Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ushering in a multipolar order requires a streamlined and coherent political agenda – not unfocused expansion.  The 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, concluded last week with the usual grand declaration of the group’s commitments, concerns and aspirations.  Many media headlines, particularly in Western countries, focused on how the summit and BRICS generally, symbolised Moscow’s ability to circumvent the fallout of sanctions by turning to the global south. In this way, BRICS is indirectly viewed as a threat to Western efforts to isolate Russia, weaken its power projection capabilities, and end its invasion of Ukraine.  Western governments and analysts often struggle to frame BRICS’s evolution beyond a binary, zero-sum narrative in which the group is a key geopolitical challenge to the Western-dominated international order. This interpretation places the forces of democracy and liberal political values in one camp and authoritarian governments in another, with certain developing countries caught in the middle, trying to play one side off the other for their own benefit.  There is some merit to these kinds of headlines. Russia and China are primarily major status-quo powers. Both have been permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members since its establishment. Moscow was the ‘other pole’ in the international order for most of the 20th century, a position Beijing is working towards. And the foreign policy goals of both place them in confrontation with the United States and its Western allies.  BRICS may be on a path towards unnecessary substantive bloat, and away from its core business.  So, are these two countries in a position to champion the global south’s cause, and why haven’t more representative bodies like the Non-Aligned Movement played a more prominent role?  The preoccupation with Russia and China detracts from BRICS’s broader, underlying geopolitical project – the need for global south countries to reform and shape the international order’s future direction on their own terms.  These include greater representation and agency in global policy- and decision-making bodies and facilitating greater freedom to trade, invest and borrow money outside the Western-dominated financial system. They also include a more just and equitable global power balance that reflects modern realities.  In pursuing these aims, BRICS countries have made steady progress on developing a shared strategic agenda for increased cooperation across various policy domains.  The Kazan summit’s 32-page outcomes declaration covers almost everything from reforming the UNSC and Bretton Woods institutions to climate change, biodiversity and conservation. It also covers challenges from global crises, conflicts and terrorism and a suite of economic development, health, education, science and cultural exchange-related issues.  A group of democracies, autocracies and theocracies speaking with one voice on human rights and democracy is absurd.  The group’s ballooning cooperation agenda may indicate progress. But it could also signify the limits of its diverse members’ ability to agree on ‘hard’ political and security matters central to the core business of reforming the international order.  The expansion of BRICS’ substantive agenda and its membership dilutes its primary purpose and reinforces the binary, zero-sum Western narrative its members constantly try to shed.  Tangible, albeit gradual, progress on establishing intra-BRICS institutions and processes such as the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism, the cross-border payment system and its independent reinsurance capacity suggest that BRICS’ clout and credibility are growing.  These initiatives could enable members to pursue their international economic objectives without the constraints and transactional costs associated with traditional financial bodies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Ideally, this would improve their relative positions of global power and influence, and help deliver a more multipolar international order.  In contrast, deepening cooperation on big cat conservation, while important, doesn’t serve that purpose. Nor does facilitating youth exchanges on sports and healthy lifestyles or championing a BRICS alliance for folk dance. Including these kinds of initiatives in BRICS’ growing agenda detracts from its core objectives.  A streamlined agenda would divert attention from the contradictions and geopolitical manoeuvring of BRICS’ members.  More worryingly, this suggests that BRICS’ diverse constellation of member states is pursuing the path of least resistance – expanding their cooperation in every direction, hoping something eventually sticks.  Instead of doubling down on hard strategic questions about a shared conception of multipolarity, and the steps necessary to reform global governance and security institutions, BRICS seems to be heading for greater expansion and formalisation. And with that come the risks, challenges and institutional dependencies that have led to the stagnation and ineffectiveness plaguing more established international organisations in recent years.  Perhaps the group’s core members recognise that they have very different ideas of what constitutes multipolarity. Russia (and China to an extent) envisage much more than global institutional reforms, focusing instead on reimagining international norms and core principles.  These differences are also reflected in BRICS’ expanding membership. It seems Russian and Chinese enthusiasm has been curbed by other founding members, who prefer a ‘partner country’ model for future growth. This contrasts with the full membership offers to Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE in 2023. (Argentina’s new political administration declined, and the Saudis have remained non-committal.)    Most worrying, however, is BRICS’ preoccupation with promoting democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. There is no doubt that these terms are increasingly politicised and rife with double standards – among developing nations with mixed political systems and traditionally liberal, Western democracies. However, for BRICS to meaningfully champion normative values, its members must at least attempt to commit to common political governance systems in their own countries.  Having a group of partner nations composed of progressive constitutional democracies and closed repressive autocracies and theocracies attempting to speak with one voice on promoting human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms is absurd. It reeks of empty political rhetoric at best, and Orwellian double-speak at worst.  This again dilutes BRICS’ key messages, undermines its important core business, and detracts from the significant progress being made towards a common strategic agenda.  BRICS primary goal moving forward should be to trim the fat.  A streamlined annual working agenda would divert attention away from its individual member states' contradictions and geopolitical manoeuvring. With a focus on addressing the international system’s failures, institutional reform and greater representation for global south countries in policy- and decision-making bodies could be prioritised.  This seems unlikely though, if this year’s summit is anything to go by. By following the path of least resistance, BRICS may be setting itself on a course towards increasing and unnecessary substantive bloat, and away from its core business.  Only time will tell if certain members are willing to be more assertive and correct course before they are too far down a path impossible to pivot away from. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском No mother wants to say goodbye to their child. However, with the looming threat of an attack from China, this fear threatens to become a reality for many Taiwanese mothers. There has been widespread speculation that People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping (習近平) has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be prepared to invade the island by 2027. Amid such predictions, Taiwan has completed numerous actions to increase its capabilities to resist a Chinese attack. Arguably, the island’s most notable single measure—and the most politically controversial—has been the extension of conscripted service for young men from four months to one year of training and military duty. [1]   Current Party Stances  When then-President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) announced the extension of conscripted service in December 2022, public opinion was divided regarding the presidential decision. In the January 2024 presidential election, the three contenders differed on their proposed policies for housing and economic issues, as well as relations with China, but all three—Lai Ching-te (賴清德) of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨), Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜) of the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨), and Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP, (台民黨)—supported expanding conscripted military service. According to Dr. Shen Ming-shih (沈明室), acting deputy chief executive of the Institute of National Defense and Security Research (INDSR, 國防安全研究院), a government funded think-tank in Taipei, the rare agreement reached by the three men reflects how the issue involves national security interests that transcend party politics.  In Taiwan, the conscription age is 18; however, deferments for higher education are very common. All males must serve in the military by age 36, when they can retire from the reserves. Conscription length has varied throughout administrations. It used to last between two and three years, until being shortened to one year in 2008. This was further cut to four months in 2012 under KMT President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who came to power in 2008 and followed a policy of pursuing warmer ties with China. In the years that followed, Taiwan’s conscripted service system has been widely criticized by commentators both inside Taiwan and abroad as ineffective in providing for Taiwan’s defense, leading the Tsai Administration to implement the one-year program.  Public Opinion and the Impacts of Conscription  Former conscripts have frequently expressed disappointment with their training and equipment. In a study conducted in September 2023, participants regarded military service as “useless” and a “waste of time.” Citing as evidence the lack of equipment and the long permitted periods of leisure time, past participants have complained about the military training camps. One participant who trained in the Taiwanese military between 2023 and 2024 stated that “I just sat under the AC with my phone, they [military personnel] didn’t train us with any specific weapons because they said to not waste bullets, so my friends and I just sat on a field most of the time.” The researchers similarly conducted an interview with Jack Huang, a 30 year old male who completed his four months of service over two semester breaks in university. According to this news report, Huang “felt [that] his shooting practice was outdated, like a holdover from the 1950s, and did not see how it would help him in modern warfare.”   These examples support what Dr. Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), a research fellow and director of INDSR has found: namely, that psychological defense and troop morale are the top concerns regarding Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. If troop morale and confidence are down, how is a sovereign island supposed to maintain its basic defense capacity against China?   Polling data and public sentiment reflect a mix of opinions regarding the conscription extension. According to a survey by the National Chengchi University (國立政治大學), 58 percent of Taiwanese citizens support the extension of conscription to one year, viewing it as a necessary measure for national defense. However, 35 percent oppose the extension, citing particular concerns about its impact on young mens’ educational and career prospects. This division in opinion is evident across different demographics, with younger generations expressing more resistance to the policy compared to older generations.  There is indeed research that points to a one year conscription policy as being an impediment to educational and job prospects. In 2015, The IZA Journal of Labor Economics published a study on the long-term effects of peace-time military conscription on educational attainment and earnings in the Netherlands. Researchers found that compulsory military service decreased the proportion of Dutch university graduates by 1.5 percentage points (from a baseline of 12.3 per cent). Furthermore, the study found that being a conscript diminished the likelihood of earning a university degree by about four percentage points. The impact of military service on wages is also detrimental and long-term. The research concluded that “approximately 18 years after military service, we still find a negative effect of 3 to 4 per cent.” This quantifies some of the negative economic impacts of prolonged military conscription.   Flexibility in Service and Better Compensation for Conscripted Soldiers  Amid public reservations about the new policy, Taiwan’s government has implemented measures aimed to provide benefits after conscription. These include considering service time when calculating future benefits, and providing “flexible” educational options to facilitate the move into the economy for all conscripts. The Taipei Times reported in June 2023 that the Ministry of Education (教育部) has implemented a “3+1” program in which conscripts can complete college in three years and military duty in one year, allowing them to graduate alongside those who do not have to serve. To do this, institutions must raise the limit on the amount of credits that draftee students may obtain each semester. They should also provide summer courses and allow drafted individuals to attend classes at other universities. However, some have criticized the program: for example, KMT members of the legislature have stated that it would jeopardize students’ educational rights, and that conscripts would be “burning the candle at both ends” by balancing studies and conscription.  Conscription programs have also traditionally been known for the very low levels of pay given to junior conscripts—another point that has made the service period unpopular. The return to one-year service is part of a package of conscription reforms that includes increased pay for conscripted soldiers, in which the monthly compensation for a private will increase from NTD $6,510 to NTD $26,307 (USD $203 to USD $850)—still not a huge sum, but a four-fold increase over the standard pay level of the past.  Personal Interviews with Taiwanese Americans Affected by the Conscription Policy   Another issue of concern regarding conscription may be identified in the current attitudes of future Taiwanese-Americans conscripts residing in Taiwan. To investigate the trend, the author conducted a limited study in Taiwan in May 2024, in which interviews were conducted with five teen participants who have to serve upon turning 18. [2] In the interviews, the participants were asked about their views towards the policy. For the first subject pool, four of the five teen participants (Teens 1, 3, 4, and 5) stated that period of the prolonged military service caused concerns regarding future career plans. This concern contributed to a decrease in national pride and connection to their Taiwanese identity. For example, when asked about his opinion regarding the conscription policy, Teen 3 stated in his interview, “Especially because the job market is so tight right now… Having to serve would make getting a job harder. I know I’m supposed to be mad at China, but I’m mad at Taiwan.”   This correlates to the fluctuation of public confidence in Taiwan’s military, according to data found by NCCU’s Election Study Center. In September of 2021, about 58 percent of respondents were confident or very confident in the military’s ability to defend Taiwan. However, confidence dropped to 54 percent in March 2022 and to 43 percent in March 2023—possibly due in part to negative news and cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare and negative news covers many areas: ranging from naval exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan and military aviation flights that steadily advance closer to Taiwan’s airspace, to bans of Taiwanese agricultural products, and the use of fringe political parties employed to spread pro-CCP (and anti-American) narratives.  Another theme commonly cited as a reason for their decreased level of patriotism was the effect of military service on plans for higher education. Three out of the five teen participants (Teens 1, 3, and 4) stated that the prolonged military service caused concerns regarding future education plans. This concern contributed to a decrease in national pride and connection to their Taiwanese identity. For example, when asked about his opinion regarding the conscription policy, Teen 1 stated in his interview, “I’m just trying to live my life and go off to college abroad and never have to think about this problem or Taiwan ever again.” The frustration expressed corresponds to a decrease in patriotic connection: as Teen 4 stated in his interview, “I don’t like it. It inconveniences me and my plans for college. Plus, Taiwan doesn’t have anything to offer to my education.”   