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Diplomacy
Ulsan, South Korea - September 28th, 2024: View of HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Ulsan Headquarters, South Korea. A key player in shipbuilding, this landmark facility.

South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam show that economic statecraft is not just the preserve of great powers

by Robyn Klingler-Vidra

Make American shipbuilding great again (Masga) may sound like an effort by the US to bolster its economic strength and project power internationally, but Masga is not an American policy. It is a South Korean initiative that emerged following trade talks with the US in June. Rather than responding to the Trump administration’s tariff threats solely through trade negotiations, Korean officials saw an opportunity to show their American counterparts that South Korea deserved better treatment. They suggested that South Korea bring its shipbuilding prowess to the US. South Korea is perhaps most famous as an exporter of K-pop, cars and semiconductors. But it is also a global powerhouse in shipbuilding. The shipyard in the south-eastern Korean city of Ulsan alone produces roughly ten times more ships annually than the entire US shipbuilding industry. And as the US tries to counter China’s rapidly growing naval fleet, Korean assistance is something that is clearly needed. The US navy secretary, John Phelan, declared earlier in 2025 that US shipbuilding programmes “are a mess”. He added: “I think our best one is six months late and 57% over budget … That is the best one.” Masga was launched in August, with South Korean conglomerates HD Hyundai and Samsung Heavy Industries signing a US$150 billion (£112 billion) deal to modernise US shipbuilding capabilities. It is a clear example of a middle power, a term for countries that lack the dominance of great powers but matter because they possess distinctive industrial, resource or diplomatic capabilities, using economic statecraft to punch above its weight. Economic statecraft has largely been used to describe actions taken by great powers like the US and China to enable and restrict access to their consumer markets, investment coffers and production capabilities. The aim is to achieve foreign policy goals or national security objectives by inflicting damage on or beating the capabilities of a rival power. One classic example is the US government’s use of sanctions against Russia over its war in Ukraine and Iran over its nuclear programme. The overt linking of economic tools like sanctions and tariffs to defence objectives in Washington’s recent national security strategy is another striking illustration of this. Middle powers have traditionally not actively pursued economic statecraft to achieve their objectives. They have instead looked to secure a seat at key tables through cooperative participation in regional and multilateral forums. But some of these countries are now asserting their power more explicitly, through preemptive moves like Masga. Using economic statecraft Taiwan is perhaps the most obvious case of a middle power engaging in economic statecraft. The country has used its critical role in global semiconductor supply chains as leverage to protect itself against Chinese invasion. Former Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen referred to international reliance on the island’s chip industry as a “silicon shield” in 2021. Taipei imposes strict controls on tech sales and screens investment, particularly from China, to protect its position. And Taiwan’s industry-leading firms, such as TSMC, also invest heavily to maintain their technological edge. Vietnam offers another example. Consistent with its “bamboo diplomacy” foreign policy model, Hanoi hosts leaders from China, Russia and the US, seeking flexibility rather than rigid alignment. The aim is clear: to maximise Vietnam’s national interests pragmatically and with autonomy. With the world’s sixth-largest reserves of rare earths, Vietnam is now looking to use critical minerals as a tool of economic statecraft. The government voted to ban rare-earth exports on December 11, citing the need to reorient the sector towards domestic processing and higher-value manufacturing rather than merely the export of basic raw materials. Rare earths are essential components in numerous products that are central to our daily lives, including smartphones, semiconductors and electric vehicles. By restricting foreign access to these essential inputs, Vietnam is striving to secure its long-term position in the supply chains of highly in-demand resources. Together, these cases show how economic statecraft is not only the preserve of great powers. Middle power states are selectively granting and restricting access to their economic strengths to reshape markets and security relationships. Korea’s shipbuilding, Taiwan’s chip production and Vietnam’s rare earths illustrate this more assertive approach. They are no longer confined to reactive measures or behind-the-scenes diplomacy in regional forums or multilateral negotiations. These states are proposing economic and military partnerships, as seen in initiatives such as Masga and Tsai’s assertion that everyone needs to care about Taiwan, given how essential chips are to the world economy. Great powers are taking notice. In October, HD Hyundai and US defence contractor Huntington Ingalls Industries announced they are together building next-generation navy vessels. This marks the first time a South Korean firm will build a US navy ship. And Washington has also reportedly been courting Hanoi with elevated diplomatic status and promises of mining support. For other middle powers, the lesson is clear: identify and leverage the strategic economic strengths that other countries depend on.

Diplomacy
Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Sessão de abertura do IV Fórum CELAC-China. China National Convention Center II, Pequim - China. Foto - Ricardo Stuckert / PR Lula Oficial, CC BY-SA 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0>,

China and the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

by Tings Chak

China’s policy paper supports the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace” — a pointed contrast to US twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy. On December 10, 2025, US forces seized the oil tanker Skipper off the coast of Venezuela, carrying over a million barrels of crude. “Well, we keep [the oil],” President Trump told reporters. Venezuela’s foreign ministry called it “blatant theft and an act of international piracy,” adding: “The true reasons for the prolonged aggression against Venezuela have finally been revealed. It has always been about our natural wealth, our oil.” That same day, on the other side of the world, China released its third Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (the first since 2016) outlining a vision of partnership “without attaching any political conditions.” The timing captures the choice now facing Latin America. Two documents released within a week — Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) on December 5 and China’s policy paper five days later — lay bare fundamentally different approaches to the hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine returns Trump’s NSS makes no pretense of diplomatic subtlety. It declares a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting US opposition to “hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets” in the hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere is now America’s “highest priority”, with three threats requiring military response: migration, drugs, and China. Countries seeking US assistance must demonstrate they are “winding down adversarial outside influence” — a demand that Latin American nations cut ties with Beijing. The strategy promises “targeted deployments” and “the use of lethal force” against cartels. It states that Washington will “reward and encourage the region’s governments … aligned with our principles and strategies.” Unsurprisingly, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio rushed to congratulate Chile’s Trump-inspired extreme right wing candidate José Antonio Kast, who won the presidency with 58% of the vote (the most right-wing leader since Pinochet). The tanker seizure shows what this doctrine looks like in practice. Since September, US strikes on boats have killed 95 people. The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier group patrols the Caribbean. As Colombian President Gustavo Petro observed, Trump is “not thinking about the democratization of Venezuela, let alone the narco-trafficking” — only oil. After declaring that a new phase of attacks could include “land strikes on Venezuela”, Trump threatened the Colombian president that “he’ll be next” as well as invasion of Mexico. China’s alternative China’s policy paper operates from an entirely different premise. Opening by identifying China as “a developing country and member of the Global South,” it positions the relationship as South-South cooperation and solidarity rather than great power competition. The document proposes five programs: Solidarity, Development, Civilization, Peace, and People-to-People Connectivity. What distinguishes this paper from its 2008 and 2016 predecessors is its explicit call for “local currency pricing and settlement’ in energy trade to “reduce the impact of external economic and financial risks” — new language directly addressing the weaponization of the dollar. This trend has been underway, as highlighted by the R$157 billion (USD 28 billion) currency swap agreement between Brazil and China, signed during Brazilian president Lula’s visit to the Asian country in May this year. China’s policy paper supports the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace” — a pointed contrast to US twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy. And it contains a line clearly responding to Washington’s pressure: “The China-LAC relationship does not target or exclude any third party, nor is it subjugated by any third party.” The historical pattern Of course, the focus on the “China threat” to “US pre-eminence” in the region is not new. In August 1961, progressive Brazilian Vice President João Goulart visited China, the first high-ranking Latin American official to do so after the Chinese Revolution. At a mass rally in Beijing, he declared that China showed “how a people, looked down upon by others for past centuries, can emancipate themselves from the yoke of their exploiters.” The US response was swift. American media constructed a narrative linking Brazilian agrarian reform movements to a “communist threat from China.” On April 1, 1964 (less than three years after Goulart’s visit) a US-backed military coup overthrew him. Twenty-one years of dictatorship followed. The playbook remains the same. In the 1960s, the pretext was “communist threat”; today it’s “China threat.” And what’s at stake is Latin American sovereignty. What makes this moment different is economic weight. China-LAC trade reached a record US$518.47 billion in 2024, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce. China’s share of trade with Mercosur countries has grown from 2% to 24% since 2000. At the May 2025 CELAC-China Forum, Xi Jinping announced a USD 9 billion investment credit line. In 1964, Latin America had few alternatives. Today, China presents another option. The question before the Latin American people The right-wing surge across the continent is undeniable — Kast in Chile, Milei in Argentina, the end of MAS rule in Bolivia. These victories reflect the limitations of progressive governments when addressing crime, migration, and economic stagnation. But they also reflect how US-generated crises become the terrain on which the right wins. The question is whether Latin American governments (including right-wing ones) want to be subordinates in what Trump’s strategy calls an “American-led world.” Even Western liberal analysts are alarmed. Brookings describes the NSS as “essentially assert[ing] a neo-imperialist presence in the region.” Chatham House notes that Trump uses “coercion instead of negotiation”, contrasted with China, “which has been providing investment and credit … without imposing conditions.” That being said, China’s presence in Latin America is not without contradictions. The structure of trade remains imbalanced — Latin America exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods. Meanwhile, labor and environmental concerns linked to specific Chinese private enterprises cannot be ignored. Whether the relationship enables development or reproduces dependency depends on what Latin American governments demand: technology transfer, local production, industrial policy. This agenda for a sovereign national project must be pushed forward by the Latin American people and popular forces. At present, the differences between the two visions being presented of the “US-led world” and a “community with a shared future” have never been starker. This article was produced by Globetrotter. The original article is under a CC BY-SA license

Diplomacy
USA and China trade relations, cooperation strategy. US America and China flags on chess pawns soldiers on a chessboard. 3d illustration

