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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, combined with a Republican-led US Senate, was widely feared among international allies and will be cheered by some of America’s foes. While the former put on a brave face, the latter are finding it hard to hide their glee.  On the war in Ukraine, Trump is likely to try to force Kyiv and Moscow into at least a ceasefire along the current front lines. This could possibly involve a permanent settlement that would acknowledge Russia’s territorial gains, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the territories occupied since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  It is also likely that Trump would accept demands by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to prevent a future Ukrainian Nato membership. Given Trump’s well-known animosity to Nato, this would also be an important pressure on Kyiv’s European allies. Trump could, once again, threaten to abandon the alliance in order to get Europeans to sign up to a deal with Putin over Ukraine.  When it comes to the Middle East, Trump has been a staunch supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past. He is likely to double down on this, including by taking an even tougher line on Iran. This aligns well with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current priorities.  Netanyahu seems determined to destroy Iran’s proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen and severely degrade Iranian capabilities. By dismissing his defence minister, Yoav Gallant, a critic of his conduct of the offensive in Gaza, Netanyahu has laid the ground for a continuation of the conflict there.  It also prepares for a widening of the offensive in Lebanon and a potentially devastating strike against Iran in response to any further Iranian attack on Israel.  Trump’s election will embolden Netanyahu to act. And this in turn would also strengthen Trump’s position towards Putin, who has come to depend on Iranian support for his war in Ukraine. Trump could offer to restrain Netanyahu in the future as a bargaining chip with Putin in his gamble to secure a deal on Ukraine.  Pivot to China  While Ukraine and the Middle East are two areas in which change looms, relations with China will most likely be characterised more by continuity than by change. With Chinese relations being perhaps the key strategic foreign policy challenge for the US, the Biden administration continued many of the policies Trump adopted in his first term – and Trump is likely to double down on them in a second term.  A Trump White House is likely to increase import tariffs, and he has talked a great deal about using them to target China. But Trump is also just as likely to be open to pragmatic, transactional deals with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Just like in relations with his European allies in Nato, a serious question mark hangs over Trump’s commitment to the defence of Taiwan and other treaty allies in Asia, including the Philippines, South Korea, and potentially Japan. Trump is at best lukewarm on US security guarantees.  But as his on-and-off relationship with North Korea in his first term demonstrated, Trump is, at times, willing to push the envelope dangerously close to war. This happened in 2017 in response to a North Korean test of intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang makes another close brush of this kind as likely as Trump’s unpredictability makes it conceivable that he would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea as part of a broader deal with Russia, which has developed increasingly close relations with Kim Jong-un’s regime.  Doing so would give Trump additional leverage over China, which has been worried over growing ties between Russia and North Korea.  Preparing for a Trump White House  Friends and foes alike are going to use the remaining months before Trump returns to the White House to try to improve their positions and get things done that would be more difficult to do once he is in office.  An expectation of a Trump push for an end to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is likely to lead to an intensification of the fighting there to create what the different parties think might be a more acceptable status quo for them. This does not bode well for the humanitarian crises already brewing in both regions.  Increasing tensions in and around the Korean peninsula are also conceivable. Pyongyang is likely to want to boost its credentials with yet more missile – and potentially nuclear – tests.  A ratcheting-up of the fighting in Europe and the Middle East and of tensions in Asia is also likely to strain relations between the US and its allies in all three regions. In Europe, the fear is that Trump may make deals with Russia over the head of its EU and Nato allies and threaten them with abandonment.  This would undermine the longevity of any Ukrainian (or broader European) deal with Moscow. The relatively dismal state of European defence capabilities and the diminishing credibility of the US nuclear umbrella would not but help to encourage Putin to push his imperial ambitions further once he has secured a deal with Trump.  In the Middle East, Netanyahu would be completely unrestrained. And yet while some Arab regimes might cheer Israel striking Iran and Iranian proxies, they will worry about backlash over the plight of Palestinians. Without resolving this perennial issue, stability in the region, let alone peace, will be all but impossible.  In Asia, the challenges are different. Here the problem is less US withdrawal and more an unpredictable and potentially unmanageable escalation. Under Trump, it is much more likely that the US and China will find it hard to escape the so-called Thucydides trap – the inevitability of war between a dominant but declining power and its rising challenger.  This then raises the question of whether US alliances in the region are safe in the long term or whether some of its partners, like Indonesia or India, will consider realigning themselves with China.  At best, all of this spells greater uncertainty and instability – not only after Trump’s inauguration but also in the months until then.  At worst, it will prove the undoing of Trump’s self-proclaimed infallibility. But by the time he and his team come to realise that geopolitics is a more complicated affair than real estate, they may have ushered in the very chaos that they have accused Biden and Harris of. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ushering in a multipolar order requires a streamlined and coherent political agenda – not unfocused expansion.  The 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, concluded last week with the usual grand declaration of the group’s commitments, concerns and aspirations.  Many media headlines, particularly in Western countries, focused on how the summit and BRICS generally, symbolised Moscow’s ability to circumvent the fallout of sanctions by turning to the global south. In this way, BRICS is indirectly viewed as a threat to Western efforts to isolate Russia, weaken its power projection capabilities, and end its invasion of Ukraine.  Western governments and analysts often struggle to frame BRICS’s evolution beyond a binary, zero-sum narrative in which the group is a key geopolitical challenge to the Western-dominated international order. This interpretation places the forces of democracy and liberal political values in one camp and authoritarian governments in another, with certain developing countries caught in the middle, trying to play one side off the other for their own benefit.  There is some merit to these kinds of headlines. Russia and China are primarily major status-quo powers. Both have been permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members since its establishment. Moscow was the ‘other pole’ in the international order for most of the 20th century, a position Beijing is working towards. And the foreign policy goals of both place them in confrontation with the United States and its Western allies.  BRICS may be on a path towards unnecessary substantive bloat, and away from its core business.  So, are these two countries in a position to champion the global south’s cause, and why haven’t more representative bodies like the Non-Aligned Movement played a more prominent role?  The preoccupation with Russia and China detracts from BRICS’s broader, underlying geopolitical project – the need for global south countries to reform and shape the international order’s future direction on their own terms.  