In a second subject pool, four parent participants (Parents 2, 3, 4, and 5) stated that the prolonged military service for boys born after 2005 caused concerns regarding future career plans. Many parent participants believed that prolonged service duration would harm a child’s employment opportunities, and cause them to lose valuable work experience. For example, Parent 2 stated in their interview, “We have to think about what the youth needs. A one-year training with weapons they will never be able to use or use well in their entire life is useless and bad for job prospects. I am disappointed in Taiwan and perhaps even a bit ashamed of my country.”    Many parent participants believed that prolonged service duration would harm a child’s educational development and cause them to lose valuable academic learning. This connects to March 2023 research in the publication Voice Tank, which found that “respondents’ confidence had dropped, for the first time below 50 percent (to 43 percent), and the proportion of those not confident exceeded that of those confident. While such a drop could be attributed to various factors and may only be temporary, we think it may be a result of cognitive warfare and negative news coverage of the ROC armed forces.” [3] This links to Parent 4’s questioning of Taiwan, asking, “What is wrong with Taiwan? Don’t they understand our future generation needs to study abroad for a better chance?” Parent 4 believes that the government is directly hindering her son’s academic development and future by implementing the policy, a reason for her declining level of patriotism.  Conclusion  The prolonged military conscription for males born after 2005 has caused clashing public opinions—and a decline in patriotic sentiment for Taiwanese Americans currently residing in Taiwan, including future conscripts and their parents. The ruling DPP must consider the unforeseen impacts of its policy amid the looming Chinese threat. It becomes imperative for the ruling party to acknowledge that while conscription may appear on the surface to be cost-effective, simple budgetary accounting does not consider the potentially high opportunity cost that young people face when forced to serve, leading to long-term earnings losses and educational disruptions. These factors combine to reduce national income and economic growth. Additionally, for Taiwanese Americans and expatriates, conscription does little to foster unity; instead, it risks further weakening the relationship between overseas citizens and the state, whose voices still influence Taiwan’s future.  The main point: The prolonged military conscription for boys born after 2005 has caused public controversy and a decline in patriotism for Taiwanese Americans currently residing in Taiwan, including future conscripts and their parents. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party must consider the unforeseen impacts of its policy amid the looming Chinese threat.  References  [1] For previous discussions of the issues surrounding the extension of service to one year, see: John Dotson, “Taiwan’s ‘Military Force Restructuring Plan’ and the Extension of Conscripted Military Service,” Global Taiwan Brief, February 8, 2023, https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/02/taiwan-military-force-restructuring-plan-and-the-extension-of-conscripted-military-service/; and John Dotson, “Taiwan Initiates Its New One-Year Military Conscription Program,” Global Taiwan Brief, February 7, 2024, https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/02/taiwan-initiates-its-new-one-year-military-conscription-program/.  [2] The research was conducted for a duration of one year, under the supervision of Dr. Irish Farley. The study utilized a two-part, mixed methods approach that surveyed boys between of 14 and 17 living in Taiwan who are eligible for military conscription upon turning of age; followed by small group interviews with the teen participants, and parents of boys aged 14 through 17 living in Taiwan.  [3] For example, a report in Nihon Keizai Shimbun in February 2023 claimed that 90 percent of retired Taiwanese spies have worked with China. In early March, soldiers stationed in Kinmen defected to Xiamen, which led to the circulation of negative news about Taiwan’s military. See: Lee, Kuan-chen, Christina Chen, and Ying-Hsuan Chen. 2024. “Core Public Attitudes toward Defense and Security in Taiwan.” Taiwan Politics, January 2024, https://doi.org/10.58570/WRON8266. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The world economy is underperforming as a result of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainty around the US election. An escalation of conflict in the Middle East could increase uncertainties, harming inflation reduction efforts and hurting growth. It has been over a year since the Hamas-led attack on Israel. Israel’s response in Gaza has resulted in widespread destruction and significant loss of life. The conflict has since expanded beyond Gaza, involving the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian strikes targeting Israel. In addition to the awful humanitarian cost of the conflicts, the war and the possibility of its further expansion pose significant repercussions for the global economy. This article discusses three potential ways in which the current conflict and a wider conflict in the Middle East could affect the global economy. Increased geopolitical uncertainties First and foremost, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could lead to greater geopolitical uncertainties. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the geopolitical risk (GPR) and geopolitical acts (GPRA) indices (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022) – these are text-based measures of heightened uncertainties due to adverse geopolitical events such as wars, terrorism and international tensions. (See this article for more discussion about these measures.) Following the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023, both the overall GPR index and its ‘war and terror acts’ component spiked strongly, to a level higher than that seen during the ISIS attack in Paris in November 2015. Both indices eased significantly in the months following October 2023 despite the continuation of the conflict. But they jumped again following Israel’s attack on southern Lebanon in September 2024. As of mid-October 2024, the GPR and GPRA remain, respectively, 21% and 35% higher than their historical averages.   What might be the consequences of such elevated levels of risk? Research tells us that higher geopolitical risk raises oil prices (Mignon and Saadaoui, 2024). It also reduces global investment and increases inflation (Caldara et al, 2022). Greater geopolitical risk has a significantly negative impact on business and consumer confidence in several advanced economies (de Wet, 2023). This is because consumers typically cut non-essential spending and businesses postpone investment decisions during turbulent times. This reduces firm-level investment, particularly for businesses with higher initial investment costs and greater market power (Wang et al, 2023). Higher geopolitical risks also reduce global trade and financial flows, causing greater volatility in capital flows in emerging markets (Kaya and Erden, 2023). Oil production cuts and higher energy prices The second way in which the Middle East conflict could affect the global economy is its impact on energy prices, both directly through production cuts and indirectly through greater uncertainties. In response to Israel’s actions against its neighbours, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could reduce oil production to penalise countries supporting Israel. A similar action in the 1970s led to a significant jump in oil prices, which contributed to years of stagflation, with higher global inflation and recessions in major economies. Before Israel's attack on Lebanon at the end of September, oil prices had been declining due to falling demand, particularly from China. On the supply side, oil production had increased in Canada and the United States, countering the production cuts by OPEC, and Saudi Arabia was expected to increase oil production from December. But the situation quickly reversed following Israel’s attack on Lebanon. Oil prices jumped by nearly $10 per barrel within a week, before easing by around $5 per barrel. While the immediate oil price impact of Israel’s attack has mostly faded, the potential for higher oil (and other energy) prices still poses a risk to global inflation and economic activity (Liadze et al, 2022). To provide further context for the potential scale of this impact, we can show what would happen if oil and gas prices were to remain $10 higher for two years than the baseline levels projected in the Summer Global Economic Outlook from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), using NIESR’s Global Macroeconometric Model (NiGEM). The results demonstrate that the $10 rise in oil and gas prices increases inflation by around 0.7 percentage points in major economies in the first year (see Figure 2). The impact is higher in China, where the economy relies relatively more on oil imports for its strong manufacturing industries. The inflationary pressures persist for two years despite central banks’ efforts to curb inflation by increasing interest rates.   The effect of higher oil and gas prices on real GDP is shown in Figure 3. In the scenario described above, GDP would fall by 0.1-0.2% in major economies immediately. Partly due to higher interest rates, real GDP would continue to weaken for three years following the shock. After this, economic activity would start to return to base levels as oil and gas prices revert to their levels in the baseline forecast.   Increased shipping costs and supply chain disruptions A wider conflict in the Middle East could also affect the economy through higher shipping costs and supply chain disruptions. Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in late 2023 showed that such disruptions can have a huge impact on global trade through shipping, which comprises 80% of world trade volume. Following the rocket attacks by the Houthi rebels, some commercial shipping re-routed from the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to significant delays in travel times and increased freight costs. As a result, the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index – a measure of sea freight rates – rose by around 260% in the second quarter of 2024 with additional disruptions to supply chains. Our analysis shows that an increase of 10 percentage points in shipping cost inflation can lead to import prices rising by up to around 1% and consumer inflation increasing by around 0.5% in OECD countries. As Figure 4 shows, the impact of shipping costs on inflation shows its full effects over six quarters. This means that inflationary concerns could be with us for the next year and a half as a result of higher shipping costs that may emerge from any possible escalation of the Middle East conflict.   Wider economic implications and policy responses While rising geopolitical risk and increased oil and shipping costs can each individually exert upward pressure on inflation and may slow down economic activity in the global economy, the combined impacts are likely to be greater. Countries with stronger trade and financial ties to the Middle East and those that rely heavily on oil imports as an input for domestic production would be most affected. On the monetary policy front, central banks may have to take a more hawkish stance in response to rising inflationary pressures from the Middle East conflict. This could lead to higher interest rates, which would further dampen economic activity, particularly in an environment where there are already recessionary concerns in some major economies. Beyond its immediate economic implications, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could trigger large-scale displacement of people, which would increase economic and social pressures on neighbouring countries. Many countries may also have to increase their military spending in response to growing regional tensions. Given that public debt levels are already elevated in many countries due to successive shocks to the global economy over the past decade, any additional defence spending could come at the expense of public infrastructure investments that would otherwise boost productivity growth. Overall, the global economy is already underperforming as a result of the lagged effects of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainties surrounding the upcoming US election and possible changes to US trade policy. A potential escalation of conflict in the Middle East could exacerbate the situation by increasing uncertainties, harming efforts to bring down inflation and reducing global GDP growth. Over the medium and long term, it could further damage the global economy, with the possibility of refugee crises as well as increased defence spending, making the effects more complex and longer lasting. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Sea of Cooperation: New Opportunities for the Development of China — ASEAN RelationsSoutheast Asia (SEA) is gaining increasing importance with the changing global order. The region is once again experiencing a period of competition between the “great powers”. During the Cold War some countries managed to stay out of the Soviet-American confrontation, but today, integration into economic, technological, and humanitarian exchanges forces members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to reshape their foreign policy in line with the prioritization of partnerships with various centers of power. SEA has significant economic growth potential, making cooperation beneficial and conflicts costly. Despite the tempting logic of harsh realism in contemporary geopolitical conditions, there remains space in this region for the traditions of idealism and complex interdependence as prerequisites for peaceful coexistence.When Profit Matters More than ClaimsThe ASEAN Summit-2024, held in October in Vientiane, clearly became a platform for a multidimensional dialogue between the “Great East Asian” countries, including India. Almost all participants tried to avoid raising contentious issues; in particular, the new Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Ishiba, emphasized Japan’s investments in Southeast Asian countries and avoided discussions about the possibility of forming an “Asian NATO”. Similar ideas about freedom from confrontations and unilateral attempts to change the balance of power were expressed by the President of South Korea, Yoon Suk Yeol. Narendra Modi focused on enhancing multilateral cooperation between Asian states in the fields of information technology, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure modernization, which would help accelerate the recovery of production and distribution chains after the COVID-19 pandemic. Chairman of the State Council of China, Li Keqiang, firmly pointed to “external forces” as the main culprits of disrupting regional order.According to him, China is ready to work with each ASEAN country in the interest of establishing a common market and achieving sustainable development. The Prime Minister stated that China and Southeast Asian countries are opening up to each other, and this process inevitably contributes to mutual prosperity, which will have a positive impact on the entire world. Notably, in 2023, the trade turnover between China and ASEAN countries exceeded 900 billion USD for the second consecutive year, and has nearly doubled over the past 10 years. The greatest activity is observed in developing relations with Vietnam and Malaysia, which together account for 230 and 191 billion USD, respectively. This means that today, Southeast Asian countries are collectively a more important partner for Beijing (in terms of volume) than the United States or the European Union.It is not surprising that at the events within the framework of the ASEAN Summit, including numerous bilateral meetings, the focus was on mutually beneficial cooperation, including issues related to further removing barriers and optimizing transport routes. Li Keqiang's statement at the 27th China-ASEAN Summit regarding the update of the Free Trade Agreement with the Association highlights the clear dominance of the economic component of cooperation over security issues, ideological differences, and other disagreements. Of course, there are opinions that Laos, in its capacity as chair, deliberately separated political issues from economic ones, but what is wrong with that?Only Philippine President F. Marcos Jr. was left alone, accusing the Chinese Coast Guard of reckless and unjustified pressure in the «exclusive economic zone». This is despite the fact that in July, an agreement was reached allowing the Philippines to deliver supplies to the “Sierra Madre” ship, which had been intentionally grounded 10 years ago at the Ayungin Shoal as a forward post for a Marine Corps unit.Professionally and SafelyToday, the South China Sea (SCS) is home to some of the busiest maritime communication routes. At least 500,000 vessels pass through the region each year, accounting for approximately 40% of global cargo traffic, and more than a million civilian flights cross the airspace above the sea annually. This high intensity of exchanges increases the importance of ensuring the safety of transport amidst unresolved disputes over the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone, the ownership of parts of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and the escalation of US-China geopolitical tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. Formally, the multilateral dispute over the islands and maritime areas between ASEAN member states and China remains unresolved.In September, the Beijing-based South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative published a report on the situation in the region. The authors of the document note that in recent years, the United States has pursued an offensive strategy to contain China, primarily using the “instability factor” in the South China Sea to escalate the multilateral dispute and fuel anti-China sentiments. Washington has also encouraged territorial claims by ASEAN countries against China, based on its own interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the concept of a “rules-based order”. So far, these flare-ups of claims against Beijing, which are sometimes accompanied by incidents between coast guard vessels, have not resulted in significant disruptions to freedom of navigation and air traffic. Moreover, China notes that the majority of the contacts have been “professional and safe”. Undoubtedly, in the event of increased tensions—such as more active actions by the air force, navy, and coast guards of various countries toward Chinese aircraft and vessels—logistical routes would need to be reorganized, which could lead to significant losses not only for China but for the entire regional economy. However, despite attempts by the US and its allies to assign special geopolitical significance to the situation in Southeast Asia, the situation remains manageable. As a result, Beijing still believes that peaceful resolution is possible.China Daily cites the opinion of specialists from the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), who believe that, in terms of ensuring the stability of international trade flows, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is not under threat. However, in the military dimension, instability is growing, primarily due to excessive US interference.