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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Regarding Linda Thomas-Greenfield's visit to the Republic of Korea. At the end of last March (March 28th), due to Russia's veto and China's abstention in the UN Security Council, it did not extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Sanctions Committee overseeing the implementation of punitive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). This joint action by two of the global powers in the multilateral body has destabilized Washington, which angrily seeks an alternative that allows it to maintain its persecutory actions. Panel of Experts It is pertinent to detail that 18 years ago, under Resolution 1718 (2006), the Security Council established the Experts Group or Panel of Experts of the Sanctions Committee to oversee penalties imposed on the DPRK, which is comprised of eight specialists. In compliance with Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017), the Experts Group has, among other functions: 1. Assist the Sanctions Committee in executing its mandate, as outlined in paragraph 12 of Resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 25 of Resolution 1874 (2009); ● Gather, examine, and analyze information provided by Member States, relevant United Nations bodies, and other stakeholders regarding the implementation of measures, particularly focusing on instances of non-compliance; ● Formulate recommendations on actions that the Council, the Committee, or Member States could consider in order to enhance the implementation of measures; ● Submit a midterm report to the Committee and, following deliberations with it, present such report to the Security Council; ● Assist Member States in preparing and submitting national reports on the implementation of specific measures they have adopted to effectively implement the provisions of relevant resolutions; ● Support the Committee's efforts in further developing, improving, and drafting guidance notes for the implementation of resolutions. The members of the Panel of Experts are appointed by the General Secretary of the United Nations, upon the proposal of the referred Sanctions Committee. Members of the Panel of Experts have specialized expertise in areas such as nuclear issues, control of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, customs and export controls, non-proliferation policy, trade, finance and economics, air and maritime transportation, and missile and related technologies. The Security Council has urged all States to fully cooperate with the Panel of Experts, particularly by providing any information they possess regarding the implementation of measures. States are encouraged to respond to all requests promptly and comprehensively for information and to invite the Panel of Experts to conduct visits and investigate alleged violations of the sanction’s regime, including inspecting assets seized by national authorities. Its current mandate will expire on April 30, 2024, in compliance with paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2680 (2023). Russia’s veto Moscow defended its veto in the Security Council against the renewal of international sanctions monitoring on Pyongyang, stating that it reflects "its current interests." Russia, with its veto, and China, with its abstention, blocked the renewal of the Panel of Experts, and while the sanctions will remain in effect, these actions paralyze the scrutiny of the experts. Russia's so-called "current interests" sparked varied responses ranging from vehement criticism to concerns and speculation. Criticism focuses on Moscow's position undermining multilateral efforts to monitor measures implemented by Pyongyang that circumvent sanctions aimed at blocking its missile-nuclear development, which, according to critics, has implications for international security. Meanwhile, concerns are directed towards the alleged support that the DPRK receives from its regional allies, (Russia and China) for its missile-nuclear development, countries with marked ideological differences and high levels of conflict with the United States. Meanwhile, speculations refer to Moscow's motivations being linked to the support that Russia receives from Pyongyang in arms and ammunition needed for its military operation in Ukraine. Regardless of criticisms, concerns, and speculations, the reality is that we are witnessing the culmination of a gamble that Russia and China have been making in the Security Council for a long time, proposing various initiatives to ease rather than strengthen the sanctions regime and relax its implementation. Meanwhile, their respective governments have issued official statements blaming US hostility and its allies as the fundamental cause for the DPRK choosing nuclear weapons and their delivery systems as the basis of its national defense and continuing to expand and perfect them. Russia's veto and China's abstention have led to the collapse of a structure that has long been in question for a long time, because it could not prevent violations of sanctions by an increasing number of UN Member States. Additionally, it represents a significant victory for the DPRK, which harbored deep animosity towards the Panel of Experts. Furthermore, it confirms the current state of Russo-North Korean and Sino-North Korean political-diplomatic relations in a context of various armed conflicts, both real and potential, that have been shaking the planet. Opposing positions in the General Assembly On April 12th, 2024, the UN General Assembly discussed Russia's veto. Russian Ambassador to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, argued that his country exercised the veto because UN sanctions against the DPRK have had no significant effect and have only caused a humanitarian crisis for the North Korean people. Meanwhile, China's alternate representative, Geng Shuang, stated that the Korean War has long ended, but the Cold War is still persisting. He reiterated his country's position that "there will be no resolution of the problems if the security concerns of all parties, including the DPRK, remain unaddressed," calling on all actors to work together to adopt a path to peace. He said that tensions are hindering these efforts, and that dialogue is needed, and the Security Council must play an active role. Using a typically Chinese allegory, he stated that "sanctions should not be carved in stone" and added that "harsh sanctions" against the DPRK have had a negative effect on the humanitarian situation in the country. Regarding Russia's new proposal, he expressed hope that Council members will work productively to extend the mandate of the panel of experts, a phrase that justifies China's abstention rather than a veto. The representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN, Hwang Joon Kook, condemned Russia's veto and criticized the military collaboration between Moscow and Pyongyang. He argued that it was vetoed because "Russia did not want the watchtower, the panel, to light its dark spot." He asserted that the Panel had included in its recent report that it had been investigating reports of the arms agreement between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, which constitute a clear violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. Meanwhile, Robert Wood, alternate representative of the United States, said: "...we need to uphold our obligations." He stated that, as the sponsor of the resolution to extend the work of the Panel of Experts, his delegation had sought a broad compromise and that China and Russia had had ample opportunities to discuss sanctions reform in the council. Instead, Russia gave to the Council members an ultimatum that sought one of two outcomes: to avoid sanctions against the DPRK or to silence the panel's investigations, including Moscow's acquisition of arms from Pyongyang for its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Russia's veto undermines the architecture of peace and security and deprives action on one of the Council's most pressing issues, that of peace on the Korean Peninsula. "Russia is already threatening to end the mandate of the UN Sanctions Committee that helps the Security Council monitor and take actions to deter threats to international peace and security (...) that is why it is crucial for all of us to raise our voices today in support of the non-proliferation regime, and opposition to the attempts to silence the information, we need to uphold our obligations." Meanwhile, the DPRK ambassador to the UN, Kim Song, said: "The DPRK greatly appreciates the veto by the Russian Federation..." and argued that the Council's sanctions on his country are a product of U.S. hostile policy. "If the DPRK's position of possessing nuclear weapons for self-defense is a threat to international peace and security, as claimed by the United States and its followers, we should first properly discuss why the United States is not considered a threat to international peace and security, even though it is the only country in the world to have used a nuclear weapon..." As can be seen, the contrasts in statements reflect the adversarial positions of the parties most directly involved in the issue. United States seeks for alternatives As expected, Washington immediately began plotting countermeasures in the face of the imminent dissolution of the Group that it had controlled for years. The United States representative to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, during her recent visit to the Republic of Korea, was tasked with addressing this issue, although no concrete proposals were heard. The agenda crafted for the U.S. Ambassador to the UN included several meetings, even with North Korean defectors, and culminated in a visit to the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas, a moment she deemed opportune to express her concern that the DPRK could freely develop missiles without the oversight of the sanctions monitoring body. She stated that Washington is considering "out-of-the-box" options to monitor Pyongyang's compliance with sanctions. "All possibilities are on the table," and her government is "working closely with South Korea and Japan to seek creative and original ways to move forward" in this regard. At the same time, she urged Russia and China to reverse course, to stop rewarding the "misbehavior of the DPRK," and to protect it from sanctions, which allow it to carry out activities on its weapons programs. The diplomat called on Moscow and Beijing to reverse course and urge Pyongyang to choose diplomacy, come to the negotiating table, and engage in constructive dialogue. Considering all possibilities, she stated that it could be within the UN General Assembly, "entities outside of it." We see that Washington is exploring alternative ways to the Group of Experts to continue investigating Pyongyang's sanction violations. During the press conference, Ms. Thomas-Greenfield said, "I look forward to collaborating with both the Republic of Korea and Japan, but also with like-minded countries, to try to develop options both within and outside of the UN. The point here is that we cannot allow the work that the panel of experts was doing to lapse." The U.S. representative to the UN added that Russia and China, which abstained from voting in favor of the extension, will continue to try to block international efforts to maintain monitoring of UN sanctions against the DPRK. She criticized Russia for violating these sanctions with its purchases of North Korean arms and, also China for shielding the North, stating, "I don't expect them to cooperate or agree with any effort we make to find another path, but that won't stop us from finding that path in the future." Recently, Marcus Noland, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and an expert on Korean affairs, has proposed: ● That the UN General Assembly plays a more significant role in maintaining pressure on Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs. This proposal emerged amid the debate over Russia's veto of a resolution