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The War in Yemen and the Rift Between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi Amid the dramatic developments in the Yemeni civil war around the turn of the year, the regional power configuration between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been fundamentally reshaped. The military offensive by Emirati-supported separatists and the counterstrike by the Yemeni government allied with Saudi Arabia are more than just another chapter in the war — they have caused the long-simmering tensions between the two Gulf monarchies to boil over. For the first time, the deep-rooted animosity between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has come to the surface. This confrontation also makes a new round of conflicts in the Gulf more likely and raises fundamental questions about stability in the Middle East, a region where the Gulf states were once seen as guarantors of security. A new phase of Gulf politics could be emerging, with two opposing poles within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) pursuing divergent regional visions through different coalitions. The break in the former Saudi-UAE alliance will also have consequences for European foreign policy in the Middle East, which has historically relied on both protagonists as anchors of stability. The Lightning Offensive in Eastern Yemen’s Hadramaut The rapid offensive in Yemen’s eastern province of Hadramaut came as a shock to Saudi Arabia and to the Yemeni government closely aligned with the Kingdom. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) – Yemeni separatists backed by the UAE – seized not only the oil-rich Hadramaut but also other regions in eastern Yemen within a few days. In the transitional capital Aden, the militia took over the presidential palace of the internationally recognized government – which the STC formally belongs to, but from which it has always sought to separate in pursuit of an independent state on the territory of the former South Yemen (until 1990). When the Yemeni government’s president, temporarily based in Aden, fled to Saudi Arabia, the STC’s dream of an independent state seemed within reach. Shortly afterward, the STC’s campaign dissolved like a mirage. The military advance had not only shifted the dynamics of Yemen’s twelve-year civil war but also threatened to alter the balance between regional power Saudi Arabia and its Emirati neighbor, both of which have been external actors in Yemen for over a decade. After years of restraint in the Yemeni conflict, the kingdom took a surprising stance against the STC: Saudi fighter jets first bombed a weapons shipment from the Emirati city of Fujairah at the STC-controlled port of Mukalla. Then the Yemeni government, with Saudi air support, launched a counteroffensive that led to the dissolution of the STC, the flight of its leader Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, and the withdrawal of Emirati troops from Yemen. These dramatic events over the turn of the year mark not just a new twist in Yemen’s convoluted civil war but also reveal deeper rifts between two key Gulf states, whose engagement – from Sudan to Gaza, Syria to Somalia – remains a major driver of regional stability (or instability). Less than five years ago, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an alliance of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their four neighboring monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula, was paralyzed by a dispute with the Emirate of Qatar. Is the Gulf now heading toward another conflict between fraternal states? Between Threat and Ambition, Control and Power Although Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened together in 2015 against the Houthi militia in the Yemeni civil war, the two Gulf powers had different and sometimes opposing priorities from the start. These differences repeatedly caused tensions and were often only mitigated through careful diplomatic maneuvering. Saudi Arabia views the war as a geostrategic threat on its doorstep. The kingdom shares a 1,300-kilometer porous land border with its southern neighbor. Access from Saudi ports on the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean passes through a narrow maritime bottleneck, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, just off the Yemeni coast. Even before the Houthis took Sanaa in 2014, they—part of Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”—had launched attacks on Saudi territory. In light of these multiple threats on its southern flank, Saudi Arabia responded not only with military intervention but also with direct control over the Yemeni government—illustrated by the fact that from 2016 to 2022, former President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi carried out most of his duties from Riyadh rather than Aden. Although Abu Dhabi also perceived the Houthi threat, the UAE was less directly affected by Yemeni instability due to the geographic distance. This allowed the Emirates to focus on their strategic ambitions, especially controlling key ports and territories along the Gulf of Aden, the southern Red Sea, and the Socotra archipelago. To secure these zones of influence along international trade routes, the UAE relied on non-state actors of all kinds rather than the Yemeni government. These proxies, such as the STC founded in 2017 with Emirati support, not only fought the Houthis but also pursued their own specific interests. Deeply rooted internal Yemeni affairs thus intertwined with the UAE’s strategic actions. In addition, the UAE—the most powerful counterweight to extremism and political Islam in the region—prioritized fighting Yemen’s branch of Al-Qaeda and marginalizing the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islah party, which was part of the Hadi government. Up to 2021, the STC’s main achievements were driving Islah out of Socotra and the southern provinces of Abyan and Shabwa. This gap between control and fear, ambition and power, continued to widen, forcing Saudi Arabia to make repeated diplomatic concessions to its Emirati partner. Riyadh mediated power-sharing agreements with the STC in 2019 and 2022, which even led to President Hadi’s resignation. Nevertheless, Saudi-Emirati differences escalated further, reaching a climax in late 2025 in Hadramaut. This oil-rich province in southeastern Yemen, with a 700-kilometer border with Saudi Arabia and serving as a strategic rear base, had long been divided between inland areas controlled by a Riyadh-backed coalition and coastal zones with the strategic port of Mukalla dominated by UAE-aligned forces. When a Riyadh-supported tribal coalition took control of the province’s largest oil field at the end of November, the STC struck back, first seizing the provincial town of Seiyun in the interior and, a few days later, the neighboring Al-Mahra region bordering Oman. Primacy of the State against Separatist Ambitions What might appear to be a new chapter in the civil war in Yemen is actually a facet of a complex regional game, marked by competing power claims and divergent political visions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Not only in Yemen but beyond the borders of this southernmost state of the Arabian Peninsula, the foreign policies of the two Gulf powers are no longer complementary but often directly contradictory. The Kingdom acts in a conservative, cautious manner focused on the state. According to Riyadh, only the existence of a strong central state, with uncontested sovereignty over its territory, can guarantee stability. This approach is applied without compromise, particularly in its immediate neighborhood. Saudi Arabia thus supports not only the Yemeni government but also state structures in Syria, Lebanon, or