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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This short analysis is based on the Security Complex theorem. Its departure point is the definition of the term, as introduced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver.  The author then briefly introduces the historical background of the Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and their relationships with Russia and suggests further readings for those willing to consult the existing scientific literature. The central part of the analysis focuses on five distinct components of the Caucasus Security Complex, which include interconnected security concerns, a distinctiveness as a geographical region, anarchical structure, shared security dynamics and Social construction of threats. The paper concludes by examining the geopolitical importance of the Caucasus region for the two Great powers, Russia and the United States of America, and the reference for the European Union. The introduction I will start by briefly explaining the notion of a Security Complex for the reader's convenience. The term "security complex" was introduced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver in their 1998 book Security: A New Framework for Analysis.  This refers to a distinct geographical region in which security concerns are interconnected. In other words, the security of one state in a complex is inextricably linked to that of others, creating a dynamic and often volatile environment. The key elements of this notion include: a) interconnected security concerns - a security complex is characterised by a web of security interdependencies where a threat to one state is perceived as a threat to others, leading to a shared sense of vulnerability and a need for collective security arrangements. b) Distinct geographical region - security complexes are geographically defined. They are typically regional in scope, although they sometimes encompass more significant areas. The geographical proximity of the states within a complex contributes to the interconnectedness of security concerns. c) Anarchical structure - just like the international system, security complexes operate within an anarchical structure. There is no overarching authority to enforce rules or resolve disputes that can lead to heightened tension and conflict. d)  States within a security complex share typical security dynamics, such as arms races, alliance formation, and conflict spirals. These dynamics create a self-reinforcing cycle of insecurity. e) Social construction of threats – the concept of security complex recognises that security threats are not objective realities but are socially constructed. States within a complex share a common understanding of what constitutes a threat, which shapes their behaviour and interactions. At the same time, it would be wise not to confuse the meaning of Security Complex with the notions of Security Community (shared sense of identity and trust among its members) or Security Regime (a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations). This short analysis will focus on three countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and explore their geopolitical situation at the beginning of 2025 from the perspective of a security complex theorem, particularly their relationships with Russia. Historical introduction The Caucasus, a region nestled between the Black and Caspian Seas, has a rich and tumultuous modern history. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, each with distinct cultural and historical trajectories, have navigated a complex landscape of imperial collapse, nation-building, and conflict. Armenia In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Armenians, then part of the Russian Empire, faced increasing tensions with their neighbours, particularly the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian Genocide, perpetrated by the Ottoman government during World War I, resulted in the systematic extermination of 1.5 million Armenians. Following the collapse of the Russian Empire, Armenia briefly experienced independence before being incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1922.    In 1988, the country was devastated by an earthquake and rising tensions with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to Armenia's renewed independence but also to the First Nagorno-Karabakh War with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan Azerbaijan, also part of the Russian Empire, declared independence in 1918, establishing the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. This short-lived independence ended in 1920 with incorporation into the Soviet Union. Similar to Armenia, Azerbaijan regained independence in 1991. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict dominated much of Azerbaijan's post-Soviet history, resulting in significant displacement and ongoing tensions.  Georgia Georgia, too, declared independence following the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. This independence was short-lived, as Georgia was invaded by the Red Army in 1921 and became part of the Soviet Union.  The country regained its independence in 1991. The post-Soviet period has been marked by internal conflicts, including the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and efforts to establish democratic institutions and closer ties with the West. The Security Complex of South Caucasus Regional Dynamics and Conflicts – Major issues The Caucasus region has been plagued by ethno-territorial conflicts, particularly the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This conflict, rooted in historical territorial claims and ethnic tensions, has resulted in significant human suffering and remains a major obstacle to regional stability. Readers interested in in-depth analysis performed by scholars researching the region are advised to consult Jansiz & Khojaste. Their thought-provoking paper discusses the history of the Caucasus crisis and its impact on regional security.  Börzel & Pamuk examine the challenges of Europeanization and fighting corruption in the Southern Caucasus. The region's geopolitical significance, located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, has also led to great power involvement, further complicating regional dynamics.   