These include greater representation and agency in global policy- and decision-making bodies and facilitating greater freedom to trade, invest and borrow money outside the Western-dominated financial system. They also include a more just and equitable global power balance that reflects modern realities.  In pursuing these aims, BRICS countries have made steady progress on developing a shared strategic agenda for increased cooperation across various policy domains.  The Kazan summit’s 32-page outcomes declaration covers almost everything from reforming the UNSC and Bretton Woods institutions to climate change, biodiversity and conservation. It also covers challenges from global crises, conflicts and terrorism and a suite of economic development, health, education, science and cultural exchange-related issues.  A group of democracies, autocracies and theocracies speaking with one voice on human rights and democracy is absurd.  The group’s ballooning cooperation agenda may indicate progress. But it could also signify the limits of its diverse members’ ability to agree on ‘hard’ political and security matters central to the core business of reforming the international order.  The expansion of BRICS’ substantive agenda and its membership dilutes its primary purpose and reinforces the binary, zero-sum Western narrative its members constantly try to shed.  Tangible, albeit gradual, progress on establishing intra-BRICS institutions and processes such as the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism, the cross-border payment system and its independent reinsurance capacity suggest that BRICS’ clout and credibility are growing.  These initiatives could enable members to pursue their international economic objectives without the constraints and transactional costs associated with traditional financial bodies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Ideally, this would improve their relative positions of global power and influence, and help deliver a more multipolar international order.  In contrast, deepening cooperation on big cat conservation, while important, doesn’t serve that purpose. Nor does facilitating youth exchanges on sports and healthy lifestyles or championing a BRICS alliance for folk dance. Including these kinds of initiatives in BRICS’ growing agenda detracts from its core objectives.  A streamlined agenda would divert attention from the contradictions and geopolitical manoeuvring of BRICS’ members.  More worryingly, this suggests that BRICS’ diverse constellation of member states is pursuing the path of least resistance – expanding their cooperation in every direction, hoping something eventually sticks.  Instead of doubling down on hard strategic questions about a shared conception of multipolarity, and the steps necessary to reform global governance and security institutions, BRICS seems to be heading for greater expansion and formalisation. And with that come the risks, challenges and institutional dependencies that have led to the stagnation and ineffectiveness plaguing more established international organisations in recent years.  Perhaps the group’s core members recognise that they have very different ideas of what constitutes multipolarity. Russia (and China to an extent) envisage much more than global institutional reforms, focusing instead on reimagining international norms and core principles.  These differences are also reflected in BRICS’ expanding membership. It seems Russian and Chinese enthusiasm has been curbed by other founding members, who prefer a ‘partner country’ model for future growth. This contrasts with the full membership offers to Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE in 2023. (Argentina’s new political administration declined, and the Saudis have remained non-committal.)    Most worrying, however, is BRICS’ preoccupation with promoting democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. There is no doubt that these terms are increasingly politicised and rife with double standards – among developing nations with mixed political systems and traditionally liberal, Western democracies. However, for BRICS to meaningfully champion normative values, its members must at least attempt to commit to common political governance systems in their own countries.  Having a group of partner nations composed of progressive constitutional democracies and closed repressive autocracies and theocracies attempting to speak with one voice on promoting human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms is absurd. It reeks of empty political rhetoric at best, and Orwellian double-speak at worst.  This again dilutes BRICS’ key messages, undermines its important core business, and detracts from the significant progress being made towards a common strategic agenda.  BRICS primary goal moving forward should be to trim the fat.  A streamlined annual working agenda would divert attention away from its individual member states' contradictions and geopolitical manoeuvring. With a focus on addressing the international system’s failures, institutional reform and greater representation for global south countries in policy- and decision-making bodies could be prioritised.  This seems unlikely though, if this year’s summit is anything to go by. By following the path of least resistance, BRICS may be setting itself on a course towards increasing and unnecessary substantive bloat, and away from its core business.  Only time will tell if certain members are willing to be more assertive and correct course before they are too far down a path impossible to pivot away from. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском There’s a degree of irony that countries attending the 2024 Brics summit this week voted to adopt the Kazan declaration (named for the capital city of the autonomous republic of Tatarstan in Russia, where the summit is being held). The declaration’s first clause emphasises that “all states should act consistently with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter in their entirety”. There’s also a certain amount of chutzpah on the part of conference chair, Vladimir Putin, whose ongoing invasion of Ukraine is so egregiously in breach of that charter.  Article one stresses that the primary purpose of the UN is to “maintain international peace and security”. Article two rules that: “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means”. If that’s not clear enough, it goes on to further insist that: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”  Still, its a funny old world in which the UN secretary general, António Guterres, pitches up at a summit whose host is wanted on an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court on charges relating to the alleged illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. In a country whose troops are currently fighting in Ukraine in direct contravention of the UN’s charter.  To add a further layer of irony, October 24 is the 79th anniversary of the entry into force of the UN Charter in 1945.  Guterres called on Putin to agree a peace deal “in line with the UN Charter, international law and UN General Assembly resolutions”. The Russian leader is perhaps more likely to listen to a deal proposed by the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. He said: “We must uphold the three key principles: no expansion of the battlefields, no escalation of hostilities, and no fanning flames and strive for swift de-escalation of the situation.”  The UN chief’s idea of a just peace would call for Russia to give up its illegal occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Xi’s proposal appears to call for a deal based on the status quo – virtually the opposite, in other words.  This is pretty much all Ukraine can hope for, as far as the University of Portsmouth’s Frank Ledwidge is concerned. Ledwidge, who has written regularly for The Conversation since Putin launched his invasion in February 2022 and is well plugged into defence and intelligence networks in Nato as well as in Ukraine itself, believes that Ukraine cannot defeat Russia – at least as things stand.  Ledwidge says Ukraine’s western allies are partly to blame for the maximalist aims of the country’s president Volodymyr Zelensky. Western rhetoric has not properly been matched by sufficient weapons or the permission to use them as effectively as the situation warrants. Now is the time for realism, he writes:  A starting point could be accepting that Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk are lost … Then we need to start planning seriously for a post-war Ukraine that will need the west’s suppport more than ever.  