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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Although the gesture from Spain, Ireland, and Norway has been welcomed by Palestinian authorities, the past week has highlighted the Zionist determination to obliterate any possibility of a genuine Palestinian state. Pedro Sánchez announced early this morning what has been awaited since it was announced almost a week ago: the recognition of the Palestinian State, which, in the words of the Prime Minister, "must be a viable state, with the West Bank and Gaza connected by a corridor, with East Jerusalem as its capital, unified under the Government of the Palestinian National Authority," he stated. The president also sought to appease Zionist opposition and dispel accusations of supporting Hamas: "This is a decision that is not against anyone, least of all against Israel, a friendly people whom we respect and appreciate, and with whom we want to have the best possible relationship. This decision reflects our outright rejection of Hamas." The announcement of the recognition of the State of Palestine will be made, as the president communicated in the press conference, after it is approved today by the Council of Ministers. Meanwhile, the coalition government partner, ‘Sumar’, has welcomed this step, reminding that other actions are still necessary. "Arms embargo, suspension of diplomatic relations, supporting ICJ measures, and supporting the South African denunciation," have been enumerated in its X account. Today, May 28, 2024, was the date that Spain, Norway, and Ireland had marked on the agenda to take this diplomatic step in support of the Palestinian people. Ireland, for its part, will proceed with the recognition of the State of Palestine following a parliamentary debate to be held during the day. The decision taken by these three European countries, made public last Wednesday, May 22nd, joins them with the 144 countries that already recognized the State of Palestine within its 1967 borders, following the commitment to the coexistence of two sovereign states that can peacefully coexist, a principle underlying the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993, and which, however, three decades later, seem unrealistic given Israeli policies of colonization of the West Bank, isolation of Gaza, and appropriation of East Jerusalem, the territories that should compose an already disjointed Palestinian state. The Spanish recognition of Palestine as a state — a recurring commitment made by the PSOE that has taken time to materialize — coordinated with Ireland and Norway, implies that European countries, traditional allies of Israel, are joining what the Global South and colonized peoples had largely done decades ago. In Europe, Sweden took that step in 2014, many years after several countries in Eastern Europe recognized the Palestinian state in 1988, before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The former Czechoslovakia is a striking case; while the Czech Republic considers this recognition no longer valid, Slovakia reaffirms the decision made in the 1980s. Currently, Belgium, Malta, and Slovenia are other European states that have expressed their intention to recognize the Palestinian state, without specifying a specific date. For Israel, it is important that this trend does not spread. Zionist Foreign Minister, Israel Khan, wasted no time in attacking the Spanish government (again) on social media for its decision, accusing the prime minister of being complicit in "inciting the murder of the Jewish people and war crimes." The decision of the heads of government of Ireland, Norway, and Spain came after the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution for the recognition of the Palestinian State, calling on the Security Council to accept Palestine as a full member after the US veto. The gesture of these three European countries has been welcomed by the Palestinian authorities, it responds to a historical demand, and contributes to put pressure on those countries that claim to advocate for the two-state solution but have not yet recognized Palestine as such. But beyond its symbolic value, for now, it doesn't seem likely to change the reality of the Palestinian people in Gaza, the West Bank, or East Jerusalem. In fact, Israel has punished Palestinians precisely after the decision of the three European countries: for example, by prohibiting the Spanish consulate in Jerusalem from assisting Palestinian individuals. On the other hand, the fact that most states recognize a Palestinian state has not translated into anything resembling its materialization: many of these states are also important allies of Israel, as emphasized by Sánchez himself this morning, recalling their closeness to the Zionist state. However, Israel, with its foreign minister at the forefront, has not ceased its attacks on Spain, Ireland, and Norway in the last week: in addition to recalling their ambassadors for consultations in the European states, there has been a constant response on social media, with videos accusing the three states of collaborating with Hamas. Meanwhile, violence against Gaza and the West Bank has intensified. Last Sunday, Israel attacked refugee camps in Rafah, leaving around fifty Palestinians dead and causing global outrage at the images of people burned alive, including children. It seems that in response to the symbolic gesture of recognizing Palestine, Israel continues with its plan to make a real Palestinian state impossible. In yesterday’s report (May 27th), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) pointed out that one million people have been forced to flee again, following Israel's ground invasion of Rafah on May 6th. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Health in Gaza has already reported over 36,000 deaths and more than 80,000 injuries, which, along with the missing persons, would account for 5% of the Strip's population. The United Nations has warned that it will take at least 80 years to rebuild Gaza. The fact that Israel is ravaging Palestine doesn't seem to concern the opposition as much as the worsening of bilateral relations with the Zionist state. While the leader of the opposition, Alberto Núñez Feijóo, stated yesterday that the government's decision "empowers" Hamas, Isabel Díaz Ayuso echoed a similar sentiment, saying, "They are calling for the extermination of Israel and are justifying what Hamas terrorism intends against that state. The offenses from the Government are continuous (...) The State [of Israel] will not respond with flowers," said the president of the Community of Madrid yesterday after the publication of a video released by Israel in which, with flamenco music in the background, it was reiterated that Hamas appreciates Spain's decision. But the recognition of the Palestinian state is not the only open front against the Zionist state: following the ICJ's order to halt the offensive against Gaza, the EU convened a meeting with Israel for the first time yesterday, and mentioned a tool that the EU has had from the beginning, the review of the preferential agreement between Brussels and the Zionist state. Meanwhile, civil society expands its mobilizations; yesterday, demonstrations condemning the bombings in Rafah took place worldwide, overflowing in cities like Paris. Meanwhile, the momentum continues from the encampments, which, as seen in yesterday's action at the Polytechnic University of Madrid, are bringing to light all the ties with Israel, achieving concrete victories, and exposing the extent of the economic interests and networks of influence that Israel has deployed in the university sphere. The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском An opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), published on 20/3/2024, revealed that only 12% of Palestinians were satisfied with Egypt’s stance during Operation al-Aqsa Flood. The survey results suggest that Egypt’s handling of the situation has weakened its role in the Palestine issue and negatively impacted its image, status and regional role. Determinants of the Egyptian Official Position The Egyptian stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was shaped by various determinants and influencing factors, foremost among them: 1. The desire to uphold Egypt’s pivotal role in the Palestine issue was driven by its significance in bolstering Egypt’s regional standing and fostering ties with the US. Throughout recent decades, Egypt has aimed to monopolize influence in Palestinian affairs, thwarting the rise of Arab or regional competitors. This ambition extends particularly to managing mediation efforts between Palestinian resistance and Israel, as well as facilitating Palestinian reconciliation. 