The following part of the analysis will look at the region through the lens of the Security Complex theorem to analyse its dynamics of security interrelationship. This will, in turn, allow us to understand the role of the Caucasus for the Great Powers and the European Union. Interconnected security concerns  A security complex is characterised by a web of security interdependencies where a threat to one state is perceived as a threat to others, leading to a shared sense of vulnerability and a need for collective security arrangements. According to Natalie Tavadze, “It is important to understand that Eurasianinism and Moscow’s approaches toward the Caucasus correspond to each other. In this regard, the Central Caucasus is considered as Russia’s backyard. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, the Black Sea, and the Caspian Sea constitute strategic dimensions for Russia. The latter is determined to dominate the region and uses the “ethnic card” to keep the countries of the Central Caucasus off balance. From the Russian standpoint, any foreign influence in its “near abroad” is seen through the prism of its national security. Such a menace should be thwarted by any means, as Moscow made clear more than once that it does not entertain any notion of conceding territories of its utmost geopolitical interests.”  This extended but thought-provoking quote from one of the local experts pretty well sketches the region's security dynamics. Now, let us look at its geographical dynamics. Distinct geographical region. Security complexes are geographically defined. They are typically regional in scope, although they sometimes encompass more significant areas. The geographical proximity of the states within a complex contributes to the interconnectedness of security concerns.  Geographically, the Caucasus is defined by the Caucasus Mountains, a formidable range dividing the region into the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus. The Greater Caucasus, the main range, boasts towering peaks like Mount Elbrus, the highest peak in Europe. This rugged terrain has historically isolated communities, leading to the development of a rich mosaic of languages and cultures. The Lesser Caucasus, located south of the Kura-Aras Lowland, further adds to the region's geographical complexity. This varied topography, ranging from high-altitude glaciers to fertile valleys and semi-desert landscapes, supports a remarkable biodiversity. The Caucasus's location at the crossroads of continents has made it a historical battleground and a corridor for trade and migration. This strategic importance has left its mark on the region's cultural landscape. The Caucasus is home to many ethnic groups, each with its distinct language, traditions, and history. This diversity, while enriching, has also been a source of conflict and tension. Throughout its history, the region has witnessed numerous internal and external power struggles. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Caucasus Anarchical structureLike the international system, security complexes operate within an anarchical structure. There is no overarching authority to enforce rules or resolve disputes that can lead to heightened tension and conflict. As Cornell and Starr adequately observe, “Many states in the Caucasus struggle with weak governance structures. This weakness is characterised by a lack of effective state control over territories, which undermines the rule of law and the provision of public services. The failure to establish strong, sovereign states based on the rule of law leads to corruption and mismanagement, further complicating governance.”  At the same time, Russia's role is significant. Russian policies have often destabilised the region, as Moscow's interventions and attempts to maintain dominance can exacerbate local conflicts and governance issues. The reliance on coercive diplomacy and military presence has undermined the sovereignty of local governments and complicated efforts toward conflict resolution.Shared security dynamicsStates within a security complex share typical security dynamics, such as arms races, alliance formation, and conflict spirals. These dynamics create a self-reinforcing cycle of insecurity. The region has been plagued by unresolved armed conflicts, which create a persistent security deficit. These conflicts destabilise the affected areas and have broader implications for regional peace and security. The ongoing hostilities hinder effective governance and contribute to widespread instability. Partly as a consequence of this, the region has seen a rise in organised crime and radical ideologies, particularly in the North Caucasus, where poverty and unemployment create fertile ground for extremist groups. The intertwining of criminality and political violence poses a significant threat to governance and societal stability.On top of that, one continues to observe ethnic and national tensions. The presence of various ethnic groups with competing national aspirations exacerbates tensions. This situation is further complicated by external influences and historical grievances, leading to a complex landscape of inter-ethnic relations that can quickly escalate into violence.Finally, there are serious socio-economic problems. Economic collapse and high poverty levels across the region contribute to governance challenges. The lack of economic opportunities fuels discontent and can lead to social unrest, making governance even more difficult.The social construction of threatsThe concept of security complex recognises that security threats are not objective realities but are socially constructed. States within a complex share a common understanding of what constitutes a threat, which shapes their behaviour and interactions. In the case of the Caucasus, it is easy to identify a number of threats and challenges that are typical for this security complex. Regional Destabilization -  the aftermath of the Chechen war and ongoing frozen conflicts in regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh create instability. These conflicts may still have the potential for spill-over effects and have been exploited by international terrorist networks. Authoritarian Governance - there is a trend of growing authoritarianism in the region, with Soviet-era power structures maintaining control. Political opposition is often suppressed, leading to a lack of democratic reforms and deteriorating living standards.Ecological Issues - the region faces significant