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Defense & Security
20241214_ROK_NA_Speaker_Woo_Won_Shik_signing_the_resolution_to_impeach_President_Yoon_Suk_Yeol_01

South Korea: President Impeached for Abuse of Power

by Human Rights Watch

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Failed Martial Law Bid Shows Need to Protect Human Rights, Rule of Law (Seoul) – The South Korean National Assembly’s 204 to 85 vote to impeach President Yoon Suk-yeol on December 14, 2024 after his rejected imposition of martial law has reinforced democratic rule and checks and balances in South Korea, Human Rights Watch said today.  All 300 National Assembly lawmakers participated in the vote, with 204 votes in favor, 85 against, three abstentions, and eight invalid votes. The National Assembly charged the president with directing the military and police to obstruct the assembly from voting to overturn his decree; attempting to take over the National Election Committee; and arresting political leaders, current and former judges, journalists, and members of civil society. “Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment reflects the broad support among South Koreans for the rule of law and democracy,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Yoon’s impeachment should encourage South Korea’s political leaders to recommit to democratic institutions and upholding human rights and civil liberties.” The National Assembly impeached Yoon in response to his short-lived declaration of martial law on the evening of December 3, during which he attempted to ban all political activities and suspend due process rights and freedoms of speech and assembly. Yoon sent soldiers into the National Assembly to arrest political leaders and to stop lawmakers from voting to lift the decree.  In announcing martial law, Yoon contended that it was justified because of opposition efforts to impeach members of his cabinet and obstruct the budget, and due to unspecified threats from North Korean communist forces. Yoon repeated these claims in a televised speech on December 11, saying that his decree was a legitimate exercise of his constitutional powers, akin to conducting foreign policy, and so did not amount to insurrection.  The South Korean constitution allows a president to declare martial law only during “war, armed conflict, or similar national emergency.”  In his December 11 speech, Yoon stated that he had not intended to stop the National Assembly from lifting martial law under article 77 of the constitution – a critical check on potential abuses of power that it exercised on the night of December 3. But testimony by military officers ordered to carry out his decree contradicted his claim. In a news conference on December 12, an army special forces commander, Col. Kim Hyun-tae, who led the special forces team that stormed the National Assembly on December 3, said he had received orders from senior military commanders to prevent more than 150 National Assembly members – the number required to repeal martial law – from gathering. The head of South Korea’s police agency, Cho Ji-ho, testified in the National Assembly on December 9 that on the evening of December 3 the armed forces asked the police to help them locate and detain 15 people, including the leaders of the biggest political parties. He also said that several hours before declaring martial law, Yoon ordered him to occupy the newsrooms of several media organizations, including MBC, one of South Korea’s largest broadcasters and a repeated target of criminal defamation charges by Yoon and his allies.  The former deputy director of South Korea’s National Intelligence Service testified that he was ordered to arrest a broadcaster and a union official, as well as several political leaders, including a sitting judge who had ruled in favor of Yoon’s political opponent, a former chief justice of the Constitutional Court, and other political leaders. Martial law troops also occupied the National Election Commission’s offices and confiscated the phones of five election officials. On December 8, a special police investigation team arrested Yoon’s former defense minister, Kim Yong-hyun, on charges of insurrection. On December 11, the team arrested Cho on the same charge, along with another senior police official.  South Korean law defines insurrection as any attempt to “overthrow government organs established by the Constitution or to make the exercise of their functions impossible by using force.”  As investigations into the events of December 3 continue, the Constitutional Court will now decide whether to uphold the impeachment vote. A police raid on the president’s office on December 11 suggests he may also be charged with insurrection. The proceedings should be fair and impartial and ensure due process, Human Rights Watch said.  Yoon’s actions reflect a culmination of his administration’s assault on the country’s democratic institutions and human rights, Human Rights Watch said. In 2022, Yoon campaigned for president on an anti-feminist platform, rejected the existence of systematic gender discrimination, and pledged to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. Once in office, his administration eroded human rights protections for women and girls; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people; racial minorities; migrants; older people; and people with disabilities.  While in office, Yoon also directed police and prosecutors to attack political opponents, unions, and journalists, eroding the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly that his martial law decree nearly suspended. “Events in South Korea since December 3 have highlighted the crucial role democratic institutions play in preventing abuses of power and protecting the rule of law,” Pearson said.

Defense & Security
Calls for President Yoon Suk Yeol to resign at Nat'l Assembly on December 4, 2024 01

What South Korea’s short-lived martial law says about nation’s democracy and the autocratic tendencies of President Yoon

by Myunghee Lee, Michigan State University

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском During a whirlwind few hours in South Korean politics, President Yoon Suk Yeol placed the country under martial law on Dec. 3, 2024, only to lift it just a short while later. It marked the first time that a South Korean leader has imposed the emergency power since 1979. And although short-lived, the measure provoked concerns of the country backsliding into authoritarian rule. To explain what happened and what it means for South Korean democracy, The Conversation U.S. turned to Myunghee Lee, an expert on authoritarianism, democracy and South Korean politics at Michigan State University. How did all this unfold? It was a crazy few hours, and I’m still trying to get my head around it – and a lot is still unknown as to why President Yoon did this. But at around 9:30 p.m. Korean time on Dec. 3, rumors started circulating among journalists that Yoon was planning an emergency press conference. And then at 10:20-ish, Yoon gave a short speech in which he blamed certain pro-North Korean and anti-state forces in South Korea of trying to destabilize the country. In effect, he was pointing the finger at opposition parties who have been blocking his policies and trying to impeach some of his appointees. He declared the situation unacceptable and said there was no way for him to continue to smoothly run the county, and as such he was declaring emergency martial law to save the nation from pro-North Korean and anti-state forces. The minister of defense then held a meeting with major military personnel, set up a martial law headquarters, and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Park An-su was appointed as martial law commander. A martial law proclamation was then issued stating that all political activities were now banned – including the work of the South Korean parliament. This all took place within around one hour of Yoon’s declaration. Despite the proclamation, legislators headed to the National Assembly, where some were blocked from entering. But many did get in, and, at around 1 a.m. local time, legislators voted against the martial law – in effect forcing Yoon to repeal his declaration. He did this but not for another three and a half hours, during which the situation was very tense. He relented at around 4.30 a.m., held another press conference and announced that he was lifting the emergency measure. Why did he declare martial law now? That’s what many people – myself included – are trying to work out. This shocked a lot of people, and it appears many were taken unawares. Obviously some people were in the know, such as the defense minister and army general appointed martial law commander. But it appears even some in his own party were unaware that Yoon was planning to do this. For sure, some opposition politicians have been warning about something like this happening since September. And Yoon has become increasingly frustrated by both divisions in his own party and moves by the opposition in the National Assembly to block key parts of his agenda. Also Yoon is facing numerous influence-peddling scandals involving both himself and his wife. This wasn’t a declaration made from a position of strength then? Hardly. Yoon is in an incredibly weak position: His approval rating has been hovering around the 20% mark. He presides over a divided party, a gridlocked parliament and a population in which he has become very unpopular. So was this an act of desperation? I don’t think so, no. The suggestion that Yoon took this step before the opposition could impeach him? That doesn’t make sense to me. He was already facing calls for impeachment – but I’m not sure that before this episode there was appetite in the country for a second impeachment, following the 2016 impeachment of President Park Geun-hye over a corruption scandal. So on that front, despite the scandals and the political issues he faced, I don’t think this can be characterized as an act of desperation. Especially as those calls for impeachment and removal from power have only been intensified by his actions. I think Yoon declared martial law out of anger – he was angry, and resentful at the opposition blocking him repeatedly. But then again, I can’t read his mind. For many, it is regarded as a foolish move – he was in such a weak position politically, it would have seemed unlikely that this tactic would succeed. But he and some of the plotters must have calculated politically that this tactic would give them a chance to gain support from his core base. The real puzzle is what drove him to make that political calculation. Is Yoon known to be an authoritarian figure? People certainly have aired concern over his autocratic tendencies. Even before this martial law incident, some of his decisions have prompted concerns. He has ignored legal procedures and tried to circumvent the National Assembly. He has certainly shown an illiberal streak at home, attacking the media as “fake news” while smearing opponents as communists and North Korean sympathizers. But that’s not always the way he is perceived in the West. Since the Russian invasion, there have been attempts by foreign policy types to divide the world into two blocs – a liberal one and an illiberal one. Yoon, as a key ally to the U.S., is framed in Washington as a defender of democracy. At home, however, it’s a different story. With the declaration of martial law, his authoritarian tendencies have been amped up for the world to see, and it’s difficult to imagine that won’t be part of his legacy. But even before this decision, he was known for being authoritarian. How does that legacy fit into the political history of South Korea? South Korea has a long history with martial law and autocratic, even military, rule. This latest declaration of martial law is by some counts the 17th instance in Korean history. The last time it was declared was in 1979 following the assassination of Park Chung-hee, a dictator who ruled South Korea during the 1960s and 1970s. That period of martial law lasted until 1981, during which Chun Doo-hwan, another dictator, came to power through a coup and perpetrated a massacre in Gwangju. Martial law hasn’t been declared since the 1980s, but certainly many older Korean people can still remember that occasion, when troops brutally cracked down on protesters. But since becoming a democracy in 1987, there hadn’t been a declaration of martial law until now. Interestingly, in a straw poll of my family, age factored into the response to Yoon’s move. Older family members very much feared the declaration of martial law. For younger family members and friends, it was met not as a joke, but certainly as a foolish move that wouldn’t actually result in a prolonged period of martial law. What happens next? My guess would be President Yoon’s days are numbered – and that this episode will hasten his political demise. Before the events of Dec. 3, there were still many people in the parliament and the public at large resistant to the idea of another impeachment following the last one in 2016. But there appears to be a groundswell of opinion in the parliament that the president should be removed, and it is echoed by the public.

