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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском While the IPCC warns that we should reach the emissions peak this year, greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere will grow by 0.8%, according to the annual report from the Global Carbon Project presented this Wednesday at COP29. A cold shower in the middle of the Climate Summit, or rather, a scorching one. The independent organization Global Carbon Project (GCP), specialized in quantifying greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel combustion, has released its latest research. The 2024 edition of the Global Carbon Budget projects, with just over a month and a half left in the year, total annual emissions from fossil fuels to reach 37.4 billion tons of carbon dioxide (CO2). This represents a 0.8% increase compared to 2023 — with a possible error range from a 0.3% decrease to a 1.9% increase — marking a new unprecedented record at the worst possible moment. In the crucial year in which, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), humanity should reach its emissions peak if it wants any chance of avoiding a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C, not only has a new historical high been reached, but there is also "no signal" that the world has reached the peak of emissions from fossil industries, warn the team behind the research presented this Wednesday. As Professor Pierre Friedlingstein from the University of Exeter’s Global Systems Institute, who coordinated the study, laments, "we still don’t see any signs that fossil fuel burning has peaked." The figures are actually more concerning, as the emissions from the "changes in land use" —which include deforestation caused by humans and their agroindustry — will add 4.2 billion tons of CO2 (GtCO2). This means that we will emit 41.6 billion tons of CO2 into the atmosphere, one billion more than last year, a period that was already a record. More coal, more oil, and more gas amid the acceleration of the climate crisis Despite significant progress in decarbonization, emissions from the three main fossil fuels will increase in 2024. The GCP’s projection is that coal emissions will rise by 0.2%, with coal responsible for 41% of emissions from fossil fuels; oil emissions will increase by 0.9%, with oil burning accounting for 32% of emissions; and gas emissions will grow by 2.4%, contributing 21% of total fossil fuel emissions. On the other hand, emissions from the cement industry, which account for 4% of global emissions, will decrease by 2.8% in 2024, mainly due to a reduction in the EU, although they will increase in China, the United States, and India, according to the research. By economic poles, while the EU — responsible for 7% of global emissions — will reduce its emissions by 3.8% this year, the United States, accounting for 13% of the total annual emissions, will only reduce them by 0.6%. China, the leading polluting power, with 32% of global annual emissions, is projected to increase its emissions by 0.2%, although the projected range suggests it could end the year with a slight decrease. Another emission hub, India, which produces 8% of greenhouse gases, will increase its emissions by 4.6% in 2024. In the rest of the world, where 38% of global emissions are produced, the forecast is an increase of 1.1%. The GCP highlights the growing importance of aviation and maritime transport in the emissions inventory: their emissions are expected to increase by 7.8%, although they remain below their 2019 level. An unprecedented concentration of gases in human history The report, conducted by researchers from over 80 institutions worldwide, including the universities of Exeter and East Anglia (UK), Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich (Germany), and the CICERO Center for International Climate Research (Norway), provides an overview of emissions over the past decade. While they mention a certain stagnation in the past decade regarding the total greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere, the reality is that emissions continue to rise, and the previous decade (2004-2013) saw strong emission growth, with an annual increase of around 2%. Such figures mean that the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere continues to rise. Just two weeks ago, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) warned of a new record for greenhouse gas concentrations last year: an annual average of 420 parts per million (ppm) for CO2. In addition, surface concentrations of 1,935 parts per billion (ppb) of methane (CH4) and 336.9 ppb of nitrous oxide (N2O) were recorded. These represent increases of 151%, 265%, and 125%, respectively, compared to pre-industrial levels. "During 2023, CO2 emissions caused by massive wildfires and a possible reduction in carbon absorption by forests, combined with persistently high CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuels for human and industrial activities, drove the observed increase in concentrations," stated the WMO Annual Bulletin on Greenhouse Gases. Never in human history has the atmosphere been so laden with these gases, which have been released at an unprecedented speed: in twenty years, CO2 concentrations have increased by 11.4%. It is expected that atmospheric CO2 levels will reach 422.5 parts per million in 2024, 2.8 ppm higher than in 2023 and 52% above pre-industrial levels. Half-full glass However, at GCP, there is room for hope amid all the discouraging figures. "Despite another increase in global emissions this year, the latest data shows evidence of widespread climate action, with the growing penetration of renewable energy and electric vehicles displacing fossil fuels, and the decrease in deforestation emissions in recent decades, now confirmed for the first time," says Corinne Le Quéré, Research Professor at the Royal Society in the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia. In