Egypt, providing aid, equipment, and guidance. Riyadh also tolerates repressive or fragile regimes, as evidenced by its support for the Somali government in Mogadishu or General Abdulfattah Al-Burhan in Sudan. Furthermore, after years of ultimately unsuccessful confrontations with regional rivals such as Iran or Qatar in the late 2010s, Saudi Arabia is now trying to avoid getting involved in the conflicts and entanglements of its neighbors’ wars as much as possible. From ending the Qatar crisis in 2021 to the ceasefire with the Houthi militia in 2022 and the restoration of diplomatic relations with Tehran in 2023, Riyadh has sought de-escalation with its rivals and a disengagement from regional conflicts — in order to stabilize its neighborhood and secure the degree of regional calm it requires for the ambitious economic reform agenda to which the Kingdom has committed itself through 2030. The UAE’s regional strategy, on the other hand, seems to be the direct counter-model to Saudi centrism and de-escalation. From Mukalla to Berbera, and up to Benghazi, the UAE has created a "string of pearls" consisting of ports and zones of influence, relying on a network of non-state armed actors in contexts of weak states along the coasts of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Behind this "string of pearls" lie lucrative economic interests, such as access to gold mines in Sudan or Chad, as well as fertile land and strategic African markets. These areas also offer the UAE strategic depth and a pool of troops that can be deployed as mercenaries in other regional conflicts. Whereas the Emirati and Saudi approaches previously complemented each other, for example during the ousting of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt in 2013, the intervention in Yemen in 2015, the Qatar blockade in 2017, or even in Sudan until 2021, Abu Dhabi’s opportunism now disrupts Riyadh’s state-centric approach. The UAE continues to arm the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), engaged since 2023 against General Al-Burhan, supported by Saudi Arabia in the Sudanese civil war, while the extension of Emirati influence in Somalia has fueled separatism in Somaliland. In both cases, Emirati action weakens the central state and destabilizes the immediate neighborhood of the Kingdom, as is currently happening in Yemen. A guiding principle of the Emirati regional strategy is often the fight against political Islam, a struggle that, if necessary, is also waged with the help of non-state armed actors such as the RSF. The Kingdom, too, takes a critical view of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist actors. However, the Saudi doctrine of a strong state relies on established regimes even when they include Islamist forces, as Riyadh’s support for Burhan in Sudan and for the Islah party in Yemen demonstrates. As a result, there is now little overlap left between what were once largely aligned regional approaches of the Gulf’s key powers, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Role of Israel as an Accelerating Factor Israel’s actions in the region, and the Gulf states’ handling of them, have also played a significant role in accelerating the shift in political relations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Prior to the brutal Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, Saudi Arabia had been close to normalizing relations with Israel. In the two years since, however, the trajectory has reversed. Israel’s war in Gaza and its broader regional operations — especially its attack on Qatar in September 2025 — have contributed to a reversion in Riyadh to its traditional position vis-à-vis Israel and to a growing perception within the Kingdom that the current Israeli government is substantially destabilizing the region. In contrast, the UAE upheld its normalized relationship with Israel established under the January 2020 Abraham Accords. While Abu Dhabi has repeatedly condemned Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip and shares the wider Gulf concern about the destabilizing impact of Israel’s regional military reach, its relatively even-handed approach toward Israel, its clear departure from the positions of other Gulf states on numerous disputes within the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and the targeted expansion of economic cooperation between the Emirates and Israel since the Gaza ceasefire have, from Saudi Arabia’s strategic perspective, nourished the perception of a supposed “Emirati–Israeli axis.” The reciprocal recognition of Israel and the Emirati-backed Somaliland in December 2025 further cemented this view in Riyadh. The factor of Israel also played a role in Yemen. Shortly after the Houthi militia began its campaign against Israel and civilian shipping in the Red Sea in 2023, reports indicated that the Southern Transitional Council (STC) expressed its willingness to support Israel in the event of a potential Israeli counter-response. STC leader Al-Zubaidi also repeatedly expressed openness to the possibility of an independent South Yemen, controlled by the STC, joining the Abraham Accords. In the regional context, the consecutive events of the STC’s military campaign and Israel’s normalization with Somaliland led to growing concerns in Riyadh that a southern flank on the Arabian Peninsula, controlled by rivals, could strategically challenge the Kingdom, particularly along the opposite coast of the Gulf of Aden. Is a New Fratricidal Conflict Looming? As unusual as the Saudi counterreaction was, the Emirati concession is just as remarkable. Just before New Year's Eve 2025, Saudi bombings marked the beginning of a ground offensive by the Yemeni army and the Homeland Shield Forces, trained by the Kingdom. Within ten days, this combined effort not only reversed the recent territorial gains of the STC (Southern Transitional Council), but also led to the recapture of the previously STC-controlled transitional capital of Aden. Not only did the separatists dissolve afterward, but the Emiratis also complied with Saudi demands by withdrawing their remaining troops from the Yemeni southern coast and vacating their base on Socotra Island. Riyadh's first direct intervention against the proxies of its smaller neighbor caused Abu Dhabi's ten-year project in Yemen to collapse like a house of cards. Looking at Yemen, it is now clear that only one foreign power has the upper hand in Aden. This new position of power means that Riyad must now ensure stability in government-controlled areas, strengthen the anti-Houthi coalition, and push the internationally recognized leadership to provide services to its citizens. Moreover, the Kingdom will have to deal with separatist movements, which, despite the dissolution of the STC, continue to enjoy broad support. In this regard, the planned dialogue with representatives from various factions in the south, scheduled for February, will be a litmus test. Although Riyad, as a hesitant hegemon in recent years, tried to escape the deadlocked war in Yemen, the Kingdom is now fully back with responsibility. Replacing the previous Emirati support networks, which were crucial both militarily and economically, is no easy task. Beyond Yemen, the main question now is whether the publicly aired rift between Riyad and Abu Dhabi will challenge the unity of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states and provide a preview of future conflicts in the Gulf region. An increasing hypernationalism in both countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia, which has led to public mudslinging on social media and smear campaigns in state-affiliated newspapers, will be hard to contain through diplomatic damage control. However, it is not certain that this atmosphere of animosity will affect leadership