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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Security dialog among like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was founded in 2007 by the USA, Japan, Australia, and India to promote a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, secure freedom of navigation and balance the growing influence of China. After a temporary dissolution, QUAD was revived in 2017. Since then, there have been regular meetings of heads of state and government and foreign ministers, which have led to concrete working groups in areas such as maritime security, modern technologies, infrastructure, climate change, health, space, and cyber security. QUAD has made considerable progress, including the provision of COVID-19 vaccines, decarbonization initiatives, the promotion of renewable energy and programs to improve maritime surveillance and digital infrastructure. QUAD is not a formal alliance, but an informal forum without a mutual defense commitment. Germany and the EU should strengthen bilateral partnerships with the QUAD states to promote common goals such as maritime security, infrastructure development and climate protection and offer a sustainable alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Will QUAD change the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific? Founded in 2007 as an informal alliance by the USA, Japan, Australia and India, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) has proven its worth as a platform for regional security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, despite difficulties and interim dissolution. The original motivation for QUAD was the increasing concern about China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and the challenges to the rules-based order in the region. In recent years, cooperation in the QUAD has deepened and includes issues such as maritime security, maintaining free shipping lanes, the fight against terrorism and the promotion of sustainable economic development. Securing a free and open Indo-Pacific - in which all countries can act sovereignly and free from coercion - is a central concern of QUAD. The beginnings of cooperation between the four countries can be traced back to 20041. In response to the devastating Boxing Day tsunami in 2004, which killed over 230,000 people2, the USA, Australia, India, and Japan spontaneously formed an ad hoc grouping to pool and coordinate their resources and capacities for emergency relief in the disaster areas. The grouping disbanded after the end of the reconstruction aid in January 2005, but the positive outcome of the cooperation proved to be viable for the future and opened the way for further initiatives towards closer cooperation between the four Indo-Pacific states.3 First foundation and dissolution of QUAD It was the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who, as part of his new foreign and defense policy, called for a value-based dialogue between Japan, India, Australia, the USA, and other like-minded countries on common interests in the Indo-Pacific at the end of 2006. On May 25, 2007, representatives of the four countries met officially for the first time at an informal Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila.4 In September 2007, the maritime military exercise "Malabar" in the Indian Ocean, which had previously only been held bilaterally between the USA and India, was expanded to include participants from Japan, Australia and Singapore. This led to strong reactions from China, which sent official protest notes to the governments of the participating countries. Beijing portrayed QUAD as an anti-China initiative, while critics described the grouping as the nucleus of a future "Asian NATO "5. China's harsh criticism of the QUAD initiative and political changes in some of the four participating countries led to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue being dissolved after a brief time. Australia, where there was a change of government in December 2007, wanted to avoid a confrontation with its most important trading partner China and therefore announced its withdrawal from QUAD in February 2008. In Japan, the most important promoter of QUAD, Shinzo Abe, was forced to resign as Prime Minister at the end of 2007 after losing the elections. There was also increasing criticism of the purpose of QUAD in India and the USA, so that in 2008 the four countries ceased their activities in the direction of quadrilateral security cooperation.6 However, taking China into consideration did not lead to the hoped-for easing of tensions. On the contrary: China's massive military build-up, its territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, its threatening gestures towards Taiwan and the use of economic pressure to achieve foreign policy goals7 have further increased geopolitical tensions in the region. In the meantime, contacts and cooperation between the four QUAD states have continued and intensified at bilateral and minilateral level. In 2011, the first meeting at the level of state secretaries took place between the governments of Japan, India, and the USA. A similar trilateral cooperation meeting was established in 2015 between Japan, India, and Australia. India and the United States signed a Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2015 and a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016.8 These agreements are a prerequisite for the interoperability of the armed forces of both countries. Since October 2015, Japan has been a regular participant in the annual naval exercise "Malabar" alongside India and the USA. And in 2017, Indian armed forces took part in the Australian naval exercise AUSINDEX for the first time, and two years later also in the air force exercise Pitch Black. Australia has been involved in the Malabar exercises again since 2020.9 Revival of the QUAD Shinzo Abe, who returned to the office of Japanese Prime Minister in 2012, put the concept of a quadrilateral security alliance (Democratic Security Diamond) in the Indo-Pacific back on the political agenda. He succeeded in convincing the new US President Donald Trump of the idea, leading to the first meeting of high-ranking representatives from the USA, Japan, India, and Australia on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila in the Philippines in November 2017. The QUAD was revived.10 In June 2018, representatives of the four countries met on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting in Singapore and again in November of the same year at the East Asia Summit, also in Singapore. On May 31, 2018, the first official meeting of the foreign ministers of the four QUAD states finally took place on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. Since then, the four foreign ministers have met once a year to discuss regional strategic challenges and priorities.11 The Biden administration has upgraded the Quadrilateral Dialogue to an important instrument for the implementation of its Indo-Pacific policy. On March 12, 2021, the first summit of QUAD heads of state and government took place, still in virtual form due to the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of the summit, a joint final declaration, The Spirit of the QUAD,12 was published, which lists the key objectives and principles of the quadripartite dialog. On September 24, 2021, the QUAD heads of government met in person for the first time in Washington. Six permanent working groups were formed to deal with the policy areas of health, climate change and clean energy, critical and modern technologies, infrastructure, space, and cybersecurity.13 On March 4, 2022, the four heads of government of the QUAD states convened for a virtual summit to discuss the impact of Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine and to reaffirm the commitment of the four dialog partners to the Indo-Pacific region. The fourth QUAD Leaders’ Summit took place in Tokyo on May 24, 2022. The follow-up meeting planned for May 2023 in Sydney was canceled as US President Biden had to remain in Washington due to the domestic budget crisis. Instead, the heads of state and government met on May 20, 2023, on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Hiroshima. Prior to this, the foreign ministers of the QUAD met in India in March, where it was decided to establish a working group on combating terrorism.14 In 2024, there was one meeting at foreign minister level (July 29 in Tokyo, Japan) and one summit meeting of QUAD leaders (September 21, 2024, in Wilmington, USA). On September 20, 2024, one day before the summit in Wilmington, a bipartisan group of representatives and senators, the QUAD Caucus, was formed in the US Congress to promote cooperation between the USA and the other QUAD members (Japan, India, and Australia). In doing so, Congress is underlining the bipartisan recognition of the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific for the USA and strengthening the institutional anchoring of the QUAD partnership in the US political system.15 What concrete results has QUAD achieved since its revival in 2017? The six QUAD working groups established in 2021 cover the most important policy areas of quadrilateral cooperation: 1. Health Security Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the QUAD Group committed to producing one billion vaccine doses by the end of 2022 and making them available to countries in the Indo-Pacific. The USA, Japan and Australia supported the expansion of production capacities for coronavirus vaccines in India. Together, the four QUAD members donated over 400 million vaccine doses to Indo-Pacific countries in 2021 and 2022 and almost 800 million worldwide. In addition, the group of four supported the COVAX initiative with 5.6 billion US dollars. In September 2024, the "QUAD Cancer Moonshot" initiative was announced, which aims to reduce the number of cancer deaths in the Indo-Pacific, particularly through measures to prevent and treat uterine cancer16. 2. Climate Change The countries of the Indo-Pacific are particularly affected by climate change. The QUAD agenda aims to accelerate decarbonization, promote renewable energy and protect the maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific. This includes the expansion of clean hydrogen technologies, climate information services and early warning systems as well as the diversification of supply chains. 3 Critical and Emerging Technologies The QUAD countries are committed to the responsible and safe use of technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and 5G. Specifically, for example, the establishment of an Open Radio Access Network (RAN) in Palau, Micronesia, is being promoted, which will later be extended to other Pacific island states. 4. Space All four QUAD nations have their own space programs, which are linked by a large number of bilateral and minilateral cooperation projects. The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative, launched in 2022, aims to strengthen maritime security and transparency in the Indo-Pacific. It will provide countries in the region with real-time maritime surveillance information, primarily data from satellites, sensors, and other surveillance technologies. This will enable small and medium-sized coastal states in the Indo-Pacific to gain a better overview of maritime activities in their exclusive economic zones, such as illegal fishing, smuggling and piracy. 