One of the key factors that Ledwidge stresses is that just one of Russia’s allies, North Korea, has supplied twice as many artillery shells this year as the whole of Europe. Now North Korean troops are apparently also about to join their Russian comrades on the battlefield. This, writes Ra Mason – a Korea specialist at the University of East Anglia – will help ease the pressure on Putin to bring forward his mobilisation plans.    It’s a diplomatic coup for Putin, Mason believes – it’s a “clear show of opposition towards the Washington-led global order”, which “deals a further blow to the myth that the Russian Federation is isolated, as an international pariah, in a world led by western powers.”  But a military coup de grace against Ukraine? Probably not. The jury is out on how effective North Korea’s “poorly equipped, unmotivated and undernourished” troops will be against Ukraine’s highly motivated defenders. It will also be interesting to see where and how they are deployed. If sent to the frontlines in Kursk, they’ll be helping an ally in its struggle against an incursion by Ukrainian forces. If deployed inside Ukraine, they’ll join Russia in breach of international law. Mason concludes:  If sent into new theatres of war against state-of-the-art Nato-supplied weaponry, it could effectively mean waves of ill-prepared cannon fodder being thrown into the meat grinder of Donbas’ trenches.  Incidentally, the term “meat grinder” has been much bandied about of late. It follows reports from US intellegence recently that, while Russian forces have been making rapid advances and gaining a significant amount of ground in recent weeks, they are doing so at considerable cost in terms of dead and wounded. September was a particularly bloody month, with reports of Russian losses of more than 1,000 men a day, killed or wounded.  But Russian military strategists are well versed in such pyrrhic victories, writes historian Becky Alexis-Martin, who points to equally savage losses in Russia’s defence against Napoleon and in the first and second world wars. Stalin, in particular, was able to defeat the Nazi war machine by, inter alia, throwing millions of troops at their enemies (and incurring terrible casualties). But it’s not a strategy that guarantees success. And terrible psychological effects are beginning to manifest themselves in veterans returning from Ukraine with severe and often violent post-traumatic stress disorder.  The diplomatic front  As if things weren’t bad enough for Zelensky on the battlefield, the Ukrainian president was dealt a serious blow earlier this month when the US president, Joe Biden, was forced by extreme weather events, including a hurricane hitting the state of Florida, to cancel the planned meeting of the heads of government of up to 50 of Ukraine’s western allies in Germany. The “Ramstein Group”, so-called after the German air base at which they meet, was scheduled to meet in the second week of October to consider Zelensky’s “victory plan”. Stefan Wolff, an international security expert at the University of Birmingham writes that the Ukrainian president was hoping to get some degree of commitment for a path to Nato membership for Ukraine as well as permission to use western-supplied long-range missiles against targets deep inside Russia.  Neither of these seem likely to happen in the short term, says Wolff. Like Ledwidge, Wolff thinks Ukraine is doomed to defeat unless its allies double down on their aid – and fast. And like Ledwidge, Wolff sees little indication of that happening any time soon.  When it comes to continuing US support for Ukraine’s war effort, all eyes are now firmly fixed on November 5. The outcome of the presidential election will be seriously consequential for Ukraine’s future. Both candidates have made their positions clear and there is considerable difference between the two positions.  Donald Trump has said any number of times that had he not lost that “rigged and stolen” election to Biden in 2020, Putin would never have invaded Ukraine in the first place. Still, he says, if he wins this one, he’ll bring the war to a very rapid conclusion. But it remains to be seen, given Trump’s oft-stated admiration for Putin, whether the conclusion will be palatable to Kyiv – or to Nato in general.  Trump’s opponent, Kamala Harris, said the former president’s proposals are not “proposals for peace, they’re proposals for surrender”. As vice-president during the Biden administration, she flew to Europe not long after the invasion in February 2022 to help shore up support for Kyiv. Harris has also regularly restated her intention to continue to back Ukraine against Russia. In the only debate of the campaign she said that Ukraine was not Putin’s final stop and that he has “his eyes on the rest of Europe, starting with Poland”.  Poland, incidentally, is an interesting case in point. While it is Ukraine’s firmest ally and it leadership is four-square behind Kyiv, the people are curiously divided on the country’s support for Ukraine. You can read more about that here.  One imagines that Zelensky is as transfixed as anyone else on the 2024 US presidential election campaign as it heads into its final ten days. All we can tell you is that the polls are still very, very close. Well within most pollsters’ margin for error, in fact. A poll of polls, which combines polls from different agencies, published on the website FiveThirtyEight on October 22 shows that Harris leads Trump by 48.1% to 46.3% in the national popular vote. But the accepted popular wisdom is that the complex electoral college system used in the US may well favour Trump’s candidacy.  We’ll be providing daily updates on the US presidential race and full coverage of election day on November 5 and its aftermath.  Update: this article originally said that Vladimir Putin launched Russia invasion of Ukraine in February 2024. This has now been corrected to February 2022. Apologies for the error. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The world economy is underperforming as a result of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainty around the US election. An escalation of conflict in the Middle East could increase uncertainties, harming inflation reduction efforts and hurting growth. It has been over a year since the Hamas-led attack on Israel. Israel’s response in Gaza has resulted in widespread destruction and significant loss of life. The conflict has since expanded beyond Gaza, involving the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian strikes targeting Israel. In addition to the awful humanitarian cost of the conflicts, the war and the possibility of its further expansion pose significant repercussions for the global economy. This article discusses three potential ways in which the current conflict and a wider conflict in the Middle East could affect the global economy. Increased geopolitical uncertainties First and foremost, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could lead to greater geopolitical uncertainties. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the geopolitical risk (GPR) and geopolitical acts (GPRA) indices (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022) – these are text-based measures of heightened uncertainties due to adverse geopolitical events such as wars, terrorism and international tensions. (See this article for more discussion about these measures.) Following the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023, both the overall GPR index and its ‘war and terror acts’ component spiked strongly, to a level higher than that seen during the ISIS attack in Paris in November 2015. Both indices eased significantly in the months following October 2023 despite the continuation of the conflict. But they jumped again following Israel’s attack on southern Lebanon in September 2024. As of mid-October 2024, the GPR and GPRA remain, respectively, 21% and 35% higher than their historical averages.   