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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Subsequent U.S. administrations, except for brief moments of relative calm, have persisted in demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) abandon its nuclear program and, moreover, have made extensive efforts to destabilize its political and economic system. Meanwhile, the successive leaders of the DPRK have persisted in advancing their defensive capabilities until reaching their preferred deterrent: nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, a guarantee of survival. This persistent situation reached an unprecedented moment when, during his previous presidency, Donald Trump made a surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK, temporarily unraveling, although without the expected results, the "Korean Gordian Knot." This led to successive summits in 2018 and 2019 (Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom) with Kim Jong Un, the leader of a state that, throughout its history, has maintained sharply confrontational relations with the United States. The world witnessed the transition from exchanges of insults and threats—Trump calling Kim "Little Rocket Man" and Kim referring to Trump as "old senile man"—and threatening the latter with "fire and fury" if the North Korean leader continued missile tests, to becoming "pen pals" and holding three unprecedented summits. No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK like Donald Trump did, and no North Korean leader in history has sat face-to-face, as equals, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did, which granted him prestige on the global stage. Due to reasons associated with its strategic ambiguity, the Biden Administration made no diplomatic progress with Pyongyang. Even though at the beginning of his term he committed to a "new strategy toward North Korea," over the past four years, his actions have only promoted sanctions in the Security Council, which have clashed dramatically with Russia's veto, struggled with the dissolution of the DPRK Expert Group in the Sanctions Committee, and observed the exponential increase in its arsenal of intercontinental, hypersonic, and short-range ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads capable of targeting the continental U.S. and U.S. military bases in the region. Furthermore, the DPRK has resumed uranium enrichment and reopened its nuclear test center. In the end, the outgoing president has been unable to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, much less contain it. So, one must ask: Will Trump's return to the White House mark continuity or a change from his previous term? An analysis of the future position of the Trump administration toward the DPRK should consider that, compared to his previous term, the circumstances have radically changed. 1. DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have made new and significant advances. At the same time, its foreign policy has undergone a reorientation due to the sustained increase in distrust toward Washington from Pyongyang.2. By order of its leader, the DPRK has severed all its ties and symbols of relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as the "main and unchanging enemy," and as it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the People's Armed Forces to accelerate preparations to "occupy, subjugate, and fully reclaim" South Korea, in response to the confrontational attitude and increasingly close military and intelligence ties between Washington and Seoul.3. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two summits between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, and Kim's description of Putin as the "closest comrade," have shown the high level of understanding and commitment between the two, which has materialized in the DPRK's unwavering support for Russia's special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures. This treaty includes a clause for "mutual military assistance," while Russia provides diplomatic and economic backing to the DPRK, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports, mainly oil, raw materials, and food, as well as assistance in various fields.4. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis is taking shape between China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies are labeling it the "new axis of evil." In this interconnected relationship, the DPRK holds significant advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. At least these four factors will significantly impact Donald Trump's decision to return, or not, to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, raising doubts about whether the former would be willing to revisit it. However, if he tries, it is unclear what Kim Jong Un's response would be, clearly more determined and militarily more powerful in the eyes of Washington, which at first glance seems unwilling to renew its offers related to denuclearization. The ironic jest by Trump at the 2024 Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, when he said that Kim Jong Un "missed him," that they "got along very well," and that "he misses me" and "wants me back in the White House" and "it's good to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons," was met with a response from North Korean media, stating that "they don't care" who assumes office in the U.S. This suggests that Pyongyang's official stance is that, regardless of what happens, it will not abandon its nuclear deterrent. Considering the visible changes in the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape that differ from those in 2018-2019, any type of negotiation aimed at reaching compromises between the parties on the denuclearization of North Korea will be even more challenging. Trump may seek alternative approaches to encourage the DPRK to freeze nuclear and missile tests, but he will need to weigh several options. These include: which side should take the first step toward engagement; whether it is necessary to "rattle sabers" to create influence; the possibility of "unilateral conciliatory gestures"; and whether he should stick to the goal of "complete denuclearization" (Chad O’Carroll and Shreyas Reddy, 2024). Donald Trump exhibits an unpredictable, egocentric personality and is a fan of diplomatic spectacle, with a penchant for reality shows. Given this, he might be tempted to revisit diplomacy, possibly considering the absence of John Bolton, who, alongside Michael Pompeo, led the Hanoi Summit to failure. Many agree with what was stated by Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University and former special advisor for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae In administration, when he admitted: "It is possible that, in his second term, Trump will prioritize solidifying his political legacy. His foreign policy would be heavily influenced by media attention and personal ego, as he cares about how history will remember him. Achieving a major deal with Pyongyang and contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula could serve to fulfill that ambition, potentially allowing him to win a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. While resolving the Ukraine war or the Gaza crisis could also improve his chances of receiving the prize, negotiations with Kim Jong Un are likely to be a key agenda for Trump. In that sense, Trump could actively engage with the North Korean leader, and might even consider a visit to Pyongyang for a summit, where he could make surprising offers. However, the success of such efforts ultimately depends on Kim's response" (Lee Hyo Jin, 2024). It is necessary to build some scenarios: 1. The influence of personal friendship could encourage Kim Jong Un to engage in communication with Trump, turning the page on the Hanoi failure and minimizing distrust toward the U.S.2. Recognition by the Trump Administration of the DPRK as a de facto nuclear power and easing of sanctions to promote progress toward the partial normalization of relations.3. Strong U.S. demands for denuclearization and the promotion of further sanctions, leading to increased tensions. Given Trump’s volatility and the unpredictability of the DPRK leadership, there are currently no conditions to determine the most likely scenario. The campaign team has not commented on whether Trump will seek new meetings with Kim Jong Un, but his statements prior to his victory suggest that he might seek to revive talks, possibly sooner rather than later. Now, it is unpredictable what roadmap Trump will implement, as his opinions during the campaign may differ from the decisions he makes officially when in office. It is not accurate to assume that his demeanor during the first term will be indicative of his future conduct. It is worth dedicating a brief space to the designated Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. As a staunch anti-communist, he is one of the promoters of the term "axis of evil," which includes the DPRK, and considers China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as aligned against the US. He has advocated concrete actions and plans against these states. It is expected that, initially, he will oppose any commitment from the incoming administration with the DPRK. As John Bolton and Michael Pompeo did at the time, Rubio could attempt to limit Donald Trump’s maneuvering room with Kim Jong Un. However, there is also the possibility that the next U.S. president’s assertive and authoritarian character, who, despite previous disagreements, appointed Rubio, will lead him to align with Trump’s decisions or, alternatively, suffer the same fate of being ousted with a “tweet and a punch,” as happened to Rex Tillerson and John Bolton. Regarding the Republic of Korea, it is important to specify that the most critical foreign policy issues for Donald Trump’s new administration will be its relationship with the European Union, the Middle East conflicts, the war in Ukraine, the China-Taiwan dispute, and relations with the DPRK. It is precisely the latter that concerns South Koreans the most, as their security largely depends on the presence of U.S. troops in their country and Washington’s support for South Korea’s defense against the imminent “North Korean threat.” The conservative government of Yoon Suk Yeol has marked a clear distinction from his predecessor Moon Jae In by significantly strengthening his alliance with the U.S., driven by his growing animosity towards the DPRK and his pro-American stance. This situation presents little likelihood of encouraging