ecological challenges, such as the deterioration of the Aral Sea and limited agricultural land, which contribute to instability and can exacerbate existing tensions.Militant and Radical Islam - the rise of militant Islamic groups, partly due to the exclusionary tactics of local regimes, poses a security threat, although it is currently considered a lesser factor compared to issues like drug trafficking.The remaining part of the article will focus on the Caucasus region's geopolitical importance for Russia, the USA, and the EU.Geopolitical ImportanceFor RussiaRussian Federation has been a significant power in the region for many years. "Retying the Caucasian Knot: Russia’s Evolving Approach to the South Caucasus" by Neil Melvin (published by Royal United Services Institute) explores Russia's changing role in the South Caucasus amid shifting geopolitical dynamics. Historically, Russia has viewed the region as a buffer against Western influence and as integral to its ambitions in the Black Sea and the Middle East. However, the emergence of multipolarity and the involvement of new international actors, such as Turkey, Iran, and China, have challenged Russia's dominance. The 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts further shifted the balance of power, diminishing Russia's leverage, particularly with Armenia. In response, Russia is reconfiguring its strategy, emphasising economic and transport ties while maintaining a security presence. The document argues that Russia seeks to reassert its influence by fostering relationships with regional powers and adapting to the new geopolitical landscape. The Euro-Atlantic community faces challenges in countering Russia's efforts as regional states pursue multi-alignment policies, and the prospect of NATO and EU integration diminishes. Ultimately, the paper highlights the need for the West to recalibrate its approaches to effectively engage with the evolving realities of the South Caucasus.Additionally, the South Caucasus is significant for Russia for several reasons. Firstly, Russian troops in the South Caucasus allow Russia to project military power and influence regional security dynamics. Following the Second Karabakh War, Russia positioned peacekeepers in Azerbaijan and has military bases in Armenia, reinforcing its role as a key security provider in the area. Economically, the South Caucasus is strategically important for energy transit routes. Russia aims to maintain control over energy supplies and infrastructure that pass through the region, ensuring its leverage over energy distribution to Europe and other markets. Finally, Russia's involvement in mediating conflicts, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, allows it to assert its role as a key player in regional stability. By doing so, Russia can prevent conflicts from escalating that might threaten its interests or lead to Western intervention. For the USAIn 2017, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published an interesting analysis by Rumer Sokolsky and Stronsky. According to the authors, the importance of the South Caucasus region for the U.S. is undisputable and rests on several arguments. According to the document, the main interests of the U.S. in the South Caucasus include: preserving regional stability (preventing the resumption of frozen conflicts and promoting a peaceful environment among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), supporting democratic change and governance (the U.S. seeks to support democratic transformations and better governance in the South Caucasus states, facilitating their integration into the international community), economic development (the U.S. is interested in fostering economic growth and development within the South Caucasus, recognizing that economic prosperity can contribute to stability), energy security (although the significance of Caspian energy resources is noted, allegedly the U.S. interest in energy from the region has become less vital due to changes in global energy markets) and finally, countering illicit activities (the U.S. is concerned with combating transnational crime and illegal trafficking, which poses risks to regional stability and security).  According to James Carafano (Vice President of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and the E. W. Richardson Fellow Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation), the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, which started in February 2022, caused the United States to reconsider its global interests and responsibilities diametrically.  Accordingly, the conflict has highlighted the need for energy diversification in Europe, leading to renewed interest in the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) and other regional partnerships. The SGC, which connects gas fields in Azerbaijan to Europe, is crucial for reducing reliance on Russian energy and enhancing European energy security. Next, regional integration. Projects like the modernization of ports in Georgia and Azerbaijan are vital for developing logistics and transport networks and promoting regional cooperation. Turkey is expected to play an increasingly significant role in the South Caucasus, supporting regional integration and security as Georgia seeks alternatives to NATO and EU membership.The remaining challenges from the perspective of the US include: geopolitical Tensions (Russia, China, and Iran continue to exert influence in the region, although their capacities may be overstretched due to the ongoing war and sanctions), economic viability (the middle corridor faces challenges such as customs and border control issues and the need for modern infrastructure. However, it presents an alternative logistical route that is gaining interest from various stakeholders); climate policy Implications (the ongoing energy crisis due to the war in Ukraine may prompt changes in climate policies, potentially favouring increased investments in oil and gas infrastructure). Last but not least, the path ahead requires the U.S. to consider military cooperation - enhanced US military support for Azerbaijan could signal a deeper commitment to regional stability, Three Seas Initiative (3SI) - success in expanding the 3SI could benefit the South Caucasus by fostering infrastructure development and regional integration, Black Sea security - NATO's evolving role in Black Sea security will be critical in linking