New World Order: China vs the United States

by Manuel Alejandro Nuñez Vilcabana

Abstract This research article seeks to analyze the current geopolitical landscape, specifically the strategic confrontation between China and the United States and its impact on the international context. In this regard, the concept of the “World Order” refers to the hegemony that the United States held in the West following the end of the Cold War. Over the years, a new concept emerged, the “New World Order,” which defines the relationships that develop after a historical stage of international hegemony. The research begins by defining the variable “World Order” and its evolution into the “New World Order.” It then focuses on post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy, which shaped the course of the West. This is followed by an analysis of China’s foreign policy in recent years, which has generated a shift in the international paradigm. Finally, the study aims to analyze the confrontation between both countries for global hegemony through various international policies and geopolitical strategies. In conclusion, the concept of the “New World Order” for the 21st century is based on the strategic rivalry between China and the United States within an increasingly multipolar system. Both countries have defined foreign policies: the United States seeks to maintain hegemony, while China aims to create an international environment in which all participants can benefit. The conflict itself defines the “New World Order.” Keywords: China, United States, New World Order, geopolitics, international economy. Introduction Currently, there is an ongoing struggle between two powerful states that influence the reality of other countries around the world: the United States and China. These economic and military powers are at an impasse. On one hand, the United States seeks to maintain its influence and hegemony in the West, setting the agenda in international organizations and resolving global conflicts according to its own rules. On the other hand, China, which has a historical rivalry with the U.S., has become the world’s second-largest economy due to its economic development and has joined powers such as Russia and India to counter the US ambitions. The old “World Order” is in decline, making it necessary to update this category of international relations and define what the “New World Order” is, what it consists of, why it emerges, and, above all, how it could be addressed. For this reason, this research article first defines what is understood by the “World Order.” It then analyzes the crisis of this “World Order” in the 21st century, which has led to the emergence of a “New World Order” spearheaded by China’s rise on the international stage. The study continues by examining the United States and the general actions it has taken to reach this critical point, followed by an analysis of the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping’s leadership, and finally, it explores how this confrontation impacts international reality. World Order To understand the concept of “World Order,” it is necessary to begin with a preliminary conceptual analysis of its underlying roots. “Hegemony” and “Power” are two key concepts for understanding the definition of “World Order.” “Hegemony” can be understood as the midpoint between the processes of influence and dominance in interstate relations, beyond its legal content in public or international law. The term has been used by Marxist and structuralist currents, but for general understanding, hegemony is predominantly the ability to lead or direct others. This can be understood from any perspective, whether international, social, or interpersonal. (Bobbio & Matteucci, 1981a) Hegemony cannot be understood without the exercise of power. In this context, power in the social sphere is the capacity of one person to influence another. A person becomes both agent and object simultaneously; the one who exercises power over another has the ability to influence decisions, activities, motivations, and more. (Bobbio & Matteucci, 1981b) The hegemonic process is explained through the exercise of power. “Power”, being the ability to influence an external agent, inherently requires being prepared to surpass this external agent in order to maintain a constant exercise of power and prevent, under any circumstances, the influenced agent from reacting and obstructing the full exercise of power. Consequently, it can be understood that the “World Order” is viewed from a hegemonic structural perspective, where the power exercised by one party — in this case, a country or countries — is largely consensual. This differs from a non-hegemonic order, where multiple actors coexist and compete for dominance over others. Even so, a notable distinction exists with respect to domination, which is the factual exercise of power. In other words, domination can exist without hegemony. (Cox, 2013) Naturally, under this definition, one might assume that the “World Order” follows a linear historical trajectory, with a clear beginning, middle, and end, along with defined actors and positions. This, however, is not the case. The “World Order” is a process marked by constant crises, emerging actors as they develop economically, socially, and militarily, specific interests seeking to influence others, and, above all, a continuous struggle for being the state at the top. (Schulz, 2023) Historically, the concept of “World Order” emerged after the Cold War. Another way to understand the term is through the hegemony of a political-economic model, materialized in the social and cultural expressions of countries. After the Cold War, a “neoliberal” model was established and adopted by most Western countries to perpetuate U.S. interests. Through “liberal” or “neoliberal” policies, a process of domination or hegemony is observed. (Duque-Vargas, 2021) Over the years, academia has reevaluated global events and defined categories through historical processes, which, due to circumstances, reemerge with new actors and in different geographic locations. Today, the concept of the “Cold War” is used as a framework to understand the struggle between powers. The so-called “New Cold War” refers to the confrontation between the U.S. and either Russia or China (Sanz Díaz & Sáenz-Rotko, 2022). It does not describe warfare in the same sense as from 1947 to 1991 but rather as a model of confrontation between powers, with the U.S. as a constant actor. From a political-philosophical perspective, liberalism has been and continues to be widely debated. To simplify — since defining this current is beyond the scope of this study — liberalism is politically expressed in liberal democracies and economically in the opening of markets to the international context and the development of capitalism as an economic model. (Bobbio & Matteucci, 1981b) Today, debate persists around the concept of “neoliberalism,” which emerges from liberalism, and no definitive canon has been established. Therefore, this term will not be defined to avoid straying from the focus of the study. Finally, the concept of “World Order” adopted for this study is a fusion of the concepts previously analyzed. The political-economic model in most Western countries over the past twenty-five years has been liberal democracy, imposed by the United States after the Cold War, expressed through culture, education, language, and other societal aspects, and continues to this day. (Dabat & Leal, 2019) In summary, the concept of “World Order” reflects the understanding that the United States maintained global hegemony over the past twenty-five years. This was due to its superior economic and military capacity, which shaped the political actions of other Western countries that adopted the pre-established model (liberal democracy). This allowed the U.S. to stimulate its market, thereby reinforcing and perpetuating its hegemony. Crisis of the 20th-Century “World Order” The World Order is affected by constant crises, as previously noted, but it is currently in a phase referred to as the “Interregnum.” This definition, noted by Gramsci, is understood as the midpoint where nothing is fully defined. It is a neutral moment, where there is neither progress nor regression, reached either because the dominant forces are unable to maintain their hegemony without detaching from coercive tools or, conversely, because the forces of change are insufficient to achieve their objectives. (Sanahuja Perales, 2022) This “stalemate” generates conflicts not only between countries but also within society itself. The post-capitalist economic model responds to this issue. Due to the technological rise of mass communication (social media) and the constant need to produce to sustain the model, problems of social identity emerge. As the identity of the “self” disappears, the identity of the “we” is eliminated; society itself disappears, leaving only a sum of undefined societies with shared problems such as anxiety and depression, which validate themselves through social media that consumes them. (Touraine & Guilpain Peuliard, 2016) The “World Order” after the Cold War established a globalizing mechanism that led to a paradigm of worldwide impoverishment, which is paradoxical to the intended outcome. This can be explained by the fact that the new production model adopted by large corporations sought to regress in social standards, promoting increased profits and reduced costs. This led major factories to relocate to countries where social policies were more easily circumvented, ignoring the regulations of their countries of origin, nullifying the consequences of their actions, and impoverishing the capacity of these populations to recover economically and socially. Consequently, this created not only a model of economic crisis but also a process of global social injustice with long-term consequences. (Chomsky, 2001) It is important to understand that the 20th-century “World Order” was not only afflicted by moral issues but also by global crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. In this context, international organizations demonstrated their inability to prevent the very problems they were originally established to address. It is essential for international organizations to promote new guidelines that cover sensitive issues such as global health. Within this framework, the “New World Order” is characterized by a human-centered approach and common development objectives. (Caldera Ynfante, 2020) To address the challenge of identifying problems affecting the international community, CEPLAN developed a series of nine “megatrends,” which are: population aging, increased global urbanization, a poly-nodal world, growing social inequalities and persistent social conflicts, crises of liberalism and globalization, changes in disease patterns and health systems, scarcity of natural resources, climate change and environmental degradation, and accelerated technological innovation and development. While these megatrends focus on the Peruvian context, they were formulated considering international agendas such as the 2030 Agenda and prospective analyses. (Observatorio Nacional de Prospectiva, n.d.) Emergence of the “New World Order” Under these circumstances, it becomes necessary to renew definitions and ask: are we still in the post–Cold War era? The answer is no, and it is necessary to present updated sociological and international relations categories. For this reason, the term “New World Order” is used when analyzing factors such as deindustrialization, failures in multilateralism, and the emergence of new powers capable of determining and imposing new positions. (Ramírez Montañez & Sarmiento Suárez, 2021) A large amount of studies presents a central point: the United States is losing its hegemonic control. This can be explained by the policies adopted by different governments, the economic decline due to historical recessions such as that of 2008, the absence of a political model to replace the failed attempt at liberal democracy in the region, internal social crises caused by various factors, and the emergence of China as an antagonist to its objectives. (Lechuga Cardozo & Leyva Cordero, 2020) United States and Hard Power The foreign policy of the United States has been widely studied by international relations scholars. It is often the focus of imaginative interpretations that sometimes verge on the absurd. Naturally, it is necessary to study such an important country with historical and economic significance with objectivity. After the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers, U.S. foreign policy took on a singular purpose: to be the world’s foremost power. This entails determining the direction of global affairs, whether through diplomatic or coercive means — military or economic. The various tools used to achieve this purpose have included multilateralism (as seen during the Obama and Biden administrations) and the radical unilateralism presented by Trump. (Domínguez López, 2021) This doctrine, however, has a history that predates the Twin Towers. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States promoted the creation of international organizations, learning from the failures of those established after World War I. These new international organizations were intended to preserve peace and develop new mechanisms for political and economic cooperation. Naturally, as the victorious power of both World Wars, and in the absence of a figure of comparable stature, the U.S. determined the future of these organizations, their purposes, and their rules. (Barbé, 1995) It is therefore necessary to understand that U.S. domestic policy effectively became its foreign policy. In other words, every state seeks to maintain order within its territory, continuously develop, and achieve a peak that can be consistently surpassed. This was how the United States viewed the world: as its canvas. (Lascano, Vedia & Colotta, 2020) Theoretically, the U.S. has a clear distinction from other states regarding hard power. Hard power is defined as a country’s military capability at strategic points around the world. The United States maintains military bases in various parts of the globe, on islands and specific territories, to impose its authority. (Peña Galindo, 2018) This military power is accompanied by economic power derived from arms development. War serves as a mean to develop the American industry, whose involvement — necessary from a business standpoint, though not necessarily military — has become central to debates due to the close relationship between political power, state structure, and the military-industrial complex. (Lorden Zeddies, 2023) The US model has been vigorously copied by various political figures. For example, Jair Bolsonaro, a member of Brazil’s right-wing party, positioned himself as a “Latin American Trump.” (Rodrigues, 2019) This demonstrates the influence of American doctrine on Western countries. Bolsonaro is not the only figure in the region; others include Javier Milei and Nayib Bukele, while in Europe, Giorgia Meloni serves as a counterpart. In the most recent U.S. elections held on November 5, 2024, Donald Trump won the presidency of the White House again. This would be his second term, and his positions, rather than moderating, became increasingly radical. His slogan, “Make America Great Again,” calls for a historical revision of what the United States represented in the world, from a colonialist perspective. Additionally, his various speeches against Mexican immigrants have been characterized as xenophobic. (Bussaja, 2024) It is evident, then, that the U.S. stance continues to be one of maintaining dominance and hegemony. The New Giant: China Xi Jinping assumed leadership of the People’s Republic of China in 2013. His first objective was the creation of a “New Silk Road,” referencing the Silk Road of the 2nd century that connected Europe, Africa, and Asia. This new route was designed to connect China with the rest of the world, opening its markets and leaving behind its historically insular past. (Zhongguo, 2019) This initiative also reflects the early stages of Jinping’s domestic policy based on soft power. The theory of soft power defines a country’s influence through economic strategy. In other words, it involves intervening in international markets to the extent necessary — or even obligatory — for the countries involved in the global landscape. In most cases, this is manifested through the accumulation of ports in different countries, controlled or financed by a single nation, with priority given to these key points as essential for its development. (Peña Galindo, 2018) This strategy not only promotes the economic development of a