Trump to engage in talks with Kim Jong Un, especially without a clear indication from Pyongyang toward denuclearization. This is likely, as all signs point to Pyongyang not making significant concessions regarding its nuclear deterrent and showing a strong aversion towards the Republic of Korea. After Donald Trump's victory, the South Korean president had a phone conversation with him to extend his congratulations and quickly express his desire for the alliance to continue under his leadership. Although both agreed to hold a summit as soon as possible, the issue of the DPRK, which was already addressed in this initial dialogue, will certainly be on the agenda. It is said that Trump plans for his government to work with South Korea on several bilateral issues, but one of the key aspects will be South Korea’s contribution to Washington for hosting U.S. bases on its territory. Let's remember that during Trump's first term, this was a hot topic in his military relations. It is worth mentioning that due to Donald Trump's transactional approach to international relations, his perception that many of the U.S. allies are "taking advantage" of its military power, and the pressure he exerted on Seoul when he was in office, with Trump's victory, national security against the DPRK is placed at the forefront. Many are concerned that his return to the White House could mean that Washington will no longer be a reliable partner, making it necessary for South Korea to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Han Dong Hoon, leader of the ruling People Power Party, said at a seminar organized to discuss the future of South Korea's nuclear policy that Trump's victory had positive aspects. "Acquiring nuclear potential — meaning having the right to enrich and reprocess uranium — does not inherently equate to possessing nuclear weapons," he said, according to The Korea Herald. "But we would be able to move to that phase at any time if North Korea intensifies its nuclear threats," he added. "I believe we should be prepared for such a scenario amid the changing dynamics of global power and order." Meanwhile, retired Army General Han Ki Ho went a step further and suggested that South Korea may no longer have a choice. "Nuclear armament may be the only path left for South Korea's survival," he stated (Julian Ryall, 2024). However, whether the Republic of Korea acquires nuclear weapons will depend on how the Trump administration approaches the alliance and relations with North Korea, that is, whether it abandons or restricts the "extended deterrence" and whether it pursues an agreement with Pyongyang that halts its development of long-range missiles that could reach the continental United States in exchange for accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear power. This type of agreement would affect Seoul, located just 48 kilometers from the border, and therefore within the range of North Korea's short-range missiles. We are facing an uncertain situation, and therefore, expectant, where the expectations regarding Donald Trump's stance on DPRK are uncertain. Whether the denuclearization of DPRK is a priority for the Trump administration depends on the approach and methods with which the president and his team address an increasingly complex scenario. DPRK, in terms of its economic performance and national defense potential, is not the same as before, which gives Kim Jong Un greater effectiveness in his military deterrence and diplomatic maneuverability, especially when his reliable conduct with Moscow and the appropriate handling of relations with Beijing strengthen his position vis-à-vis the U.S. Trump will have to deal with these realities. And while he may intend to continue his legacy, he will necessarily have to reframe his policy towards DPRK, considering that DPRK is no longer the same, that its main contenders (Russia and China) are precisely the closest to DPRK, and that the country itself is no longer the same, either militarily or socioeconomically, as it was when he engaged in talks with Kim Jong Un in 2018-2019. References - Simone McCarthy (2024) Trump claims Kim Jong Un “isses him. But he faces a very different North Korea leader this time around. Disponible en: https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-intl-hnk/index.html- Keith Johnson (2024) Could Trump Rekindle Diplomacy With North Korea? Disponible en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/13/trump-north-korea-diplomacy-putin-russia/- Joel S. Wit (2024) Blame Donald Trump for North Korea´s sable-rattling. Disponible en: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/blame-donald-trump-for-north-koreas-sabre-rattling/- Rubén Criado (2024) Así afecta la victoria de Trump a Corea del Norte. Disponible en: https://as.com/actualidad/politica/asi-afecta-la-victoria-de-trump-a-corea-del-norte-n/- Josh Smith (2024) Donald Trump se enfrenta a un Kim Jong Un envalentonado, cercano a Rusia y con un arsenal de misiles más grande. Disponible en: https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2024/11/07/donald-trump-se-enfrentara-a-un-kim-jong-un-envalentonado-cercano-a-rusia-y-con-un-arsenal-de-misiles-mas-grande/- Julian Ryall (2024) Regreso de Trump atiza debate nuclear en Corea del Sur. Disponible en: https://amp.dw.com/es/el-regreso-de-trump-atiza-el-debate-nuclear-en-corea-del-sur/a70798786#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317231276140&csi=1&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com- Chad O´Carrol y Shreyas Reddy (2024) Why North Korean denuclearization will likely take backseat in second Trump term | NK Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/why-north-korean-denuclearization-will-likely-take-backseat-in-second-trump-term/- Miguel Jiménez (2024) Donald Trump planea elegir a marcos Rubio como secretario de Estado. Disponible en: https://elpais.com/internacional/elecciones-usa/2024-11-12/donald-trump-elige-a-marco-rubio-como-secretario-de-estado.html?outputType=amp#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317890370552&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump, who won the US presidential election on November 5th, is appointing key officials for the new government that will be launched in January next year, and the content is very unconventional. In a word, they are young, reformist, and loyalists who have been breathing together with him. This is especially true for those who will lead foreign policy and security. The nominations include 40-year-old Senator James Vance as Vice President, 53-year-old Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, 44-year-old Fox News anchor Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, 50-year-old Representative Mike Walz as National Security Advisor, 43-year-old Representative Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 59-year-old former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe (59) as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 53-year-old South Dakota Governor Kristi Nome as Secretary of Homeland Security, and 67-year-old Suzy Wiles as Co-Chair of the White House Campaign Committee. Among these, the five key figures are the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, and Director of National Intelligence, with an average age of 46, and all of them are ‘hawkish conservative patriots.’ Vice President Vance, a Catholic, shares the same ideological stance as President-elect Trump, including his opposition to abortion and his denial of global warming, and served in Iraq as a Marine. Secretary of State nominee Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, has taken a hard-line stance on Chinese corporate infiltration of the United States and human rights in China while serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in 2020, he introduced the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. He also opposed the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and called North Korea a “criminal group” for its human rights abuses, nuclear and missile development, and criticized it as a “massive group of lunatics” immediately after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in 2017. He is also a pro-Korea figure who has visited the DMZ in South Korea several times. National Security Advisor nominee Walz, a retired colonel from the U.S. Army Special Forces and a veteran of the Middle East, has advocated for reducing dependence on China for key minerals and boycotting the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and in June criticized North Korea-Russia military cooperation as a “dangerous and evil alliance.” He also always visited the DMZ when he came to Korea. Secretary of Defense Haggis is also a veteran of the Middle East and a former US Army major. He later became a host for FOX News and developed a relationship with President-elect Trump. Director of National Intelligence Gabbard, who collects and analyzes information from intelligence agencies, is a reserve lieutenant colonel with experience in the Middle East. She became the youngest member of the House of Representatives in Hawaii at 21 and is the first female veteran of the war. As such, the five key figures in the diplomatic and security line are all young and reformist, and most of them are veterans of the Middle East. If we look at the ideological tendencies, passion, careers, and past words and actions of President-elect Trump and the nominees for the diplomatic and security line, we can predict many things. First, domestically, reforms will be attempted to fit Trump’s slogan of “Make America Great Again (MAGA),” such as reducing and streamlining government organizations, strengthening the US military, promoting growth-oriented economic policies, and protecting domestic companies through fair trade. Under the slogans of “political correctness (PC) and being woke (WOKE),” abortion, homosexuality in the military, and environmental policies that were spread are expected to decline. Externally, there will be a strong confrontation with the “axis of change” powers such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that are leading international conflicts in the new Cold War structure, and the US nuclear military power and nuclear doctrine are also expected to be strengthened and reinforced. In other words, the trend of nuclear reduction and conventional military reduction that has continued since the end of the Cold War will be reversed, and efforts will be made to develop tactical nuclear weapons, new ships, and aircraft. Regionally, it is expected that efforts will be made to check China’s expansionism and pressure the public economically, strengthen security cooperation with allies on fairer terms, strengthen support for Israel, and bring an early end to the Ukraine War.  