Defense & Security
Panoramic view of Tokyo and Japanese flag, Japan

Japan on the path to strategic autonomy

by Javier Fernández Aparicio

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract: Japan is going through a difficult domestic political period that coincides with the demands of the enormous geopolitical challenges posed by the threat posed by the increased assertiveness of China and Russia in the region, coupled with the risk of North Korea's nuclear programme. Uncertainty over the immediate future of the security relationship with the United States, which was tightened under former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, also leads Japan to a dilemma regarding its own deterrence capabilities, as reliance on such an alliance may become another risk factor in the event that the United States reformulates it. Therefore, the search for Japan's own strategic autonomy is becoming increasingly important, firstly by accelerating remilitarisation that includes possibilities beyond strict self-defence and, as a second pillar, by seeking to create a mutual security organisation with other countries in the region to act as a deterrent to China, Russia and North Korea, bringing together the various bilateral and multinational treaties to which Japan is a party. Introduction The 27 October elections have left Japan in a complicated political situation. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won and remains the most represented party in the Diet, with 191 seats, but together with its current partner, the Komeito, the governing coalition fell far short of the 233 needed for a majority. Nevertheless, the current prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, can continue to hold office and the punishment of the LDP seems to be read in a domestic context and not because of dissent over security and the country's external projection. Japan's stability is key to the region, so it seems unlikely that any government that is formed will affect the main lines of defence policy, as the concern remains an increasingly assertive China and the attitude of other actors such as Russia and North Korea. The main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party won 148 seats, 52 more than in the last election, but if we look at its election manifesto, on foreign policy it opts to align itself with the strategic concept of a secure and open Indo-Pacific, while on defence the question is whether to continue to rely on the alliance with the US, which has approximately 50,000 troops in the country, or whether Japan should be able to have sufficient deterrent capabilities of its own .1 On 1 October, Shigeru Ishiba took over as prime minister from his party colleague and prime minister from 2021, Fumio Kishida, worn down by several corruption cases. On October 4, Ishiba announced some of his foreign policy priorities: the design of a mutual security organisation, an "Asian NATO" with several Indo-Pacific countries and greater reciprocity in the alliance with the United States, although this does not mean a questioning of this. 2 All this in a regional context where Japan's perception of its security being threatened was growing, given that a few days earlier a Chinese aircraft carrier had passed through the waters between the Japanese islands of Yonaguni and Iriomote, coming within 24 miles of Japanese territory. For decades, Japan has been perhaps the main Pacific ally of its former World War II enemy, the United States, and this, coupled with its own geopolitical position, translates into remilitarisation, a dynamic of confrontation with China and the search for allies beyond the US, both in the region itself and further afield, in Europe, for example. With Ishida it seems that there will be some continuity with Kishida's policy, although both belong to the same party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has been governing Japan for a decade, although their sensibilities and political paths are different, while some unknowns remain in the immediate future, such as China's own position with the increasingly belligerent discourse from Japan or the future of the close alliance with the United States depending on the tenant in the White House from next year, after the elections on 1 November: continuity or rupture if the United States demands a change in Japan's defence policy, pushing it towards greater spending and thus increasing strategic autonomy? Japan's socio-economic and political turbulence Sigheru Ishiba was appointed prime minister due to corruption cases in the Fushida government, including some dealings in various contracts within the defence industry. Since 2017, laws have been tightened to prosecute bribery of officials, which has an impact on the awarding of contracts and tenders for public works. Since 2021, the year of his appointment as prime minister, Fumio Kishida's career has been punctuated by various scandals, starting with the scenario surrounding the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the summer of 2022, which brought to light the party's links to the controversial religious organisation of the Unification Church, also known as the Moon Sect, to which his assassin belonged. As early as 2023, the case of the blackmailing of senior party officials, including Kishida himself, caused his popular approval rating to fall to less than 15 percent, and after sacking senior officials and ministers, he decided last August to step down and make way for another candidate, who would end up being Ishiba .3 Sigheru Ishiba is a veteran politician known for his loquacity who has been ostracised within the LDP for his criticism of its leaders, for example in 2014 against Shinzo Abe for his reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution that prohibited the country from rearming. After several unsuccessful attempts to lead the LDP, Ishiba was a minor parliamentarian, but what was crucial in his rise to prime minister was that he embodied the image of a fighter against corruption, which is also considered a burden in Japan's current complex economic situation. Although it is the fourth largest economic power, in 2023 Germany overtook Japan as the world's third largest economy and also has a trade deficit of around 2 billion euros, as the country is totally dependent on resources such as oil and gas, suffering from rising prices and obstacles in supply chains in the Indo-Pacific, for example, with the Houthi threat in the Red Sea 4.  Another sensitive issue is demographics. Japan has an ageing society, where 30% of its 125 million inhabitants are over 65, the highest rate in the world, while the birth rate is very low, with an average of 1.3 children per woman, according to World Bank figures 5 . This has consequences such as a shrinking domestic market, as older people are reluctant to put their savings at stake, plus the danger of not being able to meet labour needs in some sectors, including defence needs, precisely at a time when there is a desire to increase manpower. Technology and robotisation have been alleviating this situation of the need for demographic renewal, but doubts lurk in the very near future, especially in one of the countries with the most restrictive immigration legislation in the world. Redoubling security threats: China, Russia and North Korea  Japan's historic territorial disputes with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the South China Sea and with Russia over the Kuril/Chishima Islands have been compounded by a heightened threat perception of these two formidable giants, while North Korean ballistic missile tests have added to the escalating tension. As the 2024 Defence White Paper has made clear, Japan's approximately 16,000 kilometres of coastline along its four main islands, which means that no point in the country is more than 150 kilometres from the sea, means that Japanese military doctrine regards its defences as definitive battle sites. Moreover, the straits separating these islands greatly restrict a rapid transfer of forces, and this is compounded by the mountainous barriers that similarly prevent rapid deployment of troops. 6  The paper notes that China is modernising and expanding its military by leaps and bounds, while Russian manoeuvres in the Kuriles have involved not only naval exercises but also the deployment of coastal missile and air defence systems. On 18 September, the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning passed through the waters between the islands of Yonaguni and Iriomote, the first ship of its kind, while it is common for fighter jets and other vessels to invade Japanese airspace or territorial waters 7. Similarly, an anti-Japanese sentiment is beginning to emerge in China that is rooted in cultural and historical elements and embedded in the diplomatic sphere. In addition to Beijing's reminders that both exports and imports between the two countries are key to their respective economies, and that any ban or stricter regulation could alter them, there are also Chinese diplomatic protests over issues such as the sending of a Japanese warship to the Taiwan Strait on 25 September, an unprecedented action, albeit in the framework of collaboration with other countries such as Australia and New Zealand, which took part in joint manoeuvres in the area, dubbed "freedom of navigation exercises"8.  Finally, several Japanese companies based in China are willing to relocate their staff after xenophobic attacks, including the fatal stabbing of a child in Shenzhen on 18 September 9. On social media, many posts from China claim that Japanese schools create spies and label them as "new colonies" in reference to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1932-1945. In these China-Japan frictions, destabilising actions are also observed within the so-called grey zone. A report has identified a disinformation network in China that promotes a supposed independence movement in Okinawa, where there are also calls for an end to the US presence on the island, which is home to more than 25,000 troops in the largest base on Japanese territory.  Violations of Japanese air or maritime sovereignty have also recently come from Russia. On 23 September, a serious incident occurred when a Russian military aircraft violated Japanese airspace north of Rebun Island in Hokkaido Prefecture and was intercepted by a Japanese aircraft, which threw flares that hit its fuselage 10. It is also noteworthy that since the summer of 2019 and on an annual basis, a joint fleet of Chinese and Russian warships have been carrying out joint manoeuvres in the space between the seas of Japan and Okhotsk, while Russia has also announced the installation of new missile platforms in the Kuriles, which is seen as an increased threat to Japan.11  For its part, North Korea and its ballistic missile tests continue to be a risk for Japan, as it seems to have become one of the main targets of such tests, given that these projectiles tend to land in Japanese sovereign waters. Recently, Prime Minister Ishiba has pushed the diplomatic option by proposing to the regime in Pyongyang to set up liaison offices in both countries to settle any disputes, including the fate of Japanese citizens abducted in the 1970s and 1980s. This proposal includes an end to missile testing in exchange for Japanese investment in North Korean projects, another sign that Tokyo is beginning to seek its own solutions to problems previously settled within the broad framework of the alliance with the United States.12  Rethinking the alliance with the United States?  It should be remembered that all of Japan's military activity and capabilities are strictly limited to a defensive character, restricting the Japanese Self-Defence Forces' overseas deployments and mission to humanitarian cover. However, the dependence on the United States in this foreign projection is quite evident and goes beyond legal limitations. Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution regulates the use of force in Japan to self-defence. Prior to the reforms during Shinzo Abe's term in office (2012-2020), the 1951 Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which is still in force, even with revisions, allows in Articles V and VI for a US presence on Japanese territory, which covers the 50,000 US military personnel stationed at bases throughout the country, especially on the island of Okinawa, up to a maximum of 100,000. 13 But guidelines signed in 1978, also in force, stipulated the possibility of Japanese participation in foreign military operations if vital sea lanes for the country were under attack, such as protection for ships under the US flag of war or carrying Japanese nationals, as well as direct assistance to the US in the event of an attack on its mainland, for example by intercepting missiles overflying Japan. 14 When Abe was prime minister in 2015, the Diet passed two bills, the first allowing Japanese forces to operate abroad for humanitarian reasons or in the case of situations that "threaten Japan's existence", and the second removing restrictions that prevented action in collective self-defence, i.e. it can use its armed forces to defend an ally under attack and no longer just the United States. This opened the door for Japan to join military alliances. Two years later, in 2017, it became a founding member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), although this alliance between the United States, India, Australia and Japan is not, stricto sensu, a coalition with military powers, this same year they agreed to greater involvement in this regard with joint maritime patrols in the waters of the Indo-Pacific from 2025. 15 Some media refer to QUAD as a germ of "NATO in the Indo-Pacific".  With regard to NATO itself, Kishida participated as an observer in the meeting of the heads of state of the member states in Madrid in June 2022, the first Japanese leader to do so in history. Recall that, in the strategic concept agreed during that meeting, China already appeared as a systemic threat in the concept, an issue of vital strategic importance to Japan. Kishida also attended the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023, and was the first Japanese leader in history to deliver a speech from a non-coalition partner country: "We welcome the increased interest and engagement in the IndoPacific by our Euro-Atlantic partners"16. Japan is part of the AP4, the NATO AsiaPacific Partners, i.e. NATO's four Indo-Pacific partners along with South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.  In December 2022, the Kishida government updated three important defence documents, the National Security Strategy, the National Defence Strategy and the Defence Strengthening Programme, which ultimately authorised the government, for example, to acquire long-range missile platforms in a controversial decision, as it contradicts the premise of not acquiring offensive weapons. It was justified by Japan's new strategic concept of deterrence and anticipatory defence in the earlier "Three Pillars of Defence" documents, which include improving its security architecture with new equipment such as these missiles, strengthening the alliance with the United States and increasing cooperation with international partners. 