to the middle corridor and ensuring regional stability and finally investment in energy resources - interest in the Transcaspian Gas Pipeline and other energy initiatives will be significant for Europe's efforts to diversify energy supplies.For Europe (The EU)The South Caucasus is essential for the EU for several reasons. Firstly as a geostrategic gateway. The region is a crucial gateway between Europe and Asia, making it significant for trade routes and connectivity. It is positioned at the intersection of major global trade routes, enhancing the EU's access to East and South markets. Secondly, in terms of energy supplies. The South Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, plays a vital role in the EU's energy strategy, especially as the EU seeks to diversify its energy supplies and reduce dependence on Russian energy. Azerbaijan is a key supplier of natural gas to the EU, which has become increasingly important following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.Thirdly geopolitically, the region's geopolitical landscape has shifted due to recent conflicts, including the war in Ukraine. The EU's engagement with South Caucasus countries is essential for maintaining stability and influencing regional dynamics, especially as these nations navigate their foreign policy options between the EU and Russia.Fourthly, as an economic partner. Strengthening ties with the South Caucasus countries can enhance economic collaboration, which is particularly important given the EU's interest in bolstering regional trade and investment. This can also increase economic growth and stability in the EU's neighbourhood.Finally, The South Caucasus is becoming increasingly significant in the context of EU sanctions against Russia, as it could serve as a transit route for goods. The EU's ability to monitor and influence trade flows through this region is critical for enforcing its sanctions.ConclusionThis short analysis proves the importance of the Caucasus (South Caucasus, to be more exact) for the international community and its potential to play the role of an essential geopolitical factor that could potentially tip the scale regarding the global balance of power. Recent political developments in Georgia (Georgian Protests 2024 – 2025), where the ruling party, Georgian Dream, won the majority of seats in parliament, were met with protests fueled by claims of the opposition parties that the elections were fraudulent.  The winning party has decided to suspend the talks with the European Union about the country’s accession to the EU until 2028.  The move is seen as anti-EU (ergo pro-Russian).  At the same time, pro-Russian commentators have claimed that the demonstrators have been supported by the CIA (a claim that has been put forward with regard to the Ukrainian Maidan of 2013 or even the HK protests of 2019). As it appears, the Southern Caucasus plays a crucial role on the geopolitical chessboard attended by the U.S.A., Russia, Turkey, Iran and the EU. All of them are, at least for the time being, interested in peace and stability, which means status quo, at least as long as the war in Ukraine is not decidedly over. The future depends, among others, on the outcome of the end of the Ukrainian war and the visions and actions of the 47th President of the U.S., who already stunned the world with his claims regarding the Panama Canal and Greenland.References1  Buzan, B and Wæver, O. 1998. “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.” Lynne Rienner Publishers.2  “Armenia.” 2018. https://armeniapedia.org/index.php?title=Armenia. 3  “აქართველო.” 2024. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Georgia_(country). 4  Jansiz, Ahmad, and Mohammad Reza Khojaste. 2015. “Conflicts in the Caucasus Region and Its Effects on Regional Security Approach.” Journal of Politics and Law. Canadian Center of Science and Education. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v8n1p83. 5  Börzel, Tanja A., and Yasemin Pamuk. 2011. “Pathologies of Europeanisation: Fighting Corruption in the Southern Caucasus.” West European Politics. Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.631315.  6  Tavadze, Natalie. 2024. “Geopolitics of the Central Caucasus.” Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-geopolitics-of-the-central-caucasus/ 7  Jansiz, Ahmad, and Mohammad Reza Khojaste. 2015. “Conflicts in the Caucasus Region and Its Effects on Regional Security Approach.” Journal of Politics and Law. Canadian Center of Science and Education. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v8n1p83. 8   Cornell, E. S and Starr, F.S. 2006. The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe. Silk Road Paper. Central Asia – Caucasus INstitutte Silk Road Studies Program. https://isdp.eu/wp-content/uploads/publications/2006_cornell-starr_the-caucasus-a-challenge-for-europe.pdf   9  Schmidt, Jürgen. "Security Challenges in the Caucasus and Central Asia - A German and European Perspective." Paper presented at the German-U.S. Conference, Conflicts in the Greater Middle East and the Transatlantic Relationship, Jena, February 28 - March 1, 2003. 10  Melvin, Neil. *Retying the Caucasian Knot: Russia’s Evolving Approach to the South Caucasus*. Occasional Paper. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2024. Accessed 30.1.2025. https://static.rusi.org/retying-the-caucasian-knot-russias-evolving-approach-to-the-south-caucasus.pdf 11  Neset, Siri, Mustafa Aydin, Ayça Ergun, Richard Giragosian, Kornely Kakachia, and Arne Strand. *Changing Geopolitics of the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War: Prospect for Regional Cooperation and/or Rivalry*. CMI Report, No. 4. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, September 2023. https://www.cmi.no/publications/8911-changing-geopolitics-of-the-south-caucasus-after-the-second-karabakh-war 12  Rumer, Eugene, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski. U.S. Policy Toward the South Caucasus: Take Three. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13079. 13  Carafano, James. "Future and Consequences of US Strategic Interest in the South Caucasus." *Caucasus Strategic Perspectives* 3, no. 2 (Winter 2022): 41-51. Caucasus Strategic Perspectives https://cspjournal.az/post/future-and-consequences-of-us-strategic-interest-in-the-south-caucasus-489. 14  Akhvlediani, Tinatin. "The EU and the South Caucasus: Geoeconomics at Play." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/the-eu-and-the-south-caucasus-geoeconomics-at-play?center=europe&lang=en 15  Human Rights Watch. "World Report 2024: Georgia." Last modified January 31, 2025. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/georgia. 16  Shamin, Sarah., 3 Dec. 2024. “Georgia protests: What’s behind them and what’s next?”. ALJAZEERA. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/3/georgia-protests-whats-behind-them-and-whats-next  17  DISINFO: Georgia protests are a planned CIA operation according to Maidan scenario. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/georgia-protests-are-a-planned-cia-operation-according-to-maidan-scenario/  see also: Kaltenberg, Kit., 6 Oct. 2023. “A Maidan 2.0 color revolution looms in Georgia”. https://thegrayzone.com/2023/10/06/maidan-color-revolution-georgia/ 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction For some international analysts, the invasion by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, into the Republic of Ukraine, led by Volodymyr Zelensky, on February 24, 2022, was a surprise. This offensive was meant to conquer Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, and Kharkiv, the second-largest city in the country. However, the war that was expected to be quick and low-cost in terms of human lives, with an aura of liberation from the "neo-Nazi government" and the "Ukrainian oligarchy," turned into a much slower and bloodier conflict than the Kremlin anticipated. It is important to clarify that in 2014, the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula, which was part of the territory of Ukraine. Shortly after, pro-Russian rebels from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, supported by Moscow, began a popular uprising, leading to a civil war against Ukrainian troops. In 2019, when pro-Western President Volodymyr Zelensky came to power, clashes between both sides intensified. In February, before the invasion, Putin signed decrees recognizing the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine as independent states, accusing the United States (U.S.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of expanding eastward into Europe, pushing Ukraine’s membership in NATO, and threatening Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. During the first week of the war, the Ukrainian president ordered a general military mobilization to defend Ukrainian territory from the Russian advance, while both the U.S. and its European Union (EU) allies announced political and economic sanctions (energy, transport, finance) against the Russian Federation and the expulsion of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, which includes over 11,000 financial institutions from over 200 countries. This system, based in Brussels, Belgium, was created to facilitate fast and secure cross-border payments and relies on confidentiality, validity, and accessibility of information from participating members. Western multinationals sold their assets in Russia and canceled any partnerships with Russian firms. These measures took Putin by surprise, although thanks to his alliance with China for the sale of gas and oil, he was able to navigate the blockade. Price hikes hurt Russian workers, who saw their income decrease due to rising prices for essential goods. As stalled negotiations continued between the Russians and Ukrainians, Russian troops halted due to Ukrainian resistance, which received weapons and supplies from NATO. This work provides a brief description and analysis of the factors that led to the Russian Federation’s invasion of the Republic of Ukraine and its economic and political consequences for both countries, as well as the role of the U.S. and NATO in the conflict. This invasion is simply a continuation of the longstanding conflict between both countries, especially since the first decade of the 21st century due to territorial and geopolitical issues involving NATO, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Ukraine. In this regard, NATO expanded eastward after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), despite Putin’s warnings. 1. A crisis that began before 2022 In March 2014, a referendum against the opinion of Kyiv was held in Crimea and the autonomous city of Sevastopol, in which pro-Russian inhabitants, who were the majority, decided to join the Russian Federation. This referendum was not accepted by Ukraine, the U.S., and the EU, thus, Moscow incorporated Crimea into its territory, claiming that the peninsula had always been part of Russia. Meanwhile, in April, pro-Russian paramilitary groups took the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which are adjacent to Russia, with supplies and weapons from Moscow. By May, referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk declared the regions as independent republics, although they did not want to join the Russian Federation. The Minsk I Agreement, signed in 2014 between Russia and Ukraine under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), established a roadmap to end the civil conflict and normalize the status of both regions. It aimed for a permanent ceasefire, decentralization of power, the release of hostages, border monitoring with Russia, elections, improved health conditions, and the withdrawal of foreign fighters. The Minsk II agreement, signed in 2015, called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from both sides, pension payments to residents, the establishment of a sanitary zone, elections, prisoner exchanges, and the granting of autonomy to the region, allowing Ukraine to recover the border areas with Russia. Both agreements failed, and fighting resumed. Putin consistently claimed that Ukraine had no intention of implementing the agreements and had only signed them due to military losses, while for the U.S. and its allies, Putin always intended to recognize the independence of both regions, betting on the failure of the negotiations. 2. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Ukraine: The war between both countries Putin had warned months earlier that Western powers, led by the United States, should negotiate with him over the expansion of NATO eastward, which was affecting Russia’s security. Putin demanded that Ukraine not be forced to join NATO, arguing that such a move would not provide any security guarantees for Russia. However, the invasion was not unexpected, as weeks before there had been satellite images showing the deployment of Russian troops and armored vehicles: "Russia had also announced, albeit inconsistently and unclearly, that it would adopt ‘technical-military’ measures against Ukraine if its demands for security guarantees and neutrality regarding the Atlantic Alliance were not accepted" (Sanahuja, 2022, 42). Ukraine’s incorporation into NATO would mean that biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons could be stationed there, something the Russians deemed unjustified since the Warsaw Pact had disappeared in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR. What the Russian Federation sought, as the world’s second-largest military power, was to prevent missiles from pointing at its territory from Ukraine due to NATO’s expansion and U.S. militaristic intentions. The Russian Federation, as one of the key international actors, even as a state strategically involved across multiple continents, felt cornered and overwhelmed in its strategic interests. The Russians sought NATO guarantees to prevent further expansion and desired security at the old geopolitical style for their borders: "On other economic and strategic issues, the Russian state continues to control its vital areas. Corporations controlling hydrocarbons, aerospace, and infrastructure, among others, are state-owned" (Zamora, 2022). On the other hand, Russian nationalism, which considered Ukraine and Russia to be sister nations, has served as a justification for the invasion. Early in the century, Putin was closer to Western positions, but after seeing that his concerns about NATO’s expansion were ignored, he turned to Russian nationalism, seeking to create a ‘hinterland’ in the old Tsarist style, denying Ukraine’s status as an independent state and instead treating it as a historical product allied with Russia. Another reason for Putin to invade Ukraine was to defend the two “people's republics” in the Donbas region: Donetsk and Luhansk. The Russian Federation recognized both regions as "sovereign states" because they had never been granted autonomy. From Putin’s perspective, the invasion was based on the United Nations Charter, which stated that a country under a "genocide" by its government should receive help, as was happening in the two “sovereign states.” According to his view, the measures taken by the Russian Federation were related to Ukraine’s political indecision in controlling the paramilitary militias that were attacking the two independent republics. Due to the failure of the Minsk agreements, Russia was forced to intervene. Following this reasoning, before the Russian intervention, the U.S. and its allies had begun providing significant amounts of modern weapons, not only to rearm the Ukrainian military forces but also to give them the ability to invade Donbas. The Ukrainian army, along with intelligence services trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), constituted a risk for the pro-Russian population in Donbas, so despite Western warnings, the Russian Federation was compelled to intervene. To summarize, in the first phase, Moscow's objectives were to overthrow the “neo-Nazi” government of Kyiv (although this objective was sidelined later due to Ukrainian resistance and Western sanctions), prevent Ukraine from joining NATO to avoid missiles close to its borders, defend the pro-Russian population of Donbas, secure recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, and finally declare the independence of the republics of Luhansk and Donetsk, or, as happened later, hold referendums to annex these regions to the Russian Federation. However, the United Nations General Assembly thought differently from the Russian leader and approved in March the resolution 2022, A/RES/ES-11/1, for humanitarian aid in Ukraine, condemning “in the strongest terms the aggression committed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine” (article 2), demanding “that the Russian Federation immediately cease the use of force against Ukraine” (article 3), and calling for “the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” (article 4). At the same time, while reinforcing the military front, the Russian Federation economically cut gas supplies to Western European countries. What the war demonstrated was the adaptability of the Ukrainian military to fight under unfavorable conditions, using elastic attacks in different places with help from terrain knowledge, spies, and satellite images and drones provided by the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. aid approved by the government of Joseph Robinette Biden Jr. until 2023 reached 40 billion dollars through the Lend-Lease Act for the Defense of Democracy in Ukraine. (Sanahuja, 2022). On the contrary, on the Russian side, the underestimation of the resistance of Ukrainian armed forces, the "Special Military Operation," was compounded by the underestimation of Ukrainian national sentiment, combined with planning problems, tactical issues, supply and logistics challenges, and the low morale of soldiers who did not want to fight against Ukrainians, despite the Kremlin’s calls to battle the "oligarch and neo-Nazi cliques" running Kyiv’s government. Furthermore, ignoring the warnings from the West and Kyiv, Putin announced the annexation of the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, after the results of the referendums showed over 95% support for annexation to the Russian Federation. In response to the annexation, Ukrainian President Zelensky officially requested Ukraine's membership in NATO. This confirmed the definitive cutoff of gas supplies to Europe, causing concern in industries across various countries, especially in small and medium-sized enterprises. 