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The Arab-Israeli settlement remains one of the important challenges in the foreign policy activities of the Joe Biden administration, whose strategy, following the logic of the continuity of the traditional course of supporting Israel, is aimed at overcoming the inconsistency in American policy in this direction and at finding approaches to neutralize threats from other actors, seeking to expand their influence in the region.

In maintaining American leadership in the Middle East, the United States faces both internal and external challenges. Iran remains one of the main external challenges, which is perceived by Washington as the main threat in the Middle East and beyond, also occupying a central place in Israel's foreign policy strategy.

Given the general priority importance of the Iranian topic for both countries, the positions of the current US administration and the Israeli government differ regarding the degree of trust in the statements of the Iranian leadership and readiness to return to the previous level of negotiations, violated by D. Trump's sharp demarche. At the same time, being a pivot point of mutual understanding, the Iranian agenda can “muffle” the differences between the parties on the Palestinian issue and move the direction of the Arab-Israeli settlement – Israel manages to use the topic of Iranian influence in the region, which is sensitive for the United States, to advance its interests, emphasizing the security issue in the Middle East region.

The second external challenge for maintaining US leadership in the peace process is the growing role of China, the main strategic competitor of the US, as a peaceful mediator in international affairs (in Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, in Iranian-Saudi relations) and in the context of increasing Sino-Israeli economic cooperation. China has a dominant position in Israel's imports in 2021-2022 and is Israel's third largest investor. Israel's diversification of partnerships will ultimately make it possible, if not to reduce the role of the United States in the Middle East as a whole, then to realize its foreign policy interests without the need to take undesirable compromise steps on the Palestinian issue.

The main internal challenge for the United States remains the party split, which gives other participants in the Arab-Israeli resolution process a reason to question the exclusive role of Washington in it. The inconsistency of American policy in this area largely stems from the difference in the approaches of Democrats and Republicans to achieving the same goal - maintaining and strengthening security in the region. If the commitment to US-Israeli security cooperation remains the same regardless of which party is in power, then unconditional support for Israel remains a point of contention between the two parties.

Traditionally, Democrats are more critical in assessing Israel's domestic policy, in particular in the issue of building new settlements in disputed territories. One of the most striking cases of manifestation of such inter-party contradictions occurred during B. Obama's trip to the Middle East in the spring of 2013. Then B. Obama proposed a formula for in-depth regional cooperation with equal consideration for the interests of both sides of the conflict, recognizing the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and the creation of their own national state while condemning the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

Meanwhile, despite inter-party disagreements, Israel retains its place as a unique and priority ally and partner of the United States, and the essence of their "special" relationship is not subject to systemic changes. Thus, at the end of B. Obama's presidency, the third Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the United States and Israel. The ten-year military-economic plan, first adopted by the B. Clinton administration and supported by B. Obama, provides allocation of $3.3 billion for military financing and $500 million for joint missile defense programs for the period of 2018–2028.

During the presidency of D. Trump, the delicate balance of American policy in the region swung again towards exclusive support for Israel. The progressive political rhetoric of the Democratic President in support of the Palestinians was followed by an equally unexpected symbolic gesture of the Republican President towards Israel: in 2017, D. Trump did something that no other American president dared to do - announced the transfer of the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The decision to move the embassy was criticized by the world community, and Hamas again declared an intifada against Israel. And although Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hastened to smooth over the effect of his president’s grand gesture, saying that the decision to move the embassy does not change the status of Jerusalem in any way, the new embassy was nevertheless opened in May 2018. Subsequently, this step was also supported by the Democratic Party. At the same time, the Trump administration continued the regional format for resolving Middle East conflicts by signing the Abraham Accords. At the same time, M. Pompeo announced that the approach, fixed by the United States in 1978, that the construction of Israeli settlements on the West Bank was inconsistent with international law, did not contribute to the development of negotiations. By doing this, he signaled Washington's support for Israel's new plans for the construction of settlements, which, in turn, did not hesitate to start implementing them. And the ultimatum plan “Peace to prosperity” presented by D. Trump completely ridiculed the Palestinians’ claims to build a state within the borders before 1967 and was regarded by the UN Human Rights Council as a violation of international law and the rights of Palestinians under occupation.