17 The so-called 'Spirit of Camp David' 18 , the meeting at President Biden's summer residence in August 2023 between President Biden, Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, further integrated Japan into the US defence architecture in the Pacific, adding a key player to the alliance in South Korea, with whom Japan had hitherto had a complicated relationship stemming from a traumatic common history, and the germ of a trilateral military alliance was even raised, effectively including the possible transfer of certain deterrent technology vis-à-vis China, Russia and North Korea, such as nuclear weapons, something that had already come up at the G7 meeting in Hiroshima in May 2023, no less, although Kishida flatly denied this possibility. However, in 2017 it was the then Diet deputy and now prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, who raised this possibility as a real option for Japan, although the then defence minister immediately rejected it 19. Now Ishiba and part of the Japanese political spectrum seem to advocate a certain distancing from dependence on the US, without disavowing bilateral agreements, but advocating initiatives such as having Japanese forces on US soil, the joint use of military bases in Okinawa, and making Japan's defence less dependent on US policy for the region.  When in doubt, open the fan and increase the force.  Last January, Kishida and his foreign and defence ministers travelled to Washington to meet with their US counterparts. There, a new step in Japan's strategic thinking was revealed when it was announced that Japan intends to increase defence spending by almost 60 per cent over five years, abandoning the 1 per cent of GDP budget cap. Beyond a reading in terms of sustaining the alliance with the United States, the fact is that we are witnessing a revision of the country's defence strategy unprecedented since World War II: doubling defence spending means giving Japan its own autonomy in this area, without depending on third parties and with the agreement of the United States 20.  Japan perceives that the US will remain the global power for the foreseeable future, but may become less so in the medium to distant future, posing a threat to Japan's defence credibility, especially in the face of Chinese assertiveness in the adjacent seas. To counter this risk, one avenue could be a security alliance with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia, India or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. In fact, there are already some bilateral agreements that allow Japanese warships to call at various ports, carry out joint manoeuvres or increase the capacity of maritime agencies to improve patrolling, with Japan supplying patrol boats, coastguard vessels and aircraft 21. However, these security agreements are not only encouraged with Indo-Pacific states, but also with more distant actors with many interests in the region, such as the Europeans, where defence exchanges, joint exercises and contracts in the Japanese defence industry are also increasingly common, either bilaterally with countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and Spain, or through recent agreements with the European Union 22.  On security issues, Ishiba has also raised the need to create a mutual defence organisation for the Pacific area that would be similar to NATO for the Atlantic, with both sharing a reference to China as a systemic rival. Thus, there is speculation about a new Basic Law on Japan's Security Policy that would authorise participation in a multinational military alliance. The way forward could be to bring together existing alliances such as the bilateral Japan-US alliance, others such as those already mentioned with South Korea and the US, as well as multinational alliances such as ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-US Security Treaty), AUKUS (a partnership between Australia, the UK and the US) and above all QUAD, which would have a principle of "collective self-defence" and expand the number of its partners.23  The narrative gaining traction in Japan is that only such a defensive alliance can deter China, Russia or North Korea from future war moves in the region. Clearly, such a proposal would involve an in-depth debate ranging from the position of a crucial power that would be the key to the success or failure of such an alliance, such as India, to the status and position of Taiwan, to the sharing of units, equipment and technology, such as nuclear, as well as the projection of the US partnership itself, On the contrary, it would be an essential part of this new organisation, from the Japanese point of view, a definitive element of deterrence, but in balance and on an equal footing with the rest of the partners, such as Japan itself. 24 Further evidence of this new Japanese perception is the acquisition of deterrence capabilities of its own, within a range of sophisticated military equipment such as longrange counter-attack missiles, designed in principle to repel a perceived adversary's attack from a distance. The country appears to be preparing not only to defend itself at home, but to anticipate its defence abroad. Other key changes in this regard include the creation of a permanent joint operational headquarters for the Self-Defence Forces, the transfer of authority over Japan's Coast Guard to the Ministry of Defence in the event of conflict, the strengthening of cyber defence and a new commitment to increase intelligence capabilities, vital for a hypothetical confrontation with China or Russia in the grey zone. 25  Conclusions: another uncertain future comes from the United States.  The key to Japan's 'Pacific NATO' project also reflects another uncertainty, that of the immediate future of US foreign policy towards the region. After the good feeling with the Biden Administration, there is some uncertainty and unease in Japan if Donald Trump returns to the White House in 2025, and a term has become popular, "MoshiTora", something akin to "What if Donald Trump wins?" ("Tora" is the beginning of Trump's name translated in Japanese as "Torampu") 26 . This could mean changes in relations between the two countries on the economy - what about tariffs - and security, as well as bilateral defence treaties. During 2017-2021, the Trump administration questioned the value of some of these treaties, especially the costs to the US treasury, insisting that NATO countries and others, such as South Korea and Japan, should pay for them and threatening to withdraw US forces. In Japan in particular, then Prime Minister Abe tried to maintain the status quo despite some of Trump's rudeness and arrogant treatment of the country. Indeed, Trump's time in office can be seen as Japan's discovery of the risks of gambling everything on the US alliance and the beginning of a discourse, like Ishida's, advocating greater autonomy in security and defence 27. However, on the campaign trail, Trump himself has hinted that he will pursue a policy of close alliance with Japan and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific, with China in his sights. 28 Also at stake in the US presidential election is the future of US financial and military assistance to Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia. In line with the previous point and reducing spending in scenarios considered onerous and not vital to US security, a withdrawal of such assistance to Ukraine could be interpreted globally as an indication of what might happen in other areas such as the Indo-Pacific, where Japan could be in a dangerous situation if there were a partial or total US withdrawal, as it would coincide with the process of remilitarisation, without clear regional security alliances and with the certain possibility that both China and Russia would redouble their threats to the country. There are two issues close to Japan that may discern which path the new US administration will take in the region. The first is North Korea, since it should be remembered that in 2019 Trump pushed for talks with Kim Jong-Un to reach an agreement on controlling and curbing the Asian country's nuclear capabilities, although in the end no agreement was reached. The truth is that he did so without including Japan in the negotiations, when it is the main country in the region affected by this threat and North Korean ballistic tests. Secondly, the situation in neighbouring Taiwan. If the United States were to relax its hitherto resolute support for the island in the face of alleged Chinese aggression, how could this be interpreted by Japan, especially when it is committed to this vision? A certain consensus seems to be flourishing in the country at the strategic level: to achieve full security autonomy that demonstrates its own deterrence capabilities. This seems to be the way forward in the short and medium term.  [1] "Contribution to global peace and prosperity", The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan. Basic Policies. Available at: Basic Policies - The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (cdp-japan.jp) (accessed 29/10/2024). [2] WARD, Robert. "Tough challenges ahead for Japan's new prime minister", The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1 October 2024. Available at: Tough challenges ahead for Japan's new prime minister (iiss.org) (accessed 30/10/2024). [3] KHALIL, Shaimaa. "Japan's embattled PM had a cruel summer - it ends with his exit", BBC. 15 August 2024. Available at: Japan: Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's cruel summer ends with his exit (bbc.com) (accessed 30/10/2024). [4] "Japan reports current account deficit of nearly $2 billion in September", ABC. 17 October 2024. Available at: Japan reports current account deficit of nearly $2 billion in September (abc.es) (accessed 30/10/2024). [5] "Total population of Japan", World Bank Data. Available at: Population, total - Japan | Data (bancomundial.org) (accessed 30/10/2024). [6] CONTE DE LOS RÍOS, Augusto. Japan presents its new Defence White Paper. IEEE Opinion Paper 92/2024. Available at: https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2024/DIEEEO92_2024_AUGCON_Japon.pdf and/or bie3 link (accessed 30/10/2024). [7] "China's Liaoning aircraft carrier sails for the first time in waters adjacent to Japan", International Press. 21 September 2024. Available in: Chinese aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sails for first time in waters adjacent to Japan - International Press - Noticias de Japón en español (accessed 30/10/2024). [8] KOSUKE, Takahashi. "In Historic First, Japan Sends Naval Ship Through the Taiwan Strait", The Diplomat. 26 September 2024. Available at: In Historic First, Japan Sends Naval Ship Through the Taiwan Strait - The Diplomat (accessed 30/10/2024). [9] "Japanese child stabbed in Shenzhen: new attack with a nationalist matrix", Asianews. 18 August 2024. Available at: CHINA - JAPAN Japanese boy stabbed in Shenzen: new attack of nationalist matrix (asianews.it) (accessed 30/10/2024). [10] JHONSON, Jesse. "Japan fighters fire flares after Russian military plane enters airspace", The Japan Times. 23 September 2024. Available at: Japan fighters fire flares after Russian military plane enters airspace - The Japan Times (accessed 30/10/2024). [11] "Russian and Chinese warships practice missile firing at Ocean-2024, RIA reports", Reuters. 16 September 2024. Available at: Russian and Chinese warships practice missile firing at Ocean-2024, RIA reports | Reuters (accessed 30/10/2024). [12] CLARK, Gregory. "Breaking the deadlock in Japan-North Korean relations", Pearls and Irritations. 28 October 2024. Available at: Breaking the deadlock in Japan-North Korean relations - Pearls and Irritations (johnmenadue.com) (accessed 30/10/2024). [13] LLANDRÉS, Borja. "Japan and the US: 60 years of alliance", Article30. Available at: Japón y EE. UU., 60 años de alianza - Artículo30 (articulo30.org) (accessed 1/11/2024). [14] "The guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation", Ministry of Defence of Japan. 27 November 1978. Available at: 19781127.pdf (accessed 1/11/2024). [15] "Fact Sheet: 2024 Quad Leaders' Summit", The White House. 21 September 2024. Available at: Fact Sheet: 2024 Quad Leaders' Summit | The White House (accessed 1/11/2024). [16] "Taking the Japan-NATO Partnership to New Heights for World Peace", Government of Japan, 25 August 2023. Available at: Taking the Japan-NATO Partnership to New Heights for World Peace | The Government of Japan - JapanGov - (accessed 1/11/2024). [17] TSUNEO, Watanabe. "What's New in Japan's Three Strategic Documents", Center for Strategic & International Studies CSIS. 13 February 2023. Available at: What's New in Japan's Three Strategic Documents (accessed 1/11/2024). [18] "The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States", The White House. 18 August 2023. Available at: The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States | The White House (accessed 1/11/2024). [19] DEACON, John T. & SOLINGEN, Etel. "Japan's nuclear weapon dilemma growing more acute", The Asia Times. 1 June 2023. Available at: Japan's nuclear weapon dilemma growing more acute - Asia Times (accessed 1/11/2024). [20] SHALAL, Andrea & BRUNNSTROM, David. "EU.S. strongly committed to Japan defense, Biden tells Kishida, hails military boost", Reuters. 14 January 2023. Available at: U.S. strongly committed to Japan defense, Biden tells Kishida, hails military boost | Reuters (accessed 1/11/2024). [21] "Japan's Two Big Decisions in Foreign and Security Policy", Government of Japan. 20 February 2023. Available at: Japan's Two Big Decisions in Foreign and Security Policy | The Government of Japan - JapanGov - (accessed 1/11/2024). [22] DOMÍNGUEZ, Gabriel & TANG, Francis. "Japan, EU launch defence and security tie-up amid mutual China concerns", The Japan Times. 1 November 2024. Available at: Japan, EU launch defense and security tie-up amid mutual China concerns - The Japan Times (accessed 1/11/2024). [23] "Shigeru Ishiba on Japan's New Security Era: The Future of Japan's Foreign Policy", Hudson Institute. 25 September 2024. Available at: Shigeru Ishiba on Japan's New Security Era: The Future of Japan's Foreign Policy | Hudson Institute (accessed 1/11/2024). [24] ESTEBAN, Mario. "Shigeru Ishiba y la nueva política de defensa japonesa: más allá de una OTAN asiática", Real Instituto Elcano. 2 October 2024. Available at: Shigeru Ishiba y la nueva política de defensa japonesa: más allá de una OTAN asiática - Real Instituto Elcano (accessed 1/11/2024). [25] Data taken from "Japan country overview", Janes. 29 October 2024. Available at: Janes: Japan (accessed 1/11/2024). [26] "'Moshi-Tora' speculates on how Trump's election might impact Japan's economy", Japan Today. 7 March 2024. Available at: 'Moshi-Tora' speculates on how Trump's election might impact Japan's economy - Japan Today (accessed 1/11/2024). [27] O'SHEA, Paul & MASLOW, Sebastian. "Making the alliance even greater: (Mis-)managing U.S.-Japan relations in the age of Trump", Asian Security, 17(2). Pp. 195-215. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1838486 (accessed 1/11/2024). [28] HUNNICUTT, Trevor et ali. "Trump will encourage Japan, South Korea ties, allies tell foreign officials", Reuters. 29 June 2024. Available at: Exclusive: Trump will encourage Japan, South Korea ties, allies tell foreign officials | Reuters (accessed 1/11/2024). .