2. The Camp David Accords have yielded significant benefits, fostering advanced political, economic and security relations with Israel. These ties have notably strengthened during the tenure of Egyptian President ‘Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 3. The security concern revolves around the potential escalation of sympathetic popular movements for Palestinian resistance, in Egypt and the wider Arab region. There’s apprehension about reigniting the Arab Spring and revitalizing the Arab street, fueled by the profound inspiration from Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the belief in altering the status quo by countering the Zionist project. This sentiment is further compounded by escalating anger over Israeli atrocities in Gaza Strip (GS) and a growing discontent with Arab regimes, either due to perceived neglect of their duty towards Palestine or internal governance failures. 4. Concerns about the significant political and security impact of a potential large-scale displacement of Palestinians from GS to Egyptian territory, which could drag Egypt into conflict with Israel, jeopardize the Camp David Accords, and disrupt the stability of Egyptian-Israeli relations. 5. Ideological reservations within the Egyptian government regarding the Islamic orientation of the Palestinian resistance, particularly amid strained relations with the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (MB) movement and broader skepticism towards Islamic movements in the region. There’s a perception that Egyptian and many Arab officials are hesitant about the victory of the Palestinian resistance in Operation al-Aqsa Flood, fearing potential destabilizing effects on Egypt’s internal dynamics and the broader Islamic movement presence in the region. 6. The Egyptian official stance in the Palestinian landscape is characterized by strong alignment with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its political objectives. Egypt maintains cautious and unfavorable relations with Hamas, showing reservations towards its resistance efforts and its inclination to maintain an independent stance and political autonomy in managing relations with Egypt and other Arab and regional entities. 7. The Egyptian economy has been grappling with a deteriorating economic crisis, marked by the sharp depreciation of the Egyptian pound against the US dollar. This situation prompted urgent foreign intervention to stabilize the economy. Notably, on 23/2/2023, Egypt signed a $35 billion deal with the UAE for the Ras al-Hekma development project. Further assistance came from the European Union, which announced a substantial financial support package for Egypt worth €7.4 billion for 20242027, including $2 billion in emergency funding slated for disbursement in 2024. 8. The geopolitical determinant lies in Egypt’s control over the Rafah crossing, the sole land access point for GS to the outside world. This control has served as a potent pressure tool on both Gaza’s resistance factions and its populace, contributing to the tightening of the GS siege since 2007. During Operation al-Aqsa Flood, this control exacerbated accusations against Egypt, alleging complicity in the siege, exacerbating suffering and scarcity, while Israeli aggression targets the GS population and resistance. Facets of Egypt’s Official Position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood By observing Egypt’s actions in handling Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the following facets emerge: 1. Politically, Egypt adhered to the resolutions set forth in the joint Arab and Islamic summit held in Riyadh on 11/11/2023, advocating for an end to Israeli aggression against GS and the facilitation of aid entry, although without specified follow-up mechanisms for implementation. 2. Egypt enforced the closure of the Rafah crossing and aligned with Israel’s stance opposing aid flow to GS, despite the crossing being under Egyptian-Palestinian jurisdiction, and the Israeli side has no authority over it. This marked a direct challenge to Egyptian sovereignty, as practical control over the crossing shifted to Israel, granting it sole authority over individual movement and aid entry. Egypt is increasingly apprehensive about the US decision to establish a seaport for Gaza aid, fearing it may diminish Egypt’s influence and control over aid entry via the Rafah crossing. 3. Egyptian authorities pressured Palestinian resistance movements to concede on prisoner exchange deals with Israel, pushing for exclusive Egyptian mediation while attempting to sideline competing mediation efforts, especially the Qatari mediation. Despite Egypt’s desire to monopolize the mediation, Qatar successfully entered the fray, becoming a favored mediator by the United States. 4. Egypt has actively opposed Israeli plans to displace GS residents to Egyptian territory, reinforcing security measures at the Rafah crossing. Diaa Rashwan, the chairperson of the Egyptian State Information Service stated, on 16/2/2024, that such displacement constitutes “a direct threat to Egyptian sovereignty and national security.” 5. During the initial days, Egyptian authorities permitted certain popular events condemning the Israeli war on GS. However, they subsequently enforced stringent measures to curb public protests sympathetic to the Palestinians, leading to a noticeable silence on the Egyptian streets. This repression contrasts with past instances where the Egyptian public reacted to lesser events in Palestinian affairs. Conclusion Operation al-Aqsa Flood’s political and field developments have cast a negative impact on Egypt’s role in the Palestine issue and its regional standing. Accusations have surfaced regarding Egypt’s cooperation with Israel in tightening the GS siege. There’s little indication of a significant shift in Egypt’s stance or political strategies regarding the ongoing war. Politically, Egypt is likely to maintain its adherence to the established official Arab and Islamic stance, over which it holds significant influence in shaping. It’s anticipated that Egypt will persist with its current policies regarding the closure of the Rafah crossing and tying aid entry to Israeli approval. Regarding its engagement with Palestinian resistance groups, particularly with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Egyptian authorities are expected to maintain a cautious and conservative stance. There’s little anticipation for a positive shift in Egypt’s position regarding permitting pro-resistance public events or condemning Israeli aggression against GS.

