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No mother wants to say goodbye to their child. However, with the looming threat of an attack from China, this fear threatens to become a reality for many Taiwanese mothers. There has been widespread speculation that People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping (習近平) has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be prepared to invade the island by 2027. Amid such predictions, Taiwan has completed numerous actions to increase its capabilities to resist a Chinese attack. Arguably, the island’s most notable single measure—and the most politically controversial—has been the extension of conscripted service for young men from four months to one year of training and military duty. [1]  

Current Party Stances 

When then-President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) announced the extension of conscripted service in December 2022, public opinion was divided regarding the presidential decision. In the January 2024 presidential election, the three contenders differed on their proposed policies for housing and economic issues, as well as relations with China, but all three—Lai Ching-te (賴清德) of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨), Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜) of the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨), and Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP, (台民黨)—supported expanding conscripted military service. According to Dr. Shen Ming-shih (沈明室), acting deputy chief executive of the Institute of National Defense and Security Research (INDSR, 國防安全研究院), a government funded think-tank in Taipei, the rare agreement reached by the three men reflects how the issue involves national security interests that transcend party politics. 

In Taiwan, the conscription age is 18; however, deferments for higher education are very common. All males must serve in the military by age 36, when they can retire from the reserves. Conscription length has varied throughout administrations. It used to last between two and three years, until being shortened to one year in 2008. This was further cut to four months in 2012 under KMT President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who came to power in 2008 and followed a policy of pursuing warmer ties with China. In the years that followed, Taiwan’s conscripted service system has been widely criticized by commentators both inside Taiwan and abroad as ineffective in providing for Taiwan’s defense, leading the Tsai Administration to implement the one-year program. 

Public Opinion and the Impacts of Conscription 

Former conscripts have frequently expressed disappointment with their training and equipment. In a study conducted in September 2023, participants regarded military service as “useless” and a “waste of time.” Citing as evidence the lack of equipment and the long permitted periods of leisure time, past participants have complained about the military training camps. One participant who trained in the Taiwanese military between 2023 and 2024 stated that “I just sat under the AC with my phone, they [military personnel] didn’t train us with any specific weapons because they said to not waste bullets, so my friends and I just sat on a field most of the time.” The researchers similarly conducted an interview with Jack Huang, a 30 year old male who completed his four months of service over two semester breaks in university. According to this news report, Huang “felt [that] his shooting practice was outdated, like a holdover from the 1950s, and did not see how it would help him in modern warfare.”  

These examples support what Dr. Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), a research fellow and director of INDSR has found: namely, that psychological defense and troop morale are the top concerns regarding Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. If troop morale and confidence are down, how is a sovereign island supposed to maintain its basic defense capacity against China?  

Polling data and public sentiment reflect a mix of opinions regarding the conscription extension. According to a survey by the National Chengchi University (國立政治大學), 58 percent of Taiwanese citizens support the extension of conscription to one year, viewing it as a necessary measure for national defense. However, 35 percent oppose the extension, citing particular concerns about its impact on young mens’ educational and career prospects. This division in opinion is evident across different demographics, with younger generations expressing more resistance to the policy compared to older generations. 

There is indeed research that points to a one year conscription policy as being an impediment to educational and job prospects. In 2015, The IZA Journal of Labor Economics published a study on the long-term effects of peace-time military conscription on educational attainment and earnings in the Netherlands. Researchers found that compulsory military service decreased the proportion of Dutch university graduates by 1.5 percentage points (from a baseline of 12.3 per cent). Furthermore, the study found that being a conscript diminished the likelihood of earning a university degree by about four percentage points. The impact of military service on wages is also detrimental and long-term. The research concluded that “approximately 18 years after military service, we still find a negative effect of 3 to 4 per cent.” This quantifies some of the negative economic impacts of prolonged military conscription.  

Flexibility in Service and Better Compensation for Conscripted Soldiers 

Amid public reservations about the new policy, Taiwan’s government has implemented measures aimed to provide benefits after conscription. These include considering service time when calculating future benefits, and providing “flexible” educational options to facilitate the move into the economy for all conscripts. The Taipei Times reported in June 2023 that the Ministry of Education (教育部) has implemented a “3+1” program in which conscripts can complete college in three years and military duty in one year, allowing them to graduate alongside those who do not have to serve. To do this, institutions must raise the limit on the amount of credits that draftee students may obtain each semester. They should also provide summer courses and allow drafted individuals to attend classes at other universities. However, some have criticized the program: for example, KMT members of the legislature have stated that it would jeopardize students’ educational rights, and that conscripts would be “burning the candle at both ends” by balancing studies and conscription. 

Conscription programs have also traditionally been known for the very low levels of pay given to junior conscripts—another point that has made the service period unpopular. The return to one-year service is part of a package of conscription reforms that includes increased pay for conscripted soldiers, in which the monthly compensation for a private will increase from NTD $6,510 to NTD $26,307 (USD $203 to USD $850)—still not a huge sum, but a four-fold increase over the standard pay level of the past. 