Defense & Security
The leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) pose for a family picture doing the signature

Sea of Cooperation: New Opportunities for the Development of China - ASEAN Relations

by Andrei Gubin

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Sea of Cooperation: New Opportunities for the Development of China — ASEAN RelationsSoutheast Asia (SEA) is gaining increasing importance with the changing global order. The region is once again experiencing a period of competition between the “great powers”. During the Cold War some countries managed to stay out of the Soviet-American confrontation, but today, integration into economic, technological, and humanitarian exchanges forces members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to reshape their foreign policy in line with the prioritization of partnerships with various centers of power. SEA has significant economic growth potential, making cooperation beneficial and conflicts costly. Despite the tempting logic of harsh realism in contemporary geopolitical conditions, there remains space in this region for the traditions of idealism and complex interdependence as prerequisites for peaceful coexistence.When Profit Matters More than ClaimsThe ASEAN Summit-2024, held in October in Vientiane, clearly became a platform for a multidimensional dialogue between the “Great East Asian” countries, including India. Almost all participants tried to avoid raising contentious issues; in particular, the new Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Ishiba, emphasized Japan’s investments in Southeast Asian countries and avoided discussions about the possibility of forming an “Asian NATO”. Similar ideas about freedom from confrontations and unilateral attempts to change the balance of power were expressed by the President of South Korea, Yoon Suk Yeol. Narendra Modi focused on enhancing multilateral cooperation between Asian states in the fields of information technology, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure modernization, which would help accelerate the recovery of production and distribution chains after the COVID-19 pandemic. Chairman of the State Council of China, Li Keqiang, firmly pointed to “external forces” as the main culprits of disrupting regional order.According to him, China is ready to work with each ASEAN country in the interest of establishing a common market and achieving sustainable development. The Prime Minister stated that China and Southeast Asian countries are opening up to each other, and this process inevitably contributes to mutual prosperity, which will have a positive impact on the entire world. Notably, in 2023, the trade turnover between China and ASEAN countries exceeded 900 billion USD for the second consecutive year, and has nearly doubled over the past 10 years. The greatest activity is observed in developing relations with Vietnam and Malaysia, which together account for 230 and 191 billion USD, respectively. This means that today, Southeast Asian countries are collectively a more important partner for Beijing (in terms of volume) than the United States or the European Union.It is not surprising that at the events within the framework of the ASEAN Summit, including numerous bilateral meetings, the focus was on mutually beneficial cooperation, including issues related to further removing barriers and optimizing transport routes. Li Keqiang's statement at the 27th China-ASEAN Summit regarding the update of the Free Trade Agreement with the Association highlights the clear dominance of the economic component of cooperation over security issues, ideological differences, and other disagreements. Of course, there are opinions that Laos, in its capacity as chair, deliberately separated political issues from economic ones, but what is wrong with that?Only Philippine President F. Marcos Jr. was left alone, accusing the Chinese Coast Guard of reckless and unjustified pressure in the «exclusive economic zone». This is despite the fact that in July, an agreement was reached allowing the Philippines to deliver supplies to the “Sierra Madre” ship, which had been intentionally grounded 10 years ago at the Ayungin Shoal as a forward post for a Marine Corps unit.Professionally and SafelyToday, the South China Sea (SCS) is home to some of the busiest maritime communication routes. At least 500,000 vessels pass through the region each year, accounting for approximately 40% of global cargo traffic, and more than a million civilian flights cross the airspace above the sea annually. This high intensity of exchanges increases the importance of ensuring the safety of transport amidst unresolved disputes over the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone, the ownership of parts of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and the escalation of US-China geopolitical tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. Formally, the multilateral dispute over the islands and maritime areas between ASEAN member states and China remains unresolved.In September, the Beijing-based South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative published a report on the situation in the region. The authors of the document note that in recent years, the United States has pursued an offensive strategy to contain China, primarily using the “instability factor” in the South China Sea to escalate the multilateral dispute and fuel anti-China sentiments. Washington has also encouraged territorial claims by ASEAN countries against China, based on its own interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the concept of a “rules-based order”. So far, these flare-ups of claims against Beijing, which are sometimes accompanied by incidents between coast guard vessels, have not resulted in significant disruptions to freedom of navigation and air traffic. Moreover, China notes that the majority of the contacts have been “professional and safe”. Undoubtedly, in the event of increased tensions—such as more active actions by the air force, navy, and coast guards of various countries toward Chinese aircraft and vessels—logistical routes would need to be reorganized, which could lead to significant losses not only for China but for the entire regional economy. However, despite attempts by the US and its allies to assign special geopolitical significance to the situation in Southeast Asia, the situation remains manageable. As a result, Beijing still believes that peaceful resolution is possible.China Daily cites the opinion of specialists from the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), who believe that, in terms of ensuring the stability of international trade flows, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is not under threat. However, in the military dimension, instability is growing, primarily due to excessive US interference.[1] The Institute argues that American activities, which involve sending military ships and aircraft to demonstrate power, only provoke disputes over sovereignty and borders. Such actions create a dangerous misconception among the leadership of several countries that Washington will intervene if necessary to contain China's expansion, thus assisting in resolving the dispute through pressure. The demonization and constant condemnation of China have already negatively affected bilateral relations with the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, which requires significant diplomatic efforts from the Chinese leadership to normalize relations.Military activity is noticeably increasing in Southeast Asia, involving both regional and non-regional states. In addition to the United States, countries such as Japan, Australia, and European NATO members — Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands — are also becoming involved. In total, the US Navy conducts over 1,600 ship hours annually in the region, with at least 3,000 additional ship hours contributed by auxiliary forces. In the airspace above the South China Sea, approximately 30,000 sorties by combat aircraft and helicopters were recorded in 2023, a third of which involved non-regional states, with no fewer than 7,800 sorties conducted by the US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.At CIIS, it is believed that through military actions, Washington is “inflating” its own importance in ensuring freedom of navigation, despite the fact that the US has no merit in this — China itself does not hinder shipping and views patrol and training missions from other countries with understanding. However, joint coast guard exercises between the two most outspoken opponents of China's activities in the South China Sea (the Philippines and Vietnam), as well as “ASEAN-wide” naval maneuvers, initiated by Indonesia, have attracted the attention of the PLA command. The main troublemaker in the region, according to Beijing, is the United States, which effectively ignores the “rules” it established for the safe passage of ships, vessels, and aircraft, constantly maintaining a military presence in the region where the greatest threat actually comes from US military forces. These actions are seen as an attempt to maintain hegemony in the face of “strategic retreat” and to push regional countries away from expanding cooperation with China by artificially creating an unsettled atmosphere and undermining multilateral confidence-building measures.The Chinese leadership's course of separating trade, economic, and investment cooperation from territorial disputes is generally understood by Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and Singapore, which claim parts of the Spratly Islands. However, it has also become a target for criticism from radical circles in these countries, clearly incited by Washington. As negotiations have shown, China and Southeast Asian countries are capable of independently developing mutually acceptable rules of action in the South China Sea, based on international law principles and taking into account each other's interests and concerns. The main idea is to establish direct dialogue in any disputed situation, maintain a constant consultation mechanism, preserve constructive negotiations, and adhere to the principle of peaceful resolution.ASEAN countries clearly do not want confrontation with Beijing, but they are in urgent need of a reliable system for peacefully managing any activities in the waters and on the continental shelf, which still needs to be developed together, ensuring guarantees of unhindered access for exploitation. Peace and cooperation in the South China Sea are inseparable, and collective responsibility for security will invariably contribute to the development of multidimensional ties, further increase trade volume, and lead to the emergence of the Sea of Cooperation on the world map.Reference1. Jiang, Chenglong. South China Sea disputes still ‘manageable’. China Daily. September 28-29, 2024. P. 2.

