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The meeting of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Moscow helped both give the impression of a united front, but underlying tensions were also discernible. What did the summit achieve for each side?With the pomp of a state visit, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping shined a spotlight on their ­growing strategic alignment, which is aimed at upending the U.S.-led, rules-based international order in favor of a multipolar world. Long on symbolism, short on concrete substance, the summit nevertheless served both leaders’ purposes. Putin welcomed the demonstration that Russia was not, and could not be, isolated on the world stage, as it deepened relations with one of the world’s two superpowers. By showcasing burgeoning commercial ties and unveiling plans to expand them, Putin conveyed confidence that Russia can remain resilient in the face of harsh Western sanctions.      Meanwhile, Xi’s decision to make Moscow his first foreign visit of his third term as president underscored his strong commitment to Russia and to Putin personally. He used the summit to underscore China’s determination to pursue its national interests in defiance of mounting U.S. economic and diplomatic pressure—making the point that China will not abandon its strategic partner in pushing back against U.S. pretensions to global leadership. That was a crucial message for his increasingly nationalistic domestic audience, as well as for the Global South, where the U.S.-led liberal order is under stress. At the same time, Xi subtly let it be known that China is the dominant partner. Putin had little choice but to accept Xi’s proposal that Russia use the yuan, not the ruble, in trade with the Global South to diminish the role of the U.S. dollar in world trade. Xi also gratuitously endorsed Putin for reelection in 2024, even though the Russian president has not declared his intention to run. And at the joint press availability at the end of the summit, Xi was much more restrained in his description of bilateral relations than was Putin, who was eager to lay out all the areas in which the two countries would enhance cooperation in the years ahead. That left the clear impression that Russia needed China much more than China needed Russia.What does the summit mean for the war in Ukraine?Nothing at the summit suggested that the underlying dynamic in the war was about to change. As expected, Beijing continued to provide Moscow with strong diplomatic support, echoing the latter’s narrative blaming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the conflict. Despite Washington’s fears, however, Xi gave no indication that China was ready to provide lethal military aid that might radically improve Russia’s chances on the battlefield. Putin noted that China’s recently released 12-point peace plan could serve as a basis for negotiations, but neither he nor Xi suggested any practical steps that might give substance to what is largely a list of bromides about respecting sovereignty, avoiding escalation, and seeking a diplomatic solution. The reality is that China benefits from the military stalemate. Russia’s aggression distracts U.S. attention and resources from the Indo-Pacific region, while Western sanctions compel Russia to turn to China as an economic lifeline. China exploits Russia’s predicament to gain access to critical natural resources, especially oil and gas, at discounted prices.  In line with this calculus, Xi provided Putin with sufficient moral and material support so that he could continue the fight, but much less than needed to give Russia the advantage. At the same time, the Chinese continued to drive hard commercial bargains. Notably, no deal was announced to build a second Power of Siberia gas pipeline, which Putin has described as “the deal of the century.” Rather, it was simply noted that further details needed to be negotiated, as China explores alternatives.What does it reveal about the underlying tensions between China and Russia?Except for a brief period after the Communist takeover of China in 1949, China and Russia have been rivals, not partners. Until the end of the Cold War, Russia was by far the superior power.   The dynamic changed dramatically after 1991. Then, the two countries’ economies were roughly the same size. Now, China’s economy is ten times larger, and the gap continues to widen.  Moreover, China now casts a much larger shadow on the global stage: it has overtaken Russia in the development of advanced technology and its conventional military is comparable to Russia’s, even as it is moving toward nuclear parity with both Russia and the United States. What once could have been seen as a roughly equal partnership has evolved to the point where Russia is decidedly the junior partner. Despite the rhetoric of comprehensive partnership and avowals from Putin and Xi that relations have never been better, this asymmetry in power and ambition is in itself a source of friction, in addition to the civilizational clashes, racial prejudices, territorial grievances, and geopolitical competition that have strained relations in the past. But these sources of tension are currently far outweighed by the shared challenge from the United States. Washington’s current policy of dual containment only reinforces their strategic alignment and pushes the tensions further into the background.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine and President Vladimir Putin of Russia are two very different leaders. The way in which each defines a national identity shapes their leadership and sectors of support.      