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Defense & Security
Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence during a two-day meeting of the alliance's Defence Ministers at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on February 14, 2023.

Where is the transatlantic relationship heading?

by Florentino Portero

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The social dimension of the Alliance The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the organization created by the signatory states of the Washington Treaty to achieve the goals set by the Alliance, is an institution characteristic of the democratic realm, where governments depend on their respective public opinions when trying to establish a security policy. The people matter – and this is something we must keep in mind – when reflecting on their future. The simplest and most logical answer to the question posed in the title of this conference, the one that responds to common sense, is wherever its member states want. And this is the core of the problem. Do the allies have a common vision? Do they share interests as they did in 1949? Do they still believe they are a community united by their commitment to democracy? Is it reasonable to consider that they form a “collective defense system”? Without clearly answering these questions, it becomes very difficult to move forward with this analysis. We would be venturing into speculative territory. On the other hand, we cannot ignore reality, and this leads us to acknowledge that it is unlikely we will receive clear answers due to a set of considerations characteristic of the present time. The first refers to the lack of reliability of the State because of the high fragmentation of public opinion. Globalization and the Digital Revolution are causing social and economic changes that have led the population to distrust their political elites. Traditional parties are disappearing or losing seats, while new political forces emerge, questioning many of the paradigms we have been working with for years. The societies of the member states no longer have as clear a sense of the purpose of the Alliance as they did a decade ago, because there is confusion about what the actual risks, challenges, and threats they face are. The second is the absence of prominent figures with the authority to exercise leadership at the heads of the allied governments. We cannot ignore that in times of uncertainty, leadership is more necessary than ever, because in its absence, it becomes extremely difficult to shape a sufficiently common position among the citizens. The third is the empirical realization that the Alliance has not been able to manage the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine in a competent and professional manner. In the first case, the European allies decided to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty even though it wasn’t necessary, but wanting to show their solidarity with the state that had guaranteed their security for decades. However, on the battlefield, the vast majority shield themselves behind their ‘rules of engagement’ to avoid complicated situations. The goal was to comply with the United States more than to commit to victory. For its part, the United States was unable to maintain consistent objectives and strategy over time, which led to a humiliating defeat. What was the point of the waste of lives and money if, in the end, the same people returned to power? What was the point of the Alliance's technological superiority if it was defeated by poorly armed militias? In the second case, we have observed that despite the obvious incompetence of its armed forces, its limited capabilities, and its dire economic situation, Russia has managed to consolidate its control over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and continues to advance. For the average citizen, it is incomprehensible that, having committed ourselves to reclaim all Ukrainian sovereign territory and being much wealthier, our strategy has led Ukraine to the unfortunate situation it finds itself in. Why didn’t we offer them the weapons they needed from the very beginning? Why have we deprived them of the victory we formally committed to? The fourth is a derivative of the previous one. In this context, does it make sense for the citizen to trust the Alliance? Isn’t it understandable that they try to seek refuge within the national framework and fear that the Alliance, in the hands of unqualified people, will drag them into scenarios that are not critical to their lives? Whether we like it or not, the citizen's distrust in NATO is as justified as their intuition that only NATO can guarantee their security, which includes both their freedom and their well-being. What is the Alliance today? In circumstances as complex as those we are currently experiencing, it is virtually impossible for an organization composed of thirty-two member states to be a community committed to the defense and promotion of democracy. The mere reference to Turkey, Hungary, or Spain is proof of how far there are nations within it that are heading in a different direction. The evolution of European political systems points to a worsening of the situation rather than the exceptional nature of the mentioned cases. The community, as well as the idea that it constitutes a "collective defense system," falls within the realm of aspirations. The Alliance has been a “collective defense system,” and I have no doubt that there are allies who continue to act consistently with this idea. However, putting aside formalities, I believe that when assessing the transatlantic relationship, we must focus on its strict condition as an alliance. NATO is an asset that no one wants to lose, even though in its current state, it leaves much to be desired. Its strength does not lie in the common perception of the threat, the solidarity of its members, the available capabilities, or in sharing a strategy, which is clearly nonexistent. What makes its members want to keep it alive is the accumulated legacy after 75 years of shared experiences and the deep sense of insecurity in the face of the dual realization of a world undergoing profound change and poorly prepared national defenses from any point of view. Outside the Alliance, it’s even colder. NATO provides us with a starting point to try to react collectively, knowing that, in reality, except for the United States, no member state has the critical size to act as a "strategic actor." We have a history, an institutional framework, civilian and military bodies, doctrines, resources... that allow us to try to adapt without having to start from scratch. The European Perspective In recent years, the European states that are members of the Alliance have experienced the contrast between the claim that the European Union should assume the role of a "strategic actor" and the harsh, relentless reality of its impotence to effectively and competently address the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. In parallel, they have shifted from contempt for the United States, due to its erratic foreign policy and its inability to successfully complete its foreign initiatives, to seeking shelter once again under its military strength, considering the evidence of their own inability to understand international politics and act accordingly. It seems beyond doubt that the dynamics of the European integration process are heading towards the establishment of a federation. The transfer of sovereignty represented by the single currency was a milestone, marking the creation of "political Europe" through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, we are moving toward a single fiscal policy, with banking union, European monetary fund... ultimately towards the consolidation of an economic and monetary policy. Such significant common economic interests demand both a shared legal framework and a unified foreign policy. However, the factor of time plays a fundamental role. The passing of generations has allowed us to make progress, overcoming nationalist prejudices. Despite the formidable progress made, which is easily reflected in the recognition by young people that we live in a common cultural environment, the reality is that we are still far from forming what Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón referred to decades ago as a "European people." One thing is to delegate certain public policies to European institutions, and another, undoubtedly very different, is the exercise of actions that are characteristically sovereign. History and geography matter, and we must acknowledge that we have not yet formed that continental identity that would allow us to credibly face the formidable challenge of establishing a common foreign policy. The advantages of planning together and having the same capabilities are obvious, but above all, what matters is its viability. The Union is still not in a position to replace American leadership. This humbling realization transforms into a flow of energy in favor of the Alliance, assuming as inevitable the implementation of changes that allow it to adapt to a new international environment. For years, we have been aware that the Washington Treaty, and especially its Article 5, are anachronistic. The emergence of new domains – space, cyber, and cognitive – and the development of hybrid strategies challenge some of its foundations. Even so, we try to adapt without facing a reform of the treaty, in an exercise of understandable but risky caution. We are aware that the European theater is no longer the same as it was in 1949, that globalization and the "competition among great powers" in the race to win the "Digital Revolution" have shaped a considerably different scenario that we must integrate into, but we feel dizzy at the thought of leaving our own geographic zone, when we are not even in a position to effectively address our own problems. The American Perspective Since the creation of the United States, American society has lived with the contradiction between its isolationist vocation and its dependence on foreign trade. It fears becoming involved in the affairs of others at a high cost. However, the commercial dimension of its economy demands freedom of navigation, legal security, access to raw materials, and the ability to penetrate other markets, conditions that lead to an international role. From the First and Second World Wars, they learned that it was impossible to turn their back on what was happening in other countries, that they had to commit to international security, trying to establish an order that would guarantee their national interests. After years of involvement in international conflicts that seemed to have no end, isolationist and nationalist sentiment has grown, as a classic pendulum effect. In this context, it is understandable that the public debate openly questions its presence in the Atlantic Alliance. Is NATO a guarantee of the security of the United States? In the years immediately preceding the Madrid Summit, it was evident that the Alliance lacked a threat to unite it, a strategy to guide its steps, and capabilities that would allow it to carry out combined activities. It should therefore come as no surprise that since the second term of the Bush Administration, statements from senior officials have been warning of the dangerous drift of the Organization or threatening its withdrawal. There has been much talk about the low defense spending by many of the European allies. It is evident that without investment, there is no modernization, and without it, there is a technological disconnect that prevents the joint action of the armed forces of the different member states. However, what is truly concerning is what this implies in terms of abuse and disregard towards the United States. Hence, the heated reactions we receive from the other side. It is indecent that we spend on welfare, reaching levels that are unattainable for the average American, while we let them bear the cost of our security, both in economic terms and in human lives. As grave as, or even more than, the lack of investment is the absence of a shared vision and strategy, but it is understandable that the debate has focused on investment, an instrumental element. For European allies, increasing defense spending under the current economic circumstances will be as difficult as it is painful, but it will not be any less difficult or painful to reach an agreement that gives meaning to NATO's existence in the coming years. One of the few consensuses in the Capitol is to consider China as its main rival, around which all its economic, foreign, and defense policies revolve. In the Strategic Concept approved in Madrid, we can read that China is a “systemic challenge” for all of us. What policy have we derived from this categorical statement? Is there an Atlantic vision on this? It is hard to imagine that the Alliance can have a future if the states on both sides of the Atlantic do not reach a common position on how to engage with the great Asian power. In the same document, we find the statement that Russia is a “threat,” which does not align with statements from American leaders of both parties, though more from the Republican side than the Democratic one. It is neither acceptable nor responsible that, after the approval of such an important document, just two and a half years later, the United States acts as if the problem is not theirs. Putting formal aspects aside, is Russia a threat to the United States? To what extent does the behavior of the Moscow government in Eastern Europe affect U.S. national interests? Does it make sense for the United States to get involved in the war in Ukraine? Was Biden's behavior a reflection of a Cold War veteran, detached from the international circumstances of today? The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance was not the result of U.S. leaders in the early postwar years being convinced that the Soviet Union posed a threat to their national interests. On the contrary, they were fully aware that it did not. What concerned them was the extreme weakness of the European states, ravaged by a brutal war, the absence of a democratic culture, the high risk of totalitarian currents feeding off misery and uncertainty, and leading the Old Continent to a Third World War. European governments felt Soviet pressure. The area occupied by the Red Army was experiencing the extermination of representative institutions, Germany was torn between neutrality and partition, communist parties were gaining parliamentary positions in significant countries like France and Italy, supported by the prestige earned in the Resistance. For U.S. analysts, the European perception of the Soviet threat was exaggerated, but its effects could be concerning. The United States chose to engage in European reconstruction to prevent its drift towards fragmentation and totalitarianism, as the consequences of this drift could directly affect their national interests. They established a comprehensive strategy based on two pillars, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance. NATO has been and continues to be an instrument to guarantee cohesion and democracy on the Old Continent. The second Trump administration must resolve the tension between the isolationist demand of the citizenry, the need to create jobs on domestic soil through the erection of tariff barriers, the necessity of securing supply and distribution chains, and the consolidation of alliances or understandings between different regional blocs in response to Chinese initiatives. It is a set of contradictory actions wrapped in the populist demagoguery characteristic of our time, but which will require decisions in times marked by a succession of crises. Time for decisions An organization inhabited by officials does not need meaning to continue functioning. From 9 AM to 5 PM, qualified staff will move papers from one office to another, showcasing their professionalism and operational efficiency. However, it is important not to confuse NATO with the Alliance. The latter does need meaning, which is now in question. Whether we like it or not, the coming years will be crucial for its future. We will witness how the decisions made regarding a set of circumstances and debates will ultimately determine it, as well as the link between the two shores of the Atlantic. As happened at its origin, that link will go far beyond security, which is instrumental in consolidating that community which was the original aspiration and is now marked by its absence. The war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the central issue in the transatlantic relationship, as it brings to the negotiation table many of the fundamental issues that question its very existence. We are facing a continental conflict that arises after a Russian diplomatic attempt to reach an agreement on a new balance of power. Moscow's proposal demanded the withdrawal of U.S. units from areas bordering its territory and the removal of its nuclear weapons stationed in the Old Continent. Putin’s government felt threatened by NATO and the European Union's eastward expansion and demanded compensation. When it was not granted, it launched its third campaign on Ukraine and its fifth on territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. This is not a campaign that can be understood in a bilateral Russia-Ukraine logic, but rather as part of an effort by a revived Russian imperialism to reconstitute its historical sphere of influence. This invasion is not the first, and unless the Alliance acts wisely, it will not be the last. The role played by the Europeans has been disappointing. Their response to previous aggressions – Moldova, Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas – was the perfect example of how supposedly educated elites learn nothing from history. The French, Germans, and Italians collectively made the same mistakes as Chamberlain in Munich, thinking that the aggressor would be satisfied by acknowledging their right to aggression, when, in reality, they were encouraging them to proceed and prepare for new expansionist ventures. This attitude provoked the logical irritation and distrust in the Slavic-Scandinavian space, which was never deceived by the ongoing process under the Russian government. These powers refused to believe U.S. intelligence warnings about Russia's willingness to invade and reacted too late and poorly. All this, combined with the old problem of lack of investment in defense, made European armed forces ineffective and their industry powerless in responding to a demand for military capabilities in a short period of time. If the Europeans do not take their defense seriously, if they have become accustomed to parasitizing U.S. leadership, the frustration of their elites with their European allies is understandable. The Biden administration tried to use the Ukraine War to reconstitute the Alliance, but the strategy of attrition applied, renouncing victory out of fear of its political and military consequences, has led to a very high number of Ukrainian casualties and to public fatigue, which, following the Russian plan, is pushing through new political formations from both the right and the left to reach an unfeasible understanding with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. In the new international scenario, characterized by competition among great powers to achieve technological hegemony within the framework of the Digital Revolution, the United States needs Europe as much as Europe needs the United States. Russia does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, but it has become a vassal of China and an instrument of Beijing to weaken the cohesion of the Western bloc. The Trump administration must not fall into the temptation of turning its back on its allies, no matter how irresponsible and incompetent they may be, as this would cede ground to the rival. An even more protectionist policy could push European states, if not the Union itself, to seek alternative markets in China. A policy of greater withdrawal would encourage both division among continental powers and the pursuit of a middle ground between the two superpowers. What is at stake is much more than tariffs or investment in defense. What we will decide soon is whether we are a community or not, whether we face the challenges of a new era together, or if we choose separation. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States has valuable allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the Slavic and Scandinavian blocs. Attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine War could mean a victory for Russia by recognizing its right to alter Europe's borders by force, and the loss of trust from these allies, who are aware that even Trump would have fallen into the Munich trap, and despite his brash rhetoric, he would have ended up playing Chamberlain’s role. This would be a grave mistake for the United States, which, on the contrary, should rely on these countries to contain Russian expansionism and send a very clear message to Beijing about its commitment to updating and maintaining the cohesion of the Western community. Such an update would require allies, this time for real, to commit to defense investment and be prepared to use their capabilities when necessary. The Alliance needs a strategy. The concept approved in Madrid was merely the political framework to develop it. It is up to the Trump administration to lead its development in order to ultimately agree on what to do about the "Russian threat" and the "systemic challenge" posed by China. The Middle East crisis is unfolding in a scenario defined by two fronts established after years of diplomatic work: the "Abraham Accords" and the Axis of Resistance. Hamas’ aggression towards Israel has materialized in a harsh military campaign in the Gaza Strip, which has severely damaged the political and military capabilities of the Islamist group, and has extended to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is also suffering a heavy blow. In addition, Iran has seen its defense industry, anti-aircraft artillery systems, and, more limitedly, its nuclear network has suffered significant damage, while its intelligence system has been humiliated and degraded. In this context, despite the damage suffered by the Gazan population, the block formed by the Abraham Accords has remained cohesive, aware of Hamas' blackmail and the cost of yielding to it. On the other hand, Europe has presented itself as divided, lacking a strategic vision, not understanding that this was not a problem between Israelis and Palestinians, but an instrumental conflict aimed at undermining the regimes of Arab countries not aligned with the Axis of Resistance. Its criticism of Israel for the effects of its military campaign on the Gazan population consciously ignored both Hamas’ responsibility in turning them into human shields and the cost that accepting Hamas' blackmail would have had for all of us — Arabs, Israelis, and Europeans — if the campaign had not continued. How is it possible that we have so easily forgotten how the Axis powers were defeated? What would have happened in Europe during WWII if we had followed the European Union's demands during the Gaza War? The Middle East is a critical space for the Atlantic Alliance. It is understandable that the United States is frustrated with many of its European allies who, once again, have acted in a frivolous and irresponsible manner, unable to think in strategic terms. Israel has long chosen to turn its back on Europe, in response to a behavior it associates with a new form of anti-Semitism. The Arab bloc appreciates the European sensitivity to the suffering of the Gazan or Lebanese people, but it seeks security under the umbrella of the United States and Israel in the face of the Axis of Resistance, which poses a challenge of internal subversion, asymmetric warfare, and nuclear threat. A renewed Alliance needs to establish a strategy for the MENA region focused on containing Islamism and consolidating moderate regimes. China and Russia are taking advantage of the instability to infiltrate and hinder our missions. For them, instability on our southern front is a strategic objective, one that would fuel migration and insecurity, and with them, division within the Alliance and the Union. The Arab-Israeli bloc distrusts the United States due to its inability to maintain a strategy over time and does not rely on the Europeans. Only a firm stance from the Alliance in favor of this group of countries and against the Axis of Resistance could overcome this situation and guarantee both the cohesion of the Alliance and its authority in the region. The circumstances that led to the creation of the Alliance are behind us. They are history. However, today the Alliance is more necessary than ever. The circumstances have changed, but the community of values and interests remains the same, even though not everyone may understand this. Dissolving this community would be a grave mistake that would only benefit those powers whose goal is nothing more than to "revise" our legacy. Reviving it will not be easy. It will require political awareness and high-level diplomacy. Challenges that are impossible to achieve without leadership that matches the times. 