Defense & Security
Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall,Taipei City,Taiwan,October 10, 2021:Military parade on Taiwan National Day

Boys Do Not Dream of War: The Impacts of Extending Compulsory Military Service on Levels of Patriotism in Taiwan

by Shelby Tang

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском No mother wants to say goodbye to their child. However, with the looming threat of an attack from China, this fear threatens to become a reality for many Taiwanese mothers. There has been widespread speculation that People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping (習近平) has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be prepared to invade the island by 2027. Amid such predictions, Taiwan has completed numerous actions to increase its capabilities to resist a Chinese attack. Arguably, the island’s most notable single measure—and the most politically controversial—has been the extension of conscripted service for young men from four months to one year of training and military duty. [1]   Current Party Stances  When then-President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) announced the extension of conscripted service in December 2022, public opinion was divided regarding the presidential decision. In the January 2024 presidential election, the three contenders differed on their proposed policies for housing and economic issues, as well as relations with China, but all three—Lai Ching-te (賴清德) of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨), Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜) of the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨), and Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP, (台民黨)—supported expanding conscripted military service. According to Dr. Shen Ming-shih (沈明室), acting deputy chief executive of the Institute of National Defense and Security Research (INDSR, 國防安全研究院), a government funded think-tank in Taipei, the rare agreement reached by the three men reflects how the issue involves national security interests that transcend party politics.  In Taiwan, the conscription age is 18; however, deferments for higher education are very common. All males must serve in the military by age 36, when they can retire from the reserves. Conscription length has varied throughout administrations. It used to last between two and three years, until being shortened to one year in 2008. This was further cut to four months in 2012 under KMT President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who came to power in 2008 and followed a policy of pursuing warmer ties with China. In the years that followed, Taiwan’s conscripted service system has been widely criticized by commentators both inside Taiwan and abroad as ineffective in providing for Taiwan’s defense, leading the Tsai Administration to implement the one-year program.  Public Opinion and the Impacts of Conscription  Former conscripts have frequently expressed disappointment with their training and equipment. In a study conducted in September 2023, participants regarded military service as “useless” and a “waste of time.” Citing as evidence the lack of equipment and the long permitted periods of leisure time, past participants have complained about the military training camps. One participant who trained in the Taiwanese military between 2023 and 2024 stated that “I just sat under the AC with my phone, they [military personnel] didn’t train us with any specific weapons because they said to not waste bullets, so my friends and I just sat on a field most of the time.” The researchers similarly conducted an interview with Jack Huang, a 30 year old male who completed his four months of service over two semester breaks in university. According to this news report, Huang “felt [that] his shooting practice was outdated, like a holdover from the 1950s, and did not see how it would help him in modern warfare.”   These examples support what Dr. Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), a research fellow and director of INDSR has found: namely, that psychological defense and troop morale are the top concerns regarding Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. If troop morale and confidence are down, how is a sovereign island supposed to maintain its basic defense capacity against China?   Polling data and public sentiment reflect a mix of opinions regarding the conscription extension. According to a survey by the National Chengchi University (國立政治大學), 58 percent of Taiwanese citizens support the extension of conscription to one year, viewing it as a necessary measure for national defense. However, 35 percent oppose the extension, citing particular concerns about its impact on young mens’ educational and career prospects. This division in opinion is evident across different demographics, with younger generations expressing more resistance to the policy compared to older generations.  There is indeed research that points to a one year conscription policy as being an impediment to educational and job prospects. In 2015, The IZA Journal of Labor Economics published a study on the long-term effects of peace-time military conscription on educational attainment and earnings in the Netherlands. Researchers found that compulsory military service decreased the proportion of Dutch university graduates by 1.5 percentage points (from a baseline of 12.3 per cent). Furthermore, the study found that being a conscript diminished the likelihood of earning a university degree by about four percentage points. The impact of military service on wages is also detrimental and long-term. The research concluded that “approximately 18 years after military service, we still find a negative effect of 3 to 4 per cent.” This quantifies some of the negative economic impacts of prolonged military conscription.   Flexibility in Service and Better Compensation for Conscripted Soldiers  Amid public reservations about the new policy, Taiwan’s government has implemented measures aimed to provide benefits after conscription. These include considering service time when calculating future benefits, and providing “flexible” educational options to facilitate the move into the economy for all conscripts. The Taipei Times reported in June 2023 that the Ministry of Education (教育部) has implemented a “3+1” program in which conscripts can complete college in three years and military duty in one year, allowing them to graduate alongside those who do not have to serve. To do this, institutions must raise the limit on the amount of credits that draftee students may obtain each semester. They should also provide summer courses and allow drafted individuals to attend classes at other universities. However, some have criticized the program: for example, KMT members of the legislature have stated that it would jeopardize students’ educational rights, and that conscripts would be “burning the candle at both ends” by balancing studies and conscription.  Conscription programs have also traditionally been known for the very low levels of pay given to junior conscripts—another point that has made the service period unpopular. The return to one-year service is part of a package of conscription reforms that includes increased pay for conscripted soldiers, in which the monthly compensation for a private will increase from NTD $6,510 to NTD $26,307 (USD $203 to USD $850)—still not a huge sum, but a four-fold increase over the standard pay level of the past.  Personal Interviews with Taiwanese Americans Affected by the Conscription Policy   Another issue of concern regarding conscription may be identified in the current attitudes of future Taiwanese-Americans conscripts residing in Taiwan. To investigate the trend, the author conducted a limited study in Taiwan in May 2024, in which interviews were conducted with five teen participants who have to serve upon turning 18. [2] In the interviews, the participants were asked about their views towards the policy. For the first subject pool, four of the five teen participants (Teens 1, 3, 4, and 5) stated that period of the prolonged military service caused concerns regarding future career plans. This concern contributed to a decrease in national pride and connection to their Taiwanese identity. For example, when asked about his opinion regarding the conscription policy, Teen 3 stated in his interview, “Especially because the job market is so tight right now… Having to serve would make getting a job harder. I know I’m supposed to be mad at China, but I’m mad at Taiwan.”   This correlates to the fluctuation of public confidence in Taiwan’s military, according to data found by NCCU’s Election Study Center. In September of 2021, about 58 percent of respondents were confident or very confident in the military’s ability to defend Taiwan. However, confidence dropped to 54 percent in March 2022 and to 43 percent in March 2023—possibly due in part to negative news and cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare and negative news covers many areas: ranging from naval exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan and military aviation flights that steadily advance closer to Taiwan’s airspace, to bans of Taiwanese agricultural products, and the use of fringe political parties employed to spread pro-CCP (and anti-American) narratives.  Another theme commonly cited as a reason for their decreased level of patriotism was the effect of military service on plans for higher education. Three out of the five teen participants (Teens 1, 3, and 4) stated that the prolonged military service caused concerns regarding future education plans. This concern contributed to a decrease in national pride and connection to their Taiwanese identity. For example, when asked about his opinion regarding the conscription policy, Teen 1 stated in his interview, “I’m just trying to live my life and go off to college abroad and never have to think about this problem or Taiwan ever again.” The frustration expressed corresponds to a decrease in patriotic connection: as Teen 4 stated in his interview, “I don’t like it. It inconveniences me and my plans for college. Plus, Taiwan doesn’t have anything to offer to my education.”   In a second subject pool, four parent participants (Parents 2, 3, 4, and 5) stated that the prolonged military service for boys born after 2005 caused concerns regarding future career plans. Many parent participants believed that prolonged service duration would harm a child’s employment opportunities, and cause them to lose valuable work experience. For example, Parent 2 stated in their interview, “We have to think about what the youth needs. A one-year training with weapons they will never be able to use or use well in their entire life is useless and bad for job prospects. I am disappointed in Taiwan and perhaps even a bit ashamed of my country.”    Many parent participants believed that prolonged service duration would harm a child’s educational development and cause them to lose valuable academic learning. This connects to March 2023 research in the publication Voice Tank, which found that “respondents’ confidence had dropped, for the first time below 50 percent (to 43 percent), and the proportion of those not confident exceeded that of those confident. While such a drop could be attributed to various factors and may only be temporary, we think it may be a result of cognitive warfare and negative news coverage of the ROC armed forces.” [3] This links to Parent 4’s questioning of Taiwan, asking, “What is wrong with Taiwan? Don’t they understand our future generation needs to study abroad for a better chance?” Parent 4 believes that the government is directly hindering her son’s academic development and future by implementing the policy, a reason for her declining level of patriotism.  Conclusion  The prolonged military conscription for males born after 2005 has caused clashing public opinions—and a decline in patriotic sentiment for Taiwanese Americans currently residing in Taiwan, including future conscripts and their parents. The ruling DPP must consider the unforeseen impacts of its policy amid the looming Chinese threat. It becomes imperative for the ruling party to acknowledge that while conscription may appear on the surface to be cost-effective, simple budgetary accounting does not consider the potentially high opportunity cost that young people face when forced to serve, leading to long-term earnings losses and educational disruptions. These factors combine to reduce national income and economic growth. Additionally, for Taiwanese Americans and expatriates, conscription does little to foster unity; instead, it risks further weakening the relationship between overseas citizens and the state, whose voices still influence Taiwan’s future.  The main point: The prolonged military conscription for boys born after 2005 has caused public controversy and a decline in patriotism for Taiwanese Americans currently residing in Taiwan, including future conscripts and their parents. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party must consider the unforeseen impacts of its policy amid the looming Chinese threat.  References  [1] For previous discussions of the issues surrounding the extension of service to one year, see: John Dotson, “Taiwan’s ‘Military Force Restructuring Plan’ and the Extension of Conscripted Military Service,” Global Taiwan Brief, February 8, 2023, https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/02/taiwan-military-force-restructuring-plan-and-the-extension-of-conscripted-military-service/; and John Dotson, “Taiwan Initiates Its New One-Year Military Conscription Program,” Global Taiwan Brief, February 7, 2024, https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/02/taiwan-initiates-its-new-one-year-military-conscription-program/.  [2] The research was conducted for a duration of one year, under the supervision of Dr. Irish Farley. The study utilized a two-part, mixed methods approach that surveyed boys between of 14 and 17 living in Taiwan who are eligible for military conscription upon turning of age; followed by small group interviews with the teen participants, and parents of boys aged 14 through 17 living in Taiwan.  [3] For example, a report in Nihon Keizai Shimbun in February 2023 claimed that 90 percent of retired Taiwanese spies have worked with China. In early March, soldiers stationed in Kinmen defected to Xiamen, which led to the circulation of negative news about Taiwan’s military. See: Lee, Kuan-chen, Christina Chen, and Ying-Hsuan Chen. 2024. “Core Public Attitudes toward Defense and Security in Taiwan.” Taiwan Politics, January 2024, https://doi.org/10.58570/WRON8266. 