Considering all these things, we can predict several things about Trump’s second term US policy toward North Korea. First, regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, unlike the ‘strategic patience’ shown by the Obama and Biden administrations, it is expected that they will actively respond. In line with this, they will likely actively oppose the restoration of the Russia-North Korea alliance, Russia-North Korea military cooperation, and the dispatch of North Korean troops to Ukraine, and they will likely be just as nervous as South Korea about Russia helping North Korea advance its nuclear program. They will also actively establish military operation plans against North Korea in case of an emergency, and South Korea-US joint training and South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation will also be strengthened. Criticism of North Korea’s human rights issues through the UN is also likely to intensify. Nevertheless, considering that all the key officials who will move the diplomatic and security line are patriots who value national interests, they may also show a pragmatic tendency. In other words, if North Korea comes to the nuclear negotiations with a genuine will to compromise, the US will also engage in sincere dialogue, and if North Korea makes a sincere proposal rather than stalling or tricking, it is possible that the US will make efforts for an unprecedented agreement. Therefore, as Trump’s second term approaches, North Korea will have to consider whether to stick to its reckless nuclear policies to date or adopt a more pragmatic stance in the face of an increasingly powerful United States. Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The implementation of yet another U.S. initiative may allow it to interfere in the information policy of ASEAN and control the cyberspace of all of Southeast Asia. Two sides of the same summit The annual summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States was held in Vientiane in October. Meetings in this format are routine for ASEAN and are held with each of the non-regional powers, i.e. the dialogue partners of the association. They discuss plans for cooperation and exchange views on international issues. This time, the U.S., represented by A. Blinken, again tried to use dialogue to impose its vision of global issues. The statements of the US Secretary of State were anti-Russian, anti-Chinese and anti-North Korean in nature, and were aimed at increasing tensions vis-à-vis the South China Sea and the internal political situation in Myanmar. The timing of the meeting was no accident; it took place before the East Asia Summit (EAS), which is a platform for multilateral negotiations between ASEAN countries and external partners. In this way, Washington hoped to force representatives of Southeast Asian states to reconsider the agenda of the EAS and planned to use the upcoming event to provoke regional conflicts and consolidate their role as the ‘chief gendarme’ of the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. However, as the EAS showed, the U.S. failed to do so: no one except U.S. allies supported the attempts to undermine the regional architecture of security and cooperation. Following the results of the US-ASEAN summit, the divergence of views was also notable. The parties did not adopt any joint document of a political nature. Such a result was natural; for ASEAN, any external imposition of views is traditionally unacceptable. In general, the ASEAN leaders’ talks with Anthony Blinken were held among other meetings with Russia, India, China etc., and they would not have attracted much attention if a very narrow joint statement (‘Statement on Promoting Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence’ (AI)) had not been adopted in the aftermaths. With good intention According to the terms of this statement, under the plausible pretext of ‘achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals’, the United States intends to implement a whole range of plans together with ASEAN. Thus, it is planned to ‘discuss the further development of ASEAN’s AI projects’ (although, why should ASEAN discuss its plans with someone?), ‘interaction with the ASEAN Working Group on AI Governance (again, a direct intention to enter the decision-making process in the association), ‘creating an ASEAN roadmap for responsible AI’ (and, thus, inclusion in the internal planning process of its activities). In addition, the parties will ‘cooperate on approaches and standards in the field of AI’ (these approaches and standards will be based on similar U.S. ones), ‘knowledge exchange, technology transfer’ (the saying about ‘free cheese in a mousetrap’ is involuntarily recalled), ‘strengthening the collective digital and cyber potential’ (again based on the United States and built according to their rules), ‘the expansion of education in the field of AI’ (also according to U.S. norms) and ‘the development of interrelated approaches to AI management’ (AI management is a serious issue and it must be understood that external participation equals a direct threat to national sovereignty). Even more ambitious tasks include ‘supporting the development of national digital and AI strategies, discussing its management and regulation’ (for the United States, gaining access to national strategies will provide new tools for interfering in the internal affairs of others), ‘implementing initiatives in cooperation with the ministries of digital development of ASEAN countries’, as well as ‘ensuring information security support for the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework’ (its adoption is planned in 2025; here the U.S. is again interfering in intra-ASEAN affairs). We were not snubbed of the traditional American demagoguery in the field of ‘human rights’. The statement supposes ‘ensuring human rights and protection from all forms of discrimination and prejudice when using AI’ and  ‘ensuring the inclusiveness and accessibility of AI’ in the near future. Whether the mass use of AI will be safe for the population is a question the authors of the document are not considering, instead occupying themselves with other tasks. Another component is ‘dealing with foreign manipulation of information, disinformation and training in the field of technologies to counter this’ (of course, the U.S. initiators do not doubt their right to assign labels to information sources). Finally, it is expected to ‘stimulate the improvement of the population’s digital literacy via the private sector’, although, it would seem, in such sensitive areas as AI, digital technologies and cyberspace, only the state can protect the interests of its citizens. The name of the game When analysing these agreements, it becomes clear that the United States is aiming to take control not only of the economy or technology, but of the information space of Southeast Asia and the information policy of both ASEAN as a whole and individual members countries and their national sectoral departments. Such a radical deepening of interaction includes direct interference in the affairs of the association – unprecedented in its arrogance and openness – and searching for opportunities to reduce the role of states in controlling AI and the cyber sphere, as well as access to scientific and technological work of Southeast Asian countries in the field of AI and monopolisation of the Southeast Asian media sphere, which is absolutely a colonial approach of deciding which information people from ASEAN are allowed to read and see and which is declared ‘foreign manipulation’. The U.S. has already demonstrated its seriousness. On November 1, Rumman Chowdhury, an AI specialist and the U.S. Special Representative for Science, flew to the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta to remind Southeast Asian countries of the need to implement the joint statement. Here it should be understood that U.S. sectoral cooperation with ASEAN will be executed by a system of highly specialised institutions that objectively does not depend on the change of the presidential administration. Agreements have been made, obligations have been established and the implementation mechanism has been launched. Moreover, the U.S. will have a separate and individual approach to each country in terms of fulfilling and implementing these agreements. It is planned to work with the sectoral ‘digital’ ministries of the Southeast Asian states, which is nothing more than the selection of loyal future agents of influence. However, the question is to what extent the political and expert circles in Southeast Asia understand the long-term risks of granting a foreign partner large-scale access to the sensitive cyber sphere – even one whose interests in the region have long been known to everyone: inciting conflicts, ‘dividing and ruling’, searching for and luring highly qualified specialists (brain drain), exclusively imposing their own view on international issues, linking countries and markets to their technologies with the transfer of all kinds of useful data to intelligence services. *  *  * It would seem that ASEAN has always opposed neo-colonialism and supported a multi-vector course, equidistant from any external interests of its dialogue partners. Most likely, the association could only allow the appearance of info-colonial encroachments from its U.S. counterpart due to hopes for disinterested financing of its development from the United States (which in itself sounds like an oxymoron) and counting on some kind of abstract technology transfer. However, the consequences of the adoption of U.S. policy by Southeast Asian countries (if they do not ‘hit the brakes’ on the commitments they have made) could be deplorable, disastrous for their digital sovereignty, technological development and their independent course in general.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, combined with a Republican-led US Senate, was widely feared among international allies and will be cheered by some of America’s foes. While the former put on a brave face, the latter are finding it hard to hide their glee.  