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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction For some international analysts, the invasion by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, into the Republic of Ukraine, led by Volodymyr Zelensky, on February 24, 2022, was a surprise. This offensive was meant to conquer Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, and Kharkiv, the second-largest city in the country. However, the war that was expected to be quick and low-cost in terms of human lives, with an aura of liberation from the "neo-Nazi government" and the "Ukrainian oligarchy," turned into a much slower and bloodier conflict than the Kremlin anticipated. It is important to clarify that in 2014, the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula, which was part of the territory of Ukraine. Shortly after, pro-Russian rebels from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, supported by Moscow, began a popular uprising, leading to a civil war against Ukrainian troops. In 2019, when pro-Western President Volodymyr Zelensky came to power, clashes between both sides intensified. In February, before the invasion, Putin signed decrees recognizing the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine as independent states, accusing the United States (U.S.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of expanding eastward into Europe, pushing Ukraine’s membership in NATO, and threatening Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. During the first week of the war, the Ukrainian president ordered a general military mobilization to defend Ukrainian territory from the Russian advance, while both the U.S. and its European Union (EU) allies announced political and economic sanctions (energy, transport, finance) against the Russian Federation and the expulsion of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, which includes over 11,000 financial institutions from over 200 countries. This system, based in Brussels, Belgium, was created to facilitate fast and secure cross-border payments and relies on confidentiality, validity, and accessibility of information from participating members. Western multinationals sold their assets in Russia and canceled any partnerships with Russian firms. These measures took Putin by surprise, although thanks to his alliance with China for the sale of gas and oil, he was able to navigate the blockade. Price hikes hurt Russian workers, who saw their income decrease due to rising prices for essential goods. As stalled negotiations continued between the Russians and Ukrainians, Russian troops halted due to Ukrainian resistance, which received weapons and supplies from NATO. This work provides a brief description and analysis of the factors that led to the Russian Federation’s invasion of the Republic of Ukraine and its economic and political consequences for both countries, as well as the role of the U.S. and NATO in the conflict. This invasion is simply a continuation of the longstanding conflict between both countries, especially since the first decade of the 21st century due to territorial and geopolitical issues involving NATO, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Ukraine. In this regard, NATO expanded eastward after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), despite Putin’s warnings. 1. A crisis that began before 2022 In March 2014, a referendum against the opinion of Kyiv was held in Crimea and the autonomous city of Sevastopol, in which pro-Russian inhabitants, who were the majority, decided to join the Russian Federation. This referendum was not accepted by Ukraine, the U.S., and the EU, thus, Moscow incorporated Crimea into its territory, claiming that the peninsula had always been part of Russia. Meanwhile, in April, pro-Russian paramilitary groups took the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which are adjacent to Russia, with supplies and weapons from Moscow. By May, referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk declared the regions as independent republics, although they did not want to join the Russian Federation. The Minsk I Agreement, signed in 2014 between Russia and Ukraine under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), established a roadmap to end the civil conflict and normalize the status of both regions. It aimed for a permanent ceasefire, decentralization of power, the release of hostages, border monitoring with Russia, elections, improved health conditions, and the withdrawal of foreign fighters. The Minsk II agreement, signed in 2015, called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from both sides, pension payments to residents, the establishment of a sanitary zone, elections, prisoner exchanges, and the granting of autonomy to the region, allowing Ukraine to recover the border areas with Russia. Both agreements failed, and fighting resumed. Putin consistently claimed that Ukraine had no intention of implementing the agreements and had only signed them due to military losses, while for the U.S. and its allies, Putin always intended to recognize the independence of both regions, betting on the failure of the negotiations. 2. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Ukraine: The war between both countries Putin had warned months earlier that Western powers, led by the United States, should negotiate with him over the expansion of NATO eastward, which was affecting Russia’s security. Putin demanded that Ukraine not be forced to join NATO, arguing that such a move would not provide any security guarantees for Russia. However, the invasion was not unexpected, as weeks before there had been satellite images showing the deployment of Russian troops and armored vehicles: "Russia had also announced, albeit inconsistently and unclearly, that it would adopt ‘technical-military’ measures against Ukraine if its demands for security guarantees and neutrality regarding the Atlantic Alliance were not accepted" (Sanahuja, 2022, 42). Ukraine’s incorporation into NATO would mean that biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons could be stationed there, something the Russians deemed unjustified since the Warsaw Pact had disappeared in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR. What the Russian Federation sought, as the world’s second-largest military power, was to prevent missiles from pointing at its territory from Ukraine due to NATO’s expansion and U.S. militaristic intentions. The Russian Federation, as one of the key international actors, even as a state strategically involved across multiple continents, felt cornered and overwhelmed in its strategic interests. The Russians sought NATO guarantees to prevent further expansion and desired security at the old geopolitical style for their borders: "On other economic and strategic issues, the Russian state continues to control its vital areas. Corporations controlling hydrocarbons, aerospace, and infrastructure, among others, are state-owned" (Zamora, 2022). On the other hand, Russian nationalism, which considered Ukraine and Russia to be sister nations, has served as a justification for the invasion. Early in the century, Putin was closer to Western positions, but after seeing that his concerns about NATO’s expansion were ignored, he turned to Russian nationalism, seeking to create a ‘hinterland’ in the old Tsarist style, denying Ukraine’s status as an independent state and instead treating it as a historical product allied with Russia. Another reason for Putin to invade Ukraine was to defend the two “people's republics” in the Donbas region: Donetsk and Luhansk. The Russian Federation recognized both regions as "sovereign states" because they had never been granted autonomy. From Putin’s perspective, the invasion was based on the United Nations Charter, which stated that a country under a "genocide" by its government should receive help, as was happening in the two “sovereign states.” According to his view, the measures taken by the Russian Federation were related to Ukraine’s political indecision in controlling the paramilitary militias that were attacking the two independent republics. Due to the failure of the Minsk agreements, Russia was forced to intervene. Following this reasoning, before the Russian intervention, the U.S. and its allies had begun providing significant amounts of modern weapons, not only to rearm the Ukrainian military forces but also to give them the ability to invade Donbas. The Ukrainian army, along with intelligence services trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), constituted a risk for the pro-Russian population in Donbas, so despite Western warnings, the Russian Federation was compelled to intervene. To summarize, in the first phase, Moscow's objectives were to overthrow the “neo-Nazi” government of Kyiv (although this objective was sidelined later due to Ukrainian resistance and Western sanctions), prevent Ukraine from joining NATO to avoid missiles close to its borders, defend the pro-Russian population of Donbas, secure recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, and finally declare the independence of the republics of Luhansk and Donetsk, or, as happened later, hold referendums to annex these regions to the Russian Federation. However, the United Nations General Assembly thought differently from the Russian leader and approved in March the resolution 2022, A/RES/ES-11/1, for humanitarian aid in Ukraine, condemning “in the strongest terms the aggression committed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine” (article 2), demanding “that the Russian Federation immediately cease the use of force against Ukraine” (article 3), and calling for “the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” (article 4). At the same time, while reinforcing the military front, the Russian Federation economically cut gas supplies to Western European countries. What the war demonstrated was the adaptability of the Ukrainian military to fight under unfavorable conditions, using elastic attacks in different places with help from terrain knowledge, spies, and satellite images and drones provided by the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. aid approved by the government of Joseph Robinette Biden Jr. until 2023 reached 40 billion dollars through the Lend-Lease Act for the Defense of Democracy in Ukraine. (Sanahuja, 2022). On the contrary, on the Russian side, the underestimation of the resistance of Ukrainian armed forces, the "Special Military Operation," was compounded by the underestimation of Ukrainian national sentiment, combined with planning problems, tactical issues, supply and logistics challenges, and the low morale of soldiers who did not want to fight against Ukrainians, despite the Kremlin’s calls to battle the "oligarch and neo-Nazi cliques" running Kyiv’s government. Furthermore, ignoring the warnings from the West and Kyiv, Putin announced the annexation of the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, after the results of the referendums showed over 95% support for annexation to the Russian Federation. In response to the annexation, Ukrainian President Zelensky officially requested Ukraine's membership in NATO. This confirmed the definitive cutoff of gas supplies to Europe, causing concern in industries across various countries, especially in small and medium-sized enterprises. 3. The United States, NATO, and China Currently, China and India are the leading buyers of Russian gas, even more so than all of Europe, with discounts granted by the Russians. This demonstrates that the world is no longer unipolar, but multipolar, with the decline of Europe and the economic rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India. While the U.S. leads militarily and is economically stronger than Russia, it is less powerful than the PRC. Therefore, attacking a Chinese ally with nuclear weapons is weakening the PRC, which does not possess many nuclear weapons itself. The U.S. helped the disintegration of the USSR, and now it also seeks the disintegration of the Russian Federation, or at least a regime change, distancing Putin from power and ensuring that the new government is more friendly with the West. This is despite the initial intention of Putin during his first term to join NATO, a request that was denied, and the Russian help (accepting the installation of U.S. bases in Central Asian countries) that the U.S. received when it invaded Afghanistan, when both countries had the same enemies (the Taliban and Al-Qaeda). Although the Russian Federation has not been able to freely use its dollar reserves, as part of them were held in Western countries, it has also benefited from the rise in gas and oil prices, which it continued to export, particularly to the PRC, which has not joined the sanctions. These price hikes not only disrupted the global economy, generating inflation in NATO countries but also increased the prices of minerals and energy, harming capitalist countries and, paradoxically, benefiting the Russians as they sell these commodities. The Russian economy has resisted more than expected, and the ruble, which depreciated at the beginning of the conflict, has recovered. Those who suffered the consequences of the sanctions were the Europeans who import gas and oil. For the U.S. and its allies, the next enemy to defeat is China, as, according to them, global problems require global solutions. Additionally, China has been criticized for not sanctioning and condemning the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is considered a threat to peace by NATO because it seeks, through coercion and annexation, to establish a sphere of influence and direct control with conventional and cyber means, destabilizing Eastern and Southern European countries. If there was any semblance of autonomy by European countries towards the U.S., the crisis has shattered those efforts. Before the crisis, the U.S. complained that Europeans were not doing enough to maintain the alliance, specifically by increasing the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dedicated to defense. The Ukrainian situation has placed them under the U.S. wing, and that autonomy has vanished for the time being. With the election of Donald Trump as president, the situation in Ukraine enters a new phase. Although the Ukrainian