Personal Interviews with Taiwanese Americans Affected by the Conscription Policy  

Another issue of concern regarding conscription may be identified in the current attitudes of future Taiwanese-Americans conscripts residing in Taiwan. To investigate the trend, the author conducted a limited study in Taiwan in May 2024, in which interviews were conducted with five teen participants who have to serve upon turning 18. [2] In the interviews, the participants were asked about their views towards the policy. For the first subject pool, four of the five teen participants (Teens 1, 3, 4, and 5) stated that period of the prolonged military service caused concerns regarding future career plans. This concern contributed to a decrease in national pride and connection to their Taiwanese identity. For example, when asked about his opinion regarding the conscription policy, Teen 3 stated in his interview, “Especially because the job market is so tight right now… Having to serve would make getting a job harder. I know I’m supposed to be mad at China, but I’m mad at Taiwan.”  

This correlates to the fluctuation of public confidence in Taiwan’s military, according to data found by NCCU’s Election Study Center. In September of 2021, about 58 percent of respondents were confident or very confident in the military’s ability to defend Taiwan. However, confidence dropped to 54 percent in March 2022 and to 43 percent in March 2023—possibly due in part to negative news and cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare and negative news covers many areas: ranging from naval exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan and military aviation flights that steadily advance closer to Taiwan’s airspace, to bans of Taiwanese agricultural products, and the use of fringe political parties employed to spread pro-CCP (and anti-American) narratives. 

Another theme commonly cited as a reason for their decreased level of patriotism was the effect of military service on plans for higher education. Three out of the five teen participants (Teens 1, 3, and 4) stated that the prolonged military service caused concerns regarding future education plans. This concern contributed to a decrease in national pride and connection to their Taiwanese identity. For example, when asked about his opinion regarding the conscription policy, Teen 1 stated in his interview, “I’m just trying to live my life and go off to college abroad and never have to think about this problem or Taiwan ever again.” The frustration expressed corresponds to a decrease in patriotic connection: as Teen 4 stated in his interview, “I don’t like it. It inconveniences me and my plans for college. Plus, Taiwan doesn’t have anything to offer to my education.”  

In a second subject pool, four parent participants (Parents 2, 3, 4, and 5) stated that the prolonged military service for boys born after 2005 caused concerns regarding future career plans. Many parent participants believed that prolonged service duration would harm a child’s employment opportunities, and cause them to lose valuable work experience. For example, Parent 2 stated in their interview, “We have to think about what the youth needs. A one-year training with weapons they will never be able to use or use well in their entire life is useless and bad for job prospects. I am disappointed in Taiwan and perhaps even a bit ashamed of my country.”   

Many parent participants believed that prolonged service duration would harm a child’s educational development and cause them to lose valuable academic learning. This connects to March 2023 research in the publication Voice Tank, which found that “respondents’ confidence had dropped, for the first time below 50 percent (to 43 percent), and the proportion of those not confident exceeded that of those confident. While such a drop could be attributed to various factors and may only be temporary, we think it may be a result of cognitive warfare and negative news coverage of the ROC armed forces.” [3] This links to Parent 4’s questioning of Taiwan, asking, “What is wrong with Taiwan? Don’t they understand our future generation needs to study abroad for a better chance?” Parent 4 believes that the government is directly hindering her son’s academic development and future by implementing the policy, a reason for her declining level of patriotism. 

Conclusion 

The prolonged military conscription for males born after 2005 has caused clashing public opinions—and a decline in patriotic sentiment for Taiwanese Americans currently residing in Taiwan, including future conscripts and their parents. The ruling DPP must consider the unforeseen impacts of its policy amid the looming Chinese threat. It becomes imperative for the ruling party to acknowledge that while conscription may appear on the surface to be cost-effective, simple budgetary accounting does not consider the potentially high opportunity cost that young people face when forced to serve, leading to long-term earnings losses and educational disruptions. These factors combine to reduce national income and economic growth. Additionally, for Taiwanese Americans and expatriates, conscription does little to foster unity; instead, it risks further weakening the relationship between overseas citizens and the state, whose voices still influence Taiwan’s future. 

The main point: The prolonged military conscription for boys born after 2005 has caused public controversy and a decline in patriotism for Taiwanese Americans currently residing in Taiwan, including future conscripts and their parents. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party must consider the unforeseen impacts of its policy amid the looming Chinese threat. 

References 

[1] For previous discussions of the issues surrounding the extension of service to one year, see: John Dotson, “Taiwan’s ‘Military Force Restructuring Plan’ and the Extension of Conscripted Military Service,” Global Taiwan Brief, February 8, 2023, https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/02/taiwan-military-force-restructuring-plan-and-the-extension-of-conscripted-military-service/; and John Dotson, “Taiwan Initiates Its New One-Year Military Conscription Program,” Global Taiwan Brief, February 7, 2024, https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/02/taiwan-initiates-its-new-one-year-military-conscription-program/. 

[2] The research was conducted for a duration of one year, under the supervision of Dr. Irish Farley. The study utilized a two-part, mixed methods approach that surveyed boys between of 14 and 17 living in Taiwan who are eligible for military conscription upon turning of age; followed by small group interviews with the teen participants, and parents of boys aged 14 through 17 living in Taiwan. 

[3] For example, a report in Nihon Keizai Shimbun in February 2023 claimed that 90 percent of retired Taiwanese spies have worked with China. In early March, soldiers stationed in Kinmen defected to Xiamen, which led to the circulation of negative news about Taiwan’s military. See: Lee, Kuan-chen, Christina Chen, and Ying-Hsuan Chen. 2024. “Core Public Attitudes toward Defense and Security in Taiwan.” Taiwan Politics, January 2024, https://doi.org/10.58570/WRON8266.