On the war in Ukraine, Trump is likely to try to force Kyiv and Moscow into at least a ceasefire along the current front lines. This could possibly involve a permanent settlement that would acknowledge Russia’s territorial gains, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the territories occupied since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  It is also likely that Trump would accept demands by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to prevent a future Ukrainian Nato membership. Given Trump’s well-known animosity to Nato, this would also be an important pressure on Kyiv’s European allies. Trump could, once again, threaten to abandon the alliance in order to get Europeans to sign up to a deal with Putin over Ukraine.  When it comes to the Middle East, Trump has been a staunch supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past. He is likely to double down on this, including by taking an even tougher line on Iran. This aligns well with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current priorities.  Netanyahu seems determined to destroy Iran’s proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen and severely degrade Iranian capabilities. By dismissing his defence minister, Yoav Gallant, a critic of his conduct of the offensive in Gaza, Netanyahu has laid the ground for a continuation of the conflict there.  It also prepares for a widening of the offensive in Lebanon and a potentially devastating strike against Iran in response to any further Iranian attack on Israel.  Trump’s election will embolden Netanyahu to act. And this in turn would also strengthen Trump’s position towards Putin, who has come to depend on Iranian support for his war in Ukraine. Trump could offer to restrain Netanyahu in the future as a bargaining chip with Putin in his gamble to secure a deal on Ukraine.  Pivot to China  While Ukraine and the Middle East are two areas in which change looms, relations with China will most likely be characterised more by continuity than by change. With Chinese relations being perhaps the key strategic foreign policy challenge for the US, the Biden administration continued many of the policies Trump adopted in his first term – and Trump is likely to double down on them in a second term.  A Trump White House is likely to increase import tariffs, and he has talked a great deal about using them to target China. But Trump is also just as likely to be open to pragmatic, transactional deals with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Just like in relations with his European allies in Nato, a serious question mark hangs over Trump’s commitment to the defence of Taiwan and other treaty allies in Asia, including the Philippines, South Korea, and potentially Japan. Trump is at best lukewarm on US security guarantees.  But as his on-and-off relationship with North Korea in his first term demonstrated, Trump is, at times, willing to push the envelope dangerously close to war. This happened in 2017 in response to a North Korean test of intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang makes another close brush of this kind as likely as Trump’s unpredictability makes it conceivable that he would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea as part of a broader deal with Russia, which has developed increasingly close relations with Kim Jong-un’s regime.  Doing so would give Trump additional leverage over China, which has been worried over growing ties between Russia and North Korea.  Preparing for a Trump White House  Friends and foes alike are going to use the remaining months before Trump returns to the White House to try to improve their positions and get things done that would be more difficult to do once he is in office.  An expectation of a Trump push for an end to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is likely to lead to an intensification of the fighting there to create what the different parties think might be a more acceptable status quo for them. This does not bode well for the humanitarian crises already brewing in both regions.  Increasing tensions in and around the Korean peninsula are also conceivable. Pyongyang is likely to want to boost its credentials with yet more missile – and potentially nuclear – tests.  A ratcheting-up of the fighting in Europe and the Middle East and of tensions in Asia is also likely to strain relations between the US and its allies in all three regions. In Europe, the fear is that Trump may make deals with Russia over the head of its EU and Nato allies and threaten them with abandonment.  This would undermine the longevity of any Ukrainian (or broader European) deal with Moscow. The relatively dismal state of European defence capabilities and the diminishing credibility of the US nuclear umbrella would not but help to encourage Putin to push his imperial ambitions further once he has secured a deal with Trump.  In the Middle East, Netanyahu would be completely unrestrained. And yet while some Arab regimes might cheer Israel striking Iran and Iranian proxies, they will worry about backlash over the plight of Palestinians. Without resolving this perennial issue, stability in the region, let alone peace, will be all but impossible.  In Asia, the challenges are different. Here the problem is less US withdrawal and more an unpredictable and potentially unmanageable escalation. Under Trump, it is much more likely that the US and China will find it hard to escape the so-called Thucydides trap – the inevitability of war between a dominant but declining power and its rising challenger.  This then raises the question of whether US alliances in the region are safe in the long term or whether some of its partners, like Indonesia or India, will consider realigning themselves with China.  At best, all of this spells greater uncertainty and instability – not only after Trump’s inauguration but also in the months until then.  At worst, it will prove the undoing of Trump’s self-proclaimed infallibility. But by the time he and his team come to realise that geopolitics is a more complicated affair than real estate, they may have ushered in the very chaos that they have accused Biden and Harris of. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Minimising the number of one’s enemies while multiplying one’s number of friends is a basic principle of diplomacy that has existed for centuries. The simplicity of the principle itself is more than compensated by the complexity of its practical implementation. In international relations, the price of friendship may be too high, limiting freedom of manoeuvre, while open hostility brings existing contradictions to the limit, radically resolving them in favour of one side or another. Advising a diplomat to expand alliances and limit confrontations is like advising a stock market player to buy shares when they are cheap and sell when they are expensive. It is obvious that minimising the number of rivals allows you to save resources, concentrate them on the tasks of internal development, and not be torn on several fronts. However, it is also obvious that competition may be preferable to concessions to the demands of the opposite side, especially when it comes to issues of principle. The situation is further complicated by the fact that countries can compete in some areas while remaining partners in others. Then adjusting the balance of cooperation and competition becomes even more difficult. The transition of international relations to extreme forms of rivalry is quite possible; history is full of such episodes. In such situations, the key task becomes not so much preserving the remnants of friendship as a preparation for the upcoming war, which the parties may consider inevitable, waging war by proxies, and entering into confrontation at a convenient moment. The bottom line is that the one who finds the optimal balance of allies and rivals will be able to conserve resources, and if confrontation is inevitable, will be able to withstand it, emerge victorious, and make use of the results of victory. The current state of international relations demonstrates a steady tendency towards the multiplication of deterrence tasks among the three key global centres of military power—the United States, China and Russia. Each of them has an increasing number of opponents. Moreover, the increase in their number, as well as the degree of confrontation, has its roots in the relatively favourable situation of the 1990s and early 2000s, when Washington, Beijing, and Moscow enjoyed much more favourable external conditions: the number of rivals was negligible, while the density of partnerships was unprecedented. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the United States had virtually no rivals among the major powers. Relations with Russia were defined by a network of arms control treaties. It was difficult to call them cloudless, but even a semblance of confrontation from the Cold War era was very difficult to imagine. The key security problem for the United States was radical Islamism in its terrorist guise; Russia actively helped the United States in its fight against international terrorism, and China simply did not interfere. North Korea and Iran formed an “axis of evil” whose nuclear ambitions Washington tried to restrain with sanctions. Moscow and Beijing, if they did not help the Americans, then at least tried to find the optimal formula for solving nuclear problems via the UN Security Council. Some twenty years later, the situation for the United States has changed quite radically. China is perceived as a powerful and long-term rival in all senses. We are talking about a military-political, economic, and even ideological rivalry. It is difficult to compare China with the USSR during the Cold War. But in all three of these dimensions, it represents an alternative to American politics. Although the United States would like to keep the rivalry with China under control, especially given the close ties between the two economies, the task of containing China will become a priority for decades to come. Russia has turned from a weakened and extremely cautious partner into a tough and uncompromising adversary, as its interests in the post-Soviet space are being infringed upon, and its economy and military-industrial complex are being restored. Enmity with it requires a manifold increase in investments in support of Ukraine, an increased presence in Europe, and the modernisation of nuclear potential, taking into account the advance appearance of new missile systems in Moscow. The arms control regime has been torn to shreds. Washington is trying to control the escalation but could find itself at war with Russia, with the unlikely but growing risk of a nuclear exchange. The DPRK has both nuclear weapons and missiles capable of launching them. It would now be more difficult to crush North Korea.  