president has stated that technical teams have been formed to address the issue of the war with the Russians, there is still no set date for a meeting. Trump also pointed out that Putin is destroying Russia after years of war, generating inflation and economic problems due to the lack of an agreement to end the conflict, although he did not provide specifics on a potential meeting with the Russian president. Trump has encountered a war whose resolution is clearly more complicated than he initially believed. However, from the Russian side, President Putin stated, “we listen to your statements about the need to do everything possible to avoid a Third World War. Of course, we welcome that spirit and congratulate the elected president of the U.S. on his inauguration,” which could be interpreted as an approach to the new administration (Infobae, 2025). The U.S. president, during his presidential campaign had announced that he would end the war in 24 hours, but then the deadline was extended to 100 days. However, now he is seeking a meeting with his Russian counterpart in the coming months, which has proven that the solution to the Russo-Ukrainian war is more complicated than it seemed. Trump has also threatened new sanctions on the Russian Federation if it does not sit at the negotiation table. He has also mentioned that he expects Chinese help to pressure Moscow to seek an end to the conflict. In summary, the U.S. president is more interested in solving internal issues like Latin American migration at the Mexican border than in addressing a war that has lasted almost three years. Final Comments The Republic of Ukraine has been used by Western powers to curb the anti-unipolar stance of the Russian Federation. To maintain Western predominance, the U.S. and allied countries have launched a struggle against the Russians, but through Ukraine, cooperating militarily, politically, and economically. The security policy developed by the U.S. in recent years has shown, on one hand, the growing military power with the maintenance of bases worldwide, from which they can attack or at least influence various countries to defend their interests. On the other hand, the use of this policy has led to the decline of the U.S. economy in the face of competition with the PRC, which has not only increased its GDP but also its productivity, foreign investments, and technological development. In other words, today, Russia is the main opponent, an ally of China, and later, it will be China. The U.S. foreign policy, which sought Ukraine’s membership in NATO, has led Putin to intervene militarily in an invasion in which he believed he would be received as a liberator but encountered fierce nationalist resistance, despite calling the Ukrainian leaders "neo-Nazis." The Russian response to NATO’s eastward expansion is related to security concerns. But they also point to the injustice committed by Western countries. According to the Russians, while they were sanctioned for the invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. was not sanctioned when it invaded Iraq, nor was NATO when it intervened in Libya. The U.S. considered the invasion as an attack on the international order and on American supremacy in the European continent, which is why they are intervening in Ukraine — to attack an invading power that seeks to recover its geopolitical role at both the regional and global levels, as it had during the USSR era. The outcome of the war remains uncertain, as the Ukrainians have invaded and occupied a large part of the Russian region of Kursk, where they have taken towns and prisoners to use as bargaining chips in future negotiations with Russia, while the destruction of infrastructure and the death toll continue to rise. References 1. -Infobae. (2022). Putin vuelve a jugar la carta nuclear y llama a falsos referendos para anexionar cuatro provincias de Ucrania. Buenos Aires. 21 de septiembre. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2022/09/21/putin-vuelve-a-jugar-la-carta-nuclear-y-llama-a-falsos-referendos-para-anexionar-cuatro-provincias-de-ucrania/2. -Infobae. (2022). Vladimir Putin anunció la anexión de las regiones ucranianas de Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson y Zaporizhzhia. Buenos Aires. 30 de septiembre. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2022/09/30/vladimir-putin-anuncio-la-anexion-de-las-regiones-ucranianas-donetsk-luhansk-kherson-y-zaporizhzhia/3. -Infobae. (2025). Trump dijo que Vladimir Putin está “destruyendo a Rusia” por no buscar un acuerdo de paz con Ucrania. Buenos Aires, 21 de enero. https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2025/01/21/trump-dijo-que-vladimir-putin-esta-destruyendo-a-rusia-por-no-buscar-un-acuerdo-de-paz-con-ucrania/4. -Luchetti, J. (2022). El papel de la Federación Rusa y Estados Unidos en la guerra ruso-ucraniana. 2° Congreso Regional de Relaciones Internacionales “(Re) Pensar las Relaciones Internacionales en un mundo en transformación”. Tandil. 28, 29 y 30 de Septiembre.5. -Luchetti, J. (2022). Rusia y la OTAN en Ucrania: la lucha por la supremacía en un país del viejo continente. XV Congreso Nacional y VIII Internacional sobre Democracia “¿Hacia un nuevo escenario internacional? Redistribución del poder, territorios y ciberespacio en disputa en un mundo inestable”. En, C. Pinillos (comp.). Memorias del XV Congreso Nacional y VIII Internacional sobre Democracia. Rosario. Universidad Nacional del Rosario, Facultad de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales, pp. 1098-1127. https://rephip.unr.edu.ar/handle/2133/260936. -Naciones Unidas. (2022). Asamblea General. Resolución A/RES/ES-11/1. Agresión contra Ucrania. New York. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n22/293/40/pdf/n2229340.pdf7. -Sanahuja, J. (2022). Guerras del interregno: la invasión rusa de Ucrania y el cambio de época europeo y global. Anuario CEIPAZ 2021-2022 Cambio de época y coyuntura crítica en la sociedad global. Madrid. Centro de Educación e Investigación para la paz, pp. 41-71. https://ceipaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/3.JoseAntonioSanahuja.pdf8. -Zamora, A. (2022). La multipolaridad contra el Imperialismo y la izquierda extraviada. Buenos Aires. Abril. https://observatoriocrisis.com/2022/04/23/la-multipolaridad-contra-el-imperialismo-y-al-izquierda-extraviada/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It’s official. On February 1, US President Donald Trump will introduce a sweeping set of new 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico. China will also face new tariffs of 10%. During the presidential campaign, Trump threatened tariffs against all three countries, claiming they weren’t doing enough to prevent an influx of “drugs, in particular fentanyl” into the US, while also accusing Canada and Mexico of not doing enough to stop “illegal aliens”. There will be some nuance. On Friday, Trump said tariffs on oil and gas would come into effect later, on February 18, and that Canadian oil would likely face a lower tariff of 10%. This may only be the first move against China. Trump has previously threatened the country with 60% tariffs, asserting this will bring jobs back to America. But the US’ move against its neighbours will have an almost immediate impact on the three countries involved and the landscape of North American trade. It marks the beginning of what could be a radical reshaping of international trade and political governance around the world. What Trump wants from Canada and Mexico While border security and drug trade concerns are the official rationale for this move, Trump’s tariffs have broader motivations. The first one is protectionist. In all his presidential campaigning, Trump portrayed himself as a champion of US workers. Back in October, he said tariff was “the most beautiful word in the dictionary”. This reflects the ongoing scepticism toward international trade that Trump – and politicians more generally on both ends of the political spectrum in the US – have held for some time. It’s a significant shift in the close trade links between these neighbours. The US, Mexico and Canada are parties to the successor of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Trump has not hidden his willingness to use tariffs as a weapon to pressure other countries to achieve unrelated geopolitical goals. This is the epitome of what a research project team I co-lead calls “Weaponised Trade”. This was on full display in late January. When the president of Colombia prohibited US military airplanes carrying Colombian nationals deported from the US to land, Trump successfully used the threat of tariffs to force Colombia to reverse course. The economic stakes The volume of trade between the US, Canada, and Mexico is enormous, encompassing a wide range of goods and services. Some of the biggest sectors are automotive manufacturing, energy, agriculture, and consumer goods. In 2022, the value of all goods and services traded between the US and Canada came to about US$909 billion (A$1.46 trillion). Between the US and Mexico that same year, it came to more than US$855 billion (A$1.37 trillion). One of the hardest hit industries will be the automotive industry, which depends on cross-border trade. A car assembled in Canada, Mexico or the US relies heavily on a supply of parts from throughout North America. Tariffs will raise costs throughout this supply chain, which could lead to higher prices for consumers and make US-based manufacturers less competitive. There could also be ripple effects for agriculture. The US exports billions of dollars in corn, soybeans, and meat to Canada and Mexico, while importing fresh produce such as avocados and tomatoes from Mexico. Tariffs may provoke retaliatory measures, putting farmers and food suppliers in all three countries at risk. Trump’s decision to delay and reduce tariffs on oil was somewhat predictable. US imports of Canadian oil have increased steadily over recent decades, meaning tariffs would immediately bite US consumers at the fuel pump. We’ve been here before This isn’t the first time the world has dealt with Trump’s tariff-heavy approach to trade policy. Looking back to his first term may provide some clues about what we might expect. In 2018, the US levied duties on steel and aluminium. Both Canada and Mexico are major exporters of steel to the US. Canada and Mexico imposed retaliatory tariffs. Ultimately, all countries removed tariffs on steel and aluminium in the process of finalising the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Notably, though, many of Trump’s trade policies remained in place even after President Joe Biden took office. This signalled a bipartisan scepticism of unfettered trade and a shift toward on-shoring or re-shoring in US policy circles. The options for Canada and Mexico This time, Canada and Mexico’s have again responded with threats of retaliatory tariffs. But they’ve also made attempts to mollify Trump – such as Canada launching a “crackdown” on fentanyl trade. Generally speaking, responses to these tariffs could range from measured diplomacy to aggressive retaliation. Canada and Mexico may target politically sensitive industries such as agriculture or gasoline, where Trump’s base could feel the pinch. There are legal options, too. Canada and Mexico could pursue legal action through the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement’s dispute resolution mechanisms or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both venues provide pathways for challenging unfair trade practices. But these practices can be slow-moving, uncertain in their outcomes and are susceptible to being ignored. A more long-term option for businesses in Canada and Mexico is to diversify their trade relationships to reduce reliance on the US market. However, the facts of geography, and the large base of consumers in the US mean that’s easier said than done. The looming threat of a global trade war Trump’s latest tariffs underscore a broader trend: the widening of the so-called “Overton window” to achieve unrelated geopolitical goals. The Overton Window refers to the range of policy options politicians have because they are accepted among the general public. Arguments for bringing critical industries back to the US, protecting domestic jobs, and reducing reliance on foreign supply chains gained traction after the ascent of China as a geopolitical and geoeconomic rival. These arguments picked up steam during the COVID-19 pandemic and have increasingly been turned into actual policy. The potential for a broader trade war looms large. Trump’s short-term goal may be to leverage tariffs as a tool to secure concessions from other jurisdictions. Trump’s threats against Denmark – in his quest to obtain control over Greenland – are a prime example. The European Union (EU), a far more potent economic player, has pledged its support for Denmark. A North American trade war – foreshadowed by the Canadian and Mexican governments – might then only be harbinger of things to come: significant economic harm, the erosion of trust among trading partners, and increased volatility in global markets.