What might be the consequences of such elevated levels of risk? Research tells us that higher geopolitical risk raises oil prices (Mignon and Saadaoui, 2024). It also reduces global investment and increases inflation (Caldara et al, 2022). Greater geopolitical risk has a significantly negative impact on business and consumer confidence in several advanced economies (de Wet, 2023). This is because consumers typically cut non-essential spending and businesses postpone investment decisions during turbulent times. This reduces firm-level investment, particularly for businesses with higher initial investment costs and greater market power (Wang et al, 2023). Higher geopolitical risks also reduce global trade and financial flows, causing greater volatility in capital flows in emerging markets (Kaya and Erden, 2023). Oil production cuts and higher energy prices The second way in which the Middle East conflict could affect the global economy is its impact on energy prices, both directly through production cuts and indirectly through greater uncertainties. In response to Israel’s actions against its neighbours, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could reduce oil production to penalise countries supporting Israel. A similar action in the 1970s led to a significant jump in oil prices, which contributed to years of stagflation, with higher global inflation and recessions in major economies. Before Israel's attack on Lebanon at the end of September, oil prices had been declining due to falling demand, particularly from China. On the supply side, oil production had increased in Canada and the United States, countering the production cuts by OPEC, and Saudi Arabia was expected to increase oil production from December. But the situation quickly reversed following Israel’s attack on Lebanon. Oil prices jumped by nearly $10 per barrel within a week, before easing by around $5 per barrel. While the immediate oil price impact of Israel’s attack has mostly faded, the potential for higher oil (and other energy) prices still poses a risk to global inflation and economic activity (Liadze et al, 2022). To provide further context for the potential scale of this impact, we can show what would happen if oil and gas prices were to remain $10 higher for two years than the baseline levels projected in the Summer Global Economic Outlook from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), using NIESR’s Global Macroeconometric Model (NiGEM). The results demonstrate that the $10 rise in oil and gas prices increases inflation by around 0.7 percentage points in major economies in the first year (see Figure 2). The impact is higher in China, where the economy relies relatively more on oil imports for its strong manufacturing industries. The inflationary pressures persist for two years despite central banks’ efforts to curb inflation by increasing interest rates.   The effect of higher oil and gas prices on real GDP is shown in Figure 3. In the scenario described above, GDP would fall by 0.1-0.2% in major economies immediately. Partly due to higher interest rates, real GDP would continue to weaken for three years following the shock. After this, economic activity would start to return to base levels as oil and gas prices revert to their levels in the baseline forecast.   Increased shipping costs and supply chain disruptions A wider conflict in the Middle East could also affect the economy through higher shipping costs and supply chain disruptions. Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in late 2023 showed that such disruptions can have a huge impact on global trade through shipping, which comprises 80% of world trade volume. Following the rocket attacks by the Houthi rebels, some commercial shipping re-routed from the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to significant delays in travel times and increased freight costs. As a result, the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index – a measure of sea freight rates – rose by around 260% in the second quarter of 2024 with additional disruptions to supply chains. Our analysis shows that an increase of 10 percentage points in shipping cost inflation can lead to import prices rising by up to around 1% and consumer inflation increasing by around 0.5% in OECD countries. As Figure 4 shows, the impact of shipping costs on inflation shows its full effects over six quarters. This means that inflationary concerns could be with us for the next year and a half as a result of higher shipping costs that may emerge from any possible escalation of the Middle East conflict.   Wider economic implications and policy responses While rising geopolitical risk and increased oil and shipping costs can each individually exert upward pressure on inflation and may slow down economic activity in the global economy, the combined impacts are likely to be greater. Countries with stronger trade and financial ties to the Middle East and those that rely heavily on oil imports as an input for domestic production would be most affected. On the monetary policy front, central banks may have to take a more hawkish stance in response to rising inflationary pressures from the Middle East conflict. This could lead to higher interest rates, which would further dampen economic activity, particularly in an environment where there are already recessionary concerns in some major economies. Beyond its immediate economic implications, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could trigger large-scale displacement of people, which would increase economic and social pressures on neighbouring countries. Many countries may also have to increase their military spending in response to growing regional tensions. Given that public debt levels are already elevated in many countries due to successive shocks to the global economy over the past decade, any additional defence spending could come at the expense of public infrastructure investments that would otherwise boost productivity growth. Overall, the global economy is already underperforming as a result of the lagged effects of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainties surrounding the upcoming US election and possible changes to US trade policy. A potential escalation of conflict in the Middle East could exacerbate the situation by increasing uncertainties, harming efforts to bring down inflation and reducing global GDP growth. Over the medium and long term, it could further damage the global economy, with the possibility of refugee crises as well as increased defence spending, making the effects more complex and longer lasting. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском AbstractThis paper draws on rapidly emerging literature on the role of artificial intelligence in military conflicts and warfare as well as its implications for international security. It departs from an assumption that the emerging technology will have a deterministic and potentially transformative influence on military power.This project intends to ascertain the role of autonomous weapons in modern military conflicts. In doing so, it further adds to the recent debates, which take place among scholars, military leaders as well as policy makers around the world regarding the potential for AI to be the source of future instability and a great power rivalry.It is suggested that there is an urgent need to regulate the development, proliferation and usage of autonomous weapons and weapon systems driven by AI before it is too late – namely the AI achieves cognizant skills. 1.DefinitionsEncyclopedia Britannica proposes that artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings. The term is frequently applied to the project of developing systems endowed with the intellectual processes characteristic of humans, such as the ability to reason, discover meaning, generalize, or learn from past experience.1Interestingly enough AI defines itself as referring to the simulation of human intelligence processes by machines, particularly computer systems. These processes include learning, reasoning, problem-solving, perception, and language understanding. AI enables machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and natural language processing. AI technologies encompass machine learning, neural networks, deep learning, and other advanced algorithms that allow machines to mimic cognitive functions.2In the context of the military, artificial intelligence refers to the utilization of AI technologies and systems to enhance military capabilities, operations, and decision-making processes. Military applications of AI include autonomous weapons systems, drones, cyber defense mechanisms, predictive analytics for strategic planning, and battlefield surveillance. AI can be used to analyze large volumes of data quickly, identify patterns, and make real-time decisions to support military objectives. While AI offers significant advantages in terms of efficiency and precision, there are ethical considerations and concerns regarding the potential risks of autonomous AI systems in warfare.32. AI in the War in Ukraine and Israel vs. Hamas - UkraineThe ongoing war in Ukraine is arguably the first “full scale drone War”, which also employs loitering munitions, autonomous ships, undersea drones for mine hunting and uncrewed ground vehicles being deployed.AI is heavily used in systems that integrate target and object recognition and geospatial intelligence. Analysis of satellite images, geolocating and analysing open-source data such as