the same vein, Dr. Glen Peters from the CICERO Center in Oslo points out that "there are many signs of positive progress at the country level, and a sense that a peak in global fossil CO2 emissions is imminent." A total of 22 countries, accounting for a combined 23% of global fossil CO2 emissions, have reduced their emissions in the 2014-2023 decade. Furthermore, countries within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in the group of wealthier nations, increased their emission reduction rates in the last decade compared to the previous one, from 0.9% to 1.4%. In the non-OECD group (excluding China), emissions growth decreased from 4.9% in the 2004-2013 decade to 1.8% in 2014-2023. However, Peters warns that "the global peak remains elusive" and emphasizes that "climate action is a collective issue, and while gradual emission reductions are occurring in some countries, increases continue in others." Another positive note is that, globally, emissions from the change in land use have decreased by 20% in the last decade, although they are expected to increase in 2024 under this category. While permanent CO2 removal through reforestation and afforestation (new forests) is offsetting emissions, it is only compensating for about half of the emissions from permanent deforestation. The GCP also issues a direct message to proponents of techno-optimism: "Current levels of technology-based carbon dioxide removal (excluding nature-based methods such as reforestation) account for only about one-millionth of the CO2 emitted by fossil fuels," they emphasize.This article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España)

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Subsequent U.S. administrations, except for brief moments of relative calm, have persisted in demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) abandon its nuclear program and, moreover, have made extensive efforts to destabilize its political and economic system. Meanwhile, the successive leaders of the DPRK have persisted in advancing their defensive capabilities until reaching their preferred deterrent: nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, a guarantee of survival. This persistent situation reached an unprecedented moment when, during his previous presidency, Donald Trump made a surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK, temporarily unraveling, although without the expected results, the "Korean Gordian Knot." This led to successive summits in 2018 and 2019 (Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom) with Kim Jong Un, the leader of a state that, throughout its history, has maintained sharply confrontational relations with the United States. The world witnessed the transition from exchanges of insults and threats—Trump calling Kim "Little Rocket Man" and Kim referring to Trump as "old senile man"—and threatening the latter with "fire and fury" if the North Korean leader continued missile tests, to becoming "pen pals" and holding three unprecedented summits. No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK like Donald Trump did, and no North Korean leader in history has sat face-to-face, as equals, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did, which granted him prestige on the global stage. Due to reasons associated with its strategic ambiguity, the Biden Administration made no diplomatic progress with Pyongyang. Even though at the beginning of his term he committed to a "new strategy toward North Korea," over the past four years, his actions have only promoted sanctions in the Security Council, which have clashed dramatically with Russia's veto, struggled with the dissolution of the DPRK Expert Group in the Sanctions Committee, and observed the exponential increase in its arsenal of intercontinental, hypersonic, and short-range ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads capable of targeting the continental U.S. and U.S. military bases in the region. Furthermore, the DPRK has resumed uranium enrichment and reopened its nuclear test center. In the end, the outgoing president has been unable to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, much less contain it. So, one must ask: Will Trump's return to the White House mark continuity or a change from his previous term? An analysis of the future position of the Trump administration toward the DPRK should consider that, compared to his previous term, the circumstances have radically changed. 1. DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have made new and significant advances. At the same time, its foreign policy has undergone a reorientation due to the sustained increase in distrust toward Washington from Pyongyang.2. By order of its leader, the DPRK has severed all its ties and symbols of relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as the "main and unchanging enemy," and as it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the People's Armed Forces to accelerate preparations to "occupy, subjugate, and fully reclaim" South Korea, in response to the confrontational attitude and increasingly close military and intelligence ties between Washington and Seoul.3. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two summits between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, and Kim's description of Putin as the "closest comrade," have shown the high level of understanding and commitment between the two, which has materialized in the DPRK's unwavering support for Russia's special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures. This treaty includes a clause for "mutual military assistance," while Russia provides diplomatic and economic backing to the DPRK, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports, mainly oil, raw materials, and food, as well as assistance in various fields.4. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis is taking shape between China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies are labeling it the "new axis of evil." In this interconnected relationship, the DPRK holds significant advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. At least these four factors will significantly impact Donald Trump's decision to return, or not, to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, raising doubts about whether the former would be willing to revisit it. However, if he tries, it is unclear what Kim Jong Un's response would be, clearly more determined and militarily more powerful in the eyes of Washington, which at first glance seems unwilling to renew its offers related to denuclearization. The ironic jest by Trump at the 2024 Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, when he said that Kim Jong Un "missed him," that they "got along very well," and that "he misses me" and "wants me back in the White House" and "it's good to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons," was met with a response from North Korean media, stating that "they don't care" who assumes office in the U.S. This suggests that Pyongyang's official stance is that, regardless of what happens, it will not abandon its nuclear deterrent. Considering the visible changes in the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape that differ from those in 2018-2019, any type of negotiation aimed at reaching compromises between the parties on the denuclearization of North Korea will be even more challenging. Trump may seek alternative approaches to encourage the DPRK to freeze nuclear and missile tests, but he will need to weigh several options. These include: which side should take the first step toward engagement; whether it is necessary to "rattle sabers" to create influence; the possibility of "unilateral conciliatory gestures"; and whether he should stick to the goal of "complete denuclearization" (Chad O’Carroll and Shreyas Reddy, 2024). Donald Trump exhibits an unpredictable, egocentric personality and is a fan of diplomatic spectacle, with a penchant for reality shows. Given this, he might be tempted to revisit diplomacy, possibly considering the absence of John Bolton, who, alongside Michael Pompeo, led the Hanoi Summit to failure. Many agree with what was stated by Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University and former special advisor for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae In administration, when he admitted: "It is possible that, in his second term, Trump will prioritize solidifying his political legacy. His foreign policy would be heavily influenced by media attention and personal ego, as he cares about how history will remember him. Achieving a major deal with Pyongyang and contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula could serve to fulfill that ambition, potentially allowing him to win a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. While resolving the Ukraine war or the Gaza crisis could also improve his chances of receiving the prize, negotiations with Kim Jong Un are likely to be a key agenda for Trump. In that sense, Trump could actively engage with the North Korean leader, and might even consider a visit to Pyongyang for a summit, where he could make surprising offers. However, the success of such efforts ultimately depends on Kim's response" (Lee Hyo Jin, 2024). It is necessary to build some scenarios: 1. The influence of personal friendship could encourage Kim Jong Un to engage in communication with Trump, turning the page on the Hanoi failure and minimizing distrust toward the U.S.2. Recognition by the Trump Administration of the DPRK as a de facto nuclear power and easing of sanctions to promote progress toward the partial normalization of relations.3. Strong U.S. demands for denuclearization and the promotion of further sanctions, leading to increased tensions. Given Trump’s volatility and the unpredictability of the DPRK leadership, there are currently no conditions to determine the most likely scenario. The campaign team has not commented on whether Trump will seek new meetings with Kim Jong Un, but his statements prior to his victory suggest that he might seek to revive talks, possibly sooner rather than later. Now, it is unpredictable what roadmap Trump will implement, as his opinions during the campaign may differ from the decisions he makes officially when in office. It is not accurate to assume that his demeanor during the first term will be indicative of his future conduct. It is worth dedicating a brief space to the designated Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. As a staunch anti-communist, he is one of the promoters of the term "axis of evil," which includes the DPRK, and considers China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as aligned against the US. He has advocated concrete actions and plans against these states. It is expected that, initially, he will oppose any commitment from the incoming administration with the DPRK. As John Bolton and Michael Pompeo did at the time, Rubio could attempt to limit Donald Trump’s maneuvering room with Kim Jong Un. However, there is also the possibility that the next U.S. president’s assertive and authoritarian character, who, despite previous disagreements, appointed Rubio, will lead him to align with Trump’s decisions or, alternatively, suffer the same fate of being ousted with a “tweet and a punch,” as happened to Rex Tillerson and John Bolton. Regarding the Republic of Korea, it is important to specify that the most critical foreign policy issues for Donald Trump’s new administration will be its relationship with the European Union, the Middle East conflicts, the war in Ukraine, the China-Taiwan dispute, and relations with the DPRK. It is precisely the latter that concerns South Koreans the most, as their security largely depends on the presence of U.S. troops in their country and Washington’s support for South Korea’s defense against the imminent “North Korean threat.” The