to extend the mandate of the panel of experts monitoring sanctions on the DPRK. ● The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched on May 31st, 2003, during the George W. Bush era, represents a coalition outside the UN framework, composed of 112 members so far. It aims to stop the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from States and non-State actors of proliferation concern. This initiative is part of the foundations of the global regime against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and has maintained strong support as a presidential priority in each of the US’s administrations since its inception. It is known that Washington, in its attempt to ensure the diversification of tools to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, apparently, foreseeing the eventual deactivation of the Panel of Experts, is seeking to strengthen and expand the PSI. Its active role in this direction involves contributing with experts, diplomats, financiers, military personnel, customs officials, and police; organizing meetings, workshops, and exercises with other States supporting the PSI; and working with specific partner States to enhance their capacity to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. ● Following the example of the United States and South Korea, who recently launched an Enhanced Disruption Working Group and jointly sanctioned six individuals and two entities based in Russia, China, and the United Arab Emirates for supporting the DPRK's weapons of mass destruction programs. According to the expert, in the absence of the Panel of Experts, these sanction’s activities can be expanded and could involve countries allied with the United States. ● Utilization of the Egmont Group, a state-led network of financial intelligence units with 174 members that shares information and collaborates on illicit financial activities. It does not have a mandate in the sanctions area, but that does not mean it cannot be granted one, and if so, the Group could assume an intensified role in monitoring North Korea's sanctions evasion in the financial sphere. The pronouncements of the US Ambassador to the UN at the DMZ suggest that the US State Department is paying attention to Marcus Noland's proposals, which, so far, are identified as the most precise ones that have emerged. However, for now, except for the UN General Assembly, which, due to its plurality, is not likely to be able to assume supervisory functions, the rest of the alternatives lack the authority of the UN as the Panel of Experts of the Sanctions Committee had. Some considerations As the DPRK strengthened its missile and nuclear capabilities, casting doubt on the effectiveness of the sanction’s regime and the performance of the Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts, this monitoring instrument of the Security Council appeared increasingly biased and uncompromising. Despite Washington and its top allies were intensifying their demands on the State Members to comply with the measures included in the resolutions, many governments avoided implementing the sanctions or did so only partially, in addition, they often failed to submit their reports. The calls from the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee for all Member States to submit their national reports on the implementation of the resolutions comprising the sanction's regime were becoming more frequent, with representatives being reminded that these reports are mandatory. Of all the UN Member States, fewer and fewer delegations were submitting their reports, and some never did. To mitigate the apathy, the Committee held meetings with Regional Groups to ascertain the technical assistance and training needs of Member States for the effective implementation of Security Council resolutions at the national level. It became evident that the most determined to challenge the Panel of Experts were Russia and China, which in the multilateral arena deployed various initiatives to ease the sanctions regime and vetoed new resolutions, while at the same time, they relativized their application bilaterally. Everything seems to indicate that Moscow and Beijing were gauging the "loophole" through which to penetrate and cause the implosion of the Panel of Experts and saw the opportunity by vetoing its extension, which will take effect on April 30. We are witnessing exasperated actions from Washington and its top allies to at least attempt to maintain oversight to contain the nuclearization of the DPRK when they have been unable to do so through other means. However, at the same time, it is observed that the main powers in conflict with the United States are aligned with Pyongyang on various fronts, including the multilateral space, something that is strategically very favorable for all three parties. References Agustín Menéndez. Matando al mensajero: sobre Corea del Norte y las Naciones Unidas – Reporte Asia. Disponible en: https://reporteasia.com/opinion/2024/04/16/matando-mensajero-corea-del-norte-naciones-unidas/ Marcus Noland. Hobbling sanctions on North Korea: Russia and the demise of the UN’s Panel of Experts. Disponible en: https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2024/hobbling-sanctions-north-korea-russia-and-demise-uns-panel-experts Chad O´Carroll. UN General Assembly could monitor North Korea Sanctions, Countries Suggest. Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/un-general-assembly-could-monitor-north-korea-sanctions-countries-suggest/ KBS WORLD. S. Korea Envoy: Russia Vetoed UN Panel Extension to Hide it´s ´Dark Spot´. Disponible en: https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=184836 UN News General Assembly debates Russia´s veto of DPR Korea sanction Panel. Disponible en: https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/04/1148431 Newsroom Infobae. La embajadora de EEUU ante la ONU visita la Zona Desmilitarizada entre las dos Coreas. Disponible en: https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2024/04/16/la-embajadora-de-eeuu-ante-la-onu-visita-la-zona-desmilitarizada-entre-las-dos-coreas/ Ifang Bremer. US exploring alternatives to North Korea sanction panel in and out of UN: Envoy. Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/us-exploring-alternatives-to-north-korea-sanctions-panel-in-and-out-of-un-envoy/ Kim Tong Hyung. Envoy says US determined to monitor North Korea nukes, through UN or otherwise. Disponible en:https://apnews.com/article/us-north-korea-un-sanctions-monitoring-panel-experts-2064dd5d479a672711945f2c6aa6f1 United States Mission to the United Nations. Readout of Ambassador Linda Thomas Greenfield´s Meeting with Young North Korean Escapees in the-Republic-of-Korea. Disponible en: https://usun.usmission.gov/readout-of-ambassador-linda-thomas-greenfields-meeting-with-young-north-korean-escapees-in-the-republic-of-korea/ Korea Times. US to seek ways to continue sanction monitoring on NK despite uncooperative Russia, China: Envoy. Disponible en: https://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=372893 United Nations. Security Council Fail to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanction Committee on Democratic People´s Republic of Korea. Disponible en: https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15648.doc.htm U.S. DEPARTMENT of STATE. Proliferation Security Initiative. About the Proliferation Security Initiative. Disponible en: http://www.state.gov/proliferation-security-initiative EGMONT GROUP OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS. Disponible en: https://egmontgroup.org/

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group”Tensions between China and the Philippines are increasing the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2024 – Spring Update, Crisis Group looks at how the EU can support regional diplomacy to mitigate maritime disputes. Rising maritime tensions between China and the Philippines have highlighted the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea and the dangers it would pose to global trade. Several countries are implicated in the set of complex sovereignty disputes in the sea, which stem from rival claims to various features and the maritime entitlements they generate, but recent incidents involving Beijing and Manila have triggered the greatest concern. The Philippines controls nine outposts in the Spratlys, a contested group of land and maritime features at the heart of the South China Sea. A submerged reef known as Second Thomas Shoal has become a dangerous flashpoint, with Chinese boats continually trying to block Manila’s efforts to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre, a rusting ship housing a handful of soldiers that a former Philippine government purposely grounded in 1999 in a bid to assert sovereignty over the atoll. China, which also claims the shoal, first started interfering with these missions in 2014, but relations between the two countries in the maritime domain have never been as volatile as during the last seven months. Chinese boats have regularly rammed the Philippine supply vessels or doused them with water cannons, occasionally wounding the sailors on board. Manila has a Mutual Defence Treaty with Washington, making this burgeoning maritime dispute part of the geopolitical competition between the U.S and China. In effect, the South China Sea has become a zone where conflict risks are rife – and where Washington and Beijing could be drawn into direct confrontation. Considering these developments, the EU and its member states should: • Seek greater diplomatic engagement with both Beijing and Manila to keep tensions in check. They should also expand their diplomatic presence across South East Asia and, where relevant, establish reliable channels through which they could communicate with high-level authorities in China and other claimant states should disputes at sea escalate; • Work to promote respect for international law, particularly the law of the sea, as a source of neutral rules for dispute resolution and conflict prevention, for example by organising public events, roundtables and dialogues in Manila and elsewhere. While this measure may not bridge the divides between Manila and Beijing, it could at least help establish a level of mutual support and understanding among the other South China Sea claimant states; and • Strengthen coast guard cooperation with the Philippines, focusing on building capacity in areas such as environmental protection, safety and search-and-rescue procedures. Troubled Waters The sovereignty disputes that underpin the tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea go back decades. But it was Beijing’s manoeuvres to take control of Mischief Reef (in the east of the Spratlys) from Manila in 1995 that altered the perceived balance of power between the two states and in the region, setting off the territorial dispute that has now taken a turn for the worse. China’s assertiveness in the sea has grown in the past few years, along with its military capabilities. The brewing territorial dispute made headlines in 2012 when Beijing in effect took control of Scarborough Shoal, an atoll 220km west of the Philippine mainland but within Manila’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), after a maritime altercation. The incident prompted then-President Benigno Aquino to file a case challenging China’s territorial claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On 12 July 2016, the presiding arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of Manila, dismissing China’s claim to all the waters within its “nine-dash line”, which constitute almost the entire South China Sea. But it was a Pyrrhic victory. Beijing not only rejected the adjudication and the subsequent ruling, but it had also already undercut efforts to settle the dispute through legal channels by building and fortifying seven artificial islands in the Spratlys while the case was winding its way through the system. This move fundamentally changed the status quo, enabling Beijing to post permanent garrisons in the area for the first