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The social dimension of the Alliance The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the organization created by the signatory states of the Washington Treaty to achieve the goals set by the Alliance, is an institution characteristic of the democratic realm, where governments depend on their respective public opinions when trying to establish a security policy. The people matter – and this is something we must keep in mind – when reflecting on their future. The simplest and most logical answer to the question posed in the title of this conference, the one that responds to common sense, is wherever its member states want. And this is the core of the problem. Do the allies have a common vision? Do they share interests as they did in 1949? Do they still believe they are a community united by their commitment to democracy? Is it reasonable to consider that they form a “collective defense system”? Without clearly answering these questions, it becomes very difficult to move forward with this analysis. We would be venturing into speculative territory. On the other hand, we cannot ignore reality, and this leads us to acknowledge that it is unlikely we will receive clear answers due to a set of considerations characteristic of the present time. The first refers to the lack of reliability of the State because of the high fragmentation of public opinion. Globalization and the Digital Revolution are causing social and economic changes that have led the population to distrust their political elites. Traditional parties are disappearing or losing seats, while new political forces emerge, questioning many of the paradigms we have been working with for years. The societies of the member states no longer have as clear a sense of the purpose of the Alliance as they did a decade ago, because there is confusion about what the actual risks, challenges, and threats they face are. The second is the absence of prominent figures with the authority to exercise leadership at the heads of the allied governments. We cannot ignore that in times of uncertainty, leadership is more necessary than ever, because in its absence, it becomes extremely difficult to shape a sufficiently common position among the citizens. The third is the empirical realization that the Alliance has not been able to manage the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine in a competent and professional manner. In the first case, the European allies decided to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty even though it wasn’t necessary, but wanting to show their solidarity with the state that had guaranteed their security for decades. However, on the battlefield, the vast majority shield themselves behind their ‘rules of engagement’ to avoid complicated situations. The goal was to comply with the United States more than to commit to victory. For its part, the United States was unable to maintain consistent objectives and strategy over time, which led to a humiliating defeat. What was the point of the waste of lives and money if, in the end, the same people returned to power? What was the point of the Alliance's technological superiority if it was defeated by poorly armed militias? In the second case, we have observed that despite the obvious incompetence of its armed forces, its limited capabilities, and its dire economic situation, Russia has managed to consolidate its control over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and continues to advance. For the average citizen, it is incomprehensible that, having committed ourselves to reclaim all Ukrainian sovereign territory and being much wealthier, our strategy has led Ukraine to the unfortunate situation it finds itself in. Why didn’t we offer them the weapons they needed from the very beginning? Why have we deprived them of the victory we formally committed to? The fourth is a derivative of the previous one. In this context, does it make sense for the citizen to trust the Alliance? Isn’t it understandable that they try to seek refuge within the national framework and fear that the Alliance, in the hands of unqualified people, will drag them into scenarios that are not critical to their lives? Whether we like it or not, the citizen's distrust in NATO is as justified as their intuition that only NATO can guarantee their security, which includes both their freedom and their well-being. What is the Alliance today? In circumstances as complex as those we are currently experiencing, it is virtually impossible for an organization composed of thirty-two member states to be a community committed to the defense and promotion of democracy. The mere reference to Turkey, Hungary, or Spain is proof of how far there are nations within it that are heading in a different direction. The evolution of European political systems points to a worsening of the situation rather than the exceptional nature of the mentioned cases. The community, as well as the idea that it constitutes a "collective defense system," falls within the realm of aspirations. The Alliance has been a “collective defense system,” and I have no doubt that there are allies who continue to act consistently with this idea. However, putting aside formalities, I believe that when assessing the transatlantic relationship, we must focus on its strict condition as an alliance. NATO is an asset that no one wants to lose, even though in its current state, it leaves much to be desired. Its strength does not lie in the common perception of the threat, the solidarity of its members, the available capabilities, or in sharing a strategy, which is clearly nonexistent. What makes its members want to keep it alive is the accumulated legacy after 75 years of shared experiences and the deep sense of insecurity in the face of the dual realization of a world undergoing profound change and poorly prepared national defenses from any point of view. Outside the Alliance, it’s even colder. NATO provides us with a starting point to try to react collectively, knowing that, in reality, except for the United States, no member state has the critical size to act as a "strategic actor." We have a history, an institutional framework, civilian and military bodies, doctrines, resources... that allow us to try to adapt without having to start from scratch. The European Perspective In recent years, the European states that are members of the Alliance have experienced the contrast between the claim that the European Union should assume the role of a "strategic actor" and the harsh, relentless reality of its impotence to effectively and competently address the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. In parallel, they have shifted from contempt for the United States, due to its erratic foreign policy and its inability to successfully complete its foreign initiatives, to seeking shelter once again under its military strength, considering the evidence of their own inability to understand international politics and act accordingly. It seems beyond doubt that the dynamics of the European integration process are heading towards the establishment of a federation. The transfer of sovereignty represented by the single currency was a milestone, marking the creation of "political Europe" through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, we are moving toward a single fiscal policy, with banking union, European monetary fund... ultimately towards the consolidation of an economic and monetary policy. Such significant common economic interests demand both a shared legal framework and a unified foreign policy. However, the factor of time plays a fundamental role. The passing of generations has allowed us to make progress, overcoming nationalist prejudices. Despite the formidable progress made, which is easily reflected in the recognition by young people that we live in a common cultural environment, the reality is that we are still far from forming what Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón referred to decades ago as a "European people." One thing is to delegate certain public policies to European institutions, and another, undoubtedly very different, is the exercise of actions that are characteristically sovereign. History and geography matter, and we must acknowledge that we have not yet formed that continental identity that would allow us to credibly face the formidable challenge of establishing a common foreign policy. The advantages of planning together and having the same capabilities are obvious, but above all, what matters is its viability. The Union is still not in a position to replace American leadership. This humbling realization transforms into a flow of energy in favor of the Alliance, assuming as inevitable the implementation of changes that allow it to adapt to a new international environment. For years, we have been aware that the Washington Treaty, and especially its Article 5, are anachronistic. The emergence of new domains – space, cyber, and cognitive – and the development of hybrid strategies challenge some of its foundations. Even so, we try to adapt without facing a reform of the treaty, in an exercise of understandable but risky caution. We are aware that the European theater is no longer the same as it was in 1949, that globalization and the "competition among great powers" in the race to win the "Digital Revolution" have shaped a considerably different scenario that we must integrate into, but we feel dizzy at the thought of leaving our own geographic zone, when we are not even in a position to effectively address our own problems. The American Perspective Since the creation of the United States, American society has lived with the contradiction between its isolationist vocation and its dependence on foreign trade. It fears becoming involved in the affairs of others at a high cost. However, the commercial dimension of its economy demands freedom of navigation, legal security, access to raw materials, and the ability to penetrate other markets, conditions that lead to an international role. From the First and Second World Wars, they learned that it was impossible to turn their back on what was happening in other countries, that they had to commit to international security, trying to establish an order that would guarantee their national interests. After years of involvement in international conflicts that seemed to have no end, isolationist and nationalist sentiment has grown, as a classic pendulum effect. In this context, it is understandable that the public debate openly questions its presence in the Atlantic Alliance. Is NATO a guarantee of the security of the United States? In the years immediately preceding the Madrid Summit, it was evident that the Alliance lacked a threat to unite it, a strategy to guide its steps, and capabilities that would allow it to carry out combined activities. It should therefore come as no surprise that since the second term of the Bush Administration, statements from senior officials have been warning of the dangerous drift of the Organization or threatening its withdrawal. There has been much talk about the low defense spending by many of the European allies. It is evident that without investment, there is no modernization, and without it, there is a technological disconnect that prevents the joint action of the armed forces of the different member states. However, what is truly concerning is what this implies in terms of abuse and disregard towards the United States. Hence, the heated reactions we receive from the other side. It is indecent that we spend on welfare, reaching levels that are unattainable for the average American, while we let them bear the cost of our security, both in economic terms and in human lives. As grave as, or even more than, the lack of investment is the absence of a shared vision and strategy, but it is understandable that the debate has focused on investment, an instrumental element. For European allies, increasing defense spending under the current economic circumstances will be as difficult as it is painful, but it will not be any less difficult or painful to reach an agreement that gives meaning to NATO's existence in the coming years. One of the few consensuses in the Capitol is to consider China as its main rival, around which all its economic, foreign, and defense policies revolve. In the Strategic Concept approved in Madrid, we can read that China is a “systemic challenge” for all of us. What policy have we derived from this categorical statement? Is there an Atlantic vision on this? It is hard to imagine that the Alliance can have a future if the states on both sides of the Atlantic do not reach a common position on how to engage with the great Asian power. In the same document, we find the statement that Russia is a “threat,” which does not align with statements from American leaders of both parties, though more from the Republican side than the Democratic one. It is neither acceptable nor responsible that, after the approval of such an important document, just two and a half years later, the United States acts as if the problem is not theirs. Putting formal aspects aside, is Russia a threat to the United States? To what extent does the behavior of the Moscow government in Eastern Europe affect U.S. national interests? Does it make sense for the United States to get involved in the war in Ukraine? Was Biden's behavior a reflection of a Cold War veteran, detached from the international circumstances of today? The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance was not the result of U.S. leaders in the early postwar years being convinced that the Soviet Union posed a threat to their national interests. On the contrary, they were fully aware that it did not. What concerned them was the extreme weakness of the European states, ravaged by a brutal war, the absence of a democratic culture, the high risk of totalitarian currents feeding off misery and uncertainty, and leading the Old Continent to a Third World War. European governments felt Soviet pressure. The area occupied by the Red Army was experiencing the extermination of representative institutions, Germany was torn between neutrality and partition, communist parties were gaining parliamentary positions in significant countries like France and Italy, supported by the prestige earned in the Resistance. For U.S. analysts, the European perception of the Soviet threat was exaggerated, but its effects could be concerning. The United States chose to engage in European reconstruction to prevent its drift towards fragmentation and totalitarianism, as the consequences of this drift could directly affect their national interests. They established a comprehensive strategy based on two pillars, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance. NATO has been and continues to be an instrument to guarantee cohesion and democracy on the Old Continent. The second Trump administration must resolve the tension between the isolationist demand of the citizenry, the need to create jobs on domestic soil through the erection of tariff barriers, the necessity of securing supply and distribution chains, and the consolidation of alliances or understandings between different regional blocs in response to Chinese initiatives. It is a set of contradictory actions wrapped in the populist demagoguery characteristic of our time, but which will require decisions in times marked by a succession of crises. Time for decisions An organization inhabited by officials does not need meaning to continue functioning. From 9 AM to 