3. The United States, NATO, and China Currently, China and India are the leading buyers of Russian gas, even more so than all of Europe, with discounts granted by the Russians. This demonstrates that the world is no longer unipolar, but multipolar, with the decline of Europe and the economic rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India. While the U.S. leads militarily and is economically stronger than Russia, it is less powerful than the PRC. Therefore, attacking a Chinese ally with nuclear weapons is weakening the PRC, which does not possess many nuclear weapons itself. The U.S. helped the disintegration of the USSR, and now it also seeks the disintegration of the Russian Federation, or at least a regime change, distancing Putin from power and ensuring that the new government is more friendly with the West. This is despite the initial intention of Putin during his first term to join NATO, a request that was denied, and the Russian help (accepting the installation of U.S. bases in Central Asian countries) that the U.S. received when it invaded Afghanistan, when both countries had the same enemies (the Taliban and Al-Qaeda). Although the Russian Federation has not been able to freely use its dollar reserves, as part of them were held in Western countries, it has also benefited from the rise in gas and oil prices, which it continued to export, particularly to the PRC, which has not joined the sanctions. These price hikes not only disrupted the global economy, generating inflation in NATO countries but also increased the prices of minerals and energy, harming capitalist countries and, paradoxically, benefiting the Russians as they sell these commodities. The Russian economy has resisted more than expected, and the ruble, which depreciated at the beginning of the conflict, has recovered. Those who suffered the consequences of the sanctions were the Europeans who import gas and oil. For the U.S. and its allies, the next enemy to defeat is China, as, according to them, global problems require global solutions. Additionally, China has been criticized for not sanctioning and condemning the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is considered a threat to peace by NATO because it seeks, through coercion and annexation, to establish a sphere of influence and direct control with conventional and cyber means, destabilizing Eastern and Southern European countries. If there was any semblance of autonomy by European countries towards the U.S., the crisis has shattered those efforts. Before the crisis, the U.S. complained that Europeans were not doing enough to maintain the alliance, specifically by increasing the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dedicated to defense. The Ukrainian situation has placed them under the U.S. wing, and that autonomy has vanished for the time being. With the election of Donald Trump as president, the situation in Ukraine enters a new phase. Although the Ukrainian president has stated that technical teams have been formed to address the issue of the war with the Russians, there is still no set date for a meeting. Trump also pointed out that Putin is destroying Russia after years of war, generating inflation and economic problems due to the lack of an agreement to end the conflict, although he did not provide specifics on a potential meeting with the Russian president. Trump has encountered a war whose resolution is clearly more complicated than he initially believed. However, from the Russian side, President Putin stated, “we listen to your statements about the need to do everything possible to avoid a Third World War. Of course, we welcome that spirit and congratulate the elected president of the U.S. on his inauguration,” which could be interpreted as an approach to the new administration (Infobae, 2025). The U.S. president, during his presidential campaign had announced that he would end the war in 24 hours, but then the deadline was extended to 100 days. However, now he is seeking a meeting with his Russian counterpart in the coming months, which has proven that the solution to the Russo-Ukrainian war is more complicated than it seemed. Trump has also threatened new sanctions on the Russian Federation if it does not sit at the negotiation table. He has also mentioned that he expects Chinese help to pressure Moscow to seek an end to the conflict. In summary, the U.S. president is more interested in solving internal issues like Latin American migration at the Mexican border than in addressing a war that has lasted almost three years. Final Comments The Republic of Ukraine has been used by Western powers to curb the anti-unipolar stance of the Russian Federation. To maintain Western predominance, the U.S. and allied countries have launched a struggle against the Russians, but through Ukraine, cooperating militarily, politically, and economically. The security policy developed by the U.S. in recent years has shown, on one hand, the growing military power with the maintenance of bases worldwide, from which they can attack or at least influence various countries to defend their interests. On the other hand, the use of this policy has led to the decline of the U.S. economy in the face of competition with the PRC, which has not only increased its GDP but also its productivity, foreign investments, and technological development. In other words, today, Russia is the main opponent, an ally of China, and later, it will be China. The U.S. foreign policy, which sought Ukraine’s membership in NATO, has led Putin to intervene militarily in an invasion in which he believed he would be received as a liberator but encountered fierce nationalist resistance, despite calling the Ukrainian leaders "neo-Nazis." The Russian response to NATO’s eastward expansion is related to security concerns. But they also point to the injustice committed by Western countries. According to the Russians, while they were sanctioned for the invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. was not sanctioned when it invaded Iraq, nor was NATO when it intervened in Libya. The U.S. considered the invasion as an attack on the international order and on American supremacy in the European continent, which is why they are intervening in Ukraine — to attack an invading power that seeks to recover its geopolitical role at both the regional and global levels, as it had during the USSR era. The outcome of the war remains uncertain, as the Ukrainians have invaded and occupied a large part of the Russian region of Kursk, where they have taken towns and prisoners to use as bargaining chips in future negotiations with Russia, while the destruction of infrastructure and the death toll continue to rise. References 1. -Infobae. (2022). Putin vuelve a jugar la carta nuclear y llama a falsos referendos para anexionar cuatro provincias de Ucrania. Buenos Aires. 21 de septiembre. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2022/09/21/putin-vuelve-a-jugar-la-carta-nuclear-y-llama-a-falsos-referendos-para-anexionar-cuatro-provincias-de-ucrania/2. -Infobae. (2022). Vladimir Putin anunció la anexión de las regiones ucranianas de Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson y Zaporizhzhia. Buenos Aires. 