state but also enables the formulation of new political relationships. In China’s case, we see outreach to Japan, India, and Russia. (Rosas, 2008) Naturally, China initially sought to engage with these countries due to geographic proximity, but over time, and with the growth of its industry, it sought relationships with more distant nations. In Latin America and the Caribbean, China has established various agreements on economic, political, and social cooperation. However, as can be inferred, these initiatives have limitations due to China’s cultural gaps; while China seeks to open its cultural world to Latin America — and vice versa — the result is not an intercultural process but rather a multicultural one. (Staiano, 2019) This approach poses a challenge for the United States. In Latin America, the U.S. has historically held strong influence, but its challenges in various areas have allowed China to enter Latin markets freely. Countries in the region are not indifferent to China’s initiatives. The Chinese market offers cheaper products, more technologically advanced goods, and cultural visibility for the general public. (Zapata & Martínez-Hernández, 2020) A clear example of China’s soft power in South America is the Chancay mega-port in Peru. This port opens multiple opportunities for the region and the world. Asian products cost less and take fewer days to arrive. It increases tariff revenue in Peru and promotes the development of economic corridors in the region. (Villagra, 2023) Finally, China’s strategy is historically grounded in the “Century of Humiliation,” a historical period that continues to affect the Chinese Communist Party’s self-perception. Since China’s opening to the international market, measures have been taken to achieve the overarching goal: to “cleanse” its history. Communication strategies such as the “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy,” Peripheral Diplomacy, and its new international relations model based on win-win principles have made Xi Jinping one of the most recognized and lauded leaders when evaluated objectively in historical context. (Mazuelos Chávez, 2022) China vs. the United States The power dynamic between the U.S. and China has persisted over time. During his presidency, Obama made decisions that marked a rapprochement with China, but this paradigm shifted under Trump’s administration, which adopted a protectionist and nationalist policy line, culminating in a tariff war in 2018. China, on the other hand, maintained its party ideals, and under Xi Jinping, distanced itself from any hegemonic ambitions, promoting economic engagement with peripheral countries, respect for international organizations, and goodwill in international politics. (Barrera G et al., 2021) China’s stance is evident in the increase of exports to various countries. In multiple conferences, President Xi Jinping consolidated China’s economic openness, generating investment confidence in other countries by presenting a strong economic ally that does not interfere in domestic politics. Furthermore, economic exchanges benefit both parties. (Xu, 2021) Thus, on one hand, the U.S. seeks to protect its economy by radicalizing protectionist measures, triggering a tariff war, disturbing the international context, and increasing tensions with the Asian continent. Meanwhile, China’s economic model functions effectively as long as it opens itself to other countries, proposing alliances that mutually benefit both sides. Consequently, in the years leading up to the coronavirus pandemic, a confrontation between China and the U.S. was anticipated. By 2021, all signs pointed to an inevitable economic clash. Beyond tariff measures, questions arose as to whether China might repeat the same mistakes the U.S. made in managing hegemony, which have been analyzed over time and through unfolding events. (Gerig, 2021) Under these tensions, the U.S. emphasized that its intentions revolved more around physical warfare than economic conflict. Unlike China, the U.S. has allies that are more strategically positioned militarily but weaker economically. This is why a military agenda is promoted: in a hypothetical conflict, U.S. military capacity, combined with access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, its military bases, and its industrial complex, would tilt the balance of war in its favor. Strategically, China has greater capacity to influence peripheral markets, making it difficult for the U.S. to initiate a conflict, as it would lack long-term trading partners, discouraging its production chain. (Gerig, 2021) Eventually, both countries need each other to maintain economic and technological development. China has independently developed innovative technologies but requires a large market to justify its multi-million-dollar investments, while the U.S. keeps many of its factories in China due to low labor costs. Trump’s first-term policies were later moderated by Biden, who adopted a more conciliatory approach, opening diplomatic channels while still emphasizing the importance of maintaining U.S. hegemony. (Fernández Tabío, 2022) So, where did this confrontation materialize? By 2023, Latin America became the preferred arena for both countries. Both sides recognized its importance, and peripheral economies were the center of attention. The notable difference between the two was, once again, their engagement strategy. The U.S. took a coercive approach toward Panama, whereas China approached Peru through port investments, creating new maritime routes that benefit the entire southern continent. (Carbajal-Glass, 2023) By 2024, with Trump’s second administration, the U.S. strongly opposed the rise of Asia, returning to isolationism. China maintained its perspective of mutual cooperation, while the U.S. pursued a militaristic stance, attempting to obstruct China’s cooperative development with Latin America and India. Even so, U.S. efforts were insufficient to prevent Asia’s engagement with other Western countries. Currently, China holds significant influence in Europe, Africa, and Latin America. (Nascimento, 2024) Discussion After conducting this comprehensive analysis of the “World Order” and its evolution into the “New World Order,” it becomes clear that the struggle for hegemony occurs between China and the United States. This confrontation is primarily economic, although it has cultural, military, social, and political dimensions. It is not comparable to the Cold War, but the term is used as a representation of a past that seems to echo in the present. (Crivelaro Neto, 2024) The “New World Order” for the 21st century represents a context of economic, political, military, cultural, and social crisis. The confrontation between these two major powers defines the current trajectory of the world. Countries that lack the capacity to participate in this confrontation (peripheral economies) nevertheless become geostrategic points of contention. This is evident in the case of Latin America. The diplomatic and cooperative relationships that China has built in recent years have strengthened its ability to confront the United States. (Rosas, 2008) The geopolitical landscape is fraught with uncertainty generated by the development of the conflict itself, making it difficult to establish definitive guidelines or perspectives in the analysis. The U.S., through its foreign policy, seeks to maintain its hegemony. Donald Trump exemplifies this approach. The American perspective is to prevent any other country from determining what should be done. This approach is not only aimed at countering China, which has become its primary adversary, but also applies to other countries, including the European Union, which remains its ally. China presents itself as the leader of this “New World Order” through its alliances in Asia and Latin America because it possesses the greatest capacity to confront the U.S., withstand policies directed against it, and develop new strategies through economic and technological development, preventing the U.S. from achieving international stability. The global reality (New World Order) is, in any case, a multipolar system. Finally, the United States faces multiple challenges. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, several events have contributed to its weakening. Moreover, the Biden administration has left a significant debt to the American people, and the crisis of liberal democracies continues to deepen. Trump represents the American mindset, while Xi Jinping is its most important adversary. This confrontation will ultimately be resolved with a single winner in a zero-sum equation. Conclusions Addressing the main objective of this research, the “New World Order” projected for the 21st century is the conflict between China and the United States. This impasse, as discussed, represents a deadlock in the international arena. It is necessary to allow more time for events to unfold. In due course, a winner will emerge in this economic contest. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the United States remains at the forefront, and figures such as Donald Trump clearly exemplify the country’s continued hegemonic perspective. In the case of China, Xi Jinping’s government has marked a decisive shift in foreign policy, achieving what the reform and opening period did not: transforming China into an international market. Only time will determine whether it can withstand U.S. measures. Furthermore, it is essential to closely observe, despite the party’s secrecy, the geopolitical actions that the Chinese Communist Party undertakes. Finally, the confrontation between the United States and China, in economic terms, is real and affects the entire world. It impacts the development of new international policies, the emergence of social and health crises, and the formulation of new bilateral agreements between states thousands of kilometers apart. This confrontation represents the “New World Order” — an order without a concrete order — something only time can define, perhaps as a precursor to an international paradigm shift. References Barbé, Esther. (1995). Relaciones internacionales. Tecnos. Barrera G, R. A., Suárez G, L., & Ospina, L. M. (2021). La balanza comercial de América Latina con China y Estados Unidos en el contexto de la guerra comercial entre Trump y Xi Jinping. Cuadernos Latinoamericanos de administración, 17(33). https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4096/409672512004/409672512004.pdf Bobbio, Norberto., & Matteucci, Nicola. (1981a). Diccionario de política. abcchdefghij (1a ed., Vol. 1). Siglo Veintiuno. Bobbio, Norberto., & Matteucci, Nicola. (1981b). Diccionario de política. klmnopqrstuvwxyz (1a ed., Vol. 2). Siglo Veintiuno. Bussaja, J. (2024). Make America Great Again (MAGA): The Covert Call for Colonialism’s Comeback. SSRN Electronic Journal, 1–11. https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.4790796 Caldera Ynfante, J. (2020). Biocracia y derecho fundamental al nuevo orden mundial en la postpandemia COVID-19. Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana, 25(4), 33–48. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3931044 Carbajal-Glass, F. (2023). Riesgo político, seguridad y geopolítica: América Latina y la competencia estratégica Estados Unidos-China. URVIO Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad, 36, 104–117. https://doi.org/10.17141/URVIO.36.2023.5842 Chomsky, N. (2001). Democracia y mercados en el nuevo orden mundial. Globalización y sindicalismo, 1, 47–83. Cox, R. (2013). Fuerzas sociales, estados y órdenes mundiales: Más allá de la Teoría de Relaciones Internacionales. Relaciones Internacionales, 24, 129–162. https://repositorio.uam.es/bitstream/handle/10486/677391/RI_24_7.pdf Crivelaro Neto, D. (2024). CHINA X EUA: RESTABELECIMENTO DA COMPETIÇÃO PELA LIDERANÇA DA ECONOMIA MUNDIAL. Revista Contemporânea, 4(3), e3445. https://doi.org/10.56083/RCV4N3-178 Dabat, A., & Leal, P. (2019). Ascenso y declive de Estados Unidos en la hegemonía mundial. Problemas del desarrollo, 50(199), 87–114. https://doi.org/10.22201/IIEC.20078951E.2019.199.67934 Domínguez López, E. (2021). De Bush 43 a Biden: cambios en el sistema-mundo y ajustes de política exterior en Estados Unidos. Política Internacional, 3(2), 27–42. Duque-Vargas, N.-H. (2021). Educación para una cultura de paz en el orden mundial posguerra fría. Revista Guillermo de Ockham, 19(2), 277–292. https://doi.org/10.21500/22563202.4086 Fernández Tabío, L. R. (2022). Estados Unidos, geoeconomía y pugna hegemónica con China. Política Internacional, 4(3), 19–31. https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/7620/762081507003.pdf Gerig, M. (2021). El retorno de la Trampa de Tucídides: la Gran Estrategia de Estados Unidos y China frente a la disputa hegemónica desde la perspectiva de la economía política de sistemas-mundo. Geopolítica(s). Revista de estudios sobre espacio y poder, 12(1), 99–122. https://doi.org/10.5209/geop.68341 Lascano y Vedia, J. R., & Colotta, M. (2020). Formulación de una política exterior: su dimensión política y social. Revista Relaciones Internacionales, 29(59), 103–130. Lechuga Cardozo, J. I., & Leyva Cordero, O. (2020). Escenarios 2020 del Orden Mundial. Análisis desde la Prospectiva Estratégica. Ánfora, 27(48), 137–161. https://doi.org/10.30854/anf.v27.n48.2020.672 Lorden Zeddies, N. (2023). Defensa y negocios: el complejo industrial militar en los Estados Unidos [Universidad Europea]. https://titula.universidadeuropea.com/handle/20.500.12880/5577 Mazuelos Chávez, J. A. (2022). El sueño chino de rejuvenecimiento nacional y la política exterior bajo Xi Jinping. Agenda Internacional, 29(40), 31–55. https://doi.org/10.18800/agenda.202201.002 Nascimento, L. G. do. (2024). La geoeconomía y geopolítica de las rivalidades China-Estados Unidos en las estrategias del Asia-Pacífico vs Indo-Pacífico. Relaciones Internacionales, 57, 191–207. https://doi.org/10.15366/RELACIONESINTERNACIONALES2024.57.010 Observatorio Nacional de Prospectiva. (s. f.). Recuperado 16 de octubre de 2025, de https://observatorio.ceplan.gob.pe/megatendencia Peña Galindo, A. (2018). ¿Soft power o Hard power? Reflexiones teóricas sobre la política exterior brasileña. Revista Relaciones Internacionales y Estrategias de seguridad, 13(2), 97–121. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/6819790.pdf Ramírez Montañez, J., & Sarmiento Suárez, J. (2021). Nuevo orden internacional a inicios de la segunda década del siglo XXI. Estudios Internacionales, 52(197), 153–166. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-3769.2020.55138 Rodrigues, G. (2019). ¿EL TRUMP DEL TRÓPICO? POLÍTICA EXTERIOR DE ULTRADERECHA EN BRASIL. Análisis Carolina, 06, 1–11. Rosas, M. C. (2008). China y Estados Unidos en el siglo XXI: ¿hacia una nueva bipolaridad? Comercio exterior, 58(3), 198–217. Sanahuja Perales, J. A. (2022). Interregno. La actualidad de un orden mundial en crisis. Nueva Sociedad, 302, 86–94. https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/72807 Sanz Díaz, C., & Sáenz-Rotko, J. M. (2022). ¿Segunda Guerra Fría? Un análisis desde la Historia y las Relaciones Internacionales. Relaciones Internacionales, 51, 167–184. https://doi.org/10.15366/RELACIONESINTERNACIONALES2022.51.009 Schulz, J. S. (2023). Crisis sistémica del orden mundial, transición hegemónica y nuevos actores en el escenario global. Cuadernos de Nuestra América, 3, 34–50. https://ri.conicet.gov.ar/handle/11336/206913 Staiano, M. F. (2019). La relaciones internacionales entre China y América Latina: encontrando un camino común hacia un nuevo orden mundial. Anuario en Relaciones Internacionales del IRI, 1–10. http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/95952 Touraine, Alain., & Guilpain Peuliard, Odile. (2016). El fin de las sociedades. Fondo de Cultura Económica. Villagra, M. E. (2023). Megapuerto de Chancay: Repercusiones en el Comercio Sudamericano e Impacto Geoestratégico. Revista Seguridad y Poder Terrestre, 2(2), 75–86. https://doi.org/10.56221/SPT.V2I2.28 Xu, Y. (2021). Los efectos internos de la apertura exterior de la Economía China [Universidad de Valladolid]. https://uvadoc.uva.es/bitstream/handle/10324/52272/TFG-J-341.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Zapata, S., & Martínez-Hernández, A. A. (2020). Latin American Foreign Policy before the hegemony of the United States and China’s emerging power. Colombia Internacional, 104, 63–93. https://doi.org/10.7440/COLOMBIAINT104.2020.03 Zhongguo, J. (2019). La Nueva Ruta de la Seda: Universalismo y pluriversalismo para un nuevo orden mundial. Memoria Académica, 32, 24–46. https://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/art_revistas/pr.13112/pr.13112.pdfInformaciónadicionalenwww.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar

Diplomacy
Flag USA and China on Computer Chip . Global chip shortage crisis and China-United States trade war concept.

Leading States in the Race for Artificial Intelligence in the Current International System

by Danna Fernanda Mena Navarro

1. Introduction: AI as a Reconfiguration of the Global Order Artificial intelligence (AI) has become one of the most influential factors shaping the contemporary international system. Major powers are competing to lead the new technological revolution that impacts the economy, security, foreign policy, defense, communications, and scientific innovation. The development of AI depends on three strategic inputs: 1. Human talent (research, data engineering, mathematics, computer science). 2. Computational capacity and access to large volumes of data. 3. Robust innovation ecosystems, with companies, universities, and aligned industrial policies. Global spending on artificial intelligence is expected to exceed USD 52 billion over the next three years, consolidating AI as the central axis of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (IDC, 2023; Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). 2. Talent as a Global Strategic Resource More than 60% of top AI researchers work in the United States, and about half of them are immigrants, primarily from China, India, Europe, and Iran (Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). The so-called brain drain is not merely an academic issue, but a geopolitical one: • States compete to attract talent through visas, high salaries, and access to frontier laboratories. • Innovation in AI depends on who concentrates the largest amount of specialized human capital. The United States dominates due to its ability to attract international researchers, while China compensates through massive investment and domestic talent production. 3. The United States Leads the AI Race for Three Main Structural Reasons 1. Innovation, talent, and industry: The United States leads in high-impact research publications and AI startups (more than 50% worldwide). Private investment exceeded USD 350 billion in 2023 alone. Key companies include Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, NVIDIA, Tesla, and IBM, among others. 2. Computational infrastructure and chips: The country concentrates the most advanced computational infrastructure and controls cutting-edge chips (such as the NVIDIA H100), a resource that China cannot yet produce at the same level. 3. AI and national security: The United States allocates more than 16 federal agencies and billions of dollars annually to AI development for defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence (White House AI Budget, 2024). 4. China: The Emerging Superpower on the AI Path China ranks second globally in the AI race but follows a more aggressive, centralized, and ambitious strategy. • Massive investment as state policy: China has pledged to invest more than USD 150 billion by 2030 in AI under its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP) (Government of China, 2017). • Domestic talent production: China trains more AI engineers than any other country. Annual graduates in science and engineering reach 4.7 million, compared to 600,000 in the United States (UNESCO, 2023). However, a significant portion migrates to the U.S. due to better research conditions. • China’s role in the global AI industry: China leads in AI-based facial recognition, with generative AI startups such as Baidu, SenseTime, Alibaba Cloud, and Tencent AI Lab. It produces massive numbers of publications, although with lower scientific impact than those from the United States. AI is widely implemented in governance, security, and smart cities. • The chip dilemma: China depends on advanced semiconductors produced only by Taiwan (TSMC), South Korea (Samsung), and the United States/Netherlands (ASML). • Export controls: Export restrictions imposed on China since 2022 limit its ability to train frontier models, although the country is making radical investments to achieve chip sovereignty. 5. Europe, India, Israel, Canada, and Other Relevant Actors • Europe: The United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the Netherlands generate a solid ecosystem in algorithmic ethics, digital regulation (AI Act), and applied research. • India: The world’s main hub of engineering talent and a global provider of technological services. • Israel: A powerhouse in cybersecurity and military AI, with per-capita innovation comparable to Silicon Valley. • Canada: The birthplace of deep learning (Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio) and a strong center for basic research. 6. Africa on the AI Chessboard: Intentions, Challenges, and Opportunities Although Africa does not lead the AI race, its geopolitical role is growing rapidly for four strategic reasons. Africa is a major producer of critical minerals. AI depends on lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements, and Africa holds 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves (in the DRC), as well as other strategic minerals in Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, and Mozambique. This places the continent in a key position within the supply chains for batteries, computers, and data centers. There is also a rapid expansion of digital infrastructure. China, through Huawei and ZTE, has built around 70% of Africa’s 4G network, as well as Ethiopia’s first smart data center and technology innovation hubs in Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Africa is entering the AI space through fintech, digital health, smart agriculture, and biometric systems. In terms of AI policy, African countries with formal AI strategies include Egypt, Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa. • Threats and challenges: limited computational infrastructure, a deep digital divide, the risk of dependence on external technological solutions, the use of AI for political surveillance (as seen in Ethiopia and Uganda), and a shortage of specialized talent. 7. China and Africa: The Intersection of AI, Data, and Geopolitics China combines its role in AI with its influence in Africa through investments in digital infrastructure, the sale of surveillance systems, the construction of data centers, and technical training programs. This creates interdependence but also raises concerns: Africa could become dependent on Chinese systems that are difficult to replace. Data may become centralized on foreign platforms, and the risk of a technological debt trap adds to existing financial dependence. 8. AI, Regulation, and Global Governance The rapid expansion of AI calls for international treaties on data use, security standards, limits on military automation, and ethical regulations to protect civil society. Governance will be decisive in determining not only who leads, but also how this technology will be used in the coming decades. In this context, global AI governance has become a new field of geopolitical competition. While the European Union promotes a regulatory approach based on human rights and risk prevention, the United States favors market self-regulation and innovation, and China advances a model of state control and technological sovereignty. Multilateral organizations such as the UN, the OECD, and the G20 have begun discussing common principles, but there is still no binding international regime. The absence of clear rules increases the risks of an algorithmic arms race, the use of AI for mass surveillance, and the deepening of global inequalities in access to and control over technology. 9. Conclusions The United States leads due to innovation, global talent attraction, and computational capacity. China follows closely with a comprehensive state-led strategy and dominance in global digital infrastructure. Europe, India, Israel, and Canada contribute key elements to the global ecosystem. Africa, while not a leader, occupies an increasingly strategic role due to its resources, data, markets, and alliances. The race for AI will define not only the global economy, but also the balance of power in the international system of the 21st century. References -Stanford University.(2024). AI Index Report 2024. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2024-ai-index-report?utm_source=chatgpt.com -International Data Corporation. (2023). Worldwide Artificial Intelligence Spending Guide. IDC. https://www.idc.com/data-analytics/spending-guide/ -State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2017). Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. Government of China https://fi.china-embassy.gov -UNESCO. (2023). Global Education Monitoring Report: science, technology, engineering and mathematics. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. https://www.unesco.org/en -The White House. (2024). Federal AI Budget and National AI Strategy. Executive Office of the President of the United States. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/eliminating-state-law-obstruction-of-national-artificial-intelligence-policy/ -European Commission.(2023).Artificial Intelligence Act. Publications Office of the European Union. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai -Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2023). OECD. Artificial Intelligence Policy Observatory. https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/artificial-intelligence.html

Diplomacy
Prime Minister's Office (GODL-India), GODL-India <https://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/Gazette_Notification_OGDL.pdf>, via Wikimedia Commons

Media statements by the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of India

by Vladimir Putin , Narendra Modi

Following Russian-Indian talks, Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi made statements for the media. The statements were preceded by a ceremony for the exchange of signed documents. Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi (retranslated): Your Excellency Vladimir Putin, my dear friend, Representatives of the two countries, and our friends from India, good afternoon. I am delighted to welcome President Putin to the 23rd Russia–India Annual Summit. President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India is taking place at a time marked by several historical dates in our relations. President Putin laid the groundwork for our strategic cooperation 25 years ago, and 15 years ago, in 2010, we upgraded our partnership to the level of a special privileged strategic partnership. Over the past 25 years, President Putin has been relentless in promoting these relations by demonstrating his wise leadership and vision. Regardless of the circumstances, it is his leadership that has reinforced our mutual relations and enabled us to achieve new heights. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to President Putin for his friendship and for his unwavering commitment to working with India. Friends, The world has faced numerous ups and downs over the past 80 years, during which humankind has had to endure many crises and challenges. And throughout this time, the friendship between Russia and India has successfully weathered these storms. These relations are based on mutual respect and deep trust and have invariably stood the test of time. Today, we discussed our ties and cooperation in all their aspects with a view to creating an even more solid foundation. We want to reinforce our economic cooperation and elevate it to a new level. This is the objective we share and it is our shared priority. To make this a reality, we have agreed to implement a programme for economic cooperation until 2030. It will provide for diversifying our trade and investment, making them more balanced and sustainable. At the same time, it will help unlock new dimensions in our cooperation. Today, President Putin and I will be taking part in the Russia–India Business Forum. I am convinced that this platform will also help strengthen our business ties and open new doors for exports, joint manufacture and technical innovation. Both countries have been proactive in working on a free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and our country. Our cooperation in agriculture and fertilizers is extremely important for our food security and the prosperity of our farmers. I am happy that our countries will work together to promote our mutual production of urea. Friends, Promoting connectivity between our countries is another priority for us. We will redouble our efforts regarding the discussions on the North-South International Transport Corridor and the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor. I am confident that we will effectively cooperate in the interests of promoting polar trade via local trade routes. We have offered an opportunity to strengthen our cooperation in the Arctic, which will create new jobs for Indian young people. At the same time, our deep cooperation in shipbuilding will help us boost our joint initiatives. This is yet another important example of our mutually beneficial cooperation, which is increasing the number of jobs and skills while strengthening regional connectivity. Energy security is another important pillar of partnership between Russia and India. Our cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy, which is rooted in our history, has helped us uphold our commitment to providing clean energy, which is extremely important for both countries. I have no doubt that our mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of critical minerals will also be important for a safe and diversified provision of resources to the world. We also maintain our cooperation in such areas as clean energy, high technologies and modern industries. Friends, Our cultural relations and ties between individual representatives of our countries are of special importance for relations between Russia and India. Over the past decades, our peoples have demonstrated respect and admiration for each other’s cultures, and we have coordinated various measures to further strengthen this cooperation. The recent opening of two Indian consulates in Russia is a significant step forward, facilitating contacts for all our citizens and bringing our nations even closer together. This October, hundreds of thousands of pilgrims received blessings at the sacred relics of Buddha Shakyamuni in Kalmykia. I am confident that we will soon implement a 30-day visa-free regime for tourist groups, which will greatly enhance travel between our countries. This measure will not only bring our peoples closer but also invigorate our societies and unlock new opportunities. I am therefore pleased that today we were able to sign two key agreements to advance this initiative. Our collaboration will also deepen in education and professional development, including through increased student and academic exchanges. Friends, Today, we discussed a range of pressing regional and global issues. On Ukraine, India’s position has been consistent from the outset: we stand for peace. We welcome all initiatives and efforts aimed at achieving a peaceful, long-term resolution of this conflict. India has always been ready to support such efforts, and we will continue to do so. India and Russia have always supported one another and worked shoulder to shoulder in the fight against terrorism. The terrorist attack in Pahalgam and the cowardly atrocity at Crocus City Hall are connected by a common, hateful ideology. India firmly believes that terrorism constitutes a direct assault on universal human values. Our unity within the global community is the only effective way to combat this evil. We cooperate closely within the UN, the G20, the SCO, BRICS, and other multilateral forums. We will continue this essential dialogue and cooperation across all these platforms. Your Excellency, I am confident that our enduring friendship will provide the strength needed to address global challenges. Together, we can help lead the way towards a more prosperous future. Once again, I thank you and all members of your delegation for your visit to India. Thank you very much. President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr. Prime Minister, dear friend, Ladies and gentlemen, My sincere thanks to the President of the Republic of India, Droupadi Murmu, to you, Mr Prime Minister, and to all our Indian colleagues for the exceptionally warm and cordial welcome extended to the Russian delegation. The discussions we have just concluded with our Indian colleagues, along with our highly productive one-on-one conversation last night – for which I thank you again, Mr Modi, for your generous hospitality – were held in a constructive and friendly spirit, reflecting the privileged partnership between Russia and India. I would note that the Prime Minister and I have established a close working and personal rapport. We have met at the SCO summit in September, we maintain regular contact by telephone and personally oversee the development of our strategic cooperation across all key areas, as well as the progress of major bilateral projects. Today, with the participation of our delegations, we conducted a thorough and comprehensive review of the entire spectrum of Russian-Indian cooperation. We also exchanged views on current international and regional issues. The joint statement we have adopted outlines clear priorities for advancing our ties in politics, security, trade, the economy, and cultural and humanitarian affairs. As you have seen, this was complemented by the signing of a substantial package of intergovernmental, interdepartmental, and corporate agreements. Many of these documents are aimed at expanding our economic partnership. This is only natural, as our nations are important partners in trade, investment, and technology. Last year, our bilateral trade grew by a further 12 percent, reaching a new record. While various estimates differ slightly, the consensus places the figure somewhere between US$64 and US$65 billion. We project trade will stand at a comparable level by year’s end. That said, we believe there is clear potential to increase this volume to US$100 billion. To realise this ambitious goal, we have now agreed upon a joint Programme for the Development of Russian-Indian Economic Cooperation until 2030. This comprehensive roadmap provides clear guidelines. Our intergovernmental commission and the relevant economic ministries and agencies are tasked with removing barriers to the flows of goods and capital, implementing joint industrial projects, and deepening our collaboration in technology and investment. Today, His Excellency the Prime Minister shared a comprehensive list of issues with us. It goes without saying that both Russia and India will be extremely diligent and responsive in reviewing them. Make no mistake, we will work on this matter. Of course, having India create a free trade zone with the Eurasian Economic Union would help boost Russia-India business ties. The effort to draft an agreement to this effect is already in progress. I must express my satisfaction with the fact that the two countries have been consistent in their commitment to switching to national currencies in mutual transactions. Their share in business deals has already reached 96 percent. Our two countries have developed resilient interbank channels for lending and financial transactions. Russian economic actors have been making wider use of the rupees they generate from export contracts. Major joint projects receive their funding in Russian rubles. There has been positive momentum in our energy partnership. Russia is a reliable supplier of energy resources and everything India needs for developing its energy sector. We are ready to continue ensuring uninterrupted fuel supplies for the Indian economy to support its rapid expansion. Of course, our bilateral energy cooperation goes far beyond this horizon. The flagship project to build India’s biggest NPP, Kudankulam, is underway. Two out of six reactors have been connected to the power grid, while the other four are in the engineering and construction stages. Once this NPP reaches its full capacity, it will make a meaningful contribution to India’s energy mix, helping Indian companies and households access affordable and clean energy. We believe that building small modular reactors and floating NPPs could also be relevant, just as using nuclear technology for non-energy purposes, including in healthcare, agriculture and other sectors. We are also working with our Indian partners to create new effective international transport logistics routes. This includes a project to create the North-South corridor linking Russia and Belarus to the Indian Ocean. Infrastructure development along the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, including the Northern Sea Route as its main artery, offers ample opportunities for expanding bilateral trade. There are many other economic sectors in which Russia and India have built a positive track record. We are working on joint initiatives in manufacturing, machine building, digital technology, space exploration and other research-intensive domains. For example, a business agreement that was signed as part of the visit provides for building a major Russian-Indian pharmaceutical plant in the Kaluga Region for producing high-quality anticancer medicine using cutting-edge Indian technology. At the same time, Russian companies will start producing their goods as part of the Make in India programme, which is Prime Minister Modi’s flagship project. Prospects for strengthening interaction between Russian and Indian entrepreneurs and business communities are being discussed in detail at the business forum that is currently underway in New Delhi. Mr Prime Minister and I will attend its plenary session later today. Russian-Indian humanitarian cooperation is ongoing in many spheres. Our peoples have been sincerely interested in each other’s traditions, history and spiritual values for centuries. Our scientific and educational contacts, as well as youth and public exchanges are actively developing. The regular cross festivals of Russian and Indian films invariably enjoy success. Mutual tourist flows grow every year. The Russian RT channel will begin broadcasting to India today. This will certainly help the Indian audience learn more about Russia and Russians and acquire objective information about current developments in our country. Our discussions on key global and regional issues have reaffirmed the similarity of our countries’ positions. Russia and India pursue an independent and sovereign foreign policy. We are working together with our allies in BRICS, the SCO and other countries of the Global Majority to promote the shaping of a more just and democratic multipolar world order, and to protect the fundamental principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter. These include the right of every country to its own path of development, the preservation of its own cultural and civilisational identity, respect for sovereignty and a delicate balance of interests of all members of the international community. Russia and India, as the founding nations of BRICS, have done and continue to do a great deal to enhance the prestige of that organisation. As you know, India will assume the BRICS chairmanship next year. We will provide all-round assistance to our Indian friends in their work on the current BRICS agenda. Of course, I would also like to say that Russia and India have traditionally worked closely together in the military-technical sphere. Our country has been assisting the modernisation of the Indian army, including the air defence, air force and navy, for over 50 years. Overall, we are certainly satisfied with the results of our talks. Our plans include a meeting with President of India Droupadi Murmu. However, I can already express my confidence that this visit and the agreements reached will effectively promote the further strengthening of the Russian-Indian strategic partnership for the benefit of the people of India and Russia. Thank you.