social media photos in geopolitically sensitive locations. On top of that neural networks are used, for example, to combine ground-level photos, drone video footage and satellite imagery.AI-enhanced facial recognition software has also been used on a substantial scale. AI is playing an important role in electronic warfare and encryption as well as cyber warfare, especially in support of defensive capabilities. Finally, AI has also been employed to spread of misinformation - the use of deep fakes as part of information warfare. The emergence of this new technology has created new actors, private companies further fueling the so-called privatisation of security: Palantir Technologies, Planet Labs, BlackSky Technology and Maxar Technologies are some examples of such.The AI driven systems make a fundamental change in the field so much so that the combined use of aerial and sea drones in the October (2022) attack on Russia’s Black Sea flagship vessel, the Admiral Makarov, was perceived by some analysts as perhaps a new type of warfare.4What makes this conflict unique is the unprecedented willingness of foreign geospatial intelligence companies to assist Ukraine by using AI-enhanced systems to convert satellite imagery into intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantages. U.S. companies play a leading role in this.These examples illustrate that the current conflict in Ukraine is a testing ground for AItechnology.- Israel vs. HamasIsraeli military says it’s using artificial intelligence to select many of these targets in real-time. The military claims that the AI system, named “the Gospel,” has helped it to rapidly identify enemy combatants and equipment, while reducing civilian casualties.5 Allegedly, multiple sources familiar with the IDF’s (Israel Defensive Forces) targeting processes confirmed the existence of the Gospel, saying it had been used to produce automated recommendations for attacking targets, such as the private homes of individuals suspected of being Hamas or Islamic Jihad operatives. In recent years, the target division has helped the IDF build a database of what sources said was between 30,000 and 40,000 suspected militants. Systems such as the Gospel, they said, had played a critical role in building lists of individuals authorised to be assassinated.6 According to IDF’s own website the use of these tools does not change the obligatory principles and rules in the Intelligence Directorate's SOP and related instructions. They do not generate orders for attacks. They do not generate new intelligence that could not otherwise be accessed by an intelligence analyst. They do not constitute the sole basis for determining targets eligible to attack – regardless of how accurate they are. On the contrary, these tools improve the quality of the intelligence process outcome. They facilitate the accessibility of the analyst to relevant information, and help the analyst be more informed of the most up-to-date and relevant intelligence sources, making the analyses more precise. They reduce the risk of errors that may occur in intelligence analyses.7 3. AI and War As far as the role of AI driven technologies and software is concerned it is probably useful to think about them as the third revolution in warfare. The first one being mostly about gunpowder and the second one being about nuclear weapons.Additionally, one should also bear in mind that AI is closely related to the so-called cyber domain, which in the literature is often referred to as the fifth domain of warfare. (The first one being land, the second being sea, the third being air and the forth being space, as in cosmic space.)While AI and associated technologies hold potential for reducing harms of war if developed and applied responsibly, there exist significant risks of technological escalation, loss of human control and value alignment that demand proactive international cooperation and oversight to guide research and use of these systems. Nonetheless all major powers, including US and China are working nonstop to develop relevant AI driven military systems hoping to achieve potential advantages against each other. These technologies include: machine learning/deep learning applications with military uses like drone/vehicle autonomy, cyber/info warfare and predictive analytics of populations/scenarios.At the same time AI poses novel challenges and escalatory risks that differ from past arms races and call for new frameworks of governance and norms. Autonomous weapons threaten to undermine international humanitarian laws by removing human accountability from targeting - problems of biases, uncertain risks of loss of meaningful human control. Other related risks include preemptive/predictive AI for mass surveillance, social control and information warfare which is likely to erode principles of sovereignty, privacy and consent.It does not take the stretch of imagination to expect a certain level of ‘techno-tyranny’ in the future. Job losses to robotic systems are probably a given and as such risk further politico-economic instability. This consequently calls for just transitions and perhaps even a universal basic income.The Opaque ‘black box’ nature of neural networks hinders verification and accountability, fuelling distrust. Furthermore, there is a potential for accidental or unintentional escalation. Without safeguards and transparency, AI may ultimately serve military-industrial complexes and geopolitical ambitions rather than global security needs.The fast-emerging technology needs to be urgently regulated. International initiatives for AI governance (norms or regimes) will probably have to be introduced by the UN and its technical bodies. These will have to include outcome accountability’ through system design, impact assessments, red lines on certain applications and universal access to benefits.As warns Heidy Khlaaf, Engineering Director of AI Assurance at Trail of Bits, a technologysecurity firm warns “AI algorithms are notoriously flawed with high error rates observed across applications that require precision, accuracy, and safety,”8Reportedly, in a simulation of a military exercise carried out by US Military Force, an AI drone 'killed operator' after going rogue. The robot worked out its controller was stopping it 'completing objectives on test.9In parallel, Chinese scientists create and cage world’s first AI commander in a PLA laboratory. “The highest-level commander is the sole core decision-making entity for the overall operation, with ultimate decision-making responsibilities and authority,”104. AI and International SecurityIn terms of national security-level applications of an AI, one can clearly identify numerous milieu:- MilitaryAI is transforming military operations by enabling autonomous systems, such as drones and robots, to perform tasks that were previously carried out by humans. These systems can be used for surveillance, reconnaissance, target identification, and even combat. AI-powered algorithms can analyze vast amounts of data to provide real-time intelligence, enhance situational awareness, and support decision-making processes on the battlefield- CybersecurityAI is crucial in combating cyber threats, as it can detect and respond to attacks more effectively than traditional security measures. Machine learning algorithms can analyze network traffic patterns, identify anomalies, and detect potential breaches. AI can also help develop predictive models to anticipate future cyber threats and vulnerabilities, allowing organizations to strengthen their defenses proactively.- Intelligence and SurveillanceAI enables intelligence agencies to process and analyze massive volumes of data, including social media feeds, satellite imagery, and communication intercepts. Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms can extract valuable insights from unstructured data sources, aiding in counterterrorism efforts, identifying potential threats, and monitoring geopolitical developments.- Decision Support SystemsAI can assist policymakers and military leaders in making informed decisions by providing predictive analysis and scenario modeling. Machine learning algorithms can analyze historical data, identify patterns, and generate forecasts regarding potential  conflicts, resource allocation, or geopolitical developments. This helps in strategic planning and resource optimization.- Autonomous Weapons SystemsThe development of autonomous weapons systems raises ethical concerns and challenges in international security. AI-powered weapons can operate without direct human control, leading to debates about accountability, proportionality, and adherence to international humanitarian law. International efforts are underway to establish regulations and norms governing the use of such systems.