[1] The Institute argues that American activities, which involve sending military ships and aircraft to demonstrate power, only provoke disputes over sovereignty and borders. Such actions create a dangerous misconception among the leadership of several countries that Washington will intervene if necessary to contain China's expansion, thus assisting in resolving the dispute through pressure. The demonization and constant condemnation of China have already negatively affected bilateral relations with the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, which requires significant diplomatic efforts from the Chinese leadership to normalize relations.Military activity is noticeably increasing in Southeast Asia, involving both regional and non-regional states. In addition to the United States, countries such as Japan, Australia, and European NATO members — Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands — are also becoming involved. In total, the US Navy conducts over 1,600 ship hours annually in the region, with at least 3,000 additional ship hours contributed by auxiliary forces. In the airspace above the South China Sea, approximately 30,000 sorties by combat aircraft and helicopters were recorded in 2023, a third of which involved non-regional states, with no fewer than 7,800 sorties conducted by the US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.At CIIS, it is believed that through military actions, Washington is “inflating” its own importance in ensuring freedom of navigation, despite the fact that the US has no merit in this — China itself does not hinder shipping and views patrol and training missions from other countries with understanding. However, joint coast guard exercises between the two most outspoken opponents of China's activities in the South China Sea (the Philippines and Vietnam), as well as “ASEAN-wide” naval maneuvers, initiated by Indonesia, have attracted the attention of the PLA command. The main troublemaker in the region, according to Beijing, is the United States, which effectively ignores the “rules” it established for the safe passage of ships, vessels, and aircraft, constantly maintaining a military presence in the region where the greatest threat actually comes from US military forces. These actions are seen as an attempt to maintain hegemony in the face of “strategic retreat” and to push regional countries away from expanding cooperation with China by artificially creating an unsettled atmosphere and undermining multilateral confidence-building measures.The Chinese leadership's course of separating trade, economic, and investment cooperation from territorial disputes is generally understood by Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and Singapore, which claim parts of the Spratly Islands. However, it has also become a target for criticism from radical circles in these countries, clearly incited by Washington. As negotiations have shown, China and Southeast Asian countries are capable of independently developing mutually acceptable rules of action in the South China Sea, based on international law principles and taking into account each other's interests and concerns. The main idea is to establish direct dialogue in any disputed situation, maintain a constant consultation mechanism, preserve constructive negotiations, and adhere to the principle of peaceful resolution.ASEAN countries clearly do not want confrontation with Beijing, but they are in urgent need of a reliable system for peacefully managing any activities in the waters and on the continental shelf, which still needs to be developed together, ensuring guarantees of unhindered access for exploitation. Peace and cooperation in the South China Sea are inseparable, and collective responsibility for security will invariably contribute to the development of multidimensional ties, further increase trade volume, and lead to the emergence of the Sea of Cooperation on the world map.Reference1. Jiang, Chenglong. South China Sea disputes still ‘manageable’. China Daily. September 28-29, 2024. P. 2.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract: Japan is going through a difficult domestic political period that coincides with the demands of the enormous geopolitical challenges posed by the threat posed by the increased assertiveness of China and Russia in the region, coupled with the risk of North Korea's nuclear programme. Uncertainty over the immediate future of the security relationship with the United States, which was tightened under former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, also leads Japan to a dilemma regarding its own deterrence capabilities, as reliance on such an alliance may become another risk factor in the event that the United States reformulates it. Therefore, the search for Japan's own strategic autonomy is becoming increasingly important, firstly by accelerating remilitarisation that includes possibilities beyond strict self-defence and, as a second pillar, by seeking to create a mutual security organisation with other countries in the region to act as a deterrent to China, Russia and North Korea, bringing together the various bilateral and multinational treaties to which Japan is a party. Introduction The 27 October elections have left Japan in a complicated political situation. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won and remains the most represented party in the Diet, with 191 seats, but together with its current partner, the Komeito, the governing coalition fell far short of the 233 needed for a majority. Nevertheless, the current prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, can continue to hold office and the punishment of the LDP seems to be read in a domestic context and not because of dissent over security and the country's external projection. Japan's stability is key to the region, so it seems unlikely that any government that is formed will affect the main lines of defence policy, as the concern remains an increasingly assertive China and the attitude of other actors such as Russia and North Korea. The main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party won 148 seats, 52 more than in the last election, but if we look at its election manifesto, on foreign policy it opts to align itself with the strategic concept of a secure and open Indo-Pacific, while on defence the question is whether to continue to rely on the alliance with the US, which has approximately 50,000 troops in the country, or whether Japan should be able to have sufficient deterrent capabilities of its own .1 On 1 October, Shigeru Ishiba took over as prime minister from his party colleague and prime minister from 2021, Fumio Kishida, worn down by several corruption cases. On October 4, Ishiba announced some of his foreign policy priorities: the design of a mutual security organisation, an "Asian NATO" with several Indo-Pacific countries and greater reciprocity in the alliance with the United States, although this does not mean a questioning of this. 2 All this in a regional context where Japan's perception of its security being threatened was growing, given that a few days earlier a Chinese aircraft carrier had passed through the waters between the Japanese islands of Yonaguni and Iriomote, coming within 24 miles of Japanese territory. For decades, Japan has been perhaps the main Pacific ally of its former World War II enemy, the United States, and this, coupled with its own geopolitical position, translates into remilitarisation, a dynamic of confrontation with China and the search for allies beyond the US, both in the region itself and further afield, in Europe, for example. With Ishida it seems that there will be some continuity with Kishida's policy, although both belong to the same party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has been governing Japan for a decade, although their sensibilities and political paths are different, while some unknowns remain in the immediate future, such as China's own position with the increasingly belligerent discourse from Japan or the future of the close alliance with the United States depending on the tenant in the White House from next year, after the elections on 1 November: continuity or rupture if the United States demands a change in Japan's defence policy, pushing it towards greater spending and thus increasing strategic autonomy? Japan's socio-economic and political turbulence Sigheru Ishiba was appointed prime minister due to corruption cases in the Fushida government, including some dealings in various contracts within the defence industry. Since 2017, laws have been tightened to prosecute bribery of officials, which has an impact on the awarding of contracts and tenders for public works. Since 2021, the year of his appointment as prime minister, Fumio Kishida's career has been punctuated by various scandals, starting with the scenario surrounding the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the summer of 2022, which brought to light the party's links to the controversial religious organisation of the Unification Church, also known as the Moon Sect, to which his assassin belonged. As early as 2023, the case of the blackmailing of senior party officials, including Kishida himself, caused his popular approval rating to fall to less than 15 percent, and after sacking senior officials and ministers, he decided last August to step down and make way for another candidate, who would end up being Ishiba .3 Sigheru Ishiba is a veteran politician known for his loquacity who has been ostracised within the LDP for his criticism of its leaders, for example in 2014 against Shinzo Abe for his reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution that prohibited the country from rearming. After several unsuccessful attempts to lead the LDP, Ishiba was a minor parliamentarian, but what was crucial in his rise to prime minister was that he embodied the image of a fighter against corruption, which is also considered a burden in Japan's current complex economic situation. Although it is the fourth largest economic power, in 2023 Germany overtook Japan as the world's third largest economy and also has a trade deficit of around 2 billion euros, as the country is totally dependent on resources such as oil and gas, suffering from rising prices and obstacles in supply chains in the Indo-Pacific, for example, with the Houthi threat in the Red Sea 4.  Another sensitive issue is demographics. Japan has an ageing society, where 30% of its 125 million inhabitants are over 65, the highest rate in the world, while the birth rate is very low, with an average of 1.3 children per woman, according to World Bank figures 5 . This has consequences such as a shrinking domestic market, as older people are reluctant to put their savings at stake, plus the danger of not being able to meet labour needs in some sectors, including defence needs, precisely at a time when there is a desire to increase manpower. Technology and robotisation have been alleviating this situation of the need for demographic renewal, but doubts lurk in the very near future, especially in one of the countries with the most restrictive immigration legislation in the world. Redoubling security threats: China, Russia and North Korea  Japan's historic territorial disputes with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the South China Sea and with Russia over the Kuril/Chishima Islands have been compounded by a heightened threat perception of these two formidable giants, while North Korean ballistic missile tests have added to the escalating tension. As the 2024 Defence White Paper has made clear, Japan's approximately 16,000 kilometres of coastline along its four main islands, which means that no point in the country is more than 150 kilometres from the sea, means that Japanese military doctrine regards its defences as definitive battle sites. Moreover, the straits separating these islands greatly restrict a rapid transfer of forces, and this is compounded by the mountainous barriers that similarly prevent rapid deployment of troops. 6  The paper notes that China is modernising and expanding its military by leaps and bounds, while Russian manoeuvres in the Kuriles have involved not only naval exercises but also the deployment of coastal missile and air defence systems. On 18 September, the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning passed through the waters between the islands of Yonaguni and Iriomote, the first ship of its kind, while it is common for fighter jets and other vessels to invade Japanese airspace or territorial waters 7. Similarly, an anti-Japanese sentiment is beginning to emerge in China that is rooted in cultural and historical elements and embedded in the diplomatic sphere. In addition to Beijing's reminders that both exports and imports between the two countries are key to their respective economies, and that any ban or stricter regulation could alter them, there are also Chinese diplomatic protests over issues such as the sending of a Japanese warship to the Taiwan Strait on 25 September, an unprecedented action, albeit in the framework of collaboration with other countries such as Australia and New Zealand, which took part in joint manoeuvres in the area, dubbed "freedom of navigation exercises"8.  Finally, several Japanese companies based in China are willing to relocate their staff after xenophobic attacks, including the fatal stabbing of a child in Shenzhen on 18 September 9. On social media, many posts from China claim that Japanese schools create spies and label them as "new colonies" in reference to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1932-1945. In these China-Japan frictions, destabilising actions are also observed within the so-called grey zone. A report has identified a disinformation network in China that promotes a supposed independence movement in Okinawa, where there are also calls for an end to the US presence on the island, which is home to more than 25,000 troops in the largest base on Japanese territory.  Violations of Japanese air or maritime sovereignty have also recently come from Russia. On 23 September, a serious incident occurred when a Russian military aircraft violated Japanese airspace north of Rebun Island in Hokkaido Prefecture and was intercepted by a Japanese aircraft, which threw flares that hit its fuselage 10. It is also noteworthy that since the summer of 2019 and on an annual basis, a joint fleet of Chinese and Russian warships have been carrying out joint manoeuvres in the space between the seas of Japan and Okhotsk, while Russia has also announced the installation of new missile platforms in the Kuriles, which is seen as an increased threat to Japan.11  For its part, North Korea and its ballistic missile tests continue to be a risk for Japan, as it seems to have become one of the main targets of such tests, given that these projectiles tend to land in Japanese sovereign waters. Recently, Prime Minister Ishiba has pushed the diplomatic option by proposing to the regime in Pyongyang to set up liaison offices in both countries to settle any disputes, including the fate of Japanese citizens abducted in the 1970s and 1980s. This proposal includes an end to missile testing in exchange for Japanese investment in North Korean projects, another sign that Tokyo is beginning to seek its own solutions to problems previously settled within the broad framework of the alliance with the United States.12  Rethinking the alliance with the United States?  It should be remembered that all of Japan's military activity and capabilities are strictly limited to a defensive character, restricting the Japanese Self-Defence Forces' overseas deployments and mission to humanitarian cover. However, the dependence on the United States in this foreign projection is quite evident and goes beyond legal limitations. Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution regulates the use of force in Japan to self-defence. Prior to the reforms during Shinzo Abe's term in office (2012-2020), the 1951 Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which is still in force, even with revisions, allows in Articles V and VI for a US presence on Japanese territory, which covers the 50,000 US military personnel stationed at bases throughout the country, especially on the island of Okinawa, up to a maximum of 100,000. 