Diplomacy
The Japanese and Chinese flags are being pulled apart, with the Taiwanese flag in the middle. This suggests that Japan's stance is,

Why Japan’s support for Taiwan has gone down so badly in China

by Lewis Eves

Tensions are rising between China and Japan again over a dispute in the East China Sea. Such tensions are usually over the Senkaku Islands, an uninhabited chain administered by Japan but claimed by China. The current row, however, stems from international anxiety over a possible Chinese invasion of democratically ruled Taiwan. On November 17, in her first parliamentary address since taking office in October, Japan’s prime minister Sanae Takaichi suggested that her country could intervene militarily in the event of an attack on Taiwan. Takaichi’s comments sparked anger in China, with state media framing her rhetoric as reminiscent of Japanese acts of violence towards China during the second world war. Beijing has demanded that Takaichi retract her comments – a call she has rebuffed – and is advising Chinese citizens against travelling to Japan, claiming there has been a deterioration in public security there. China has also introduced a blanket ban on Japanese seafood imports as the row continues to escalate. The ruling communist party, which frames itself as the protector of the Chinese nation, has long sought to reunify China following the so-called “century of humiliation”. Starting with the first opium war in 1839 and concluding with the end of the second world war in 1945, this period saw China victimised and partitioned by various foreign powers. Taiwan is thus problematic for the party. The island state broke away from China in 1949 at the end of the Chinese civil war, and its autonomy from Beijing contradicts the goal of national unity that the party has promised. Some observers fear that China will seek reunification through force, with some predictions suggesting it will be ready to invade Taiwan as soon as 2027. There is no guarantee that an invasion will occur. But the international community, led by the US, is preparing for a confrontation over Taiwan regardless. On the same day Takaichi made her comments, the US government announced it had agreed to sell US$700 million (£535 million) of arms to Taiwan. In this context, Japan’s show of support for a strategic partner in the region is not surprising – yet Takaichi’s remarks about Japanese intervention are particularly provocative for China. One reason is that Japan occupied and colonised Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, contributing to China’s century of humiliation. This makes Japanese threats to intervene in Taiwan’s defence a contentious prospect for China to consider. Another reason is that anti-Japanese sentiment is a prominent characteristic of Chinese nationalism. Many Chinese nationalists are vocal in condemning Japan for any provocation, pointing to historical atrocities committed against China as evidence of a need to stay vigilant against renewed Japanese aggression. The idea of Japan intervening to maintain the status quo in what China considers a breakaway province probably falls under their idea of an aggressive act. Will tensions escalate? Outright conflict between China and Japan remains unlikely. It is possible that Takaichi’s remarks were simply an effort to shore up domestic political support, rather than a genuine military threat. Her rightwing Liberal Democratic party (LDP) previously governed Japan in coalition with the centre-right Komeito party. This coalition broke down in October 2025, forcing the LDP to rely increasingly on its nationalist base for support – a group that is generally suspicious of China’s growing military and economic strength. Irrespective of Takaichi’s motive, China has responded assertively. It sent its coast guard to the Senkaku Islands in what it called a “rights enforcement patrol”. The Japanese government has also accused China of flying military drones near Japan’s most westerly territory, Yonaguni, which is close to Taiwan’s east coast. Any misfire risks open hostility between the two nations. The Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan but claimed by China as the Diaoyu Islands. vadimmmus / Shutterstock Relations between Japan and China are tense, yet I see cause for optimism. Takaichi has positioned herself as a successor to the late Shinzo Abe, who served as Japan’s prime minister from 2006 to 2007 and again from 2012 to 2020.Like Takaichi, Abe promoted an assertive Japanese foreign policy. He oversaw reinterpretations of Article 9, the pacifist clause of Japan’s constitution, to lessen restrictions on his country’s use of military force. This included passing legislation in 2015 which allows Japan’s self-defence force to deploy to protect the country’s allies. This legislation has enabled Takaichi to consider military intervention in Taiwan’s favour. When Abe entered office in 2012, it was also a tense time for China and Japan. Japanese nationalist activists swam to the Senkaku Islands and raised their country’s flag, triggering massive anti-Japanese protests in China. Tensions remained high for several years, with both countries deploying ships and warplanes to the region. This resulted in several near-misses that could have escalated into outright conflict. In 2014, Chinese fighter jets flew extremely close to a Japanese surveillance plane and intelligence aircraft near the islands, passing about 30 metres from one plane and 50 metres from another. However, once tensions passed, Abe and China’s leader, Xi Jinping, oversaw several years of relative calm and cooperation between their two countries. In fact, this is usually linked to the familiarity Abe and Xi developed through their interactions while managing their countries’ mutual animosity over the disputed islands. So, if Takaichi can follow her mentor’s lead and successfully navigate the tensions to build an effective working relationship with Xi, a more stable relationship between China and Japan in the future is still possible.

Diplomacy
President Donald Trump greets Chinese President Xi Jinping before a bilateral meeting at the Gimhae International Airport terminal, Thursday, October 30, 2025, in Busan, South Korea. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

Between Tactical Easing and Strategic Confrontation: The Busan Moment in China-US Relations

by Bo Ma , Yiyi Xu

On 30 October 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump held their first in-person meeting since 2019 on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Busan. The encounter marked a cautious “tentative reengagement” after six years of sustained friction, signalling neither a diplomatic thaw nor a substantive breakthrough, but a forced recalibration. Both sides recognised that prolonged confrontation was increasingly costly, yet neither was willing to display strategic vulnerability or compromise on core interests. The central challenge of this “six-year reunion” was how to balance unavoidable competition with limited cooperation. The Busan meeting did not resolve long-standing disputes, but it did illuminate the evolving structure of bilateral engagement: limited economic de-escalation coexisting with sustained tensions in security and technology. Trust remained thin, and risk management defined the tone. Within this framework of cautious interaction and enduring rivalry, both sides resumed dialogue while leaving key structural contradictions unresolved. Tactical Easing: A “Mutual Ceasefire” over Rare Earths and Tariffs Building on preliminary understandings reached during earlier Kuala Lumpur discussions, the Busan meeting yielded limited but concrete outcomes. Washington agreed to suspend part of its planned tariff increases and delay the expansion of export restrictions. Beijing, in turn, postponed implementation of newly announced controls on rare earth elements and related technologies. These reciprocal measures were explicitly time-limited, with a one-year horizon.While framed as mutual concessions, the steps reflected pragmatic political calculations within each country’s domestic context. President Trump sought short-term economic calm to support financial markets and reassure key Midwestern constituencies ahead of the election cycle. Beijing, for its part, aimed to preserve a stable external environment through managed openness, gaining room for continued economic restructuring and technological adaptation. Yet the truce was fragile. China’s decision to delay export controls was not a concession but a strategic withholding of leverage. As the supplier of roughly 60 percent of the world’s mined rare earths – critical to semiconductors, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and US defence platforms such as the F-35—Beijing retains significant influence over global supply chains. The Busan easing was therefore less a structural breakthrough than a tactical pause: a deferral of escalation rather than a resolution of underlying tensions. Diplomatic Silence over Taiwan: Strategic Caution and Latent Risks The Busan meeting made no reference to the Taiwan issue—an omission that is rare in the history of China–US summitry. Following the talks, President Trump remarked that President Xi “understands the consequences” of attempting to seize Taiwan but declined to clarify whether the United States would intervene militarily. Secretary of State Marco Rubio similarly emphasised that Washington would not trade Taiwan’s interests for economic concessions. Taiwan thus became the “elephant in the room”: too consequential to ignore, yet too politically volatile to confront directly. For Beijing, Taiwan constitutes an inviolable sovereignty red line. For Trump, raising the issue risked derailing trade-focused dialogue and undermining his image of diplomatic control. Both leaders chose strategic silence as a means of avoiding escalation. This silence did not indicate convergence, but rather mutual restraint under high pressure. Taiwan has become a latent variable in every round of China–US engagement: absent from formal discussions, yet structurally embedded in the broader strategic equation. The longer it is avoided, the more its political cost accrues. In the future, renewed tensions—whether triggered by trade disputes or maritime incidents in the South China Seas—could rapidly return Taiwan to the center of bilateral confrontation. Taiwan’s “absence” in Busan does not reduce its relevance; it only signals that the crisis has been temporarily displaced from public diplomacy rather than defused. Institutionalised Decoupling: From Policy Choice to Structural Reality The diplomatic silence over Taiwan reflected tactical caution, while at a deeper level, the Busan meeting underscored the entrenched technological and institutional divergence between China and the United States. Trump signalled that US firms such as NVIDIA might engage in selective transactions involving mid-range AI chips, but reaffirmed that the most advanced semiconductor products would remain tightly restricted. This reaffirmed Washington’s “technology defense logic,” in which high-tech rivalry is governed by national security imperatives rather than market access concerns. In Beijing’s view, technological self-sufficiency is equally central to national resilience and regime security. Both sides now frame their strategic contest as a “struggle over national trajectory,” where concession is viewed as structural vulnerability. As a result, each is doubling down on domestic institutional insulation rather than pursuing negotiated guardrails. This bifurcation has produced a dual trajectory: modest stabilisation in trade flows paired with accelerating fragmentation in high-end technologies. Both governments are using this brief “technological cooldown” to advance structural measures. Washington is deepening coordination with allies and expanding export control and investment screening regimes. Beijing, for its part, is formulating new legal instruments—including draft frameworks akin to a Science and Technology Security Law and prospective regulations on critical technologies—to consolidate oversight over strategic sectors. While these initiatives are not yet fully codified, they reflect a clear intent to embed technology governance within national security architecture. In this context, technology has lost its value as a bargaining lever in diplomacy. Both sides tacitly acknowledge that strategic technologies can no longer be traded without compromising sovereignty. Technological decoupling has thus evolved from a temporary response into a systemic condition. The Busan “easing” did not reflect progress toward convergence, but rather a managed pause in an increasingly institutionalised contest. From High-Intensity Confrontation to Managed Competition The Busan meeting marked a shift in China–US relations from high-intensity confrontation to limited management. The two sides temporarily stabilised trade and exercised restraint on political and security fronts, while competition in technological and institutional domains remained entrenched. This was not reconciliation, nor a turning point, but the formation of a provisional equilibrium. For China, Busan offered a space for economic adjustment and accelerated efforts toward technological autonomy. For the United States, it maintained strategic pressure while averting short-term escalation. Beneath the optics of diplomacy, structural divergence and strategic mistrust persist. Across the Indo-Pacific, this “uneasy coexistence” is increasingly becoming the regional default. The significance of Busan lies not in concrete outcomes, but in the shared recognition that strategic confrontation must be managed, even if it cannot yet be resolved. This article was published under a Creative Commons license and may be republished with attribution, check original source for more information.