- Diplomacy and Conflict ResolutionAI can facilitate diplomatic negotiations and conflict resolution by providing data-driven insights and analysis. Natural Language Processing algorithms can assist in analyzing diplomatic texts, identifying common ground, and suggesting potential compromises. AI can also simulate scenarios and predict the outcomes of different negotiation strategies, aiding diplomats in finding mutually beneficial solutions.- Threat Detection and PreventionAI can enhance early warning systems for various threats, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and pandemics. Machine learning algorithms can analyze patterns in data to identify potential risks and predict emerging threats. This enables governments and international organizations to take proactive measures to prevent or mitigate these risks.5. ConclusionIn the world of microelectronics, experts often talk about Moore's law: the principle that the number of transistors on chips doubles every two years, resulting in exponentially more capable devices. The law helps explain the rapid rise of so many technological innovations, including smartphones and search engines.Within national security, AI progress has created another kind of Moore's law. Whichever military first masters organizing, incorporating, and institutionalizing the use of data and AI into its operations in the coming years will reap exponential advances, giving it remarkable advantages over its foes. The first adopter of AI at scale is likely to have a faster decision cycle and better information on which to base decisions. Its networks are likely to be more resilient when under attack, preserving its ability to maintain situational awareness, defend its forces, engage targets effectively, and protect the integrity of its command, control, and communications. It will also be able to control swarms of unmanned systems in the air, on the water, and under the sea to confuse and overwhelm an adversary.11References*This paper was presented at International Studies Association 65th Annual Convention. San Francisco, California April 3rd – 6th 20241 Copeland, B. (2024, March 15). Artificial intelligence. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence2 How do you define artificial intelligence? ChatGPT, GPT-4 Turbo, OpenAI, 2024, October 25. https://genai.hkbu.edu.hk/3 How do you define artificial intelligence in the context of the military? ChatGPT, GPT-4 Turbo, OpenAI, 2024, October 25. https://genai.hkbu.edu.hk/4 Fontes, R. and Kamminga, J. (2023, March 24). Ukraine A Living Lab for AI Warefare. National Defence. NDIA’s Bussiness Technology Magazine. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/3/24/ukraine-a-living-lab-for-ai-warfare5 Brumfiel, G. (2023, December 14). Israel is using an AI system to find targets in Gaza. Experts say it’s just the start. Wisconsin Public Radio. https://www.wpr.org/news/israel-using-ai-system-find-targets-gaza-experts-say-its-just-start6 ‘The Gospel’: how Israel uses AI to select bombing targets in Gaza. (2023, December 1). The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/01/the-gospel-how-israel-uses-ai-to-select-bombing-targets 7 The IDF's Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing. (2024, June 18). IDF Press Releases: Israel at War. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-24-pr/the-idf-s-use-of-data-technologies-in-intelligence-processing/8 Brumfiel, G. (2023, December 14). Israel is using an AI system to find targets in Gaza. Experts say it’s just the start. Wisconsin Public Radio. https://www.wpr.org/news/israel-using-ai-system-find-targets-gaza-experts-say-its-just-start9 Bowman, V. (2023, June 2). AI drone 'killed operator' after going rogue on simulation. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/06/02/us-air-force-ai-military-drone-goes-rogue-simulation/10 Chen, S. (2024, June 16). Chinese scientists create and cage world’s first AI commander in a PLA laboratory. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3266444/chinese-scientists-create-and-cage-worlds-first-ai-commander-pla-laboratory?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage 11 Flournoy, Michèle A. 2023. “AI Is Already at War.” Foreign Affairs 102 (6): 56–69. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=shib&db=bth&AN=173135132&site=ehost-live.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President of Russia Vladimir Putin: I would like to inform the military personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, citizens of our country, our friends across the globe, and those who persist in the illusion that a strategic defeat can be inflicted upon Russia, about the events taking place today in the zone of the special military operation, specifically following the attacks by Western long-range weapons against our territory.The escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, instigated by the West, continues with the United States and its NATO allies previously announcing that they authorise the use of their long-range high-precision weapons for strikes inside the Russian Federation. Experts are well aware, and the Russian side has repeatedly highlighted it, that the use of such weapons is not possible without the direct involvement of military experts from the manufacturing nations.On November 19, six ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles produced by the United States, and on November 21, during a combined missile assault involving British Storm Shadow systems and HIMARS systems produced by the US, attacked military facilities inside the Russian Federation in the Bryansk and Kursk regions. From that point onward, as we have repeatedly emphasised in prior communications, the regional conflict in Ukraine provoked by the West has assumed elements of a global nature. Our air defence systems successfully counteracted these incursions, preventing the enemy from achieving their apparent objectives.The fire at the ammunition depot in the Bryansk Region, caused by the debris of ATACMS missiles, was extinguished without casualties or significant damage. In the Kursk Region, the attack targeted one of the command posts of our group North. Regrettably, the attack and the subsequent air defence battle resulted in casualties, both fatalities and injuries, among the perimeter security units and servicing staff. However, the command and operational staff of the control centre suffered no casualties and continues to manage effectively the operations of our forces to eliminate and push enemy units out of the Kursk Region.I wish to underscore once again that the use by the enemy of such weapons cannot affect the course of combat operations in the special military operation zone. Our forces are making successful advances along the entire line of contact, and all objectives we have set will be accomplished.In response to the deployment of American and British long-range weapons, on November 21, the Russian Armed Forces delivered a combined strike on a facility within Ukraine’s defence industrial complex. In field conditions, we also carried out tests of one of Russia’s latest medium-range missile systems – in this case, carrying a non-nuclear hypersonic ballistic missile that our engineers named Oreshnik. The tests were successful, achieving the intended objective of the launch. In the city of Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, one of the largest and most famous industrial complexes from the Soviet Union era, which continues to produce missiles and other armaments, was hit.We are developing intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in response to US plans to produce and deploy intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. We believe that the United States made a mistake by unilaterally destroying the INF Treaty in 2019 under a far-fetched pretext. Today, the United States is not only producing such equipment, but, as we can see, it has worked out ways to deploy its advanced missile systems to different regions of the world, including Europe, during training exercises for its troops. Moreover, in the course of these exercises, they are conducting training for using them.As a reminder, Russia has voluntarily and unilaterally committed not to deploy intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles until US weapons of this kind appear in any region of the world.To reiterate, we are conducting combat tests of the Oreshnik missile system in response to NATO’s aggressive actions against Russia. Our decision on further deployment of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles will depend on the actions of the United States and its satellites.We will determine the targets during further tests of our advanced missile systems based on the threats to the security of the Russian Federation. We consider ourselves entitled to use our weapons against military facilities of those countries that allow to use their weapons against our facilities, and in case of an escalation of aggressive actions, we will respond decisively and in mirror-like manner. I recommend that the ruling elites of the countries that are hatching plans to use their military contingents against Russia seriously consider this.It goes without saying that when choosing, if necessary and as a retaliatory measure, targets to be hit by systems such as Oreshnik on Ukrainian territory, we will in advance suggest that civilians and citizens of friendly countries residing in those areas leave danger zones. We will do so for humanitarian reasons, openly and publicly, without fear of counter-moves coming from the enemy, who will also be receiving this information.Why without fear? Because there are no means of countering such weapons today. Missiles attack targets at a speed of Mach 10, which is 2.5 to 3 kilometres per second. Air defence systems currently available in the world and missile defence systems being created by the Americans in Europe cannot intercept such missiles. It is impossible.I would like to emphasise once again that it was not Russia, but the United States that destroyed the international security system and, by continuing to fight, cling to its hegemony, they are pushing the whole world into a global conflict.We have always preferred and are ready now to resolve all disputes by peaceful means. But we are also ready for any turn of events.If anyone still doubts this, make no mistake: there will always be a response.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Amid the Ukraine conflict, Central Asian states are leveraging a multi-vector foreign policy to balance historic ties with Russia and expanding partnerships with global powers. This strategic pivot highlights their resilience in navigating a complex and shifting geopolitical landscape. The impacts of the Russia-Ukraine conflict have stretched well beyond Europe, shifting global alliances and influencing regions like Central Asia in complex ways. Caught between longstanding ties to Russia and other great powers, Central Asian countries now face a delicate balancing act. While the region has traditionally relied on Russia for economic and security partnerships, the ongoing conflict has created new pressures and opportunities, pushing these nations to adopt a more confident, yet cautious foreign policy. Central Asian states have responded to the shifting geopolitical landscape in several ways: maintaining economic ties to Russia, cautiously refraining from direct criticism of Moscow, and expanding partnerships with other global powers such as China, the West, and Türkiye. These evolving dynamics reveal the region’s vulnerabilities and strategic resilience in navigating an increasingly complex world order.  Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union, Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—have undergone a challenging transition from a shared Soviet past to diverse paths of nation-building and economic liberalisation. The five Central Asian states are members of one or more of the Russian-led institutions, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). For Central Asian states, these organisations serve as platforms for regional security and economic collaboration with Russia, allowing Russia, in turn, to maintain a significant influence in Central Asia’s geopolitical landscape. However, participation in these institutions reflects a complex balancing act; Central Asian states must navigate their relationships with Russia while also exploring partnerships with other global powers.  Since the start of the war, the Central Asian states have been leading the so-called “multi-vector” foreign policy approach, aiming for balanced relations with Russia and other powers such as China, the Western world, and Türkiye. The states of the region did not recognise Russia’s newly annexed territories of Ukraine, and some of the states issued official statements in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the early days of the war in 2022. Yet these states did not officially criticise Vladimir Putin and his “Special Military Operation.” There are several reasons at play here: economic reliance and the factor of Central Asian migrants, and membership in the Russia-led institutions.    Russia is a key economic partner for which each Central Asian state relies on for trade. Although, more recently, China has become the top trade partner for most of them, Russia remains the second one after China for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Central Asian states export agricultural products, metal and minerals, cotton, and textile products. Another major factor keeping the region reliant on Putin’s regime is millions of migrants from the region, particularly from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—who work in Russia. According to Russian official statistics, there are about 6.1 million migrants in Russia and most come from the states in the region.   Most of the Central Asian migrants travel to Russia for low-level seasonal work, particularly in the construction industry. In 2021 remittances sent by the migrants in Russia accounted for 35 percent of Tajikistan’s GDP and 33 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP. For Uzbekistan, the remittances made up 13 percent of GDP. Such dependence constrains open criticism of Russia’s actions, as economic stability is tied to these remittances.   Further to economic factors, there are also security concerns and long-standing ties with Russia. Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Russian-led security block CSTO; Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Eurasian Economic Union; and all of the Central Asian states are members of CIS. These ties and economic elements require the states to maintain a balanced approach to safeguard relationships on all fronts.  With the war in Ukraine, there has been increased attention from the global community towards Central Asia. Regional states have been growing partnerships with other global players like China, the EU, the US and Türkiye. China held the first Central Asia Summit in May 2023 in Xi’an, where all leaders of the Central Asian states attended.     The US held its inaugural C5+1 platform summit on 19 September 2023, with President Joe Biden meeting with the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The event was described as “a historic moment, building on years of close cooperation.”   From the European perspective, Germany’s interest in the region has been on the rise; the country initiated the “Germany – Central Asia” platform and held its first summit on 29 September 2023 in Berlin. More recently, on 18 September 2024, Chancellor Olaf Scholz travelled to Astana where the second summit of the platform was held with all Central Asian states. Germany, additionally, recently signed a migration agreement with Uzbekistan with aims to simplify the legal migration of Uzbek skilled workers into Germany.   Meanwhile, Türkiye has strengthened its presence in the region through the platform of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The OTS was established in 2009 to enhance cooperation among Turkic-speaking nations across Central Asia, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan, with Turkmenistan and Hungary holding observer status. This cooperation has grown rapidly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It focuses on economic, energy, and transport collaboration among the member states. Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are key players in OTS initiatives. The organisation provides leverage for Türkiye via its cultural and linguistic ties, increasing its influence across the region.   These varying partnerships present viable economic and political alternatives to dependency on Russia. In the shifting geopolitical landscape, Central Asian states are seizing new opportunities to assert their independence and diversify their foreign relations. A key feature of this strategy is their adherence to a “multi-vector foreign policy,” enabling them to engage with various global powers while avoiding alignment with any single bloc. This approach has been strengthened by a renewed emphasis on regional integration, exemplified by the “Consultative Meetings of Central Asian States.” To date, six meetings have taken place, featuring participation from the presidents of each Central Asian country.   