Defense & Security
Wavy Turkisd and Israel Flags

Türkiye’s approach to Israel’s challenges and prospects

by Samyar Rostami

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It also seems that various international, domestic, and regional variables in the economic and political dimensions will prevent widespread military-security tension in Turkey-Israel relations. Turkey recognized Israel in March 1949. Less serious ups and downs sometimes accompanied the bilateral relations between the two sides in the following decades. These relations continued during the rule of the Justice and Development Party over Turkey.The killing of 8 Turkish citizens by Israel in 2010, the reduction of tensions in 2016, the expulsion of ambassadors in 2018, and the existence of many ups and downs were important incidents in Turkey-Israel relations. While Erdoğan and Netanyahu met in New York in September 2023, seeking to normalize relations fully; the Israel-Gaza War on October 7, 2023, made Ankara to intensify its criticism and recall its ambassador from Israel. Although some Turkish diplomats continued to operate in Tel Aviv, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced in November 2024 that Turkey had severed all ties with Israel and currently had no relations with Israel. However, it appears that the Turkish embassy in Israel is operating and the Israeli diplomatic mission in Ankara is also open. Сhallenges Israeli-Turkish relations have reached a critical point, and the scope of tensions and disagreements has also expanded. Turkey has been one of the major critics of Israel in recent years, and the recent November 2024 announcement indicates an escalation of diplomatic tensions. Turkey’s approach to the Israel-Palestine crisis has been based on Turkey’s foreign strategy, increasing the status of Palestine in its foreign policy. Turkey, by opposing Israeli settlement in the West Bank, and using the international mechanism, emphasizing the two-state solution, etc., tries to play a leading role in diplomatic efforts on Palestine. But from Israel’s point of view, many of Turkey’s approaches include interfering in social and political issues inside Israel, are considered as weakening the Israeli government, reviving Muslim institutions, and inciting violence against Israel. Ankara has sought to cement its role in advancing Palestinian aspirations by engaging with various groups, including Hamas, offering to host Hamas political offices, mourning the assassination of Haniyeh, and occasionally “visiting” Hamas leaders from Turkey. In May, Erdoğan called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a “vampire” and called on Muslims to fight the Jewish state. In this view, Israel is a threat to “all of humanity” and has been mistreating Gaza for years. Therefore, it must be pressured by holding Israel accountable for its “genocide” and actions in Gaza, the Islamic League of Nations, and the international community. Earlier this year, Turkey filed a request to join the genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in support of Palestine. On November 1, Turkey initiated an arms embargo, calling for a halt to arms sales to Israel. In addition, it seems that Turkey wants to facilitate access to its national interests and even a mediatory role in reaching peace with Israel by exerting appropriate influence between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Also, apart from Turkey’s explicit opposition to Israel’s war in Lebanon and the risk of expelling Palestinians, the disagreements in Syria could be an important current and future stage in Israeli-Turkish relations. Israel and Turkey are the main beneficiaries of Assad’s collapse in Syria, but Turkey is known to support Islamist and Salafi-jihadi factions. Although Benjamin Netanyahu called Assad’s fall on December 8 a “historic day,” Ankara does not accept Israel’s seizure of buffer zones, advance into Syrian territory, and bombing of Syrian military sites after the collapse. Turkey and Israel have pursued their red lines in Syria with highly contradictory plans. Turkey does not accept Kurdish parties and the PKK taking advantage of the new situation in Syria or Israel occupying Damascus and reaching northern Syria. Also, while many in Israel have declared the Kurds to be Israel’s “allies” and have emphasized the importance of protecting minorities in Syria, Turkey now sees the Kurdish threat as more prominent. In addition, Ankara is likely to have regional and international convergences in mind to pressure Israel by highlighting Israel’s role in Syria. In the geopolitical sphere, alliances and coalitions in the Eastern Mediterranean are also not in Turkey’s interest. Ankara does not want to witness the risk of anti-Turkish geopolitical-geoeconomic coalitions forming in the region with Israel’s presence. Dimensions of geopolitical and security cooperation between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus pose major challenges for Ankara,. Ankara is pursuing a two-state solution in Cyprus but knows that in the Cyprus tension and dispute between Turkey and Greece, Israel stands in the Athens and Cyprus front. Turkey has also had tumultuous relations with the European Union and the United States in recent years. Israel is an important partner and collaborator of Western military and political institutions. Ankara still seems reluctant to have broader ties with NATO. Turkey is also trying to reduce the possibility of Israeli cooperation (against Ankara’s interests) with the Greek-American community, Turkish opposition parties, Gulen, Armenians. Turkey and Israel announced trade barriers against each other in 2024 and relations deteriorated. Turkey announced a trade embargo against Israel in May 2024, imposing restrictions on the export of 54 products. However, despite trade through third countries, the trade situation has hurt the state of the economies of both sides, bilateral trade agreements, and their plans for joint initiatives for gas extraction and transportation. The Turk opposition continues to challenge Erdoğan for his continued supply of Azerbaijani oil to Israel via Turkey and the Turkish Kurcik radar base, and for his double standards. However, anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments have increased in Turkey. The Turkish government continues to face public backlash over the continued flow of Azerbaijani oil to Israel via Turkey, Turkey’s ongoing trade relations with Tel Aviv, and indirect trade through third countries. Even amid public outcry in Turkey, Zorlu Holding announced its intention to sell its stake in Israel’s Dorad Energy. In this context, Ankara cannot immediately increase economic ties with Israel. Opportunities for relations Ties with Israel will help Erdoğan use the Israeli influence in the United States to improve relations between Washington and Ankara. Maintaining the relationship could benefit from some intelligence, security, and military agreements or military-technological and defense cooperation, cooperation in the field of information exchange and regional security, Turkey’s military modernization, cooperation on illegal immigration, and human trafficking. Israel and Turkey both have common interests in areas such as the South Caucasus. However, easing tensions with Israel could help Athens compromise and reduce pressure on Ankara over the Greek islands, and militarize the Aegean Sea. Turkey’s transportation policy could reach the Middle East, North Africa, and the Mediterranean region by taking advantage of port connections in Turkey and strengthening projects such as the sea bridge from Iskenderun to the port of Haifa. Some key issues, especially geoeconomics in the Eastern Mediterranean and energy policy, and common interests in the field of energy could prevent a complete break. Israeli gas to Europe could help reduce Turkey’s dependence. Turkey is also still the conduit for 40 percent of Israel’s energy, which comes from Azerbaijan via Turkey. Israel was Turkey’s 13th largest export partner in 2023, and the total value of trade between Israel and Turkey reached $6.8 billion. Expanding economic relations and using the economy as a factor in strengthening relations can add to other dimensions of cooperation between the two actors. Outlook: Although tensions between Turkey and Israel have not escalated to a security or military level, Turkey has repeatedly warned that a war between Turkey and Israel could break out. However, many challenges remain. The level of pessimism about Ankara’s intentions in Israel is very high. Turkey cannot show a broad retreat on Turkey’s red lines in Palestine. The range of mutual pessimism and the role of different variables may hurt the outlook for the Turkey and Israel relationship.  Therefore, in the short term, it is inconceivable that the defense and security relations between Turkey and Israel will return to the level of relations of the 1990s. With Trump coming to power in the US, the long-term strategic tension between Israel and Turkey will become more difficult for Ankara’s interests. It also seems that various international, domestic, and regional variables in the economic and political dimensions will prevent widespread military-security tension in Turkey-Israel relations. It is also possible that actors such as Baku could help reduce tensions. In this situation, it seems that Ankara, with a more pragmatic approach and a complex interaction of ideology, pragmatism, and geopolitical strategy of economic relations between the two countries, does not want to witness widespread, practical, or even military tension with Israel.