As we pass one year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, attention is fixed on how the war in Ukraine will unfold this year. What happens in 2023 will have implications not only for Ukraine and Russia but for the international order more broadly. One factor that has influenced the trajectory of war so far, and is likely to continue to do so in 2023, is the distinct leadership styles of President Zelenskyy and President Putin. Zelenskyy and Putin could not be more different as leaders. Putin leads a personalist autocracy, having risen through the ranks of the Russian security services to claim the presidency in 2000. Zelenskyy, a newcomer to both politics and government, was freely elected in competitive elections in 2019. Putin leads in the style of nationalist-populist leaders. He has slowly but consistently tightened his grip on power since his first electoral success in 2000, shaping Russia into an electoral autocracy. Putin is very much a man of his generation. At 70 years old, he grew up and established himself during the time of the Soviet Union and now surrounds himself with advisors of a similar or more advanced age. He is very far from media savvy, reportedly not even owning a smart phone. Zelenskyy, on the other hand, is a master of media communications, having operated as an actor and comedian before becoming president. Also a man of his generation at 45 years old, Zelenskyy forged a media career in the post-Soviet world of the emerging democracy of Ukraine. A self-made comedian and media personality, he is a part of Ukraine’s dynamic and entrepreneurial civil society.National identity: A glorious past or a bright future?A key factor that distinguishes Zelenskyy and Putin as leaders is the way in which they draw on national identity in their leadership. For Putin, Russia’s national identity is static and homogenous. There is one acceptable version of Russian identity; variations are considered deviant and a threat. For Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s national identity is dynamic and inclusive. The unifying elements of Putin’s vision of national identity are specific communal factors: shared language, history, religion, culture, or ethnicity. For Putin, such elements create a common bond and a common purpose among those who possess them. In 2021 Putin stated: “Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus… bound together by one language…, economic ties, the rule of the princes of the Rurik dynasty, and – after the baptism of Rus – the Orthodox faith… we are one people.” For Putin, this idea of an exceptional nation simultaneously evokes Russian entitlement based on past glory, as well as Russia’s victimhood and humiliation at the hands of foreign enemies. Putin’s popularity “is tied to the idea of reanimating Russia’s past to reinstate the country’s greatness.” In 2022, Putin praised the conquests of the historical Russian ruler Peter the Great as returning to Russia what was “rightfully” hers. At the same time, for Putin, Russia’s greatness is under threat from the West. By contrast, Zelenskyy himself brings together the fractured components of Ukrainian identity in his own person. He is a Russian-speaking Ukrainian born in the east of the country who embodies a strong Ukrainian identity that is distinct from a Russian one. In Zelenskyy’s words: “[Ukrainians] are all different. They fight wearing the cross, the crescent, the star of David. Lads from Western Ukraine and from the south-east. Russian speakers from Kharkiv and Kryvyi Rih and Ukrainaian speakers from Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk… All different. All Ukrainians.” The unifying element of Zelenskyy’s national identity is a focus on the human striving for freedom and dignity. This factor also constitutes a universal element – uniting Ukrainians with others who share these values. In contrast to Putin, for Zelenskyy, history is not used to illustrate a glorious and longed-for past, but rather to show that the human drive for freedom can triumph over oppression to create a brighter future. As Zelenskyy stated to the UK parliament in February 2023: “[Both of] our people went through crises and growth, inflation, and periods of social losses and social gains. It was tough but we always found strength and stamina to move ahead and achieve results… We know freedom will win… We proved together that the world truly helps those who are brave in defending freedom. And thus, paves the way for a new history.”Does national identity galvanise support?Ultimately, military outcomes will be decisive in determining whether and how the war might conclude this year. However, Putin and Zelenskyy’s distinct imaginings of national identity contribute to galvanising support with audiences domestically and across the world. Domestically, Putin’s static and homogenous national identity appeals to those for whom it provides certainty and belonging to a specific idea of what it means to be Russian. For this segment of the Russian population, the ongoing war only serves to reinforce Russia’s entitlement to territorial control beyond its borders, as well as the looming spectre of humiliation at the hands of the West. This constituency will not lose faith in Putin’s war in 2023. However, if Russia fails militarily, these supporters may grow dissatisfied with the outcome, if not the war itself. Globally, Putin’s emphasis on the West as Russia’s central opponent will further isolate Russia from Western countries. However, Putin’s assertion of a homogenous identity does appeal to groups who conceptualise their own identity in a similar way within their own context. Additionally, Putin’s narrative of Russian victimhood by the West resonates in countries that are uncomfortable with a US-led global order or have an enduring historical memory of Western colonialism. Nevertheless, given Putin’s emphasis on Russian particularism, this is more likely to create tacit acceptance of