13 But guidelines signed in 1978, also in force, stipulated the possibility of Japanese participation in foreign military operations if vital sea lanes for the country were under attack, such as protection for ships under the US flag of war or carrying Japanese nationals, as well as direct assistance to the US in the event of an attack on its mainland, for example by intercepting missiles overflying Japan. 14 When Abe was prime minister in 2015, the Diet passed two bills, the first allowing Japanese forces to operate abroad for humanitarian reasons or in the case of situations that "threaten Japan's existence", and the second removing restrictions that prevented action in collective self-defence, i.e. it can use its armed forces to defend an ally under attack and no longer just the United States. This opened the door for Japan to join military alliances. Two years later, in 2017, it became a founding member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), although this alliance between the United States, India, Australia and Japan is not, stricto sensu, a coalition with military powers, this same year they agreed to greater involvement in this regard with joint maritime patrols in the waters of the Indo-Pacific from 2025. 15 Some media refer to QUAD as a germ of "NATO in the Indo-Pacific".  With regard to NATO itself, Kishida participated as an observer in the meeting of the heads of state of the member states in Madrid in June 2022, the first Japanese leader to do so in history. Recall that, in the strategic concept agreed during that meeting, China already appeared as a systemic threat in the concept, an issue of vital strategic importance to Japan. Kishida also attended the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023, and was the first Japanese leader in history to deliver a speech from a non-coalition partner country: "We welcome the increased interest and engagement in the IndoPacific by our Euro-Atlantic partners"16. Japan is part of the AP4, the NATO AsiaPacific Partners, i.e. NATO's four Indo-Pacific partners along with South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.  In December 2022, the Kishida government updated three important defence documents, the National Security Strategy, the National Defence Strategy and the Defence Strengthening Programme, which ultimately authorised the government, for example, to acquire long-range missile platforms in a controversial decision, as it contradicts the premise of not acquiring offensive weapons. It was justified by Japan's new strategic concept of deterrence and anticipatory defence in the earlier "Three Pillars of Defence" documents, which include improving its security architecture with new equipment such as these missiles, strengthening the alliance with the United States and increasing cooperation with international partners. 17 The so-called 'Spirit of Camp David' 18 , the meeting at President Biden's summer residence in August 2023 between President Biden, Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, further integrated Japan into the US defence architecture in the Pacific, adding a key player to the alliance in South Korea, with whom Japan had hitherto had a complicated relationship stemming from a traumatic common history, and the germ of a trilateral military alliance was even raised, effectively including the possible transfer of certain deterrent technology vis-à-vis China, Russia and North Korea, such as nuclear weapons, something that had already come up at the G7 meeting in Hiroshima in May 2023, no less, although Kishida flatly denied this possibility. However, in 2017 it was the then Diet deputy and now prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, who raised this possibility as a real option for Japan, although the then defence minister immediately rejected it 19. Now Ishiba and part of the Japanese political spectrum seem to advocate a certain distancing from dependence on the US, without disavowing bilateral agreements, but advocating initiatives such as having Japanese forces on US soil, the joint use of military bases in Okinawa, and making Japan's defence less dependent on US policy for the region.  When in doubt, open the fan and increase the force.  Last January, Kishida and his foreign and defence ministers travelled to Washington to meet with their US counterparts. There, a new step in Japan's strategic thinking was revealed when it was announced that Japan intends to increase defence spending by almost 60 per cent over five years, abandoning the 1 per cent of GDP budget cap. Beyond a reading in terms of sustaining the alliance with the United States, the fact is that we are witnessing a revision of the country's defence strategy unprecedented since World War II: doubling defence spending means giving Japan its own autonomy in this area, without depending on third parties and with the agreement of the United States 20.  Japan perceives that the US will remain the global power for the foreseeable future, but may become less so in the medium to distant future, posing a threat to Japan's defence credibility, especially in the face of Chinese assertiveness in the adjacent seas. To counter this risk, one avenue could be a security alliance with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia, India or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. In fact, there are already some bilateral agreements that allow Japanese warships to call at various ports, carry out joint manoeuvres or increase the capacity of maritime agencies to improve patrolling, with Japan supplying patrol boats, coastguard vessels and aircraft 21. However, these security agreements are not only encouraged with Indo-Pacific states, but also with more distant actors with many interests in the region, such as the Europeans, where defence exchanges, joint exercises and contracts in the Japanese defence industry are also increasingly common, either bilaterally with countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and Spain, or through recent agreements with the European Union 22.  On security issues, Ishiba has also raised the need to create a mutual defence organisation for the Pacific area that would be similar to NATO for the Atlantic, with both sharing a reference to China as a systemic rival. Thus, there is speculation about a new Basic Law on Japan's Security Policy that would authorise participation in a multinational military alliance. The way forward could be to bring together existing alliances such as the bilateral Japan-US alliance, others such as those already mentioned with South Korea and the US, as well as multinational alliances such as ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-US Security Treaty), AUKUS (a partnership between Australia, the UK and the US) and above all QUAD, which would have a principle of "collective self-defence" and expand the number of its partners.23  The narrative gaining traction in Japan is that only such a defensive alliance can deter China, Russia or North Korea from future war moves in the region. Clearly, such a proposal would involve an in-depth debate ranging from the position of a crucial power that would be the key to the success or failure of such an alliance, such as India, to the status and position of Taiwan, to the sharing of units, equipment and technology, such as nuclear, as well as the projection of the US partnership itself, On the contrary, it would be an essential part of this new organisation, from the Japanese point of view, a definitive element of deterrence, but in balance and on an equal footing with the rest of the partners, such as Japan itself. 24 Further evidence of this new Japanese perception is the acquisition of deterrence capabilities of its own, within a range of sophisticated military equipment such as longrange counter-attack missiles, designed in principle to repel a perceived adversary's attack from a distance. The country appears to be preparing not only to defend itself at home, but to anticipate its defence abroad. Other key changes in this regard include the creation of a permanent joint operational headquarters for the Self-Defence Forces, the transfer of authority over Japan's Coast Guard to the Ministry of Defence in the event of conflict, the strengthening of cyber defence and a new commitment to increase intelligence capabilities, vital for a hypothetical confrontation with China or Russia in the grey zone. 25  Conclusions: another uncertain future comes from the United States.  The key to Japan's 'Pacific NATO' project also reflects another uncertainty, that of the immediate future of US foreign policy towards the region. After the good feeling with the Biden Administration, there is some uncertainty and unease in Japan if Donald Trump returns to the White House in 2025, and a term has become popular, "MoshiTora", something akin to "What if Donald Trump wins?" ("Tora" is the beginning of Trump's name translated in Japanese as "Torampu") 26 . This could mean changes in relations between the two countries on the economy - what about tariffs - and security, as well as bilateral defence treaties. During 2017-2021, the Trump administration questioned the value of some of these treaties, especially the costs to the US treasury, insisting that NATO countries and others, such as South Korea and Japan, should pay for them and threatening to withdraw US forces. In Japan in particular, then Prime Minister Abe tried to maintain the status quo despite some of Trump's rudeness and arrogant treatment of the country. Indeed, Trump's time in office can be seen as Japan's discovery of the risks of gambling everything on the US alliance and the beginning of a discourse, like Ishida's, advocating greater autonomy in security and defence 27. However, on the campaign trail, Trump himself has hinted that he will pursue a policy of close alliance with Japan and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific, with China in his sights. 28 Also at stake in the US presidential election is the future of US financial and military assistance to Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia. In line with the previous point and reducing spending in scenarios considered onerous and not vital to US security, a withdrawal of such assistance to Ukraine could be interpreted globally as an indication of what might happen in other areas such as the Indo-Pacific, where Japan could be in a dangerous situation if there were a partial or total US withdrawal, as it would coincide with the process of remilitarisation, without clear regional security alliances and with the certain possibility that both China and Russia would redouble their threats to the country. There are two issues close to Japan that may discern which path the new US administration will take in the region. The first is North Korea, since it should be remembered that in 2019 Trump pushed for talks with Kim Jong-Un to reach an agreement on controlling and curbing the Asian country's nuclear capabilities, although in the end no agreement was reached. The truth is that he did so without including Japan in the negotiations, when it is the main country in the region affected by this threat and North Korean ballistic tests. Secondly, the situation in neighbouring Taiwan. If the United States were to relax its hitherto resolute support for the island in the face of alleged Chinese aggression, how could this be interpreted by Japan, especially when it is committed to this vision? A certain consensus seems to be flourishing in the country at the strategic level: to achieve full security autonomy that demonstrates its own deterrence capabilities. This seems to be the way forward in the short and medium term.  [1] "Contribution to global peace and prosperity", The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan. Basic Policies. Available at: Basic Policies - The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (cdp-japan.jp) (accessed 29/10/2024). [2] WARD, Robert. "Tough challenges ahead for Japan's new prime minister", The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1 October 2024. Available at: Tough challenges ahead for Japan's new prime minister (iiss.org) (accessed 30/10/2024). [3] KHALIL, Shaimaa. "Japan's embattled PM had a cruel summer - it ends with his exit", BBC. 15 August 2024. Available at: Japan: Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's cruel summer ends with his exit (bbc.com) (accessed 30/10/2024). [4] "Japan reports current account deficit of nearly $2 billion in September", ABC. 17 October 2024. Available at: Japan reports current account deficit of nearly $2 billion in September (abc.es) (accessed 30/10/2024). [5] "Total population of Japan", World Bank Data. Available at: Population, total - Japan | Data (bancomundial.org) (accessed 30/10/2024). [6] CONTE DE LOS RÍOS, Augusto. Japan presents its new Defence White Paper. IEEE Opinion Paper 92/2024. Available at: https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2024/DIEEEO92_2024_AUGCON_Japon.pdf and/or bie3 link (accessed 30/10/2024). [7] "China's Liaoning aircraft carrier sails for the first time in waters adjacent to Japan", International Press. 21 September 2024. Available in: Chinese aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sails for first time in waters adjacent to Japan - International Press - Noticias de Japón en español (accessed 30/10/2024). [8] KOSUKE, Takahashi. "In Historic First, Japan Sends Naval Ship Through the Taiwan Strait", The Diplomat. 26 September 2024. Available at: In Historic First, Japan Sends Naval Ship Through the Taiwan Strait - The Diplomat (accessed 30/10/2024). [9] "Japanese child stabbed in Shenzhen: new attack with a nationalist matrix", Asianews. 18 August 2024. Available at: CHINA - JAPAN Japanese boy stabbed in Shenzen: new attack of nationalist matrix (asianews.it) (accessed 30/10/2024). [10] JHONSON, Jesse. "Japan fighters fire flares after Russian military plane enters airspace", The Japan Times. 23 September 2024. Available at: Japan fighters fire flares after Russian military plane enters airspace - The Japan Times (accessed 30/10/2024). [11] "Russian and Chinese warships practice missile firing at Ocean-2024, RIA reports", Reuters. 16 September 2024. Available at: Russian and Chinese warships practice missile firing at Ocean-2024, RIA reports | Reuters (accessed 30/10/2024). [12] CLARK, Gregory. "Breaking the deadlock in Japan-North Korean relations", Pearls and Irritations. 28 October 2024. Available at: Breaking the deadlock in Japan-North Korean relations - Pearls and Irritations (johnmenadue.com) (accessed 30/10/2024). [13] LLANDRÉS, Borja. "Japan and the US: 60 years of alliance", Article30. Available at: Japón y EE. UU., 60 años de alianza - Artículo30 (articulo30.org) (accessed 1/11/2024). [14] "The guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation", Ministry of Defence of Japan. 27 November 1978. Available at: 19781127.pdf (accessed 1/11/2024). [15] "Fact Sheet: 2024 Quad Leaders' Summit", The White House. 21 September 2024. Available at: Fact Sheet: 2024 Quad Leaders' Summit | The White House (accessed 1/11/2024). [16] "Taking the Japan-NATO Partnership to New Heights for World Peace", Government of Japan, 25 August 2023. Available at: Taking the Japan-NATO Partnership to New Heights for World Peace | The Government of Japan - JapanGov - (accessed 1/11/2024). [17] TSUNEO, Watanabe. "What's New in Japan's Three Strategic Documents", Center for Strategic & International Studies CSIS. 13 February 2023. Available at: What's New in Japan's Three Strategic Documents (accessed 1/11/2024). [18] "The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States", The White House. 18 August 2023. Available at: The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States | The White House (accessed 1/11/2024). [19] DEACON, John T. & SOLINGEN, Etel. "Japan's nuclear weapon dilemma growing more acute", The Asia Times. 1 June 2023. Available at: Japan's nuclear weapon dilemma growing more acute - Asia Times (accessed 1/11/2024). [20] SHALAL, Andrea & BRUNNSTROM, David. "EU.S. strongly committed to Japan defense, Biden tells Kishida, hails military boost", Reuters. 14 January 2023. Available at: U.S. strongly committed to Japan defense, Biden tells Kishida, hails military boost | Reuters (accessed 1/11/2024). [21] "Japan's Two Big Decisions in Foreign and Security Policy", Government of Japan. 20 February 2023. Available at: Japan's Two Big Decisions in Foreign and Security Policy | The Government of Japan - JapanGov - (accessed 1/11/2024). [22] DOMÍNGUEZ, Gabriel & TANG, Francis. "Japan, EU launch defence and security tie-up amid mutual China concerns", The Japan Times. 1 November 2024. Available at: Japan, EU launch defense and security tie-up amid mutual China concerns - The Japan Times (accessed 1/11/2024). [23] "Shigeru Ishiba on Japan's New Security Era: The Future of Japan's Foreign Policy", Hudson Institute. 25 September 2024. Available at: Shigeru Ishiba on Japan's New Security Era: The Future of Japan's Foreign Policy | Hudson Institute (accessed 1/11/2024). [24] ESTEBAN, Mario. "Shigeru Ishiba y la nueva política de defensa japonesa: más allá de una OTAN asiática", Real Instituto Elcano. 2 October 2024. Available at: Shigeru Ishiba y la nueva política de defensa japonesa: más allá de una OTAN asiática - Real Instituto Elcano (accessed 1/11/2024). [25] Data taken from "Japan country overview", Janes. 29 October 2024. Available at: Janes: Japan (accessed 1/11/2024). [26] "'Moshi-Tora' speculates on how Trump's election might impact Japan's economy", Japan Today. 7 March 2024. Available at: 'Moshi-Tora' speculates on how Trump's election might impact Japan's economy - Japan Today (accessed 1/11/2024). [27] O'SHEA, Paul & MASLOW, Sebastian. "Making the alliance even greater: (Mis-)managing U.S.-Japan relations in the age of Trump", Asian Security, 17(2). Pp. 195-215. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1838486 (accessed 1/11/2024). [28] HUNNICUTT, Trevor et ali. "Trump will encourage Japan, South Korea ties, allies tell foreign officials", Reuters. 29 June 2024. Available at: Exclusive: Trump will encourage Japan, South Korea ties, allies tell foreign officials | Reuters (accessed 1/11/2024). .

