Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

Summary

Periodically, initiatives are launched to address the Middle East peace process, including in connection with other simmering issues. Currently, an idea is being discussed that emanates from the Biden administration and is said to have as its goal the recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia. The U.S., whose representatives have previously spoken of a rocky road in this context, most recently denied having entered into any agreements. Away from the international interest focused on the Ukraine war, the region is once again on the move. In this regard, the ideas reported by the U.S. media, which are quite consistent with U.S. strategic interests, reflect a lack of understanding of the region. It would not be new.

Analysis

According to the Wall Street Journal, the Biden administration has launched a new initiative to kill two birds with one stone: Saudi Arabia's recognition of Israel and curbing China's influence over the regional middle power on the Arabian Peninsula. At the heart of the matter are possible concessions to Riyadh, subject to various conditions. After the Trump family's failed attempt at a 'Deal of the Century,' an improvement in the region's relational fabric with various conditions attached, the new strategy sounds like another 'stroke of genius.' Israeli media in particular are discussing the project; in the Arab world there is rather radio silence. There, the focus is on the first installation of a Saudi ambassador – as a secondary accreditation of the representative in Amman – in Palestine. Visits by U.S. National Security Advisor Sullivan in recent months are fuelling the speculation. The U.S. government already denied having entered into any agreements. After various offers to mediate in the peace process, including one by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the question arises as to the viability and impact of such initiatives. 

According to the Wall Street Journal, in return for recognition of Israel, Saudi Arabia would receive support in building up its civilian nuclear energy program, promote the formation of a Palestinian state, and curb Beijing's economic and military influence. The idea includes a number of elements that, while understandably consistent with recent strategies of the Biden administration, each of which already has a clear degree of complexity. 

Relations with Israel had already been the subject of discussion once before during a high-profile visit by the Saudi crown prince to the United States – still under the Trump administration. Following this, King Salman had apparently felt compelled to confirm the kingdom's official stance toward Israel and end the discussion. Mohammed bin Salman, according to U.S. officials, is now said to be ready for a 'deal' that does not, however, imply full diplomatic relations. No mention is made of the Wahhabi clergy as a decisive pillar of the royal family's position of power, which has already put the ruling family under pressure on various occasions in the past with its uncompromising interpretation of the Koran on relations with Judaism. With driving licenses for women, the opening of movie theatres, the hosting of cultural events, the dismantling of the religious police and other things, the young generation that Mohammed bin Salman represents is challenging this radical conservative ulama right now anyway. The rigorous crackdown on other parts of the family and the imposition of a succession plan favouring King Salman's descendants since 2015 are also likely to have caused rifts. The effects of dealing with relations with Israel in such a situation will be interesting to observe. 

In return for various concessions, Riyadh is supposed to limit its relations with the People's Republic of China and, for example, not allow any Chin ese military installations, although it questions whether this is even a real scenario. The establishment of military bases on Saudi territory in the 1990s to deter Saddam Hussein from attacking Saudi Arabia, whose army was considered inferior, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, was a key trigger for Osama bin Laden to turn against the United States. In this, he was not alone, but was in line with Wahhabi preachers. The then-royalist Mufti Bin Baz had to perform significant contortions to justify the presence of 'non-believers' – including women who piloted aircraft and operated weapons. In Saudi Arabia – and especially within Wahhabi circles – this is not forgotten. What real-world value there is in accepting the establishment of a Chinese military base - run by 'communist atheists' (m/f) – in the Land of Two Holy Places will be interesting to observe, especially since Beijing already has a well-developed base on the opposite side of Bab al-Mandab in Djibouti, alongside the US and France, from which, for example, the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Sudan was operated.

Initiatives aimed at establishing a functioning Palestinian state remain completely out of touch with reality. Quite independently of the domestic political situation in Israel and the current influence of the settler movement, the various Palestinian groups – Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, Intifada movement, Dahlan supporters, etc. – do not appear to be in a position to do so. Although President Abbas and Haniye of Hamas have recently spoken to each other again in Egypt and Turkey, there is no overlap between the two, except for a desire to act against Israel in order to secure their own position of power, which is linked to economic interests, and their positioning with regard to a successor to Abbas. The question of a Palestinian state is therefore more a media concession to the Arab street, which still remembers the deeply buried Oslo Accords. The 'Deal of the Century' presented in the management style of global management consultancies by Trump's son-in-law was already a prime example of similar denial of reality, which thrived on each party hoping for an economic advantage for itself without wanting to make any real compromises and excluding various harsh realities in the region. It seemed more real at times that President Abbas would dissolve the presidential administration and hand over the remnants of government authority in the West Bank to Israel-at least he threatened to do so.

In recent years, the rapprochement between Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv has been sustained by the frontline position toward their common adversary Iran. While this has not disappeared, it has weakened noticeably in recent months – even if the Revolutionary Guards continue to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, negotiations with the Huthis in Yemen, and a reported slowdown in Iranian uranium enrichment have taken the Iran scenario somewhat out of the public eye and reduced the pressure to act.

It is obvious that U.S. influence in Saudi Arabia, as in the entire region, has declined in recent years. In a speech in Cairo, President Obama announced a policy shift toward the Arab world. The disappointment was all the greater when this did not materialize – and those former elites whose fall was passionately welcomed in Western states during the Arab Spring returned to power. President Trump reduced Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to a buyer of U.S. defense products at the White House. The Saudi visitor was reportedly uncomfortable with this. The current president began his term with tones clearly critical of Riyadh, which fell silent as oil prices rose.