5 PM, qualified staff will move papers from one office to another, showcasing their professionalism and operational efficiency. However, it is important not to confuse NATO with the Alliance. The latter does need meaning, which is now in question. Whether we like it or not, the coming years will be crucial for its future. We will witness how the decisions made regarding a set of circumstances and debates will ultimately determine it, as well as the link between the two shores of the Atlantic. As happened at its origin, that link will go far beyond security, which is instrumental in consolidating that community which was the original aspiration and is now marked by its absence. The war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the central issue in the transatlantic relationship, as it brings to the negotiation table many of the fundamental issues that question its very existence. We are facing a continental conflict that arises after a Russian diplomatic attempt to reach an agreement on a new balance of power. Moscow's proposal demanded the withdrawal of U.S. units from areas bordering its territory and the removal of its nuclear weapons stationed in the Old Continent. Putin’s government felt threatened by NATO and the European Union's eastward expansion and demanded compensation. When it was not granted, it launched its third campaign on Ukraine and its fifth on territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. This is not a campaign that can be understood in a bilateral Russia-Ukraine logic, but rather as part of an effort by a revived Russian imperialism to reconstitute its historical sphere of influence. This invasion is not the first, and unless the Alliance acts wisely, it will not be the last. The role played by the Europeans has been disappointing. Their response to previous aggressions – Moldova, Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas – was the perfect example of how supposedly educated elites learn nothing from history. The French, Germans, and Italians collectively made the same mistakes as Chamberlain in Munich, thinking that the aggressor would be satisfied by acknowledging their right to aggression, when, in reality, they were encouraging them to proceed and prepare for new expansionist ventures. This attitude provoked the logical irritation and distrust in the Slavic-Scandinavian space, which was never deceived by the ongoing process under the Russian government. These powers refused to believe U.S. intelligence warnings about Russia's willingness to invade and reacted too late and poorly. All this, combined with the old problem of lack of investment in defense, made European armed forces ineffective and their industry powerless in responding to a demand for military capabilities in a short period of time. If the Europeans do not take their defense seriously, if they have become accustomed to parasitizing U.S. leadership, the frustration of their elites with their European allies is understandable. The Biden administration tried to use the Ukraine War to reconstitute the Alliance, but the strategy of attrition applied, renouncing victory out of fear of its political and military consequences, has led to a very high number of Ukrainian casualties and to public fatigue, which, following the Russian plan, is pushing through new political formations from both the right and the left to reach an unfeasible understanding with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. In the new international scenario, characterized by competition among great powers to achieve technological hegemony within the framework of the Digital Revolution, the United States needs Europe as much as Europe needs the United States. Russia does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, but it has become a vassal of China and an instrument of Beijing to weaken the cohesion of the Western bloc. The Trump administration must not fall into the temptation of turning its back on its allies, no matter how irresponsible and incompetent they may be, as this would cede ground to the rival. An even more protectionist policy could push European states, if not the Union itself, to seek alternative markets in China. A policy of greater withdrawal would encourage both division among continental powers and the pursuit of a middle ground between the two superpowers. What is at stake is much more than tariffs or investment in defense. What we will decide soon is whether we are a community or not, whether we face the challenges of a new era together, or if we choose separation. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States has valuable allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the Slavic and Scandinavian blocs. Attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine War could mean a victory for Russia by recognizing its right to alter Europe's borders by force, and the loss of trust from these allies, who are aware that even Trump would have fallen into the Munich trap, and despite his brash rhetoric, he would have ended up playing Chamberlain’s role. This would be a grave mistake for the United States, which, on the contrary, should rely on these countries to contain Russian expansionism and send a very clear message to Beijing about its commitment to updating and maintaining the cohesion of the Western community. Such an update would require allies, this time for real, to commit to defense investment and be prepared to use their capabilities when necessary. The Alliance needs a strategy. The concept approved in Madrid was merely the political framework to develop it. It is up to the Trump administration to lead its development in order to ultimately agree on what to do about the "Russian threat" and the "systemic challenge" posed by China. The Middle East crisis is unfolding in a scenario defined by two fronts established after years of diplomatic work: the "Abraham Accords" and the Axis of Resistance. Hamas’ aggression towards Israel has materialized in a harsh military campaign in the Gaza Strip, which has severely damaged the political and military capabilities of the Islamist group, and has extended to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is also suffering a heavy blow. In addition, Iran has seen its defense industry, anti-aircraft artillery systems, and, more limitedly, its nuclear network has suffered significant damage, while its intelligence system has been humiliated and degraded. In this context, despite the damage suffered by the Gazan population, the block formed by the Abraham Accords has remained cohesive, aware of Hamas' blackmail and the cost of yielding to it. On the other hand, Europe has presented itself as divided, lacking a strategic vision, not understanding that this was not a problem between Israelis and Palestinians, but an instrumental conflict aimed at undermining the regimes of Arab countries not aligned with the Axis of Resistance. Its criticism of Israel for the effects of its military campaign on the Gazan population consciously ignored both Hamas’ responsibility in turning them into human shields and the cost that accepting Hamas' blackmail would have had for all of us — Arabs, Israelis, and Europeans — if the campaign had not continued. How is it possible that we have so easily forgotten how the Axis powers were defeated? What would have happened in Europe during WWII if we had followed the European Union's demands during the Gaza War? The Middle East is a critical space for the Atlantic Alliance. It is understandable that the United States is frustrated with many of its European allies who, once again, have acted in a frivolous and irresponsible manner, unable to think in strategic terms. Israel has long chosen to turn its back on Europe, in response to a behavior it associates with a new form of anti-Semitism. The Arab bloc appreciates the European sensitivity to the suffering of the Gazan or Lebanese people, but it seeks security under the umbrella of the United States and Israel in the face of the Axis of Resistance, which poses a challenge of internal subversion, asymmetric warfare, and nuclear threat. A renewed Alliance needs to establish a strategy for the MENA region focused on containing Islamism and consolidating moderate regimes. China and Russia are taking advantage of the instability to infiltrate and hinder our missions. For them, instability on our southern front is a strategic objective, one that would fuel migration and insecurity, and with them, division within the Alliance and the Union. The Arab-Israeli bloc distrusts the United States due to its inability to maintain a strategy over time and does not rely on the Europeans. Only a firm stance from the Alliance in favor of this group of countries and against the Axis of Resistance could overcome this situation and guarantee both the cohesion of the Alliance and its authority in the region. The circumstances that led to the creation of the Alliance are behind us. They are history. However, today the Alliance is more necessary than ever. The circumstances have changed, but the community of values and interests remains the same, even though not everyone may understand this. Dissolving this community would be a grave mistake that would only benefit those powers whose goal is nothing more than to "revise" our legacy. Reviving it will not be easy. It will require political awareness and high-level diplomacy. Challenges that are impossible to achieve without leadership that matches the times. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump has sparked diplomatic controversy by suggesting the U.S. needs to acquire Greenland for reasons of “national security” and refusing to definitively rule out using military force to do so. Greenland, a self-governing Danish territory, “is not for sale,” said Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen. Trump’s interest in Greenland is not new. He first expressed interest in the territory in 2019, but it never developed into any action. Whether or not Trump has actual plans this time around to advance any attempt in Washington to own Greenland is far from clear. But given the incoming president’s repeated statements and invocation of national security, it’s worth considering what strategic value Greenland might actually have from the perspective of the U.S.’s geopolitical priorities. As a scholar of geopolitical conflicts involving natural resources and the Arctic, I believe Greenland’s value from an international political perspective can be viewed in terms of four fundamental areas: minerals, military presence, Arctic geopolitics and the territory’s potential independence. A matter of minerals Greenland’s most valuable natural resources lie with its vast mineral wealth, which holds real potential to advance its economy. Identified deposits include precious metals such as gold and platinum, a number of base metals – zinc, iron, copper, nickel, cobalt and uranium – and rare earth elements, including neodymium, dysprosium and praseodymium. A detailed 2023 summary published by the Geologic Survey of Denmark and Greenland suggests new deposits will be found with the continued retreat of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Greenland’s rare earth resources are particularly significant. These elements are essential not only to battery, solar and wind technology but also to military applications. If fully developed, the Kvanefjeld – or Kuannersuit in Greenlandic – uranium and rare earth deposit would place Greenland among the top producers worldwide. During the 2010s, Greenland’s leaders encouraged interest from outside mining firms, including leading Chinese companies, before finally granting a lease to the Australian company Energy Transition Minerals (formerly Greenland Minerals Ltd). When China’s Shenghe Resources took a major share in Energy Transition Minerals, it raised red flags for Denmark, the European Union and the U.S., which felt China was seeking to expand its global dominance of the rare earth market while reducing Europe’s own potential supply. The issue was put to rest in 2021 when Greenland’s parliament banned all uranium mining, killing further development of Kvanefjeld for the time being. That same year saw the government also prohibit any further oil and gas activity. Predictably, a majority of mining companies have subsequently steered clear of Greenland due to perceived concern of any investment being jeopardized by future political decisions. Fears of China abroad China’s interest in Greenland stretches back at least a decade. In 2015, Greenland Minister of Finance and Interior Vittus Qujaukitsoq visited China to discuss possible investment in mining, hydropower, port and other infrastructure projects. One firm, China Communications Construction Company, bid to build two airports, one in the capital, Nuuk, the other in Ilulissat. Another Chinese firm, General Nice Group, offered to purchase an abandoned Danish naval base in northeastern Greenland, while the Chinese Academy of Sciences asked to build a permanent research center and a satellite ground station near Nuuk. None of this sat well with the first Trump administration, which put pressure on Denmark to convince Greenland’s government that a significant, official Chinese presence on the island was unwanted. The Danes and Greenlanders complied, rebuffing Chinese attempts to invest in Greenland-based projects. The Trump administration, in particular, viewed China’s interest in Greenland as having hidden commercial and military motives, concerns that continued under the Biden administration in its recent lobbying of another Australian mining firm not to sell any of its Greenland assets to Chinese companies. Long-standing US interest The U.S. has had a long-standing security interest in Greenland dating from 1946, when it offered Denmark US$100 million in gold bullion for it. The Danes politely but firmly declined, with their foreign minister saying he didn’t feel “we owe them the whole island.” In the early 1950s, the U.S built Thule Air Force Base 750 miles (about 1,200 kilometers) north of the Arctic Circle. Originally a missile early warning and radio communications site, it was transferred to the newly formed U.S. Space Force in 2020 and renamed Pituffik Space Base in 2023.   