Jordan’s official stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood faced challenges in maintaining a balanced position, despite strong and unprecedented engagement from the Jordanian public. The initial official stance, which seemed relatively strong and clear, diminished later, revealing contradictions between political declarations and practical measures on the ground. This has raised questions about the factors influencing Jordan’s position on the confrontation. First: Determinants of the Official Stance The official Jordanian stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was shaped by various factors: 1. Concerns regarding national security intensified due to the hostile attitudes of extreme right-wing Zionist groups towards Jordan, along with fears of forced displacement in the West Bank (WB) amidst the arming of tens of thousands of settlers and their persistent efforts to compel Palestinians to relocate to Jordan. Furthermore, concerns emerged regarding security threats to the kingdom’s northern and eastern borders amidst increased attempts to breach them due to escalation in Gaza Strip (GS). On 28/1/2024, a drone attack targeted US forces stationed near the Syrian border in Jordan, killing three soldiers and wounding about 35 others. 2. Geographic and demographic factors, coupled with strong public engagement with Operation al-Aqsa Flood, persistently fueled Jordanian protests against Israeli aggression and in support of resistance since October 7th. The protests have spanned the entire geographical and societal spectrum in Jordan. 3. The provisions of the Wadi Araba Treaty between Jordan and Israel, including political, economic restrictions, and normalization commitments between the parties. 4. The strategic relationship between Jordan and the US, which fully sided with Israel and provided it with political, military and financial cover to continue its aggression on GS. 5. Jordan’s tepid ties with Hamas suffered a setback after Operation al-Aqsa Flood, which coincided with a noticeable decline in relations, prompted by the arrest of several Hamas members for attempting to smuggle weapons into WB. 6. Jordan’s political stance within the Arab and international sphere, which opposes Hamas and “political Islam” movements. 7. Jordan’s political choices in the Palestinian arena, which support the political settlement, negotiations and the two-state solution, the efforts to de-escalate and impose calm in WB, enhancing the PA status within the Palestinian society, and preventing its collapse or decline in favor of other parties. 8. The official side voiced concerns about the impact of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on Jordanian public sentiment and electoral trends, fearing its exploitation by the Islamic movement during the critical upcoming parliamentary elections later this year (2024). Second: The Various Facets of the Jordanian Position On the political front, Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi was the first to indicate in the early days of the confrontation that “Hamas is an idea, and the idea does not end.” He emphasized that discussing a post-Gaza phase is a leap in the air, clarifying that Hamas did not create the conflict but rather the conflict created Hamas. Jordan was quick to describe Israeli military operations in GS as aggression and heinous war crimes, with positions issued by the King, Queen, Crown Prince and Jordanian Prime Minister condemning the aggression, calling for its cessation, and declaring solidarity with the Palestinian people. On the practical front, Jordan canceled the Quad Summit scheduled in Amman with the US President on 18/10/2023, in protest against the Israeli massacre at the Baptist Hospital in GS. Jordan also froze the energy-for-water agreement with Israel. On 1/11/2023, Jordan recalled its ambassador from Israel and conducted multiple air drops to support its field hospital in GS, while establishing a second field hospital in Khan Younis. Yet, the Jordanian public deemed these official actions insufficient, demanding the cancellation of the Wadi Araba treaty and the gas agreement with Israel, along with halting the water-for-electricity deal, closing foreign military bases in Jordan, supporting Palestinian resistance and engaging with its factions. The Jordanian official stance during Operation al-Aqsa Flood can be summarized as follows: 1. Condemnation of Israeli aggression on GS and urging an end to war crimes. 2. Implementation of measures falling short of public demands, amidst strong interaction by the Jordanian public during the confrontation. 3. Permitting limited popular activities, restricting access to borders with the occupied Palestinian territories, opposing open sit-ins and arresting activists participating in some events. 4. Allowing Jordanian territory for Gulf-to-Israel truck transit, within the context of a land bridge inaugurated to bypass Houthi restrictions in the Bab al-Mandab Strait for ships bound to Israel. Conclusion Jordan’s official response to Operation al-Aqsa Flood reveals significant confusion in aligning its regional and international stance, political choices and commitments with addressing the demands of the Jordanian public. Jordan’s participation in the land bridge for goods transit to Israel has damaged its credibility and provoked public outrage. This revelation coincided with Israel’s intensified blockade on GS, coupled with increased measures to prevent the entry of humanitarian aid, as part of the Israeli policy to starve the population and incite popular resentment against the resistance. Given recent practical behavior and relative retreat in stance and rhetoric, ongoing confusion in Jordan’s official position is expected in the coming period, with increased engagement in Arab and international arrangements regarding Gaza’s post-war future. Regarding relations with Palestinian factions, Jordan’s official side is expected to maintain its preference for engaging solely with the Palestinian Authority, aiming to bolster its position in the Palestinian arena, without showing openness to resistance movements in the foreseeable future.