figures in the power apparatus in Riyad and Abu Dhabi. In the short term, the Emirati-Saudi rift is leading to a clearer division among the fragile neighboring states in the Gulf region. The government in Aden declared in December that its defense agreement with the UAE was null and void, while Mogadishu also annulled all bilateral agreements with Abu Dhabi in January. The military rulers in Sudan had already suspended their diplomatic relations with the UAE in May 2025. However, it is unlikely that this division between states aligned with Riyad and those favorable to the Emiratis will spill over into the GCC or evolve into a regional crisis of the magnitude of the Qatar blockade. A full-scale bilateral conflict would cause too much damage to both countries, not least because of their close trade relations and Saudi Arabia’s reliance on billions of dollars in investments from the UAE and Dubai’s port infrastructure for its exports. Nevertheless, it appears that the era of joint Saudi-Emirati alliances, as seen in the 2010s, is likely over. Instead, Abu Dhabi and Riyad will probably act in opposing coalitions going forward. For example, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are increasingly finding themselves on the same side of regional issues, as evidenced by their support for the governments of Syria, Sudan, and Somalia. Similarly, the Saudi partnership with Pakistan, with which a bilateral defense pact was signed in September 2025, will gain relative importance in the future. The UAE, on the other hand, will continue to strengthen its relations with Israel and further expand security cooperation with India. However, most of these non-Arab states, such as India, Pakistan, and Turkey, will likely be unwilling to risk their (sometimes newly regained) relations with both countries and will seek to remain neutral wherever possible. Germany and Europe now face significant challenges due to the new status quo in the Gulf. Both Riyad and Abu Dhabi hold particular importance as anchors of stability in a volatile region, due to their economic weight, good relations with (almost) all sides, and political influence in neighboring countries. The growing rivalry between these Gulf powers not only destabilizes their relationship with each other but also means that two key European partners are no longer working in unison, and bilateral misunderstandings or confrontations can lead to crossing red lines and military escalation beyond the Arabian Peninsula. A fragmentation of the Middle East along the Riyad-Abu Dhabi fault line is not in Germany's interest, nor does a political rift within the Gulf Cooperation Council make strengthening the strategic partnership between the GCC and the EU any easier. Moreover, the turbulent events of recent weeks once again highlight the limits of European influence on the ground: Without real levers of power on the Arabian Peninsula and with minimal political attention to conflicts in seemingly unimportant countries like Yemen, neither Berlin nor Brussels were relevant (mediating) actors in the recent conflict. Instead, Europe must stand by as a mere spectator to the strategic shifts in the Gulf, even though these developments will ultimately have implications for its own interests.

The recently released Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) has upended what had been the decades-long consensus about American foreign policy. Most notable in it is the Trump Administration’s prioritization of the Western Hemisphere as an American security concern, its deemphasis on defending America’s traditional European allies, its identification of China as far more of a threat than Russia, and its determination not to be drawn into conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. But while the 2025 Trump Administration National Security Strategy breaks with much of previous American foreign policy, the logic behind it is not something completely new. Even though the document makes no mention of him, the policy outlined in the NSS comports with what John Mearsheimer described in his influential book, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, which was first published in 2001 and updated in 2014. In his book Mearsheimer declared that no nation has ever achieved global hegemony. According to Mearsheimer, America is the only country that has achieved predominant influence in its own region (the Western Hemisphere) and has also been able to prevent any other great power from dominating any other region. Mearsheimer wrote, “States that achieve regional hegemony seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peers” (2014 edition, p. 41). Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy has, whether knowingly or not, adopted these aims as well. It discusses the various regions of the world in the order of their priority for the Trump Administration: the Western Hemisphere first, followed by Asia (or Indo-Pacific), Europe, the Middle East, and lastly Africa. With regard to the Western Hemisphere, the NSS unambiguously calls for the restoration of “American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere,” and states, “We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.” This is very much in keeping with what Mearsheimer described as America being a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. As for the other four regions of the world, though, the Trump Administration seeks either to prevent any other great power from becoming predominant — or it doesn’t see this as a possibility that needs to be worried about. According to the NSS, the Middle East was a priority in the past because it was the world’s most important energy supplier and was a prime theater of superpower conflict. Now, however, there are other energy suppliers (including the U.S.) and superpower competition has been replaced by “great power jockeying” in which the U.S. retains “the most enviable position.” In other words: the Trump Administration does not see any other great power as able to become predominant in this region which is now less strategically important than it used to be anyway. Similarly, the NSS does not see any other great power as even seeking to become predominant in Africa. The NSS thus sees America’s main interests there as mainly commercial. By contrast, China is seen as a threat in the Indo-Pacific region. The NSS, though, discusses Chinese threats in the economic and technological spheres before turning to the military one. A continued U.S. military presence in the region is seen as important for preventing Chinese predominance. But Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia are all enjoined by the NSS to increase their defense spending in order to counter this threat. The NSS also identifies “the potential for any competitor to control the South China Sea” as a common threat that not only requires investment in U.S. military capabilities, “but also strong cooperation with every nation that stands to suffer, from India to Japan and beyond.” Unlike the Middle East and Africa, then, the NSS does identify a rival great power as striving for predominance in the Indo-Pacific region. Countering it, though, is not seen as just being America’s responsibility, but also that of other powerful states in the region. The strangest section in the 2025 NSS is the one on Europe. While acknowledging that “many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat,” the NSS envisions America’s role as “managing European relations with Russia” both to “reestablish conditions of strategic stability” and “to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.” This is very different from the decades-long U.S. policy of seeing America’s role as defending democratic Europe against an expansionist Soviet Union in the past and Putin’s Russia more