Energy & Economics
Trump - Putin - Flags

The World Awaits Change

by Andrei Kortunov

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском “Changes! We’re waiting for changes!” proclaimed Viktor Tsoi nearly 40 years ago, at the dawn of the Soviet perestroika. If one were to summarize the multitude of diverse and contradictory events, trends, and sentiments of the past year in a single phrase, it would be that the modern world is eagerly awaiting change. Much like the former USSR in the 1980s, few today can clearly define what these changes should entail or what their ultimate outcome will be. Yet, the idea of maintaining the status quo has evidently found little favor with the public over the past year. This impatient anticipation of change was reflected, for instance, in the outcomes of numerous elections held over the past 12 months across the globe. In total, more than 1.6 billion people went to the polls, and in most cases, supporters of the status quo lost ground. In the United States, the Democrats suffered a resounding defeat to the Republicans, while in the United Kingdom, the Conservatives were decisively beaten by the Labour Party. In France, Emmanuel Macron's once-dominant ruling party found itself squeezed between right-wing and left-wing opposition, plunging the Fifth Republic into a deep political crisis. The seemingly stable foundations of political centrism were shaken in Germany, South Korea, and Japan. Even the party of the highly popular Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi failed to retain its parliamentary majority after the elections, and in South Africa, the African National Congress led by Cyril Ramaphosa also lost its majority. Pessimists might argue that abandoning the status quo in itself solves no problems, and the much-anticipated changes, as the final years of the Soviet Union demonstrated, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. Replacing cautious technocrats with reckless populists often backfires, affecting those most critical of the entrenched status quo. Optimists, on the other hand, would counter that the rusted structures of state machinery everywhere are in desperate need of radical modernization. They would add that the costs inevitably associated with maintaining the existing state of affairs at all costs far outweigh any risks tied to attempts to change it. The international events of the past year are also open to various interpretations. Pessimists would undoubtedly point out that none of the major armed conflicts carried over from 2023 were resolved in 2024. On the contrary, many of them showed clear tendencies toward escalation. For instance, in late summer, Ukraine launched an incursion into the Kursk region of Russia, and in mid-November, the U.S. authorized Kyiv to use long-range ATACMS missiles against targets deep within Russian territory. Meanwhile, the military operation launched by Israel in Gaza in the fall of 2023 gradually expanded to the West Bank, then to southern Lebanon, and by the end of 2024, to parts of Syrian territory adjacent to the Golan Heights. From the optimists' perspective, however, the past year demonstrated that the disintegration of the old international system has its limits. A direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO did not occur, nor did a large-scale regional war break out in the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, or the Korean Peninsula. The economic results of 2024 are equally ambiguous. On one hand, the global economy remained heavily influenced by geopolitics throughout the year. The process of “technological decoupling” between the U.S. and China continued, and unilateral sanctions firmly established themselves as a key instrument of Western foreign policy. On the other hand, the world managed to avoid a deep economic recession despite the numerous trade and investment restrictions. Global economic growth for the year is expected to reach around 3%, which is quite respectable for such turbulent times, especially considering that the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have not yet been fully overcome. In 2024, the average annual global temperature exceeded pre-industrial levels by more than 1,5 °C for the first time, crossing another critical “red line”. However, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) held in November in Baku fell short of many expectations. At the same time, China reached its peak carbon emissions by the end of the year, achieving this milestone a full five years ahead of previously announced plans. In the past year, the UN Security Council managed to adopt only 12 resolutions, mostly of a humanitarian nature, clearly reflecting the declining effectiveness of this global governance body. For comparison, in 2000, the Security Council approved 29 resolutions, including key decisions on conflict resolution in the Balkans and Africa. At the same time, 2024 saw continued efforts to explore new formats for multilateral cooperation, including mechanisms within the BRICS group, which held its 16th summit in Kazan for the first time in its newly expanded composition. With enough imagination, one can easily find evidence in the past 12 months to confirm any omen or superstition traditionally associated with leap years. However, all these signs and superstitions predicting upheavals and catastrophes—while aligning with the pessimistic conclusions about the year now ending—do not apply to the year ahead. Human nature, after all, tends to lean more towards optimism than pessimism; if it were the other way around, we would still be living in caves. As they bid farewell to a difficult and challenging year, people around the world continue to hope for better times. And the mere act of hoping for the best is already significant in itself. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe aptly remarked, “Our wishes are forebodings of our capabilities, harbingers of what we are destined to achieve”. Originally published in Izvestia.

Defense & Security
Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at G20 meeting Bali, Indonesia 15.11.2022

Türkiye’s regional triumph is evident

by Alexander Svarants

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The fall of B. Assad’s regime was the result of a number of internal and external contradictions, in which the Turkish factor played a key role. Ankara is celebrating the success of its diplomacy in Syria. The success in Syria is giving R. Erdogan wings In its diplomacy, Türkiye consistently tries to adhere to a pragmatic course of achieving its national interests. At the same time, Ankara’s policy does not represent the short-term ambitions of an adventurist leader, rather reflects a long-term programme in accordance with the doctrines and strategies of neo-Ottomanism and neo-pan-Turanism. Türkiye does not hide its ambitions; it makes public various programme provisions and concepts, which focus on raising the status of Turkish statehood to the rank of a regional superpower. For this reason, when former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu explained in Washington the essence of the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism, developed by him in the framework of his ‘Strategic Depth’, he noted Ankara’s attachment to the post-Ottoman space, i.e. to the peoples and countries that were previously part of the Ottoman Empire. Of course, no nation freed from the tyranny of the Ottoman Empire will voluntarily return to the new Türkiye or become its vassal, however Ankara does not set (at least at this point in historical development) the task of reuniting independent entities of the post-Ottoman space with Türkiye. Ankara is trying to spread its influence and realise national interests in relation to geographical neighbours, to use its advantageous economic and geographical position on transit routes, which increases Türkiye’s status at the junction of Europe, Africa and Asia. For these purposes, the Turkish authorities are effectively using economic, political and military means. In North Africa, betting on one of the political forces in the devastated Libya and the local use of military forces – combined with the supply of weapons – provided Ankara with the opportunity to gain access to oil fields. The energy partnership with Russia and the consideration of Moscow’s crisis relations with the West have, in a certain sense, created not only trade and economic interests, but also the relative geopolitical dependence of the Russian Federation on relations with Türkiye. As a result, through partnership diplomacy, the Turks localised military and other threats from Russia to implement the geopolitical strategy of neo-pan-Turansim in the post-Soviet southeast. Ankara is supporting Turkic countries in local conflicts With regard to the newly formed Turkic countries, Türkiye did not rely only on Turkism and pan-Turkism, instead choosing a more flexible tactic: combining ethno-cultural kinship and ideological expansion with a more rational, economic (primarily energy, transport, communication and transit) integration strategy according to the formula ‘One people – two (three, four, five, six) states’. However, Ankara has strongly and consistently supported Turkic countries in local conflicts, providing them with the necessary military, military-technical, intelligence and diplomatic assistance. In this regard, the Turkish-Azeri tandem against Armenia in the Karabakh conflict is a good example. As a result, Türkiye, using its position in NATO and its allied relations with the UK and US, achieved the implementation of new strategic communications bypassing Russia to export oil and gas from the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea and then to Europe. This ambitious transport and energy programme, as well as the military victory in Karabakh, laid the foundation for strengthening the independence of Turkic countries and supporting common Turkic integration, which allowed Türkiye to create the international Organisation of Turkic States (OTG) and move towards the goal of a single Turan. In the Middle East, Türkiye supports is allied with Qatar and opposed the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, which previously (2009) abandoned the transit project of a Qatari gas pipeline through Syria to Türkiye and Europe. Given the unsolvable intra-confessional (between Sunnis and Shi’as, Alawites) and inter-ethnic (the Kurdish issue) contradictions in Syria, President Erdogan waged a consistent battle to overthrow the undesirable regime, strengthen the pro-Turkish forces of Sunni Islamic radicals and local Turkmen in Syria, as well as to neutralise any forms of independence of the Syrian Kurds. Türkiye was not only aware of the plans of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS) and the Syrian National Army* (SNA) for six months, but it was Türkiye itself that developed the plan for a military operation against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, providing them with the necessary military, technical, intelligence and diplomatic support. Türkiye said that Bashar al-Assad refused the hand that Erdogan extended to him and refused negotiations on Ankara’s terms with the recognition of the reality on the ground (i.e. the de facto Turkish occupation of the ‘security zone’ in the north-west of Syria). In response, Turkish proxy forces taught Assad a lesson by excommunicating him from power and removing him from Syria itself. Erdogan exhibited violent and aggressive rhetoric against Netanyahu because of the conflict in the Gaza Strip and took cosmetic measures within the framework of the trade embargo. In reality, Ankara did not follow Tehran’s example and did not provide military assistance to the Palestinians. Türkiye has not banned the transit of Azeri oil to Israel via its territory. Regarding the military operation against the Assad regime in Syria, Ankara skilfully used Tel Aviv’s signals about the launch of an offensive on Aleppo and Damascus. For some reason, the Turks are not blaming Israel for its numerous airstrikes on Syrian communications and the military arsenal of the former Syrian army, which greatly facilitated the advance of HTS* and SNA* forces in Syria. Ankara did not make harsh statements against Israel about the fact that the IDF entered the buffer zone in the Golan Heights and that Israeli tanks were 20km from Damascus. However, as the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak reports, Türkiye is threatening to shoot down the Israeli Air Force with its air defence systems if they support the Kurdish forces in Syria. Erdogan’s triumph Turkish media is enthusiastically celebrating Erdogan’s triumph in Syria and the fall of the Assad regime. At the moment, the Turks have strengthened their positions in Syria. The interim (or transitional) government in Damascus, headed HTS* leader Mohammed al-Jolani, is, in fact, an ally of Ankara. With even greater effort and reliance on the new Syrian authorities, Türkiye will obviously continue its policy of forcibly resolving and neutralising the Kurdish issue in Rojava. The fall of Assad allows Türkiye to repatriate more than 3 million Syrian refugees and strengthen its influence on domestic political life in a weak Syria. Finally, the Turks are counting on the implementation of the Qatari gas pipeline project in the near future, a project which was postponed due to the past position of Bashar al-Assad and his allies. It is no coincidence that on December 13, the heads of the Turkish and Qatari intelligence services met in Damascus, where they held joint talks with the leader of the HTS*, al-Jolani. Ankara and Doha have already announced their plans to open diplomatic missions in Syria. Immediately after the fall of the Assad regime, Türkiye announced on December 9 that it would help Syria rebuild its energy sector, although Ankara did not receive an official request from the new government. In turn, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar did not rule out that the Qatari gas pipeline project will be revived, as Syria has restored its unity and stability. Bayraktar stressed that it is necessary to ensure the safety of the gas pipeline. It seems that the question of ensuring the security of the future gas pipeline was also addressed by the Turkish and Qatari heads of intelligence with HTS* leader al-Jolani. The most openly pretentious statement vis-à-vis Syrian territory was the speech of President R. Erdogan at a party meeting, in which he proposed to review the results of the First World War and return the Syrian provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Damascus and Raqqa to Türkiye, as they were previously part of the Ottoman Empire. This is how neo-Ottomanism manifests itself in real life. However, Erdogan apparently forgot that following the results of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire lost and collapsed and the territories of the new Türkiye changed. The author of revised borders within the framework of the Versailles Treaty system was Türkiye’s eternal ally Great Britain. Following that logic, today Russia has the right to demand from Türkiye Kars, Artvin, Ardahan and Surmalu district with Mount Ararat, which the Bolsheviks unreasonably ceded in March, 1921, to Kemal Pasha. Which problems may await Türkiye following the regime change in Syria? Of course, at this stage Türkiye’s success in Syria is obvious, but it is unlikely to be the result of Turkish planning alone. The United States did not officially interfere in the situation surrounding overthrowing the Assad regime, but did not leave Syria either. Washington and Tel Aviv actually dragged Ankara into a joint plan to collapse Iran and Russia in Syria. Given the inaction of the Syrian authorities and the army, Moscow did not get involved in a new conflict. Tehran adheres to approximately the same position. Some experts believe that the newly elected US President D. Trump supposedly promised to redistribute spheres of influence with Russia, where Moscow gets peace in Ukraine in accordance with the reality on the ground, but withdraws from Syria. However, in Syria, the United States and Israel will support the Kurds, who are Türkiye’s main opponents. Ankara continues to insist on eliminating Kurdish structures in Syria, which may be at odds with the approaches of the United States and Israel. Russian expert Stanislav Tarasov believes that the Turkish-Kurdish confrontation in Syria can lead to sad consequences for the Turks and the loss of almost eight Kurdish-populated vilayets in the south-east of Türkiye itself with the involvement of the United States and Israel. At the same time, D. Trump’s focus on confrontation with Iran in Israel’s favour prolongs the risk of war waged by the Western coalition against Iran, in which Türkiye will face a military conflict with Tehran. It is more likely that Russia will abstain from intervening in such a conflict. Türkiye, however, could suffer significantly. Syria can either follow the path of ‘Iraqisation’ and the division of its territories into ‘zones of responsibility’ of external and internal forces or find itself divided between neighbours and new entities (including Israel, Türkiye, Iran and Kurdistan). * currently banned in the Russian Federation