Israel has emerged as one of the world’s leading jailers of journalists, according to a newly released census compiled by the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists. Each year, the committee releases a snapshot of the number of journalists behind bars as of December 1 2023 was the second highest on record with 320 in detention around the world. In a small way, that is encouraging news. The figure is down from a high of 363 the previous year. But a troublingly large number remain locked up, undermining press freedom and often, human rights. China takes out unenviable top spot At the top of the list sits China with 44 in detention, followed by Myanmar (43), Belarus (28), Russia (22), and Vietnam (19). Israel and Iran share sixth place with 17 each. While the dip in numbers is positive, the statistics expose a few troubling trends. As well as a straight count, the Committee to Protect Journalists examines the charges the journalists are facing. The advocacy group found that globally, almost two-thirds are behind bars on what they broadly describe as “anti-state charges” – things such as espionage, terrorism, false news and so on. In other words, governments have come to regard journalism as some sort of existential threat that has to be dealt with using national security legislation. In some cases, that may be justified. It is impossible to independently assess the legitimacy of each case, but it does point to the way governments increasingly regard information and the media as a part of the battlefield. That places journalists in the dangerous position of sometimes being unwitting combatants in often brutally violent struggles. China’s top spot is hardly surprising. It has been there – or close to it – for some years. Censorship makes it extremely difficult to make an accurate assessment of the numbers behind bars, but since the crackdown on pro-democracy activists in 2021, journalists from Hong Kong have, for the first time, found themselves locked up. And almost half of China’s total are Uyghurs from Xinjiang, where Beijing has been accused of human rights abuses in its ongoing repression of the region’s mostly Muslim ethnic minorities. The rest of the top four are also familiar, but the two biggest movements are unexpected. Iran had been the 2022 gold medallist with 62 journalists imprisoned. In the latest census, it dropped to sixth place with just 17. And Israel, which previously had only one behind bars, has climbed to share that place. That is positive news for Iranian journalists, but awkward for Israel, which repeatedly argues it is the only democracy in the Middle East and the only one that respects media freedom. It also routinely points to Iran for its long-running assault on critics of the regime. The journalists Israel had detained were all from the occupied West Bank, all Palestinian, and all arrested after Hamas’s horrific attacks from Gaza on October 7. But we know very little about why they were detained. The journalists’ relatives told the committee that most are under what Israel describes as “administrative detention”. 17 arrests in Israel in less than 2 months The benign term “administrative detention” in fact means the journalists have been incarcerated indefinitely, without trial or charge. It is possible that they were somehow planning attacks or involved with extremism (Israel uses administrative detention to stop people they accuse of planning to commit a future offence) but the evidence used to justify the detention is not disclosed. We don’t even know why they were arrested. Israel’s place near the top of the Committee to Protect Journalists’ list exposes a difficult paradox. Media freedom is an intrinsic part of a free democracy. A vibrant, awkward and sometimes snarly media is a proven way to keep public debate alive and the political system healthy. It is often uncomfortable, but you can’t have a strong democratic system without journalists freely and vigorously fulfilling their watchdog role. In fact, a good way to tell if a democracy is sliding is the extent of a government’s crackdown on the media. This is not to suggest equivalence between Israel and Iran. Israel remains a democracy, and Israeli media is often savagely critical of its government in ways that would be unthinkable in Tehran. But if Israel wants to restore confidence in its commitment to democratic norms, at the very least it will need to be transparent about the reasons for arresting 17 journalists in less than two months, and the evidence against them. And if there is no evidence they pose a genuine threat to Israeli security, they must be released immediately.