US enmity towards Russia and its rivalry with China has provided an opportunity for Pyongyang to emerge from isolation. The same goes for Iran. The aggravation of US relations with Russia and China plays into Tehran’s hands in overcoming isolation and the blockade. The “axis of evil” that the United States so actively fought against has only strengthened, and in interaction with Russia and partly China, it will continue to strengthen. Russia and China themselves are also getting closer. A military alliance is a long way off. Moscow and Beijing are not striving for it. But their interaction is now closer, and the United States will no longer be able to use Russia to balance China. Chinese diplomacy has been building an extremely cautious foreign policy since the late 1970s. Beijing has most consistently adhered to the principle of minimizing adversaries and maximizing friends. In many ways, China has achieved its goal, having managed to create favourable foreign policy conditions for enormous economic growth, increasing the well-being of citizens and modernising the army. The problem is that such PRC growth, even taking into account the lack of expressed ambitions, has caused growing concern in the United States. As a result, Beijing was faced with the fact that Washington decided to act proactively, containing China while the possibilities for such containment remained in the arsenal of American foreign policy. Perhaps the PRC leadership would prefer to continue to enjoy the benefits of global peace and live amid conditions of minimal competition. But the results of successful modernisation are now becoming an issue that the United States considers a security challenge. This means China will have to live in response to the American policy of containment, which includes the building of anti-Chinese alliances. Here, American diplomacy will try to place its bets, including in India. However, India is too large and powerful a country to play a passive role. China, in turn, is building a special relationship with the United States' European NATO allies. Here Beijing could take into account the Russian experience of “special” relations with the European Union. Finally, Russia at the turn of the century had practically no serious rivals. The country was seriously weakened by the fall of the Soviet Union and controversial reforms. Political relations with the West have gradually deteriorated since the late 1990s, but still haven’t reached a critical level, having been compensated with a high level of economic cooperation. In Asia, relations with US allies Japan and South Korea were also especially cordial without the burdens that remained in matters of European security. Today, almost the entire collective West is fighting against a strengthened Russia in Ukraine, supplying Kiev with weapons and ammunition, and providing Ukraine with finances, intelligence, military specialists, etc. Economic relations have been undermined for a long time by sanctions. Tokyo and especially Seoul have taken a more cautious position, but are still forced to follow the American line. The bottom line is that all three powers, for various reasons, have found themselves in a situation where the tasks of containment, expanding confrontation, and the need to resolve security issues involve using force or the threat of its use. Past economic ties have not held back political contradictions. Apparently, we are only at the beginning of an exacerbation. After all, the real fight between the two key rivals—the USA and China—is yet to come. One can argue for a long time about what is the root cause of the increase in deterrence—mistakes of diplomats or objective factors giving rise to rivalry. The result is what’s important. The three largest military-political centres simultaneously faced deteriorating foreign policy conditions, whereas twenty years ago all three were in a much more peaceful environment. The fate of the future world order still depends on the ability of the ‘troika’ to control rivalry and on the results of such rivalry. First published in the Valdai Discussion Club. Original published in Russian. https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/ssha-kitay-rossiya-umnozhenie-sderzhivaniya/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As the Pacific Islands Forum came to an end, the underlying questions remain: who has a voice and legitimacy to influence the region, and who doesn’t  The Pacific Islands – a grouping largely made up of small island developing states – is in the middle of an increasingly contested strategic space, making regional politics an important, and closely observed, site. At the end of August, Pacific Islands Forum heads of government met in Tonga for the organisation’s annual leaders’ meeting. Along with the Pacific heads of government, other dignitaries were also present, including United Nations Secretary General António Guterres. This is the apex event on the regional calendar, and it came with a crowded agenda, including issues like climate change, transnational crime and health security. But one of the pressing issues facing the Forum is an existential one, as membership debates and geopolitical tussles highlight: the question of who and what the Forum represents. In recent years, divisions within the region have become apparent, including the perceived marginalisation of North Pacific countries in what was initially called the South Pacific Forum. These tensions culminated in the decision by five Micronesian states to leave the Forum in 2021, although this was later reversed. Yet, the final Forum communiqué demonstrates that Pacific leaders are on the same page on many issues, covering agreed outcomes relating to health, education, fisheries and other key issues. Climate change was highlighted as ‘a matter of priority to the Pacific region’ and as an intersecting and broad-ranging issue affecting Pacific states. A new Pacific Policing Initiative – a proposal to create a multinational Pacific police force and invest in subregional policing hubs – was endorsed, although in a nod to some debate surrounding its implementation, leaders emphasised the need for further consultation. Emerging geopolitical frictions  A controversy over the final version of the communiqué, however, highlights enduring divisions in the Forum. In the communiqué initially published online on Friday afternoon, paragraph 66 read that ‘Leaders reaffirmed the 1992 Leaders decision on relations with Taiwan/Republic of China.’ This refers to Taiwan’s established status as a ‘development partner’ of the Forum. After public statements from China’s special envoy for the Pacific Qian Bo criticising this language, the communiqué was taken offline and revised, with the paragraph referencing Taiwan removed. Forum officials blamed the confusion on an administrative error. Three of the 18 full members of the Forum recognise Taiwan: Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu. While the Pacific was once a key focus of Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy, its influence has waned in the region in recent years with moves from Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Nauru to shift recognition to Beijing, prompted by a diplomatic offensive by the People’s Republic of China. In an increasingly contested geopolitical context, Taiwan’s status in regards to the Forum is likely to remain a difficult topic for member countries. The concept of sovereignty has always been relatively flexible in the Forum: founding members include the Cook Islands and Niue, which are countries in free association with New Zealand and are not UN member states. In light of rising strategic competition, issues of membership of the Forum also raise existential questions for its future. In 2016, the French territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia became full Forum members. But their political status does pose interesting questions for the Forum, especially considering the recent riots and ongoing tensions in New Caledonia. In the Forum communiqué, leaders reaffirmed a decision to send a mission to New Caledonia, a move that has been fraught; prior to the meeting, the French Ambassador to the Pacific had asserted that ‘New Caledonia is French territory and it is the [French] State which decides on who enters’. The communiqué also endorsed the applications for associate member status for Guam and American Samoa, two US territories with clear ambitions to accede to full membership status in the future as New Caledonia and French Polynesia have. The concept of sovereignty has always been relatively flexible in the Forum: founding members include the Cook Islands and Niue, which are countries in free association with New Zealand and are not United Nations member states and also do not issue their own passports. Yet, the 2016 decision represented a substantive shift in the principles of Forum membership, one likely to bolster the claims to full membership of other territories. On the one hand, it can be argued that the Forum is becoming more representative in encompassing more Pacific polities and acknowledging the remarkable diversity in political status that exists in the region. On the other, an expanding membership raises questions of the influence of metropolitan powers like France and the US in the Forum. This is an already fraught conversation given the perceived outsized influence of founding member states Australia and New Zealand. Pacific leaders have in the past been outspokenly critical about the role of larger countries in the Forum, given the power differentials and differences in policy on key issues like climate change. France and the US, along with Australia and New Zealand, all have colonial histories – and, for many, an enduring colonial presence – in the region. Given this context, their present and prospective roles in the Forum have been critiqued as preventing the institution from being a truly Pacific space. Pacific leaders like former Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama have in the past been outspokenly critical about the role of larger countries in the Forum, given the power differentials and differences in policy on key issues like climate change. Behind all of these decisions and controversies are fundamental questions: who has a voice in the Forum and who does not; who has the legitimacy to exert influence in the region and who does not. Resolving these issues in a way that strengthens the Forum’s own legitimacy as the primary regional institution is a pressing and existential matter. In the midst of this, what was not on the Forum agenda is also worth considering. Even in the presence of two elected women heads of government – President Hilda Heine of Marshall Islands and Prime Minister Fiamē Naomi Mata’afa of Samoa – and even following last year’s endorsement of a Revitalised Pacific Leaders Gender Equality Declaration, gender equality is absent from the 2024 communiqué.