Their multi-vector foreign policy allows them to maintain economic and security links to Russia while exploring alternatives with powers such as China, the EU, Türkiye, and the United States. As the global focus on Central Asia intensifies, these countries are also showing renewed interest in regional integration, which may strengthen their collective voice and enhance stability in a volatile environment.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Among Turkey’s political elite, the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election is inspiring confidence in a reboot of Turkish-American relations and a strengthening of Turkey’s status in international affairs. What are the prospects for an “upturn” in Turkish-American relations? Turkey remains an important NATO member because of its geographical position and its geopolitical ambitions to integrate the countries of the Turkic world. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s policy of strengthening national sovereignty and independence from the United States is, naturally, of considerable concern to Washington. Turkey has traditionally remained a difficult partner for the West (as well as the East) because it has never fully abandoned its imperial mentality, and because Turks continue to hope for the resuscitation of Ottomanism, albeit in a new form. It is the repeated declarations of the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism and Panturanism by Turkish politicians that are causing concern in the US and EU, as well as in Russia, Iran and China. Perhaps the only country with an interest the formation of a new Turanian Union under Turkish leadership is the UK. London’s goal is to promote British geo-economic and geopolitical interests deep into Eurasia to gain access to the rich mineral resources of the post-Soviet Turkic countries and to create a dividing corridor between Russia, on the one hand, and Iran and China on the other. The intensification of Turkey’s mutually beneficial ties with Russia (especially in the area of military-technical cooperation on the S-400 air defense system deal) was the formal reason for Ankara’s withdrawal from the US fifth-generation F-35 fighter program and a contract for the delivery of 40 upgraded F-16 fighters. Immediately following the conclusion of the deal, sanctions were imposed on some Turkish officials, and the process of Turkey’s integration with the EU was once again blocked. Subsequently, the Turkish economy plunged into a protracted financial crisis. Turkey began to develop its trade and economic relations with Russia following the beginning of Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine independently of US sanctions. The trade turnover between the two countries doubled in 2022, adding problems for Turkey’s relations with the US and resulting in threats from US financial institutions. During Joe Biden’s presidency, Erdoğan’s failed to make an official visit to the United States. As part of the 2023 presidential election process, Turkey engaged in pragmatic political horse-trading with the United States over its agreement to Finland and Sweden’s membership of NATO. This political deal laid the ground for a restart in Turkey’s strained relations with the United States, as part of which the US president agreed to a “military deal” on the fate of 40 F-16 fighter jets and the IMF agreed to provide financial support for the Turkish government. Erdoğan has included pro-American specialists, led by Finance and Treasury Minister Mehmet Şimşek, in his new government’s economic department. The victory of Republican candidate Donald Trump in the US presidential election has raised hopes among Turkey’s ruling political elite for a comprehensive restart in Turkish-American relations. In Ankara both politicians and experts have expressed confidence that as a result of Donald Trump’s policy of withdrawing the US from conflicts abroad, firstly, the US will stop supplying arms to Israel and stop the war in Gaza and Lebanon; secondly, that, with Turkish mediation, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict can be frozen; thirdly, that Turkey can once again participate in the F-35 fighter jet production program and address other issues necessary to ensure the strategic security of the state; fourthly, the process of Turkey’s integration can be stepped up, with Turkey continuing to strengthen its key logistical function of connecting the West with the East; fifthly, Turkey can continue its expansion into the vast Turan region (post-Soviet Central Asia) under the auspices of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Erdoğan was among the first to congratulate Trump on his election victory and invited him to visit Ankara. In summary, he is counting on a full restoration of Turkish-American relations. Turkey hopes to regain its status as the main mediator in the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, following Donald Trump’s reelection to the White House, reiterated his support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and his hopes for a ceasefire in the near future. The pragmatic Turks are aiming for the participation of their construction companies in the reconstruction of Ukraine. However, the Turkish Foreign Minister failed to specify under what conditions this peace should take place. And how can the territorial integrity of Ukraine be reconciled with the realities on the ground after two and a half years of fighting and successes on the Russian side? In a recent interview with the Turkish newspaper Hürriet, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed bewilderment at the fact of Turkey’s military and technical cooperation with the Kiev regime, because Turkish weapons allow the Armed Forces of Ukraine to kill Russian soldiers and civilians. Nevertheless, Sergey Lavrov thanked his Turkish counterparts for their active attempts to achieve peace and a political resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. However, he doubted the success of Turkey’s political mediation, given the obstructive approach of the head of the Kiev regime, Volodymyr Zelensky, who rejects constructive peace proposals from Moscow. What has changed since Turkey has repeatedly and insistently expressed its confidence in initiatives to secure peace between Russia and Ukraine? Obviously, with Donald Trump’s victory, the policy of the main sponsor of the Ukrainian conflict and of the Kiev regime may change. If Donald Trump stops providing financial, military-technical and political support to Kiev and wishes to restore Ukraine’s constitutional norms and change Zelensky’s regime, then it is hard to see how the military conflict can continue. But it should be kept in mind that Erdoğan, as part of his development of trade relations with Russia amid the Ukrainian crisis, has not neglected the supply of dual-use goods to the Russian Federation. In this regard, the Turkish side periodically cites financial and economic threats from the US in connection with the circumvention of US sanctions. In other words, Erdoğan has officially provided military assistance to the Kiev regime, in compliance with the concept of the strategic interoperability of NATO member states, and Russia has, in effect, allowed such tacit assistance as part of an independent and pragmatic policy that allows Turkey to maintain partnership ties with Moscow as well. Will there be an “Istanbul 2”? In reality, Turkey rather tends to support military conflict between brotherly Slavic peoples and states so that both states and their military might are weakened. Ankara demonstrates a diametrically opposed policy towards the ethnically kindred countries and peoples of the Turkic world, and, with the unambiguous support of the UK and the tacit consent of the US and the EU, it has established the Organization of Turkic States, and is establishing a place in the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions, and as a result, is displacing or weakening Russia’s presence in those regions. Since the late 18th century, Turkey has maintained a steady interest in resuscitating its dominance in the Crimean peninsula and the Black Sea basin as a whole. Under these conditions, Turkey expects that a reduction or cessation of US military assistance to Ukraine will reset the Istanbul platform for the resumption of Russian-Ukrainian peace talks. Whether Istanbul-2 will play out in the same way that Istanbul-1, time will tell. However, the status of Crimea and the liberated territories cannot be a subject for bargaining and compromise.