5. Cyber Security In 2022, the QUAD Cybersecurity Partnership was established to combat threats from cybercrime and state-sponsored attacks. The partnership is divided into four sectors, with each member of QUAD taking the lead in one sector to address cyber vulnerabilities. The sectors include critical infrastructure protection, supply chain resilience, skills training, and software security standards.17 6. Infrastructure QUAD countries are promoting the development of sustainable port infrastructure and announcing major investments in submarine cable projects to improve digital connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In 2022, the goal was set to invest up to USD 50 billion in infrastructure projects in the region within five years. Launched in 2023, the QUAD Infrastructure Fellowship will provide over 1,800 fellowships, exchanges and other program opportunities for government officials and infrastructure professionals in the region to share best practices in infrastructure management. Outside of these six main themes, the QUAD group also collaborates in other areas: The QUAD Fellowship Program provides scholarships for master's and doctoral students in the fields of mathematics, computer science, natural sciences and technology (STEM) in the US, and since 2024, applicants from the ten ASEAN countries have also been admitted18. The Counterterrorism Working Group was founded in 2023. Other areas of cooperation mentioned in the QUAD plans are sustainable, transparent, and fair lending and financing practices, nuclear stability, and critical minerals. Conclusion The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue QUAD has proven to be a stable and effective security policy dialog platform in recent years. QUAD has the potential to transform the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific by creating a strategic balance in the face of challenges such as China's rising power and territorial expansion. The QUAD promotes cooperation between the US, India, Japan, and Australia, the four most influential democracies in the region. Cooperation is based on shared values such as freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and adherence to international rules. QUAD is not a formal security alliance, there is no mutual defense commitment. It is a flexible, informal coalition forum that focuses on a wide range of issues, including broader security, the economy, infrastructure, technology, and climate change. QUAD has no institutional structures. There are annual summits of heads of state and government and foreign ministers, and the decisions of the summits are implemented by the state apparatuses of the member countries. The naval exercise "Malabar" is not an official part of QUAD but serves as a platform to strengthen military interoperability and is seen as an operational extension of QUAD's security objectives, particularly in the maritime domain. India plays a special role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. It contributes not only its geographical and geopolitical importance in the Indo-Pacific, but also a perspective characterized by strategic autonomy and multipolar diplomacy. India is regarded as an important representative of the so-called Global South and is seen as a counterweight to China in this group of states.19 On the other hand, India avoids presenting QUAD as an explicitly anti-Chinese alliance in order to avoid putting too much strain on its own sensitive relationship with China. The EU and Germany should adopt a strategically balanced position towards QUAD that considers both the geopolitical realities in the Indo-Pacific and their own economic and security interests. The EU and Germany share with the QUAD states the goal of preserving a rules-based order, particularly regarding international maritime law (UNCLOS). To exert greater influence on the region, Germany and the EU should strengthen bilateral partnerships with the QUAD states to promote common interests such as infrastructure development, new and critical technologies, climate protection and maritime security. Joint infrastructure development projects in the Indo-Pacific could offer a sustainable alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Information This publication of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. is for information purposes only. It may not be used by political parties or by campaigners or campaign helpers for the purpose of election advertising. This applies to federal, state, and local elections as well as elections to the European Parliament. The text of this work is licensed under the terms of "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 international", CC BY-SA 4.0 (available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de) References 1 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/2 Earthquake in the Indian Ocean 2004, https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erdbeben_im_Indischen_Ozean_2004  3 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/ 4 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue5 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/  6 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue 7 Feigenbaum, Eva A., „Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?”, MarcoPolo, Paulson Institute, 25. Juli 2017, https://macropolo.org/analysis/is-coercion-the-new-normal-in-chinas-economic-statecraft/?rp=m  8 Panda, Jagannath, „India and the ‘Quad Plus’ Dialogue”, 12. June 2020, RUSI, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/india-and-quad-plus-dialogue 9 Parker, Jennifer, „Not just another naval exercise: Malabar’s vital messaging”, 10. August 2023, The Strategist, ASPI, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/not-just-another-naval-exercise-malabars-vital-messaging/ 10 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue 11 Samir Saran, Satu Limaye, Vivek Mishra, Lilah Connell, Amy Namur, Robin McCoy, and Aryan D’Rozario, East-West Center, „Two Decades of the QUAD: Diplomacy & Cooperation in the Indopacific”, 14. June 2024,  https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/two-decades-quad-diplomacy-cooperation-indo-pacific/  12 The White House, 12. March 2021, Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: „The Spirit of the QUAD”, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/ 13 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, „The QUAD”, last visit 02.12.2024, in https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad 14 Ebd. 15 U.S. Representative Ami Bera, M.D. (D-CA), Press Release, 20. September 2024, https://bera.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=400409 16 Samir Saran, Satu Limaye, Vivek Mishra, Lilah Connell, Amy Namur, Robin McCoy, and Aryan D’Rozario, East-West Center, „Two Decades of the QUAD: Diplomacy & Cooperation in the Indopacific”, 14. June 2024, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/two-decades-quad-diplomacy-cooperation-indo-pacific/ 17 Ebd. 18 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Kooperation international, „QUAD-Fellowship-Programm auf ASEAN-Staaten ausgeweitet“, zuletzt gelesen am 02.12.2024 in https://www.kooperation-international.de/aktuelles/nachrichten/detail/info/quad-fellowship-programm-auf-asean-staaten-ausgeweitet  19 Heiduk, Felix; Wirth, Christian: „The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) between Australia, India, Japan and the USA “, SWP-Aktuell, Nr. 35, June 2023, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023A35/ 

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском “Changes! We’re waiting for changes!” proclaimed Viktor Tsoi nearly 40 years ago, at the dawn of the Soviet perestroika. If one were to summarize the multitude of diverse and contradictory events, trends, and sentiments of the past year in a single phrase, it would be that the modern world is eagerly awaiting change. Much like the former USSR in the 1980s, few today can clearly define what these changes should entail or what their ultimate outcome will be. Yet, the idea of maintaining the status quo has evidently found little favor with the public over the past year. This impatient anticipation of change was reflected, for instance, in the outcomes of numerous elections held over the past 12 months across the globe. In total, more than 1.6 billion people went to the polls, and in most cases, supporters of the status quo lost ground. In the United States, the Democrats suffered a resounding defeat to the Republicans, while in the United Kingdom, the Conservatives were decisively beaten by the Labour Party. In France, Emmanuel Macron's once-dominant ruling party found itself squeezed between right-wing and left-wing opposition, plunging the Fifth Republic into a deep political crisis. The seemingly stable foundations of political centrism were shaken in Germany, South Korea, and Japan. Even the party of the highly popular Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi failed to retain its parliamentary majority after the elections, and in South Africa, the African National Congress led by Cyril Ramaphosa also lost its majority. Pessimists might argue that abandoning the status quo in itself solves no problems, and the much-anticipated changes, as the final years of the Soviet Union demonstrated, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. Replacing cautious technocrats with reckless populists often backfires, affecting those most critical of the entrenched status quo. Optimists, on the other hand, would counter that the rusted structures of state machinery everywhere are in desperate need of radical modernization. They would add that the costs inevitably associated with maintaining the existing state of affairs at all costs far outweigh any risks tied to attempts to change it. The international events of the past year are also open to various interpretations. Pessimists would undoubtedly point out that none of the major armed conflicts carried over from 2023 were resolved in 2024. On the contrary, many of them showed clear tendencies toward escalation. For instance, in late summer, Ukraine launched an incursion into the Kursk region of Russia, and in mid-November, the U.S. authorized Kyiv to use long-range ATACMS missiles against targets deep within Russian territory. Meanwhile, the military operation launched by Israel in Gaza in the fall of 2023 gradually expanded to the West Bank, then to southern Lebanon, and by the end of 2024, to parts of Syrian territory adjacent to the Golan Heights. From the optimists' perspective, however, the past year demonstrated that the disintegration of the old international system has its limits. A direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO did not occur, nor did a large-scale regional war break out in the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, or the Korean Peninsula. The economic results of 2024 are equally ambiguous. On one hand, the global economy remained heavily influenced by geopolitics throughout the year. The process of “technological decoupling” between the U.S. and China continued, and unilateral sanctions firmly established themselves as a key instrument of Western foreign policy. On the other hand, the world managed to avoid a deep economic recession despite the numerous trade and investment restrictions. Global economic growth for the year is expected to reach around 3%, which is quite respectable for such turbulent times, especially considering that the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have not yet been fully overcome. In 2024, the average annual global temperature exceeded pre-industrial levels by more than 1,5 °C for the first time, crossing another critical “red line”. However, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) held in November in Baku fell short of many expectations. At the same time, China reached its peak carbon emissions by the end of the year, achieving this milestone a full five years ahead of previously announced plans. In the past year, the UN Security Council managed to adopt only 12 resolutions, mostly of a humanitarian nature, clearly reflecting the declining effectiveness of this global governance body. For comparison, in 2000, the Security Council approved 29 resolutions, including key decisions on conflict resolution in the Balkans and Africa. At the same time, 2024 saw continued efforts to explore new formats for multilateral cooperation, including mechanisms within the BRICS group, which held its 16th summit in Kazan for the first time in its newly expanded composition. With enough imagination, one can easily find evidence in the past 12 months to confirm any omen or superstition traditionally associated with leap years. However, all these signs and superstitions predicting upheavals and catastrophes—while aligning with the pessimistic conclusions about the year now ending—do not apply to the year ahead. Human nature, after all, tends to lean more towards optimism than pessimism; if it were the other way around, we would still be living in caves. As they bid farewell to a difficult and challenging year, people around the world continue to hope for better times. And the mere act of hoping for the best is already significant in itself. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe aptly remarked, “Our wishes are forebodings of our capabilities, harbingers of what we are destined to achieve”. Originally published in Izvestia.