time. By many accounts, China has thus ensured itself control of the sea in any situation below the threshold of armed conflict. A short lull in the maritime dispute appeared to follow. After coming to power in 2016, Aquino’s successor, Rodrigo Duterte, pursued a pragmatic policy toward Beijing. Duterte downplayed the tribunal’s decision and cast sovereignty issues aside, hoping to benefit from Beijing’s economic largesse in exchange. Yet his ambitious gambit did not pay off. Tensions at sea continued in the form of regular standoffs between the country’s coast guard and Chinese vessels. Filipino fisherfolk struggled to reach their traditional fishing grounds, and Manila could not exploit the precious oil and gas reserves within its EEZ to which it is entitled under international law. In March 2021, Chinese ships massed around Whitsun Reef, an unoccupied feature in the sea, ringing alarm bells in Manila, where senior officials voiced public criticism of China’s behaviour for the first time in years. By the end of the Duterte administration, the Philippines had revived its ties with the U.S. and become more assertive still, filing several diplomatic protests with the Chinese government. Elected in 2022, President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Duterte’s successor, was initially disposed toward friendly relations with Beijing, but the relationship soured only a few months into his presidency. Although China remains the Philippines’ top trading partner, Marcos, Jr.’s meetings with President Xi Jinping did not achieve the desired results: Beijing neither agreed to make major new investments nor curtailed its “grey zone” tactics in the South China Sea, understood as coercive actions that remain below the threshold of armed conflict. These rebuffs have helped push Marcos, Jr. toward strengthening ties with Washington, and the Biden administration has, on several occasions, publicly committed that the countries’ Mutual Defence Treaty would be deemed triggered in the event of an armed attack on Philippine warships, aircraft or public vessels. In perhaps the most significant recent development, after a series of high-level visits by U.S. officials to Manila, the two countries agreed to scale up implementation of their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which gives U.S. troops rotational expanded access to Philippine military bases, and which China perceives as a provocation, especially given these bases’ proximity not just to the South China Sea but also to Taiwan. Manila has also received defence and diplomatic support from a host of other countries, particularly Japan and Australia. Despite the dispute it has with Vietnam over parts of the South China Sea, it has engaged, more quietly, with Hanoi, and acquired maritime defence equipment from India, thus expanding its circle of partners. Joint naval exercises with various countries have included large-scale ones with the U.S. in April, which involved the deployment of missiles that can reach targets almost 1,600km away – something that was sure to draw Beijing’s attention – and took place just after Manila wound up its first-ever trilateral presidential summit with Washington and Tokyo. In the meantime, the Marcos, Jr. administration has pursued what it calls a “transparency initiative”, publicising information about maritime incidents by inviting journalists to join its coast guard ships or posting video recordings of events almost as they are happening. Dramatic footage of Chinese vessels blocking, ramming or attacking its resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal with water cannons has generated widespread condemnation in the Philippines and abroad. Many consider these tactics to be bullying. For its part, and despite the 2016 ruling, Beijing asserts that Manila is intruding into its waters and maintains that it is demonstrating maximum restraint. China has also recently referred to a so-called gentleman’s agreement under former President Duterte that it says foresaw preserving a status quo in the South China Sea, with Manila ostensibly agreeing to supply only humanitarian goods and no construction materials to the BRP Sierra Madre; Manila denies that there was any such arrangement. Given the Philippines’ determination to continue resupplying its troops on the BRP Sierra Madre, Second Thomas Shoal will likely remain a flashpoint. Due to the constraints imposed at sea by the Chinese maritime militia and coast guard, Manila is starting to look into other means of provisioning its outpost, some of which are likely to irk Beijing even more, such as airdrops or closer U.S. naval escorts. In September 2023, a U.S. plane was in the shoal’s vicinity during a resupply mission, while a U.S. warship passed through waters nearby in December. But the shoal is not the only possible source of tension. Chinese vessels, both official and non-official, sail through many areas where Philippine fisherfolk traditionally work, while other features, such as Scarborough Shoal, are also points of friction. A large-scale encounter or accident at sea could be especially dangerous. Should a Filipino or Chinese national die during such a confrontation, it could stir nationalist sentiments in Manila and Beijing and heighten threat perceptions on both sides. In case of loss of life on the Philippine side, Manila would expect its U.S. ally to assist under the Mutual Defence Treaty, especially given the recent exchanges with Washington on that topic, although the U.S. has not said precisely how it would come to the Philippines’ aid. How such a dangerous situation would evolve depends in large part on Manila’s political decision to invoke the treaty and the choices Washington makes about how to fulfill its commitments. In principle, Beijing and Manila remain open to negotiations. But the bilateral consultative mechanism, a confidence-building measure designed in 2017 to manage maritime issues between the two countries, among other things, has generated no results of note. Meanwhile, efforts to create a Code of Conduct, which aims to reduce tensions at sea by setting up norms and rules between claimants and has been under discussion between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for over two decades, have stagnated. Why the Sea Matters The South China Sea is a vital waterway through which around one third of global shipping passes. Peace and stability in the sea are a prerequisite for safe trade and are demonstrably in the interest of the EU and its member states. At over 40 per cent, the share of the EU’s trade with the rest of the world transiting the sea is even higher than the global average. Instability in the area would deal a major blow to the European economy; even a slight disturbance of shipping routes could result in higher transport costs, shipping delays and acute product shortages. Should there be an escalation that pits China against the U.S. in a direct conflict, the consequences could be catastrophic and global. European positions toward South China Sea disputes have traditionally highlighted the importance of all parties respecting international law and the need for peaceful resolution, while being careful not to take sides. But over the last few years, China’s assertiveness and expanding military capabilities have driven a greater sense of urgency and something of a shift in European thinking. First, the EU and several of its member states have developed “Indo-Pacific” strategies, designed to guide and promote cooperation with countries throughout the region. Secondly, Brussels has increased its diplomatic support for the Philippine position following maritime altercations, offering supportive statements in December 2023 and March 2024. Brussels and several European capitals now back Manila in regularly underlining the importance of UNCLOS and maritime law in the South China Sea context. Meanwhile, Europe’s presence in the region is growing, if slowly and in part symbolically. In 2021, the EU appointed a special envoy for the Indo-Pacific for the first time, while European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen visited Manila in July 2023, the first trip to the Philippines by someone holding that office and an opportunity to express, at the highest level, the EU’s readiness to strengthen cooperation with the government in maritime security, among other areas. A German frigate entered the South China Sea in 2021, and French and Italian ships made port calls in Manila in 2023. In March 2024, the EU and the Philippines agreed to resume negotiations over a free trade agreement, while a month later France announced talks regarding a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines. While EU interest in the region is rising, European stances on the South China Sea are complex, with member states harbouring different views on maritime disputes in the region and, more broadly, on big-power competition. Some, such as France – which is the only EU member state to have overseas territories in the region (and which has significant EEZ interests there) – see themselves as having stakes higher than others and are keen to participate in the region’s discussions on security. Others, such as Greece and Hungary, are less concerned with maritime flare-ups so far away and tend to ascribe greater importance to maintaining good relations with Beijing. What the EU and Its Member States Can Do As the EU and its most powerful member states are drawn deeper into the South China Sea, they should raise their diplomatic game in the region – both to ensure awareness of mounting tensions and to look for ways to manage corresponding risks. As a practical matter, Brussels could leverage its status as an ASEAN Strategic Partner to seek more participation in that bloc’s security mechanisms and regional forums; the EU and member states could seek higher levels of engagement with regional powers such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea on matters concerning the South China Sea; and Europe could post more diplomats to the region, including permanent defence attachés who speak the language of naval diplomacy. Of particular importance will be maintaining strong lines of communication with Beijing, where Europe is seen as still having some distance from the U.S.-China strategic rivalry, which works to its diplomatic advantage. While to some extent this communication will be traditional bilateral statecraft, it may also mean looking for new opportunities and new channels for dialogue. For example, some member states could also seek to follow the precedent set by France and China in establishing a coordination and deconfliction mechanism between their militaries. Brussels should also continue raising the South China Sea in its engagement with Beijing as it did during the EU-China summit in 2023. Maintaining these channels will become both more difficult and more important if and when the EU and member states expand their operational presence in the region – for example, if they decide to establish a calibrated maritime presence in the South China Sea, as proposed by the EU envoy to the Indo-Pacific. Such a move is still deemed unlikely for now. As for public diplomacy, Brussels and EU member states should consider practical ways to promote principles of the law of the sea in the region, making the case that broader regional support for and adherence to these principles would provide neutral ground for peacefully avoiding and resolving disputes. While it is hard to see this approach appealing to Beijing, which has rebuffed the UNCLOS tribunal’s decision, there could still be benefits in forging closer cooperation among other claimant states. Convenings in Manila and other regional capitals could cover topics related to the continuing disputes but also to cross-cutting themes of regional interest such as fisheries. With negotiations over a regional Code of Conduct stuck, like-minded countries in the region could use these occasions to at least develop common positions on discrete issues that might be addressed by the Code or that could foster regional confidence-building in the South China Sea. Finally, in the realm of capacity building, European governments should continue to strengthen coast guard cooperation with South China Sea claimant states, helping them develop tools and protocols that might be used where appropriate to avoid confrontation and conflict. Since Aquino’s administration, Manila has tried to boost its coast guard capabilities. Given that many of the other claimant states’ vessels in the South China Sea are coast guard ships, and find themselves embroiled in maritime confrontations, a common approach on rules of engagement could help avoid misunderstandings at sea. Building on the EU’s integrated coast guard system, the EU could host or sponsor joint workshops to develop operating principles for the region’s law enforcement vessels and exchange best practices with Philippine authorities. Brussels could also fund agencies such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to strengthen coast guard expertise on issues such as environmental protection, safety and search-and-rescue procedures. European member states could also participate in joint activities with the Philippine and other ASEAN coast guards to strengthen fisheries control and maritime border protection and deter piracy or smuggling.