Diplomacy
Aerial view Panama Canal, third set of locks, water shortages, maritime traffic, water reuse vats, summer drought.

What CK Hutchison told us in the Panama Case?

by Wallace Loo

The attempted sale of CK Hutchison’s Panama Canal operations to the US-based company BlackRock and Terminal Investment Limited was more than a commercial transaction. When Beijing publicly opposed the deal, branding it a betrayal of national interests, it transformed into a case study in how global business is being reshaped by strategic rivalry. The controversy illustrates a deeper question: Can Hong Kong’s leading conglomerates still operate on commercial logic alone, or are they inevitably drawn into the geopolitical contest between the United States and China? For Hutchison, the Panama case shows that the room for neutrality is shrinking. Why does it matter? Beijing’s intervention signals to Hong Kong businesses and foreign investors alike that commercial neutrality is no longer assured. Loyalty, alignment, and political sacrifice are emerging as expectations alongside profit and efficiency. For global decision-makers, this raises two critical issues: Why did Hutchison seek to exit its Panama Canal holdings in the first place? Why did Beijing judge it necessary to intervene in a transaction that, on the surface, was driven by corporate strategy? Why Hutchison sold its Panama Canal operations? 1. Strategic Realignment Toward Core Businesses CK Hutchison has steadily repositioned itself around two “twin engines”, i.e. real estate in Asia and infrastructure in Europe. While ports in Latin America once fit into its global footprint, they were never central to this model. By selling its Panama Canal operations, Hutchison freed resources to consolidate strengths where it sees long-term stability and growth. This is part of a deliberate shift visible over the past decade: acquiring the German infrastructure firm ISTA in 2017 and securing UK regulatory approval in 2024 for the £11 billion merger of Vodafone UK and Hutchison’s subsidiary Three. These moves point to a concentration of capital in Europe’s regulated infrastructure and Asia’s high-demand property markets, underscoring a deliberate pivot toward strengthening European operations and ensuring cash flow visibility. This implies that Hutchison is reducing its exposure and a systematic exit to regions marked by political uncertainty and doubling down on reinvesting into higher-yielding and strategically aligned assets, particularly in European infrastructure platform while deepening its Asian real estate footprint. For governments and investors, this suggests that Hong Kong conglomerates are not retreating from globalization but are planning to recalibrate toward safer, higher-visibility assets. 2. Capitalizing on Market Timing and Asset Valuation The divestment also reflected classic Hutchison discipline: Buying early and exiting when valuations reach the peak. With global demand for strategic infrastructure rising, the Panama Canal assets commanded a premium. The resulting HK$19 billion in proceeds and a sharp rise in share price underlined investor confidence. Such timing underscores Hutchison’s longstanding strategy of opportunistic repositioning. This divestment was both value-accretive and strategically well-timed. By crystallizing gains now, the group strengthens its balance sheet and cash-reserve, maintaining its flexibility to reinvest or return capital to shareholders. For policymakers, this implies that global infrastructure assets are increasingly financialized. Strategic nodes like the Panama Canal are no longer just trade arteries but high-value commodities in global capital markets. Governments must therefore view divestments not only as corporate decisions but as moves that can shift control of strategic assets between geopolitical actors. 3. Geopolitical Considerations and Risk Mitigation The Panama Canal is a corridor of strategic significance and what US-President Donald Trump calls Chinese ownership on the potential dual-use nature of port terminals there inevitably drew scrutiny in Washington. U.S. allies have already tightened the screening of Chinese-linked infrastructure deals and the EU’s 2019 FDI framework explicitly flagged ports as areas requiring “special oversight”. Against this backdrop, Hutchison sought to avoid being cast as a “Chinese state-backed actor”, an extension of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Hutchison has taken deliberate steps to present itself as a neutral and commercially driven multinational investor, rather than an extension of Chinese state policy. The company restructured in 2015 to a Cayman Islands base carefully positioning itself apart from state-linked Chinese enterprises, which creates an international legal identity rather than retaining a mainland Chinese or Hong Kong corporate domicile. By exiting Panama, Hutchison not only monetized assets but also reduced exposure to the intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry in one of the world’s most contested trade chokepoints. For European and U.S. decision-makers, this implies that Hutchison’s move signals how Hong Kong firms navigate geopolitical pressure. It shows that even Chinese-origin conglomerates may prefer retreat to avoid being entangled in state rivalries. Hutchison pre-emptively mitigated the risk of being labelled a “Chinese state proxy” in a critical geopolitical theatre. This move not only alleviated Western concerns about Hutchison’s control of Panama’s ports but also demonstrated the group’s ability to act with commercial neutrality and flexibility, preserving its ability to operate, finance, and expand in Western markets without being constrained by the “Chinese capital” label. For Beijing, however, this retreat risks weakening China’s global port footprint. This highlights a potential divergence between the commercial logic of Hong Kong firms and China’s strategic ambitions. Why did Beijing intervened? 1. Loss of Chinese Strategic Assets and Diplomatic Advantage The Panama Canal is among the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints and control of its ports carries weight far beyond commerce. For China, investment in Latin American terminals has been part of a wider strategy to shape global shipping routes and enhance strategic reach. From Beijing’s perspective, CK Hutchison’s divestment was more than a business transaction. This was a strategic setback. The transfer of control to U.S.-linked interests was seen as a symbolic “recapture” of the terminals, which weakens China’s presence at a vital corridor. Within the Chinese leadership, the ports had been regarded as potential bargaining leverage in trade negotiations with Washington. But this loss reduced Beijing’s diplomatic toolkit at a time of rising frictions. The episode illustrates how Chinese policymakers increasingly view overseas ports as instruments of geopolitical positioning, not just commercial assets. Hutchison’s decision to sell underscored a broader reality: not all Chinese-affiliated enterprises act in alignment with state objectives. For Beijing, this implies that the Panama case highlighted the limits of relying on Hong Kong conglomerates to advance strategic interests abroad. For foreign governments and firms, it signalled both China’s heightened sensitivity to divestments in contested regions and the growing tension between corporate autonomy and state geopolitical expectations. 2. Absence of Beijing’s Prior Approval Sparked Political Backlash In the Panama Canal divestment, Beijing’s leadership reacted strongly against CK Hutchison’s “transaction first, then approval” approach. Beijing expressed dissatisfaction and even instructed state-owned enterprises to suspend new collaborations with the Li family, who serve as the controlling shareholders and principal decision-makers of Hutchison. Hutchison defended this sale as a “purely commercial and competitive process” by emphasizing Mediterranean Shipping Company as the principal buyer. Yet, in the context of intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry, this stance was no longer acceptable. Regulatory pressure and political intervention from Beijing slowed negotiations, preventing the transaction from proceeding as planned. The broader precedent is clear: in strategically sensitive areas, Beijing now expects Hong Kong firms to align commercial decisions with state priorities. Neutrality is no longer an option. This marks a fundamental shift in the operating environment, binding the leading Hong Kong conglomerates more closely to state interests and constraining their room for independent strategic choices. For policymakers and investors, this implies that the Panama case shows how Beijing is extending political oversight into commercial domains once seen as autonomous. Hong Kong enterprises face increasing limits on their ability to separate business logic from state loyalty, particularly where Sino-U.S. rivalry is at stake. 3. Public Opinion as Strategic Pressure: Shaping a New Regional Order Beijing’s response to Hutchison’s Panama sale was not confined to official channels. Pro-Beijing media denounced the deal as disloyal and profit-driven, framing it as a matter of national honour. When the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, which is the Beijing central body responsible for overseeing Hong Kong and Macao affairs, amplified these narratives, they gained quasi-official status and exerted pressure on both Hutchison and other Hong Kong firms. This discourse resonated beyond China. The Panama Canal Authority warned that excessive concentration of terminal assets could undermine neutrality and competitiveness. This wording strikingly complies with Beijing’s “anti-hegemony” rhetoric. By shaping the terms of debate, Beijing positioned itself to argue for greater balance and competition in Panama’s port operations. Looking ahead, China advocates to leverage new concession tenders to advance its tactical objectives: strengthening the role of China Ocean Shipping Company, counterbalancing U.S. and European dominance and embedding Chinese capital in Latin America’s maritime infrastructure. More broadly, the case illustrates how Beijing integrates public opinion, regulatory narratives, and commercial strategy to shape a regional order more favourable to its interests. For policymakers, this implies that Panama demonstrates how Beijing transforms domestic media pressure into a tool of international influence. What begins as reputational discipline at home can translate into bargaining leverage abroad, particularly in contested regions where infrastructure and influence are intertwined. Points of Special Relevance: Beijing’s Strategic Signal Beijing’s intervention in the Panama Canal case should be read not as a single act but as a strategic signal. Its aims to prevent U.S. and European firms from consolidating control at a vital chokepoint and to avoid the appearance of “losing” strategic assets. At the same time, Beijing used this episode to remind Hong Kong conglomerates that in sensitive geopolitical contexts, commercial logic alone is no longer sufficient. The Panama case demonstrates how Beijing leverages commercial disputes as instruments of statecraft. The more plausible outcome is a conditional arrangement to encourage Panama to introduce mechanisms that limit Western influence in Latin America. China seeks structural adjustments that preserve its influence and reshape the regional order to its advantage. From Neutrality to National Loyalty As U.S. China tensions intensify, many multinational firms pursue de-risking strategies: not full decoupling as it is economically unviable, but carefully calibrated ambiguity that allows them to operate in both markets without explicit political commitments. This balancing act is becoming harder in Hong Kong. Since 1997, the influx of mainland state-linked enterprises has blurred the line between state and market. Benefiting from the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, these firms embedded political expectations into business norms. Ties to the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference are increasingly relevant in Hong Kong. By 2019, Beijing moved further, promoting patriotism in the business sector such as the Greater Bay Area Business Support Scheme, which channels funding toward firms demonstrating “patriotic entrepreneurship” or contributions to “national rejuvenation”. The result is a growing convergence of economic and political expectations. Commercial autonomy is increasingly contingent on political alignment, eroding the distinction between business logic and ideological loyalty. For investors and firms, this raises strategic concerns: - Will political loyalty requirements constrain the free flow of capital? - Could companies risk state intervention or even nationalization if perceived as acting against China’s interests? These questions remain unresolved, but Hutchison’s Panama case shows how quickly a commercial decision can be redefined as a matter of national loyalty. The broader uncertainty surrounding Hong Kong’s business environment will shape the city’s role as a financial hub in the decade ahead. This is my view on things: An Outlook on Hong Kong Looking ahead, the space for Hong Kong conglomerates to maintain commercial neutrality is narrowing. The rise of a nationalist business paradigm means companies must increasingly balance political conformity with economic self-interest. Two scenarios are emerging: 1. “Hong Kong, then China”: firms retain some operational autonomy and global credibility by prioritizing commercial logic, while carefully managing political sensitivities. 2. “China, then Hong Kong”: political loyalty takes precedence, with business priorities subordinated to national strategic goals of the Chinese Communist Party. Which path prevails will determine Hong Kong’s role as a financial hub. The tension between economic liberalism and political loyalty is no longer abstract. It is becoming the defining fault line for Hong Kong’s business landscape in the decade ahead.