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, paid a visit to Pyongyang this week and signed a defence pact with reclusive North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, as he looks for new allies who can help him increase Russia’s supply of munitions for the war in Ukraine. As part of this mutual aid deal, the two leaders promised that each country will come to the defence of the other if attacked. Kim also promised North Korea’s full support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. What’s interesting about the entire Russia-North Korea showy display of camaraderie is China’s response: silence. China has misgivings about how things are unfolding, which reports suggest prompted Chinese president Xi Jinping’s call to Putin to call off the latter’s visit to Pyongyang. Obviously, Putin didn’t heed Xi’s request. Why would Beijing be so rattled by the Russian-North Korea defence treaty? After all, China has its own defensive pact with North Korea, which was inked in 1961 and renewed in 2021. Beijing also has a “no limits” partnership with Russia. Logically, if China could sign its own defence treaty with North Korea, so can Russia. But the pact made by Putin and Kim severely threatens Chinese security. China was already worried that whatever control it has over North Korea was weakened when Pyongyang reportedly supplied almost 7,000 containers worth of weapons to Moscow. And this is why, in April, the Middle Kingdom sent its third most senior leader within the Chinese Communist party hierarchy, Zhao Leji, to assure the North Korean strongman that Beijing was still a strong ally. Now the defensive pact that draws Moscow and Pyongyang closer threatens to further diminish China’s influence over Kim. The Kremlin knows that one of Beijing’s greatest fears is that a renegade North Korea may one day point its weapons at China. And this is a key reason behind Putin’s peace treaty with Pyongyang. China and North Korea’s turbulent past For decades, China had tried to maintain its influence over Pyongyang by being the mediator between North Korea and the rest of the world. This included attempting to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Beijing does so to safeguard its own safety and survival, and probably believes that as long as North Korea remains dependent on China, it wouldn’t bite the hand that feeds it. China also remains North Korea’s biggest trade partner. This all sounds awfully bizarre, since China’s mutual defence pact with North Korea suggests that both nations are close allies. But North Korea has a tradition of defying China, and this deal with Russia might embolden it further – and that will be worrying Beijing. In 2017, for instance, Kim Jong-un, in clear defiance of China, ordered the assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, in Malaysia. And when China retaliated by halting all coal imports from North Korea into China, North Korea not only condemned Beijing for “dancing to the tune of the United States”, but also vented its anger by firing missiles in the direction of Japan. But where the missiles originated from in North Korea and the distance that it covered towards the direction of Japan provided China with a rather grim check on reality: North Korea’s weapon capabilities extend to major Chinese cities. The Sino-Korean animosity dates back centuries and took shape when Korea was a vassal state of imperial China. Unfortunately, this animosity extended to modern times when Mao Zedong decided to station Chinese troops in North Korea even after the conclusion of the Korean war, and when Beijing did not aid Pyongyang in its nuclear ambitions. It didn’t help either that the founding leader of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, was suspected of espionage and was nearly executed by the Chinese Communist party in the 1930s. All this history plays a part in what decisions and alliances are being made today, and why. It would be a serious mistake to think that the Russians, even in desperation, would believe that making North Korea an ally would turn the tide of the Ukrainian-Russian war in Russia’s favour. But this move, and his recent trip to Vietnam, shows Putin’s desperation. Even if Pyongyang continues to supply Russia with much-needed ammunition and weapons, Moscow will need greater technology and firepower to win against a Ukraine that uses weapons supplied by the US and Europe. Putin’s agenda This fact is not lost to Putin, and he knows that for Russia to stand a winning chance in the war that he started in 2022, requires its partner of “no limits” to stand firmly by Russia’s side. But beyond supplying Russia with the dual-use technology (which could be used for civilian or military purposes) to fuel Russia’s industrial war complex, China appears to have fallen short of supplying actual weapons to Russia. Even if China wanted to provide weapons to Russia it can’t. This is because it fears further antagonising the west, and triggering economic sanctions would prove lethal for an already ailing Chinese economy. China knows that it needs a strong Russia so that the west doesn’t consolidate its resources to deal with the perceived Chinese threat. But on the other hand, helping Moscow may prove too much for Beijing to stomach since that would harm China’s economy. So, Putin needs to force Beijing’s hand, and the peace treaty that he just signed with North Korea might just do the trick.

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, recently stated at the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives of the Diet that “…he strongly feels the need to boldly change the current situation of the ties between Japan and the DPRK,” and “…it is very important that he himself establishes (…) relations with the President of the State Affairs of the DPRK, Kim Jong Un, and continues to make efforts through different channels for this purpose”. Immediately, the KCNA agency released, in response to the statement made by the Japanese Prime Minister, a declaration from Kim Yo Jong, the Deputy Director of the Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). The One in charge of the affairs related to the Republic of Korea and the United States – now it seems also with Japan – commented that she found it noteworthy that the Japanese media have assessed Prime Minister Kishida’s words as “a different position from before” regarding the issue of DPRK-Japan bilateral relations. She added that “there is no reason not to evaluate positively” the words of the Japanese Prime Minister if he shows the “true intention” to move forward the relations between the two countries “by courageously freeing themselves from the shackles of the past”. He added that if Japan abandons its “bad habits” such as unjustly violating the self-defense rights of the DPRK and stops turning the already resolved issue of abductions into an obstacle, there is no reason to prevent a rapprochement between the two countries and the day may come when Kishida visits Pyongyang. She noted that, if Japan opts for a new path to improve relations and approaches the North with “respectful and sincere” behavior, the two countries can create a “new future” together. According to Kim Yo Jong, she made her statements not from an official position, but in a “personal capacity”, something that can be questioned, as she appears as the closest collaborator of her brother Kim Jong Un, and the fact that she holds the high responsibility of being the deputy director of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the WPK, formally requires her to uphold party discipline. The most immediate antecedent to Kim Yo Jong’s remarks was when, earlier this year, as western Japan was recovering from an earthquake that killed more than 200 people and damaged tens of thousands of homes in Niigata Prefecture, the Chairman of the State Affairs of the DPRK, Kim Jong Un, sent a message of “sympathy and condolences” to the Japanese Prime Minister, which was seen as unusual and a conciliatory note, given Pyongyang’s demonstrated animosity towards successive Japanese governments and the systematic messages of grievances sent by the DPRK’s official media. Now, a month later, through Kim Yo Jong, the DPRK sends a new signal that it may be willing to improve relations with Japan. However, many observers view with skepticism the supposed show of commitment towards reconciliation with Japan because, over the decades, events raise suspicious about whether their pronouncements were sincere or not. For well-known historical reasons, the DPRK-Japan relations have never been healthy. Especially, in the last two decades when they have been distinguished by their progressive worsening. Successive administrations, especially those of Shinzo Abe and Yoshihide Suga, have taken the nuclear threat as a pretext for their militaristic ambitions, something that has severely displeased the leadership in Pyongyang. Due to what the North Koreans call “infamous submission” to the US, expressions of disdain from high-ranking officials towards Tokyo are regular occurrences. The most controversial issue revolves around the matter of the abducted Japanese. Although in 2002, coinciding with the first visit to Pyongyang of then-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the DPRK and Japan signed a historic agreement committing an early normalization of bilateral relations and leading to the return of five of the abducted Japanese, Tokyo holds Pyongyang responsible for the abduction of 17 Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, with 12 of them still believed to be in the DPRK. However, Pyongyang admits to having abducted only 13 individuals, claiming to have returned five and stating that the remaining eight had died. What is most unnerving in the eventual Japan-North Korea ties is that Pyongyang assumes the abductee issue as a “settle issue” and Tokyo keeps it as a priority on its political-diplomatic agenda. To date, Japan continues to present the abductees as a premise for talks at any level, while the DPRK considers it as already solved and furthermore, the issue of nuclear weapons and missiles has nothing to do with the improvements of bilateral ties, as Pyongyang considers it as its legitimate self-defense. Japan finds it extremely