Diplomacy
Dotted world map illustration made of USA flag colors as concept for United States global dominance. Power and leadership symbol. Politics, military and economic influence.

Is the United States Still the Sole Superpower of the World?

by Taut Bataut

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the rise of Russia and China, the world is shifting dramatically from a unipolar US-dominated order to a multipolar one. Russia’s strategic alliances, along with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and economic growth, are reshaping global power dynamics. On the other hand, the United States’ military interventions and isolationist moves have raised a critical question: can it adapt to this new global reality, or will it continue to lose influence on these emerging powers? The Decline of U.S. Global Dominance The global order is witnessing a transformative period, from a unipolar order under US dominance to a multipolar one. The latter provides other major powers an extensive opportunity to challenge the US-led global system. China, Russia, and even the middle powers use this waning US influence to expand their global political clout. The rise of these powers is altering the global balance of power. Numerous US policy decisions have weakened its position in the global sphere. The militarization approach of the United States and the successive unpopular government policies have made its fall inevitable. The realist theorists attempt to attribute these changes in global power distribution as a result of the anarchic world system. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its growing economic might present the strongest challenge to the US economic and military hegemony in the world. The BRI has posed it as an indispensable economic partner of the countries across the three continents including Africa, Asia, and Latin America due to the investment of trillions of dollars in infrastructural projects. Moreover, its trade volume reached $6 trillion in 2022 surpassing the US trade volume of $4.9 trillion. This economic might has enabled it to entice states that became weary of the US’s harsh approach towards the developing and underdeveloped world. The Emergence of a Multipolar World Order Furthermore, globalization has also prompted the Third World countries to partake in knowledge and economic competitions with the Western world.   The liberal theorists hold that the leveling effect of globalization enables it to redistribute power. The emergence of this new multipolar world order has made it difficult for the US to establish and maintain its influence over the globe and remain relevant in global governance. The rise of BRICS, with its share of 37.4 percent in the global GDP in 2023, and its decision to introduce its currency for mutual trade have challenged the US financial system, hastening the decline of the US-led economic and political order. Moreover, the US policies under a few former presidents have also contributed to the rapid decline of the country’s hegemony. United States military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, its covert involvement behind sparking the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and its compliance in Israel’s war crimes in Gaza have all damaged Washington’s global standing. Its deadliest invasion of Iraq, under the pretext of unverified reports of WMDs, undermined its credibility and destabilized the whole Middle Eastern region. In addition, the United States failed invasion of Afghanistan also contributed to its malignity around the globe. Russia and China were emboldened by such US failures and challenged it economically, militarily, and ideologically. Leadership crises in the United States have also undermined its international standing. President-elect Donald Trump’s previous government damaged America’s reputation to a great extent. His decision to withdraw from the Paris Accord and his criticism of NATO also inculcated distrust among the country’s allies. The US also holds a reputation for betraying its allies after achieving its ambitions. Pakistan is one of the best examples of this. The United States had always had a transactional relationship with Islamabad. After achieving its regional ambitions, it has always imposed sanctions on the country. Therefore, the US allies have started thinking of it as an unreliable ally. President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election has once again inculcated frustration among the US allies. His stance on Ukraine has already been criticized by its allies. President-elect Donald Trump seeks an immediate and peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Recently, he called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine after meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He advocates a non-interventionist policy. Therefore, it is believed that the Russia-Ukraine conflict would come to an end after his final selection as the US President. Moreover, his presidency might also affect the unity of NATO, as he has always been critical of funding it. His “America First” approach also contributes to decreasing US influence and dominance over the world. President-elect Donald Trump’s crackdown against immigrants has also contributed to the United States’ isolation in the American region and beyond. In addition, Russia and China’s rise and BRICS expansion have also provided the middle powers and third-world countries a novel opportunity to form new alliances. The election of President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election, de-dollarization by BRICS, and the swift rise of Russia and China, along with other middle powers, all are contributing to the rapid decline of the US influence and dominance over the world.

Diplomacy
NATIONAL HARBOR, MD, USA- February 24, 2024: Donald Trump speaks at an event about his plan for defeating current President Joe Biden in November.