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This analysis focuses on possible short and medium-term effects of Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States. This paper starts with a brief account of Trump’s first presidency and then continues to account for major challenges that Trump’s administration will have to face domestically,The central part of the analysis focuses on the geopolitical consequences of Trump’s election. In particular, the author looks at Europe (the ongoing war in Ukraine): Middle East and Far East – especially China.The paper concludes with the author's conviction that the next few years will bring decisive changes likely to usher in the new world order.Keywords: Trump, US, Europe, Security, Geopolitics Introduction Donald Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States in 2017 had significant and far-reaching effects on world politics, marking a departure from previous administrations' approaches to foreign policy and international relations. Trump's presidency shifted from globalization to isolationism, protectionism, and nationalism (Kawashima, 2017). His "America First" strategy emphasized unilateral action and challenged the liberal international order the United States had led and protected since World War II (Mansbach, 2021). This approach has strained relationships with traditional allies, particularly in Europe, while simultaneously raising authoritarian leaders (Mansbach, 2021). Interestingly, Trump's election immediately negatively impacted trust in the U.S. government in Latin America, as demonstrated by a regression discontinuity design study (Carreras et al., 2021). Additionally, his controversial policies, such as the trade war with China, have had significant impacts on the global economy (Sahide et al., 2024). The Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Islamic World was notably less friendly compared to the Obama era, causing tensions in US-Islamic World relations (Bahari & Sahide, 2022). There seems to be a consensus that Trump's presidency accelerated societal processes, undermined democratic institutions, and encouraged hyperpartisanship within political institutions (James, 2021). While he did not always succeed in implementing major policy changes or fulfilling campaign promises, his leadership style and policy decisions significantly altered the global perception of the United States and its role in world politics, creating what some scholars describe as " a more dangerous world" (Mansbach, 2021).  Admittedly, Trump does not seem to be exceptionally hawkish when it comes to using military tools in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Let us remember that Barak Obama (Democratic Party), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, ordered airstrikes in seven different countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria) (Liptak, 2014). During first Trump’s presidency, no new campaigns were started, although the intensification of the existing ones allegedly increased. Ultimately, it was Trump who was mainly behind the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Trump 2.0 November 2024 Presidential elections brought sweeping changes to the American political kaleidoscope. Donald Trump took a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Kamala Harris, securing 312 electoral votes (with 270 being a victory threshold). Republicans also won the Senate with 52 seats against 47 and the House with 218 seats against 212. (Election Centre 2024).  This is arguably one of the most important political events in the world in 2024. Already Trump’s declarations regarding the first decisions to be taken once sworn in office on the 20th of January next year, plus his appointments for top offices in the U.S. administration, have caused a furore – a phenomenon referred to by many as the so-called ‘Trump Effect’. As much as political scientists, cognitive anthropologists or psychologists usually use this term to refer to racially inflammatory Elite Communication (Newman et al., 2020), this short analysis will look at the tectonic shifts in international relations, international security system and geopolitics that have already happened or are likely to occur after the 20th of January 2025. U.S. – politics Undoubtedly, the U.S. economy, society, and political system are in deep crisis. Economically, the Americans have been doing worse than ever since the Second World War. Inflation is rampant; economic inequality is very high; unemployment is on the rise; the state of infrastructure is relatively poor, and the level of public services is far from desirable, whereas taxation is reaching new heights amidst a slowing economy and diminishing number of small and medium enterprises (USA FACTS). Societywise, the problems are equally severe. According to Pew Research, the top issues facing the U.S. in this category are in the order of importance from top to bottom: the affordability of healthcare, drug addiction, illegal immigration, gun violence, violent crime, the state of moral values, the quality of public k-12 schools, Climate change, international terrorism, infrastructure condition, domestic terrorism and racism (Pew Research Centre, 2024). One should also add here the rising “wokeness’ of the American educational system, which poses a great challenge to the cohesion of the society and its future in terms of military power.  Politically, the picture is not better. According to the same research institution (Pew), the biggest problems that the U.S. political system faces are: political leaders do not face the consequences if they act unethically, it is difficult to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics, Congress accomplishes less than people give it credit for, the Federal Government does less for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for. Other problems include the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in policymaking, the cost of political campaigns and the animosity between the Republicans and the Democrats, which, in consequence, causes the inability of the political system to solve critical societal problems (Pew Research Centre, 2023). The first and foremost task ahead of Trump is to rectify problems at home. His Agenda47 (Republican Platform) declares 20 core promises: seal the border and stop the migrant invasion, carry out the largest deportation operation in american history, end inflation, and make america affordable again, make america the dominant energy producer in the world, by far, stop outsourcing, and turn the United States into a manufacturing superpower, large tax cuts for workers, and no tax on tips, defend the constitution, the bill of rights, and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to keep and bear arms, prevent world war three, restore peace in europe and in the middle east, and build a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country -- all made in america, end the weaponization of government against the american people, stop the migrant crime epidemic, demolish the foreign drug cartels, crush gang violence, and lock up violent offenders, rebuild cities, including washington dc, making them safe, clean, and beautiful again, strengthen and modernize the military, making it, without question, the strongest and most powerful in the world, keep the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, fight for and protect social security and medicare with no cuts, including no changes to the retirement age, cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations, cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory, radical gender ideology, and other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on children, keep men out of women's sports, deport pro-hamas radicals and make college campuses safe and patriotic again, secure our elections, including same day voting, voter identification, paper ballots, and proof of citizenship and lastly unite the country by bringing it to new and record levels of success (Agenda 47).  International Politics Internationally, Trump faces many challenges. His presidency will have to address three primary regions defined geographically: Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. - Europe As far as Europe is concerned, the most pressing issue is the war in Ukraine. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly declared that his administration's support for the continuation of the U.S. support for the war effort against Russia would be terminated during the first 24 hours of his presidency (Hansler, 2024). As a consequence, shortly after Trump’s winning the White House race, the outgoing administration under POTUS Joe Biden finally allowed the Ukrainians to attack Russian territory with American long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS), which allegedly came in as a response to the North Korean decision to send its troops to support Russian soldiers against Ukraine (Entous, Schmitt and Barnes, 2024). Next, in counter-response, President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a new nuclear Doctrine into power. Chillingly, it declares that Russia may use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear state, even in case of a conventional attack (Associated Press, 2024). As of the beginning of December 2024, the media are full of reports of an alleged concentration of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border, fueling speculation about an imminent mass invasion, this time with cities such as Kyiv being targeted in a conventional terrain operation (Bodner, De Luce and Smith, 2024).  One can only speculate what all this means and how far we are from the outbreak of the III World War (Sky News, 2024). Some things are, however, more or less evident. Firstly, the current escalation of war in Ukraine is likely a direct effect of Trump's winning and his declaration to end the war as soon as possible. The more the Russian troops advance in the field, the higher they can bid once the peace talks begin. Similarly, the more complex the situation in the field (Biden’s decision regarding the use of ATACMS), the more challenging it will be for Trump and his administration to achieve peace. Knowing the radically different approach to conflict with Russia of President Trump, the outgoing administration and national security advisors most likely wanted to achieve militarily as much as possible before they were ousted from their jobs. Secondly, Trump declared on numerous occasions that if European members of NATO want to continue their support for Ukraine, they should take the whole responsibility. He singled Germany, France, and Poland out. Poland, for that matter, enthusiastically agreed to carry on the baton and declared that it was ready to bear the heavy burden. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, when participating in a radio broadcast, “We [Poland] are ready to take over the large part of the costs of supporting Ukraine” (Nczas Info, 2024). At the same time on the 3rd of December, the new Secretary General of NATO – Mark Rutte, during his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, openly declared: “The immediate priority must be to provide more arms to the country's forces as Russia gains territory along the battlefront in eastern Ukraine.The [Ukrainian] front is not moving eastwards. It is slowly moving westwards. So, we have to make sure that Ukraine gets into a position of strength, and then it should be for the Ukrainian government to decide on the next steps in terms of opening peace talks and how to conduct them." (VoA, 2024). To sum up, it looks like the current escalation, according to theoretical models such as those proposed by Herman Kahn in 1965 – a Cold War physicist - we are at stage 12 of 44 steps on the escalation ladder. As comforting as one might think it is, let us remember that according to Kahn’s theory, a local nuclear war takes place as early as at step 21 (Tinline, 2023). As history has proved many times, it is difficult, if impossible, to wage a systemic war on two fronts at the same time. Given the economic and military challenges perceived by Trump during his first tenure as U.S. President (See: A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017), China is the challenger number one for the position of the United States in the international system and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, China wants to reorder the area in its favour. Would it be too much of a stretch of the imagination to claim that most likely, given the context above, Trump will probably arrange for peaceful talks with Russia over Ukrainian political and military leadership heads’? What will he want? Probably Russia’s neutrality in the face of the coming escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and China. What can he offer? Probably a big part of Ukrainian territory and the amendment to the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the country should forever be neutral militarily and politically. At the same time, the American withdrawal from Europe will most probably create a void that is most likely to be filled by Germans. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts (The Federal Government, 2022).  The leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's ‘special responsibility’ for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government’s ‘special responsibility’ for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. (German National Security Strategy, 2023). In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the ‘best equipped armed force’ in Europe (Euronews, 2022). Let us also remember that Berlin vigorously supported the latest proposal for a European army, which presumably might serve as a vehicle for further European integration towards the federalization of Europe.  At the same time, the prospect of federalization will face two major challenges: firstly, the future of transatlantic relations is less than certain, especially the economic competition between the EU and the U.S. European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen signalled the possibility of an economic war with the U.S. as a response to Trump declared protectionism of the American economy (Berg, Meyers, 2024). Secondly, the EU is highly inefficient in energy, so the question of future energy security becomes a priority. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the redirection of Russian gas to China will profoundly affect the future of European economic development amid the so-called ‘Fit-for-55’ -  a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (Fit for 55, 2024). - Middle East As of the writing of this paper, one sees the escalation of the war in Syria. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “ongoing hostilities in northern Syria continue to expand to other parts of the country, endangering civilians and humanitarian workers, causing severe damage to critical infrastructure and disrupting humanitarian operations. As of 5 December, at least 178,000 people have been displaced due to the recent escalations in northern Syria, including 128,000 newly displaced and 39,000 displaced at least twice. Figures are still being reconciled, noting that UNHR and NGOs operating in the northeastern part of Syria estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people have been newly displaced there, including more than 25,000 currently hosted in collective centers”. (OCHA, 2024). According to international media (CBC News, 2024): ”Syria's long-running civil war came to a head Sunday when opposition forces entered the capital city of Damascus and the government of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. Russian state media later reported that Assad and his family had fled to Moscow. Crowds gathered in Damascus to celebrate the fall of Assad's government with chants, prayers and occasional gunfire, marking the end of a regime that, between the ousted President and his father, had ruled over Syria for half of a century.” […] "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen," President Biden said Sunday afternoon at the White House after convening his national security team to discuss the developments. He said the fall of Assad presented a "historic moment of opportunity" and pledged support for Syria and its neighbours against any threats” (Ott, 2024). Syria seems to be just another litmus test of the so-called regional security complex in the Middle East. As such, the war in Syria is obviously but a puzzle in a much bigger jigsaw that includes all major powers that operate in the region: the U.S.A, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran to name the most obvious ones. All of the above are deeply engaged in Middle East politics for the sake of their national interests and international security strategies. All of the above deserve separate analyses. For the sake of this paper, however, the author will focus only on the U.S. According to Douglas Macgregor and Dave Ramaswamy, “The fear in many nations’ capitals is that President Donald Trump’s return to Washington might make Israel feel more confident in attacking Iran. According to Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, “There is no world leader Trump respects more than Netanyahu.”  The evangelical leader also confides that President Trump would support an Israeli attack before his inauguration on the assumption that the destruction of Iran’s oil production facilities would devastate Iran’s economy, inducing Iran to end the war with Israel before President Trump assumes his office. This thinking by no means excludes an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear development sites as well.” (Macgregor & Ramaswamy, 2024). In their article, they state that “If America joins Israel in its war against Iran, the outcome will be a geopolitical showdown that could dramatically alter the world as we know it. It is the storm of the 21st century and, for the moment, the American ship of state is sailing right into it. “ They consequently pose four fundamental questions:  1. What is the American purpose in waging war against Iran? Is Washington’s purpose to destroy the Iranian state? To destroy its capability to wage war against Israel? To eliminate Iran’s developing nuclear capability? Or to decapitate the Iranian state in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow their national government? 2. How will U.S. military power achieve the objectives? 3. What is the desired end state? What does the President want Iran and the region that surrounds it to look like when the fighting ends? 4. What is the strategic cost to the American people if Washington declines to participate in a regional war begun by Israel?  They conclude by asking yet another, perhaps the most crucial question: what do Netanyahu’s goals mean for the health of the American economy and the stability of the international system? Can Israel survive without attacking its numerous enemies?  The next couple of months are likely to bring at least some answers to some of these questions. Importantly, expert voices concerning the future of Israel seem to be abounding more and more (Teller, 2024). - China and the Far East Finally, there is a question of China. As mentioned before, Trump sees China as a major challenger to the role and position of the U.S. in the international system. The Republicans and the Democrats may be divided by numerous issues, but there is at least one regarding which they stay united. The true bipartisanship revolves around the Chinese challenge. Both parties, therefore, claim that the possibility of a systemic conflict with China is not a science fiction scenario. On November 20, 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress heard that the U.S. had to prepare for a potential conflict with China by raising its defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP. (South China Morning Post, 2024). The recommendation came during an interactive exercise for members of the House Select Committee on China, based on a scenario predicted for 2026 and hosted by Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report titled: The First Battle of the Next War Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, authored by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham opens with a chilling question: “What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is, therefore, not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.” (The First Battle of the Next War, 2023). They go on to claim that: “China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.” China has grown increasingly assertive over the last decades and sees no reason to continue accepting a dominated world that facilitates the benefits of Western powers, especially the U.S.A. At a recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (November 2024), the President of China openly called for a multipolar world (Xinhua, 2024). In his words: “China and Brazil stay committed to peace, development, fairness and justice. We have similar or identical views on many international and regional issues. Both are staunch defenders of the basic norms of international relations and multilateralism, coordinating closely and consistently within the United Nations, G20, BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms on crucial issues, including global governance and climate change. Not long ago, China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Our initiative has received a positive response from the international community. China and Brazil, embracing our roles and responsibilities as major countries, have contributed to a multipolar world, conduced to greater democracy in international relations and injected positive energy into global peace and stability.” (Xinhua, 2024 b).  Conclusion Taiwan has long been a global security issue and a point of concern on the geopolitical maps of the national security planners of great powers. It is not the only one, though. The war between the Koreas is formally not over (recently, North Korea allegedly sent soldiers to back Russia in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine); the American military presence in the Far East and South East Asia is likely to remain an issue, especially from the point of view of Beijing. Central Asia, with its geopolitical environment, religious activism and economic challenges, is likely to rise in importance as a chessboard for great powers. As the weight and focus of International Relations is relocating back to Asia (Euroasia rather than the North Atlantic Area), China and Russia are more likely to hold the keys to international peace and security than the United States. On top of that, one needs to look out for North Africa as a source of continuing instability and massive migration, especially to Europe. All in all, Trump’s next presidency will surely bring a lot of interesting developments, which are likely to fuel a new world order.  References - A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017. NSS_BookLayout_FIN_121917.indd - Agenda 47. https://www.donaldjtrump.com/platform - Associated Press, Nov. 8, 2024. “The Kremlin has revised its nuclear policy. Does that make the use of atomic weapons more likely?” https://apnews.com/article/russia-nuclear-doctrine-putin-ukraine-war-b5ee115aa2099fa247f630e16da861d8- Bahari, Diana Mutiara, and Ahmad Sahide. 2022. “The Comparison of The United States Foreign Policy Against The Islamic World Under President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump Administration.” Journal of Islamic World and Politics 6 (2): 270–97. https://doi.org/10.18196/jiwp.v6i2.13060. - Berg, Aslak and Meyers, Zach. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Subsequent U.S. administrations, except for brief moments of relative calm, have persisted in demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) abandon its nuclear program and, moreover, have made extensive efforts to destabilize its political and economic system. Meanwhile, the successive leaders of the DPRK have persisted in advancing their defensive capabilities until reaching their preferred deterrent: nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, a guarantee of survival. This persistent situation reached an unprecedented moment when, during his previous presidency, Donald Trump made a surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK, temporarily unraveling, although without the expected results, the "Korean Gordian Knot." This led to successive summits in 2018 and 2019 (Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom) with Kim Jong Un, the leader of a state that, throughout its history, has maintained sharply confrontational relations with the United States. The world witnessed the transition from exchanges of insults and threats—Trump calling Kim "Little Rocket Man" and Kim referring to Trump as "old senile man"—and threatening the latter with "fire and fury" if the North Korean leader continued missile tests, to becoming "pen pals" and holding three unprecedented summits. No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK like Donald Trump did, and no North Korean leader in history has sat face-to-face, as equals, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did, which granted him prestige on the global stage. Due to reasons associated with its strategic ambiguity, the Biden Administration made no diplomatic progress with Pyongyang. Even though at the beginning of his term he committed to a "new strategy toward North Korea," over the past four years, his actions have only promoted sanctions in the Security Council, which have clashed dramatically with Russia's veto, struggled with the dissolution of the DPRK Expert Group in the Sanctions Committee, and observed the exponential increase in its arsenal of intercontinental, hypersonic, and short-range ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads capable of targeting the continental U.S. and U.S. military bases in the region. Furthermore, the DPRK has resumed uranium enrichment and reopened its nuclear test center. In the end, the outgoing president has been unable to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, much less contain it. So, one must ask: Will Trump's return to the White House mark continuity or a change from his previous term? An analysis of the future position of the Trump administration toward the DPRK should consider that, compared to his previous term, the circumstances have radically changed. 1. DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have made new and significant advances. At the same time, its foreign policy has undergone a reorientation due to the sustained increase in distrust toward Washington from Pyongyang.2. By order of its leader, the DPRK has severed all its ties and symbols of relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as the "main and unchanging enemy," and as it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the People's Armed Forces to accelerate preparations to "occupy, subjugate, and fully reclaim" South Korea, in response to the confrontational attitude and increasingly close military and intelligence ties between Washington and Seoul.3. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two summits between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, and Kim's description of Putin as the "closest comrade," have shown the high level of understanding and commitment between the two, which has materialized in the DPRK's unwavering support for Russia's special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures. This treaty includes a clause for "mutual military assistance," while Russia provides diplomatic and economic backing to the DPRK, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports, mainly oil, raw materials, and food, as well as assistance in various fields.4. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis is taking shape between China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies are labeling it the "new axis of evil." In this interconnected relationship, the DPRK holds significant advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. At least these four factors will significantly impact Donald Trump's decision to return, or not, to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, raising doubts about whether the former would be willing to revisit it. However, if he tries, it is unclear what Kim Jong Un's response would be, clearly more determined and militarily more powerful in the eyes of Washington, which at first glance seems unwilling to renew its offers related to denuclearization. The ironic jest by Trump at the 2024 Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, when he said that Kim Jong Un "missed him," that they "got along very well," and that "he misses me" and "wants me back in the White House" and "it's good to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons," was met with a response from North Korean media, stating that "they don't care" who assumes office in the U.S. This suggests that Pyongyang's official stance is that, regardless of what happens, it will not abandon its nuclear deterrent. Considering the visible changes in the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape that differ from those in 2018-2019, any type of negotiation aimed at reaching compromises between the parties on the denuclearization of North Korea will be even more challenging. Trump may seek alternative approaches to encourage the DPRK to freeze nuclear and missile tests, but he will need to weigh several options. These include: which side should take the first step toward engagement; whether it is necessary to "rattle sabers" to create influence; the possibility of "unilateral conciliatory gestures"; and whether he should stick to the goal of "complete denuclearization" (Chad O’Carroll and Shreyas Reddy, 2024). Donald Trump exhibits an unpredictable, egocentric personality and is a fan of diplomatic spectacle, with a penchant for reality shows. Given this, he might be tempted to revisit diplomacy, possibly considering the absence of John Bolton, who, alongside Michael Pompeo, led the Hanoi Summit to failure. Many agree with what was stated by Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University and former special advisor for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae In administration, when he admitted: "It is possible that, in his second term, Trump will prioritize solidifying his political legacy. His foreign policy would be heavily influenced by media attention and personal ego, as he cares about how history will remember him. Achieving a major deal with Pyongyang and contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula could serve to fulfill that ambition, potentially allowing him to win a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. While resolving the Ukraine war or the Gaza crisis could also improve his chances of receiving the prize, negotiations with Kim Jong Un are likely to be a key agenda for Trump. In that sense, Trump could actively engage with the North Korean leader, and might even consider a visit to Pyongyang for a summit, where he could make surprising offers. However, the success of such efforts ultimately depends on Kim's response" (Lee Hyo Jin, 2024). It is necessary to build some scenarios: 1. The influence of personal friendship could encourage Kim Jong Un to engage in communication with Trump, turning the page on the Hanoi failure and minimizing distrust toward the U.S.2. Recognition by the Trump Administration of the DPRK as a de facto nuclear power and easing of sanctions to promote progress toward the partial normalization of relations.3. Strong U.S. demands for denuclearization and the promotion of further sanctions, leading to increased tensions. Given Trump’s volatility and the unpredictability of the DPRK leadership, there are currently no conditions to determine the most likely scenario. The campaign team has not commented on whether Trump will seek new meetings with Kim Jong Un, but his statements prior to his victory suggest that he might seek to revive talks, possibly sooner rather than later. Now, it is unpredictable what roadmap Trump will implement, as his opinions during the campaign may differ from the decisions he makes officially when in office. It is not accurate to assume that his demeanor during the first term will be indicative of his future conduct. It is worth dedicating a brief space to the designated Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. As a staunch anti-communist, he is one of the promoters of the term "axis of evil," which includes the DPRK, and considers China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as aligned against the US. He has advocated concrete actions and plans against these states. It is expected that, initially, he will oppose any commitment from the incoming administration with the DPRK. As John Bolton and Michael Pompeo did at the time, Rubio could attempt to limit Donald Trump’s maneuvering room with Kim Jong Un. However, there is also the possibility that the next U.S. president’s assertive and authoritarian character, who, despite previous disagreements, appointed Rubio, will lead him to align with Trump’s decisions or, alternatively, suffer the same fate of being ousted with a “tweet and a punch,” as happened to Rex Tillerson and John Bolton. Regarding the Republic of Korea, it is important to specify that the most critical foreign policy issues for Donald Trump’s new administration will be its relationship with the European Union, the Middle East conflicts, the war in Ukraine, the China-Taiwan dispute, and relations with the DPRK. It is precisely the latter that concerns South Koreans the most, as their security largely depends on the presence of U.S. troops in their country and Washington’s support for South Korea’s defense against the imminent “North Korean threat.” The conservative government of Yoon Suk Yeol has marked a clear distinction from his predecessor Moon Jae In by significantly strengthening his alliance with the U.S., driven by his growing animosity towards the DPRK and his pro-American stance. This situation presents little likelihood of encouraging Trump to engage in talks with Kim Jong Un, especially without a clear indication from Pyongyang toward denuclearization. This is likely, as all signs point to Pyongyang not making significant concessions regarding its nuclear deterrent and showing a strong aversion towards the Republic of Korea. After Donald Trump's victory, the South Korean president had a phone conversation with him to extend his congratulations and quickly express his desire for the alliance to continue under his leadership. Although both agreed to hold a summit as soon as possible, the issue of the DPRK, which was already addressed in this initial dialogue, will certainly be on the agenda. It is said that Trump plans for his government to work with South Korea on several bilateral issues, but one of the key aspects will be South Korea’s contribution to Washington for hosting U.S. bases on its territory. Let's remember that during Trump's first term, this was a hot topic in his military relations. It is worth mentioning that due to Donald Trump's transactional approach to international relations, his perception that many of the U.S. allies are "taking advantage" of its military power, and the pressure he exerted on Seoul when he was in office, with Trump's victory, national security against the DPRK is placed at the forefront. Many are concerned that his return to the White House could mean that Washington will no longer be a reliable partner, making it necessary for South Korea to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Han Dong Hoon, leader of the ruling People Power Party, said at a seminar organized to discuss the future of South Korea's nuclear policy that Trump's victory had positive aspects. "Acquiring nuclear potential — meaning having the right to enrich and reprocess uranium — does not inherently equate to possessing nuclear weapons," he said, according to The Korea Herald. "But we would be able to move to that phase at any time if North Korea intensifies its nuclear threats," he added. "I believe we should be prepared for such a scenario amid the changing dynamics of global power and order." Meanwhile, retired Army General Han Ki Ho went a step further and suggested that South Korea may no longer have a choice. "Nuclear armament may be the only path left for South Korea's survival," he stated (Julian Ryall, 2024). However, whether the Republic of Korea acquires nuclear weapons will depend on how the Trump administration approaches the alliance and relations with North Korea, that is, whether it abandons or restricts the "extended deterrence" and whether it pursues an agreement with Pyongyang that halts its development of long-range missiles that could reach the continental United States in exchange for accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear power. This type of agreement would affect Seoul, located just 48 kilometers from the border, and therefore within the range of North Korea's short-range missiles. We are facing an uncertain situation, and therefore, expectant, where the expectations regarding Donald Trump's stance on DPRK are uncertain. Whether the denuclearization of DPRK is a priority for the Trump administration depends on the approach and methods with which the president and his team address an increasingly complex scenario. DPRK, in terms of its economic performance and national defense potential, is not the same as before, which gives Kim Jong Un greater effectiveness in his military deterrence and diplomatic maneuverability, especially when his reliable conduct with Moscow and the appropriate