conservative government of Yoon Suk Yeol has marked a clear distinction from his predecessor Moon Jae In by significantly strengthening his alliance with the U.S., driven by his growing animosity towards the DPRK and his pro-American stance. This situation presents little likelihood of encouraging Trump to engage in talks with Kim Jong Un, especially without a clear indication from Pyongyang toward denuclearization. This is likely, as all signs point to Pyongyang not making significant concessions regarding its nuclear deterrent and showing a strong aversion towards the Republic of Korea. After Donald Trump's victory, the South Korean president had a phone conversation with him to extend his congratulations and quickly express his desire for the alliance to continue under his leadership. Although both agreed to hold a summit as soon as possible, the issue of the DPRK, which was already addressed in this initial dialogue, will certainly be on the agenda. It is said that Trump plans for his government to work with South Korea on several bilateral issues, but one of the key aspects will be South Korea’s contribution to Washington for hosting U.S. bases on its territory. Let's remember that during Trump's first term, this was a hot topic in his military relations. It is worth mentioning that due to Donald Trump's transactional approach to international relations, his perception that many of the U.S. allies are "taking advantage" of its military power, and the pressure he exerted on Seoul when he was in office, with Trump's victory, national security against the DPRK is placed at the forefront. Many are concerned that his return to the White House could mean that Washington will no longer be a reliable partner, making it necessary for South Korea to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Han Dong Hoon, leader of the ruling People Power Party, said at a seminar organized to discuss the future of South Korea's nuclear policy that Trump's victory had positive aspects. "Acquiring nuclear potential — meaning having the right to enrich and reprocess uranium — does not inherently equate to possessing nuclear weapons," he said, according to The Korea Herald. "But we would be able to move to that phase at any time if North Korea intensifies its nuclear threats," he added. "I believe we should be prepared for such a scenario amid the changing dynamics of global power and order." Meanwhile, retired Army General Han Ki Ho went a step further and suggested that South Korea may no longer have a choice. "Nuclear armament may be the only path left for South Korea's survival," he stated (Julian Ryall, 2024). However, whether the Republic of Korea acquires nuclear weapons will depend on how the Trump administration approaches the alliance and relations with North Korea, that is, whether it abandons or restricts the "extended deterrence" and whether it pursues an agreement with Pyongyang that halts its development of long-range missiles that could reach the continental United States in exchange for accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear power. This type of agreement would affect Seoul, located just 48 kilometers from the border, and therefore within the range of North Korea's short-range missiles. We are facing an uncertain situation, and therefore, expectant, where the expectations regarding Donald Trump's stance on DPRK are uncertain. Whether the denuclearization of DPRK is a priority for the Trump administration depends on the approach and methods with which the president and his team address an increasingly complex scenario. DPRK, in terms of its economic performance and national defense potential, is not the same as before, which gives Kim Jong Un greater effectiveness in his military deterrence and diplomatic maneuverability, especially when his reliable conduct with Moscow and the appropriate handling of relations with Beijing strengthen his position vis-à-vis the U.S. Trump will have to deal with these realities. And while he may intend to continue his legacy, he will necessarily have to reframe his policy towards DPRK, considering that DPRK is no longer the same, that its main contenders (Russia and China) are precisely the closest to DPRK, and that the country itself is no longer the same, either militarily or socioeconomically, as it was when he engaged in talks with Kim Jong Un in 2018-2019. References - Simone McCarthy (2024) Trump claims Kim Jong Un “isses him. But he faces a very different North Korea leader this time around. Disponible en: https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-intl-hnk/index.html- Keith Johnson (2024) Could Trump Rekindle Diplomacy With North Korea? Disponible en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/13/trump-north-korea-diplomacy-putin-russia/- Joel S. Wit (2024) Blame Donald Trump for North Korea´s sable-rattling. Disponible en: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/blame-donald-trump-for-north-koreas-sabre-rattling/- Rubén Criado (2024) Así afecta la victoria de Trump a Corea del Norte. Disponible en: https://as.com/actualidad/politica/asi-afecta-la-victoria-de-trump-a-corea-del-norte-n/- Josh Smith (2024) Donald Trump se enfrenta a un Kim Jong Un envalentonado, cercano a Rusia y con un arsenal de misiles más grande. Disponible en: https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2024/11/07/donald-trump-se-enfrentara-a-un-kim-jong-un-envalentonado-cercano-a-rusia-y-con-un-arsenal-de-misiles-mas-grande/- Julian Ryall (2024) Regreso de Trump atiza debate nuclear en Corea del Sur. Disponible en: https://amp.dw.com/es/el-regreso-de-trump-atiza-el-debate-nuclear-en-corea-del-sur/a70798786#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317231276140&csi=1&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com- Chad O´Carrol y Shreyas Reddy (2024) Why North Korean denuclearization will likely take backseat in second Trump term | NK Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/why-north-korean-denuclearization-will-likely-take-backseat-in-second-trump-term/- Miguel Jiménez (2024) Donald Trump planea elegir a marcos Rubio como secretario de Estado. Disponible en: https://elpais.com/internacional/elecciones-usa/2024-11-12/donald-trump-elige-a-marco-rubio-como-secretario-de-estado.html?outputType=amp#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317890370552&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Failed Martial Law Bid Shows Need to Protect Human Rights, Rule of Law (Seoul) – The South Korean National Assembly’s 204 to 85 vote to impeach President Yoon Suk-yeol on December 14, 2024 after his rejected imposition of martial law has reinforced democratic rule and checks and balances in South Korea, Human Rights Watch said today.  