Diplomacy
President of Russia Vladimir Putin meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2025)

Why Xi, Putin and Kim on One Stage Matters

by Roie Yellinek

Beijing’s Victory Day parade in Tiananmen Square was designed to dazzle: ranks of uniformed troops, formations of aircraft, and an arsenal of new systems meant to underscore China’s rapid military modernization. But the most consequential image was not a missile or a stealth jet. It was a tableau of three leaders—Xi Jinping at the center, flanked by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un—watching the spectacle together. The scene, widely broadcast and photographed, turned a commemorative event into a geopolitical marker. It was less a snapshot than a signal: the public normalization of a deepening alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea, at a moment when Western democracies are struggling to sustain cohesion on core strategic questions. The parade itself offered the familiar mixture of hardware and narrative. Coverage highlighted the unveiling or public confirmation of advanced systems across domains: upgraded intercontinental missiles, new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, hypersonic and anti-ship capabilities, long-range bombers, early warning aircraft, and a broad stable of unmanned platforms, including undersea vehicles and “loyal wingman” drones. Chinese media presented these developments as evidence of a “world-class” People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moving beyond legacy constraints and into truly multi-domain operations, with information, space, and cyber now integrated alongside land, sea, and air. Independent reporting catalogued the breadth of systems and emphasized a narrative of credible deterrence and strategic depth rather than mere choreography. Yet the more instructive message was political. The presence of Putin and Kim, alongside other leaders, was not a mere ceremonial occurrence. Each leader arrived with clear incentives to be seen at Xi’s side, and each gained by lending visual weight to Beijing’s story. For Moscow, the image reinforced the claim that Russia is not isolated, that it retains powerful partners and is embedded in a wider non-Western coalition. For Pyongyang, the moment was even more significant: an opportunity to step out of diplomatic isolation and be recognized publicly as a member of a consequential strategic grouping. For Beijing, hosting both leaders signaled that China can convene and coordinate—projecting status, reassuring sympathetic governments, and unsettling adversaries by hinting at a tighter web of cooperation among U.S. rivals. The convergence behind the optics has been building for years, and could have happened only on Chinese soil. China and Russia have expanded their coordination across energy, defense, and diplomatic, even as they preserve maneuvering room on sensitive issues. North Korea’s accelerating exchanges with Russia, alongside growing political warmth with Beijing, provide a third leg to this emerging tripod. None of this amounts to a formal alliance with mutual defense obligations. But it does resemble a strategic alignment held together by shared interests: resisting a U.S.-led order, blunting sanctions pressure, reducing vulnerability to Western technology restrictions, and demonstrating that alternatives exist to dollar-centric finance and Western supply chains. The choreography on the rostrum did not create this alignment; it made it more legible and clear. Memory politics is a key component of that legibility. Beijing’s decision to anchor the parade in the commemoration of victory over Japan allows contemporary power projection to be cloaked in a unifying moral narrative. China increasingly leverages World War II memory in diplomacy—shaping a “memory war” that reframes the post-1945 order and what is seen from China as its rightful place within it. Russia’s long-standing use of the “Great Patriotic War” plays a parallel role, justifying current policies through selective historical continuity. North Korea’s revolutionary mythology fits easily into this narrative architecture. By standing together at an anniversary of anti-fascist victory, the three leaders signaled an ideational convergence that complements their material cooperation: a claim to moral legitimacy as guardians of an alternative international vision. The military dimension of the parade, while not the core of this argument, still matters. Displays of a maturing triad—land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched systems, and an air-launched nuclear component—aim to convey survivable second-strike capacity. The public presentation of hypersonic and anti-ship systems is meant to complicate adversary planning in the Western Pacific. The range of unmanned platforms suggests an intent to saturate domains with relatively low-cost, attritable assets, improving persistence and compressing the sensor-to-shooter loop. It is prudent to treat parades cautiously: not all showcased systems are fully operational or fielded at scale, and performance claims are difficult to validate. But as an indicator, the breadth and integration of platforms reflect a planning culture committed to joint operations and “intelligentized” warfare, where AI-enabled targeting and decision support are not theoretical ambitions but programmatic priorities What, then, does the image of Xi–Putin–Kim actually change? First, it clarifies expectations. Observers no longer need to infer the trajectory of this triangular relationship from scattered bilateral overtures. The three leaders have chosen to make their alignment visible. Visibility creates deterrent value, raising the perceived costs of coercing any one member, and it can also facilitate practical cooperation: intelligence sharing, diplomatic coordination at the UN and other fora, synchronized signaling during regional crises, and mutually reinforcing sanctions-evasion practices. Second, it complicates Western planning. Even if Beijing keeps caution around direct military assistance in Europe or the Korean Peninsula, diplomatic top-cover, economic buffering, and technology flows short of lethal aid can still alter the correlation of forces over time. Finally, it resonates across the Global South. Many governments seek strategic autonomy and resist being forced into binary choices. The parade’s optics supplied a ready-made narrative for those who argue that the international system is already multipolar and that non-Western coalitions can deliver security and development without Western tutelage. The contrast with Western coordination was strikingly evident. In the transatlantic community, support for Ukraine remains substantial; however, debates about resource levels, war aims, and timelines have intensified. In the Indo-Pacific, there is a growing alignment on deterring coercion in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea; however, national economic interests and differing risk tolerances result in uneven policies toward China. Across Europe and North America, electoral politics continue to inject volatility into foreign policy, complicating efforts to sustain long-term, bipartisan strategies. None of these frictions amounts to collapse, and there are genuine Western successes in coalition-building—from NATO enlargement to evolving minilateral formats in the Indo-Pacific. However, an analytically honest reading of the moment acknowledges that the authoritarian trio in Beijing has projected a unity of purpose that Western capitals currently struggle to match consistently. Three implications follow. The first is narrative competition. If Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang can turn a commemorative event into a global story about legitimacy and resilience, they will continue to use history as a strategic resource. The appropriate Western response is not to cede the narrative field but to invest in historically grounded, forward-looking messaging that explains the link between rules-based order and practical benefits—trade reliability, crisis management, and sovereignty protection—for diverse audiences. The second is coalition maintenance. Western policymakers will need to prioritize “coalition hygiene”: aligning export controls and investment screening where it matters most; building redundancy into critical supply chains; closing divergences in sanctions enforcement; and coordinating messaging so that tactical differences do not obscure strategic alignment. This requires political discipline more than new institutions. The third is theater integration. As the Beijing image suggested a cross-regional understanding among three adversarial capitals, allied planning must better account for cross-theater linkages—how actions in Europe affect deterrence in Asia, and vice versa—and ensure that resource allocations and industrial policies reflect genuinely global prioritization. It is important not to overstate. The emerging alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea is asymmetric and interest-based, not a tightly binding alliance. Beijing’s global economic integration imposes constraints that Moscow and Pyongyang do not share. Russia and North Korea each bring liabilities that China will manage carefully. Frictions—over technology, pricing, and regional equities—will persist. But the threshold crossed in Beijing is nonetheless meaningful. These governments judged that the benefits of public proximity now outweigh the costs. That judgment, once made, is difficult to reverse quickly; it tends to generate its own momentum through bureaucratic follow-through and sunk reputational costs. One image cannot rewrite the balance of power. It can, however, crystallize a trend and concentrate minds. The sight of Xi, Putin, and Kim standing together did exactly that. It captured an authoritarian convergence rooted in shared grievances and converging strategies, and it highlighted the challenge facing democracies that wish to preserve an open and stable order: maintaining the patience, unity, and policy discipline to act together. The test for the West is less whether it recognizes the signal—most capitals do—than whether it can convert recognition into sustained, collective action. If Beijing’s parade was a demonstration of choreography and intent, the appropriate answer is not a counter-parade, but the quieter work of alignment: aligning narratives with interests, interests with instruments, and instruments with partners. That work is not glamorous. It is, however, what turns a photo into policy.

Diplomacy
Kim and Trump shaking hands at the red carpet during the DPRK–USA Singapore Summit 2018

Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Trump 2.0: Another cycle with new attributes?