The northernmost military facility of the U.S., Pituffik has updated radar and tracking capabilities to provide missile warning, defense and space surveillance, and satellite command missions. While it also supports scientific research focused on the Arctic, the base is intended to increase military capabilities in the Arctic region for both the U.S. and its allies. The base has the ability to track shipping as well as air and satellite positions, giving it both real and symbolic importance to American strategic interests in the Arctic. As a result, much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, not just those in Trump’s orbit, view any notable Chinese presence in Greenland, whether temporary or permanent, with concern. Geopolitics of the Arctic Greenland is geographically situated between the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, two Arctic shipping routes whose importance is growing as sea ice shrinks. By around 2050, a Transpolar Sea Route is likely to open through the central Arctic Ocean, passing Greenland’s eastern shores. Furthermore, the island is the basis of Denmark’s sovereignty claim to the North Pole – rivaled by claims by Russia and Canada. While international law recognizes no national sovereignty in international waters, that has done little to end the diplomatic tug-of-war over the pole. The matter is far from trivial: Sovereignty would give a country access to potentially significant oil, gas and rare earth resources, as well as superior scientific and military access to the future Transpolar Sea Route. Yet, this dispute over ownership of the North Pole is only one part of the geopolitical struggle for offshore territory in the region. Russia’s growing militarization of its enormous coastal area has been countered by NATO military exercises in northern Scandinavia, while China’s own moves into the Arctic, aided by Moscow, has seen the launch of several research stations supported by icebreakers and agreements for research and commercial projects. China’s government has also asserted it has rights in the region, for navigation, fishing, overflight, investment in oil and gas projects, and more. Greenland for Greenlanders? All of these factors help decipher the realities involved in the U.S.-Denmark-Greenland relationship. Despite Trump’s words, I believe it is extremely unlikely he would actually use U.S. military force to take Greenland, and it’s an open question whether he would use coercive economic policies in the form of tariffs against Denmark to give him leverage in negotiating a purchase of Greenland. Yet while Trump and other foreign policy outsiders view Greenland through an external strategic and economic lens, the island is home to nearly 60,000 people – 90% of them indigenous Inuit – many of whom treat the designs of foreign nations on their territory with skepticism. Indeed, in 2008, Greenland voted to pursue nationhood. The island receives an annual subsidy of 500 million euros ($513 million) from Denmark, and to further economic independence, it has sought foreign investment. Interest from China has accompanied Greenland’s moves toward independence, backed by Beijing’s strategy to be an Arctic player. The thinking in Beijing may be that an independent Greenland will be less shackled to NATO and the European Union, and as such, more open to investment from further afield. Ironically, Trump’s recent comments have the potential of achieving something very different than their aim by encouraging Greenland’s prime minister, Mute Egede, to propose a referendum in 2025 on full independence. “It is now time for our country to take the next step,” he said. “We must work to remove … the shackles of colonialism.”

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump has made clear his intent to supercharge his “America First” approach to foreign policy in his second term – and Mexico looks set to be at the tip of the spear. While many of Trump’s predecessors have also followed a “realist” strategy – that is, one where relative power is at the forefront of international relations, while diplomatic success is viewed through how it benefits one’s own nation – the incoming president has displayed an apparent unwillingness to consider the pain that his plans would inflict on targeted countries or the responses this will engender. Trump’s proposed policies threaten Mexico in three key ways: First, his goal of deporting millions of migrants would put tremendous pressure on Mexico’s economy and society as the country tried to absorb the influx. This would be exacerbated by his second threat, a sharp increase in tariffs, which could devastate the critical export sector of Mexico’s economy. And third, Trump has floated the idea of using U.S. military power to confront narcotraffickers within Mexico, which would directly impinge on Mexico’s sovereignty and could generate more violence on both sides of the border. But as a scholar of Latin American politics and U.S.-Latin American relations, I see several options that Mexico could use to push back on Trump by imposing high costs on U.S. interests. Indeed, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has already signaled how she may counter Trump’s policies. The most obvious tools are ending cooperation on drugs and immigration and imposing tariffs of her own. She could also revoke some of the decades-old tax and labor privileges that have benefited U.S. businesses operating within Mexico. And finally, she could play the “China card” – that is, in the face of worsening U.S.-Mexico ties, Mexico could turn to Washington’s biggest economic rival at a time when Beijing is seeking to assert more influence across Latin America. From conciliation to confrontration Of course, a worsening relationship is not inevitable. During Trump’s first term, Mexico’s then-president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, maintained a constructive relationship with the U.S. administration. In fact, Lopez Obrador was surprisingly cooperative given Trump’s at times hostile rhetoric toward Mexico. For example, he helped facilitate the Trump administration’s “Remain in Mexico” program for those seeking asylum in the U.S. and also accepted Trump’s demands to renegotiate NAFTA and give it a title reflecting U.S. leadership: the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA. Sheinbaum, who took office on Oct. 1, 2024, started with a cautious approach to her relationship with Trump. She congratulated Trump on his victory and urged dialogue with the incoming U.S. president. “There will be good relations with the United States. I’m convinced of that,” she told reporters on Nov. 7, 2024. But Trump hasn’t been conciliatory. In addition to talk about dumping millions of immigrants across the border, he announced on social media on Nov. 24 that he would impose a 25% tariff on Mexican and Canadian goods – a move that would effectively abrogate the USMCA. That post seemingly ended Sheinbaum’s cautious approach. In a strongly worded response, the Mexican president cautioned that she would respond in kind. A trade war, she noted, would harm the economies of both countries; progress on immigration and drug trafficking required cooperation, not threats, she added. The impact of tariffs Sheinbaum has said she wants to avoid a trade war, but Trump’s threats have led her nonetheless to talk about how a trade war would begin. This trade war, plus other costs Sheinbaum could impose on U.S. investors, would also likely foment a coalition of opposition within the U.S. business community – a group that has been a key ally of Trump. Trump’s stated goal of putting high tariffs on goods coming from Mexico is to encourage businesses that currently exploit lower employment costs in Mexico to relocate to the northern side of the border. But that approach ignores the impact that retaliatory tariffs and investment controls would have on U.S.-based companies that rely on the Mexican market. It would have several negative effects. First, a tit-for-tat tariff war would generate inflation for U.S. and Mexican consumers. Second, it would disrupt the integration of markets across North America. As a result of the elimination of tariffs – a key component of both NAFTA and the Trump-era USMCA – markets and the production of goods across North America have become highly interconnected. The trade treaties severely reduced barriers to investment in Mexico, allowing significant American investment in sectors such as agriculture and energy – where U.S. companies were formerly prohibited. Further, manufacturers now rely on processes in which, for example, the average car crosses the border multiple times during production. Similarly, agribusiness has developed symbiotic practices, such that grains, apples and pears are predominantly grown in the United States, while tomatoes, strawberries and avocados are grown in Mexico. Given these processes, the U.S. now exports over US$300 billion of goods and services per year to Mexico, and the stock of U.S. investments in Mexico reached $144 billion in 2023. If Trump abrogates the trade deals and imposes tariffs, he might convince investors to spend their next dollars in the U.S. But if Mexico imposes tariffs, business taxes or investment restrictions, what would happen to investors’ farms and factories already in Mexico? Past experience suggests that any disruption to supply chains or U.S. export markets would awaken strong business opposition, as analysts and business groups have already recognized. Trump is not immune to pressure from U.S. businesses. During his first administration, companies successfully opposed Trump’s attempt to close the border, arguing that slowing the flow of immigrants also meant slowing trucks full of goods. Security and immigration On the issue of the border and immigration, while Trump has issued threats, Sheinbaum has stressed the importance of cooperation. Currently, the Mexican government expends significant resources to patrol its own southern border, not to mention dealing with the many potential migrants who gather in its northern cities. Mexico could demand more support from the U.S. in exchange for this work, plus the costs associated with welcoming back the estimated 4 million Mexicans who are currently in the U.S. without proper documentation. The deportation of undocumented immigrants that Trump has repeatedly promised will require other types of cooperation, such as processing border crossings, and Mexico could slow-walk this process. Mexico has already signaled that it will withhold processing of non-Mexicans. The two countries have a history of collaboration in addressing the illegal drugs trade – but here too there have also been tensions. Toward the end of Trump’s first term, for example, a Mexican general was arrested in the U.S. on drug charges. After a diplomatic uproar, he was returned to Mexico and released. In late November, Sheinbaum noted that she and Trump had discussed security cooperation “within the framework of our sovereignty.” But Trump’s campaign rheotric seemed less concerned with Mexico’s sovereignty, floating the idea of sending troops to the border or even deploying them within Mexico to counter narcotraffickers. That would clearly enrage Mexico, with consequences that would extend far beyond a willingness to cooperate on the issues of drug trafficking. A chance for China? One country that stands to benefit should U.S.-Mexican relations deteriorate is China – an issue that Mexico could exploit. China is now the first or second trading partner with nearly every country in Latin America, including Mexico. The value of U.S.-Mexico trade is over $100 billion a year, but the growth of Chinese imports into Mexico has been limited somewhat by rules-of-origin provisions in NAFTA and the USMCA. A U.S.-Mexican trade war could weaken or end any incentive to keep Chinese goods out. Further, if the doors to the United States are narrowed through tariffs and hostile rhetoric, China’s car parts and financial services would clearly become even more attractive to Mexican businesses. A U.S.-Mexican trade war, in short, would augment Beijing’s access to a market on the U.S. border. A coalition of the concerned? In sum, if Trump goes through with his threats, the result will be costs to consumers and businesses, plus a new opportunity for China. This is likely to foment a coalition of industries, investors, consumers and foreign policy experts concerned with China – many parts of which supported Trump’s campaign.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском  Through its recent official and popular position towards the Gaza war, China seeks to define its position as a leader and defender of the so-called “global south” to pass the policy of transformation towards a multipolar international world in the face of the United States of America and its allies in the West. China seizes the opportunity to express the urgent need to reshape the global system led by the West under the leadership of Washington. Here, both Moscow and Beijing see Israel's war on the Gaza Strip as having led to directing Western military support efforts from Ukraine in the face of Russia, Beijing's close ally, to Israel, while China views the war from the perspective of its confrontation with America. As China attempts to express global and popular public opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as part of a much broader Chinese strategy aimed at winning the support of the countries of the Global South to its side.    Both Russia and China are working to benefit from the war in Gaza, by strengthening their roles as supporters of the countries of the Global South, and demonstrating the failure and bias of the United States and the international system led by Washington in dealing with the grievances of that large bloc of countries in the world in the South. This also serves to realize Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision of Chinese leadership of the Global South, which includes the majority of Arab countries and Palestine, which enhances Beijing’s efforts to confront Washington and its Western allies and reshape the international system in its favor. China has exploited anti-Israel sentiments globally and at home, in an attempt to strengthen its position within the framework of the Global South.  