All 300 National Assembly lawmakers participated in the vote, with 204 votes in favor, 85 against, three abstentions, and eight invalid votes. The National Assembly charged the president with directing the military and police to obstruct the assembly from voting to overturn his decree; attempting to take over the National Election Committee; and arresting political leaders, current and former judges, journalists, and members of civil society. “Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment reflects the broad support among South Koreans for the rule of law and democracy,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Yoon’s impeachment should encourage South Korea’s political leaders to recommit to democratic institutions and upholding human rights and civil liberties.” The National Assembly impeached Yoon in response to his short-lived declaration of martial law on the evening of December 3, during which he attempted to ban all political activities and suspend due process rights and freedoms of speech and assembly. Yoon sent soldiers into the National Assembly to arrest political leaders and to stop lawmakers from voting to lift the decree.  In announcing martial law, Yoon contended that it was justified because of opposition efforts to impeach members of his cabinet and obstruct the budget, and due to unspecified threats from North Korean communist forces. Yoon repeated these claims in a televised speech on December 11, saying that his decree was a legitimate exercise of his constitutional powers, akin to conducting foreign policy, and so did not amount to insurrection.  The South Korean constitution allows a president to declare martial law only during “war, armed conflict, or similar national emergency.”  In his December 11 speech, Yoon stated that he had not intended to stop the National Assembly from lifting martial law under article 77 of the constitution – a critical check on potential abuses of power that it exercised on the night of December 3. But testimony by military officers ordered to carry out his decree contradicted his claim. In a news conference on December 12, an army special forces commander, Col. Kim Hyun-tae, who led the special forces team that stormed the National Assembly on December 3, said he had received orders from senior military commanders to prevent more than 150 National Assembly members – the number required to repeal martial law – from gathering. The head of South Korea’s police agency, Cho Ji-ho, testified in the National Assembly on December 9 that on the evening of December 3 the armed forces asked the police to help them locate and detain 15 people, including the leaders of the biggest political parties. He also said that several hours before declaring martial law, Yoon ordered him to occupy the newsrooms of several media organizations, including MBC, one of South Korea’s largest broadcasters and a repeated target of criminal defamation charges by Yoon and his allies.  The former deputy director of South Korea’s National Intelligence Service testified that he was ordered to arrest a broadcaster and a union official, as well as several political leaders, including a sitting judge who had ruled in favor of Yoon’s political opponent, a former chief justice of the Constitutional Court, and other political leaders. Martial law troops also occupied the National Election Commission’s offices and confiscated the phones of five election officials. On December 8, a special police investigation team arrested Yoon’s former defense minister, Kim Yong-hyun, on charges of insurrection. On December 11, the team arrested Cho on the same charge, along with another senior police official.  South Korean law defines insurrection as any attempt to “overthrow government organs established by the Constitution or to make the exercise of their functions impossible by using force.”  As investigations into the events of December 3 continue, the Constitutional Court will now decide whether to uphold the impeachment vote. A police raid on the president’s office on December 11 suggests he may also be charged with insurrection. The proceedings should be fair and impartial and ensure due process, Human Rights Watch said.  Yoon’s actions reflect a culmination of his administration’s assault on the country’s democratic institutions and human rights, Human Rights Watch said. In 2022, Yoon campaigned for president on an anti-feminist platform, rejected the existence of systematic gender discrimination, and pledged to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. Once in office, his administration eroded human rights protections for women and girls; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people; racial minorities; migrants; older people; and people with disabilities.  While in office, Yoon also directed police and prosecutors to attack political opponents, unions, and journalists, eroding the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly that his martial law decree nearly suspended. “Events in South Korea since December 3 have highlighted the crucial role democratic institutions play in preventing abuses of power and protecting the rule of law,” Pearson said.