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The ongoing skirmishes in the South China Sea between China and regional states represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting Africa. As China grows increasingly aggressive in its race for global hegemony and influence, and the United States (US) slowly plunges into the battle to prevent China’s rise, the world is watching the unfolding of this rivalry with unease. Although a few places have felt intense pressure from this alarming competition, the South China Sea (SCS) region is where a violent showdown looks increasingly probable. Unlike the war in Ukraine or Gaza, the US and China may start a direct war in the SCS. And amidst this multifaceted new Cold War 2.0, Africa remains cautious. The South China tinderbox On 23 April, another skirmish took place between China and the Philippines when two Filipino patrol boats approached the shallow turquoise waters of a disputed shoal around 194 km west of the Philippine Islands province of Palawan. The patrol boats were there for an underwater survey near the disputed shoal claimed by both China and the Philippines, thus prompting a Chinese response. A Chinese coast guard, via radio, instructed them to leave the area and threatened hostile measures. Following several radio exchanges, the Chinese coast guard damaged both the Philippine patrol boats by firing high-pressure water cannons at them. However, this was not the first time China’s assertion in this region has caused friction with other SCS neighbours, including Japan and South Korea. China has used an unconvincing U-shaped “nine-dash line” that crosses the exclusive economic zones, or EEZs, of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam to demonstrate its claim in the region. Despite their low intrinsic value, the region lies along a vital trade and supply corridor that supports over US$3 trillion in yearly shipborne commerce. Oil, gas, and fishing sources abound in the area. Beijing has declined to acknowledge a 2016 decision from the Permanent Court of Arbitration that ruled Beijing’s broad claims invalid based on historical grounds. China and the Philippines have already fought many times over the Second Thomas Shoal and the Bashi Channel. China has become increasingly aggressive in the region in the last few years, putting regional stability at high risk. So far, these skirmishes will likely remain regional without the risk of any full-scale war. However, there are risks of casualties or even the vessel capsizing. Making of Cold War 2.0 over the SCS Washington’s response to the upcoming crisis is still modest. US President Biden raised concerns about China’s actions in the SCS , including efforts to impede the Philippines from resupplying its forces on the fiercely disputed Second Thomas Shoal. The US has repeatedly warned China that it’s obligated to defend the Philippines, its oldest treaty ally in Asia, if Filipino forces, ships or aircraft come under an armed attack. The US also conducted Balikatan drills (‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ in Tagalog) with the Philippines with more than 16,000 American and Philippines military personnel. Indeed, its resources are thinly stretched, and Beijing seems to be moving ahead. To deter China by stepping up regional defence diplomacy, Washington is exploring the possibility of a security alliance with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, tentatively called SQUAD. This is in addition to two other existing groupings in the region, “Quad” and “AUKUS,” a defence pact among Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. While AUKUS is a defence pact, Quad is simply a dialogue platform. Africa’s tricky balancing act Even while the socioeconomic repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war have not yet wholly subsided in Africa, the ongoing skirmishes in the SCS represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting several African nations. Despite being geographically far, the conflict’s spillover effect would impact the continent’s food security in terms of both the availability and pricing of some food crops. In addition, the SCS region represents a crucial geographic sweet spot for Africa as a source of trade and investment, translating into growth and development for many African economies. The crisis can potentially fuel price rise, particularly for oil-importing countries. The prospect of a consequential price rise of essential commodities will have enormous ramifications for domestic stability in most African countries. Furthermore, many African economies heavily rely on trade, investment, and aid from South and Southeast Asia, the crisis will significantly hamper the development and growth of the continent. There are also strategic lessons for Africa to learn from the conflict. China’s principal interest in Africa consists of protecting its BRI investments and ensuring steady trade flow. Africa is also essential for China to fulfil its resource needs, maintaining industrial growth and energy security. Therefore, securing stability in countries where China has invested is in China’s interest, just like keeping a stable relationship with China is in the interest of those investment-starved countries. Further, since many investment projects in China are located in different African countries, these countries should be careful. China can become aggressively irredentist, even in Africa. Currently, China owns a naval base in Djibouti and a ballistic missile tracker Yuan Wang 5, off the coast of Durban. It has strong economic influence across the countries of Africa’s east coast thanks to its Belt Road Initiative (BRI). On the West Coast, China has many seaports financed or constructed by Chinese entities. If the national governments of these countries fail to pay, China would happily take control of these ports through lease as it did in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. In addition to Sri Lanka, other South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar also faced dire consequences due to the failure of their BRI debt payment, leading to economic crises, and sometimes even political crises. Therefore, caution would be expected from these African governments. Conclusion China’s increasingly aggressive posture over the SCS raises concerns about the stability of the region. As the current uneasy détente between the US and China bears remarkable similarities to the Cold War, questions are raised regarding the possibilities of a new Cold War 2.0. Questions are also raised concerning the possible reactions from different African countries vis-á-vis Chinese aggression in the region. Undoubtedly, any serious conflict between China and the Philippines would be dangerous. These frequent skirmishes may not lead to a direct war between the US and China. Yet, the risk of vessel capsizing and casualties is high. Any such event would ultimately spark a crisis in Africa. So far, Africa is cautious and continues to balance its great power relationships. Undoubtedly, it is increasingly concerned with the aggressive posture of the Chinese in the region. On the other hand, it needs China for economic purposes. Therefore, Africa will continue to walk the tightrope where it would want US involvement in de-escalating the situation without ruffling any feathers with China. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Kim Tae-woo, former head of the Institute for Unification Studies Today, I would like to tell you that the US nuclear strategy is changing . As President Biden’s term draws to a close, the US is changing its nuclear weapons operational guidelines. President Biden , like President Obama, originally argued for a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons. That is why, when he took office as president in 2020, he advocated for sole purpose nuclear use and no first use (NFU). ‘Sole purpose nuclear use’ means that the US will only use nuclear weapons when it is directly attacked by nuclear weapons, and NFU is an abbreviation for ‘No First Use’, which means that it will not use nuclear weapons before its adversary. When a president changes, the US publishes a strategy document called the ‘Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)’, which declares its nuclear strategy and nuclear operational policies to the outside world. Allies were concerned that if President Biden included such content in the NPR, they would distrust the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. Perhaps conscious of these concerns, the 2022 NPR did not include such content, but President Biden’s nuclear philosophy was reflected throughout the strategy book. As a result, the United States decided to stop developing submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and retire the B83-1 (1.2 mt) missile, an aircraft-delivered nuclear weapon. The Biden administration has changed. In March, it ordered the US military to create nuclear operational guidelines to prepare for a situation in which China, Russia, and North Korea cooperate to launch a nuclear attack on the US, and approved the newly created guidelines. At the same time, it also ordered the development of necessary new weapons and the modernization of the nuclear operational system. In June, the director of the White House National Security Council (NSC)’s nonproliferation office also said, “If the nuclear threat from China, Russia, and North Korea increases, the US will also increase its deployed nuclear weapons,” and hinted at the possibility that “nuclear weapons can be used in conventional warfare.” This is a reversal of President Biden’s policy of giving up preemptive nuclear use. In this way, President Biden is adopting new nuclear operational guidelines and nuclear doctrine while changing his previous position with less than a year left in his term. The reason for this change in the US nuclear doctrine is that he is taking the nuclear arms buildup of China, Russia, and North Korea very seriously in the new Cold War situation, and the strategic focus on the North Korean nuclear issue is changing from ‘North Korea’s nuclear abandonment’ to ‘prevention of nuclear use.’ Although the sensitive parts of the newly created nuclear weapons operational guidelines have not been made public, it is known that they contain explicit concerns about China’s nuclear arms buildup. The guidelines are based on the US Department of Defense’s estimate that China’s nuclear weapons will increase to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, and are intended to prepare for the possibility that China could threaten the US by cooperating with Russia and North Korea on nuclear weapons. The same goes for North Korea. In March, the US, through the NSC and experts, mentioned the need for “interim steps” that are a step back from the goal of “denuclearization,” and said, “We are willing to talk to North Korea unconditionally for negotiations.” The terms “denuclearization of North Korea” and “CVID,” or “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,” disappeared from the platforms of the US Democratic and Republican parties announced ahead of the November presidential election. North Korea may say that “the US has recognized our possession of nuclear weapons,” but that is a misinterpretation. It does not mean accepting, or tolerating, North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but rather recognizing, and is trying to lower the nuclear threat through dialogue, recognizing that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons immediately, but responding strongly if North Korea refuses. As such, the nuclear issue is now reaching a dead end. As the military closeness and nuclear cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea intensifies, it is ultimately triggering a response from the US. Naturally, South Korea cannot just keep watching. In Korea, civic groups are currently conducting a campaign to collect 10 million signatures calling for nuclear armament, but it is unclear how much this movement will change national policy in the future. If this trend continues, there may be countermoves in Japan and Taiwan as well. It is difficult to understand why North Korea should really increase its nuclear weapons and strengthen its military power with drones and artillery, even though food shortages are starting again, the youth are opposing the one-party dictatorship, and the elite are increasingly defecting to seek freedom. “Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org.”