This position of the Republican administration provoked criticism from the Democrats. As expected, after the change of party control over the federal government in 2021 in the House of Representatives, the progressive Democratic wing proposed a bill to resolve the conflict based on the principle of Two-State Solution Act, which reflected concerns about Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. The bill includes monitoring the funds allocated under the ten-year plan (MoU) and other financial assistance, so that they are not used by the Israeli authorities for further annexation of disputed territories. The document also pays special attention to the term "occupied territories", it is proposed to mention such a wording in all official communications and documents regarding the territory of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. At the same time, changes in the US-Israeli security policy are not supported by the legislation.

Unlike his predecessors, J. Biden, from the very beginning of his presidency, tried to avoid such steps that could further destabilize the situation between the conflicting parties. The administration returned to the traditional principles of the Democratic Party in the Middle East - the principle of the unacceptability of the expansion of settlements, the continuation of the policy of ensuring the security of Israel and involving this country in regional cooperation with Arab countries in the spirit of the "Abraham Accords", protecting the rights of both Israelis and Palestinians equally and the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This position was repeatedly emphasized by the US President in September-October 2022, as well as by Secretary of State A. Blinken during meetings in 2023. As part of the efforts made, contacts between the US and UNRWA were restored, and funding for programs was resumed.

The elections of the Prime Minister of Israel, held in the fall of 2022, led to ambiguous results, from the point of view of some American experts, and became a new problematic factor in the settlement issue. The victory of the Likud party under the leadership of B. Netanyahu and the coalition government formed by him with the right wing represented by Religious Zionism, Shas and Yahadut Ha Torah caused fears among representatives of both US parties and lobbyist organizations.

First of all, the American leadership was alarmed by the connection of the current members of the coalition with an organization recognized as terrorist in the USA. Kahane Hai was officially designated a terrorist organization in Washington from October 1997 to May 2022, and has been a “specially designated global terrorist organization” since last year. It is also critically perceived that part of the new government called for a reduction in the powers of the Israeli Supreme Court, the return of the death penalty for those accused of terrorism, some supported the Russian policy towards Ukraine.

Despite the fact that the results of the 2022 elections are perceived in Washington as a serious blow to Israeli democracy, they fully reflect public sentiment. Based on the polls, the vast majority of Israeli voters (62%) identify themselves as right-wing. This means that the Americans, one way or another, will have to reckon with this factor and start a sustainable dialogue with this political force. In general, the United States welcomed Netanyahu's victory in the elections, but emphasizing the special status of relations with Israel, common interests and values and the intention to cooperate with the new government, focusing on its policies, and not on individuals, clearly declares its readiness to prevent any attempts to undermine the efforts to stabilize the situation in vulnerable areas.

In fact, despite the existing concerns and even rejection of certain positions of the new Israeli government, the US is ready to accept their right-wing conservative rhetoric as part of the Israeli democratic choice. The current formula of American policy in this area is that the United States will continue to promote its vision of a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on protecting the interests of both sides of the conflict, but Israel's security will remain an American priority and will determine a restrained reaction to Tel Aviv's policy regarding disputed territories. The reason for this duality, in addition to traditional inter-party disagreements, may also be a shift in the focus of the security dialogue from the Palestinian issue to the Iranian threat.

The contours of the problems outlined signal that the very inconsistency of the American policy regarding the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iranian problem is becoming a factor that delays the prospect of Washington playing the role of the main regional mediator and peacemaker. In this regard, the emergence of new approaches on the part of other powers and a change in the alignment of forces in the region should be considered natural, which is the basis of the challenge for the Joe Biden administration.

Nevertheless, the consistency of the White House in relation to ensuring Israeli security is the main stable link, which, firstly, guarantees the American presence in the Middle East, and, secondly, smooths out the corners of emerging contradictions in US-Israeli relations. Thus, the main task for Washington remains to restore the traditional Democratic balanced approach to Middle East politics and overcome the threats and problems posed by Iran, the new Israeli coalition government, and China as a new significant actor in the Middle East.