Three months after the horrendous events of October 7, the death toll in Gaza continues to mount daily. The humanitarian crisis has been called “unprecedented” and will have lasting effects for generations to come. Moreover, every day the crisis continues, the region faces the potential of multiple conflicts that, unless managed effectively and immediately, threatens to broaden the scope of the calamity beyond what has been seen so far. The escalation is already visible in the Red Sea, with several attacks on international shipping lines putting 12% of the world’s commerce that traverses the Bab El-Mandab strait at risk. These attacks increase the possibility of further regional reactions and instability. While efforts such as the recently announced US-led maritime task force Operation Prosperity Guardian are welcome steps to prevent further incidents from occurring, the issue of maritime security around the world’s chokepoints must be addressed collectively by the international community. Only such combined efforts will send the right message to the concerned states, and to the Houthis in Yemen and other violent non-state actors and prevent more attacks. The rising tensions in the Red Sea are a clear indication of how volatile the security environment in the entire Middle East remains and how quickly developments can escalate. Given the current state of affairs, any incident can further unravel the delicate situation in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, or Libya, to name the most immediate cases. Once the pressure valve explodes, it will be incredibly difficult to reverse the consequences. All the above undermines the efforts by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over the past years to de- escalate regional tensions and put relationships on a more cooperative footing. This includes rapprochement with Iraq and Türkiye and pushing for Syria to rejoin the Arab League. Regarding Iran and Yemen, Saudi Arabia has recently reiterated its commitment to peaceful regional relations, including welcoming the UN envoy’s statement on the Yemen Peace Roadmap as well as reiterating its commitment to the Beijing Agreement with Iran. What is therefore required, now more urgently than ever, is a clear meeting of the minds of Washington and Riyadh when it comes to preventing further tragedies. The United States remains the most consequential actor when it comes to the medium to long-term security landscape in the wider Middle East. Yet, its policies over the past decades have been unbalanced, haphazard, and uncommitted and have threatened the long-term stability of the region. Moreover, the US has not listened to the advice of its Gulf allies throughout this period. This must change, or the gap in perception between the two sides will continue to widen. The more pressing issue is the need for a straightforward and clear commitment by the US to end the conflict in Gaza. The US is the only external actor with a measure of influence over Israel, but it has yet to use that influence effectively in ending the hostilities and promoting a more comprehensive and just political solution for the Palestinian issue. Instead of focusing on an Israel- only approach, what this involves is a genuine engagement with all its regional allies to defuse the situation and prevent further escalation. This can best be done if there is adequate and wide-ranging engagement with the Arab world, including with the GCC states. So far, Washington has not uttered the word ‘ceasefire’ even once. This stands in contrast to most of the rest of the international community, including an increasing number of European countries and many Latin American countries, that demand an end to military operations as far as the current violence on the Palestinian-Israeli front is concerned. Any change in rhetoric heard from Washington so far has been inconsequential. This includes the most recent announcement from Israel of a tactical shift in fighting, a step that President Biden had pushed for. The region now expects the US to demonstrate a real and substantive commitment to pursuing a ceasefire as every day this conflict remains, the threat of extremism and a widening regional conflict also increases. The time for shuttle diplomacy for the sake of conducting visits has clearly passed. Additionally, there needs to be a clear commitment to the two-state solution with reference to the Arab Peace Initiative. At the 2023 Munich Security Conference, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken explained about the Ukraine crisis that “there is no neutral position when it comes to a war of aggression...there is no balance.” However, these same principles are not being applied by the US when it comes to Gaza and the wider Middle East. The US refused to listen to the advice of the GCC states twenty years ago in Iraq; Unless it quickly begins to shift its course, it risks making those same mistakes again. Saudi Arabia, as well as most of other Arab states, see no wisdom in the current US regional policy and cannot support an unwise policy. It's not defiance to the US, but a rejection of a short sighted, non- fruitful policy.

Israel and Morocco mark three years this week since renewing their relations, but the war between Israel and Hamas leaves no room for celebration. For the time being, bilateral cooperation on the governmental level is limited and low profile, focusing mainly on security matters. Despite high expectations from the numerous visits by Israeli ministers and officials to Morocco, these visits have not led to substantial cooperation beyond statements and memoranda of understanding. The lack of focus and the inability to materialize the dozens of signed agreements is evident these days, emphasizing what has not yet been implemented. For instance, an agreement for employing Moroccan migrant workers in Israel has not yet been signed, despite the statement made by the former interior minister Ayelet Shaked in July 2022. Nor has the economic infrastructure to enable business between the countries been completed, namely agreements on customs, double taxation avoidance, promotion and protection of investments, and other systems to enhance the attractiveness and competitiveness of the trade channel between Morocco and Israel. Moroccan decision makers, for their part, appear to regard the ongoing war with Hamas, and no less so the current Israeli government, as detrimental to the resumption of relations between the countries to its positive course. Statements by senior Israeli officials calling for the destruction of Gaza, while vehemently opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state, echo in the Moroccan media, damage Israel’s image, and mainly serve opposition parties who wish to harm the special relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, Morocco’s official position regarding relations with Israel as a strategic interest remains intact. This was evidenced by the results of the extraordinary Arab Islamic Conference held in Riyadh in November, in which Morocco – alongside other key Arab and Muslim countries – was reluctant to embrace actual decisions or actions against their relations with Israel. Morocco’s decision to keep its ambassador in Tel Aviv – despite the Israeli mission staff being evacuated from Rabat – is a significant statement in itself. In the economic