difficult to accept such conditions. The DPRK’s increasingly sophisticated missiles are constantly being projected into the Sea of Japan and have even flown over Japanese territory. Japan also perceives the possibility that, like South Korea, the DPRK will carry out preventive nuclear strike when it sees signs of real and imminent risk. And, as far as the abduction issue is concerned, all indicates that Japan is not ready to accept that it has been resolved. It is a combination of social forces, forming a critical mass that puts pressure on the Japanese government to act in favor of finding a plausible solution to the abduction issue. In this regard, the Japanese government’s chief spokesman, Yoshimasa Hayashi, stated at a press conference that Japan remains unchanged and “…intends to comprehensively resolve outstanding issues, such as nuclear energy, missiles and abductions”. It is well known that the Japanese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly appealed to its counterparts in friendly countries to the DPRK to make efforts to lead to talks with Pyongyang authorities. It is documented that these efforts have been unsuccessful due to their reluctant stance towards Tokyo. Why is the DPRK rushing to positively assimilate Prime Minister Kishida’s words now? In a previous article, we discussed how at the January 15th, 2024 session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Chairman Kim Jong Un made a decision to sever all ties with the Republic of Korea (ROK), which he called as the “number one hostile country” and indicated to constitutionally endorse a better definition of the border and physically destroy all inter-Korean symbols. We saw that the main thing was to “erase” from the Constitution what he referred to as “inherited concepts” that classify South Koreans as compatriots and likewise, the term unification, removing phrases he assessed as “deceptive” such as “3,000 miles of golden water, rivers and mountains” and “80 million Koreans”, arguing that “…it is correct to specify in the corresponding article [of the Constitution] that the Republic of Korea is firmly considered as the number one hostile country and immutable main enemy”. The above-mentioned contrast with the position that presumably highlights the expectation of an eventual improvement in relations with Tokyo, which has the same status as a major ally of Washington in East Asia, as does Seoul, and which together form a harmonious triangular anti-DPRK alliance. It is notorious that a priority of the DPRK, reinforced in recent times, has always been to fracture the US-ROK-Japan axis. It is convenient to recapitulate that, under the Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump administrations, when Pyongyang – Seoul and Pyongyang – Washington relations exhibited relative understanding and détente, the DPRK furiously attacked the Abe administration, with the same purpose of breaking the alliance. Pyongyang may find it worthwhile to engage with Tokyo under the assumption of forcing open some cracks in the recently strengthened trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. This is because under conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol, South Korea has sought, with the support of the Biden Administration, closer relations, and more stable ties with Japan, including defense and intelligence information exchange, and to a significant extent, has achieved it. However, the Seoul-Tokyo-US convergence suffers from fragility, which is reflected in the appreciable differences over the shared history between South Korea and Japan, and the ongoing disputes with the former colonial ruler over comfort women and forced laborers. In addition, there is US political volatility; in both Seoul and Tokyo there are uncertainties about whether Washington would directly involve itself in a conflagration involving either of them with the DPRK, as well as whether Washington would accommodate South Korea’s nuclear aspirations and unreservedly support Japan’s abandonment of the status of its Armed Forces as self-defense forces. Still, it can be argued that, as risk management and empathy sustainer, Kishida will keep Seoul and Washington abreast of his dealings with Pyongyang. In March, he will visit Seoul and in April, Washington; these would be important indicators of alignment between the trio. Kishida will seek the blessing of the Yoon and Biden administrations, anticipating that Kim Jong Un will move toward a summit that Kishida has so often called for. Washington has moved forward in supporting Japan’s attempts to engage with the DPRK. The ROK and Japan are in close communication on any future Tokyo-Pyongyang dialogue. Meanwhile, South Korea says that any contact between Japan and the DPRK should be conducted in a manner that helps promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Conclusions We are in the presence of a new diplomatic gamble by the DPRK that illustrates the level of specialization it has reached in managing its complicated relations with the main US allies in East Asia, who, in turn, are perceived as systematically confrontational countries. A straightforward resolution of the outstanding issues for discussion (nuclear weapons, missiles, and abductions) between Kim Jong Un and Fumio Kishida is not to be expected. These are issues on which the DPRK and Japan have diametrically different positions and directly concern the comprehensive strategic security of both countries, including the recurring abduction issue, which is associated with the political gain of any Japanese government. A meeting at the Japan-North Korea summit would be one of the few pleasant surprises to be received in the context of the vicious circle of conflict associated with the DPRK. It would be attractive to see a determined understanding between Pyongyang and Tokyo. It may be foreseeable that a Kim Jong Un - Fumio Kishida meeting will take place, but the past and present history negates any prospect of success. For this to happen, both sides will have to make principled concessions that, if made, will have combined counterproductive political effects. Bibliographic references KCNA. Kim Yo Jong publica declaración con el tema de relaciones Corea-Japón. Disponible en: http://www.kcna.kp/es/article/q/cba25051838d476c95acd451a45ae8a8.kcmsf KBS WORLD Prensa japonesa: Kim Yo Jong busca desestabilizar alianza Seúl. Washington-Tokio. Disponible en: https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=s&id=In&Seq_Code=88473 Leonardo Estandarte. Corea del Norte-Japón: Kim Yo-jong plantea la hipótesis de la visita de Kishida a Pyongyang. Disponible en: https://www.agenzianova.com/es/news/Corea-del-Norte-Jap%C3%B3n-Kim-Yo-Jong-plantea-la-hip%C3%B3tesis-de-la-visita-de-Kishida-a-Pyongyang/ Kim Yo Jong dice que Corea del Norte está abierta a mejorar sus lazos con Japón. Disponible en: https://reporteasia.com/relaciones-diplomaticas/2024/02/15/kim-yo-jong-corea-del-norte-mejorar-lazos-japon/ Japón califica de inaceptable que Corea del Norte afirme que la cuestión de los secuestros está resuelta- Disponible en: https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/es/news/20240216_15/ Jesse Johnson. North Korea-Japan summit push gains steam after remarks by Kim´s sister. Disponible en: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/02/16/japan/politics/japan-north-korea-summit-push/ Mitch Shin. Will Kim Jong Un Meet with Japan´s Prime Minister Kishida? Disponible en: https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/will-kim-jong-un-meet-with-japans-prime-minister-kishida/

It is a running gag among the pro-Taiwan camp that if you were to ask ordinary folks about Taiwan five years earlier, most could not locate Taiwan on a map. At the time, matters relating to China were mainly debates about Donald Trump’s protectionist stance, as relations between Taiwan and China didn’t receive the attention many would warrant in the face of a potential war. However, ever since the outbreak of the coronavirus—now probably having originated from the Wuhan Institute of Virology—and the narrative of a grand alliance between Beijing and Moscow during the war in Ukraine, comparisons have been drawn between the fate of Taiwan and Ukraine. Even though CNN became confused between Taiwan and Thailand a year ago, any mention of Taiwan now will ring the alarm about how the United States can be deprived of semiconductors should it not respond to an imminent threat posed by China. As we move toward 2027, people have been arguing that the US should cease intervening elsewhere to concentrate its ability on defending Taiwan—in other words, Taiwan is the only case worthy of intervention. Unlike Ukraine, the case of Taiwan is more black-and-white as Taiwan stands as a victim of Chinese coercion. Whether on a purely strategic or moral argument, there is a lot of sympathy for Taiwan, regardless of political orientation. Nevertheless, war is still war, and in such a scenario, a confrontation between two superpowers is to be avoided at all costs. Even with nuclear weapons factored out, a clean victory for the US and Taiwan is unlikely due to logistical problems, encirclement, and the high cost of lives. In an interview on Tom Wood’s podcast, Joseph Solis-Mullen argued that the only possible way out is to abide according to the principles of the One China Policy—to lead Taiwan into reunification with China under the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Again, we should oppose a war with China, as it would only deliver catastrophe for the US, China, Taiwan, and likely the other countries surrounding Taiwan regardless of the outcome—though Solis-Mullen did acknowledge that should Taiwan fall under the control of the PRC, human rights in Taiwan will take a sharp turn for the worse. Even though the recent elections haven’t decisively favored the pro–Taiwan independence and anti-PRC Democratic Progressive Party, virtually no Taiwanese identifies himself as Chinese. Even the Kuomintang—the only large party that supports a One China Policy—argues that while Taiwan belongs to China, China is the Republic of China (ROC), not the PRC, and the Kuomintang has recently distanced itself from former president Ma Ying-jeou over comments that reunification is acceptable for Taiwan. After all, by the principle of self-determination and voluntary association (as close as it may get), Taiwan is effectively a country in all but on paper. As far as adherence to the principle of armed neutrality goes, Taiwan shouldn’t receive US arms shipments or a security guarantee (which it has under the Taiwan Relations