recently. Indeed, the NSS’s claim that the European Union undermines “political liberty and sovereignty” and its welcoming “the growing influence of patriotic European parties” (in other words, anti-EU right wing nationalist ones) suggests that it is not Russia which the Trump Administration sees as a rival, but the European Union. The 2025 NSS does call for a “strong Europe…to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.” The NSS, though, seems to envision the European Union as either greater than or equal to Russia in threatening to dominate European nations. In his book, Mearsheimer did not envision the European Union as a potential great power rival to the U.S. Indeed, there isn’t even an entry for it in the book’s index. The way that the NSS envisions the world, though, comports with how Mearsheimer described America’s great power position: predominant in the Western Hemisphere and able to prevent any other great power from becoming predominant in any other region of the world. Mearsheimer, though, is a scholar who described the position in the world that he saw the U.S. as having achieved and which would seek to maintain. The 2025 NSS, by contrast, is a policy document laying out how the Trump Administration believes it can best maintain this position. And there is reason to doubt that it has done so realistically. Keeping non-Hemispheric great powers out of the Western Hemisphere will not be easy when there are governments there that want to cooperate with them. Further, devoting American resources to being predominant in Latin America when this will be resented and resisted could not only take away from America’s ability to prevent rival great powers from becoming predominant in other regions, but could counterproductively lead Latin American nations than have already done so to increase their cooperation with external great powers which the Trump Administration wants to avoid. Further, the Trump Administration’s efforts to reduce the influence of the European Union runs two risks: the first is that such an effort will succeed, but that the rise of anti-EU nationalist governments throughout the old continent results in a Europe less able to resist Russian manipulation and incursion. The second is that Trump Administration efforts to weaken the European Union backfire and result not only in a Europe united against American interference but unnecessarily emerging as a rival to the U.S. It would be ironic indeed if pursuing the NSS’s plan for upholding what Mearsheimer described as America’s ability to predominate over the Western Hemisphere combined with an ability to prevent any rival from predominating over any other region ended up undermining America’s ability to do either.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Signed in 2024, the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has reshaped regional dynamics, potentially granting Ethiopia sea access via Berbera in exchange for Somaliland’s recognition. This move challenged Somalia’s territorial integrity and prompted Mogadishu to align itself with Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti against Ethiopia. While the crisis reflects Ethiopia’s strategic push for a maritime presence, it also captures Somaliland’s long-standing quest for independence. In the wider Red Sea region, regional tensions are exacerbated by extra-regional actors which include the UAE, Turkey, France, and Saudi Arabia, all of which have their own interests therein. Although, external actors do not directly cause conflict, their involvement emboldens local actors and escalates rivalries. Hence, the Red Sea region has a growing importance in contemporary global geopolitics. Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU: Geopolitical Ambitions and the Quest for Recognition The year 2024 began with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The latter, formerly British Somaliland, was part of Somalia, from which it unilaterally seceded after Siad Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991. Since then, Somaliland has been self-ruled and is considered a de facto state. However, the Hargheisa authority does not enjoy any international legal recognition. If implemented, the agreement with Addis Ababa would give Somaliland its first significant de jure recognition. In return, the Hargheisa authorities would grant Ethiopia access to the sea through the port of Berbera and the concession of a coastal area for military use. The situation revolves around three key regional players: Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland. Each of these actors has engaged in activities driven by its own objectives and strategic priorities. Ethiopia’s decision is influenced by several practical economic and strategic factors. Following the Eritrean War in the early 1990s, Ethiopia lost its Red Sea ports and became the world’s most populous landlocked country. Since 1998, Djibouti’s ports have handled 95 per cent of trade to and from Addis Ababa. Sea access through Djibouti costs Ethiopia between $1.5 and $2 billion annually which Ethiopia’s rulers, since 2019, begun to express more strongly that they consider this spending excessive and unsustainable in the medium to long term. To reduce Addis Ababa’s dependence on Djiboutian ports, the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed believes it is necessary to find a viable alternative. Before the MoU, Ethiopia had considered several alternatives to Djibouti, including Eritrea, Somalia, and Kenya. The idea of developing an economic and trade corridor between Addis Ababa and the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden began to take shape in the final months of 2023. Somaliland’s main port has been operated by the Emirati company – DP World since 2015, which has developed its infrastructure and increased its cargo transit capacity. Ethiopia estimates that it can divert between 12 and 15 per cent of the total volume passing through Djibouti’s ports to Berbera and, in the long term, connect its industrial zones to several trade corridors. From a strategic point of view, Ethiopian assessments are influenced by Addis Ababa’s national role conception. Ethiopia sees itself as the leading regional power because of its history and traditional economic and political weight in the region. Consequently, Ethiopian elites perceive the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden as their natural strategic spheres. For this reason, the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs recently announced the ‘Grand Strategy of the Two Waters.’ The new agenda aims to expand the sphere of national interest and action eastwards towards the sea, unlike in the past when the focus of Ethiopia’s strategic projection was mainly on the Nile Basin. Indeed, Ethiopia’s ambitions as a regional power are challenged by its lack of a maritime gateway. For Addis Ababa, having a presence in the Red Sea would provide two strategic benefits: first, it would strengthen its standing in the region; second, it would bolster Ethiopia’s international role by enhancing cooperation in multilateral anti-piracy efforts. In short, the Ethiopian government sees maritime projection as a strategic resource and a gateway to the geopolitics of the coming decades, which will focus on Asia and the Indo-Pacific in particular. Therefore, one of the key clauses of the MoU allows Ethiopia to establish a military outpost in Lughaya, a town overlooking the Gulf of Aden, for at least fifty years. According to Ethiopian plans, the naval base will become the headquarters of the nascent Ethiopian navy. For Somaliland, the MoU represents a further step on the difficult path to independence. In the past year, the issue of Somaliland’s independence has gained renewed attention and relevance. This