The Trump Effect

by Krzysztof Śliwiński

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This analysis focuses on possible short and medium-term effects of Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States. This paper starts with a brief account of Trump’s first presidency and then continues to account for major challenges that Trump’s administration will have to face domestically,The central part of the analysis focuses on the geopolitical consequences of Trump’s election. In particular, the author looks at Europe (the ongoing war in Ukraine): Middle East and Far East – especially China.The paper concludes with the author's conviction that the next few years will bring decisive changes likely to usher in the new world order.Keywords: Trump, US, Europe, Security, Geopolitics Introduction Donald Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States in 2017 had significant and far-reaching effects on world politics, marking a departure from previous administrations' approaches to foreign policy and international relations. Trump's presidency shifted from globalization to isolationism, protectionism, and nationalism (Kawashima, 2017). His "America First" strategy emphasized unilateral action and challenged the liberal international order the United States had led and protected since World War II (Mansbach, 2021). This approach has strained relationships with traditional allies, particularly in Europe, while simultaneously raising authoritarian leaders (Mansbach, 2021). Interestingly, Trump's election immediately negatively impacted trust in the U.S. government in Latin America, as demonstrated by a regression discontinuity design study (Carreras et al., 2021). Additionally, his controversial policies, such as the trade war with China, have had significant impacts on the global economy (Sahide et al., 2024). The Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Islamic World was notably less friendly compared to the Obama era, causing tensions in US-Islamic World relations (Bahari & Sahide, 2022). There seems to be a consensus that Trump's presidency accelerated societal processes, undermined democratic institutions, and encouraged hyperpartisanship within political institutions (James, 2021). While he did not always succeed in implementing major policy changes or fulfilling campaign promises, his leadership style and policy decisions significantly altered the global perception of the United States and its role in world politics, creating what some scholars describe as " a more dangerous world" (Mansbach, 2021).  Admittedly, Trump does not seem to be exceptionally hawkish when it comes to using military tools in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Let us remember that Barak Obama (Democratic Party), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, ordered airstrikes in seven different countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria) (Liptak, 2014). During first Trump’s presidency, no new campaigns were started, although the intensification of the existing ones allegedly increased. Ultimately, it was Trump who was mainly behind the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Trump 2.0 November 2024 Presidential elections brought sweeping changes to the American political kaleidoscope. Donald Trump took a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Kamala Harris, securing 312 electoral votes (with 270 being a victory threshold). Republicans also won the Senate with 52 seats against 47 and the House with 218 seats against 212. (Election Centre 2024).  This is arguably one of the most important political events in the world in 2024. Already Trump’s declarations regarding the first decisions to be taken once sworn in office on the 20th of January next year, plus his appointments for top offices in the U.S. administration, have caused a furore – a phenomenon referred to by many as the so-called ‘Trump Effect’. As much as political scientists, cognitive anthropologists or psychologists usually use this term to refer to racially inflammatory Elite Communication (Newman et al., 2020), this short analysis will look at the tectonic shifts in international relations, international security system and geopolitics that have already happened or are likely to occur after the 20th of January 2025. U.S. – politics Undoubtedly, the U.S. economy, society, and political system are in deep crisis. Economically, the Americans have been doing worse than ever since the Second World War. Inflation is rampant; economic inequality is very high; unemployment is on the rise; the state of infrastructure is relatively poor, and the level of public services is far from desirable, whereas taxation is reaching new heights amidst a slowing economy and diminishing number of small and medium enterprises (USA FACTS). Societywise, the problems are equally severe. According to Pew Research, the top issues facing the U.S. in this category are in the order of importance from top to bottom: the affordability of healthcare, drug addiction, illegal immigration, gun violence, violent crime, the state of moral values, the quality of public k-12 schools, Climate change, international terrorism, infrastructure condition, domestic terrorism and racism (Pew Research Centre, 2024). One should also add here the rising “wokeness’ of the American educational system, which poses a great challenge to the cohesion of the society and its future in terms of military power.  Politically, the picture is not better. According to the same research institution (Pew), the biggest problems that the U.S. political system faces are: political leaders do not face the consequences if they act unethically, it is difficult to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics, Congress accomplishes less than people give it credit for, the Federal Government does less for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for. Other problems include the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in policymaking, the cost of political campaigns and the animosity between the Republicans and the Democrats, which, in consequence, causes the inability of the political system to solve critical societal problems (Pew Research Centre, 2023). The first and foremost task ahead of Trump is to rectify problems at home. His Agenda47 (Republican Platform) declares 20 core promises: seal the border and stop the migrant invasion, carry out the largest deportation operation in american history, end inflation, and make america affordable again, make america the dominant energy producer in the world, by far, stop outsourcing, and turn the United States into a manufacturing superpower, large tax cuts for workers, and no tax on tips, defend the constitution, the bill of rights, and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to keep and bear arms, prevent world war three, restore peace in europe and in the middle east, and build a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country -- all made in america, end the weaponization of government against the american people, stop the migrant crime epidemic, demolish the foreign drug cartels, crush gang violence, and lock up violent offenders, rebuild cities, including washington dc, making them safe, clean, and beautiful again, strengthen and modernize the military, making it, without question, the strongest and most powerful in the world, keep the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, fight for and protect social security and medicare with no cuts, including no changes to the retirement age, cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations, cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory, radical gender ideology, and other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on children, keep men out of women's sports, deport pro-hamas radicals and make college campuses safe and patriotic again, secure our elections, including same day voting, voter identification, paper ballots, and proof of citizenship and lastly unite the country by bringing it to new and record levels of success (Agenda 47).  International Politics Internationally, Trump faces many challenges. His presidency will have to address three primary regions defined geographically: Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. - Europe As far as Europe is concerned, the most pressing issue is the war in Ukraine. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly declared that his administration's support for the continuation of the U.S. support for the war effort against Russia would be terminated during the first 24 hours of his presidency (Hansler, 2024). As a consequence, shortly after Trump’s winning the White House race, the outgoing administration under POTUS Joe Biden finally allowed the Ukrainians to attack Russian territory with American long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS), which allegedly came in as a response to the North Korean decision to send its troops to support Russian soldiers against Ukraine (Entous, Schmitt and Barnes, 2024). Next, in counter-response, President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a new nuclear Doctrine into power. Chillingly, it declares that Russia may use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear state, even in case of a conventional attack (Associated Press, 2024). As of the beginning of December 2024, the media are full of reports of an alleged concentration of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border, fueling speculation about an imminent mass invasion, this time with cities such as Kyiv being targeted in a conventional terrain operation (Bodner, De Luce and Smith, 2024).  One can only speculate what all this means and how far we are from the outbreak of the III World War (Sky News, 2024). Some things are, however, more or less evident. Firstly, the current escalation of war in Ukraine is likely a direct effect of Trump's winning and his declaration to end the war as soon as possible. The more the Russian troops advance in the field, the higher they can bid once the peace talks begin. Similarly, the more complex the situation in the field (Biden’s decision regarding the use of ATACMS), the more challenging it will be for Trump and his administration to achieve peace. Knowing the radically different approach to conflict with Russia of President Trump, the outgoing administration and national security advisors most likely wanted to achieve militarily as much as possible before they were ousted from their jobs. Secondly, Trump declared on numerous occasions that if European members of NATO want to continue their support for Ukraine, they should take the whole responsibility. He singled Germany, France, and Poland out. Poland, for that matter, enthusiastically agreed to carry on the baton and declared that it was ready to bear the heavy burden. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, when participating in a radio broadcast, “We [Poland] are ready to take over the large part of the costs of supporting Ukraine” (Nczas Info, 2024). At the same time on the 3rd of December, the new Secretary General of NATO – Mark Rutte, during his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, openly declared: “The immediate priority must be to provide more arms to the country's forces as Russia gains territory along the battlefront in eastern Ukraine.The [Ukrainian] front is not moving eastwards. It is slowly moving westwards. So, we have to make sure that Ukraine gets into a position of strength, and then it should be for the Ukrainian government to decide on the next steps in terms of opening peace talks and how to conduct them." (VoA, 2024). To sum up, it looks like the current escalation, according to theoretical models such as those proposed by Herman Kahn in 1965 – a Cold War physicist - we are at stage 12 of 44 steps on the escalation ladder. As comforting as one might think it is, let us remember that according to Kahn’s theory, a local nuclear war takes place as early as at step 21 (Tinline, 2023). As history has proved many times, it is difficult, if impossible, to wage a systemic war on two fronts at the same time. Given the economic and military challenges perceived by Trump during his first tenure as U.S. President (See: A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017), China is the challenger number one for the position of the United States in the international system and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, China wants to reorder the area in its favour. Would it be too much of a stretch of the imagination to claim that most likely, given the context above, Trump will probably arrange for peaceful talks with Russia over Ukrainian political and military leadership heads’? What will he want? Probably Russia’s neutrality in the face of the coming escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and China. What can he offer? Probably a big part of Ukrainian territory and the amendment to the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the country should forever be neutral militarily and politically. At the same time, the American withdrawal from Europe will most probably create a void that is most likely to be filled by Germans. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts (The Federal Government, 2022).  The leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's ‘special responsibility’ for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government’s ‘special responsibility’ for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. (German National Security Strategy, 2023). In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the ‘best equipped armed force’ in Europe (Euronews, 2022). Let us also remember that Berlin vigorously supported the latest proposal for a European army, which presumably might serve as a vehicle for further European integration towards the federalization of Europe.  At the same time, the prospect of federalization will face two major challenges: firstly, the future of transatlantic relations is less than certain, especially the economic competition between the EU and the U.S. European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen signalled the possibility of an economic war with the U.S. as a response to Trump declared protectionism of the American economy (Berg, Meyers, 2024). Secondly, the EU is highly inefficient in energy, so the question of future energy security becomes a priority. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the redirection of Russian gas to China will profoundly affect the future of European economic development amid the so-called ‘Fit-for-55’ -  a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (Fit for 55, 2024). - Middle East As of the writing of this paper, one sees the escalation of the war in Syria. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “ongoing hostilities in northern Syria continue to expand to other parts of the country, endangering civilians and humanitarian workers, causing severe damage to critical infrastructure and disrupting humanitarian operations. As of 5 December, at least 178,000 people have been displaced due to the recent escalations in northern Syria, including 128,000 newly displaced and 39,000 displaced at least twice. Figures are still being reconciled, noting that UNHR and NGOs operating in the northeastern part of Syria estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people have been newly displaced there, including more than 25,000 currently hosted in collective centers”. (OCHA, 2024). According to international media (CBC News, 2024): ”Syria's long-running civil war came to a head Sunday when opposition forces entered the capital city of Damascus and the government of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. Russian state media later reported that Assad and his family had fled to Moscow. Crowds gathered in Damascus to celebrate the fall of Assad's government with chants, prayers and occasional gunfire, marking the end of a regime that, between the ousted President and his father, had ruled over Syria for half of a century.” […] "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen," President Biden said Sunday afternoon at the White House after convening his national security team to discuss the developments. He said the fall of Assad presented a "historic moment of opportunity" and pledged support for Syria and its neighbours against any threats” (Ott, 2024). Syria seems to be just another litmus test of the so-called regional security complex in the Middle East. As such, the war in Syria is obviously but a puzzle in a much bigger jigsaw that includes all major powers that operate in the region: the U.S.A, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran to name the most obvious ones. All of the above are deeply engaged in Middle East politics for the sake of their national interests and international security strategies. All of the above deserve separate analyses. For the sake of this paper, however, the author will focus only on the U.S. According to Douglas Macgregor and Dave Ramaswamy, “The fear in many nations’ capitals is that President Donald Trump’s return to Washington might make Israel feel more confident in attacking Iran. According to Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, “There is no world leader Trump respects more than Netanyahu.”  The evangelical leader also confides that President Trump would support an Israeli attack before his inauguration on the assumption that the destruction of Iran’s oil production facilities would devastate Iran’s economy, inducing Iran to end the war with Israel before President Trump assumes his office. This thinking by no means excludes an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear development sites as well.” (Macgregor & Ramaswamy, 2024). In their article, they state that “If America joins Israel in its war against Iran, the outcome will be a geopolitical showdown that could dramatically alter the world as we know it. It is the storm of the 21st century and, for the moment, the American ship of state is sailing right into it. “ They consequently pose four fundamental questions:  1. What is the American purpose in waging war against Iran? Is Washington’s purpose to destroy the Iranian state? To destroy its capability to wage war against Israel? To eliminate Iran’s developing nuclear capability? Or to decapitate the Iranian state in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow their national government? 2. How will U.S. military power achieve the objectives? 3. What is the desired end state? What does the President want Iran and the region that surrounds it to look like when the fighting ends? 4. What is the strategic cost to the American people if Washington declines to participate in a regional war begun by Israel?  They conclude by asking yet another, perhaps the most crucial question: what do Netanyahu’s goals mean for the health of the American economy and the stability of the international system? Can Israel survive without attacking its numerous enemies?  The next couple of months are likely to bring at least some answers to some of these questions. Importantly, expert voices concerning the future of Israel seem to be abounding more and more (Teller, 2024). - China and the Far East Finally, there is a question of China. As mentioned before, Trump sees China as a major challenger to the role and position of the U.S. in the international system. The Republicans and the Democrats may be divided by numerous issues, but there is at least one regarding which they stay united. The true bipartisanship revolves around the Chinese challenge. Both parties, therefore, claim that the possibility of a systemic conflict with China is not a science fiction scenario. On November 20, 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress heard that the U.S. had to prepare for a potential conflict with China by raising its defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP. (South China Morning Post, 2024). The recommendation came during an interactive exercise for members of the House Select Committee on China, based on a scenario predicted for 2026 and hosted by Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report titled: The First Battle of the Next War Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, authored by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham opens with a chilling question: “What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is, therefore, not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.” (The First Battle of the Next War, 2023). They go on to claim that: “China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.” China has grown increasingly assertive over the last decades and sees no reason to continue accepting a dominated world that facilitates the benefits of Western powers, especially the U.S.A. At a recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (November 2024), the President of China openly called for a multipolar world (Xinhua, 2024). In his words: “China and Brazil stay committed to peace, development, fairness and justice. We have similar or identical views on many international and regional issues. Both are staunch defenders of the basic norms of international relations and multilateralism, coordinating closely and consistently within the United Nations, G20, BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms on crucial issues, including global governance and climate change. Not long ago, China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Our initiative has received a positive response from the international community. China and Brazil, embracing our roles and responsibilities as major countries, have contributed to a multipolar world, conduced to greater democracy in international relations and injected positive energy into global peace and stability.” (Xinhua, 2024 b).  Conclusion Taiwan has long been a global security issue and a point of concern on the geopolitical maps of the national security planners of great powers. It is not the only one, though. The war between the Koreas is formally not over (recently, North Korea allegedly sent soldiers to back Russia in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine); the American military presence in the Far East and South East Asia is likely to remain an issue, especially from the point of view of Beijing. Central Asia, with its geopolitical environment, religious activism and economic challenges, is likely to rise in importance as a chessboard for great powers. As the weight and focus of International Relations is relocating back to Asia (Euroasia rather than the North Atlantic Area), China and Russia are more likely to hold the keys to international peace and security than the United States. On top of that, one needs to look out for North Africa as a source of continuing instability and massive migration, especially to Europe. All in all, Trump’s next presidency will surely bring a lot of interesting developments, which are likely to fuel a new world order.  References - A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017. NSS_BookLayout_FIN_121917.indd - Agenda 47. https://www.donaldjtrump.com/platform - Associated Press, Nov. 8, 2024. “The Kremlin has revised its nuclear policy. Does that make the use of atomic weapons more likely?” https://apnews.com/article/russia-nuclear-doctrine-putin-ukraine-war-b5ee115aa2099fa247f630e16da861d8- Bahari, Diana Mutiara, and Ahmad Sahide. 2022. “The Comparison of The United States Foreign Policy Against The Islamic World Under President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump Administration.” Journal of Islamic World and Politics 6 (2): 270–97. https://doi.org/10.18196/jiwp.v6i2.13060. - Berg, Aslak and Meyers, Zach. Oct. 3, 2024. “Surviving Trump 2.0: What does the US election mean for Europe's economy?” https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2024/surviving-trump-20-what-does-us-election-mean-europes-economy - Bodner, Matthew, Luce, Dan De and Smith, Alexander. Dec. 2, 2024. “Russian troops mass on Ukraine's border. West worries this isn't like the last time.” https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russian-troops-mass-ukraines-border-west-worries-isnt-last-time-rcna7203 - Carreras, Miguel, Giancarlo Visconti, and Igor Acácio. 2021. “The Trump Election and Attitudes toward the United States in Latin America.” Public Opinion Quarterly 85 (4): 1092–1102. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfab055. - Election Centre 2024, CNN Politics. https://edition.cnn.com/election/2024 - Entous, Adam, Schmitt, Eric and Barnes, Julian E. Nov. 17, 2024. “Biden Allows Ukraine to Strike Russia With Long-Range U.S. Missiles.” https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/17/us/politics/biden-ukraine-russia-atacms-missiles.html- Fit for 55, European Council. Council of the European Union. European Green Deal. Accessed March 8, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/ - Germany must become 'the best equipped armed force in Europe', Scholz says. Euronews, September 16, 2022. Accessed March 8, 2023. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/09/16/germany-must-become-the-best-equipped-armed-force-in-europe-scholz-says- Hansler, Jennifer. Nov. 6, 2024. “Trump’s victory could mean US withdraws support for Ukraine in war with Russia.” https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/06/politics/trump-election-ukraine-war-russia-intl/index.html- James, Toby S. 2021. “The Effects of Donald Trump.” Policy Studies 42 (5–6): 755–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2021.1980114. - Kawashima, Shin. 2017. "Japan–US-China Relations during the Trump Administration and the Outlook for East Asia." Asia-Pacific Review 24 (1): 23–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2017.1328800. - Liptak, James. Sept. 23, 2014. “Countries bombed by the U.S. under the Obama administration.” CNN Politics. https://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/23/politics/countries-obama-bombed/index.html - Macgregor, Douglas & Ramaswamy, Dave, Nov. 19, 2024. “Trump and the Storm of the Century. The U.S. is sleepwalking into disaster in the Middle East.” The American Conservative. https://www.theamericanconservative.com/trump-and-the-storm-of-the-century/ - Mansbach, Richard W. 2021. "America’s Foreign Policy under Donald Trump.” In, 201–34. oxford university. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197618721.003.0010. - National Security Strategy. Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany (2023). Federal Foreign Office, Werderscher Markt 1, 10117 Berlin. - Nczas Info. Nov. 12, 2024. “Szokujące słowa wiceszefa MSZ. Oddamy jeszcze więcej Ukrainie? „Jesteśmy gotowi przejąć dużą część kosztów” [VIDEO]”. https://nczas.info/2024/11/12/szokujace-slowa-wiceszefa-msz-oddamy-jeszcze-wiecej-ukrainie-jestesmy-gotowi-przejac-duza-czesc-kosztow-video/ - Newman, Benjamin, Jennifer L. Merolla, Sono Shah, Danielle Casarez Lemi, Loren Collingwood, and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan. “The Trump Effect: An Experimental Investigation of the Emboldening Effect of Racially Inflammatory Elite Communication.” British Journal of Political Science 51, no. 3 (2021): 1138–59. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000590. - OCHA, Dec. 5, 2024. “The Whole of Syria Flash Update No. 2 - Recent Developments in Syria (As of 5 December 2024)”. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/syrian-arab-republic/whole-syria-flash-update-no-2-recent-developments-syria-5-december-2024 - Ott, H, Dec. 9, 2024. “What to know after Syrian rebels force Bashar al-Assad from power in a rekindled civil war”. CBC News. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-war-assad-ousted-what-to-know/ - Pew Research Centre, The biggest problems and greatest strengths of the U.S. political system. Sept. 19, 2023. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/09/19/the-biggest-problems-and-greatest-strengths-of-the-u-s-political-system/ - Pew Research Centre, Top Problems Facing the U.S., May 23, 2024. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/05/23/top-problems-facing-the-u-s/ - Sahide, Ahmad, Misran Misran, and Ali Maksum. 2024. “Indonesian Media Framing against Trump in the 2020 Presidential Election.” Multidisciplinary Reviews 7 (5): 2024097. https://doi.org/10.31893/multirev.2024097. - Sky News. April 16, 2024. “Are we heading for World War Three? Experts give their verdicts.” https://news.sky.com/story/are-we-heading-for-world-war-three-experts-give-their-verdicts-13116540 - South China Morning Post, Nov. 21, 2024. “China war scenario calls for US boost in defence spending to more than 3% of GDP. China’s projected military industrial base cannot be matched without increased spending, lawmakers hear”. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3287467/china-war-scenario-calls-us-boost-defence-spending-more-3-gdp?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage- Teller, Neville, June 28, 2024. “'The End of Israel': Building a case against Netanyahu – review. The End of Israel is undeniably thought-provoking and, in a world where exchanges of differing views is being increasingly inhibited, to be welcomed.” The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-808080- The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles University In Prague On Monday, August 29 2022. Available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752 - The First Battle of the Next War, Jan. 2023. A Report of the CSIS International Security Program. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ- Tinline, Phil. July 19, 2023. “Imagining Armageddon: the mad and dangerous ideas of Herman Kahn”. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/policy/defence-news/62117/imagining-armageddon-herman-kahn-nuclear-ladder- USA FACTS, How is the U.S. economy doing? https://usafacts.org/state-of-the-union/economy/ - VoA, Dec. 3, 2024. „West pushes for more Ukraine military aid, not NATO membership”. https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-support-in-focus-as-nato-foreign-ministers-meet/7885166.html - Xinhua, Nov. 18, 2024 b. “Full Text of Chinese President's signed article in Brazilian media”. https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/597977#Full-Text-of-Chinese-president's-signed-article-in-Brazilian-media--2024-11-18 - Xinhua, Nov. 19, 2024. “G20 Summit: Xi calls for multipolar world, inclusive globalization”. https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/newsletter/top_headlines/article/581033