field, businesses more or less continue as usual. Israeli companies come to Morocco or meet their partners in third-country destinations such as France and Spain. This discreet arrangement seems convenient for everyone.Tourism has almost completely stopped between the countriesTourism is the most affected sector, with direct flights between Tel Aviv and Rabat still on hold, and a travel warning in effect with a rating of three out of four, advising Israelis to avoid non-essential travel to Morocco. As a result, Israeli and international Jewish tourism to Morocco has almost entirely stopped. This situation is exacting a price from Israeli tourism agencies and Moroccan hotels and service providers. While tourism is a key to people-to-people connections, most civil and cultural partnerships are currently on hold and in a “waiting” situation until the end of the war. Despite the challenges, some joint initiatives can be preserved, finding creative ways to sustain them, such as transferring them from a bilateral framework to a multi-sided one under an American, European, Emirati, or other umbrella, or conducting activities online whenever possible. One of the main challenges in the civil context is the sentiment among Israelis of Moroccan descent regarding Morocco. It ranges from disappointment to astonishment and a lack of understanding in light of images of mass protests from Rabat and other cities in Morocco and even antisemitic incidents that do not receive official condemnation. Here, it should be noted that Israeli frustration is partly due to cultural and behavioral differences between Israel and Morocco, despite their close cultural connection. According to the Moroccan perspective, including that of decision-makers, it is preferable to avoid conflicts, make explicit statements, and deal with matters quietly behind the scenes. In their view, the secrecy of action is a key to success, preserving internal stability and advancing a wishful agenda. That’s because, according to their understanding, one cannot resist what one does not see or know, so ultimately, maintaining quiet preserves the status quo as if nothing has been done. In Morocco, non-action is considered, in practice, equivalent to any action, and perhaps even the most proper and challenging action to execute. Three years after the resumption of official ties, and in the shadow of the Gaza war challenges, the crisis also provides a new opportunity for regional and bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Morocco’s relatively neutral position may in fact enable it to play an important role in the aftermath of the war as part of a broader coalition dedicated to rehabilitation and reconstruction processes. It could help in the reconstruction and in implementing local and regional programs to deal with and prevent extremism and violence. Morocco could assist in the training of Palestinian public employees deployed in Gaza. Morocco could also host forums, meetings, and conferences to support and promote a sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The good relations that Morocco maintains with both sides – Israeli and Palestinian – and the religious authority of King Mohammed VI, including his role as the chairman of the Al-Quds Committee in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, are just some of the assets Morocco can bring to this complex task. The connection with Morocco is a significant asset for Israel in times of peace and war alike. It is important that we learn and derive insights from the past three years towards the new chapter in relations that will unfold once the war is over.

Vladimir Putin held talks with President of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi. The agenda included the current state of multifaceted Russia-UAE cooperation and prospects for the further expansion of ties, as well as topical international issues with a focus on the situation in the Middle East. Before the consultations began, an official welcoming ceremony for the Russian President was hosted by the President of the UAE at the Qasr Al Watan Palace. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov, Deputy Prime Minister – Minister of Industry and Trade, Russian co-chair of the Russian-Emirati Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation Denis Manturov, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office – Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov, presidential aides Igor Levitin, Maxim Oreshkin and Yury Ushakov, Russia’s Ambassador to the UAE Timur Zabirov, as well as Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, Central Bank Governor, heads of the Roscosmos State Corporation, Russian Direct Investment Fund, Rosatom State Corporation, Rosoboronexport, VEB.RF State Development Corporation, and other officials took part in the talks on Russia’s side. * * * Beginning of Russia-UAE talks President of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (retranslated): Welcome, my dear friend Vladimir Putin, to the United Arab Emirates. I am glad to see you again. Let me begin by emphasising the historical nature of relations between the Russian Federation and the UAE. Over the past years, we have witnessed a substantial push to develop these relations in various spheres for the mutual benefit of our nations and people. I would like to express my great appreciation for your personal and effective contribution to strengthening our bilateral relations. In this context, I would like to say that the UAE is Russia’s biggest trade partner in the Middle East and in the Gulf Region. Let me note that the UAE is a major investor in the Russian economy. Investment in the non-oil sector increased by 103 percent over the past year. I would like to specifically mention that this is an unprecedented breakthrough which demonstrates the special nature of relations between our countries. I will be glad to continue working together on strengthening bilateral cooperation in various spheres. Of course, promoting development in energy, infrastructure, and high technologies, as well as elsewhere has special priority. In addition to this, I would like to mention that the United Arab Emirates and the Russian Federation have been working together and cooperating within various international frameworks. For example, we work together within BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where the Emirates were granted dialogue partner status in May 2023. We are also developing and promoting the strategic dialogue between the Russian Federation and the Gulf Cooperation Council. This helps us reinforce our relations and expand them in various spheres, promoting a proactive exchange of views on key international and regional matters, as well as on key items on our bilateral agenda. Once again, Mr President, welcome to the United Arab Emirates. I wish progress and prosperity to the Russian Federation and its people. President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Your Highness, friends, First of all, I would like to thank you for inviting us and for this colourful and friendly welcome. The other day, the United Arab Emirates celebrated the 52nd anniversary of its founding. I want to congratulate you on this and I want to recall that the Soviet Union was among the first to recognise this independent, self-reliant, and sovereign state. Today, our relations – thanks to the position you have taken – have reached unprecedented heights. You and I are in constant contact, and our colleagues work together on a permanent basis. In fact, the United Arab Emirates is Russia’s main trade partner in the Arab world. Last year, trade grew by 67.7 percent. This year, I think, the figures will be even higher. The same goes for investment activity. There is also progress in industrial cooperation, by which I mean cooperation to build certain industrial facilities in the United Arab Emirates and in the Russian Federation. A number of major oil and gas projects are being implemented. We also cooperate through OPEC Plus. We certainly attach due importance to humanitarian ties. Tourist exchanges are making headway: last year, almost one million tourists from Russia – a little over 900,000 – visited the UAE. A Russian school has been opened, and we are grateful to you for ordering land set aside to build a Russian Orthodox church. We also cooperate internationally. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, the United Arab Emirates makes a huge contribution to stabilising the situation in the world. We will certainly discuss with you the situation in the main hot spots, primarily, of course, the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I will certainly inform you of the developments in the context of the Ukraine crisis. I am quite pleased that the United Arab Emirates is beginning to work within the BRICS system. In 2024, Russia will chair this organisation. We will continue contacts on this. We look forward to meeting you at the [BRICS] summit in Kazan in October 2024. The UAE is currently hosting one of the world’s most important environmental forums. The first results of the effort to implement the Paris Agreement are being summed up. As expected, you are holding this event at the highest level, and very many people in the world, even those who do not identify themselves with environmental movements, are certainly grateful to you for this work. A Russian delegation is also involved in this work at the highest level. We wish you success. I have no doubt that it will be so. Shukran! <…>

A meeting between Vladimir Putin and Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud took place in the Saudi King’s al-Yamamah Palace. At the Conclusion of the Visit of Vladimir Putin to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a Joint Statement has been adopted. Beginning of Russian-Saudi talks Crown Prince, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (retranslated):We can find many topics and subjects of common interest, on which we are working together to promote stability and development around the world, including in the Middle East. Over the past seven years, we have achieved a lot in our bilateral relations, for example, in the energy sector, investment and agriculture. In addition, our political cooperation and interactions have had a positive influence on several Middle Eastern issues and helped enhance security. Moreover, our future political ties and cooperation will, no doubt, have a positive bearing on the international environment. We have broad and far-reaching opportunities ahead of us, and by seizing them we can work together for the benefit of our nations and the entire world. I would like to reiterate, Mr President, that you are a cherished guest here in Saudi Arabia. We welcome you on behalf of its government and its people. Welcome! President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Thank you. Your Highness, first, I would like to thank you for the invitation. We expected to see you in Moscow. I know that the circumstances have affected these plans. But, as I said, nothing can prevent the development of our friendly relations. Indeed, being in this region on a scheduled visit to the United Arab Emirates, I used your invitation to come and see you and all our friends that we have been vigorously developing our interaction with over the past seven years. That said, the next meeting will hopefully take place in Moscow. Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (retranslated): Of course, we are ready. Vladimir Putin: Agreed. Indeed, the Soviet Union was among the first to recognise the independent state of Saudi Arabia. This was almost a hundred years ago. Our relations have developed in different ways during this time. Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud: I would like to note that it was the development of independence rather than the independence of a state that was recognised at that time. Vladimir Putin: In any event, we respected the will of the subjects of Saudi Arabia to build their future independently. Much has happened in our relations during this time, but over the past seven years, they have certainly reached a truly unprecedented level. This was achieved owing to the wise policy of your father, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King of Saudi Arabia with your direct participation. We have stable, very good ties in political interaction, the economy and in humanitarian area. And, of course, it is now very important for all of us to exchange information and views on what is taking place in the region. No doubt, our meeting is timely. Thank you very much for your invitation, once again. Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud: Welcome! <…>

Although the visit to Saudi Arabia was brief, President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. said that it was a successful and productive one with various engagements accomplished to reaffirm the Philippines’ commitment to the partnership between the GCC and ASEAN countries, as well as to promote the country to prospect investors. In his arrival speech on Saturday following his visit to Riyadh, the President ticked off his accomplishments, mentioning the business-to-business agreements that would guarantee additional employment for Filipino workers. President Marcos described the ASEAN-GCC Summit held in Riyadh as a landmark event, adding that it was the first time that ASEAN and GCC Member States gathered together to discuss regional and international issues and on future cooperation. The six GCC member countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates while Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam compose the ASEAN. “The Summit provided an opportunity to project the Philippines’ long-standing promotion of a rules-based international order, which is essential to the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in our regions which sit astride two of the most vibrant sea-lanes of trade and communications in the world,” President Marcos said. The President said that the Summit also provided an opportunity for the Philippines to secure a US$120-million Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that would establish a 500-person capacity training facility in the country to upskill Filipino workers in the construction industry. “The facility aims to train at least 3,000 Filipinos a year and more than 15,000 in the next 5 years, ready for deployment at any time,” President Marcos said. Another three business-to-business agreements were also discussed among Saudi and Philippine human resource companies “for the training and employment of Filipinos across a wide range of industries including healthcare; hotel, restaurant, and catering; and maintenance and