by Jesús de los Ángeles Aise Sotolongo

Abstract Never before had a sitting U.S. president managed relations with the DPRK as Donald Trump did, nor had any leader from Pyongyang sat face-to-face with a sitting U.S. president during their term as Kim Jong Un did. With Trump’s potential return, could there be another cycle of rapprochement? This paper seeks to address this question. The failure of the previous negotiating cycle, the DPRK’s advances in deterrence, and shifts in peninsular, regional, and global circumstances suggest that both leaders might bring new attributes to their interactions, potentially yielding surprising outcomes Introduction Except for a few moments of rapprochement, since the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), U.S. administrations have maneuvered with various forms and methods to destabilize its political and economic system. And since Pyongyang decided to develop nuclear weapons, Washington has labeled them illegal, demanding that they be abandoned, sponsoring United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions, and implementing strict unilateral penalties. Meanwhile, successive DPRK leaders have persevered in a military doctrine based on the development of nuclear deterrence to guarantee national defense and security. Nevertheless, an unprecedented moment that broke with that persistent circumstance took place during Donald Trump’s previous term, when the relationship shifted from “fire and fury” to successive summits with Kim Jong Un in 2018 and 2019, in Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom. The exchange of insults — Trump calling Kim “little rocket man” and Kim referring to Trump as a “dotard” — mutated into their approaching one another as “pen pals.” This surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK temporarily, though without the expected results, loosened the “Korean Gordian knot.” No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK as Donald Trump did, and in history, no North Korean leader had ever stood face-to-face, on equal footing, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did. Former President Barack Obama delivered several appealing speeches, but he seemed weak to many countries in East Asia, including U.S. allies and partners. For eight years, he did nothing about North Korea, calling it “strategic patience.” This eroded deterrence and allowed Pyongyang to advance its weapons and nuclear programs (Kausikan, 2025). For his part, at the beginning of his term, Joe Biden announced a “new strategy” toward the DPRK that never materialized; he pleaded for dialogue with Kim Jong Un while simultaneously increasing war threats; he grouped China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea into an ideological category that resurrected the Bush-era notion of the “axis of evil.” Biden’s simplistic binary categorization was not a policy. It ignored the differences in how these four countries define their interests, the degree of integration into the global economy, and the scope of their ambitions. These differences should be the starting point for U.S. diplomacy toward North Korea (Kausikan, 2025). The purpose of this article is to examine the circumstances, obstacles, and expectations for a new cycle of negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang with Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency. Development This second term of President Donald Trump, more transactional and less predictable, seems to be raising expectations of reducing confrontational stress on the Korean Peninsula, and everything indicates that it brings with it a modification of Washington’s policy toward the DPRK. This is conditioned by the following radical changes in strategic circumstances compared to his previous term: DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have undergone new and sophisticated advances. The DPRK has broken all ties and symbols of its relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as its “principal and unchanging enemy.” Declaring that it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the Korean People’s Army to accelerate preparations to “occupy, subdue, and completely reclaim” South Korea. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two Kim Jong Un–Vladimir Putin summits, and Kim’s reference to Putin as his “closest comrade,” have shown the very high level of understanding and commitment between the parties. This is reflected in the DPRK’s unrestricted support for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures, which includes a “mutual military assistance” clause. Meanwhile, Russia supports the DPRK diplomatically and economically, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports — essentially oil, raw materials, and food — as well as providing assistance in various fields. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis has been taking shape among China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies describe it as a “new axis.” Within this interconnection, the DPRK holds important advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. The removal of President Yoon Suk Yeol over his irresponsible Martial Law is reinforcing the possibility of a new government led by the Democratic Party, with Lee Jae Myung as the clear favorite and, as of today, more likely to win. [1] This would open the door to a revival of North–South détente reminiscent of the Moon Jae In era. Trump’s foreign policy objectives are based on his “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) vision — now reinforced — which prioritizes U.S. strategic and economic interests over traditional alliance commitments (e.g., South Korea and Japan). At least these six factors seem to be significantly influencing Donald Trump’s decision to return to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un. While the DPRK occupies a relatively lower position on Trump’s list of priorities (with China and the Russia–Ukraine conflict taking precedence), and dialogue does not appear imminent, he has made it clear that he would like to reconnect with Kim Jong Un, seems willing to reopen negotiations, and is evaluating and discussing possible avenues of interaction that could lay the groundwork for a potential summit. It is said that Washington has been holding discreet conversations with Pyongyang, consulting external experts, and considering options to potentially restart dialogue. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un — clearly more assertive and militarily more powerful in Washington’s eyes — has not publicly shown any willingness to renew his earlier offers related to denuclearization. In his own words: “the DPRK’s nuclearization is non-negotiable,” and he continues to exert pressure by showcasing the country’s missile–nuclear power. This has been illustrated unequivocally and consistently when Kim Jong Un visited nuclear material production facilities and the Nuclear Weapons Institute (NWI) in September 2024 and January 2025. For the DPRK, survival is an existential matter, and Pyongyang considers its nuclear–missile programs absolutely indispensable to secure it; there is nothing we can see that would persuade or force it to renounce them, as that would imply regime change. Everything indicates that the U.S. president is aware that his counterpart has not yet overcome the discouragement caused by the failure of the previous negotiation process, and for that reason, he is sending increasingly precise messages about the possibility of renewed talks, while boasting of his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un. At the same time, however, Pyongyang continues to issue contradictory signals of distrust toward Washington, in response to the confrontational attitude and the increasingly close military and intelligence ties with the DPRK’s immediate neighbors. It is worth noting that, this past February, the U.S. sent a nuclear submarine and several B-1B bombers to South Korea; U.S. military forces carried out multiple war exercises, including live-fire drills along the Demilitarized Zone, as well as heavy bombing maneuvers and even space force operations. In March, a large-scale scheduled exercise took place—70 percent larger than the one held the previous year. Nevertheless, it appears that by the end of 2024 the DPRK leadership decided to create a certain margin of diplomatic maneuver in anticipation of the incoming Trump administration. The coverage given to Trump’s inauguration on January 22 marked a shift from Pyongyang’s initial decision to remain silent on the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections in November. Moreover, this information was published in media outlets aimed at both domestic and international audiences, suggesting that North Korea has begun preparing its people for a new approach to Trump, when appropriate. Despite the steady flow of official statements and media commentary criticizing the United States, anti-American rhetoric has become somewhat less intense. Notably, the use of the expression “U.S. imperialists” has significantly decreased since then. This is also true of Kim’s public statements, which are considered the most authoritative in North Korea. For example, Kim’s speech at the Ministry of Defence on February 8 was the harshest and most detailed on the United States since his speech at a national defence exhibition in November 2024. However, unlike in many of his previous speeches at defence-related venues or events, he did not use derogatory terms such as “U.S. imperialists.” In fact, the last reported use by Kim of the term “U.S. imperialists” was in his defence exhibition speech last November. While there has been a rise in criticism of the United States since early February, as demonstrated by a series of “KCNA commentaries,” the broader trend since December still holds. The media have refrained from mentioning Trump by name, even when criticizing U.S. statements or actions. When issuing criticism, they have only referred to “the new U.S. administration,” “the current administration,” or the “U.S. ruler.” KCNA’s commentary on February 12 regarding the Gaza Strip, for example, blamed the “current U.S. administration” for the plan to take control of Gaza, omitting Trump’s name. All these articles were published in outlets aimed at domestic audiences, likely because they addressed foreign policy issues not directly relevant to North Korea. In contrast, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ criticism of Rubio’s statement about the “rogue state” was only published on external websites and not disseminated to the domestic audience. This allowed Pyongyang to register its rejection of the statement to external audiences while controlling the narrative about the Trump administration at home. Pyongyang also appears to be creating diplomatic space by attempting to influence Washington’s thinking while it awaits the new Trump administration’s policy toward North Korea. Its Ministry of Defence stated that the United States was “openly ignoring the DPRK’s security concerns” in reference to a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine that entered a South Korean port — an unusually direct accusation that the United States “ignores” its security concerns. If we consider the reverse side of this message (do not ignore North Korea’s security concerns), it is in fact a call from Pyongyang to the new administration to take its “security concerns” into account in its policy toward North Korea (Minyoung Lee, 2025). We can therefore see some Trumpist signals that could prove attractive to Pyongyang’s leadership: Repeated references by the U.S. president, describing the DPRK as a “nuclear power,” a concept recently reinforced when he qualified it as a “great nuclear power.” It is noteworthy that very recently U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio used the expression “nuclear-armed state” to refer to the DPRK, implicitly admitting Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons. This comment suggests that the U.S. is unofficially considering the DPRK as a nuclear-armed nation, just as it does with India, Pakistan, and Israel. There are signs of a strategic shift aimed at overcoming deadlock and building trust by moving from denuclearization as the priority toward nuclear security. In other words, instead of demanding denuclearization, the focus would be on improving the safety of nuclear facilities — such as preventing accidents, leaks, or proliferation risks to third countries — through active bilateral technical cooperation that aligns reciprocal interests. The decisions that have shaken the peninsular geopolitical context and the Washington–Seoul alliance, when the U.S. classified South Korea as a “sensitive country,” as well as the so-called “strategic flexibility” that “modifies the mission of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).” It is true that many officials in the Trump administration continue to officially reiterate their commitment to the DPRK’s denuclearization. However, statements by the U.S. president and his Secretary of State suggest that they recognize North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, generating a dual reaction: on one hand, surprise at an abrupt shift in policy toward the DPRK’s nuclearization, and on the other, uncertainty about what would happen to the security concerns of its allies — South Korea and Japan — as well as those of the U.S. itself. It should be noted that Trump stated — no less than in front of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte — that he intended to re-establish relations with Kim Jong Un, that “he would do it,” that he has “…an excellent relationship with Kim Jong Un and we’ll see what happens.” And he declared: “But without a doubt, it is a nuclear power.” In that same setting, Trump also mentioned that India and Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons, effectively recognizing them as de facto nuclear-armed states, adding that Kim Jong Un “possesses numerous nuclear weapons” and that “others possess them as well.” Therefore, the statements by Trump and Rubio that tacitly recognize the DPRK as a “nuclear power” indicate a shift in Washington’s policy toward Pyongyang. It seems that interactions between the DPRK and the U.S. are moving toward a turning point: from denuclearization as the priority to nuclear security — a strategic change in U.S. policy aimed at overcoming deadlock and establishing trust, as a preliminary step toward a possible peace treaty. The repeated reference by U.S. President Donald Trump to the DPRK as a nuclear power could be an effort to draw Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, since North Korea seeks de facto recognition by the U.S. as a nuclear-armed state. Trump seems to be maintaining the perspective that the next negotiation should focus on reducing threats rather than denuclearization, despite his stated pursuit of “complete denuclearization.” Everything suggests that Trump is emphasizing the evident reality of Pyongyang’s progress in its nuclear program. It can also be considered that Trump’s remarks may imply that, as a result of the failure of his summit efforts to reach an agreement with Kim Jong Un to halt North Korea’s nuclear program, he may now be encouraging the consideration of an alternative strategy. However, Pyongyang is publicly and incessantly rejecting Trump’s attempts to restart dialogue; this stance has much to do with the recent history of U.S. negotiations and the president’s insufficient reciprocity to the concrete measures proposed by Kim Jong Un. In addition to the above, it is worth highlighting the latest developments that have shaken the peninsular geopolitical context and the Washington–Seoul alliance, which could, to some extent, influence a shift in Pyongyang’s perception and lead it to accept talks with Washington. We refer to the classification of South Korea as a “sensitive country” and the idea of “modifying the mission of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).” The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) designated South Korea as a “sensitive country,” a classification that significantly restricts collaboration in areas of advanced technology, including nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, quantum science, and advanced computing. This measure, which took effect on April 15, subjects South Korean researchers to stricter controls for collaborating or participating in research at DOE facilities or research centers and marks the first time South Korea has received such a designation from the U.S. government. In this regard, the “sensitive country” classification is based on unilateral criteria such as national security, nuclear non-proliferation, regional instability, threats to economic security, and alleged support for terrorism. This list, maintained by the DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI) along with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), already included countries such as India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan. Additionally, North Korea and Iran are designated as “state sponsors of terrorism,” while China and Russia are considered “countries of concern.” Such a designation suggests that the U.S. has growing concerns about the increasing voices among South Korean academics, politicians, and citizens who support the development of domestic nuclear weapons. Recent surveys reveal that popular support for nuclear armament has reached between 60% and 70%, apparently stemming from the belief that South Korea must take a bold defensive measure against North Korea’s growing nuclear threats. Although some who favor this idea believe that President Donald Trump’s skeptical view of alliances — focused on reducing the financial burden of protecting U.S. allies — might allow Seoul to develop nuclear weapons and thus reduce Washington’s responsibilities on the Korean Peninsula, the likelihood of this happening remains slim. However, the debate will not disappear in the short term due to growing skepticism about the so-called U.S. “extended deterrence,” which relies only on the deployment of strategic assets in the South of the peninsula. In the meantime, the DPRK is very likely to feel satisfied, as it sees its long-standing desire fulfilled: to witness cracks in the Washington–Seoul alliance. Another decision that would benefit the DPRK under the so-called “strategic flexibility” is the projection that the Trump administration may deploy U.S. troops stationed in South Korea in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, following the circulation of a purported Pentagon memorandum detailing its objective of deterring China from occupying Taiwan. As is well known, the primary mission of the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea is to deter threats from the DPRK. Should this decision materialize, their mission would then shift to countering China, considered a key component of the current administration’s foreign policy. This would create a security vacuum for Seoul and further strain its relations with Beijing. In such a circumstance, the Trump administration could pressure South Korea to handle conventional military actions from the DPRK independently, with the U.S. intervening only in the case of nuclear threats. Therefore, the best option for Seoul is to significantly strengthen its defensive capabilities, preparing for a scenario in which U.S. troops are not involved in a conventional war with the DPRK. The notion of “strategic flexibility” for the USFK reflects a shift in the main mission of U.S. forces abroad, moving from the defense of nations through their permanent presence to rapid deployment in other parts of the world where conflicts arise. As expected, unease is growing in Seoul in the face of Pyongyang’s increasing assertiveness, while the latter shows greater defiance. First, due to the possibility that Trump’s second administration may divert part of the USFK’s resources to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which would leave South Korea more vulnerable. Second, because South Korea is currently in open political turmoil over the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol, and everything seems to indicate that the so-called South Korean democracy has failed to demonstrate itself as reliable in the eyes of Trump and his team. It is worth mentioning what Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University, stated in his most recent book, titled “Why American Diplomacy Fails”. The expert describes North Korea’s nuclear problem as an illustrative failure of U.S. diplomacy. His remarks are eloquent when he says: “In my conversations with members of the Trump administration during my trip to America, I had the impression that they firmly feel that Korea [South Korea] has been getting a free ride [on U.S. security] for far too long. South Korea’s excessive dependence on the United States could have serious consequences. The Korean government needs to develop autonomous strategic thinking. It needs to explore creative contingency plans for the worst-case scenario of a U.S. absence from the Korean peninsula.” We can see that Trump’s return is testing diplomatic limits and fueling a key question: Will Trump’s return to the White House open another cycle of engagement with Kim Jong Un, but with new attributes? The U.S. president always highlights his good personal relationship with the DPRK leader, something that, undoubtedly, could have a positive effect. But, as of today, Pyongyang seems to lack incentives to negotiate with Washington for four essential reasons: Military, it has achieved significant advances in its conventional weapons programs, strategic missiles, and nuclear arms, which provide it with a high deterrent capability. Economically, even under heavy sanctions, it is experiencing moments of economic expansion, it has made progress in import substitution, its local industry is reviving, and infrastructure construction is in full development. This makes negotiating the lifting of sanctions, in general and with Washington in particular, less urgent for Pyongyang. Its willingness to take political risks in exchange for economic benefits has clearly diminished. Geostrategically, its military alliance with Russia may generate new revenues, transfers of military technology, practical experience in modern warfare, and weaken the international sanctions regime. Geopolitically, the world is entering a period of dynamic geopolitical realignment that could eventually result in a multipolar order. The DPRK seems well positioned due to its ties with two key actors in the multipolarization process: Russia and China. At the same time, it observes the disruption of the traditional alliance structure with the United States and sees Washington distancing itself from its main allies, who are also DPRK’s adversaries in East Asia. Therefore, it appears willing to watch the evolution of events and their outcome. Donald Trump has stated that his administration has opened a line of communication with the DPRK and considered that, at some point, “something will probably happen,” emphasizing: “There is communication. I have a very good relationship with Kim Jong Un… I get along wonderfully with him… I think it is very important. It is a ‘great nuclear nation,’ and he is a ‘very smart guy.’ I got to know him very well… We will probably do something at some point.” It cannot be ruled out in this analysis that the DPRK is doubly leveraged. On one hand, with stable trade with China; on the other, with Russia’s reciprocity for its declared and materially sustained support for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Therefore, additional incentives directly linked to DPRK’s comprehensive security must emerge. If the U.S. were to formally recognize the DPRK as a “de facto nuclear power,” which would represent a radical change in U.S. strategy, the prospect of future negotiations focused on threat reduction rather than denuclearization would open up. Despite Trump’s flattering words and the expectations they raise, it is not clear whether the U.S. president would be able to secure internal consensus within his administration to make such a decision without major obstacles, and, at the same time, manage to mitigate the suspicion and animosity of Kim Jong Un and the leadership around him. Conclusions The viability of negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK under Trump’s new government remains uncertain, but it is possible that Trump will pursue a new “diplomatic victory” — similar to his 2018 Singapore summit with Kim Jong Un — through an alternative strategy that bilaterally satisfies Pyongyang’s aspiration to be recognized as a de facto nuclear state. However, it is unlikely that the international community would accept the U.S. unilaterally recognizing the DPRK as a nuclear-armed state. According to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a vote by the UN Security Council would be required, where the United Kingdom and France would surely veto it; and if it were brought to the General Assembly as a resolution, the number of opposing votes would probably be a majority. It is worth noting that the DPRK is doubly leveraged: it has stable trade with China and reciprocity from Russia for its material support, in addition to enjoying the diplomatic backing of both powers. Given its persistent distrust of Washington, it is to be expected that Pyongyang will maintain its close coordination with Beijing and Moscow and use it to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Washington. Thus, for the time being, it is not clear whether the U.S. president will be able to mitigate the suspicion and animosity of Kim Jong Un and the leadership surrounding him. Notes[1] Lee Jae Myung was elected as president of the Republic of Korea after the June 3rd, 2025 elections. References Aise Sotolongo, J. (2025). Return of Donald Trump: Continuity or change with the DPRK? World and New World Journal. https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=4082Chan-kyong, P. (2025, 12 de marzo). Kim Jong Un seeks negotiating leverage over Trump's new nuclear demands, analysts say. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3296722/kim-jong-un-seeks-negotiating-leverage-over-trump-new-nuclear-demands-analystsChung-in, M. (2025, 15 de febrero). 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