Defense & Security
Washington DC USA - November 26, 2024 - President Biden announces a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah during an address from the Rose Garden.

Ukraine, Turkey, Syria and Biden’s greatest legacy: War

by Ricardo Nuno Costa

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Biden has treacherously shown what his real legacy is: bringing back perpetual wars, creating chaos through bribery and corruption, financing coups, unfreezing dormant conflicts and playing one against the other. Within two weeks of the election of Donald Trump, outgoing US President Joe Biden took an extremely disruptive step in international relations, pushing the conflict in Ukraine to a much more dangerous level by authorising Kiev to use American long-range missiles against Russian territory, a rogue move certainly intended to hinder the détente his successor had announced.As if that weren’t enough, a week later, Turkey (the largest NATO army in Europe) launched an offensive in neighbouring Syria through intermediaries led by HTS*, the former Al-Nusra Front*, effectively tearing up the Astana agreements with Moscow and Tehran on its role in Syria. Towards the end of the Biden administration, two major escalations took place in the two largest military conflicts taking place today, in Ukraine and the Middle East, both geographically separated by Turkey, which has now entered the scene. At whose behest? It would be naive to think that Erdoğan took the initiative to stage the invasion of Syria without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the Americans, the British, the Israelis and the Europeans. Organising, training and arming tens of thousands of men on Syrian territory under his authority or in Turkey itself is an operation that requires logistical and intelligence coordination between various state and non-state entities. Anatolia is the Eurasian axis par excellence, where three tectonic plates meet (the Eurasian, the African and the Arabian). Geographically, Turkey has always been an asset to NATO, particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This is where the natural spaces of Turkish projection and influence collide with those of Russia. For decades, NATO has tolerated Turkey’s neo-imperial ambitions, especially during the Erdoğan era, even if they have historically been anti-Western. This is a strategic asset that the Atlanticists are saving for the right moment. In reality, Turkish nationalism has been expressed in these regions since the early 1980s, and in the 1990s, with the vacuum left by the post-Soviet chaos, its influence spread and the Turan project was revived, which is now very visible in the form of the Organisation of Turkic States. But Turanism isn’t Ankara’s only asset. On the one hand, the Turkish diaspora in Europe, on the other hand the Islamic charity and educational network that Turkey manoeuvres in Africa, and on the other hand the military expansion with several bases in a good dozen countries in Europe, Africa, the Caucasus and the Middle East, shape Turkey’s aspirations to project power in the world. The crossroads of the Levant The reactivation of the Syrian civil war, or even the dismemberment of the country, is full of contradictions, unlikely alliances and unclear objectives, but also the hidden but known interests of a number of external actors who have been trying to take over the country since 2011. It serves Israel well, after more than 40 years of occupation of the Golan Heights, which are legally Syrian. Tel Aviv could extend its dominance in the area in the face of a Syria that is likely to be dysfunctional and without an army. Netanyahu’s regional escalation is also his way out of the mess he got himself into over a year ago in Gaza and Lebanon, while he waits for the new US administration, full of Zionists in foreign policy positions. Coincidentally or not, the hordes of jihadists took over Syria the day after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was announced. It should come as no surprise that behind this episode lies a tacit pact between Ankara and Tel Aviv to eliminate Iranian influence from the region. The US role is more nebulous. Officially, it didn’t make a statement until the final fall of Assad. But it’s also a role that doesn’t need clarity because it’s the only power that has allowed itself to occupy Syria since 2014, especially with clandestine military bases in the centre-south and east of the country, justifying this blatant international illegality with the flimsy excuse of being able to “fight ISIS*”. In reality, the US is ensuring a strategic military presence with an eye on Iran and Russia, which will certainly be formalised with the next phase in Syria. In addition, Washington has several major players on the ground, such as the Kurds of the SDF, who control the north, and the Free Syrian Army, which confronts them. On the other hand, the leader of the HTS, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who now controls most of the territory, spent five years in US prisons in Iraq (including the notorious Abu Ghraib). Al-Julani will surely be the most important and valuable asset for American interests in this proxy war. But what have the Western powers given Erdoğan to make him take the initiative to conquer Syria? What is the bargaining chip? Is the new Syrian government willing to give up the Russian base in Tartus, or is its removal one of NATO’s conditions for Erdoğan? What about Palestine and the genocide in Gaza? Will Lebanon follow the possible fragmentation of Syria? Who will form the new government, and what will be its vision for the future? Will there be an energy agreement between Ankara, Baku and Brussels? What will happen to trade, energy and infrastructure relations between Turkey and Russia? Will Turkey still be a candidate for the BRICS? Many big questions have been asked. Syria and Ukraine, the same conflict The most worrying aspect of the current scenario is that the two ongoing conflicts, surrounded by volatile regions, are moving closer together. The HTS, brought to Syria by Ankara, has been in Ukraine learning new combat tactics and night attacks from Kiev troops using advanced drones supplied by Qatar. Unlike the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Qatar has never sympathised with the Assad government after it took over Aleppo. Among the members of the Arab League, Qatar, an ally of Turkey (which has a naval base in Doha), is the only Arab country that has consistently sided with the Syrian Salafist opposition since 2011. After Erdoğan’s move, Russia will not be able to accept a freeze in military activity on its borders, lest it see the enemy rearm. It is therefore impossible to expect a ‘Minsk 3’ for the Trump era. In any case, an understanding between Russia and the US is necessary. After such a dark four years of the Biden administration, which brought war again to Europe and the Middle East, there is certainly hope for better relations between the world’s two largest military powers. An escalation of the conflict in Ukraine is unthinkable. More immigration for a Europe in recession For Europe, the current situation in Syria is terrible because it opens up new prospects for hundreds of thousands more refugees, depending on how the situation in Syria develops. Assad’s Syria was a dictatorship, just like Gaddafi’s Libya, but it provided a stability that is no longer guaranteed. The ‘melting pot’ that Europe’s major cities have become after 20 years of perpetual US wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria also has the potential to bring the inter-community and interethnic problems of the Middle East onto European soil at a time of recession, as is the case in Germany. With this move, Turkey has opened the game and shown that it wants to compete with Russia for its sphere of influence. Erdoğan has taken on the destabilising role his external superiors have assigned him. Erdoğan’s alignment with Western designs in Syria opens a rift in relations with Moscow and should be seen as a declaration of intention. War on multipolarism The Syrian war, which has all the makings of a protracted affair, is also a far-reaching move against the BRICS, since Turkey was one of the main candidates for membership of the organisation. The control of this strategic region, which is increasingly in the domain of the Silk Roads and the BRICS, is now entering a period of predictable instability. Indeed, the very strange Hamas attack in October 2023 took place in the middle of the new members of the group (Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran), and launched a war on the region along the lines of the ‘creative destruction’ advocated by the neoconservative think tanks. Just when everything was getting ready for a new US administration that seemed at least minimally pragmatic and willing to engage in dialogue and put an end to the Ukrainian conflict, and to the joy that for the first time in three years a Western statesman was uttering the word ‘peace’, Biden has treacherously shown what his real legacy is: bringing back the eternal wars, creating chaos through bribery and corruption, financing coups d’état, unfreezing dormant conflicts and playing one against the other. An old practice of those who can’t compete with economics, trade and diplomacy and think they can with wars. *- banned in the Russian Federation

Defense & Security
Military Think Tank, AI technology in the army. Warfare analytic operator checking coordination of the military team. Military commander with a digital device with vr glasses operating troops.