In its strenuous efforts to express world public opinion and the feelings of peoples, China is pursuing many and varied plans to support the issues of the developing global south, most notably the Palestinian cause, and to expose what China considers to be American double standards in dealing with the Palestinians compared to Israel.    China's assumption of the presidency of the UN Security Council in November 2023 comes immediately after Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” or the Gaza War in October 2023, succeeding Brazil, coinciding with the escalation of brutal Israeli military operations in Gaza. For this reason, China has risked angering Israel, as it sees broader stakes in the current conflict that go beyond the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Beijing sees the crisis as an opportunity to distinguish its position from the pro-Israel West and to enhance its reputation in the global south, many of whose countries strongly sympathize with the Palestinian cause, which serves China's image.  To this end, China has used a tough diplomatic rhetoric against Israeli crimes in the Gaza Strip, and has condemned the US position, especially the obstacles created by the US by voting against a series of Chinese and Russian ceasefire resolutions in the UN Security Council. In addition, China has supported various decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court to condemn Israel and arrest its Prime Minister “Benjamin Netanyahu”.  China used its veto power against a draft resolution proposed by the United States of America on October 15, 2023, which did not include a call for an immediate ceasefire, or a permanent humanitarian truce for the entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. The Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations, "Chang Jun”  justified his country's opposition to the American draft resolution, because it includes many elements that divide rather than unite, and goes beyond the humanitarian dimension, and is unbalanced and mixes right and wrong, and does not reflect a strong call for a ceasefire and an end to the violence. The Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations “Jun” considered that the ceasefire is not just a diplomatic phrase, but means life and death for many civilians, which Washington did not understand, according to him. China also participated in the (Cairo Peace Summit 2023), which was held on October 21, 2023 in the New Administrative Capital, with China's call during the summit to stop the war in Gaza.  China's motivation for taking an interest in the Palestinian issue after the recent Gaza war may be more related to its competition with the United States and the image that China wants to project domestically and even internationally in light of its new position as a major global power. China wants to be seen as a wise and responsible superpower interested in mediation and peacebuilding. It is also likely that Beijing seeks to present an alternative viewpoint to the United States' perspective on peace to the world order, especially in the global South, where most countries in the region support the Palestinians.   Beijing has already come a long way in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from its active support for Palestinian factions recently to their invitation to China after the recent Gaza war to complete the Palestinian reconciliation process between all the warring Palestinian factions with Chinese support.  Since the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip, Chinese positions and statements by officials in Beijing have carried a degree of escalation in tone towards Israel’s behavior. Beijing criticized the comprehensive Israeli bombing of civilians, condemned violations of international law, called for the implementation of the two-state solution, and called for the establishment of a humanitarian corridor to allow aid to enter the besieged Gaza Strip. Chinese Foreign Minister “Wang Yi” went further, describing the Israeli bombing of civilians in Gaza as actions that go beyond the scope of self-defense.  Chinese state media have also been highly critical of Israel, and in most of their reports have cited Iranian media, with the Chinese emphasis that: “the illegal use of white phosphorus bombs by the Israeli army against Palestinian civilians exposes it to international accountability”. Chinese state media have also blamed the United States, Israel’s strongest supporter, and have been explicitly accused in Beijing, for fueling tensions in the region. China has also angered Israel by refusing to join the United States and other countries in designating Hamas as a terrorist organization, describing it instead as a Palestinian resistance movement.    In late October 2024, immediately after the Gaza war, the China Daily, a Chinese propaganda outlet, declared that: “the United States is on the wrong side of history in Gaza”. Elsewhere, Chinese state television reported that Jews represent 3 percent of the United States’ population but control more than 70 percent of its wealth. With all official and popular Chinese media keen to repeat the narratives that dominate the popular discourse in the Global South. This repetition is in line with the majority opinion in some countries of the South, and it allows China to present itself as an alternative to the image of the United States of America as a warmonger, hegemonic, hypocritical and unjust.         In July 2024, Hamas, Fatah and other Palestinian factions signed a preliminary agreement in the Chinese capital, Beijing, to form a transitional government for national reconciliation, with the aim of managing Gaza after the end of the war. The same group met in the Russian capital, Moscow, in February 2024, seeking to reach a similar agreement. At the same time, China was able to bring the Palestinian Fatah and Hamas movements together at the negotiating table in Beijing in two sessions of the National Dialogue during the months of April and June 2024, in a move that reflects China’s desire to interact with the Palestinian issue in a positive way.        Chinese official media is trying to support its position before Chinese public opinion at home and their sympathy for the people of Gaza, by emphasizing China's official discourse, which seeks to confirm that Beijing has made proposals to stop the war on Gaza, brought together the Palestinian movements Hamas and Fatah inside China, and called on the UN Security Council to calm the conflict. China also seized the opportunity of its meetings with Arab and Gulf foreign ministers to reaffirm the multiple peace plans it had previously proposed in favor of resolving the Palestinian issue. With the Chinese envoy to the Middle East “Zhai Jun” , confirming, with Palestinian and Arab officials, China's immediate call for an immediate ceasefire and providing humanitarian support to the Palestinian people.   As for the most prominent Chinese academic and research analyses of the Gaza war, Chinese Professor “Yan Shutong”, Dean of the Institute of International Relations at China's Xinhua University, described the matter as: “The Israel-Gaza war will reduce the global political influence of the United States. This has become very clear, because even its allies will have to distance themselves from it on this issue, and with the undermining of the United States' strategic relations with other major powers, the strategic balance between China and the United States will shift in China's favor”. Professor “Wang Yiwei”, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, also said: “China is now in a better position than the United States to help resolve conflicts, whether between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Russia and Ukraine, or Israel and the Palestinians”.  In this context, Professor Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University of China, asserts that: “Beijing’s policy in the Middle East has been paralyzed by the conflict, given that the United States, which strongly supports Israel, is involved in this crisis, whether directly or indirectly. Who would listen to China?”. A report by the (international human rights organization Freedom House) described a wave of anti-Semitic sentiments on the Chinese Internet and Chinese media, especially popular ones related to Chinese social media, such as: the widely-used Chinese WeChat program, Weibo, QQ, and others. The Freedom House report confirmed that: “With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Chinese government has long promoted a narrative that places the blame squarely on Israel”. In light of the growing global and internal Chinese popular sympathy for the Palestinians, and the unprecedented spread of its manifestations within Chinese society via Chinese social media, and the holding of limited demonstrations in light of China’s sensitive internal policy towards popular demonstrations, decision-makers in Beijing find themselves facing a challenge to maintain a balanced position between the crimes committed by Israel against civilians in the Gaza Strip, and the position of the Palestinians in the Strip.   As an expert in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party in China, and constantly informed of all reports of Chinese think tanks and research centers, especially those related to the Middle East, it is noted that a number of Chinese analyses adopt a trend, vision, and perhaps another theory or school for the war in Gaza, namely the “theory of war between wars”, which later became clear to a large extent to be correct, meaning: that the war that was limited to the Palestinian Hamas movement and Israel, and Israel's practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, will expand to include a conflict between Israel and Iran, but through its agents in the region, which means waging wars on different fronts at the same time, namely the war of Israel against Hamas, targeting Palestinian resistance elements in the West Bank, confronting Hezbollah on the southern Lebanese front, confronting the threats of the Houthi militia in Yemen, fighting the Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, and waging confrontations against Iran, which leads the axis of resistance.    To this end, China seized the opportunity of the 10th China-Arab Cooperation Forum, to be held on May 30, 2024, with the participation of Chinese President “Xi Jinping” and a number of Arab leaders, most notably Egyptian President “Abdel Fattah El-Sisi”, to reflect the common desire to discuss aspects of China-Arab relations and ways to enhance them, deepen consensus between China and Arab countries, raise questions about the position of Gaza in China-Arab discussions, the limits of China's role in helping to stop the Israeli aggression on Gaza, and support the return to the path of political settlement between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, leading to the two-state solution supported by major powers, most notably China.  Here, the Arab Summit, which was held in the Bahraini capital, Manama, on May 16, 2024, adopted the necessity of calling for an international peace conference that would contribute to restoring the negotiating track. This call intersects with the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call to hold an international peace conference during the Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum, where he stressed in his speech before the forum on May 30, 2024, that Beijing wants to strengthen its relations with Arab countries to be a model for global stability, calling for an international peace conference aimed at ending the war between Israel and Hamas, noting that Beijing is ready to work with Arab countries to resolve issues related to hot spots in ways that support the principles of fairness and justice and achieve peace and stability in the long term. Xi Jinping stressed that war cannot continue indefinitely, justice cannot remain absent forever, and the two-state solution cannot be arbitrarily overthrown.     Based on the previous analysis, we reach the conclusion that the Chinese trend towards interacting with the Middle East issues and the recent Gaza war represents one of the pillars of the escalation of the Chinese role at the global level and among the developing countries of the Global South led by China. This trend coincided with the vision of the United States of America to limit its ties to the interactions of the Middle East, due to its high cost and to move eastward to confront the growing Chinese influence in Asia.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump has claimed that he could end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours of taking office. He now calls for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and the beginning of negotiations. However, history shows that what cannot be achieved on the battlefield is unlikely to be obtained at the negotiating table. Immediate ceasefire of the Ukraine war could be a double-edged sword for the United States under the current circumstances. Russia occupies significant Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and parts of Zaporizhzhia, amounting to approximately 18% of Ukraine’s territory. Ukraine has made incursions into the Russian regions of Belgorod and Bryansk, only amounting to less than 1% of Russia’s total territory. How can both sides achieve their goals at the negotiating table?  Trump’s special envoy Keith Kellogg suggests ending the war by halting weapon supplies to Ukraine if it refuses to engage in peace talks — and increasing weapon deliveries to Ukraine if Russia fails to do the same. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has suggested the possibility of negotiating a cease-fire deal with Russia, proposing that the status of occupied territories could be addressed diplomatically at a later stage. This reflects Ukraine’s constrained position under various pressures. Russia is open to a peace talk but is unlikely to make a huge compromise with Ukraine. Despite NATO’s extensive support, sufficient military resources such as ammunition and air defense systems have not been provided to enable Ukraine to effectively counter Russian advances and produce decisive outcomes in strategic offensives due to unclear strategic objectives and effective implementation measures.   Sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies have not crippled the Russian economy as intended; instead, the Russian economy grew by 3.1% in the third quarter of 2024, and its national debt remains at 14.6% of GDP—approximately the same level as when the war began in 2022.  In 2023, Russia spent $160 billion on military needs, accounting for about 40% of its budget. For 2025, Russia has already allocated 13.5 trillion rubles (over $145 billion) for national defense, representing 32.5% of the budget. With support from North Korea, Iran, China, and other countries, Russia is likely to sustain its efforts on Ukrainian soil. In contrast, Ukraine is unlikely to achieve a decisive victory in the short term. If its allies continue with the current strategy while reducing financial aid, Ukraine risks depleting its resources and prolonging the conflict into an unpredictable stalemate, potentially leaving it at a disadvantage during negotiations. Without doubt, an immediate ceasefire could help stop further casualties and bring some much-needed relief to the people affected by the conflict. It can also ease the immediate burden of supporting Ukraine militarily and financially, freeing resources for domestic priorities and addressing other international challenges, particularly countering China’s challenges. However, an immediate ceasefire according to the current battlefield map could also benefit U.S. rivals—authoritarian regimes. First, it would solidify Russia’s control over occupied territories, allowing Moscow to claim a partial victory and bolster domestic support. Such an outcome rewards territorial aggression and undermines international norms. Second, it could weaken the U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, signaling to adversaries that aggression can succeed if sustained long enough. European allies might interpret a ceasefire as a sign of wavering U.S. resolve, leading to fractures within NATO and weakening transatlantic unity. Allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, may question the reliability of U.S. security commitments in the region. Third, China has been closely watching the West’s response to the Ukraine crisis, focusing on the cohesion of alliances, the impact of sanctions, and the dynamics of military support. An immediate freeze of the war would demonstrate limited Western resolve and suggest that territorial aggression can yield lasting gains. This reinforces Beijing’s belief that the international community would hesitate to intervene militarily in Taiwan and encourages China to change the status quo over the Taiwan Strait, believing it can manage economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures. Fourth, an immediate ceasefire does not guarantee long-term peace. The lack of a comprehensive peace agreement leaves underlying issues unaddressed, and it merely postpones hostilities, making the prospect of sustainable peace elusive. Historically, frozen conflicts like those in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Moldova’s Transnistria have fostered prolonged instability, enabling aggressors to consolidate control over occupied territories and exert leverage over affected states. The lesson from Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea demonstrates that tolerating an aggressor only encourages further expansion of their ambitions. Instead of an immediate ceasefire agreement, it is necessary to further support Ukraine in reclaiming its territory by changing the current strategy before reaching any cease-fire deal. Historical patterns show that successful territorial recaptures often require asserting military strength before engaging in peace talks. A cease-fire without the necessary restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty risks legitimizing Russia’s invasion. A successful Ukrainian counteroffensive could not only enhance Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations but also serve as a powerful deterrent against future territorial ambitions by other authoritarian regimes globally. The United States will not compromise American national interests when mediating a cease-fire agreement between Ukraine and Russia. However, it will be an extremely challenging task for any American president to broker a peace deal at this time because a deal should uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and internationally recognized borders, align with U.S. support for a rules-based international order, and ensure a balance between both parties instead of rewarding Russian aggression. It should strengthen U.S.-European relations rather than undermine allied unity, adhere to longstanding U.S. foreign policy principles rather than prioritize political gains, and enhance the U.S.’s reputation as a reliable global leader. Otherwise, immediately freezing the war could potentially harm U.S. national interests in the long term and directly encourage the ambitions of aggressors worldwide. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/]

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском “Changes! We’re waiting for changes!” proclaimed Viktor Tsoi nearly 40 years ago, at the dawn of the Soviet perestroika. If one were to summarize the multitude of diverse and contradictory events, trends, and sentiments of the past year in a single phrase, it would be that the modern world is eagerly awaiting change. Much like the former USSR in the 1980s, few today can clearly define what these changes should entail or what their ultimate outcome will be. Yet, the idea of maintaining the status quo has evidently found little favor with the public over the past year. This impatient anticipation of change was reflected, for instance, in the outcomes of numerous elections held over the past 12 months across the globe. In total, more than 1.6 billion people went to the polls, and in most cases, supporters of the status quo lost ground. In the United States, the Democrats suffered a resounding defeat to the Republicans, while in the United Kingdom, the Conservatives were decisively beaten by the Labour Party. In France, Emmanuel Macron's once-dominant ruling party found itself squeezed between right-wing and left-wing opposition, plunging the Fifth Republic into a deep political crisis. The seemingly stable foundations of political centrism were shaken in Germany, South Korea, and Japan. Even the party of the highly popular Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi failed to retain its parliamentary majority after the elections, and in South Africa, the African National Congress led by Cyril Ramaphosa also lost its majority. Pessimists might argue that abandoning the status quo in itself solves no problems, and the much-anticipated changes, as the final years of the Soviet Union demonstrated, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. Replacing cautious technocrats with reckless populists often backfires, affecting those most critical of the entrenched status quo. Optimists, on the other hand, would counter that the rusted structures of state machinery everywhere are in desperate need of radical modernization. They would add that the costs inevitably associated with maintaining the existing state of affairs at all costs far outweigh any risks tied to attempts to change it. The international events of the past year are also open to various interpretations. Pessimists would undoubtedly point out that none of the major armed conflicts carried over from 2023 were resolved in 2024. On the contrary, many of them showed clear tendencies toward escalation. For instance, in late summer, Ukraine launched an incursion into the Kursk region of Russia, and in mid-November, the U.S. authorized Kyiv to use long-range ATACMS missiles against targets deep within Russian territory. Meanwhile, the military operation launched by Israel in Gaza in the fall of 2023 gradually expanded to the West Bank, then to southern Lebanon, and by the end of 2024, to parts of Syrian territory adjacent to the Golan Heights. From the optimists' perspective, however, the past year demonstrated that the disintegration of the old international system has its limits. A direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO did not occur, nor did a large-scale regional war break out in the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, or the Korean Peninsula. The economic results of 2024 are equally ambiguous. On one hand, the global economy remained heavily influenced by geopolitics throughout the year. The process of “technological decoupling” between the U.S. and China continued, and unilateral sanctions firmly established themselves as a key instrument of Western foreign policy. On the other hand, the world managed to avoid a deep economic recession despite the numerous trade and investment restrictions. Global economic growth for the year is expected to reach around 3%, which is quite respectable for such turbulent times, especially considering that the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have not yet been fully overcome. In 2024, the average annual global temperature exceeded pre-industrial levels by more than 1,5 °C for the first time, crossing another critical “red line”. However, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) held in November in Baku fell short of many expectations. At the same time, China reached its peak carbon emissions by the end of the year, achieving this milestone a full five years ahead of previously announced plans. In the past year, the UN Security Council managed to adopt only 12 resolutions, mostly of a humanitarian nature, clearly reflecting the declining effectiveness of this global governance body. For comparison, in 2000, the Security Council approved 29 resolutions, including key decisions on conflict resolution in the Balkans and Africa. At the same time, 2024 saw continued efforts to explore new formats for multilateral cooperation, including mechanisms within the BRICS group, which held its 16th summit in Kazan for the first time in its newly expanded composition. With enough imagination, one can easily find evidence in the past 12 months to confirm any omen or superstition traditionally associated with leap years. However, all these signs and superstitions predicting upheavals and catastrophes—while aligning with the pessimistic conclusions about the year now ending—do not apply to the year ahead. Human nature, after all, tends to lean more towards optimism than pessimism; if it were the other way around, we would still be living in caves. As they bid farewell to a difficult and challenging year, people around the world continue to hope for better times. And the mere act of hoping for the best is already significant in itself. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe aptly remarked, “Our wishes are forebodings of our capabilities, harbingers of what we are destined to achieve”. Originally published in Izvestia.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine faces mounting challenges as battlefield victory becomes unlikely, with Donald Trump’s proposed “peace plan” offering a ceasefire based on territorial concessions. While Russia’s vulnerabilities may push Vladimir Putin toward negotiations, the outcome risks freezing the conflict and undermining the international rules-based order. Winning the war against Russian through  “victory on the battlefield” does not look good for Ukraine. The odds are just too high:  from the overall sobering strategic outlook for Ukraine on the battlefield, Ukraine’s limitations in terms of overall military power, the weakening support from Western nations and their fear of a further escalation (falling for Putin’s red lines regarding nuclear escalation); to the president-elect Donald Trump’s newly touted “peace plan”  for Ukraine. Trump has made ending the war in Ukraine one of his election promises. The reasons for his optimism include his perceived personal diplomatic potential, but also necessity in US economic concerns, political strategy, and the ability to able to focus on the China challenge. Russia is weakened and needs a pause in the fighting Vladimir Putin’s own challenges, of course, might make him more inclined to listen to a US led “peace plan” for Ukraine. These include the worsening economic downturn, the erosion of his military power, and recent setbacks of Russian brinkmanship in the Middle East and its alliances with both Iran and Syria. Last week’s dramatic events in Syria with Bashar Al Assad’s regime finally toppling has revealed several miscalculations in Russia. The events of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war in Palestine has shifted regional power dynamics, not only diminishing Russia’s role but also its ally Iran whose  ‘Axis of  Resistance’ , including Hamas and Hezbollah, hasbeen severely weakened. The fall of Syria is a major strategic loss for Putin and has serious consequences for Russia’s role and standing not only in the Middle East but beyond. The “strong” and perhaps “wise” man image is falling apart. Not a good prospect when it comes to China and the “no limits” partnership: a weak Russia is not what President Xi Jinping needs in his challenge to the current political and military Western order. Given these strategic circumstances it is in Putin’s interest to find a diplomatic solution for ending “his” war in Ukraine. A negotiated freezing of the conflict, with Russia keeping the current occupied parts of Ukraine and Crimea, might be a way out for Putin to declare “mission accomplished.” Ukraine’s precarious position President Volodymir Zelensky’s five step victory plan of November 2024, is already dead. its two main conditions, full NATO membership in the very near future and a step up in Western military assistance, will not happen. NATO maintains that Ukraine is on an “irreversible path to NATO membership,” subject to the Alliance members’ agreement and conditions being met, and the end of hostilities. Perhaps more concerning, the mood seems to have shifted among Ukrainians: recent polls show a majority of Ukrainians supporting a negotiated peace with Russia as current battlefield gains by the Russian Armed Forces continue. This poll also reveals that Ukrainians have become increasingly wary of promises of  support of the West. President Zelensky, maintaining optimism in the face of grave difficulties, has openly stated that he is looking forward to Trump’s return to the White House. He now also suggests  