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The implementation of yet another U.S. initiative may allow it to interfere in the information policy of ASEAN and control the cyberspace of all of Southeast Asia. Two sides of the same summit The annual summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States was held in Vientiane in October. Meetings in this format are routine for ASEAN and are held with each of the non-regional powers, i.e. the dialogue partners of the association. They discuss plans for cooperation and exchange views on international issues. This time, the U.S., represented by A. Blinken, again tried to use dialogue to impose its vision of global issues. The statements of the US Secretary of State were anti-Russian, anti-Chinese and anti-North Korean in nature, and were aimed at increasing tensions vis-à-vis the South China Sea and the internal political situation in Myanmar. The timing of the meeting was no accident; it took place before the East Asia Summit (EAS), which is a platform for multilateral negotiations between ASEAN countries and external partners. In this way, Washington hoped to force representatives of Southeast Asian states to reconsider the agenda of the EAS and planned to use the upcoming event to provoke regional conflicts and consolidate their role as the ‘chief gendarme’ of the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. However, as the EAS showed, the U.S. failed to do so: no one except U.S. allies supported the attempts to undermine the regional architecture of security and cooperation. Following the results of the US-ASEAN summit, the divergence of views was also notable. The parties did not adopt any joint document of a political nature. Such a result was natural; for ASEAN, any external imposition of views is traditionally unacceptable. In general, the ASEAN leaders’ talks with Anthony Blinken were held among other meetings with Russia, India, China etc., and they would not have attracted much attention if a very narrow joint statement (‘Statement on Promoting Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence’ (AI)) had not been adopted in the aftermaths. With good intention According to the terms of this statement, under the plausible pretext of ‘achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals’, the United States intends to implement a whole range of plans together with ASEAN. Thus, it is planned to ‘discuss the further development of ASEAN’s AI projects’ (although, why should ASEAN discuss its plans with someone?), ‘interaction with the ASEAN Working Group on AI Governance (again, a direct intention to enter the decision-making process in the association), ‘creating an ASEAN roadmap for responsible AI’ (and, thus, inclusion in the internal planning process of its activities). In addition, the parties will ‘cooperate on approaches and standards in the field of AI’ (these approaches and standards will be based on similar U.S. ones), ‘knowledge exchange, technology transfer’ (the saying about ‘free cheese in a mousetrap’ is involuntarily recalled), ‘strengthening the collective digital and cyber potential’ (again based on the United States and built according to their rules), ‘the expansion of education in the field of AI’ (also according to U.S. norms) and ‘the development of interrelated approaches to AI management’ (AI management is a serious issue and it must be understood that external participation equals a direct threat to national sovereignty). Even more ambitious tasks include ‘supporting the development of national digital and AI strategies, discussing its management and regulation’ (for the United States, gaining access to national strategies will provide new tools for interfering in the internal affairs of others), ‘implementing initiatives in cooperation with the ministries of digital development of ASEAN countries’, as well as ‘ensuring information security support for the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework’ (its adoption is planned in 2025; here the U.S. is again interfering in intra-ASEAN affairs). We were not snubbed of the traditional American demagoguery in the field of ‘human rights’. The statement supposes ‘ensuring human rights and protection from all forms of discrimination and prejudice when using AI’ and  ‘ensuring the inclusiveness and accessibility of AI’ in the near future. Whether the mass use of AI will be safe for the population is a question the authors of the document are not considering, instead occupying themselves with other tasks. Another component is ‘dealing with foreign manipulation of information, disinformation and training in the field of technologies to counter this’ (of course, the U.S. initiators do not doubt their right to assign labels to information sources). Finally, it is expected to ‘stimulate the improvement of the population’s digital literacy via the private sector’, although, it would seem, in such sensitive areas as AI, digital technologies and cyberspace, only the state can protect the interests of its citizens. The name of the game When analysing these agreements, it becomes clear that the United States is aiming to take control not only of the economy or technology, but of the information space of Southeast Asia and the information policy of both ASEAN as a whole and individual members countries and their national sectoral departments. Such a radical deepening of interaction includes direct interference in the affairs of the association – unprecedented in its arrogance and openness – and searching for opportunities to reduce the role of states in controlling AI and the cyber sphere, as well as access to scientific and technological work of Southeast Asian countries in the field of AI and monopolisation of the Southeast Asian media sphere, which is absolutely a colonial approach of deciding which information people from ASEAN are allowed to read and see and which is declared ‘foreign manipulation’. The U.S. has already demonstrated its seriousness. On November 1, Rumman Chowdhury, an AI specialist and the U.S. Special Representative for Science, flew to the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta to remind Southeast Asian countries of the need to implement the joint statement. Here it should be understood that U.S. sectoral cooperation with ASEAN will be executed by a system of highly specialised institutions that objectively does not depend on the change of the presidential administration. Agreements have been made, obligations have been established and the implementation mechanism has been launched. Moreover, the U.S. will have a separate and individual approach to each country in terms of fulfilling and implementing these agreements. It is planned to work with the sectoral ‘digital’ ministries of the Southeast Asian states, which is nothing more than the selection of loyal future agents of influence. However, the question is to what extent the political and expert circles in Southeast Asia understand the long-term risks of granting a foreign partner large-scale access to the sensitive cyber sphere – even one whose interests in the region have long been known to everyone: inciting conflicts, ‘dividing and ruling’, searching for and luring highly qualified specialists (brain drain), exclusively imposing their own view on international issues, linking countries and markets to their technologies with the transfer of all kinds of useful data to intelligence services. *  *  * It would seem that ASEAN has always opposed neo-colonialism and supported a multi-vector course, equidistant from any external interests of its dialogue partners. Most likely, the association could only allow the appearance of info-colonial encroachments from its U.S. counterpart due to hopes for disinterested financing of its development from the United States (which in itself sounds like an oxymoron) and counting on some kind of abstract technology transfer. However, the consequences of the adoption of U.S. policy by Southeast Asian countries (if they do not ‘hit the brakes’ on the commitments they have made) could be deplorable, disastrous for their digital sovereignty, technological development and their independent course in general.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump, who won the US presidential election on November 5th, is appointing key officials for the new government that will be launched in January next year, and the content is very unconventional. In a word, they are young, reformist, and loyalists who have been breathing together with him. This is especially true for those who will lead foreign policy and security. The nominations include 40-year-old Senator James Vance as Vice President, 53-year-old Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, 44-year-old Fox News anchor Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, 50-year-old Representative Mike Walz as National Security Advisor, 43-year-old Representative Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 59-year-old former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe (59) as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 53-year-old South Dakota Governor Kristi Nome as Secretary of Homeland Security, and 67-year-old Suzy Wiles as Co-Chair of the White House Campaign Committee. Among these, the five key figures are the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, and Director of National Intelligence, with an average age of 46, and all of them are ‘hawkish conservative patriots.’ Vice President Vance, a Catholic, shares the same ideological stance as President-elect Trump, including his opposition to abortion and his denial of global warming, and served in Iraq as a Marine. Secretary of State nominee Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, has taken a hard-line stance on Chinese corporate infiltration of the United States and human rights in China while serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in 2020, he introduced the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. He also opposed the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and called North Korea a “criminal group” for its human rights abuses, nuclear and missile development, and criticized it as a “massive group of lunatics” immediately after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in 2017. He is also a pro-Korea figure who has visited the DMZ in South Korea several times. National Security Advisor nominee Walz, a retired colonel from the U.S. Army Special Forces and a veteran of the Middle East, has advocated for reducing dependence on China for key minerals and boycotting the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and in June criticized North Korea-Russia military cooperation as a “dangerous and evil alliance.” He also always visited the DMZ when he came to Korea. Secretary of Defense Haggis is also a veteran of the Middle East and a former US Army major. He later became a host for FOX News and developed a relationship with President-elect Trump. Director of National Intelligence Gabbard, who collects and analyzes information from intelligence agencies, is a reserve lieutenant colonel with experience in the Middle East. She became the youngest member of the House of Representatives in Hawaii at 21 and is the first female veteran of the war. As such, the five key figures in the diplomatic and security line are all young and reformist, and most of them are veterans of the Middle East. If we look at the ideological tendencies, passion, careers, and past words and actions of President-elect Trump and the nominees for the diplomatic and security line, we can predict many things. First, domestically, reforms will be attempted to fit Trump’s slogan of “Make America Great Again (MAGA),” such as reducing and streamlining government organizations, strengthening the US military, promoting growth-oriented economic policies, and protecting domestic companies through fair trade. Under the slogans of “political correctness (PC) and being woke (WOKE),” abortion, homosexuality in the military, and environmental policies that were spread are expected to decline. Externally, there will be a strong confrontation with the “axis of change” powers such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that are leading international conflicts in the new Cold War structure, and the US nuclear military power and nuclear doctrine are also expected to be strengthened and reinforced. In other words, the trend of nuclear reduction and conventional military reduction that has continued since the end of the Cold War will be reversed, and efforts will be made to develop tactical nuclear weapons, new ships, and aircraft. Regionally, it is expected that efforts will be made to check China’s expansionism and pressure the public economically, strengthen security cooperation with allies on fairer terms, strengthen support for Israel, and bring an early end to the Ukraine War.  Considering all these things, we can predict several things about Trump’s second term US policy toward North Korea. First, regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, unlike the ‘strategic patience’ shown by the Obama and Biden administrations, it is expected that they will actively respond. In line with this, they will likely actively oppose the restoration of the Russia-North Korea alliance, Russia-North Korea military cooperation, and the dispatch of North Korean troops to Ukraine, and they will likely be just as nervous as South Korea about Russia helping North Korea advance its nuclear program. They will also actively establish military operation plans against North Korea in case of an emergency, and South Korea-US joint training and South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation will also be strengthened. Criticism of North Korea’s human rights issues through the UN is also likely to intensify. Nevertheless, considering that all the key officials who will move the diplomatic and security line are patriots who value national interests, they may also show a pragmatic tendency. In other words, if North Korea comes to the nuclear negotiations with a genuine will to compromise, the US will also engage in sincere dialogue, and if North Korea makes a sincere proposal rather than stalling or tricking, it is possible that the US will make efforts for an unprecedented agreement. Therefore, as Trump’s second term approaches, North Korea will have to consider whether to stick to its reckless nuclear policies to date or adopt a more pragmatic stance in the face of an increasingly powerful United States. Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Subsequent U.S. administrations, except for brief moments of relative calm, have persisted in demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) abandon its nuclear program and, moreover, have made extensive efforts to destabilize its political and economic system. Meanwhile, the successive leaders of the DPRK have persisted in advancing their defensive capabilities until reaching their preferred deterrent: nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, a guarantee of survival. This persistent situation reached an unprecedented moment when, during his previous presidency, Donald Trump made a surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK, temporarily unraveling, although without the expected results, the "Korean Gordian Knot." This led to successive summits in 2018 and 2019 (Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom) with Kim Jong Un, the leader of a state that, throughout its history, has maintained sharply confrontational relations with the United States. The world witnessed the transition from exchanges of insults and threats—Trump calling Kim "Little Rocket Man" and Kim referring to Trump as "old senile man"—and threatening the latter with "fire and fury" if the North Korean leader continued missile tests, to becoming "pen pals" and holding three unprecedented summits. No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK like Donald Trump did, and no North Korean leader in history has sat face-to-face, as equals, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did, which granted him prestige on the global stage. Due to reasons associated with its strategic ambiguity, the Biden Administration made no diplomatic progress with Pyongyang. Even though at the beginning of his term he committed to a "new strategy toward North Korea," over the past four years, his actions have only promoted sanctions in the Security Council, which have clashed dramatically with Russia's veto, struggled with the dissolution of the DPRK Expert Group in the Sanctions Committee, and observed the exponential increase in its arsenal of intercontinental, hypersonic, and short-range ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads capable of targeting the continental U.S. and U.S. military bases in the region. Furthermore, the DPRK has resumed uranium enrichment and reopened its nuclear test center. In the end, the outgoing president has been unable to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, much less contain it. So, one must ask: Will Trump's return to the White House mark continuity or a change from his previous term? An analysis of the future position of the Trump administration toward the DPRK should consider that, compared to his previous term, the circumstances have radically changed. 1. DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have made new and significant advances. At the same time, its foreign policy has undergone a reorientation due to the sustained increase in distrust toward Washington from Pyongyang.2. By order of its leader, the DPRK has severed all its ties and symbols of relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as the "main and unchanging enemy," and as it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the People's Armed Forces to accelerate preparations to "occupy, subjugate, and fully reclaim" South Korea, in response to the confrontational attitude and increasingly close military and intelligence ties between Washington and Seoul.3. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two summits between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, and Kim's description of Putin as the "closest comrade," have shown the high level of understanding and commitment between the two, which has materialized in the DPRK's unwavering support for Russia's special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures. This treaty includes a clause for "mutual military assistance," while Russia provides diplomatic and economic backing to the DPRK, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports, mainly oil, raw materials, and food, as well as assistance in various fields.4. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis is taking shape between China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies are labeling it the "new axis of evil." In this interconnected relationship, the DPRK holds significant advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. At least these four factors will significantly impact Donald Trump's decision to return, or not, to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, raising doubts about whether the former would be willing to revisit it. However, if he tries, it is unclear what Kim Jong Un's response would be, clearly more determined and militarily more powerful in the eyes of Washington, which at first glance seems unwilling to renew its offers related to denuclearization. The ironic jest by Trump at the 2024 Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, when he said that Kim Jong Un "missed him," that they "got along very well," and that "he misses me" and "wants me back in the White House" and "it's good to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons," was met with a response from North Korean media, stating that "they don't care" who assumes office in the U.S. This suggests that Pyongyang's official stance is that, regardless of what happens, it will not abandon its nuclear deterrent. Considering the visible changes in the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape that differ from those in 2018-2019, any type of negotiation aimed at reaching compromises between the parties on the denuclearization of North Korea will be even more challenging. Trump may seek alternative approaches to encourage the DPRK to freeze nuclear and missile tests, but he will need to weigh several options. These include: which side should take the first step toward engagement; whether it is necessary to "rattle sabers" to create influence; the possibility of "unilateral conciliatory gestures"; and whether he should stick to the goal of "complete denuclearization" (Chad O’Carroll and Shreyas Reddy, 2024). Donald Trump exhibits an unpredictable, egocentric personality and is a fan of diplomatic spectacle, with a penchant for reality shows. Given this, he might be tempted to revisit diplomacy, possibly considering the absence of John Bolton, who, alongside Michael Pompeo, led the Hanoi Summit to failure. Many agree with what was stated by Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University and former special advisor for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae In administration, when he admitted: "It is possible that, in his second term, Trump will prioritize solidifying his political legacy. His foreign policy would be heavily influenced by media attention and personal ego, as he cares about how history will remember him. Achieving a major deal with Pyongyang and contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula could serve to fulfill that ambition, potentially allowing him to win a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. While resolving the Ukraine war or the Gaza crisis could also improve his chances of receiving the prize, negotiations with Kim Jong Un are likely to be a key agenda for Trump. In that sense, Trump could actively engage with the North Korean leader, and might even consider a visit to Pyongyang for a summit, where he could make surprising offers. However, the success of such efforts ultimately depends on Kim's response" (Lee Hyo Jin, 2024). It is necessary to build some scenarios: 1. The influence of personal friendship could encourage Kim Jong Un to engage in communication with Trump, turning the page on the Hanoi failure and minimizing distrust toward the U.S.2. Recognition by the Trump Administration of the DPRK as a de facto nuclear power and easing of sanctions to promote progress toward the partial normalization of relations.3. Strong U.S. demands for denuclearization and the promotion of further sanctions, leading to increased tensions. Given Trump’s volatility and the unpredictability of the DPRK leadership, there are currently no conditions to determine the most likely scenario. The campaign team has not commented on whether Trump will seek new meetings with Kim Jong Un, but his statements prior to his victory suggest that he might seek to revive talks, possibly sooner rather than later. Now, it is unpredictable what roadmap Trump will implement, as his opinions during the campaign may differ from the decisions he makes officially when in office. It is not accurate to assume that his demeanor during the first term will be indicative of his future conduct. It is worth dedicating a brief space to the designated Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. As a staunch anti-communist, he is one of the promoters of the term "axis of evil," which includes the DPRK, and considers China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as aligned against the US. He has advocated concrete actions and plans against these states. It is expected that, initially, he will oppose any commitment from the incoming administration with the DPRK. As John Bolton and Michael Pompeo did at the time, Rubio could attempt to limit Donald Trump’s maneuvering room with Kim Jong Un. However, there is also the possibility that the next U.S. president’s assertive and authoritarian character, who, despite previous disagreements, appointed Rubio, will lead him to align with Trump’s decisions or, alternatively, suffer the same fate of being ousted with a “tweet and a punch,” as happened to Rex Tillerson and John Bolton. Regarding the Republic of Korea, it is important to specify that the most critical foreign policy issues for Donald Trump’s new administration will be its relationship with the European Union, the Middle East conflicts, the war in Ukraine, the China-Taiwan dispute, and relations with the DPRK. It is precisely the latter that concerns South Koreans the most, as their security largely depends on the presence of U.S. troops in their country and Washington’s support for South Korea’s defense against the imminent “North Korean threat.” The conservative government of Yoon Suk Yeol has marked a clear distinction from his predecessor Moon Jae In by significantly strengthening his alliance with the U.S., driven by his growing animosity towards the DPRK and his pro-American stance. This situation presents little likelihood of encouraging Trump to engage in talks with Kim Jong Un, especially without a clear indication from Pyongyang toward denuclearization. This is likely, as all signs point to Pyongyang not making significant concessions regarding its nuclear deterrent and showing a strong aversion towards the Republic of Korea. After Donald Trump's victory, the South Korean president had a phone conversation with him to extend his congratulations and quickly express his desire for the alliance to continue under his leadership. Although both agreed to hold a summit as soon as possible, the issue of the DPRK, which was already addressed in this initial dialogue, will certainly be on the agenda. It is said that Trump plans for his government to work with South Korea on several bilateral issues, but one of the key aspects will be South Korea’s contribution to Washington for hosting U.S. bases on its territory. Let's remember that during Trump's first term, this was a hot topic in his military relations. It is worth mentioning that due to Donald Trump's transactional approach to international relations, his perception that many of the U.S. allies are "taking advantage" of its military power, and the pressure he exerted on Seoul when he was in office, with Trump's victory, national security against the DPRK is placed at the forefront. Many are concerned that his return to the White House could mean that Washington will no longer be a reliable partner, making it necessary for South Korea to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Han Dong Hoon, leader of the ruling People Power Party, said at a seminar organized to discuss the future of South Korea's nuclear policy that Trump's victory had positive aspects. "Acquiring nuclear potential — meaning having the right to enrich and reprocess uranium — does not inherently equate to possessing nuclear weapons," he said, according to The Korea Herald. "But we would be able to move to that phase at any time if North Korea intensifies its nuclear threats," he added. "I believe we should be prepared for such a scenario amid the changing dynamics of global power and order." Meanwhile, retired Army General Han Ki Ho went a step further and suggested that South Korea may no longer have a choice. "Nuclear armament may be the only path left for South Korea's survival," he stated (Julian Ryall, 2024). However, whether the Republic of Korea acquires nuclear weapons will depend on how the Trump administration approaches the alliance and relations with North Korea, that is, whether it abandons or restricts the "extended deterrence" and whether it pursues an agreement with Pyongyang that halts its development of long-range missiles that could reach the continental United States in exchange for accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear power. This type of agreement would affect Seoul, located just 48 kilometers from the border, and therefore within the range of North Korea's short-range missiles. We are facing an uncertain situation, and therefore, expectant, where the expectations regarding Donald Trump's stance on DPRK are uncertain. Whether the denuclearization of DPRK is a priority for the Trump administration depends on the approach and methods with which the president and his team address an increasingly complex scenario. DPRK, in terms of its economic performance and national defense potential, is not the same as before, which gives Kim Jong Un greater effectiveness in his military deterrence and diplomatic maneuverability, especially when his reliable conduct with Moscow and the appropriate handling of relations with Beijing strengthen his position vis-à-vis the U.S. Trump will have to deal with these realities. And while he may intend to continue his legacy, he will necessarily have to reframe his policy towards DPRK, considering that DPRK is no longer the same, that its main contenders (Russia and China) are precisely the closest to DPRK, and that the country itself is no longer the same, either militarily or socioeconomically, as it was when he engaged in talks with Kim Jong Un in 2018-2019. References - Simone McCarthy (2024) Trump claims Kim Jong Un “isses him. But he faces a very different North Korea leader this time around. Disponible en: https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-intl-hnk/index.html- Keith Johnson (2024) Could Trump Rekindle Diplomacy With North Korea? Disponible en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/13/trump-north-korea-diplomacy-putin-russia/- Joel S. Wit (2024) Blame Donald Trump for North Korea´s sable-rattling. Disponible en: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/blame-donald-trump-for-north-koreas-sabre-rattling/- Rubén Criado (2024) Así afecta la victoria de Trump a Corea del Norte. Disponible en: https://as.com/actualidad/politica/asi-afecta-la-victoria-de-trump-a-corea-del-norte-n/- Josh Smith (2024) Donald Trump se enfrenta a un Kim Jong Un envalentonado, cercano a Rusia y con un arsenal de misiles más grande. Disponible en: https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2024/11/07/donald-trump-se-enfrentara-a-un-kim-jong-un-envalentonado-cercano-a-rusia-y-con-un-arsenal-de-misiles-mas-grande/- Julian Ryall (2024) Regreso de Trump atiza debate nuclear en Corea del Sur. Disponible en: https://amp.dw.com/es/el-regreso-de-trump-atiza-el-debate-nuclear-en-corea-del-sur/a70798786#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317231276140&csi=1&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com- Chad O´Carrol y Shreyas Reddy (2024) Why North Korean denuclearization will likely take backseat in second Trump term | NK Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/why-north-korean-denuclearization-will-likely-take-backseat-in-second-trump-term/- Miguel Jiménez (2024) Donald Trump planea elegir a marcos Rubio como secretario de Estado. Disponible en: https://elpais.com/internacional/elecciones-usa/2024-11-12/donald-trump-elige-a-marco-rubio-como-secretario-de-estado.html?outputType=amp#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317890370552&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Last week Donald Trump made a bizarre threat on his Truth Social site that he would impose 100 percent taxes on the imports (tariffs) from any country that doesn’t take a pledge to not move away from the dollar as its reserve currency.  Donald Trump’s Big Fear Exists Only in His Imagination  The threat was bizarre for several reasons. First, he seemed to imagine that the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and their allies are in the process of setting up an alternative currency to the dollar.  This would be very hard to imagine since this group of countries has little in common other than feeling marginalized by the United States, West Europe, and the international institutions they have established. Agreeing on rules for a common currency involves considerable haggling and is difficult even among countries that are similar in their economies, history, and culture. Ask the countries in the euro zone. Bringing this group together in a common currency seems a long shot even one or two decades out. So, Trump was making some grand threat against a development that will almost certainly not happen. Oh well, always good to be cautious. Who Cares If They Establish Their Own Currency? Trump’s ignorance of trade and finance issues really shines through on this one. Paul Krugman has been working hard trying to educate the public on the meaning of a reserve currency.  First of all, there is not a single reserve currency. There is no law that requires all international payments be made in dollars, and many in fact are not. If businesses find it more convenient to sell in euros or yen, there is nothing that prevents them from doing so. It’s not clear if Donald Trump is unaware of this fact or thinks that he somehow will police all the transactions in the world and require them to be done in dollars. Central banks also hold currencies in reserve to cover international payments and to support their own currency in the event of a crisis. The dollar is the predominant reserve currency, but not the only one. Central banks also hold euros, British pounds, Japanese yen, and even Swiss francs. Perhaps Trump wants to monitor the currency holdings of central banks and start raising the tax on imports from any country where dollar holdings fall below a certain level. That seems a pretty whacky way to set trade policy (it would violate most of our trade agreements), but about par for Donald Trump economic policy. The Dollar as a Reserve Currency Undermines Donald Trump’s Dream of Balanced Trade  Insofar as having the dollar as the world’s leading reserve currency matters, its main benefit would be increasing demand for the currency and thereby driving up its value relative to other currencies. This would be good in the sense that it makes it cheaper for people in the United States to buy items imported from other countries.  The effect is not likely to be very large. The overwhelming reason for wanting to hold dollars is to invest in US financial assets, like stock and bonds, both public and private. As long as investors think the United States has a strong and stable economy, they will want to have dollars to be able to invest here.  If the United States were just another reserve currency, like the euro, then fewer dollars would be held as reserves and for carrying through transactions. This would likely mean the dollar was valued somewhat less against other currencies, but it is unlikely that the drop would be more than 5-10 percent. This is the sort of movement in the dollar we see all the time over the course of a year or two. It usually does not get much attention. For example, the dollar rose by more than 5.0 percent against the euro between May of 2021 and the end of the year, and it seems no one noticed. More importantly for this issue, insofar as being the leading reserve currency raises the value of the dollar, it goes the wrong way in terms of Donald Trump’s goals on trade policy. Donald Trump seems to want the United States to have balanced trade or even a trade surplus.  