Artificial Intelligence and International Military Conflicts – the case of war in Ukraine.

by Krzysztof Śliwiński

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском AbstractThis paper draws on rapidly emerging literature on the role of artificial intelligence in military conflicts and warfare as well as its implications for international security. It departs from an assumption that the emerging technology will have a deterministic and potentially transformative influence on military power.This project intends to ascertain the role of autonomous weapons in modern military conflicts. In doing so, it further adds to the recent debates, which take place among scholars, military leaders as well as policy makers around the world regarding the potential for AI to be the source of future instability and a great power rivalry.It is suggested that there is an urgent need to regulate the development, proliferation and usage of autonomous weapons and weapon systems driven by AI before it is too late – namely the AI achieves cognizant skills. 1.DefinitionsEncyclopedia Britannica proposes that artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings. The term is frequently applied to the project of developing systems endowed with the intellectual processes characteristic of humans, such as the ability to reason, discover meaning, generalize, or learn from past experience.1Interestingly enough AI defines itself as referring to the simulation of human intelligence processes by machines, particularly computer systems. These processes include learning, reasoning, problem-solving, perception, and language understanding. AI enables machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and natural language processing. AI technologies encompass machine learning, neural networks, deep learning, and other advanced algorithms that allow machines to mimic cognitive functions.2In the context of the military, artificial intelligence refers to the utilization of AI technologies and systems to enhance military capabilities, operations, and decision-making processes. Military applications of AI include autonomous weapons systems, drones, cyber defense mechanisms, predictive analytics for strategic planning, and battlefield surveillance. AI can be used to analyze large volumes of data quickly, identify patterns, and make real-time decisions to support military objectives. While AI offers significant advantages in terms of efficiency and precision, there are ethical considerations and concerns regarding the potential risks of autonomous AI systems in warfare.32. AI in the War in Ukraine and Israel vs. Hamas - UkraineThe ongoing war in Ukraine is arguably the first “full scale drone War”, which also employs loitering munitions, autonomous ships, undersea drones for mine hunting and uncrewed ground vehicles being deployed.AI is heavily used in systems that integrate target and object recognition and geospatial intelligence. Analysis of satellite images, geolocating and analysing open-source data such as social media photos in geopolitically sensitive locations. On top of that neural networks are used, for example, to combine ground-level photos, drone video footage and satellite imagery.AI-enhanced facial recognition software has also been used on a substantial scale. AI is playing an important role in electronic warfare and encryption as well as cyber warfare, especially in support of defensive capabilities. Finally, AI has also been employed to spread of misinformation - the use of deep fakes as part of information warfare. The emergence of this new technology has created new actors, private companies further fueling the so-called privatisation of security: Palantir Technologies, Planet Labs, BlackSky Technology and Maxar Technologies are some examples of such.The AI driven systems make a fundamental change in the field so much so that the combined use of aerial and sea drones in the October (2022) attack on Russia’s Black Sea flagship vessel, the Admiral Makarov, was perceived by some analysts as perhaps a new type of warfare.4What makes this conflict unique is the unprecedented willingness of foreign geospatial intelligence companies to assist Ukraine by using AI-enhanced systems to convert satellite imagery into intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantages. U.S. companies play a leading role in this.These examples illustrate that the current conflict in Ukraine is a testing ground for AItechnology.- Israel vs. HamasIsraeli military says it’s using artificial intelligence to select many of these targets in real-time. The military claims that the AI system, named “the Gospel,” has helped it to rapidly identify enemy combatants and equipment, while reducing civilian casualties.5 Allegedly, multiple sources familiar with the IDF’s (Israel Defensive Forces) targeting processes confirmed the existence of the Gospel, saying it had been used to produce automated recommendations for attacking targets, such as the private homes of individuals suspected of being Hamas or Islamic Jihad operatives. In recent years, the target division has helped the IDF build a database of what sources said was between 30,000 and 40,000 suspected militants. Systems such as the Gospel, they said, had played a critical role in building lists of individuals authorised to be assassinated.6 According to IDF’s own website the use of these tools does not change the obligatory principles and rules in the Intelligence Directorate's SOP and related instructions. They do not generate orders for attacks. They do not generate new intelligence that could not otherwise be accessed by an intelligence analyst. They do not constitute the sole basis for determining targets eligible to attack – regardless of how accurate they are. On the contrary, these tools improve the quality of the intelligence process outcome. They facilitate the accessibility of the analyst to relevant information, and help the analyst be more informed of the most up-to-date and relevant intelligence sources, making the analyses more precise. They reduce the risk of errors that may occur in intelligence analyses.7 3. AI and War As far as the role of AI driven technologies and software is concerned it is probably useful to think about them as the third revolution in warfare. The first one being mostly about gunpowder and the second one being about nuclear weapons.Additionally, one should also bear in mind that AI is closely related to the so-called cyber domain, which in the literature is often referred to as the fifth domain of warfare. (The first one being land, the second being sea, the third being air and the forth being space, as in cosmic space.)While AI and associated technologies hold potential for reducing harms of war if developed and applied responsibly, there exist significant risks of technological escalation, loss of human control and value alignment that demand proactive international cooperation and oversight to guide research and use of these systems. Nonetheless all major powers, including US and China are working nonstop to develop relevant AI driven military systems hoping to achieve potential advantages against each other. These technologies include: machine learning/deep learning applications with military uses like drone/vehicle autonomy, cyber/info warfare and predictive analytics of populations/scenarios.At the same time AI poses novel challenges and escalatory risks that differ from past arms races and call for new frameworks of governance and norms. Autonomous weapons threaten to undermine international humanitarian laws by removing human accountability from targeting - problems of biases, uncertain risks of loss of meaningful human control. Other related risks include preemptive/predictive AI for mass surveillance, social control and information warfare which is likely to erode principles of sovereignty, privacy and consent.It does not take the stretch of imagination to expect a certain level of ‘techno-tyranny’ in the future. Job losses to robotic systems are probably a given and as such risk further politico-economic instability. This consequently calls for just transitions and perhaps even a universal basic income.The Opaque ‘black box’ nature of neural networks hinders verification and accountability, fuelling distrust. Furthermore, there is a potential for accidental or unintentional escalation. Without safeguards and transparency, AI may ultimately serve military-industrial complexes and geopolitical ambitions rather than global security needs.The fast-emerging technology needs to be urgently regulated. International initiatives for AI governance (norms or regimes) will probably have to be introduced by the UN and its technical bodies. These will have to include outcome accountability’ through system design, impact assessments, red lines on certain applications and universal access to benefits.As warns Heidy Khlaaf, Engineering Director of AI Assurance at Trail of Bits, a technologysecurity firm warns “AI algorithms are notoriously flawed with high error rates observed across applications that require precision, accuracy, and safety,”8Reportedly, in a simulation of a military exercise carried out by US Military Force, an AI drone 'killed operator' after going rogue. The robot worked out its controller was stopping it 'completing objectives on test.9In parallel, Chinese scientists create and cage world’s first AI commander in a PLA laboratory. “The highest-level commander is the sole core decision-making entity for the overall operation, with ultimate decision-making responsibilities and authority,”104. AI and International SecurityIn terms of national security-level applications of an AI, one can clearly identify numerous milieu:- MilitaryAI is transforming military operations by enabling autonomous systems, such as drones and robots, to perform tasks that were previously carried out by humans. These systems can be used for surveillance, reconnaissance, target identification, and even combat. AI-powered algorithms can analyze vast amounts of data to provide real-time intelligence, enhance situational awareness, and support decision-making processes on the battlefield- CybersecurityAI is crucial in combating cyber threats, as it can detect and respond to attacks more effectively than traditional security measures. Machine learning algorithms can analyze network traffic patterns, identify anomalies, and detect potential breaches. AI can also help develop predictive models to anticipate future cyber threats and vulnerabilities, allowing organizations to strengthen their defenses proactively.- Intelligence and SurveillanceAI enables intelligence agencies to process and analyze massive volumes of data, including social media feeds, satellite imagery, and communication intercepts. Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms can extract valuable insights from unstructured data sources, aiding in counterterrorism efforts, identifying potential threats, and monitoring geopolitical developments.- Decision Support SystemsAI can assist policymakers and military leaders in making informed decisions by providing predictive analysis and scenario modeling. Machine learning algorithms can analyze historical data, identify patterns, and generate forecasts regarding potential  conflicts, resource allocation, or geopolitical developments. This helps in strategic planning and resource optimization.- Autonomous Weapons SystemsThe development of autonomous weapons systems raises ethical concerns and challenges in international security. AI-powered weapons can operate without direct human control, leading to debates about accountability, proportionality, and adherence to international humanitarian law. International efforts are underway to establish regulations and norms governing the use of such systems.- Diplomacy and Conflict ResolutionAI can facilitate diplomatic negotiations and conflict resolution by providing data-driven insights and analysis. Natural Language Processing algorithms can assist in analyzing diplomatic texts, identifying common ground, and suggesting potential compromises. AI can also simulate scenarios and predict the outcomes of different negotiation strategies, aiding diplomats in finding mutually beneficial solutions.- Threat Detection and PreventionAI can enhance early warning systems for various threats, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and pandemics. Machine learning algorithms can analyze patterns in data to identify potential risks and predict emerging threats. This enables governments and international organizations to take proactive measures to prevent or mitigate these risks.5. ConclusionIn the world of microelectronics, experts often talk about Moore's law: the principle that the number of transistors on chips doubles every two years, resulting in exponentially more capable devices. The law helps explain the rapid rise of so many technological innovations, including smartphones and search engines.Within national security, AI progress has created another kind of Moore's law. Whichever military first masters organizing, incorporating, and institutionalizing the use of data and AI into its operations in the coming years will reap exponential advances, giving it remarkable advantages over its foes. The first adopter of AI at scale is likely to have a faster decision cycle and better information on which to base decisions. Its networks are likely to be more resilient when under attack, preserving its ability to maintain situational awareness, defend its forces, engage targets effectively, and protect the integrity of its command, control, and communications. It will also be able to control swarms of unmanned systems in the air, on the water, and under the sea to confuse and overwhelm an adversary.11References*This paper was presented at International Studies Association 65th Annual Convention. San Francisco, California April 3rd – 6th 20241 Copeland, B. (2024, March 15). Artificial intelligence. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence2 How do you define artificial intelligence? ChatGPT, GPT-4 Turbo, OpenAI, 2024, October 25. https://genai.hkbu.edu.hk/3 How do you define artificial intelligence in the context of the military? ChatGPT, GPT-4 Turbo, OpenAI, 2024, October 25. https://genai.hkbu.edu.hk/4 Fontes, R. and Kamminga, J. (2023, March 24). Ukraine A Living Lab for AI Warefare. National Defence. NDIA’s Bussiness Technology Magazine. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/3/24/ukraine-a-living-lab-for-ai-warfare5 Brumfiel, G. (2023, December 14). Israel is using an AI system to find targets in Gaza. Experts say it’s just the start. Wisconsin Public Radio. https://www.wpr.org/news/israel-using-ai-system-find-targets-gaza-experts-say-its-just-start6 ‘The Gospel’: how Israel uses AI to select bombing targets in Gaza. (2023, December 1). The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/01/the-gospel-how-israel-uses-ai-to-select-bombing-targets 7 The IDF's Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing. (2024, June 18). IDF Press Releases: Israel at War. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-24-pr/the-idf-s-use-of-data-technologies-in-intelligence-processing/8 Brumfiel, G. (2023, December 14). Israel is using an AI system to find targets in Gaza. Experts say it’s just the start. Wisconsin Public Radio. https://www.wpr.org/news/israel-using-ai-system-find-targets-gaza-experts-say-its-just-start9 Bowman, V. (2023, June 2). AI drone 'killed operator' after going rogue on simulation. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/06/02/us-air-force-ai-military-drone-goes-rogue-simulation/10 Chen, S. (2024, June 16). Chinese scientists create and cage world’s first AI commander in a PLA laboratory. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3266444/chinese-scientists-create-and-cage-worlds-first-ai-commander-pla-laboratory?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage 11 Flournoy, Michèle A. 2023. “AI Is Already at War.” Foreign Affairs 102 (6): 56–69. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=shib&db=bth&AN=173135132&site=ehost-live.