Defense & Security
Natuna, Indonesia - June 15, 2024. Indonesian Coast Guard ships regularly patrol Natuna waters, as a form of the government's responsibility to protect Indonesian waters.

The 'Fatal Waters' of the Strait of Malacca: The Challenges of Combating Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia

by Egor Sigauri-Gorsky

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The problem of piracy has cast a shadow over the maritime areas of Southeast Asia for many centuries. The waters of the Malacca and Singapore Straits, which hold tremendous economic significance for international trade, are particularly susceptible to pirate attacks. In the 2000s, ASEAN countries launched a comprehensive regional campaign to institutionalize measures for collective action against maritime piracy, and these measures proved to be effective. However, excessive concerns about intrusions into their sovereignty have led the Association's member states to "dilute" their efforts, resulting in a lack of true unity. This situation could result not only in losses for international trade but also in the loss of lives of ship crews.  Introduction to the History of Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia  Despite the long and dark history of the ugly and inhumane activities of the "hostis humani generis" [1], the romanticized image of pirates continues to captivate the public's imagination, thanks to numerous literary and cinematic works. In these portrayals, pirates appear as free-spirited men and women, living outside the reach of legal and state institutions, driven by daring adventures. However, it is not only European privateers, Somali groups, and the inhabitants of Morocco's "pirate" Republic of Salé who have left their grim mark on the history of maritime trade routes. For many centuries, pirates in Southeast Asia have attacked trading vessels passing through the Straits of Malacca. As early as the 13th century, the Chinese traveler Zhao Rukuo described how the powerful maritime kingdom of Srivijaya controlled regional waters [2], sending boats to attack ships that did not dock at its ports. Trading hubs in Malacca, Johor, and the Riau Archipelago flourished under the rule of Muslim sultanates, with the support of the Orang Laut community — “the sea people” — whose culture was inextricably linked to maritime activities [3]. It is no coincidence that in 1856, the Scotsman John Crawfurd, considered a leading British authority on Malay history and culture, noted that many Malay rulers viewed piracy as an "honest and regular source of their income" [4].  The Economic Significance of Maritime Waters in Southeast Asia  However, in the 21st century, maritime piracy remains one of the most pressing issues for Southeast Asian countries. According to data from the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center, from 1992 to 2006, Southeast Asia was the most "pirate-infested" region in the world. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the waters of the Malacca and Singapore Straits, which are most susceptible to pirate attacks, are crucial for trade in the Asia-Pacific region. These straits also serve as "superhighways" of global shipping, with over 120,000 vessels passing through them annually. In 2000, 39% of Japan's foreign trade (equivalent to $260 billion) and 27% of China's foreign trade ($65.6 billion) were conducted through Southeast Asia's maritime routes [5]. Annually, the Malacca Strait facilitates trade valued at $3.5 trillion, accounting for two-thirds of China's maritime trade and 40% of Japan's maritime trade.  Despite significant improvements in the security of Southeast Asia's maritime routes over the past 20 years, thanks to the joint efforts of ASEAN countries and their partners, as well as the development of the shipping industry, the threat of maritime piracy remains a pressing issue. In this context, it is crucial to examine the existing initiatives aimed at combating maritime piracy in the region.  Overview of Projects, Agreements, and Initiatives  In 1999, at the ASEAN+3 Ministers' Conference under the concept of "Maintaining Peace in the World Ocean" Japan proposed an initiative to establish a permanent regional naval force based on national contingents. However, the project did not receive the necessary support. Five years later, in 2004, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was signed, leading to the establishment of an Information Sharing Center to facilitate cooperation between stakeholders and coastal states in combating maritime piracy in Southeast Asia. These events marked the beginning of a new era of multilateral cooperation.  The activities of the Information Sharing Center (ISC) have been crucial in building operational links between member countries of the Agreement and coordination centers, enabling information exchange, incident reporting, and rapid response to threats. A key role in maintaining security in the region is played by the Trilateral Cooperative Agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, known as "INDOMALPHI" signed in 2017. Under this agreement, maritime security is ensured through coordinated surface patrols, combined aerial maritime patrols, and the operation of an Intelligence Exchange Group. These efforts collectively enhance regional capabilities to respond to piracy and strengthen the overall security of Southeast Asia's maritime routes.  Coordination efforts among Southeast Asian countries also take place through naval cooperation. For instance, the Singapore Navy works closely with Malaysian and Indonesian regional naval forces to combat maritime piracy through the Information Fusion Centre (IFC). The navies of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam also actively participate in multilateral exercises conducted annually by the United States Navy. A key objective of these exercises is to strengthen regional measures against the threats of maritime terrorism and piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, as well as in the South China Sea.  As a result of these efforts, the number of ship hijackings for ransom significantly decreased between 2007 and 2022. Representatives of Indonesia's Ministry of Defense noted that in the first six months of 2023, not a single incident of ship hijacking was recorded, whereas, in 2017, 99 cases of piracy and armed robbery at sea were reported in the patrol zone. Experts also highlight the potential benefits of Japan and India joining the "INDOMALPHI" initiative, which could further enhance regional security efforts against piracy.  Challenges to Regional Unity in Combating Maritime Piracy  Despite significant successes in consolidating the efforts of Southeast Asian countries in combating maritime piracy, there are still “gaps” in the “united front” of interested ASEAN countries that hinder individual and collective initiatives. Thus, Indonesia and Malaysia have not ratified the 2004 Agreement and are not de jure participants in the Information Exchange Centre, although they participate in some events under its auspices. The Centre itself receives information on cases of piracy and armed robbery at sea from the coordination centers of the participating countries, which inevitably entails a time lag that may prove critical in the event of a threat to a ship and its crew. It is noted that an appropriate clarification of the mechanism of its work would be the obligation of ships to send information directly to the Centre, which would immediately transmit it to the relevant operational units of the participating countries responsible for deploying patrol vessels on site.  The Downside of the "ASEAN Way"  The Russian researchers note that while ASEAN is discussing the possibility of creating a unified navy to combat piracy, the approaches of the "ten" countries to the problem differ [7]. It is the absence of full-scale consolidated institutions that significantly undermines the successes already achieved and may provoke an escalation of the problem after the "lull" of 2000-2022. ASEAN's traditional rigid orientation towards the rejection of any supranational institutions and concern about maintaining national sovereignty may play a "dirty joke" on the Association's states, since the existence of multiple regional initiatives duplicating each other's functions and goals, as well as the fact that the Information Exchange Center does not have a real operational status, slow down progress. Finally, it should be borne in mind that at stake in this case is not only the stability of international economic turnover along the maritime trade routes of Southeast Asia, but also the lives and safety of ship crews, fishermen and sailors, whose professions are already associated with risk.  References  1. "Enemies of the Human Race" - author's note.  2. See in particular: Berezin E.O. History of Thailand M. 1973. 320 pages. p. 35.   3. There are conflicting views regarding the true role of the Orang Laut in maritime piracy. While some researchers portray their culture as inherently linked to piracy in the conventional sense, others argue that the "sea people" were driven to piracy due to the actions of British colonial authorities who controlled the port of Singapore. See on this: Barnard T.P. Celates, Rayat-Laut, Pirates: The Orang Laut and Their Decline in History // Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Vol. 80. No. 2. 2007. P. 33-49.  4. Amirell S.E. Pirates of Empire. Colonisation and Maritime Violence in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. 2019. 266 pp. P. 37.  5. Frécon E. The Resurgence of Sea Piracy in Southeast Asia. Institut de recherche sur l’Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine. 2008. 131 pp. P. 72-73.  6. Paramonov O.G. "Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: A Regional Perspective." // International Analytics. No. 1-2 (27-28), 2019, pp. 74-81, p. 77.  7. Paramonov O.G. "Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: A Regional Perspective," p. 78. 

Defense & Security
Harris and Trump presidential election 2024. Word cloud showing their political key issues.