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Minimising the number of one’s enemies while multiplying one’s number of friends is a basic principle of diplomacy that has existed for centuries. The simplicity of the principle itself is more than compensated by the complexity of its practical implementation. In international relations, the price of friendship may be too high, limiting freedom of manoeuvre, while open hostility brings existing contradictions to the limit, radically resolving them in favour of one side or another. Advising a diplomat to expand alliances and limit confrontations is like advising a stock market player to buy shares when they are cheap and sell when they are expensive. It is obvious that minimising the number of rivals allows you to save resources, concentrate them on the tasks of internal development, and not be torn on several fronts. However, it is also obvious that competition may be preferable to concessions to the demands of the opposite side, especially when it comes to issues of principle. The situation is further complicated by the fact that countries can compete in some areas while remaining partners in others. Then adjusting the balance of cooperation and competition becomes even more difficult. The transition of international relations to extreme forms of rivalry is quite possible; history is full of such episodes. In such situations, the key task becomes not so much preserving the remnants of friendship as a preparation for the upcoming war, which the parties may consider inevitable, waging war by proxies, and entering into confrontation at a convenient moment. The bottom line is that the one who finds the optimal balance of allies and rivals will be able to conserve resources, and if confrontation is inevitable, will be able to withstand it, emerge victorious, and make use of the results of victory. The current state of international relations demonstrates a steady tendency towards the multiplication of deterrence tasks among the three key global centres of military power—the United States, China and Russia. Each of them has an increasing number of opponents. Moreover, the increase in their number, as well as the degree of confrontation, has its roots in the relatively favourable situation of the 1990s and early 2000s, when Washington, Beijing, and Moscow enjoyed much more favourable external conditions: the number of rivals was negligible, while the density of partnerships was unprecedented. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the United States had virtually no rivals among the major powers. Relations with Russia were defined by a network of arms control treaties. It was difficult to call them cloudless, but even a semblance of confrontation from the Cold War era was very difficult to imagine. The key security problem for the United States was radical Islamism in its terrorist guise; Russia actively helped the United States in its fight against international terrorism, and China simply did not interfere. North Korea and Iran formed an “axis of evil” whose nuclear ambitions Washington tried to restrain with sanctions. Moscow and Beijing, if they did not help the Americans, then at least tried to find the optimal formula for solving nuclear problems via the UN Security Council. Some twenty years later, the situation for the United States has changed quite radically. China is perceived as a powerful and long-term rival in all senses. We are talking about a military-political, economic, and even ideological rivalry. It is difficult to compare China with the USSR during the Cold War. But in all three of these dimensions, it represents an alternative to American politics. Although the United States would like to keep the rivalry with China under control, especially given the close ties between the two economies, the task of containing China will become a priority for decades to come. Russia has turned from a weakened and extremely cautious partner into a tough and uncompromising adversary, as its interests in the post-Soviet space are being infringed upon, and its economy and military-industrial complex are being restored. Enmity with it requires a manifold increase in investments in support of Ukraine, an increased presence in Europe, and the modernisation of nuclear potential, taking into account the advance appearance of new missile systems in Moscow. The arms control regime has been torn to shreds. Washington is trying to control the escalation but could find itself at war with Russia, with the unlikely but growing risk of a nuclear exchange. The DPRK has both nuclear weapons and missiles capable of launching them. It would now be more difficult to crush North Korea.  US enmity towards Russia and its rivalry with China has provided an opportunity for Pyongyang to emerge from isolation. The same goes for Iran. The aggravation of US relations with Russia and China plays into Tehran’s hands in overcoming isolation and the blockade. The “axis of evil” that the United States so actively fought against has only strengthened, and in interaction with Russia and partly China, it will continue to strengthen. Russia and China themselves are also getting closer. A military alliance is a long way off. Moscow and Beijing are not striving for it. But their interaction is now closer, and the United States will no longer be able to use Russia to balance China. Chinese diplomacy has been building an extremely cautious foreign policy since the late 1970s. Beijing has most consistently adhered to the principle of minimizing adversaries and maximizing friends. In many ways, China has achieved its goal, having managed to create favourable foreign policy conditions for enormous economic growth, increasing the well-being of citizens and modernising the army. The problem is that such PRC growth, even taking into account the lack of expressed ambitions, has caused growing concern in the United States. As a result, Beijing was faced with the fact that Washington decided to act proactively, containing China while the possibilities for such containment remained in the arsenal of American foreign policy. Perhaps the PRC leadership would prefer to continue to enjoy the benefits of global peace and live amid conditions of minimal competition. But the results of successful modernisation are now becoming an issue that the United States considers a security challenge. This means China will have to live in response to the American policy of containment, which includes the building of anti-Chinese alliances. Here, American diplomacy will try to place its bets, including in India. However, India is too large and powerful a country to play a passive role. China, in turn, is building a special relationship with the United States' European NATO allies. Here Beijing could take into account the Russian experience of “special” relations with the European Union. Finally, Russia at the turn of the century had practically no serious rivals. The country was seriously weakened by the fall of the Soviet Union and controversial reforms. Political relations with the West have gradually deteriorated since the late 1990s, but still haven’t reached a critical level, having been compensated with a high level of economic cooperation. In Asia, relations with US allies Japan and South Korea were also especially cordial without the burdens that remained in matters of European security. Today, almost the entire collective West is fighting against a strengthened Russia in Ukraine, supplying Kiev with weapons and ammunition, and providing Ukraine with finances, intelligence, military specialists, etc. Economic relations have been undermined for a long time by sanctions. Tokyo and especially Seoul have taken a more cautious position, but are still forced to follow the American line. The bottom line is that all three powers, for various reasons, have found themselves in a situation where the tasks of containment, expanding confrontation, and the need to resolve security issues involve using force or the threat of its use. Past economic ties have not held back political contradictions. Apparently, we are only at the beginning of an exacerbation. After all, the real fight between the two key rivals—the USA and China—is yet to come. One can argue for a long time about what is the root cause of the increase in deterrence—mistakes of diplomats or objective factors giving rise to rivalry. The result is what’s important. The three largest military-political centres simultaneously faced deteriorating foreign policy conditions, whereas twenty years ago all three were in a much more peaceful environment. The fate of the future world order still depends on the ability of the ‘troika’ to control rivalry and on the results of such rivalry. First published in the Valdai Discussion Club. Original published in Russian. https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/ssha-kitay-rossiya-umnozhenie-sderzhivaniya/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, combined with a Republican-led US Senate, was widely feared among international allies and will be cheered by some of America’s foes. While the former put on a brave face, the latter are finding it hard to hide their glee.  On the war in Ukraine, Trump is likely to try to force Kyiv and Moscow into at least a ceasefire along the current front lines. This could possibly involve a permanent settlement that would acknowledge Russia’s territorial gains, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the territories occupied since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  It is also likely that Trump would accept demands by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to prevent a future Ukrainian Nato membership. Given Trump’s well-known animosity to Nato, this would also be an important pressure on Kyiv’s European allies. Trump could, once again, threaten to abandon the alliance in order to get Europeans to sign up to a deal with Putin over Ukraine.  When it comes to the Middle East, Trump has been a staunch supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past. He is likely to double down on this, including by taking an even tougher line on Iran. This aligns well with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current priorities.  