Russia’s actions than stir costly action in support of Russia’s war. Domestically, Zelenskyy’s dynamic and inclusive Ukrainian identity, with an emphasis on the striving for freedom, appeals to broad swaths of the Ukrainian population – and aligns with the sense of purpose felt by those fighting on the frontlines. This is unlikely to change in 2023. As Russia doubles down on asserting its self-proclaimed right to control Ukraine, the idea of freedom and agency become ever more galvanising. Beyond Ukraine, Zelenskyy’s emphasis on a common human striving for freedom as a basis for identity invites others who align with this notion to rally alongside Ukraine. This will continue to boost support for Ukraine in established democracies – but also beyond, in places where populations or leaders resonate with a smaller state fighting against a stronger one to determine its own political and social reality. In the coming months we are likely to see military escalation between Ukraine and Russia. A less-visible factor that will contribute to the trajectory of this conflict is whether Putin and Zelenskyy’s distinct articulations of national identity will maintain traction with their respective constituencies. Will Putin’s homogenous and static national identity, that harks back to a time of historical glory, continue to appeal – or will it fracture if Russian glory on the battlefield falls short? Will Zelenskyy continue to be able to unify the diverse aspects of Ukrainian society into a coherent whole – and will this unity hold past his leadership? The answer to these questions will shape the societal impacts of this war – in both Ukraine and Russia – long after the fighting has ceased.

As the war in Ukraine continues, China sees greater economic and political openings in Central Asia, the region extremely wary of Russian military ambitions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reverberated far and deep across the Eurasian continent. One region which especially susceptible to the pace of changes is Central Asia. Here, Russia, China, and Iran, the three former imperial powers willing to change the present world order, seek to impose a version of regionalism that excludes non-regional powers, chiefly the US and the EU, from playing an active role. However, the trend is not limited to the region, with similar developments taking place elsewhere across the continent, whether it is in the Black Sea, South Caucasus, or the South China Sea, where the race towards establishing spheres of influence has accelerated. The most significant game-changer to the geopolitical situation in the region is, of course, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Among other effects, Moscow’s aggression against its neighbor risks undermining the balance Moscow and Beijing have successfully maintained in Central Asia. The unofficial division of labor where Russia is a major security player and China focuses on the economic engagement has often been challenged as Beijing made inroads into security areas, too. Now, the pace of change could further accelerate. Russia’s war put its Central Asian neighbors on high alert, in fear that Moscow might use the same tactics as in Ukraine. Seeing Vladimir Putin fixated on making dreams of recreating the imperial map of Russia a reality, the former subjects to Moscow’s suzerainty cannot feel safe. This is especially true with Kazakhstan which shares a 7,644-kilometre border with Russia and northern parts of which are populated with ethnic Russians. While the tensions between Kazakhstan and its northern neighbor rarely get to the surface, they can hardly be dismissed. The friction was on public display at the latest St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Speaking at the gathering, the  first deputy chairman of the committee of the State Duma for the CIS and relations with Russian nationals abroad, Konstantin Zatulin, rather ominously remarked that “[Kazakhs] know too well that a number of regions, settlements with a predominantly Russian population had little to do with what was called Kazakhstan.” This followed a rather unexpected exchange between the Kazakh president, Kassim-Jomart Tokayev, and Russia’s notorious propagandist, Margarita Simonyan, in which the Kazakh president said his country will not be recognizing Lugansk and Donetsk separatist republics – the policy Kazakhstan has pursued also toward other separatist entities supported by Moscow. What is more interesting, however, is that the exchange took place in Vladimir Putin’s presence. Later, unconfirmed reports emerged that Kazakhstan stalled 1 700 railcars of Russian coal on its territory in response to Moscow’s decision to block Kazakh oil. Many linked the development to Tokayev’s statements. Yet, this was not a one-off deviation from supporting Russia, as Kazakhstan has consistently refused to toe the Russian line. In April, one Kazakh official argued that Kazakhstan will not help Russia to evade Western sanctions imposed on Moscow.Confident KazakhstanTo many, Kazakh behavior seems dangerous with geopolitically far-reaching effects on its relations with Russia and the security of the northern territories. Comparisons with Georgia and Ukraine go rampant – a similar fate might await Kazakhstan. An established analysis argued Kazakhstan feels vulnerable especially after the unrest in early 2022 when Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) troops were deployed to Kazakhstan. The thinking was that beholden Tokayev would have to keep close to Russia. Though this analysis is not entirely unfounded, a closer look reveals that Kazakhstan could actually be far more confident than other Russia’s neighbors. One critical factor to consider is that any major military move against Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity risks deteriorating Moscow’s ties with Beijing, which sees Kazakhstan as a gateway to Europe and a vital part of the sprawling Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This gives Kazakhstan greater space for maneuver. As the Russian invasion creates cracks in Moscow’s ties with its Central Asian neighbors, a widening space for diplomatic and economic maneuver will allow Beijing to gain a firmer hold in the region’s affairs. China will, nevertheless, be careful. Beijing will not make major moves to undermine its ties with Russia – larger issues such as competition with the US take precedent and Beijing has consistently made it clear that it is willing to give Russia political support on the international stage despite its war on Ukraine. Yet, the emphasis on greater Chinese engagement with Central Asia and especially Kazakhstan is nevertheless to be expected. A spillover effect from the troubled Russian economy (including a decreased level of remittances) will be pushing Central Asian states to embrace Chinese investments more readily. Moreover, increased cooperation with China can be a way to hedge against the military threat from Russia. These sentiments were visible in early June when the third China-Central Asian states summit (C+C5) was held where participants agreed to develop a structure for regular meetings between the informal groupings’ heads of state. The conference also approved four joint documents, including on data security and strengthening connectivity. The Chinese side stressed that Beijing would always stand behind Central Asian nations in respecting their sovereignty and independence, which bears particular relevance in the current context The parties also agreed on 10 points covering cooperation under the BRI, and maintaining indivisible regional security. While here, China essentially echoes Russia’s thinking toward security in the immediate neighborhood, at the same time, it signals that also Russia is not to be allowed to threaten China’s own security interests by encroaching upon its neighbors.The Middle CorridorConnectivity has long been a key topic on the agenda for China-Central Asia cooperation, but its relevance is bound to increase further. The Russian invasion set in motion massive changes in the connectivity of the Eurasian continent. The Russia route used by China to reach Europe by rail is hobbled by anti-Russia sanctions and, quite naturally, Beijing seeks alternative routes to ensure unimpeded trade flows. This puts Kazakhstan in an advantageous position as the Middle Corridor stretching from Turkey to the Caspian Sea would not be operative without Kazakh ports. Early signs of the re-emergence of the Middle Corridor are quite promising. Cargo transshipment across Central Asia and the Caucasus is expected to increase sixfold to 3.2 million metric tons year-on-year. In April, Maersk, a Danish shipping corporation, started a new train service along the Middle Corridor in response to the changing geopolitical situation in Eurasia. Another company, Finland’s Nurminen Logistics, started running a container train from China to Central Europe through the trans-Caspian route on May 10. The developments are also spurring cooperation among regional actors along the route. In early May, a Georgian Railway team met in Ankara with counterparts from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan to discuss the Middle Corridor of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route project. On May 25, Georgia’s state railway company said that it was working with businesses from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to develop a new shipping route employing feeder vessels between Georgia’s Poti and Romania’s Constanta. This follows a joint declaration by Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey in late March on improving the region’s transportation potential. In re-invigorating the middle Corridor China and Kazakhstan also seek greater support from other players, namely, Turkey. While Turkey may lag behind China and Russia in what it can offer to the regional states, it also presents an alternative to those who fear Russia but also feel uncomfortable relying heavily on China. A quest for diversification of diplomatic and economic ties creates a favorable momentum for Turkey’s increased penetration into the region. Recently, there has already been a noticeable upsurge in active diplomacy by Ankara, seeking to capitalize on the developments with diplomatic visits and pledges to enhance bilateral trade among Turkic nations. The growing interest to circumvent Russia was reflected in the messages Kazakhstan’s Tokayev conveyed to his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the visit to Ankara in May as well. The joint statement included an interesting passage on connectivity when the two countries agreed to enhance cooperation in transport and logistics, praised the growth of cargo transit via the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, and stressed the importance of the Middle Corridor. Hence, Russia’s war creates significant opportunities for China in Central Asia. Even if Beijing will be careful not to upend the balance straight away, it will chip away at Russia’s influence and use the emerging openings, such as by helping Kazakhstan to diversify its economic and political dependence away from Russia or building the Middle Corridor as a potential alternative to the Russian route. In Russia, this is sure to cause grievances, but Moscow finds itself in an unenviable position when it cannot really openly oppose Chinese moves without compromising their mutual understanding on joint resistance to the collective West. At a time when the end of the war in Ukraine is nowhere in sight, having China’s backing seems far more critical.