pursuit of self-determination is deeply rooted in a historical context that stretches back to the 19th century, predating the regime of Siad Barre. The Somalilanders’ path began during a pivotal time when the British Empire established agreements with various Somali clans, particularly the Gadabuursi, Issa, and Habr Awal. In 1884, the region was officially designated as British Somaliland, a protectorate that enjoyed a measure of autonomy and governance, distinguishing it from the colonial dominance exerted by Italian authorities in southern Somalia. Following the unification of Somaliland with the Trust Territory of Somalia in 1960, the social, economic, and political conditions of the people of Somaliland began to deteriorate, leading to widespread discontent and a strong desire for independence. Over time, the Siad Barre regime cast a long shadow over Somaliland, leading to widespread discrimination and marginalisation. The political and economic machinations of the central government often neglected the aspirations of the Somaliland people, fuelling a growing sense of injustice. In this context, collective memory became a powerful cornerstone of identity, highlighting the stark contrasts between Somaliland’s struggles and Somalia’s divergent trajectories in the turbulent post-Siad Barre era. Hargheisa’s quest for independence is rooted in historical grievances and reflects the unique identities and trajectories of its people. The Somaliland narrative often draws comparisons with the current situation in the rest of Somalia. Over the past three decades, this de facto state has made significant progress towards sustainable institutional and administrative development albeit on a very limited budget. The democratisation process is also crucial to further the development of Somaliland’s independence. The recent national elections held last November demonstrated the political maturity of all parties involved. The peaceful transfer of power from the defeated government to the electoral process is a remarkable event in the region and stands out as one of the few such instances in the continent. The achievements of the institution-building process in Somaliland are even more striking when compared to the path taken by Somalia. Somalia’s Diplomatic Counterbalance and the Emergence of an Anti-Ethiopian Block  The signing of the MoU by Ethiopia and Somaliland raised concerns among regional actors, particularly Somalia. As Somaliland is formally and legally recognised as an integral part of Somalia, there were fears that Hargeisa’s claims to independence were gaining momentum. Mogadishu was particularly concerned that Ethiopia’s official recognition of Somaliland’s claims could trigger a domino effect, leading other regional and extra-regional actors to follow suit. Therefore, Somalia saw Ethiopia’s actions as a deliberate act of intimidation that threatened its territorial integrity at a sensitive time for its political future. Somalia faces several challenges, including the struggle to establish an effective institutional framework, particularly with regard to the relationship between the central government and the federal states, and also the fight against the terrorist group – al-Shabaab. In response to the MoU, the Somali executive, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, launched an intense diplomatic campaign to prevent its implementation and recognition by the international community. Somalia has sought support from regional organisations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), and the African Union (AU). In doing so, Somalia has consolidated alliances with both regional and extra-regional actors. As a result, the dynamics between these three actors – Somalia, Ethiopia, and Somaliland have become increasingly intertwined. Mogadishu’s natural anti-Ethiopian partners are two of Addis Ababa’s historical rivals: Eritrea and Egypt. Compared to 2018, the year of normalisation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the situation today is very different. The positions of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed quickly diverged following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement (2022), which ended the two-year conflict in Tigray. Eritrea, which had supported the Ethiopian military campaign, refused to negotiate with the Tigrayan authorities, represented by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The distance between the two leaders has widened as Ethiopia’s claims to the sea have grown. Indeed, Asmara fears that Ethiopia is eyeing its ports, a fear fuelled by the rhetoric of Abiy and other Ethiopian leaders. Conversely, Isaias has used his leadership and many regional relationships to foster a kind of ‘anti-Ethiopian coalition’. One significant change has been Egypt’s increasing involvement in the region. Mogadishu’s rapprochement with Cairo was formalised in August 2024 with the signing of a defence agreement. This agreement centres on Egypt’s intention to support Somalia’s request for the withdrawal of all Ethiopian troops currently stationed in Somalia as part of the African Union peacekeeping mission (formerly known as Atmis, replaced by the Aussom mission on 1 January 2025). The strengthening of Somali-Egyptian relations, supported by Asmara and involving Djibouti through a security cooperation agreement, has consolidated an anti-Ethiopian bloc. This alignment represents a significant shift in the regional balance and illustrates Egypt’s changing Africa policy. Since 2020, Egypt has reaffirmed the importance of its southern relations. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has gradually reassessed Egypt’s African relations and promoted a geopolitical strategy that emphasises a north-south axis, rather than the east-west axis that dominated in previous decades. The Red Sea region, including the Nile Basin, is now a key part of this new strategic framework, which is shaped by Egypt’s historical rivalry with Ethiopia. Between the two states, the balance on the Nile has changed. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has given Ethiopia a strategic advantage over Egypt. Egypt therefore had to adapt its approach to the ongoing dynamics by deciding to expand the areas of contention toward the sea. Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia therefore provided an opportunity to increase Egypt’s footprint in the region. Regional Tensions and Extra-regional Actors in the Red Sea The MoU signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland has opened a new phase in tensions. The focus of regional tensions is shifting to the coastal areas, particularly the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are marked by a number of security and defence agreements. Common strategic interests underpin the alignment of the anti-Ethiopian bloc, which includes Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Egypt. Somalia views any legal recognition of Somaliland’s independence as an existential threat. For Djibouti, the economic damage from increased trade through Berbera is marginal but potentially devastating to its fragile internal balance of power. Eritrea perceives Ethiopia as an ongoing threat, and the current Ethiopian government is seen by Asmara as highly unreliable, raising concerns about a potential escalation of violence along their shared borders. Finally, for Egypt, the assessment of its regional position is of particular importance. Traditionally, Cairo has regarded the waters between Suez and Aden as its ‘lake’. As a result, like Addis Ababa, it regards the entire region as part of its sphere of influence. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey are among the most active players in the region. The UAE has supported the MoU to capitalise on investments in Berbera and Addis Ababa. Turkey, on the other hand, has taken a more balanced approach, thanks to its strong political and commercial ties with Ethiopia and Somalia. For Ankara, however, Somalia’s integrity must not be questioned. Following their rapprochement in 2021, the UAE and Turkey have maintained good relations. Despite their different strategies and some disagreements, both nations share a common interest in maintaining a central role in regional affairs. Other extra-regional players, such as France and Saudi Arabia, are also active in the background. France supports the MoU as part of its ongoing efforts to increase its presence in East Africa, which began at the same time as its withdrawal from the Sahel region. Its base in Djibouti is destined to become more central to French policy as French military presence in West Africa is being reduced. French officials see this increased influence in regional affairs as essential to France’s future interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, whose geopolitical focus is shifting from the Gulf to the Red Sea, opposes the implementation of the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland. It seeks to counter regional projects promoted by the UAE. This might be as a result of the long-standing political rift between the two Gulf monarchies. Extra-regional actors do not directly cause an increase in regional conflicts. Rather, it is local actors who, feeling empowered by their connections with these extra-regional partners, perceive their environment as more permissive and gain the confidence to take assertive actions that they may not have considered before. Understanding these dynamics sheds light on why Ethiopia and Somaliland decided to sign the MoU at this historic moment. This perspective also helps to explain other regional crises, such as the civil war in Sudan and the conflict in Tigray. The different transformations in the international system have created a context in which local actors can seek multiple forms of external support. Increased alignment and overlap between local and regional rivalries has increased the willingness of actors to take assertive action, leading to a general increase in inter- and intra-state tensions. However, the flexible nature of alliances can also mitigate the risk of the trickle-down effect that often accompanies such alliances. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0): https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Photo credit: Flickr/Sailing Nomad - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/ Ambassador Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga, Farea Al-Muslimi, Lisa Boström and Veera Tuomala In recent months, the Red Sea has drawn global attention, particularly due to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the deal between Ethiopia and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland on access to the Gulf of Aden, which sparked a dispute with Somalia. The rising tensions and increasing military responses risk worsening conflicts in a highly volatile region. The renewed focus on the Red Sea, however, also provides an opportunity to redouble commitment to multilateralism and enhance the collective action needed to address threats facing the region. This blog post gives an overview of current issues in the region and possible ways to address them, building on the outcomes of a panel discussion at the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. Geopolitical competition in the Red Sea region The Red Sea has become a major flashpoint for global and regional contestation, with local, regional and global conflict dynamics deeply intertwined. Regional and global powers are constructing naval bases and military installations around the Red Sea to enhance their power projection, fuelling existing tensions and exacerbating ongoing conflicts. This has aggravated already dire humanitarian conditions, contributing to fragility across the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and North Africa. In Sudan, competition between Gulf states is widely considered a driving factor behind the civil war. In Somalia and Yemen, external influences have fuelled internal disputes and aggravated tensions, undermining state-building efforts and incurring particularly devastating consequences in Yemen. Climate change and a scramble for scarce natural resources and critical commodities, including water, agricultural land and food supplies, may reinforce this dynamic. Gulf states, in particular, have invested billions in agriculture and manufacturing in the Horn of Africa in recent years to secure food production and tap into the region’s burgeoning labour markets. Regional insecurity escalates Insecurity in the Red Sea region reached a critical point in early 2024 when the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in response to the ongoing conflict in Gaza, further threatening regional and international stability, upending trade and disrupting global markets. In response, the United States and the United Kingdom carried out airstrikes against targets in Yemen, while the European Union took a more defensive approach with the launch of Operation ASPIDES to protect vessels. This escalation delayed peace negotiations in Yemen, weakening the fragile trust needed to agree on an extended ceasefire and a roadmap to peace. The Houthi attacks also further compounded humanitarian challenges, disrupting the flow of essential goods and humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region more widely, thus worsening shortages and human suffering. In Sudan around 26 million people, more than half the population, are suffering acute food insecurity. In Yemen, around 22 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, with about 17 million facing acute food insecurity. Instability on both coasts has also increased migration across the Red Sea. The number of migrants from the Horn of Africa arriving in Yemen has nearly tripled in recent years, with tens of thousands making the dangerous crossing annually in search of better economic opportunities. Additionally, the rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia has exacerbated regional insecurity, with reports of coordination between the Houthis and the Al-Shabaab armed group in the Horn, increasing the risk of human trafficking and forced migration. Opportunities to strengthen multilateralism, cooperation and collective action The barriers to effective cooperation in the Red Sea region are significant but not insurmountable. Historical rivalries and political instability have eroded trust among countries in the region, and the diverse priorities and strategic interests of these countries complicate collaboration. Despite these challenges, the region holds immense potential for growth and development. The strategic location and resources of countries on both shores, if harnessed constructively and collectively, could spur economic prosperity and regional stability. However, the region can realize its potential and accelerate socio-economic development only through inclusive growth, innovation and addressing long-standing developmental challenges. In this regard, prioritizing economic and regional integration is critical to unlocking the region’s vast potential. Indeed, the geographical proximity between the Horn of Africa and Yemen across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has brought about initiatives such as the Bridge of the Horns, proposed in 2007 between Djibouti and Yemen, which represented a bold vision for a more integrated, peaceful and prosperous region. While the project did not materialize, it is symbolic of the potential for deep and mutually beneficial economic, cultural and political ties across the Red Sea. While there are currently no