handling of relations with Beijing strengthen his position vis-à-vis the U.S. Trump will have to deal with these realities. And while he may intend to continue his legacy, he will necessarily have to reframe his policy towards DPRK, considering that DPRK is no longer the same, that its main contenders (Russia and China) are precisely the closest to DPRK, and that the country itself is no longer the same, either militarily or socioeconomically, as it was when he engaged in talks with Kim Jong Un in 2018-2019. References - Simone McCarthy (2024) Trump claims Kim Jong Un “isses him. But he faces a very different North Korea leader this time around. Disponible en: https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-intl-hnk/index.html- Keith Johnson (2024) Could Trump Rekindle Diplomacy With North Korea? Disponible en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/13/trump-north-korea-diplomacy-putin-russia/- Joel S. Wit (2024) Blame Donald Trump for North Korea´s sable-rattling. Disponible en: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/blame-donald-trump-for-north-koreas-sabre-rattling/- Rubén Criado (2024) Así afecta la victoria de Trump a Corea del Norte. Disponible en: https://as.com/actualidad/politica/asi-afecta-la-victoria-de-trump-a-corea-del-norte-n/- Josh Smith (2024) Donald Trump se enfrenta a un Kim Jong Un envalentonado, cercano a Rusia y con un arsenal de misiles más grande. Disponible en: https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2024/11/07/donald-trump-se-enfrentara-a-un-kim-jong-un-envalentonado-cercano-a-rusia-y-con-un-arsenal-de-misiles-mas-grande/- Julian Ryall (2024) Regreso de Trump atiza debate nuclear en Corea del Sur. Disponible en: https://amp.dw.com/es/el-regreso-de-trump-atiza-el-debate-nuclear-en-corea-del-sur/a70798786#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317231276140&csi=1&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com- Chad O´Carrol y Shreyas Reddy (2024) Why North Korean denuclearization will likely take backseat in second Trump term | NK Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/why-north-korean-denuclearization-will-likely-take-backseat-in-second-trump-term/- Miguel Jiménez (2024) Donald Trump planea elegir a marcos Rubio como secretario de Estado. Disponible en: https://elpais.com/internacional/elecciones-usa/2024-11-12/donald-trump-elige-a-marco-rubio-como-secretario-de-estado.html?outputType=amp#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317890370552&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump, who won the US presidential election on November 5th, is appointing key officials for the new government that will be launched in January next year, and the content is very unconventional. In a word, they are young, reformist, and loyalists who have been breathing together with him. This is especially true for those who will lead foreign policy and security. The nominations include 40-year-old Senator James Vance as Vice President, 53-year-old Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, 44-year-old Fox News anchor Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, 50-year-old Representative Mike Walz as National Security Advisor, 43-year-old Representative Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 59-year-old former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe (59) as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 53-year-old South Dakota Governor Kristi Nome as Secretary of Homeland Security, and 67-year-old Suzy Wiles as Co-Chair of the White House Campaign Committee. Among these, the five key figures are the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, and Director of National Intelligence, with an average age of 46, and all of them are ‘hawkish conservative patriots.’ Vice President Vance, a Catholic, shares the same ideological stance as President-elect Trump, including his opposition to abortion and his denial of global warming, and served in Iraq as a Marine. Secretary of State nominee Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, has taken a hard-line stance on Chinese corporate infiltration of the United States and human rights in China while serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in 2020, he introduced the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. He also opposed the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and called North Korea a “criminal group” for its human rights abuses, nuclear and missile development, and criticized it as a “massive group of lunatics” immediately after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in 2017. He is also a pro-Korea figure who has visited the DMZ in South Korea several times. National Security Advisor nominee Walz, a retired colonel from the U.S. Army Special Forces and a veteran of the Middle East, has advocated for reducing dependence on China for key minerals and boycotting the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and in June criticized North Korea-Russia military cooperation as a “dangerous and evil alliance.” He also always visited the DMZ when he came to Korea. Secretary of Defense Haggis is also a veteran of the Middle East and a former US Army major. He later became a host for FOX News and developed a relationship with President-elect Trump. Director of National Intelligence Gabbard, who collects and analyzes information from intelligence agencies, is a reserve lieutenant colonel with experience in the Middle East. She became the youngest member of the House of Representatives in Hawaii at 21 and is the first female veteran of the war. As such, the five key figures in the diplomatic and security line are all young and reformist, and most of them are veterans of the Middle East. If we look at the ideological tendencies, passion, careers, and past words and actions of President-elect Trump and the nominees for the diplomatic and security line, we can predict many things. First, domestically, reforms will be attempted to fit Trump’s slogan of “Make America Great Again (MAGA),” such as reducing and streamlining government organizations, strengthening the US military, promoting growth-oriented economic policies, and protecting domestic companies through fair trade. Under the slogans of “political correctness (PC) and being woke (WOKE),” abortion, homosexuality in the military, and environmental policies that were spread are expected to decline. Externally, there will be a strong confrontation with the “axis of change” powers such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that are leading international conflicts in the new Cold War structure, and the US nuclear military power and nuclear doctrine are also expected to be strengthened and reinforced. In other words, the trend of nuclear reduction and conventional military reduction that has continued since the end of the Cold War will be reversed, and efforts will be made to develop tactical nuclear weapons, new ships, and aircraft. Regionally, it is expected that efforts will be made to check China’s expansionism and pressure the public economically, strengthen security cooperation with allies on fairer terms, strengthen support for Israel, and bring an early end to the Ukraine War.  Considering all these things, we can predict several things about Trump’s second term US policy toward North Korea. First, regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, unlike the ‘strategic patience’ shown by the Obama and Biden administrations, it is expected that they will actively respond. In line with this, they will likely actively oppose the restoration of the Russia-North Korea alliance, Russia-North Korea military cooperation, and the dispatch of North Korean troops to Ukraine, and they will likely be just as nervous as South Korea about Russia helping North Korea advance its nuclear program. They will also actively establish military operation plans against North Korea in case of an emergency, and South Korea-US joint training and South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation will also be strengthened. Criticism of North Korea’s human rights issues through the UN is also likely to intensify. Nevertheless, considering that all the key officials who will move the diplomatic and security line are patriots who value national interests, they may also show a pragmatic tendency. In other words, if North Korea comes to the nuclear negotiations with a genuine will to compromise, the US will also engage in sincere dialogue, and if North Korea makes a sincere proposal rather than stalling or tricking, it is possible that the US will make efforts for an unprecedented agreement. Therefore, as Trump’s second term approaches, North Korea will have to consider whether to stick to its reckless nuclear policies to date or adopt a more pragmatic stance in the face of an increasingly powerful United States. Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The implementation of yet another U.S. initiative may allow it to interfere in the information policy of ASEAN and control the cyberspace of all of Southeast Asia. Two sides of the same summit The annual summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States was held in Vientiane in October. Meetings in this format are routine for ASEAN and are held with each of the non-regional powers, i.e. the dialogue partners of the association. They discuss plans for cooperation and exchange views on international issues. This time, the U.S., represented by A. Blinken, again tried to use dialogue to impose its vision of global issues. The statements of the US Secretary of State were anti-Russian, anti-Chinese and anti-North Korean in nature, and were aimed at increasing tensions vis-à-vis the South China Sea and the internal political situation in Myanmar. The timing of the meeting was no accident; it took place before the East Asia Summit (EAS), which is a platform for multilateral negotiations between ASEAN countries and external partners. In this way, Washington hoped to force representatives of Southeast Asian states to reconsider the agenda of the EAS and planned to use the upcoming event to provoke regional conflicts and consolidate their role as the ‘chief gendarme’ of the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. However, as the EAS showed, the U.S. failed to do so: no one except U.S. allies supported the attempts to undermine the regional architecture of security and cooperation. Following the results of the US-ASEAN summit, the divergence of views was also notable. The parties did not adopt any joint document of a political nature. Such a result was natural; for ASEAN, any external imposition of views is traditionally unacceptable. In general, the ASEAN leaders’ talks with Anthony Blinken were held among other meetings with Russia, India, China etc., and they would not have attracted much attention if a very narrow joint statement (‘Statement on Promoting Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence’ (AI)) had not been adopted in the aftermaths. With good intention According to the terms of this statement, under the plausible pretext of ‘achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals’, the United States intends to implement a whole range of plans together with ASEAN. Thus, it is planned to ‘discuss the further development of ASEAN’s AI projects’ (although, why should ASEAN discuss its plans with someone?), ‘interaction with the ASEAN Working Group on AI Governance (again, a direct intention to enter the decision-making process in the association), ‘creating an ASEAN roadmap for responsible AI’ (and, thus, inclusion in the internal planning process of its activities). In addition, the parties will ‘cooperate on approaches and standards in the field of AI’ (these approaches and standards will be based on similar U.S. ones), ‘knowledge exchange, technology transfer’ (the saying about ‘free cheese in a mousetrap’ is involuntarily recalled), ‘strengthening the collective digital and cyber potential’ (again based on the United States and built according to their rules), ‘the expansion of education in the field of AI’ (also according to U.S. norms) and ‘the development of interrelated approaches to AI management’ (AI management is a serious issue and it must be understood that external participation equals a direct threat to national sovereignty). Even more ambitious tasks include ‘supporting the development of national digital and AI strategies, discussing its management and regulation’ (for the United States, gaining access to national strategies will provide