Energy & Economics
Middle East Conflict. Conceptual photo

How might a wider Middle East conflict affect the global economy?

by Ahmet Kaya

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The world economy is underperforming as a result of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainty around the US election. An escalation of conflict in the Middle East could increase uncertainties, harming inflation reduction efforts and hurting growth. It has been over a year since the Hamas-led attack on Israel. Israel’s response in Gaza has resulted in widespread destruction and significant loss of life. The conflict has since expanded beyond Gaza, involving the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian strikes targeting Israel. In addition to the awful humanitarian cost of the conflicts, the war and the possibility of its further expansion pose significant repercussions for the global economy. This article discusses three potential ways in which the current conflict and a wider conflict in the Middle East could affect the global economy. Increased geopolitical uncertainties First and foremost, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could lead to greater geopolitical uncertainties. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the geopolitical risk (GPR) and geopolitical acts (GPRA) indices (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022) – these are text-based measures of heightened uncertainties due to adverse geopolitical events such as wars, terrorism and international tensions. (See this article for more discussion about these measures.) Following the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023, both the overall GPR index and its ‘war and terror acts’ component spiked strongly, to a level higher than that seen during the ISIS attack in Paris in November 2015. Both indices eased significantly in the months following October 2023 despite the continuation of the conflict. But they jumped again following Israel’s attack on southern Lebanon in September 2024. As of mid-October 2024, the GPR and GPRA remain, respectively, 21% and 35% higher than their historical averages.   What might be the consequences of such elevated levels of risk? Research tells us that higher geopolitical risk raises oil prices (Mignon and Saadaoui, 2024). It also reduces global investment and increases inflation (Caldara et al, 2022). Greater geopolitical risk has a significantly negative impact on business and consumer confidence in several advanced economies (de Wet, 2023). This is because consumers typically cut non-essential spending and businesses postpone investment decisions during turbulent times. This reduces firm-level investment, particularly for businesses with higher initial investment costs and greater market power (Wang et al, 2023). Higher geopolitical risks also reduce global trade and financial flows, causing greater volatility in capital flows in emerging markets (Kaya and Erden, 2023). Oil production cuts and higher energy prices The second way in which the Middle East conflict could affect the global economy is its impact on energy prices, both directly through production cuts and indirectly through greater uncertainties. In response to Israel’s actions against its neighbours, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could reduce oil production to penalise countries supporting Israel. A similar action in the 1970s led to a significant jump in oil prices, which contributed to years of stagflation, with higher global inflation and recessions in major economies. Before Israel's attack on Lebanon at the end of September, oil prices had been declining due to falling demand, particularly from China. On the supply side, oil production had increased in Canada and the United States, countering the production cuts by OPEC, and Saudi Arabia was expected to increase oil production from December. But the situation quickly reversed following Israel’s attack on Lebanon. Oil prices jumped by nearly $10 per barrel within a week, before easing by around $5 per barrel. While the immediate oil price impact of Israel’s attack has mostly faded, the potential for higher oil (and other energy) prices still poses a risk to global inflation and economic activity (Liadze et al, 2022). To provide further context for the potential scale of this impact, we can show what would happen if oil and gas prices were to remain $10 higher for two years than the baseline levels projected in the Summer Global Economic Outlook from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), using NIESR’s Global Macroeconometric Model (NiGEM). The results demonstrate that the $10 rise in oil and gas prices increases inflation by around 0.7 percentage points in major economies in the first year (see Figure 2). The impact is higher in China, where the economy relies relatively more on oil imports for its strong manufacturing industries. The inflationary pressures persist for two years despite central banks’ efforts to curb inflation by increasing interest rates.   The effect of higher oil and gas prices on real GDP is shown in Figure 3. In the scenario described above, GDP would fall by 0.1-0.2% in major economies immediately. Partly due to higher interest rates, real GDP would continue to weaken for three years following the shock. After this, economic activity would start to return to base levels as oil and gas prices revert to their levels in the baseline forecast.   Increased shipping costs and supply chain disruptions A wider conflict in the Middle East could also affect the economy through higher shipping costs and supply chain disruptions. Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in late 2023 showed that such disruptions can have a huge impact on global trade through shipping, which comprises 80% of world trade volume. Following the rocket attacks by the Houthi rebels, some commercial shipping re-routed from the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to significant delays in travel times and increased freight costs. As a result, the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index – a measure of sea freight rates – rose by around 260% in the second quarter of 2024 with additional disruptions to supply chains. Our analysis shows that an increase of 10 percentage points in shipping cost inflation can lead to import prices rising by up to around 1% and consumer inflation increasing by around 0.5% in OECD countries. As Figure 4 shows, the impact of shipping costs on inflation shows its full effects over six quarters. This means that inflationary concerns could be with us for the next year and a half as a result of higher shipping costs that may emerge from any possible escalation of the Middle East conflict.   Wider economic implications and policy responses While rising geopolitical risk and increased oil and shipping costs can each individually exert upward pressure on inflation and may slow down economic activity in the global economy, the combined impacts are likely to be greater. Countries with stronger trade and financial ties to the Middle East and those that rely heavily on oil imports as an input for domestic production would be most affected. On the monetary policy front, central banks may have to take a more hawkish stance in response to rising inflationary pressures from the Middle East conflict. This could lead to higher interest rates, which would further dampen economic activity, particularly in an environment where there are already recessionary concerns in some major economies. Beyond its immediate economic implications, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could trigger large-scale displacement of people, which would increase economic and social pressures on neighbouring countries. Many countries may also have to increase their military spending in response to growing regional tensions. Given that public debt levels are already elevated in many countries due to successive shocks to the global economy over the past decade, any additional defence spending could come at the expense of public infrastructure investments that would otherwise boost productivity growth. Overall, the global economy is already underperforming as a result of the lagged effects of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainties surrounding the upcoming US election and possible changes to US trade policy. A potential escalation of conflict in the Middle East could exacerbate the situation by increasing uncertainties, harming efforts to bring down inflation and reducing global GDP growth. Over the medium and long term, it could further damage the global economy, with the possibility of refugee crises as well as increased defence spending, making the effects more complex and longer lasting. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

Diplomacy
Donald Trump win in US president elections 2024. Washington DC, United Sates Of America - 2024 November 6

What Trump’s victory means for Ukraine, the Middle East, China and the rest of the world

by Stefan Wolff

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, combined with a Republican-led US Senate, was widely feared among international allies and will be cheered by some of America’s foes. While the former put on a brave face, the latter are finding it hard to hide their glee.  On the war in Ukraine, Trump is likely to try to force Kyiv and Moscow into at least a ceasefire along the current front lines. This could possibly involve a permanent settlement that would acknowledge Russia’s territorial gains, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the territories occupied since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  It is also likely that Trump would accept demands by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to prevent a future Ukrainian Nato membership. Given Trump’s well-known animosity to Nato, this would also be an important pressure on Kyiv’s European allies. Trump could, once again, threaten to abandon the alliance in order to get Europeans to sign up to a deal with Putin over Ukraine.  When it comes to the Middle East, Trump has been a staunch supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past. He is likely to double down on this, including by taking an even tougher line on Iran. This aligns well with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current priorities.  Netanyahu seems determined to destroy Iran’s proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen and severely degrade Iranian capabilities. By dismissing his defence minister, Yoav Gallant, a critic of his conduct of the offensive in Gaza, Netanyahu has laid the ground for a continuation of the conflict there.  It also prepares for a widening of the offensive in Lebanon and a potentially devastating strike against Iran in response to any further Iranian attack on Israel.  Trump’s election will embolden Netanyahu to act. And this in turn would also strengthen Trump’s position towards Putin, who has come to depend on Iranian support for his war in Ukraine. Trump could offer to restrain Netanyahu in the future as a bargaining chip with Putin in his gamble to secure a deal on Ukraine.  Pivot to China  While Ukraine and the Middle East are two areas in which change looms, relations with China will most likely be characterised more by continuity than by change. With Chinese relations being perhaps the key strategic foreign policy challenge for the US, the Biden administration continued many of the policies Trump adopted in his first term – and Trump is likely to double down on them in a second term.  A Trump White House is likely to increase import tariffs, and he has talked a great deal about using them to target China. But Trump is also just as likely to be open to pragmatic, transactional deals with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Just like in relations with his European allies in Nato, a serious question mark hangs over Trump’s commitment to the defence of Taiwan and other treaty allies in Asia, including the Philippines, South Korea, and potentially Japan. Trump is at best lukewarm on US security guarantees.  But as his on-and-off relationship with North Korea in his first term demonstrated, Trump is, at times, willing to push the envelope dangerously close to war. This happened in 2017 in response to a North Korean test of intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang makes another close brush of this kind as likely as Trump’s unpredictability makes it conceivable that he would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea as part of a broader deal with Russia, which has developed increasingly close relations with Kim Jong-un’s regime.  Doing so would give Trump additional leverage over China, which has been worried over growing ties between Russia and North Korea.  Preparing for a Trump White House  Friends and foes alike are going to use the remaining months before Trump returns to the White House to try to improve their positions and get things done that would be more difficult to do once he is in office.  An expectation of a Trump push for an end to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is likely to lead to an intensification of the fighting there to create what the different parties think might be a more acceptable status quo for them. This does not bode well for the humanitarian crises already brewing in both regions.  Increasing tensions in and around the Korean peninsula are also conceivable. Pyongyang is likely to want to boost its credentials with yet more missile – and potentially nuclear – tests.  A ratcheting-up of the fighting in Europe and the Middle East and of tensions in Asia is also likely to strain relations between the US and its allies in all three regions. In Europe, the fear is that Trump may make deals with Russia over the head of its EU and Nato allies and threaten them with abandonment.  This would undermine the longevity of any Ukrainian (or broader European) deal with Moscow. The relatively dismal state of European defence capabilities and the diminishing credibility of the US nuclear umbrella would not but help to encourage Putin to push his imperial ambitions further once he has secured a deal with Trump.  In the Middle East, Netanyahu would be completely unrestrained. And yet while some Arab regimes might cheer Israel striking Iran and Iranian proxies, they will worry about backlash over the plight of Palestinians. Without resolving this perennial issue, stability in the region, let alone peace, will be all but impossible.  In Asia, the challenges are different. Here the problem is less US withdrawal and more an unpredictable and potentially unmanageable escalation. Under Trump, it is much more likely that the US and China will find it hard to escape the so-called Thucydides trap – the inevitability of war between a dominant but declining power and its rising challenger.  This then raises the question of whether US alliances in the region are safe in the long term or whether some of its partners, like Indonesia or India, will consider realigning themselves with China.  At best, all of this spells greater uncertainty and instability – not only after Trump’s inauguration but also in the months until then.  At worst, it will prove the undoing of Trump’s self-proclaimed infallibility. But by the time he and his team come to realise that geopolitics is a more complicated affair than real estate, they may have ushered in the very chaos that they have accused Biden and Harris of.