operations, amongst other operations.” “These agreements are expected to generate more than USD 4.2 billion and additional 220,000 jobs for Filipinos over the next few years,” he said. President Marcos also reported resolving the outstanding bilateral issue with Kuwait at the sidelines of the Summit, including working out the lifting of the deployment ban of Filipino workers. “Now, that will end and we will now return to the normal state of affairs with the Kuwaiti government,” he said. The President said he also had the opportunity to meet with the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, and he referred to their discussion as “very encouraging,” with anticipated capital investments pledged by the government of Saudi Arabia to the Philippines. “We exchanged views on issues of common concern to our two countries, and I expressed hope that we can sustain the momentum of high-level exchanges as we expand cooperation in key areas of mutual benefit to our peoples,” President Marcos said. In his arrival speech, President Marcos reiterated his commitment to continue to advance the country’s interest and at the same time, expand the Philippines’ partnership with ally nations. “Let me assure you that we will continue to advance our national interests as we further expand our partnerships abroad,” Marcos said. In his speech during the Summit, President Marcos emphasized further cooperation in key areas including energy and food security and enhancement of logistic chains. He also called for safeguarding of rights and welfare of Filipino workers. President Marcos arrived at the Villamor Air Base in Pasay City at 2:50 p.m. Saturday. PND

Vladimir Putin took part in an extraordinary BRICS summit on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, held via videoconference. The extraordinary BRICS summit on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (held via videoconference) was attended by President of Russia Vladimir Putin, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil Luiz Lula da Silva, President of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping, President of the Republic of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa, and Minister of External Affairs of the Republic of India Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. The states invited to join the association were represented at the summit by President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Ebrahim Raisi, Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, President of the United Arab Emirates Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of the Argentine Republic Santiago Andres Cafiero. * * * Speech by the President of Russia President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Ramaphosa, colleagues, friends, We think the initiative of the President of South Africa, as the current chair of BRICS, to convene an extraordinary summit to discuss the escalation in the Gaza Strip, has come at the right time. The thousands of deaths and mass expulsion of civilians, the humanitarian disaster unfolding in the area are causing deep concern. Just now, one of our colleagues spoke of the deaths of a large number of children. It is terrible, but when you watch children being operated on without anaesthesia, it certainly evokes intense feelings. And all of that is, in fact, happening as a consequence of the United States’ aspiration to monopolise the mediation role in the Palestinian-Israeli settlement process and block the activities of the Middle East Quartet of international mediators. This is history’s way of demonstrating that attempts to single-handedly cut the “Palestinian knot” are unviable and counterproductive. Because of the sabotage of UN decisions, which clearly called for the establishment and peaceful coexistence of two independent and sovereign states – Israel and Palestine – more than one generation of Palestinians has grown up in an atmosphere of injustice, and Israelis cannot fully guarantee the security of their state either. Russia's stance is consistent and independent of momentary conditions. We urge the international community to join efforts aimed at de-escalating the situation, negotiating a ceasefire, and achieving a political solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The BRICS states and the countries in the region could play a key role in this work. For this reason, it is particularly significant that our colleagues from Middle Eastern countries, which received invitations to become full members of the BRICS this year, are joining our meeting today. I would like to take this opportunity to respectfully acknowledge their efforts to normalise the situation. In particular, I am referring to the Peace Summit hosted by Egypt and the joint Arab-Islamic extraordinary summit in Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting that all BRICS countries have similar positions on the need to collectively reach long-term and durable settlement of the long-standing Palestinian-Israeli problem. This was reflected during voting on the draft resolution on a humanitarian truce in the UN General Assembly and in discussing a UN Security Council resolution on the Middle East settlement process, which was adopted for the first time in the past seven years. Although this resolution contains merely an appeal for humanitarian pauses rather than a full ceasefire, we consider the very fact of its approval a step in the right direction. I would like to emphasise that such humanitarian pauses and, better still, a full ceasefire is essential to continue the efforts to free hostages and evacuate civilians and foreigners from the Gaza Strip. I must express again my deep gratitude to President [of Egypt Abdel Fattah] el-Sisi, and all our Egyptian colleagues for their help in resolving many challenging issues linked with receiving and sending home the Russian citizens that had left the conflict area. Of course, by all accounts, the most urgent goal is to reach a truly long-term and sustainable truce. I agree with my Brazilian colleague that it is important that other states not get drawn into a war in the Middle East and that the conflict not spread in any way, as is preserving the fragile peace between religions. In this context, we consider it extremely useful to continue discussing subsequent developments in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in BRICS. If there are no objections, colleagues, we will initiate possible contacts, including via videoconference, concerning these issues during Russia’s upcoming BRICS presidency next year. In general, the new format of emergency online summit meetings suggested by President [of South Africa Cyril] Ramaphosa appears to be quite promising. Importantly, this applies not only to the Middle East settlement but to other urgent global and regional issues. Thank you for your attention. The views and opinions expressed in this article solely belong to the author and do not represent the perspectives or stance of World and New World Journal, nor do they reflect the opinions of any of our employees. World and New World Journal does not endorse or take responsibility for the content, opinions, or information presented in this article. Readers are encouraged to consider multiple sources and viewpoints for a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. Thank you for your understanding.