A higher valued dollar directly undermines the effort to achieve this goal. If the dollar is higher valued against other currencies, it makes imports cheaper for people in the United States. That means we will buy more imports.  If the dollar is higher valued against other currencies it means that foreigners will have to use more of their own currency to buy a dollar. That makes our exports more expensive for them. If our exports are more expensive, people living in foreign countries will buy less of exports. If we buy more imports, and sell fewer exports, then our trade deficit will be larger. This means that Donald Trump’s quest to preserve the dollar’s status as the premier reserve currency goes completely against his goal of reducing the trade deficit. Donald Trump’s 100 Percent Tariff Will Hurt Us Much More Than It Will Hurt China The United States provides a valuable export market for China, but it would require some very strange arithmetic to imagine that China somehow needs the US market for its prosperity. First, it is worth getting an idea of the volume of exports at stake. The US had imported $322 billion in goods from China through September of this year, which puts it on a course to import roughly $430 billion for the year. By comparison, China’s GDP on a purchasing power parity basis is projected to be $37.1 trillion this year using a purchasing power parity (PPP) measure of GDP, while it would be $18.3 trillion using an exchange rate measure. This means that its exports to the US would be equal to 1.2 percent of its GDP using the PPP measure, and 2.3 percent using the exchange rate measure. The difference between these two measures is that the PPP measure uses a common set of prices across countries for all goods and services. It means that it prices a haircut and a heart operation at the same price in the United State and China, as well as every other country. By contrast, the exchange rate measure takes the country’s GDP calculated in its own currency and then converts it to dollars at the current exchange rate. The large difference between the two measures is explained by the fact that many services cost much less in China than in the United States and other wealthy countries. For example, renting a comparable apartment or getting a doctor’s exam would cost far less in China than it would in the United States. While for many purposes, such as comparing living standards, the PPP measure is appropriate, in this case the exchange rate measure is probably the right one. We are asking how much demand China would lose in its economy if it is cut off from the US market. Since the goods sold internationally are likely priced in China close to their prices internationally, the demand loss would be larger than would be indicated by their share of its GDP measured in PPP terms.  This means that in the extreme case where China loses its entire US export market, demand in its economy would fall by 2.3 percent, before taking account of any multiplier effects. This is far from trivial, but it is not likely to lead China’s economy to collapse. By comparison, when the housing bubble collapsed in the United States in 2006-2008, the share of residential construction in GDP dropped by 4.0 percentage points.  That drop gave the US a severe recession, but it is important to keep in mind the economic problem we are describing. This would be a story of inadequate demand in the economy. This can be counteracted by the government spending more money, which we did to some extent with the stimulus package enacted under President Obama in 2008-09 and with an even larger package under President Biden in 2021-22.  There may be political considerations that act as obstacles to large-scale stimulus in China, as there are here, but there is no economic reason that China could not boost its economy in a way that replaces the demand lost from the U.S. export market. If China’s government chose, it could even borrow a trick from the US playbook and send $2,000 checks to everyone in the country and put Donald Trump’s name on the check. That would hardly be a crisis from China’s standpoint. The picture looks much worse from the US standpoint. We will be paying substantially more for the $430 billion in goods that we had been buying from China. It would be necessary to look at possible substitutes for these imports on a sector-by-sector basis, but let’s say on average that the additional cost for the replacement its is 40 percent of the price of the goods from China. In that case, we would be paying an extra $170 billion a year, roughly $1,400 per family, to cover the additional cost.  The reason this looks worse from the US standpoint than the Chinese standpoint is that China just needs to create a new source of demand, which its government can do directly by giving people money. On the other hand, the United States is seeing the cost of a number of items rise, in effect seeing a shortage of supply comparable to what happened with the supply chain crisis during the pandemic.  Most governments would not deliberately inflict this sort of pain on its population without a good cause, but Donald Trump prides himself on being unorthodox. This threat over the dollar’s status as a reserve currency certainly is unorthodox.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This analysis focuses on possible short and medium-term effects of Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States. This paper starts with a brief account of Trump’s first presidency and then continues to account for major challenges that Trump’s administration will have to face domestically,The central part of the analysis focuses on the geopolitical consequences of Trump’s election. In particular, the author looks at Europe (the ongoing war in Ukraine): Middle East and Far East – especially China.The paper concludes with the author's conviction that the next few years will bring decisive changes likely to usher in the new world order.Keywords: Trump, US, Europe, Security, Geopolitics Introduction Donald Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States in 2017 had significant and far-reaching effects on world politics, marking a departure from previous administrations' approaches to foreign policy and international relations. Trump's presidency shifted from globalization to isolationism, protectionism, and nationalism (Kawashima, 2017). His "America First" strategy emphasized unilateral action and challenged the liberal international order the United States had led and protected since World War II (Mansbach, 2021). This approach has strained relationships with traditional allies, particularly in Europe, while simultaneously raising authoritarian leaders (Mansbach, 2021). Interestingly, Trump's election immediately negatively impacted trust in the U.S. government in Latin America, as demonstrated by a regression discontinuity design study (Carreras et al., 2021). Additionally, his controversial policies, such as the trade war with China, have had significant impacts on the global economy (Sahide et al., 2024). The Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Islamic World was notably less friendly compared to the Obama era, causing tensions in US-Islamic World relations (Bahari & Sahide, 2022). There seems to be a consensus that Trump's presidency accelerated societal processes, undermined democratic institutions, and encouraged hyperpartisanship within political institutions (James, 2021). While he did not always succeed in implementing major policy changes or fulfilling campaign promises, his leadership style and policy decisions significantly altered the global perception of the United States and its role in world politics, creating what some scholars describe as " a more dangerous world" (Mansbach, 2021).  Admittedly, Trump does not seem to be exceptionally hawkish when it comes to using military tools in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Let us remember that Barak Obama (Democratic Party), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, ordered airstrikes in seven different countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria) (Liptak, 2014). During first Trump’s presidency, no new campaigns were started, although the intensification of the existing ones allegedly increased. Ultimately, it was Trump who was mainly behind the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Trump 2.0 November 2024 Presidential elections brought sweeping changes to the American political kaleidoscope. Donald Trump took a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Kamala Harris, securing 312 electoral votes (with 270 being a victory threshold). Republicans also won the Senate with 52 seats against 47 and the House with 218 seats against 212. (Election Centre 2024).  This is arguably one of the most important political events in the world in 2024. Already Trump’s declarations regarding the first decisions to be taken once sworn in office on the 20th of January next year, plus his appointments for top offices in the U.S. administration, have caused a furore – a phenomenon referred to by many as the so-called ‘Trump Effect’. As much as political scientists, cognitive anthropologists or psychologists usually use this term to refer to racially inflammatory Elite Communication (Newman et al., 2020), this short analysis will look at the tectonic shifts in international relations, international security system and geopolitics that have already happened or are likely to occur after the 20th of January 2025. U.S. – politics Undoubtedly, the U.S. economy, society, and political system are in deep crisis. Economically, the Americans have been doing worse than ever since the Second World War. Inflation is rampant; economic inequality is very high; unemployment is on the rise; the state of infrastructure is relatively poor, and the level of public services is far from desirable, whereas taxation is reaching new heights amidst a slowing economy and diminishing number of small and medium enterprises (USA FACTS). Societywise, the problems are equally severe. According to Pew Research, the top issues facing the U.S. in this category are in the order of importance from top to bottom: the affordability of healthcare, drug addiction, illegal immigration, gun violence, violent crime, the state of moral values, the quality of public k-12 schools, Climate change, international terrorism, infrastructure condition, domestic terrorism and racism (Pew Research Centre, 2024). One should also add here the rising “wokeness’ of the American educational system, which poses a great challenge to the cohesion of the society and its future in terms of military power.  Politically, the picture is not better. According to the same research institution (Pew), the biggest problems that the U.S. political system faces are: political leaders do not face the consequences if they act unethically, it is difficult to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics, Congress accomplishes less than people give it credit for, the Federal Government does less for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for. Other problems include the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in policymaking, the cost of political campaigns and the animosity between the Republicans and the Democrats, which, in consequence, causes the inability of the political system to solve critical societal problems (Pew Research Centre, 2023). The first and foremost task ahead of Trump is to rectify problems at home. His Agenda47 (Republican Platform) declares 20 core promises: seal the border and stop the migrant invasion, carry out the largest deportation operation in american history, end inflation, and make america affordable again, make america the dominant energy producer in the world, by far, stop outsourcing, and turn the United States into a manufacturing superpower, large tax cuts for workers, and no tax on tips, defend the constitution, the bill of rights, and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to keep and bear arms, prevent world war three, restore peace in europe and in the middle east, and build a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country -- all made in america, end the weaponization of government against the american people, stop the migrant crime epidemic, demolish the foreign drug cartels, crush gang violence, and lock up violent offenders, rebuild cities, including washington dc, making them safe, clean, and beautiful again, strengthen and modernize the military, making it, without question, the strongest and most powerful in the world, keep the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, fight for and protect social security and medicare with no cuts, including no changes to the retirement age, cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations, cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory, radical gender ideology, and other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on children, keep men out of women's sports, deport pro-hamas radicals and make college campuses safe and patriotic again, secure our elections, including same day voting, voter identification, paper ballots, and proof of citizenship and lastly unite the country by bringing it to new and record levels of success (Agenda 47).  International Politics Internationally, Trump faces many challenges. His presidency will have to address three primary regions defined geographically: Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. - Europe As far as Europe is concerned, the most pressing issue is the war in Ukraine. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly declared that his administration's support for the continuation of the U.S. support for the war effort against Russia would be terminated during the first 24 hours of his presidency (Hansler, 2024). As a consequence, shortly after Trump’s winning the White House race, the outgoing administration under POTUS Joe Biden finally allowed the Ukrainians to attack Russian territory with American long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS), which allegedly came in as a response to the North Korean decision to send its troops to support Russian soldiers against Ukraine (Entous, Schmitt and Barnes, 2024). Next, in counter-response, President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a new nuclear Doctrine into power. Chillingly, it declares that Russia may use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear state, even in case of a conventional attack (Associated Press, 2024). As of the beginning of December 2024, the media are full of reports of an alleged concentration of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border, fueling speculation about an imminent mass invasion, this time with cities such as Kyiv being targeted in a conventional terrain operation (Bodner, De Luce and Smith, 2024).  One can only speculate what all this means and how far we are from the outbreak of the III World War (Sky News, 2024). Some things are, however, more or less evident. Firstly, the current escalation of war in Ukraine is likely a direct effect of Trump's winning and his declaration to end the war as soon as possible. The more the Russian troops advance in the field, the higher they can bid once the peace talks begin. Similarly, the more complex the situation in the field (Biden’s decision regarding the use of ATACMS), the more challenging it will be for Trump and his administration to achieve peace. Knowing the radically different approach to conflict with Russia of President Trump, the outgoing administration and national security advisors most likely wanted to achieve militarily as much as possible before they were ousted from their jobs. Secondly, Trump declared on numerous occasions that if European members of NATO want to continue their support for Ukraine, they should take the whole responsibility. He singled Germany, France, and Poland out. Poland, for that matter, enthusiastically agreed to carry on the baton and declared that it was ready to bear the heavy burden. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, when participating in a radio broadcast, “We [Poland] are ready to take over the large part of the costs of supporting Ukraine” (Nczas Info, 2024). At the same time on the 3rd of December, the new Secretary General of NATO – Mark Rutte, during his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, openly declared: “The immediate priority must be to provide more arms to the country's forces as Russia gains territory along the battlefront in eastern Ukraine.The [Ukrainian] front is not moving eastwards. It is slowly moving westwards. So, we have to make sure that Ukraine gets into a position of strength, and then it should be for the Ukrainian government to decide on the next steps in terms of opening peace talks and how to conduct them." (VoA, 2024). To sum up, it looks like the current escalation, according to theoretical models such as those proposed by Herman Kahn in 1965 – a Cold War physicist - we are at stage 12 of 44 steps on the escalation ladder. As comforting as one might think it is, let us remember that according to Kahn’s theory, a local nuclear war takes place as early as at step 21 (Tinline, 2023). As history has proved many times, it is difficult, if impossible, to wage a systemic war on two fronts at the same time. Given the economic and military challenges perceived by Trump during his first tenure as U.S. President (See: A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017), China is the challenger number one for the position of the United States in the international system and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, China wants to reorder the area in its favour. Would it be too much of a stretch of the imagination to claim that most likely, given the context above, Trump will probably arrange for peaceful talks with Russia over Ukrainian political and military leadership heads’? What will he want? Probably Russia’s neutrality in the face of the coming escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and China. What can he offer? Probably a big part of Ukrainian territory and the amendment to the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the country should forever be neutral militarily and politically. At the same time, the American withdrawal from Europe will most probably create a void that is most likely to be filled by Germans. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts (The Federal Government, 2022).  The leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's ‘special responsibility’ for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government’s ‘special responsibility’ for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. (German National Security Strategy, 2023). In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the ‘best equipped armed force’ in Europe (Euronews, 2022). Let us also remember that Berlin vigorously supported the latest proposal for a European army, which presumably might serve as a vehicle for further European integration towards the federalization of Europe.  At the same time, the prospect of federalization will face two major challenges: firstly, the future of transatlantic relations is less than certain, especially the economic competition between the EU and the U.S. European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen signalled the possibility of an economic war with the U.S. as a response to Trump declared protectionism of the American economy (Berg, Meyers, 2024). Secondly, the EU is highly inefficient in energy, so the question of future energy security becomes a priority. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the redirection of Russian gas to China will profoundly affect the future of European economic development amid the so-called ‘Fit-for-55’ -  a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (Fit for 55, 2024). - Middle East As of the writing of this paper, one sees the escalation of the war in Syria. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “ongoing hostilities in northern Syria continue to expand to other parts of the country, endangering civilians and humanitarian workers, causing severe damage to critical infrastructure and disrupting humanitarian operations. As of 5 December, at least 178,000 people have been displaced due to the recent escalations in northern Syria, including 128,000 newly displaced and 39,000 displaced at least twice. Figures are still being reconciled, noting that UNHR and NGOs operating in the northeastern part of Syria estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people have been newly displaced there, including more than 25,000 currently hosted in collective centers”. (OCHA, 2024). According to international media (CBC News, 2024): ”Syria's long-running civil war came to a head Sunday when opposition forces entered the capital city of Damascus and the government of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. Russian state media later reported that Assad and his family had fled to Moscow. Crowds gathered in Damascus to celebrate the fall of Assad's government with chants, prayers and occasional gunfire, marking the end of a regime that, between the ousted President and his father, had ruled over Syria for half of a century.” […] "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen," President Biden said Sunday afternoon at the White House after convening his national security team to discuss the developments. He said the fall of Assad presented a "historic moment of opportunity" and pledged support for Syria and its neighbours against any threats” (Ott, 2024). Syria seems to be just another litmus test of the so-called regional security complex in the Middle East. As such, the war in Syria is obviously but a puzzle in a much bigger jigsaw that includes all major powers that operate in the region: the U.S.A, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran to name the most obvious ones. All of the above are deeply engaged in Middle East politics for the sake of their national interests and international security strategies. All of the above deserve separate analyses. For the sake of this paper, however, the author will focus only on the U.S. According to Douglas Macgregor and Dave Ramaswamy, “The fear in many nations’ capitals is that President Donald Trump’s return to Washington might make Israel feel more confident in attacking Iran. According to Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, “There is no world leader Trump respects more than Netanyahu.”  The evangelical leader also confides that President Trump would support an Israeli attack before his inauguration on the assumption that the destruction of Iran’s oil production facilities would devastate Iran’s economy, inducing Iran to end the war with Israel before President Trump assumes his office. This thinking by no means excludes an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear development sites as well.” (Macgregor & Ramaswamy, 2024). In their article, they state that “If America joins Israel in its war against Iran, the outcome will be a geopolitical showdown that could dramatically alter the world as we know it. It is the storm of the 21st century and, for the moment, the American ship of state is sailing right into it. “ They consequently pose four fundamental questions:  1. What is the American purpose in waging war against Iran? Is Washington’s purpose to destroy the Iranian state? To destroy its capability to wage war against Israel? To eliminate Iran’s developing nuclear capability? Or to decapitate the Iranian state in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow their national government? 2. How will U.S. military power achieve the objectives? 3. What is the desired end state? What does the President want Iran and the region that surrounds it to look like when the fighting ends? 4. What is the strategic cost to the American people if Washington declines to participate in a regional war begun by Israel?  They conclude by asking yet another, perhaps the most crucial question: what do Netanyahu’s goals mean for the health of the American economy and the stability of the international system? Can Israel survive without attacking its numerous enemies?  The next couple of months are likely to bring at least some answers to some of these questions. Importantly, expert voices concerning the future of Israel seem to be abounding more and more (Teller, 2024). - China and the Far East Finally, there is a question of China. As mentioned before, Trump sees China as a major challenger to the role and position of the U.S. in the international system. The Republicans and the Democrats may be divided by numerous issues, but there is at least one regarding which they stay united. The true bipartisanship revolves around the Chinese challenge. Both parties, therefore, claim that the possibility of a systemic conflict with China is not a science fiction scenario. On November 20, 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress heard that the U.S. had to prepare for a potential conflict with China by raising its defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP. (South China Morning Post, 2024). The recommendation came during an interactive exercise for members of the House Select Committee on China, based on a scenario predicted for 2026 and hosted by Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report titled: The First Battle of the Next War Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, authored by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham opens with a chilling question: “What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is, therefore, not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.” (The First Battle of the Next War, 2023). They go on to claim that: “China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.” China has grown increasingly assertive over the last decades and sees no reason to continue accepting a dominated world that facilitates the benefits of Western powers, especially the U.S.A. At a recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (November 2024), the President of China openly called for a multipolar world (Xinhua, 2024). In his words: “China and Brazil stay committed to peace, development, fairness and justice. We have similar or identical views on many international and regional issues. Both are staunch defenders of the basic norms of international relations and multilateralism, coordinating closely and consistently within the United Nations, G20, BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms on crucial issues, including global governance and climate change. Not long ago, China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Our initiative has received a positive response from the international community. China and Brazil, embracing our roles and responsibilities as major countries, have contributed to a multipolar world, conduced to greater democracy in international relations and injected positive energy into global peace and stability.” (Xinhua, 2024 b).  Conclusion Taiwan has long been a global security issue and a point of concern on the geopolitical maps of the national security planners of great powers. It is not the only one, though. The war between the Koreas is formally not over (recently, North Korea allegedly sent soldiers to back Russia in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine); the American military presence in the Far East and South East Asia is likely to remain an issue, especially from the point of view of Beijing. Central Asia, with its geopolitical environment, religious activism and economic challenges, is likely to rise in importance as a chessboard for great powers. As the weight and focus of International Relations is relocating back to Asia (Euroasia rather than the North Atlantic Area), China and Russia are more likely to hold the keys to international peace and security than the United States. On top of that, one needs to look out for North Africa as a source of continuing instability and massive migration, especially to Europe. All in all, Trump’s next presidency will surely bring a lot of interesting developments, which are likely to fuel a new world order.  References - A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017. NSS_BookLayout_FIN_121917.indd - Agenda 47. https://www.donaldjtrump.com/platform - Associated Press, Nov. 8, 2024. “The Kremlin has revised its nuclear policy. Does that make the use of atomic weapons more likely?” https://apnews.com/article/russia-nuclear-doctrine-putin-ukraine-war-b5ee115aa2099fa247f630e16da861d8- Bahari, Diana Mutiara, and Ahmad Sahide. 2022. “The Comparison of The United States Foreign Policy Against The Islamic World Under President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump Administration.” Journal of Islamic World and Politics 6 (2): 270–97. https://doi.org/10.18196/jiwp.v6i2.13060. - Berg, Aslak and Meyers, Zach. Oct. 3, 2024. “Surviving Trump 2.0: What does the US election mean for Europe's economy?” https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2024/surviving-trump-20-what-does-us-election-mean-europes-economy - Bodner, Matthew, Luce, Dan De and Smith, Alexander. Dec. 2, 2024. “Russian troops mass on Ukraine's border. West worries this isn't like the last time.” https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russian-troops-mass-ukraines-border-west-worries-isnt-last-time-rcna7203 - Carreras, Miguel, Giancarlo Visconti, and Igor Acácio. 2021. “The Trump Election and Attitudes toward the United States in Latin America.” Public Opinion Quarterly 85 (4): 1092–1102. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfab055. - Election Centre 2024, CNN Politics. https://edition.cnn.com/election/2024 - Entous, Adam, Schmitt, Eric and Barnes, Julian E. Nov. 17, 2024. “Biden Allows Ukraine to Strike Russia With Long-Range U.S. Missiles.” https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/17/us/politics/biden-ukraine-russia-atacms-missiles.html- Fit for 55, European Council. Council of the European Union. European Green Deal. Accessed March 8, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/ - Germany must become 'the best equipped armed force in Europe', Scholz says. Euronews, September 16, 2022. Accessed March 8, 2023. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/09/16/germany-must-become-the-best-equipped-armed-force-in-europe-scholz-says- Hansler, Jennifer. Nov. 6, 2024. “Trump’s victory could mean US withdraws support for Ukraine in war with Russia.” https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/06/politics/trump-election-ukraine-war-russia-intl/index.html- James, Toby S. 2021. “The Effects of Donald Trump.” Policy Studies 42 (5–6): 755–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2021.1980114. - Kawashima, Shin. 2017. "Japan–US-China Relations during the Trump Administration and the Outlook for East Asia." Asia-Pacific Review 24 (1): 23–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2017.1328800. - Liptak, James. Sept. 23, 2014. “Countries bombed by the U.S. under the Obama administration.” CNN Politics. https://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/23/politics/countries-obama-bombed/index.html - Macgregor, Douglas & Ramaswamy, Dave, Nov. 19, 2024. “Trump and the Storm of the Century. The U.S. is sleepwalking into disaster in the Middle East.” The American Conservative. https://www.theamericanconservative.com/trump-and-the-storm-of-the-century/ - Mansbach, Richard W. 2021. "America’s Foreign Policy under Donald Trump.” In, 201–34. oxford university. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197618721.003.0010. - National Security Strategy. Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany (2023). Federal Foreign Office, Werderscher Markt 1, 10117 Berlin. - Nczas Info. Nov. 12, 2024. “Szokujące słowa wiceszefa MSZ. Oddamy jeszcze więcej Ukrainie? „Jesteśmy gotowi przejąć dużą część kosztów” [VIDEO]”. https://nczas.info/2024/11/12/szokujace-slowa-wiceszefa-msz-oddamy-jeszcze-wiecej-ukrainie-jestesmy-gotowi-przejac-duza-czesc-kosztow-video/ - Newman, Benjamin, Jennifer L. Merolla, Sono Shah, Danielle Casarez Lemi, Loren Collingwood, and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan. “The Trump Effect: An Experimental Investigation of the Emboldening Effect of Racially Inflammatory Elite Communication.” British Journal of Political Science 51, no. 3 (2021): 1138–59. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000590. - OCHA, Dec. 5, 2024. “The Whole of Syria Flash Update No. 2 - Recent Developments in Syria (As of 5 December 2024)”. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/syrian-arab-republic/whole-syria-flash-update-no-2-recent-developments-syria-5-december-2024 - Ott, H, Dec. 9, 2024. “What to know after Syrian rebels force Bashar al-Assad from power in a rekindled civil war”. CBC News. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-war-assad-ousted-what-to-know/ - Pew Research Centre, The biggest problems and greatest strengths of the U.S. political system. Sept. 19, 2023. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/09/19/the-biggest-problems-and-greatest-strengths-of-the-u-s-political-system/ - Pew Research Centre, Top Problems Facing the U.S., May 23, 2024. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/05/23/top-problems-facing-the-u-s/ - Sahide, Ahmad, Misran Misran, and Ali Maksum. 2024. “Indonesian Media Framing against Trump in the 2020 Presidential Election.” Multidisciplinary Reviews 7 (5): 2024097. https://doi.org/10.31893/multirev.2024097. - Sky News. April 16, 2024. “Are we heading for World War Three? Experts give their verdicts.” https://news.sky.com/story/are-we-heading-for-world-war-three-experts-give-their-verdicts-13116540 - South China Morning Post, Nov. 21, 2024. “China war scenario calls for US boost in defence spending to more than 3% of GDP. China’s projected military industrial base cannot be matched without increased spending, lawmakers hear”. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3287467/china-war-scenario-calls-us-boost-defence-spending-more-3-gdp?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage- Teller, Neville, June 28, 2024. “'The End of Israel': Building a case against Netanyahu – review. The End of Israel is undeniably thought-provoking and, in a world where exchanges of differing views is being increasingly inhibited, to be welcomed.” The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-808080- The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles University In Prague On Monday, August 29 2022. Available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752 - The First Battle of the Next War, Jan. 2023. A Report of the CSIS International Security Program. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ- Tinline, Phil. July 19, 2023. “Imagining Armageddon: the mad and dangerous ideas of Herman Kahn”. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/policy/defence-news/62117/imagining-armageddon-herman-kahn-nuclear-ladder- USA FACTS, How is the U.S. economy doing? https://usafacts.org/state-of-the-union/economy/ - VoA, Dec. 3, 2024. „West pushes for more Ukraine military aid, not NATO membership”. https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-support-in-focus-as-nato-foreign-ministers-meet/7885166.html - Xinhua, Nov. 18, 2024 b. “Full Text of Chinese President's signed article in Brazilian media”. https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/597977#Full-Text-of-Chinese-president's-signed-article-in-Brazilian-media--2024-11-18 - Xinhua, Nov. 19, 2024. “G20 Summit: Xi calls for multipolar world, inclusive globalization”. https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/newsletter/top_headlines/article/581033