Netanyahu seems determined to destroy Iran’s proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen and severely degrade Iranian capabilities. By dismissing his defence minister, Yoav Gallant, a critic of his conduct of the offensive in Gaza, Netanyahu has laid the ground for a continuation of the conflict there.  It also prepares for a widening of the offensive in Lebanon and a potentially devastating strike against Iran in response to any further Iranian attack on Israel.  Trump’s election will embolden Netanyahu to act. And this in turn would also strengthen Trump’s position towards Putin, who has come to depend on Iranian support for his war in Ukraine. Trump could offer to restrain Netanyahu in the future as a bargaining chip with Putin in his gamble to secure a deal on Ukraine.  Pivot to China  While Ukraine and the Middle East are two areas in which change looms, relations with China will most likely be characterised more by continuity than by change. With Chinese relations being perhaps the key strategic foreign policy challenge for the US, the Biden administration continued many of the policies Trump adopted in his first term – and Trump is likely to double down on them in a second term.  A Trump White House is likely to increase import tariffs, and he has talked a great deal about using them to target China. But Trump is also just as likely to be open to pragmatic, transactional deals with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Just like in relations with his European allies in Nato, a serious question mark hangs over Trump’s commitment to the defence of Taiwan and other treaty allies in Asia, including the Philippines, South Korea, and potentially Japan. Trump is at best lukewarm on US security guarantees.  But as his on-and-off relationship with North Korea in his first term demonstrated, Trump is, at times, willing to push the envelope dangerously close to war. This happened in 2017 in response to a North Korean test of intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang makes another close brush of this kind as likely as Trump’s unpredictability makes it conceivable that he would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea as part of a broader deal with Russia, which has developed increasingly close relations with Kim Jong-un’s regime.  Doing so would give Trump additional leverage over China, which has been worried over growing ties between Russia and North Korea.  Preparing for a Trump White House  Friends and foes alike are going to use the remaining months before Trump returns to the White House to try to improve their positions and get things done that would be more difficult to do once he is in office.  An expectation of a Trump push for an end to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is likely to lead to an intensification of the fighting there to create what the different parties think might be a more acceptable status quo for them. This does not bode well for the humanitarian crises already brewing in both regions.  Increasing tensions in and around the Korean peninsula are also conceivable. Pyongyang is likely to want to boost its credentials with yet more missile – and potentially nuclear – tests.  A ratcheting-up of the fighting in Europe and the Middle East and of tensions in Asia is also likely to strain relations between the US and its allies in all three regions. In Europe, the fear is that Trump may make deals with Russia over the head of its EU and Nato allies and threaten them with abandonment.  This would undermine the longevity of any Ukrainian (or broader European) deal with Moscow. The relatively dismal state of European defence capabilities and the diminishing credibility of the US nuclear umbrella would not but help to encourage Putin to push his imperial ambitions further once he has secured a deal with Trump.  In the Middle East, Netanyahu would be completely unrestrained. And yet while some Arab regimes might cheer Israel striking Iran and Iranian proxies, they will worry about backlash over the plight of Palestinians. Without resolving this perennial issue, stability in the region, let alone peace, will be all but impossible.  In Asia, the challenges are different. Here the problem is less US withdrawal and more an unpredictable and potentially unmanageable escalation. Under Trump, it is much more likely that the US and China will find it hard to escape the so-called Thucydides trap – the inevitability of war between a dominant but declining power and its rising challenger.  This then raises the question of whether US alliances in the region are safe in the long term or whether some of its partners, like Indonesia or India, will consider realigning themselves with China.  At best, all of this spells greater uncertainty and instability – not only after Trump’s inauguration but also in the months until then.  At worst, it will prove the undoing of Trump’s self-proclaimed infallibility. But by the time he and his team come to realise that geopolitics is a more complicated affair than real estate, they may have ushered in the very chaos that they have accused Biden and Harris of. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The implementation of yet another U.S. initiative may allow it to interfere in the information policy of ASEAN and control the cyberspace of all of Southeast Asia. Two sides of the same summit The annual summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States was held in Vientiane in October. Meetings in this format are routine for ASEAN and are held with each of the non-regional powers, i.e. the dialogue partners of the association. They discuss plans for cooperation and exchange views on international issues. This time, the U.S., represented by A. Blinken, again tried to use dialogue to impose its vision of global issues. The statements of the US Secretary of State were anti-Russian, anti-Chinese and anti-North Korean in nature, and were aimed at increasing tensions vis-à-vis the South China Sea and the internal political situation in Myanmar. The timing of the meeting was no accident; it took place before the East Asia Summit (EAS), which is a platform for multilateral negotiations between ASEAN countries and external partners. In this way, Washington hoped to force representatives of Southeast Asian states to reconsider the agenda of the EAS and planned to use the upcoming event to provoke regional conflicts and consolidate their role as the ‘chief gendarme’ of the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. However, as the EAS showed, the U.S. failed to do so: no one except U.S. allies supported the attempts to undermine the regional architecture of security and cooperation. Following the results of the US-ASEAN summit, the divergence of views was also notable. The parties did not adopt any joint document of a political nature. Such a result was natural; for ASEAN, any external imposition of views is traditionally unacceptable. In general, the ASEAN leaders’ talks with Anthony Blinken were held among other meetings with Russia, India, China etc., and they would not have attracted much attention if a very narrow joint statement (‘Statement on Promoting Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence’ (AI)) had not been adopted in the aftermaths. With good intention According to the terms of this statement, under the plausible pretext of ‘achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals’, the United States intends to implement a whole range of plans together with ASEAN. Thus, it is planned to ‘discuss the further development of ASEAN’s AI projects’ (although, why should ASEAN discuss its plans with someone?), ‘interaction with the ASEAN Working Group on AI Governance (again, a direct intention to enter the decision-making process in the association), ‘creating an ASEAN roadmap for responsible AI’ (and, thus, inclusion in the internal planning process of its activities). In addition, the parties will ‘cooperate on approaches and standards in the field of AI’ (these approaches and standards will be based on similar U.S. ones), ‘knowledge exchange, technology transfer’ (the saying about ‘free cheese in a mousetrap’ is involuntarily recalled), ‘strengthening the collective digital and cyber potential’ (again based on the United States and built according to their rules), ‘the expansion of education in the field of AI’ (also according to U.S. norms) and ‘the development of interrelated approaches to AI management’ (AI management is a serious issue and it must be understood that external participation equals a direct threat to national sovereignty). Even more ambitious tasks include ‘supporting the development of national digital and AI strategies, discussing its management and regulation’ (for the United States, gaining access to national strategies will provide new tools for interfering in the internal affairs of others), ‘implementing initiatives in cooperation with the ministries of digital development of ASEAN countries’, as well as ‘ensuring information security support for the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework’ (its adoption is planned in 2025; here the U.S. is again interfering in intra-ASEAN affairs). We were not snubbed of the traditional American demagoguery in the field of ‘human rights’. The statement supposes ‘ensuring human rights and protection from all forms of discrimination and prejudice when using AI’ and  ‘ensuring the inclusiveness and accessibility of AI’ in the near future. Whether the mass use of AI will be safe for the population is a question the authors of the document are not considering, instead occupying themselves with other tasks. Another component is ‘dealing with foreign manipulation of information, disinformation and training in the field of technologies to counter this’ (of course, the U.S. initiators do not doubt their right to assign labels to information sources). Finally, it is expected to ‘stimulate the improvement of the population’s digital literacy via the private sector’, although, it would seem, in such sensitive areas as AI, digital technologies and cyberspace, only the state can protect the interests of its citizens. The name of the game When analysing these agreements, it becomes clear that the United States is aiming to take control not only of the economy or technology, but of the information space of Southeast Asia and the information policy of both ASEAN as a whole and individual members countries and their national sectoral departments. Such a radical deepening of interaction includes direct interference in the affairs of the association – unprecedented in its arrogance and openness – and searching for opportunities to reduce the role of states in controlling AI and the cyber sphere, as well as access to scientific and technological work of Southeast Asian countries in the field of AI and monopolisation of the Southeast Asian media sphere, which is absolutely a colonial approach of deciding which information people from ASEAN are allowed to read and see and which is declared ‘foreign manipulation’. The U.S. has already demonstrated its seriousness. On November 1, Rumman Chowdhury, an AI specialist and the U.S. Special Representative for Science, flew to the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta to remind Southeast Asian countries of the need to implement the joint statement. Here it should be understood that U.S. sectoral cooperation with ASEAN will be executed by a system of highly specialised institutions that objectively does not depend on the change of the presidential administration. Agreements have been made, obligations have been established and the implementation mechanism has been launched. Moreover, the U.S. will have a separate and individual approach to each country in terms of fulfilling and implementing these agreements. It is planned to work with the sectoral ‘digital’ ministries of the Southeast Asian states, which is nothing more than the selection of loyal future agents of influence. However, the question is to what extent the political and expert circles in Southeast Asia understand the long-term risks of granting a foreign partner large-scale access to the sensitive cyber sphere – even one whose interests in the region have long been known to everyone: inciting conflicts, ‘dividing and ruling’, searching for and luring highly qualified specialists (brain drain), exclusively imposing their own view on international issues, linking countries and markets to their technologies with the transfer of all kinds of useful data to intelligence services. *  *  * It would seem that ASEAN has always opposed neo-colonialism and supported a multi-vector course, equidistant from any external interests of its dialogue partners. Most likely, the association could only allow the appearance of info-colonial encroachments from its U.S. counterpart due to hopes for disinterested financing of its development from the United States (which in itself sounds like an oxymoron) and counting on some kind of abstract technology transfer. However, the consequences of the adoption of U.S. policy by Southeast Asian countries (if they do not ‘hit the brakes’ on the commitments they have made) could be deplorable, disastrous for their digital sovereignty, technological development and their independent course in general.