that the war may  end sooner with Trump’s re-election. The most contentious points remaining are NATO membership and no territorial concessions. Zelensky has recently indicated a willingness to trade (at least temporarily) territory for NATO membership. Given NATO’s clear messaging during the 2024 Washington Summit that this would not happen without peace first he might need to change his position in respect to NATO membership as well. How would Trump’s peace plan look like Trump’s “Peace Plan” is still vague but it will be a cease fire agreement with territorial concessions, a potential demilitarised zone, continuing security assistance, and potentially “boots on the grounds,” with sanctions relief for Russia as a further stimulus. In signposting his seriousness with the proposal, Trump has appointed retired General Keith Kellogg as a special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, and has met with Zelensky about ending the war during last week’s meeting of world leaders in France at the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral. President Zelensky called his discussions with Trump “good and productive.” An armistice in Ukraine cannot be just an extension of the Minsk II agreement of 2015. The agreement did not work for multiple reasons, but most importantly because of Russian non-compliance and a lack of a deterrence element. Such an armistice would need to be a modern day Korean Armistice Agreement with a potential UN monitoring presence in a demilitarised zone, and a sizeable military deterrence component from Western militaries for Ukraine. NATO membership in the immediate future would be the best option, but likely off the cards due to Russia’s opposition and lack of support from NATO. A twenty year moratorium on Ukraine’s NATO bid, as proposed by the Trump team, could be a way forward. A “West German model of NATO membership” for the unoccupied territories of Ukraine would also be a possible option for Ukraine, which President Zelenksy seems to support. Again, such a proposal seems unlikely given the headwinds from both NATO and Russia. A European permanent military presence in the unoccupied parts of Ukraine (inclusive of US military support), like the US in South Korea, would in theory be possible as they would explicitly be in the respective national but not NATO capacity. This option would rejuvenate an idea of French President Emmanuel Macron madeearlier this year, and if mandated by the UN could be a potential security safeguard for Ukraine. Whatever the outcome, care needs to be taken that this temporary “freezing” of hostilities does not become a de facto “victory for Putin” and a loss for the Rules Based Order. Trump’s attitude towards solving diplomatic and other issues has been described in the past as being “transactional” in essence: ending the Ukraine War has now become the first major test for Trump, the transactional president. Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann is Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra), University of Canberra, and a Research Fellow with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also a Fellow with NATO SHAPE – ACO Office of Legal Affairs where he works on Hybrid Threats and Lawfare. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The fall of B. Assad’s regime was the result of a number of internal and external contradictions, in which the Turkish factor played a key role. Ankara is celebrating the success of its diplomacy in Syria. The success in Syria is giving R. Erdogan wings In its diplomacy, Türkiye consistently tries to adhere to a pragmatic course of achieving its national interests. At the same time, Ankara’s policy does not represent the short-term ambitions of an adventurist leader, rather reflects a long-term programme in accordance with the doctrines and strategies of neo-Ottomanism and neo-pan-Turanism. Türkiye does not hide its ambitions; it makes public various programme provisions and concepts, which focus on raising the status of Turkish statehood to the rank of a regional superpower. For this reason, when former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu explained in Washington the essence of the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism, developed by him in the framework of his ‘Strategic Depth’, he noted Ankara’s attachment to the post-Ottoman space, i.e. to the peoples and countries that were previously part of the Ottoman Empire. Of course, no nation freed from the tyranny of the Ottoman Empire will voluntarily return to the new Türkiye or become its vassal, however Ankara does not set (at least at this point in historical development) the task of reuniting independent entities of the post-Ottoman space with Türkiye. Ankara is trying to spread its influence and realise national interests in relation to geographical neighbours, to use its advantageous economic and geographical position on transit routes, which increases Türkiye’s status at the junction of Europe, Africa and Asia. For these purposes, the Turkish authorities are effectively using economic, political and military means. In North Africa, betting on one of the political forces in the devastated Libya and the local use of military forces – combined with the supply of weapons – provided Ankara with the opportunity to gain access to oil fields. The energy partnership with Russia and the consideration of Moscow’s crisis relations with the West have, in a certain sense, created not only trade and economic interests, but also the relative geopolitical dependence of the Russian Federation on relations with Türkiye. As a result, through partnership diplomacy, the Turks localised military and other threats from Russia to implement the geopolitical strategy of neo-pan-Turansim in the post-Soviet southeast. Ankara is supporting Turkic countries in local conflicts With regard to the newly formed Turkic countries, Türkiye did not rely only on Turkism and pan-Turkism, instead choosing a more flexible tactic: combining ethno-cultural kinship and ideological expansion with a more rational, economic (primarily energy, transport, communication and transit) integration strategy according to the formula ‘One people – two (three, four, five, six) states’. However, Ankara has strongly and consistently supported Turkic countries in local conflicts, providing them with the necessary military, military-technical, intelligence and diplomatic assistance. In this regard, the Turkish-Azeri tandem against Armenia in the Karabakh conflict is a good example. As a result, Türkiye, using its position in NATO and its allied relations with the UK and US, achieved the implementation of new strategic communications bypassing Russia to export oil and gas from the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea and then to Europe. This ambitious transport and energy programme, as well as the military victory in Karabakh, laid the foundation for strengthening the independence of Turkic countries and supporting common Turkic integration, which allowed Türkiye to create the international Organisation of Turkic States (OTG) and move towards the goal of a single Turan. In the Middle East, Türkiye supports is allied with Qatar and opposed the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, which previously (2009) abandoned the transit project of a Qatari gas pipeline through Syria to Türkiye and Europe. Given the unsolvable intra-confessional (between Sunnis and Shi’as, Alawites) and inter-ethnic (the Kurdish issue) contradictions in Syria, President Erdogan waged a consistent battle to overthrow the undesirable regime, strengthen the pro-Turkish forces of Sunni Islamic radicals and local Turkmen in Syria, as well as to neutralise any forms of independence of the Syrian Kurds. Türkiye was not only aware of the plans of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS) and the Syrian National Army* (SNA) for six months, but it was Türkiye itself that developed the plan for a military operation against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, providing them with the necessary military, technical, intelligence and diplomatic support. Türkiye said that Bashar al-Assad refused the hand that Erdogan extended to him and refused negotiations on Ankara’s terms with the recognition of the reality on the ground (i.e. the de facto Turkish occupation of the ‘security zone’ in the north-west of Syria). In response, Turkish proxy forces taught Assad a lesson by excommunicating him from power and removing him from Syria itself. Erdogan exhibited violent and aggressive rhetoric against Netanyahu because of the conflict in the Gaza Strip and took cosmetic measures within the framework of the trade embargo. In reality, Ankara did not follow Tehran’s example and did not provide military assistance to the Palestinians. Türkiye has not banned the transit of Azeri oil to Israel via its territory. Regarding the military operation against the Assad regime in Syria, Ankara skilfully used Tel Aviv’s signals about the launch of an offensive on Aleppo and Damascus. For some reason, the Turks are not blaming Israel for its numerous airstrikes on Syrian communications and the military arsenal of the former Syrian army, which greatly facilitated the advance of HTS* and SNA* forces in Syria. Ankara did not make harsh statements against Israel about the fact that the IDF entered the buffer zone in the Golan Heights and that Israeli tanks were 20km from Damascus. However, as the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak reports, Türkiye is threatening to shoot down the Israeli Air Force with its air defence systems if they support the Kurdish forces in Syria. Erdogan’s triumph Turkish media is enthusiastically celebrating Erdogan’s triumph in Syria and the fall of the Assad regime. At the moment, the Turks have strengthened their positions in Syria. The interim (or transitional) government in Damascus, headed HTS* leader Mohammed al-Jolani, is, in fact, an ally of Ankara. With even greater effort and reliance on the new Syrian authorities, Türkiye will obviously continue its policy of forcibly resolving and neutralising the Kurdish issue in Rojava. The fall of Assad allows Türkiye to repatriate more than 3 million Syrian refugees and strengthen its influence on domestic political life in a weak Syria. Finally, the Turks are counting on the implementation of the Qatari gas pipeline project in the near future, a project which was postponed due to the past position of Bashar al-Assad and his allies. It is no coincidence that on December 13, the heads of the Turkish and Qatari intelligence services met in Damascus, where they held joint talks with the leader of the HTS*, al-Jolani. Ankara and Doha have already announced their plans to open diplomatic missions in Syria. Immediately after the fall of the Assad regime, Türkiye announced on December 9 that it would help Syria rebuild its energy sector, although Ankara did not receive an official request from the new government. In turn, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar did not rule out that the Qatari gas pipeline project will be revived, as Syria has restored its unity and stability. Bayraktar stressed that it is necessary to ensure the safety of the gas pipeline. It seems that the question of ensuring the security of the future gas pipeline was also addressed by the Turkish and Qatari heads of intelligence with HTS* leader al-Jolani. The most openly pretentious statement vis-à-vis Syrian territory was the speech of President R. Erdogan at a party meeting, in which he proposed to review the results of the First World War and return the Syrian provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Damascus and Raqqa to Türkiye, as they were previously part of the Ottoman Empire. This is how neo-Ottomanism manifests itself in real life. However, Erdogan apparently forgot that following the results of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire lost and collapsed and the territories of the new Türkiye changed. The author of revised borders within the framework of the Versailles Treaty system was Türkiye’s eternal ally Great Britain. Following that logic, today Russia has the right to demand from Türkiye Kars, Artvin, Ardahan and Surmalu district with Mount Ararat, which the Bolsheviks unreasonably ceded in March, 1921, to Kemal Pasha. Which problems may await Türkiye following the regime change in Syria? Of course, at this stage Türkiye’s success in Syria is obvious, but it is unlikely to be the result of Turkish planning alone. The United States did not officially interfere in the situation surrounding overthrowing the Assad regime, but did not leave Syria either. Washington and Tel Aviv actually dragged Ankara into a joint plan to collapse Iran and Russia in Syria. Given the inaction of the Syrian authorities and the army, Moscow did not get involved in a new conflict. Tehran adheres to approximately the same position. Some experts believe that the newly elected US President D. Trump supposedly promised to redistribute spheres of influence with Russia, where Moscow gets peace in Ukraine in accordance with the reality on the ground, but withdraws from Syria. However, in Syria, the United States and Israel will support the Kurds, who are Türkiye’s main opponents. Ankara continues to insist on eliminating Kurdish structures in Syria, which may be at odds with the approaches of the United States and Israel. Russian expert Stanislav Tarasov believes that the Turkish-Kurdish confrontation in Syria can lead to sad consequences for the Turks and the loss of almost eight Kurdish-populated vilayets in the south-east of Türkiye itself with the involvement of the United States and Israel. At the same time, D. Trump’s focus on confrontation with Iran in Israel’s favour prolongs the risk of war waged by the Western coalition against Iran, in which Türkiye will face a military conflict with Tehran. It is more likely that Russia will abstain from intervening in such a conflict. Türkiye, however, could suffer significantly. Syria can either follow the path of ‘Iraqisation’ and the division of its territories into ‘zones of responsibility’ of external and internal forces or find itself divided between neighbours and new entities (including Israel, Türkiye, Iran and Kurdistan). * currently banned in the Russian Federation