citing solidarity with Gaza, have intensified missile launches towards Israeli territory, including attempted strikes near Ben Gurion Airport, underscoring their expanding operational capacity and the symbolic coordination anchoring the Axis of Resistance.   Tehran’s influence may be weakening. The Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated a higher risk appetite, often acting beyond Iran’s preferred thresholds of escalation. This divergence complicates Tehran’s efforts to preserve plausible deniability while reaping the strategic dividends of proxy activism. The resulting imbalance reveals a deeper problem: Iran seeks the benefits of Houthi militancy without bearing the cost, an increasingly unsustainable equilibrium under Trump’s zero-tolerance posture.  Iran’s dilemma: no more deniability  According to the 2025 US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment, the Houthis continue to enhance their military capabilities through arms and dual-use technology imports from Russia and China. The smuggling of drone components through the Red Sea and the Omani-Yemeni border indicates a pattern of sustained logistical support. By dismantling Iran’s plausible deniability and publicly attributing every Houthi strike to Tehran, Washington seeks to force a binary: either Iran controls its proxies or accepts full strategic liability.  This exposes Tehran to a potential regional escalation that it is likely unprepared to navigate. The US narrative, amplified by Trump’s statements and CENTCOM’s operational tempo, collapses the operational gap between proxy and patron. This leaves Iran with shrinking room for strategic manoeuvre, particularly as it seeks to avoid direct conflict while preserving deterrent credibility. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have already conducted cross-border raids into Yemen, and Israel is lobbying for expanded UN sanctions on Iran’s missile program.  Backchannel bargains: araghchi’s high-wire diplomacy  Amid growing domestic unrest, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has reportedly been granted authority to pursue indirect negotiations with Washington. While Supreme Leader Khamenei maintains opposition to direct talks, the use of European and Omani channels offers Tehran a diplomatic off-ramp, though under immense diplomatic and political pressure. Araghchi, a veteran of the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) talks, is viewed as more pragmatic than hardliners in the regime.  This opening follows Trump’s letter to Khamenei, demanding a new nuclear agreement within two months. The letter includes explicit demands: dismantle uranium enrichment, abandon missile development, and sever ties with regional proxies.   Iran’s nuclear posture remains opaque. The IAEA confirms Tehran has stockpiled enough 60 percent enriched uranium for multiple warheads if refined further. Yet, Iran insists its nuclear aims are peaceful. Semi-official sources suggest that continued Western escalation could prompt withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.   Iran’s domestic pressures are compounding. The economy suffers under inflation, sanctions, and currency collapse. The unrest in Urmia during Nowruz—the Persian New Year celebrated on the spring equinox—driven by inter-ethnic Kurdish-Azeri tensions, underscore the regime’s waning ability to manage internal dissent. With state institutions weakened, and central authority increasingly concentrated in the hands of Khamenei, public disillusionment is deepening.  The squeeze on Iran: less room to manoeuvre  Iran’s ability to maintain the status quo is under unprecedented strain. Its decades-old strategy of “strategic patience” is becoming harder to sustain. Though Iran continues to nurture ties with China and Russia, and remains engaged with European interlocutors,these relationships no longer offer the same buffer. The European Union, constrained by Washington’s hard-line approach, lacks the independence to offer credible guarantees.  Meanwhile, Israel and Saudi Arabia remain resolute in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. The Begin Doctrine, which justified Israel’s pre-emptive strikes on Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007), may resurface should diplomacy falter. The spectre of unilateral military action now shapes Tehran’s strategic calculus.  Regionally, Iran’s proxy entanglements are escalating. The synchronised attacks from the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah are overstretching Israeli defences and fuelling calls in Tel Aviv for broader regional offensives. Israeli retaliation, paired with US military strikes, has intensified the risk of a wider conflagration. Arab regimes, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, fear being drawn into the fray, threatening their economic visions for 2030 and beyond.  Meanwhile the Palestinians remain largely abandoned, with no Arab state willing to absorb the population of Gaza as Trump toys with expulsion scenarios. This hard-line vision, absent regional consensus, risks igniting further instability across Jordan, Egypt, and the broader Arab world. Trump’s coercive diplomacy may satisfy tactical aims but alienates Arab publics, a recipe for internal backlash across fragile states.  Yet, abandoning its nuclear leverage is not politically viable for the Iranian regime. Any concessions must be matched by credible, enforceable guarantees—a lesson painfully learned from Trump’s unilateral exit from the JCPOA in 2018. Tehran may accept a phased or limited deal but will resist anything perceived as total capitulation.  In sum, Iran now faces a multidimensional siege: external coercion, proxy volatility, domestic instability, and ideological polarisation. Trump’s second term seeks to corner Tehran into submission, not negotiation. Yet, by collapsing the space between proxy action and state responsibility, Washington may provoke precisely what it seeks to prevent: a regional war with no clear exits. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source