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump, who won the US presidential election on November 5th, is appointing key officials for the new government that will be launched in January next year, and the content is very unconventional. In a word, they are young, reformist, and loyalists who have been breathing together with him. This is especially true for those who will lead foreign policy and security. The nominations include 40-year-old Senator James Vance as Vice President, 53-year-old Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, 44-year-old Fox News anchor Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, 50-year-old Representative Mike Walz as National Security Advisor, 43-year-old Representative Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 59-year-old former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe (59) as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 53-year-old South Dakota Governor Kristi Nome as Secretary of Homeland Security, and 67-year-old Suzy Wiles as Co-Chair of the White House Campaign Committee. Among these, the five key figures are the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, and Director of National Intelligence, with an average age of 46, and all of them are ‘hawkish conservative patriots.’ Vice President Vance, a Catholic, shares the same ideological stance as President-elect Trump, including his opposition to abortion and his denial of global warming, and served in Iraq as a Marine. Secretary of State nominee Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, has taken a hard-line stance on Chinese corporate infiltration of the United States and human rights in China while serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in 2020, he introduced the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. He also opposed the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and called North Korea a “criminal group” for its human rights abuses, nuclear and missile development, and criticized it as a “massive group of lunatics” immediately after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in 2017. He is also a pro-Korea figure who has visited the DMZ in South Korea several times. National Security Advisor nominee Walz, a retired colonel from the U.S. Army Special Forces and a veteran of the Middle East, has advocated for reducing dependence on China for key minerals and boycotting the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and in June criticized North Korea-Russia military cooperation as a “dangerous and evil alliance.” He also always visited the DMZ when he came to Korea. Secretary of Defense Haggis is also a veteran of the Middle East and a former US Army major. He later became a host for FOX News and developed a relationship with President-elect Trump. Director of National Intelligence Gabbard, who collects and analyzes information from intelligence agencies, is a reserve lieutenant colonel with experience in the Middle East. She became the youngest member of the House of Representatives in Hawaii at 21 and is the first female veteran of the war. As such, the five key figures in the diplomatic and security line are all young and reformist, and most of them are veterans of the Middle East. If we look at the ideological tendencies, passion, careers, and past words and actions of President-elect Trump and the nominees for the diplomatic and security line, we can predict many things. First, domestically, reforms will be attempted to fit Trump’s slogan of “Make America Great Again (MAGA),” such as reducing and streamlining government organizations, strengthening the US military, promoting growth-oriented economic policies, and protecting domestic companies through fair trade. Under the slogans of “political correctness (PC) and being woke (WOKE),” abortion, homosexuality in the military, and environmental policies that were spread are expected to decline. Externally, there will be a strong confrontation with the “axis of change” powers such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that are leading international conflicts in the new Cold War structure, and the US nuclear military power and nuclear doctrine are also expected to be strengthened and reinforced. In other words, the trend of nuclear reduction and conventional military reduction that has continued since the end of the Cold War will be reversed, and efforts will be made to develop tactical nuclear weapons, new ships, and aircraft. Regionally, it is expected that efforts will be made to check China’s expansionism and pressure the public economically, strengthen security cooperation with allies on fairer terms, strengthen support for Israel, and bring an early end to the Ukraine War.  Considering all these things, we can predict several things about Trump’s second term US policy toward North Korea. First, regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, unlike the ‘strategic patience’ shown by the Obama and Biden administrations, it is expected that they will actively respond. In line with this, they will likely actively oppose the restoration of the Russia-North Korea alliance, Russia-North Korea military cooperation, and the dispatch of North Korean troops to Ukraine, and they will likely be just as nervous as South Korea about Russia helping North Korea advance its nuclear program. They will also actively establish military operation plans against North Korea in case of an emergency, and South Korea-US joint training and South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation will also be strengthened. Criticism of North Korea’s human rights issues through the UN is also likely to intensify. Nevertheless, considering that all the key officials who will move the diplomatic and security line are patriots who value national interests, they may also show a pragmatic tendency. In other words, if North Korea comes to the nuclear negotiations with a genuine will to compromise, the US will also engage in sincere dialogue, and if North Korea makes a sincere proposal rather than stalling or tricking, it is possible that the US will make efforts for an unprecedented agreement. Therefore, as Trump’s second term approaches, North Korea will have to consider whether to stick to its reckless nuclear policies to date or adopt a more pragmatic stance in the face of an increasingly powerful United States. Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Subsequent U.S. administrations, except for brief moments of relative calm, have persisted in demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) abandon its nuclear program and, moreover, have made extensive efforts to destabilize its political and economic system. Meanwhile, the successive leaders of the DPRK have persisted in advancing their defensive capabilities until reaching their preferred deterrent: nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, a guarantee of survival. This persistent situation reached an unprecedented moment when, during his previous presidency, Donald Trump made a surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK, temporarily unraveling, although without the expected results, the "Korean Gordian Knot." This led to successive summits in 2018 and 2019 (Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom) with Kim Jong Un, the leader of a state that, throughout its history, has maintained sharply confrontational relations with the United States. The world witnessed the transition from exchanges of insults and threats—Trump calling Kim "Little Rocket Man" and Kim referring to Trump as "old senile man"—and threatening the latter with "fire and fury" if the North Korean leader continued missile tests, to becoming "pen pals" and holding three unprecedented summits. No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK like Donald Trump did, and no North Korean leader in history has sat face-to-face, as equals, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did, which granted him prestige on the global stage. Due to reasons associated with its strategic ambiguity, the Biden Administration made no diplomatic progress with Pyongyang. Even though at the beginning of his term he committed to a "new strategy toward North Korea," over the past four years, his actions have only promoted sanctions in the Security Council, which have clashed dramatically with Russia's veto, struggled with the dissolution of the DPRK Expert Group in the Sanctions Committee, and observed the exponential increase in its arsenal of intercontinental, hypersonic, and short-range ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads capable of targeting the continental U.S. and U.S. military bases in the region. Furthermore, the DPRK has resumed uranium enrichment and reopened its nuclear test center. In the end, the outgoing president has been unable to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, much less contain it. So, one must ask: Will Trump's return to the White House mark continuity or a change from his previous term? An analysis of the future position of the Trump administration toward the DPRK should consider that, compared to his previous term, the circumstances have radically changed. 1. DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have made new and significant advances. At the same time, its foreign policy has undergone a reorientation due to the sustained increase in distrust toward Washington from Pyongyang.2. By order of its leader, the DPRK has severed all its ties and symbols of relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as the "main and unchanging enemy," and as it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the People's Armed Forces to accelerate preparations to "occupy, subjugate, and fully reclaim" South Korea, in response to the confrontational attitude and increasingly close military and intelligence ties between Washington and Seoul.3. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two summits between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, and Kim's description of Putin as the "closest comrade," have shown the high level of understanding and commitment between the two, which has materialized in the DPRK's unwavering support for Russia's special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures. This treaty includes a clause for "mutual military assistance," while Russia provides diplomatic and economic backing to the DPRK, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports, mainly oil, raw materials, and food, as well as assistance in various fields.4. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis is taking shape between China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies are labeling it the "new axis of evil." In this interconnected relationship, the DPRK holds significant advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. At least these four factors will significantly impact Donald Trump's decision to return, or not, to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, raising doubts about whether the former would be willing to revisit it. However, if he tries, it is unclear what Kim Jong Un's response would be, clearly more determined and militarily more powerful in the eyes of Washington, which at first glance seems unwilling to renew its offers related to denuclearization. The ironic jest by Trump at the 2024 Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, when he said that Kim Jong Un "missed him," that they "got along very well," and that "he misses me" and "wants me back in the White House" and "it's good to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons," was met with a response from North Korean media, stating that "they don't care" who assumes office in the U.S. This suggests that Pyongyang's official stance is that, regardless of what happens, it will not abandon its nuclear deterrent. Considering the visible changes in the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape that differ from those in 2018-2019, any type of negotiation aimed at reaching compromises between the parties on the denuclearization of North Korea will be even more challenging. Trump may seek alternative approaches to encourage the DPRK to freeze nuclear and missile tests, but he will need to weigh several options. These include: which side should take the first step toward engagement; whether it is necessary to "rattle sabers" to create influence; the possibility of "unilateral conciliatory gestures"; and whether he should stick to the goal of "complete denuclearization" (Chad O’Carroll and Shreyas Reddy, 2024). Donald Trump exhibits an unpredictable, egocentric personality and is a fan of diplomatic spectacle, with a penchant for reality shows. Given this, he might be tempted to revisit diplomacy, possibly considering the absence of John Bolton, who, alongside Michael Pompeo, led the Hanoi Summit to failure. Many agree with what was stated by Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University and former special advisor for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae In administration, when he admitted: "It is possible that, in his second term, Trump will prioritize solidifying his political legacy. His foreign policy would be heavily influenced by media attention and personal ego, as he cares about how history will remember him. Achieving a major deal with Pyongyang and contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula could serve to fulfill that ambition, potentially allowing him to win a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. While resolving the Ukraine war or the Gaza crisis could also improve his chances of receiving the prize, negotiations with Kim Jong Un are likely to be a key agenda for Trump. In that sense, Trump could actively engage with the North Korean leader, and might even consider a visit to Pyongyang for a summit, where he could make surprising offers. However, the success of such efforts ultimately depends on Kim's response" (Lee Hyo Jin, 2024). It is necessary to build some scenarios: 1. The influence of personal friendship could encourage Kim Jong Un to engage in communication with Trump, turning the page on the Hanoi failure and minimizing distrust toward the U.S.2. Recognition by the Trump Administration of the DPRK as a de facto nuclear power and easing of sanctions to promote progress toward the partial normalization of relations.3. Strong U.S. demands for denuclearization and the promotion of further sanctions, leading to increased tensions. Given Trump’s volatility and the unpredictability of the DPRK leadership, there are currently no conditions to determine the most likely scenario. The campaign team has not commented on whether Trump will seek new meetings with Kim Jong Un, but his statements prior to his victory suggest that he might seek to revive talks, possibly sooner rather than later. Now, it is unpredictable what roadmap Trump will implement, as his opinions during the campaign may differ from the decisions he makes officially when in office. It is not accurate to assume that his demeanor during the first term will be indicative of his future conduct. It is worth dedicating a brief space to the designated Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. As a staunch anti-communist, he is one of the promoters of the term "axis of evil," which includes the DPRK, and considers China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as aligned against the US. He has advocated concrete actions and plans against these states. It is expected that, initially, he will oppose any commitment from the incoming administration with the DPRK. As John Bolton and Michael Pompeo did at the time, Rubio could attempt to limit Donald Trump’s maneuvering room with Kim Jong Un. However, there is also the possibility that the next U.S. president’s assertive and authoritarian character, who, despite previous disagreements, appointed Rubio, will lead him to align with Trump’s decisions or, alternatively, suffer the same fate of being ousted with a “tweet and a punch,” as happened to Rex Tillerson and John Bolton. Regarding the Republic of Korea, it is important to specify that the most critical foreign policy issues for Donald Trump’s new administration will be its relationship with the European Union, the Middle East conflicts, the war in Ukraine, the China-Taiwan dispute, and relations with the DPRK. It is precisely the latter that concerns South Koreans the most, as their security largely depends on the presence of U.S. troops in their country and Washington’s support for South Korea’s defense against the imminent “North Korean threat.” The conservative government of Yoon Suk Yeol has marked a clear distinction from his predecessor Moon Jae In by significantly strengthening his alliance with the U.S., driven by his growing animosity towards the DPRK and his pro-American stance. This situation presents little likelihood of encouraging Trump to engage in talks with Kim Jong Un, especially without a clear indication from Pyongyang toward denuclearization. This is likely, as all signs point to Pyongyang not making significant concessions regarding its nuclear deterrent and showing a strong aversion towards the Republic of Korea. After Donald Trump's victory, the South Korean president had a phone conversation with him to extend his congratulations and quickly express his desire for the alliance to continue under his leadership. Although both agreed to hold a summit as soon as possible, the issue of the DPRK, which was already addressed in this initial dialogue, will certainly be on the agenda. It is said that Trump plans for his government to work with South Korea on several bilateral issues, but one of the key aspects will be South Korea’s contribution to Washington for hosting U.S. bases on its territory. Let's remember that during Trump's first term, this was a hot topic in his military relations. It is worth mentioning that due to Donald Trump's transactional approach to international relations, his perception that many of the U.S. allies are "taking advantage" of its military power, and the pressure he exerted on Seoul when he was in office, with Trump's victory, national security against the DPRK is placed at the forefront. Many are concerned that his return to the White House could mean that Washington will no longer be a reliable partner, making it necessary for South Korea to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Han Dong Hoon, leader of the ruling People Power Party, said at a seminar organized to discuss the future of South Korea's nuclear policy that Trump's victory had positive aspects. "Acquiring nuclear potential — meaning having the right to enrich and reprocess uranium — does not inherently equate to possessing nuclear weapons," he said, according to The Korea Herald. "But we would be able to move to that phase at any time if North Korea intensifies its nuclear threats," he added. "I believe we should be prepared for such a scenario amid the changing dynamics of global power and order." Meanwhile, retired Army General Han Ki Ho went a step further and suggested that South Korea may no longer have a choice. "Nuclear armament may be the only path left for South Korea's survival," he stated (Julian Ryall, 2024). However, whether the Republic of Korea acquires nuclear weapons will depend on how the Trump administration approaches the alliance and relations with North Korea, that is, whether it abandons or restricts the "extended deterrence" and whether it pursues an agreement with Pyongyang that halts its development of long-range missiles that could reach the continental United States in exchange for accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear power. This type of agreement would affect Seoul, located just 48 kilometers from the border, and therefore within the range of North Korea's short-range missiles. We are facing an uncertain situation, and therefore, expectant, where the expectations regarding Donald Trump's stance on DPRK are uncertain. Whether the denuclearization of DPRK is a priority for the Trump administration depends on the approach and methods with which the president and his team address an increasingly complex scenario. DPRK, in terms of its economic performance and national defense potential, is not the same as before, which gives Kim Jong Un greater effectiveness in his military deterrence and diplomatic maneuverability, especially when his reliable conduct with Moscow and the appropriate handling of relations with Beijing strengthen his position vis-à-vis the U.S. Trump will have to deal with these realities. And while he may intend to continue his legacy, he will necessarily have to reframe his policy towards DPRK, considering that DPRK is no longer the same, that its main contenders (Russia and China) are precisely the closest to DPRK, and that the country itself is no longer the same, either militarily or socioeconomically, as it was when he engaged in talks with Kim Jong Un in 2018-2019. References - Simone McCarthy (2024) Trump claims Kim Jong Un “isses him. But he faces a very different North Korea leader this time around. Disponible en: https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-intl-hnk/index.html- Keith Johnson (2024) Could Trump Rekindle Diplomacy With North Korea? Disponible en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/13/trump-north-korea-diplomacy-putin-russia/- Joel S. Wit (2024) Blame Donald Trump for North Korea´s sable-rattling. Disponible en: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/blame-donald-trump-for-north-koreas-sabre-rattling/- Rubén Criado (2024) Así afecta la victoria de Trump a Corea del Norte. Disponible en: https://as.com/actualidad/politica/asi-afecta-la-victoria-de-trump-a-corea-del-norte-n/- Josh Smith (2024) Donald Trump se enfrenta a un Kim Jong Un envalentonado, cercano a Rusia y con un arsenal de misiles más grande. Disponible en: https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2024/11/07/donald-trump-se-enfrentara-a-un-kim-jong-un-envalentonado-cercano-a-rusia-y-con-un-arsenal-de-misiles-mas-grande/- Julian Ryall (2024) Regreso de Trump atiza debate nuclear en Corea del Sur. Disponible en: https://amp.dw.com/es/el-regreso-de-trump-atiza-el-debate-nuclear-en-corea-del-sur/a70798786#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317231276140&csi=1&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com- Chad O´Carrol y Shreyas Reddy (2024) Why North Korean denuclearization will likely take backseat in second Trump term | NK Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/why-north-korean-denuclearization-will-likely-take-backseat-in-second-trump-term/- Miguel Jiménez (2024) Donald Trump planea elegir a marcos Rubio como secretario de Estado. Disponible en: https://elpais.com/internacional/elecciones-usa/2024-11-12/donald-trump-elige-a-marco-rubio-como-secretario-de-estado.html?outputType=amp#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317890370552&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com