Act). However, the constraint is that China forces countries that want to establish diplomatic ties with China to adhere to its version of the One China Principle, which stipulates that the legitimate government of China is the PRC. Taiwan, however, can’t move away from the One China Principle but can argue that the ROC is the legitimate government of China. However, the reality is different off-paper where Taiwan is a country. China can coerce countries into either choosing the PRC or the ROC, but it can’t afford to fully coerce everyone. While there’s a strategic side to US-Taiwan relations—given Taiwan’s position in the first island chain—the commercial side is undeniable, thanks to the dominance of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company in the semiconductor industry. In other words, there’s a reason why the so-called Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices (or Taipei Representative Offices) are there as de facto Taiwanese embassies. While there is a strong element of strategy at play, the US need not abolish all ties with Taipei, just arms sales and defense guarantees as neither China nor the US is willing to risk trade relations to a level too deep. While this may trigger alarm bells for people who support Taiwan, chances are that Japan, Australia, and even some Southeast Asian countries would prefer Taiwan to remain as it is. For many of these countries, a takeover of Taiwan means a step further for China to infringe upon their territories and disrupt trade routes. While it didn’t announce whether it would directly intervene, Japan has labeled Taiwan as a matter of national security and has been bolstering its own defense over the fears that the US might not help Japan. With a military persistently known for corruption and now a diplomatic emphasis on softening tensions, Beijing sees war as undesirable as well. As stated before, the world is not as remarkably united and can be separated into three blocs as it was during the Cold War. “Allies” of the US would prefer to delegate their responsibility to defend themselves to the US, even if they can do the job themselves and keep a check on one another. As for how we should see Taiwan, it’s a country that in some cases might be more libertarian than the US (except for conscription). Whether people want to debate the similarities or differences between “acknowledging” and “affirming” the One China Principle, it doesn’t erase the fact that Taiwan for all intents and purposes is a sovereign country.

When South Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol broke out into an impromptu performance of the song “American Pie” at a gala White House dinner in 2023, it was more than just a musical interlude. It was symbolic of how on the big Indo-Pacific issues of the day, Washington and Seoul are singing from the same songbook. But so, too, is Japan. And for South Korea’s karaoke-loving leader, that means humming a different tune to predecessors on the international stage – and risking hitting a sour note back at home. Yoon, who took office in May 2022, has embraced closer ties with Japan, South Korea’s former colonizer, as part of an alignment with U.S.-led security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. It entails a more demanding stance toward North Korea’s denuclearization and a watchful eye on China and its increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. The approach culminated in a historic Camp David summit in 2023 aimed at solidifying relations between South Korea and Japan. Such rapprochement with Japan has won Yoon plaudits in the U.S. But it has done nothing to improve his popularity back home. In South Korea there is growing disapproval of Yoon’s leadership. Critics point to an illiberal streak in his rhetoric and policies, which has included attacks on his critics and the media. It has, they contend, contributed to a worrying trend of democratic erosion in Korea. Yoon’s poll ratings are sinking at a time when his conservative party seeks control of parliament in elections slated for April 10, 2024. As scholars who study democratization and authoritarian politics and modern Korea, we are watching as these concerns grow in the run-up to the parliamentary elections. That vote will prove a test of the popular support for Yoon, his domestic agenda and his vision for South Korea’s more outward-looking international role. Japan is ‘now our partner’ Yoon struck a raw nerve in an Aug. 15, 2023, speech celebrating National Liberation Day in Korea, in which he affirmed the country’s partnership with neighboring Japan. He said the country’s former colonial occupier is “now our partner, sharing universal values and pursuing common interests,” and emphasized that “as security and economic partners, Korea and Japan will cooperate with a forward-looking approach, contributing to global peace and prosperity.” His remarks were met with public outrage, especially given their timing: National Liberation Day commemorates Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule, which lasted from 1910 to 1945. The Japanese occupation was brutal, simultaneously exploiting Korean women – as evident in the use of so-called “comfort women,” or military sexual slaves – and treating Koreans generally as second-class citizens, all the while pushing obligatory assimilation into Japanese civilization on the occupied population. Attempts by the Japanese colonial regime at erasing a separate Korean identity and culture – this included banning the teaching of the Korean language and coercing Koreans to adopt Japanese names, along with the violent suppression of independence movements – left deep scars on the collective Korean psyche. For many Koreans, watching their country join Japan in a trilateral partnership with the U.S. is too much to accept. Emergence of pro-Japan voices Yoon and his conservative administration’s foreign policy goals are based not on nationalism but on what has been described as “a value-based alliance” with Washington. This stance is at odds with the nationalist focus often seen in the right-wing politics of other countries. Indeed, in South Korea it is the political left that increasingly identifies with a form of nationalism. Meanwhile, the “New Right” in South Korea has correspondingly embraced an anti-nationalist stance, specifically attacking anti-Japanese sentiment. Since the early 2000s, Korean conservatives have increasingly distanced themselves from nationalism, particularly of the anti-Japanese variety. If, as theorists such as Ernest Gellner have argued, modern nationalism is based on the presumed unity of state and nation, political developments in Korea since 1980 have destabilized this relationship. After the bloodshed of the Gwangju Massacre in 1980, during which the state killed hundreds of its own citizens, leftist nationalists argued that the South Korean state was neither the representative or defender of the Korean nation. Rather, they saw the South Korean state’s inheritance of institutions and personnel from the Japanese colonial government, alongside the hegemonic presence of the United States in Korea – characterized as “neocolonial” by some – as diluting the state’s nationalist credentials. In contrast, conservatives defended the South Korean authoritarian state’s legitimacy and its legacies. They argued that authoritarian rule was responsible for the rapid economic growth that allowed South Koreans to live in prosperity. As part of their defense of Korea’s legacy and attack on a political left increasingly identified with nationalism, conservatives embraced an anti-nationalist stance, specifically attacking anti-Japanese rhetoric. This has involved downplaying the negative effects of Japan’s colonial rule in Korea between 1910 and 1945 and even rejecting the validity of Korean comfort women testimonies. One additional motivation for conservatives has been to justify the achievements of right-wing heroes such as former dictator Park Chung Hee. Park, who has been credited with jump-starting Korea’s economic growth, has been castigated by nationalists as a pro-Japanese collaborator due to his having been trained in the Manchurian and Japanese military academies during the 1940s. Starting around the turn of the century, there has been a gradual increase in the frequency and intensity of pro-Japan voices. Far-right organizations, such as the Republic of Korea Mom’s Brigade, have since the 2010s organized rallies in defense of Japanese colonialism. More recently, far-right groups have systematically disrupted so-called Wednesday Demonstrations – a protest that has been continually held for over 30 years in front of the Japanese embassy in Korea to demand that Japan address the comfort women issue. In a 2019 bestselling book, conservatives even attacked anti-Japanese nationalism as a form of “tribalism” on the left. It is in this context of the growing prominence of pro-Japan voices that Yoon, in a 2023 interview with The Washington Post, expressed that he “could not accept the notion that Japan must kneel because of what happened 100 years ago. Attacks on critics and fake news Yoon embodies this reorientation of Korean conservative ideology and foreign policy that rejects nationalism in favor of closer relations with Japan, especially in the context of alignment with the U.S. against the threat of North Korea and China. The approach has seen Yoon embraced by American policymakers. Yet his popularity at home has fallen from an approval rating of above 50% in mid-2022 to 29% at the beginning of February 2024, although it has since picked up a little. At first glance, his foreign policy seems to support liberal and democratic values. However, in domestic matters there has been growing concern that his rhetoric and policies reflect an illiberal character. Examples include labeling his opponents as “communists” and attacks on the media and “fake news.” This is perhaps unsurprising; the nature of Korean conservatism is deeply rooted in authoritarianism. The Biden administration is keen to present Yoon differently – as an ally, along with Japan, in the protection of Asia’s democracies. But this says more about a U.S. foreign policy that centers China as a threat than it does Yoon’s actual commitment to democratic freedoms. To a South Korea audience, however, Yoon’s position on Japan only adds to general concern over his illiberal tendencies ahead of April’s vote – the first general parliamentary elections during Yoon’s tenure. Editor’s note: The article was updated on March 7, 2024 to clarify Park Chung Hee’s World War II record.