The Armageddon Agenda: Kamala Harris, Donald Trump, and the Race to Oblivion

by Michael T. Klare

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The next president of the US will face various challenges that divide the nation, including a nuclear defense policy. The next president of the United States, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will face many contentious domestic issues that have long divided this country, including abortion rights, immigration, racial discord, and economic inequality. In the foreign policy realm, she or he will face vexing decisions over Ukraine, Israel/Gaza, and China/Taiwan. But one issue that few of us are even thinking about could pose a far greater quandary for the next president and even deeper peril for the rest of us: nuclear weapons policy. Consider this: For the past three decades, we’ve been living through a period in which the risk of nuclear war has been far lower than at any time since the Nuclear Age began — so low, in fact, that the danger of such a holocaust has been largely invisible to most people. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the signing of agreements that substantially reduced the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles eliminated the most extreme risk of thermonuclear conflict, allowing us to push thoughts of nuclear Armageddon aside (and focus on other worries). But those quiescent days should now be considered over. Relations among the major powers have deteriorated in recent years and progress on disarmament has stalled. The United States and Russia are, in fact, upgrading their nuclear arsenals with new and more powerful weapons, while China — previously an outlier in the nuclear threat equation — has begun a major expansion of its own arsenal. The altered nuclear equation is also evident in the renewed talk of possible nuclear weapons use by leaders of the major nuclear-armed powers. Such public discussion largely ceased after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when it became evident that any thermonuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would result in their mutual annihilation. However, that fear has diminished in recent years and we’re again hearing talk of nuclear weapons use. Since ordering the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened to employ nuclear munitions in response to unspecified future actions of the U.S. and NATO in support of Ukrainian forces. Citing those threats, along with China’s growing military might, US Congress has authorized a program to develop more “lower-yield” nuclear munitions supposedly meant (however madly) to provide a president with further “options” in the event of a future regional conflict with Russia or China. Thanks to those events and related developments, the world is now closer to an actual nuclear conflagration than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And while popular anxiety about a nuclear exchange may have diminished, keep in mind that the explosive power of existing arsenals has not. Imagine this, for instance: even a “limited” nuclear war — involving the use of just a dozen or so of the hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possessed by China, Russia, and the United States — would cause enough planetary destruction to ensure civilization’s collapse and the death of billions of people. And consider all of that as just the backdrop against which the next president will undoubtedly face fateful decisions regarding the production and possible use of such weaponry, whether in the bilateral nuclear relationship between the U.S. and Russia or the trilateral one that incorporates China. The U.S.-Russia Nuclear Equation  The first nuclear quandary facing the next president has an actual timeline. In approximately 500 days, on February 5th, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear accord between the U.S. and Russia limiting the size of their arsenals, will expire. That treaty, signed in 2010, limits each side to a maximum of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads along with 700 delivery systems, whether ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or nuclear-capable heavy bombers. (That treaty only covers strategic warheads, or those intended for attacks on each other’s homeland; it does not include the potentially devastating stockpiles of “tactical” nuclear munitions possessed by the two countries that are intended for use in regional conflicts.) At present, the treaty is on life support. On February 21st, 2023, Vladimir Putin ominously announced that Russia had “suspended” its formal participation in New START, although claiming it would continue to abide by its warhead and delivery limits as long as the U.S. did so. The Biden administration then agreed that it, too, would continue to abide by the treaty limits. It has also signaled to Moscow that it’s willing to discuss the terms of a replacement treaty for New START when that agreement expires in 2026. The Russians have, however, declined to engage in such conversations as long as the U.S. continues its military support for Ukraine. Accordingly, among the first major decisions the next president has to make in January 2025 will be what stance to take regarding the future status of New START (or its replacement). With the treaty’s extinction barely more than a year away, little time will remain for careful deliberation as a new administration chooses among several potentially fateful and contentious possibilities. Its first option, of course, would be to preserve the status quo, agreeing that the U.S. will abide by that treaty’s numerical limits as long as Russia does, even in the absence of a treaty obliging it to do so. Count on one thing, though: such a decision would almost certainly be challenged and tested by nuclear hawks in both Washington and Moscow. Of course, President Harris or Trump could decide to launch a diplomatic drive to persuade Moscow to agree to a new version of New START, a distinctly demanding undertaking, given the time remaining. Ideally, such an agreement would entail further reductions in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals or at least include caps on the number of tactical weapons on each side. And remember, even if such an agreement were indeed to be reached, it would also require Senate approval and undoubtedly encounter fierce resistance from the hawkish members of that body. Despite such obstacles, this probably represents the best possible outcome imaginable. The worst — and yet most likely — would be a decision to abandon the New START limits and begin adding yet more weapons to the American nuclear arsenal, reversing a bipartisan arms control policy that goes back to the administration of President Richard Nixon. Sadly, there are too many members of Congress who favor just such a shift and are already proposing measures to initiate it. In June, for example, in its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2025, the Senate Armed Services Committee instructed the Department of Defense to begin devising plans for an increase in the number of deployed ICBMs from 400 of the existing Minuteman-IIIs to 450 of its replacement, the future Sentinel ICBM. The House Armed Services Committee version of that measure does not contain that provision but includes separate plans for ICBM force expansion. (The consolidated text of the bill has yet to be finalized.) Should the U.S. and/or Russia abandon the New START limits and begin adding to its atomic arsenal after February 5th, 2026, a new nuclear arms race would almost certainly be ignited, with no foreseeable limits. No matter which side announced such a move first, the other would undoubtedly feel compelled to follow suit and so, for the first time since the Nixon era, both nuclear powers would be expanding rather than reducing their deployed nuclear forces — only increasing, of course, the potential for mutual annihilation. And if Cold War history is any guide, such an arms-building contest would result in increased suspicion and hostility, adding a greater danger of nuclear escalation to any crisis that might arise between them. The Three-Way Arms Race  Scary as that might prove, a two-way nuclear arms race isn’t the greatest peril we face. After all, should Moscow and Washington prove unable to agree on a successor to New START and begin expanding their arsenals, any trilateral nuclear agreement including China that might slow that country’s present nuclear buildup becomes essentially unimaginable. Ever since it acquired nuclear weapons in 1964, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued a minimalist stance when it came to deploying such weaponry, insisting that it would never initiate a nuclear conflict but would only use nuclear weapons in a second-strike retaliatory fashion following a nuclear attack on the PRC. In accordance with that policy, China long maintained a relatively small arsenal, only 200 or so nuclear warheads and a small fleet of ICBMs and SLBMs. In the past few years, however, China has launched a significant nuclear build-up, adding another 300 warheads and producing more missiles and missile-launching silos — all while insisting its no-first-use policy remains unchanged and that it is only maintaining a retaliatory force to deter potential aggression by other nuclear-armed states. Some Western analysts believe that Xi Jinping, China’s nationalistic and authoritarian leader, considers a larger arsenal necessary to boost his country’s status in a highly competitive, multipolar world. Others argue that China fears improvements in U.S. defensive capabilities, especially the installation of anti-ballistic missile systems, that could endanger its relatively small retaliatory force and so rob it of a deterrent to any future American first strike. Given the Chinese construction of several hundred new missile silos, Pentagon analysts contend that the country plans to deploy as many as 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035 — roughly equivalent to deployed Russian and American stockpiles under the New START guidelines. At present, there is no way to confirm such predictions, which are based on extrapolations from the recent growth of the Chinese arsenal from perhaps 200 to 500 warheads. Nonetheless, many Washington officials, especially in the Republican Party, have begun to argue that, given such a buildup, the New START limits must be abandoned in 2026 and yet more weapons added to the deployed U.S. nuclear stockpile to counter both Russia and China. As Franklin Miller of the Washington-based Scowcroft Group and a former director of nuclear targeting in the office of the secretary of defense put it, “Deterring China and Russia simultaneously [requires] an increased level of U.S. strategic warheads.” Miller was one of 12 members of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, a bipartisan group convened in 2022 to reconsider America’s nuclear policies in light of China’s growing arsenal, Putin’s nuclear threats, and other developments. In its final October 2023 report, that commission recommended numerous alterations and additions to the American arsenal, including installing multiple warheads (instead of single ones) on the Sentinel missiles being built to replace the Minuteman ICBM and increasing the number of B-21 nuclear bombers and Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines to be produced under the Pentagon’s $1.5 trillion nuclear “modernization” program. The Biden administration has yet to endorse the recommendations in that report. It has, however, signaled that it’s considering the steps a future administration might take to address an expanded Chinese arsenal. In March, the White House approved a new version of a top-secret document, the Nuclear Employment Guidance, which for the first time reportedly focused as much on countering China as Russia. According to the few public comments made by administration officials about that document, it, too, sets out contingency plans for increasing the number of deployed strategic weapons in the years ahead if Russia breaks out of the current New START limits and no arms restraints have been negotiated with China. “We have begun exploring options to increase future launcher capacity or additional deployed warheads on the land, sea, and air legs [of the nuclear delivery “triad” of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers] that could offer national leadership increased flexibility, if desired, and executed,” said acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy Vipin Narang on August 1st. While none of those options are likely to be implemented in President Biden’s remaining months, the next administration will be confronted with distinctly ominous decisions about the future composition of that already monstrous nuclear arsenal. Whether it is kept as is or expanded, the one option you won’t hear much about in Washington is finding ways to reduce it. And count on one thing: even a decision simply to preserve the status quo in the context of today’s increasingly antagonistic international environment poses an increased risk of nuclear conflict. Any decision to expand it, along with comparable moves by Russia and China, will undoubtedly create an even greater risk of instability and potentially suicidal nuclear escalation. The Need for Citizen Advocacy  For many of us, nuclear weapons policy seems like a difficult issue that should be left to the experts. This wasn’t always so. During the Cold War years, nuclear war seemed like an ever-present possibility and millions of Americans familiarized themselves with nuclear issues, participating in ban-the-bomb protests or the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign of the 1980s. But with the Cold War’s end and a diminished sense of nuclear doom, most of us turned to other issues and concerns. Yet the nuclear danger is growing rapidly and so decisions regarding the U.S. arsenal could have life-or-death repercussions on a global scale. And one thing should be made clear: adding more weapons to the U.S. arsenal will not make us one bit safer. Given the invulnerability of this country’s missile-bearing nuclear submarines and the multitude of other weapons in our nuclear arsenal, no foreign leader could conceivably mount a first strike on this country and not expect catastrophic retaliation, which in turn would devastate the planet. Acquiring more nuclear weapons would not alter any of this in the slightest. All it could possibly do is add to international tensions and increase the risk of global annihilation. As Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan research and advocacy outfit, put it recently: “Significant increases in the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal would undermine mutual and global security by making the existing balance of nuclear terror more unpredictable and would set into motion a counterproductive, costly action-reaction cycle of nuclear competition.” A decision to pursue such a reckless path could occur just months from now. In early 2025, the next president, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will be making critical decisions regarding the future of the New START Treaty and the composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Given the vital stakes involved, such decisions should not be left to the president and a small coterie of her or his close advisers. Rather, it should be the concern of every citizen, ensuring vigorous debate on alternative options, including steps aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating the world’s nuclear arsenals. Without such public advocacy, we face the very real danger that, for the first time since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons will again be detonated on this planet, with billions of us finding ourselves in almost unimaginable peril. The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