operational overarching mechanisms or forums for multilateral cooperation around the region, the establishment in 2020 of the Red Sea Council—formally the Council of Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden—could fill this gap. Once operational, it could help to mitigate tensions and foster cooperation towards a shared vision for the region. Moving forward There are several areas where enhanced cooperation is achievable and could benefit the Red Sea region as a whole. For example, establishing joint coastal patrols and information-sharing mechanisms could significantly enhance maritime security and combat piracy, smuggling and terrorism along the vital maritime corridor. Developing regional trade agreements and infrastructure projects could boost economic growth and interdependence, reducing the likelihood of conflict. Collaborative efforts to address climate change, manage shared water resources and protect marine ecosystems could promote sustainability and reduce resource-related tensions. Coordinating humanitarian responses and development programmes could address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, food insecurity, and poor access to education and healthcare. Finally, establishing platforms for dialogue and mediation could help to resolve disputes peacefully, preventing the escalation of conflicts. By focusing on these areas, the countries of the Red Sea region could move towards a more cooperative, stable and prosperous future. Strengthening cooperation through robust multilateral frameworks is vital to addressing the factors that underpin regional insecurity as well as to promoting sustainable development. Regional solutions should be led by the region, rather than relying on external entities whose priorities and resources are currently focused elsewhere. Countries on both coasts of the Red Sea need to view each other as partners for common goals and stability, prioritizing cooperation to connect their needs and interests effectively. As United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres notes in the New Agenda for Peace, rebuilding consensus around shared norms and developing new ways for states to act cooperatively is crucial to addressing collective challenges and meeting shared objectives. SIPRI is pleased to share a series of guest blog posts from partners of the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. This blog builds on a panel discussion at the Forum on the topic ‘Red Sea Security in a Time of Disorder’, which was organized by CMI–Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The ongoing skirmishes in the South China Sea between China and regional states represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting Africa. As China grows increasingly aggressive in its race for global hegemony and influence, and the United States (US) slowly plunges into the battle to prevent China’s rise, the world is watching the unfolding of this rivalry with unease. Although a few places have felt intense pressure from this alarming competition, the South China Sea (SCS) region is where a violent showdown looks increasingly probable. Unlike the war in Ukraine or Gaza, the US and China may start a direct war in the SCS. And amidst this multifaceted new Cold War 2.0, Africa remains cautious. The South China tinderbox On 23 April, another skirmish took place between China and the Philippines when two Filipino patrol boats approached the shallow turquoise waters of a disputed shoal around 194 km west of the Philippine Islands province of Palawan. The patrol boats were there for an underwater survey near the disputed shoal claimed by both China and the Philippines, thus prompting a Chinese response. A Chinese coast guard, via radio, instructed them to leave the area and threatened hostile measures. Following several radio exchanges, the Chinese coast guard damaged both the Philippine patrol boats by firing high-pressure water cannons at them. However, this was not the first time China’s assertion in this region has caused friction with other SCS neighbours, including Japan and South Korea. China has used an unconvincing U-shaped “nine-dash line” that crosses the exclusive economic zones, or EEZs, of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam to demonstrate its claim in the region. Despite their low intrinsic value, the region lies along a vital trade and supply corridor that supports over US$3 trillion in yearly shipborne commerce. Oil, gas, and fishing sources abound in the area. Beijing has declined to acknowledge a 2016 decision from the Permanent Court of Arbitration that ruled Beijing’s broad claims invalid based on historical grounds. China and the Philippines have already fought many times over the Second Thomas Shoal and the Bashi Channel. China has become increasingly aggressive in the region in the last few years, putting regional stability at high risk. So far, these skirmishes will likely remain regional without the risk of any full-scale war. However, there are risks of casualties or even the vessel capsizing. Making of Cold War 2.0 over the SCS Washington’s response to the upcoming crisis is still modest. US President Biden raised concerns about China’s actions in the SCS , including efforts to impede the Philippines from resupplying its forces on the fiercely disputed Second Thomas Shoal. The US has repeatedly warned China that it’s obligated to defend the Philippines, its oldest treaty ally in Asia, if Filipino forces, ships or aircraft come under an armed attack. The US also conducted Balikatan drills (‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ in Tagalog) with the Philippines with more than 16,000 American and Philippines military personnel. Indeed, its resources are thinly stretched, and Beijing seems to be moving ahead. To deter China by stepping up regional defence diplomacy, Washington is exploring the possibility of a security alliance with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, tentatively called SQUAD. This is in addition to two other existing groupings in the region, “Quad” and “AUKUS,” a defence pact among Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. While AUKUS is a defence pact, Quad is simply a dialogue platform. Africa’s tricky balancing act Even while the socioeconomic repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war have not yet wholly subsided in Africa, the ongoing skirmishes in the SCS represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting several African nations. Despite being geographically far, the conflict’s spillover effect would impact the continent’s food security in terms of both the availability and pricing of some food crops. In addition, the SCS region represents a crucial geographic sweet spot for Africa as a source of trade and investment, translating into growth and development for many African economies. The crisis can potentially fuel price rise, particularly for oil-importing countries. The prospect of a consequential price rise of essential commodities will have enormous ramifications for domestic stability in most African countries. Furthermore, many African economies heavily rely on trade, investment, and aid from South and Southeast Asia, the crisis will significantly hamper the development and growth of the continent. There are also strategic lessons for Africa to learn from the conflict. China’s principal interest in Africa consists of protecting its BRI investments and ensuring steady trade flow. Africa is also essential for China to fulfil its resource needs, maintaining industrial growth and energy security. Therefore, securing stability in countries where China has invested is in China’s interest, just like keeping a stable relationship with China is in the interest of those investment-starved countries. Further, since