new tools for interfering in the internal affairs of others), ‘implementing initiatives in cooperation with the ministries of digital development of ASEAN countries’, as well as ‘ensuring information security support for the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework’ (its adoption is planned in 2025; here the U.S. is again interfering in intra-ASEAN affairs). We were not snubbed of the traditional American demagoguery in the field of ‘human rights’. The statement supposes ‘ensuring human rights and protection from all forms of discrimination and prejudice when using AI’ and  ‘ensuring the inclusiveness and accessibility of AI’ in the near future. Whether the mass use of AI will be safe for the population is a question the authors of the document are not considering, instead occupying themselves with other tasks. Another component is ‘dealing with foreign manipulation of information, disinformation and training in the field of technologies to counter this’ (of course, the U.S. initiators do not doubt their right to assign labels to information sources). Finally, it is expected to ‘stimulate the improvement of the population’s digital literacy via the private sector’, although, it would seem, in such sensitive areas as AI, digital technologies and cyberspace, only the state can protect the interests of its citizens. The name of the game When analysing these agreements, it becomes clear that the United States is aiming to take control not only of the economy or technology, but of the information space of Southeast Asia and the information policy of both ASEAN as a whole and individual members countries and their national sectoral departments. Such a radical deepening of interaction includes direct interference in the affairs of the association – unprecedented in its arrogance and openness – and searching for opportunities to reduce the role of states in controlling AI and the cyber sphere, as well as access to scientific and technological work of Southeast Asian countries in the field of AI and monopolisation of the Southeast Asian media sphere, which is absolutely a colonial approach of deciding which information people from ASEAN are allowed to read and see and which is declared ‘foreign manipulation’. The U.S. has already demonstrated its seriousness. On November 1, Rumman Chowdhury, an AI specialist and the U.S. Special Representative for Science, flew to the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta to remind Southeast Asian countries of the need to implement the joint statement. Here it should be understood that U.S. sectoral cooperation with ASEAN will be executed by a system of highly specialised institutions that objectively does not depend on the change of the presidential administration. Agreements have been made, obligations have been established and the implementation mechanism has been launched. Moreover, the U.S. will have a separate and individual approach to each country in terms of fulfilling and implementing these agreements. It is planned to work with the sectoral ‘digital’ ministries of the Southeast Asian states, which is nothing more than the selection of loyal future agents of influence. However, the question is to what extent the political and expert circles in Southeast Asia understand the long-term risks of granting a foreign partner large-scale access to the sensitive cyber sphere – even one whose interests in the region have long been known to everyone: inciting conflicts, ‘dividing and ruling’, searching for and luring highly qualified specialists (brain drain), exclusively imposing their own view on international issues, linking countries and markets to their technologies with the transfer of all kinds of useful data to intelligence services. *  *  * It would seem that ASEAN has always opposed neo-colonialism and supported a multi-vector course, equidistant from any external interests of its dialogue partners. Most likely, the association could only allow the appearance of info-colonial encroachments from its U.S. counterpart due to hopes for disinterested financing of its development from the United States (which in itself sounds like an oxymoron) and counting on some kind of abstract technology transfer. However, the consequences of the adoption of U.S. policy by Southeast Asian countries (if they do not ‘hit the brakes’ on the commitments they have made) could be deplorable, disastrous for their digital sovereignty, technological development and their independent course in general.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, combined with a Republican-led US Senate, was widely feared among international allies and will be cheered by some of America’s foes. While the former put on a brave face, the latter are finding it hard to hide their glee.  On the war in Ukraine, Trump is likely to try to force Kyiv and Moscow into at least a ceasefire along the current front lines. This could possibly involve a permanent settlement that would acknowledge Russia’s territorial gains, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the territories occupied since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  It is also likely that Trump would accept demands by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to prevent a future Ukrainian Nato membership. Given Trump’s well-known animosity to Nato, this would also be an important pressure on Kyiv’s European allies. Trump could, once again, threaten to abandon the alliance in order to get Europeans to sign up to a deal with Putin over Ukraine.  When it comes to the Middle East, Trump has been a staunch supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past. He is likely to double down on this, including by taking an even tougher line on Iran. This aligns well with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current priorities.  Netanyahu seems determined to destroy Iran’s proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen and severely degrade Iranian capabilities. By dismissing his defence minister, Yoav Gallant, a critic of his conduct of the offensive in Gaza, Netanyahu has laid the ground for a continuation of the conflict there.  It also prepares for a widening of the offensive in Lebanon and a potentially devastating strike against Iran in response to any further Iranian attack on Israel.  Trump’s election will embolden Netanyahu to act. And this in turn would also strengthen Trump’s position towards Putin, who has come to depend on Iranian support for his war in Ukraine. Trump could offer to restrain Netanyahu in the future as a bargaining chip with Putin in his gamble to secure a deal on Ukraine.  Pivot to China  While Ukraine and the Middle East are two areas in which change looms, relations with China will most likely be characterised more by continuity than by change. With Chinese relations being perhaps the key strategic foreign policy challenge for the US, the Biden administration continued many of the policies Trump adopted in his first term – and Trump is likely to double down on them in a second term.  A Trump White House is likely to increase import tariffs, and he has talked a great deal about using them to target China. But Trump is also just as likely to be open to pragmatic, transactional deals with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Just like in relations with his European allies in Nato, a serious question mark hangs over Trump’s commitment to the defence of Taiwan and other treaty allies in Asia, including the Philippines, South Korea, and potentially Japan. Trump is at best lukewarm on US security guarantees.  But as his on-and-off relationship with North Korea in his first term demonstrated, Trump is, at times, willing to push the envelope dangerously close to war. This happened in 2017 in response to a North Korean test of intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang makes another close brush of this kind as likely as Trump’s unpredictability makes it conceivable that he would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea as part of a broader deal with Russia, which has developed increasingly close relations with Kim Jong-un’s regime.  Doing so would give Trump additional leverage over China, which has been worried over growing ties between Russia and North Korea.  Preparing for a Trump White House  Friends and foes alike are going to use the remaining months before Trump returns to the White House to try to improve their positions and get things done that would be more difficult to do once he is in office.  An expectation of a Trump push for an end to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is likely to lead to an intensification of the fighting there to create what the different parties think might be a more acceptable status quo for them. This does not bode well for the humanitarian crises already brewing in both regions.  Increasing tensions in and around the Korean peninsula are also conceivable. Pyongyang is likely to want to boost its credentials with yet more missile – and potentially nuclear – tests.  A ratcheting-up of the fighting in Europe and the Middle East and of tensions in Asia is also likely to strain relations between the US and its allies in all three regions. In Europe, the fear is that Trump may make deals with Russia over the head of its EU and Nato allies and threaten them with abandonment.  This would undermine the longevity of any Ukrainian (or broader European) deal with Moscow. The relatively dismal state of European defence capabilities and the diminishing credibility of the US nuclear umbrella would not but help to encourage Putin to push his imperial ambitions further once he has secured a deal with Trump.  In the Middle East, Netanyahu would be completely unrestrained. And yet while some Arab regimes might cheer Israel striking Iran and Iranian proxies, they will worry about backlash over the plight of Palestinians. Without resolving this perennial issue, stability in the region, let alone peace, will be all but impossible.  In Asia, the challenges are different. Here the problem is less US withdrawal and more an unpredictable and potentially unmanageable escalation. Under Trump, it is much more likely that the US and China will find it hard to escape the so-called Thucydides trap – the inevitability of war between a dominant but declining power and its rising challenger.  This then raises the question of whether US alliances in the region are safe in the long term or whether some of its partners, like Indonesia or India, will consider realigning themselves with China.  At best, all of this spells greater uncertainty and instability – not only after Trump’s inauguration but also in the months until then.  At worst, it will prove the undoing of Trump’s self-proclaimed infallibility. But by the time he and his team come to realise that geopolitics is a more complicated affair than real estate, they may have ushered in the very chaos that they have accused Biden and Harris of. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Minimising the number of one’s enemies while multiplying one’s number of friends is a basic principle of diplomacy that has existed for centuries. The simplicity of the principle itself is more than compensated by the complexity of its practical implementation. In international relations, the price of friendship may be too high, limiting freedom of manoeuvre, while open hostility brings existing contradictions to the limit, radically resolving them in favour of one side or another. Advising a diplomat to expand alliances and limit confrontations is like advising a stock market player to buy shares when they are cheap and sell when they are expensive. It is obvious that minimising the number of rivals allows you to save resources, concentrate them on the tasks of internal development, and not be torn on several fronts. However, it is also obvious that competition may be preferable to concessions to the demands of the opposite side, especially when it comes to issues of principle. The situation is further complicated by the fact that countries can compete in some areas while remaining partners in others. Then adjusting the balance of cooperation and competition becomes even more difficult. The transition of international relations to extreme forms of rivalry is quite possible; history is full of such episodes. In such situations, the key task becomes not so much preserving the remnants of friendship as a preparation for the upcoming war, which the parties may consider inevitable, waging war by proxies, and entering into confrontation at a convenient moment. The bottom line is that the one who finds the optimal balance of allies and rivals will be able to conserve resources, and if confrontation is inevitable, will be able to withstand it, emerge victorious, and make use of the results of victory. The current state of international relations demonstrates a steady tendency towards the multiplication of deterrence tasks among the three key global centres of military power—the United States, China and Russia. Each of them has an increasing number of opponents. Moreover, the increase in their number, as well as the degree of confrontation, has its roots in the relatively favourable situation of the 1990s and early 2000s, when Washington, Beijing, and Moscow enjoyed much more favourable external conditions: the number of rivals was negligible, while the density of partnerships was unprecedented. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the United States had virtually no rivals among the major powers. Relations with Russia were defined by a network of arms control treaties. It was difficult to call them cloudless, but even a semblance of confrontation from the Cold War era was very difficult to imagine. The key security problem for the United States was radical Islamism in its terrorist guise; Russia actively helped the United States in its fight against international terrorism, and China simply did not interfere. North Korea and Iran formed an “axis of evil” whose nuclear ambitions Washington tried to restrain with sanctions. Moscow and Beijing, if they did not help the Americans, then at least tried to find the optimal formula for solving nuclear problems via the UN Security Council. Some twenty years later, the situation for the United States has changed quite radically. China is perceived as a powerful and long-term rival in all senses. We are talking about a military-political, economic, and even ideological rivalry. It is difficult to compare China with the USSR during the Cold War. But in all three of these dimensions, it represents an alternative to American politics. Although the United States would like to keep the rivalry with China under control, especially given the close ties between the two economies, the task of containing China will become a priority for decades to come. Russia has turned from a weakened and extremely cautious partner into a tough and uncompromising adversary, as its interests in the post-Soviet space are being infringed upon, and its economy and military-industrial complex are being restored. Enmity with it requires a manifold increase in investments in support of Ukraine, an increased presence in Europe, and the modernisation of nuclear potential, taking into account the advance appearance of new missile systems in Moscow. The arms control regime has been torn to shreds. Washington is trying to control the escalation but could find itself at war with Russia, with the unlikely but growing risk of a nuclear exchange. The DPRK has both nuclear weapons and missiles capable of launching them. It would now be more difficult to crush North Korea.  US enmity towards Russia and its rivalry with China has provided an opportunity for Pyongyang to emerge from isolation. The same goes for Iran. The aggravation of US relations with Russia and China plays into Tehran’s hands in overcoming isolation and the blockade. The “axis of evil” that the United States so actively fought against has only strengthened, and in interaction with Russia and partly China, it will continue to strengthen. Russia and China themselves are also getting closer. A military alliance is a long way off. Moscow and Beijing are not striving for it. But their interaction is now closer, and the United States will no longer be able to use Russia to balance China. Chinese diplomacy has been building an extremely cautious foreign policy since the late 1970s. Beijing has most consistently adhered to the principle of minimizing adversaries and maximizing friends. In many ways, China has achieved its goal, having managed to create favourable foreign policy conditions for enormous economic growth, increasing the well-being of citizens and modernising the army. The problem is that such PRC growth, even taking into account the lack of expressed ambitions, has caused growing concern in the United States. As a result, Beijing was faced with the fact that Washington decided to act proactively, containing China while the possibilities for such containment remained in the arsenal of American foreign policy. Perhaps the PRC leadership would prefer to continue to enjoy the benefits of global peace and live amid conditions of minimal competition. But the results of successful modernisation are now becoming an issue that the United States considers a security challenge. This means China will have to live in response to the American policy of containment, which includes the building of anti-Chinese alliances. Here, American diplomacy will try to place its bets, including in India. However, India is too large and powerful a country to play a passive role. China, in turn, is building a special relationship with the United States' European NATO allies. Here Beijing could take into account the Russian experience of “special” relations with the European Union. Finally, Russia at the turn of the century had practically no serious rivals. The country was seriously weakened by the fall of the Soviet Union and controversial reforms. Political relations with the West have gradually deteriorated since the late 1990s, but still haven’t reached a critical level, having been compensated with a high level of economic cooperation. In Asia, relations with US allies Japan and South Korea were also especially cordial without the burdens that remained in matters of European security. Today, almost the entire collective West is fighting against a strengthened Russia in Ukraine, supplying Kiev with weapons and ammunition, and providing Ukraine with finances, intelligence, military specialists, etc. Economic relations have been undermined for a long time by sanctions. Tokyo and especially Seoul have taken a more cautious position, but are still forced to follow the American line. The bottom line is that all three powers, for various reasons, have found themselves in a situation where the tasks of containment, expanding confrontation, and the need to resolve security issues involve using force or the threat of its use. Past economic ties have not held back political contradictions. Apparently, we are only at the beginning of an exacerbation. After all, the real fight between the two key rivals—the USA and China—is yet to come. One can argue for a long time about what is the root cause of the increase in deterrence—mistakes of diplomats or objective factors giving rise to rivalry. The result is what’s important. The three largest military-political centres simultaneously faced deteriorating foreign policy conditions, whereas twenty years ago all three were in a much more peaceful environment. The fate of the future world order still depends on the ability of the ‘troika’ to control rivalry and on the results of such rivalry. First published in the Valdai Discussion Club. Original published in Russian. https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/ssha-kitay-rossiya-umnozhenie-sderzhivaniya/

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Kim Tae-woo, former head of the Institute for Unification Studies Today, I would like to tell you that the US nuclear strategy is changing . As President Biden’s term draws to a close, the US is changing its nuclear weapons operational guidelines. President Biden , like President Obama, originally argued for a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons. That is why, when he took office as president in 2020, he advocated for sole purpose nuclear use and no first use (NFU). ‘Sole purpose nuclear use’ means that the US will only use nuclear weapons when it is directly attacked by nuclear weapons, and NFU is an abbreviation for ‘No First Use’, which means that it will not use nuclear weapons before its adversary. When a president changes, the US publishes a strategy document called the ‘Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)’, which declares its nuclear strategy and nuclear operational policies to the outside world. Allies were concerned that if President Biden included such content in the NPR, they would distrust the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. Perhaps conscious of these concerns, the 2022 NPR did not include such content, but President Biden’s nuclear philosophy was reflected throughout the strategy book. As a result, the United States decided to stop developing submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and retire the B83-1 (1.2 mt) missile, an aircraft-delivered nuclear weapon. The Biden administration has changed. In March, it ordered the US military to create nuclear operational guidelines to prepare for a situation in which China, Russia, and North Korea cooperate to launch a nuclear attack on the US, and approved the newly created guidelines. At the same time, it also ordered the development of necessary new weapons and the modernization of the nuclear operational system. In June, the director of the White House National Security Council (NSC)’s nonproliferation office also said, “If the nuclear threat from China, Russia, and North Korea increases, the US will also increase its deployed nuclear weapons,” and hinted at the possibility that “nuclear weapons can be used in conventional warfare.” This is a reversal of President Biden’s policy of giving up preemptive nuclear use. In this way, President Biden is adopting new nuclear operational guidelines and nuclear doctrine while changing his previous position with less than a year left in his term. The reason for this change in the US nuclear doctrine is that he is taking the nuclear arms buildup of China, Russia, and North Korea very seriously in the new Cold War situation, and the strategic focus on the North Korean nuclear issue is changing from ‘North Korea’s nuclear abandonment’ to ‘prevention of nuclear use.’ Although the sensitive parts of the newly created nuclear weapons operational guidelines have not been made public, it is known that they contain explicit concerns about China’s nuclear arms buildup. The guidelines are based on the US Department of Defense’s estimate that China’s nuclear weapons will increase to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, and are intended to prepare for the possibility that China could threaten the US by cooperating with Russia and North Korea on nuclear weapons. The same goes for North Korea. In March, the US, through the NSC and experts, mentioned the need for “interim steps” that are a step back from the goal of “denuclearization,” and said, “We are willing to talk to North Korea unconditionally for negotiations.” The terms “denuclearization of North Korea” and “CVID,” or “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,” disappeared from the platforms of the US Democratic and Republican parties announced ahead of the November presidential election. North Korea may say that “the US has recognized our possession of nuclear weapons,” but that is a misinterpretation. It does not mean accepting, or tolerating, North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but rather recognizing, and is trying to lower the nuclear threat through dialogue, recognizing that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons immediately, but responding strongly if North Korea refuses. As such, the nuclear issue is now reaching a dead end. As the military closeness and nuclear cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea intensifies, it is ultimately triggering a response from the US. Naturally, South Korea cannot just keep watching. In Korea, civic groups are currently conducting a campaign to collect 10 million signatures calling for nuclear armament, but it is unclear how much this movement will change national policy in the future. If this trend continues, there may be countermoves in Japan and Taiwan as well. It is difficult to understand why North Korea should really increase its nuclear weapons and strengthen its military power with drones and artillery, even though food shortages are starting again, the youth are opposing the one-party dictatorship, and the elite are increasingly defecting to seek freedom. “Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org.”

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.