Defense & Security
American nuclear button concept. USA missile launches from its underground silo launch facility, 3D rendering

Revision of US Nuclear Operational Guidelines

by Kim Tae-Woo

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Kim Tae-woo, former head of the Institute for Unification Studies Today, I would like to tell you that the US nuclear strategy is changing . As President Biden’s term draws to a close, the US is changing its nuclear weapons operational guidelines. President Biden , like President Obama, originally argued for a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons. That is why, when he took office as president in 2020, he advocated for sole purpose nuclear use and no first use (NFU). ‘Sole purpose nuclear use’ means that the US will only use nuclear weapons when it is directly attacked by nuclear weapons, and NFU is an abbreviation for ‘No First Use’, which means that it will not use nuclear weapons before its adversary. When a president changes, the US publishes a strategy document called the ‘Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)’, which declares its nuclear strategy and nuclear operational policies to the outside world. Allies were concerned that if President Biden included such content in the NPR, they would distrust the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. Perhaps conscious of these concerns, the 2022 NPR did not include such content, but President Biden’s nuclear philosophy was reflected throughout the strategy book. As a result, the United States decided to stop developing submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and retire the B83-1 (1.2 mt) missile, an aircraft-delivered nuclear weapon. The Biden administration has changed. In March, it ordered the US military to create nuclear operational guidelines to prepare for a situation in which China, Russia, and North Korea cooperate to launch a nuclear attack on the US, and approved the newly created guidelines. At the same time, it also ordered the development of necessary new weapons and the modernization of the nuclear operational system. In June, the director of the White House National Security Council (NSC)’s nonproliferation office also said, “If the nuclear threat from China, Russia, and North Korea increases, the US will also increase its deployed nuclear weapons,” and hinted at the possibility that “nuclear weapons can be used in conventional warfare.” This is a reversal of President Biden’s policy of giving up preemptive nuclear use. In this way, President Biden is adopting new nuclear operational guidelines and nuclear doctrine while changing his previous position with less than a year left in his term. The reason for this change in the US nuclear doctrine is that he is taking the nuclear arms buildup of China, Russia, and North Korea very seriously in the new Cold War situation, and the strategic focus on the North Korean nuclear issue is changing from ‘North Korea’s nuclear abandonment’ to ‘prevention of nuclear use.’ Although the sensitive parts of the newly created nuclear weapons operational guidelines have not been made public, it is known that they contain explicit concerns about China’s nuclear arms buildup. The guidelines are based on the US Department of Defense’s estimate that China’s nuclear weapons will increase to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, and are intended to prepare for the possibility that China could threaten the US by cooperating with Russia and North Korea on nuclear weapons. The same goes for North Korea. In March, the US, through the NSC and experts, mentioned the need for “interim steps” that are a step back from the goal of “denuclearization,” and said, “We are willing to talk to North Korea unconditionally for negotiations.” The terms “denuclearization of North Korea” and “CVID,” or “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,” disappeared from the platforms of the US Democratic and Republican parties announced ahead of the November presidential election. North Korea may say that “the US has recognized our possession of nuclear weapons,” but that is a misinterpretation. It does not mean accepting, or tolerating, North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but rather recognizing, and is trying to lower the nuclear threat through dialogue, recognizing that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons immediately, but responding strongly if North Korea refuses. As such, the nuclear issue is now reaching a dead end. As the military closeness and nuclear cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea intensifies, it is ultimately triggering a response from the US. Naturally, South Korea cannot just keep watching. In Korea, civic groups are currently conducting a campaign to collect 10 million signatures calling for nuclear armament, but it is unclear how much this movement will change national policy in the future. If this trend continues, there may be countermoves in Japan and Taiwan as well. It is difficult to understand why North Korea should really increase its nuclear weapons and strengthen its military power with drones and artillery, even though food shortages are starting again, the youth are opposing the one-party dictatorship, and the elite are increasingly defecting to seek freedom. “Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org.”

Defense & Security
japan,australia,usa and india friendship against china.Quad plus countries flags Quad plus countries flags over china flag.Quad plus countries. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Trump II and US Nuclear Assurances in the Indo-Pacific

by Liviu Horovitz , Elisabeth Suh

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.

Defense & Security
Disputed Claims In The South China Sea.

Africa’s delicate diplomacy in the South China Sea dispute

by Samir Bhattacharya

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The ongoing skirmishes in the South China Sea between China and regional states represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting Africa. As China grows increasingly aggressive in its race for global hegemony and influence, and the United States (US) slowly plunges into the battle to prevent China’s rise, the world is watching the unfolding of this rivalry with unease. Although a few places have felt intense pressure from this alarming competition, the South China Sea (SCS) region is where a violent showdown looks increasingly probable. Unlike the war in Ukraine or Gaza, the US and China may start a direct war in the SCS. And amidst this multifaceted new Cold War 2.0, Africa remains cautious. The South China tinderbox On 23 April, another skirmish took place between China and the Philippines when two Filipino patrol boats approached the shallow turquoise waters of a disputed shoal around 194 km west of the Philippine Islands province of Palawan. The patrol boats were there for an underwater survey near the disputed shoal claimed by both China and the Philippines, thus prompting a Chinese response. A Chinese coast guard, via radio, instructed them to leave the area and threatened hostile measures. Following several radio exchanges, the Chinese coast guard damaged both the Philippine patrol boats by firing high-pressure water cannons at them. However, this was not the first time China’s assertion in this region has caused friction with other SCS neighbours, including Japan and South Korea. China has used an unconvincing U-shaped “nine-dash line” that crosses the exclusive economic zones, or EEZs, of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam to demonstrate its claim in the region. Despite their low intrinsic value, the region lies along a vital trade and supply corridor that supports over US$3 trillion in yearly shipborne commerce. Oil, gas, and fishing sources abound in the area. Beijing has declined to acknowledge a 2016 decision from the Permanent Court of Arbitration that ruled Beijing’s broad claims invalid based on historical grounds. China and the Philippines have already fought many times over the Second Thomas Shoal and the Bashi Channel. China has become increasingly aggressive in the region in the last few years, putting regional stability at high risk. So far, these skirmishes will likely remain regional without the risk of any full-scale war. However, there are risks of casualties or even the vessel capsizing. Making of Cold War 2.0 over the SCS Washington’s response to the upcoming crisis is still modest. US President Biden raised concerns about China’s actions in the SCS , including efforts to impede the Philippines from resupplying its forces on the fiercely disputed Second Thomas Shoal. The US has repeatedly warned China that it’s obligated to defend the Philippines, its oldest treaty ally in Asia, if Filipino forces, ships or aircraft come under an armed attack. The US also conducted Balikatan drills (‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ in Tagalog) with the Philippines with more than 16,000 American and Philippines military personnel. Indeed, its resources are thinly stretched, and Beijing seems to be moving ahead. To deter China by stepping up regional defence diplomacy, Washington is exploring the possibility of a security alliance with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, tentatively called SQUAD. This is in addition to two other existing groupings in the region, “Quad” and “AUKUS,” a defence pact among Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. While AUKUS is a defence pact, Quad is simply a dialogue platform. Africa’s tricky balancing act Even while the socioeconomic repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war have not yet wholly subsided in Africa, the ongoing skirmishes in the SCS represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting several African nations. Despite being geographically far, the conflict’s spillover effect would impact the continent’s food security in terms of both the availability and pricing of some food crops. In addition, the SCS region represents a crucial geographic sweet spot for Africa as a source of trade and investment, translating into growth and development for many African economies. The crisis can potentially fuel price rise, particularly for oil-importing countries. The prospect of a consequential price rise of essential commodities will have enormous ramifications for domestic stability in most African countries. Furthermore, many African economies heavily rely on trade, investment, and aid from South and Southeast Asia, the crisis will significantly hamper the development and growth of the continent. There are also strategic lessons for Africa to learn from the conflict. China’s principal interest in Africa consists of protecting its BRI investments and ensuring steady trade flow. Africa is also essential for China to fulfil its resource needs, maintaining industrial growth and energy security. Therefore, securing stability in countries where China has invested is in China’s interest, just like keeping a stable relationship with China is in the interest of those investment-starved countries. Further, since many investment projects in China are located in different African countries, these countries should be careful. China can become aggressively irredentist, even in Africa. Currently, China owns a naval base in Djibouti and a ballistic missile tracker Yuan Wang 5, off the coast of Durban. It has strong economic influence across the countries of Africa’s east coast thanks to its Belt Road Initiative (BRI). On the West Coast, China has many seaports financed or constructed by Chinese entities. If the national governments of these countries fail to pay, China would happily take control of these ports through lease as it did in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. In addition to Sri Lanka, other South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar also faced dire consequences due to the failure of their BRI debt payment, leading to economic crises, and sometimes even political crises. Therefore, caution would be expected from these African governments. Conclusion China’s increasingly aggressive posture over the SCS raises concerns about the stability of the region. As the current uneasy détente between the US and China bears remarkable similarities to the Cold War, questions are raised regarding the possibilities of a new Cold War 2.0. Questions are also raised concerning the possible reactions from different African countries vis-á-vis Chinese aggression in the region. Undoubtedly, any serious conflict between China and the Philippines would be dangerous. These frequent skirmishes may not lead to a direct war between the US and China. Yet, the risk of vessel capsizing and casualties is high. Any such event would ultimately spark a crisis in Africa. So far, Africa is cautious and continues to balance its great power relationships. Undoubtedly, it is increasingly concerned with the aggressive posture of the Chinese in the region. On the other hand, it needs China for economic purposes. Therefore, Africa will continue to walk the tightrope where it would want US involvement in de-escalating the situation without ruffling any feathers with China. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).