many investment projects in China are located in different African countries, these countries should be careful. China can become aggressively irredentist, even in Africa. Currently, China owns a naval base in Djibouti and a ballistic missile tracker Yuan Wang 5, off the coast of Durban. It has strong economic influence across the countries of Africa’s east coast thanks to its Belt Road Initiative (BRI). On the West Coast, China has many seaports financed or constructed by Chinese entities. If the national governments of these countries fail to pay, China would happily take control of these ports through lease as it did in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. In addition to Sri Lanka, other South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar also faced dire consequences due to the failure of their BRI debt payment, leading to economic crises, and sometimes even political crises. Therefore, caution would be expected from these African governments. Conclusion China’s increasingly aggressive posture over the SCS raises concerns about the stability of the region. As the current uneasy détente between the US and China bears remarkable similarities to the Cold War, questions are raised regarding the possibilities of a new Cold War 2.0. Questions are also raised concerning the possible reactions from different African countries vis-á-vis Chinese aggression in the region. Undoubtedly, any serious conflict between China and the Philippines would be dangerous. These frequent skirmishes may not lead to a direct war between the US and China. Yet, the risk of vessel capsizing and casualties is high. Any such event would ultimately spark a crisis in Africa. So far, Africa is cautious and continues to balance its great power relationships. Undoubtedly, it is increasingly concerned with the aggressive posture of the Chinese in the region. On the other hand, it needs China for economic purposes. Therefore, Africa will continue to walk the tightrope where it would want US involvement in de-escalating the situation without ruffling any feathers with China. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Programme Director, Mama Graça Machel,  Minister of Sports, Arts and Culture, Mr. Zizi Kodwa Deputy Minister of Sports, Arts and Culture, Ms. Nocawe Mafu, Premier of the Eastern Cape, Mr. Lubabalo Oscar Mabuyane,  Your Majesties Kings and Queens, Other traditional leaders present, MEC for Sports, Recreation, Arts and Culture, Ms. Nonceba Kontsiwe, Executive Mayor of the OR Tambo District Municipality, Cllr. Mesuli Ngqondwana, Executive Mayor of the King Sabata Dalindyebo Local Municipality, Cllr. Nyaniso Nelani, Chief Executive Officer of the Nelson Mandela Museum, Dr. Vuyani Booi, Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Fellow South Africans. Molweni. Sanibonani. Dumelang, Goeie more, Kgotsong, Lotjhani, Ndi matsheloni, Nhlekanhi. Good Morning. I greet you all wherever you may be on this Nelson Mandela Day. To be here, eQunu where Tata grew up and that is his final resting place, is a great honour. Qunu had a special place in Madiba’s heart.  This was where he spent his boyhood being cared for by his family, tending cattle and listening to the stories of the elders about the bravery of his people.  It has been said that the two most important days in your life are the day you are born - and the day you find out why. It was here in Qunu that the first seeds of his political consciousness were planted, where Madiba’s imagination was first stirred, and where his great mind began to be shaped. Madiba later said of this place that:  “It was there in the hills and valleys of Qunu, in the rolling hills of KwaDlangezwa, in the Genadendal settlement, and long the Gariep, the Lekoa and the Luvuvhu rivers, that we first understood that we are not free.”  In Long Walk to Freedom, he wrote that as he listened to the stories of the elders, he hoped to someday have the opportunity to serve his people, and to make his own humble contribution to the struggle for freedom. Madiba’s was no humble contribution. He led our nation to freedom, and even today, many years since his passing, his legacy lives on.  There are many monuments paying tribute to Madiba across South Africa, across Africa and in many parts of the world, from Palestine to the United Kingdom, Seychelles, Senegal, Cuba, the US, Brazil, China, France, and many other places. But for us to be able to honour the father of our nation at this place that meant so much to him is something we have been working towards for some time. Since 2021 the Eastern Cape Provincial Heritage Resource Agency, the Mandela family, the Nelson Mandela Museum and the Department of Sports, Arts and Culture have been driving this process – a process that included public consultation. As human beings we are the sum of many parts, and Madiba was no different.  Our upbringing, our culture, and many other factors shape our lived experiences.  The statue we unveiled earlier today in Mthatha depicts Madiba in the role for which he was most well-known, that of a statesman. The statue here in Qunu depicts him in the attire of his Xhosa-Tembu culture, reminding us of the traditional values he lived by and that shaped his consciousness. It is our hope that this homage to Madiba in his final resting place will serve as an inspiration especially to the young people in the community.  It is to remind you that the seeds of greatness lie dormant within each one of us, and that it is up to us to make them germinate and bloom. It is to remind you that being born in a rural area, or having humble beginnings, is no obstacle to achieving greatness, and to fulfilling your destiny. It is to remind us of all our duty to do what we can to make the world a better place. Monuments, statues, and museums have a key role to play in the political and cultural life of any country. They are a means of giving recognition to those who suffered hardship, repression, exile, or death in pursuit of universal ideals such as human freedom.  Monuments such as this one are the struggle of memory against forgetting. These statues of Madiba are beacons of hope to individuals and communities that are still suffering from the evils of marginalisation, and the scourges of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment.  This statue should serve as reminder to those of us elected to serve the South African people that we must redouble our efforts to build a better South Africa that leaves no-one behind.  To quote Madiba’s own words, as long as poverty, injustice and gross inequality still exist in our world, none of us can truly rest. I would like to thank you, Mama Graça Machel, and members of the family for agreeing to collaborate with the Department of Sports, Arts and Culture on this project.  Earlier today in Mthatha a library was handed over to the Zingisa Comprehensive School. I am told that the library project was sparked by a letter written to the authorities by a learner at the school requesting assistance, and I want to thank the provincial government for acceding to this request. I call upon the people of Qunu to protect and look after these sites of memorialization and commemoration. I have no doubt they have the potential to attract tourists which will in turn support business and job creation. Every Nelson Mandela Day we are called upon to dedicate 67 minutes to performing acts of goodwill towards others as part of making our world a better place. If you have not yet done so, I encourage each South African to do their bit of good today, wherever they may be. Madiba built bridges of peace, and mobilised people of the world to fight against social injustice and oppression.  Let us strive to emulate his example, today and every day. I wish you all a Happy Nelson Mandela Day. I thank you.