30 de septiembre. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2022/09/30/vladimir-putin-anuncio-la-anexion-de-las-regiones-ucranianas-donetsk-luhansk-kherson-y-zaporizhzhia/3. -Infobae. (2025). Trump dijo que Vladimir Putin está “destruyendo a Rusia” por no buscar un acuerdo de paz con Ucrania. Buenos Aires, 21 de enero. https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2025/01/21/trump-dijo-que-vladimir-putin-esta-destruyendo-a-rusia-por-no-buscar-un-acuerdo-de-paz-con-ucrania/4. -Luchetti, J. (2022). El papel de la Federación Rusa y Estados Unidos en la guerra ruso-ucraniana. 2° Congreso Regional de Relaciones Internacionales “(Re) Pensar las Relaciones Internacionales en un mundo en transformación”. Tandil. 28, 29 y 30 de Septiembre.5. -Luchetti, J. (2022). Rusia y la OTAN en Ucrania: la lucha por la supremacía en un país del viejo continente. XV Congreso Nacional y VIII Internacional sobre Democracia “¿Hacia un nuevo escenario internacional? Redistribución del poder, territorios y ciberespacio en disputa en un mundo inestable”. En, C. Pinillos (comp.). Memorias del XV Congreso Nacional y VIII Internacional sobre Democracia. Rosario. Universidad Nacional del Rosario, Facultad de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales, pp. 1098-1127. https://rephip.unr.edu.ar/handle/2133/260936. -Naciones Unidas. (2022). Asamblea General. Resolución A/RES/ES-11/1. Agresión contra Ucrania. New York. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n22/293/40/pdf/n2229340.pdf7. -Sanahuja, J. (2022). Guerras del interregno: la invasión rusa de Ucrania y el cambio de época europeo y global. Anuario CEIPAZ 2021-2022 Cambio de época y coyuntura crítica en la sociedad global. Madrid. Centro de Educación e Investigación para la paz, pp. 41-71. https://ceipaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/3.JoseAntonioSanahuja.pdf8. -Zamora, A. (2022). La multipolaridad contra el Imperialismo y la izquierda extraviada. Buenos Aires. Abril. https://observatoriocrisis.com/2022/04/23/la-multipolaridad-contra-el-imperialismo-y-al-izquierda-extraviada/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Indonesia’s inclusion in BRICS enhances the representation of the Global South and strengthens efforts to reform global governance institutions. This move positions the bloc as a stronger platform for collaboration among developing nations. On 7 January, Indonesia officially joined the BRICS grouping. In welcoming Indonesia, the Brazilian Government issued a statement, saying: “With the largest population and economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia shares with other members a commitment to reforming global governance institutions and contributes positively to deepening South-South cooperation.” With full membership, Indonesia has become the first country in Southeast Asia to join BRICS. Currently, Thailand and Malaysia are official partners, but not full members. Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its statement said the BRICS membership is “a strategic step to improve the collaborations and cooperation with other developing nations, based on the principle of equality, mutual respect, and sustainable development.” Economically, this could mean an increase of 0.3 percent growth to GDP, and the expansion of Indonesia’s access to BRICS markets. Geopolitically, it provides Indonesia a bargaining position in the global arena as well as a platform to voice the aspirations of the Global South. For BRICS, Indonesia’s membership adds another feather to its hat by bringing in greater representation of the Global South to its multipolar vision. This makes it imperative to assess the trajectory of the grouping. What started as an acronym “BRIC,” coined by Jim O’Neill in 2001 in the report “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” the grouping was projected in the next decade to grow significantly. Founded in 2009 by the four countries—Brazil, Russia, China, and India—the bloc’s first expansion came in 2010 with the joining of South Africa. In the last 16 years, BRICS has graduated from being a popular buzz word in international politics to a significant platform of emerging economies representing the “Global South.” What is noteworthy is that BRICS is not yet a formal multilateral organisation like the United Nations, World Bank or the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but increasingly there has been a greater demand among states (mostly developing countries) to join this club of emerging economies. Despite its informality, what made BRICS relevant in the international order was the 2008 financial crises, which raised scepticism and concerns over the dollar-dominated monetary system. This invariably challenged the effectiveness of the West-led Bretton Woods institutions given the suffering of the United States and Europe in the wake of the financial crisis. In contrast, the BRICS economies showed resilience. The first BRIC summit was held in Yekaterinburg in 2009, where the Joint Declaration put forward the desire of BRIC countries to develop “an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open, and transparent dialogue and cooperation” that is “conducive not only to serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but also to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.” This was reaffirmed at the most recent 16th BRICS Summit held in October 2024 in Kazan. With the indicative expansion of its institutional framework and functionaries since 2009, the most significant outputs have been the New Development Bank (NDB), which provides developmental funds to countries; the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with a resource pool of US$100 billion, which provides a mutual support mechanism for short-term balance of payments pressures, enhancing the financial safety net of member countries; and the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 for effective integration of BRICS enterprises into global and regional value chains. A significant milestone was the call, during the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg in 2023, for the expansion of BRICS by inviting new states to join. Another, in 2024, was the deliberation on the formation of the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative (also known as BRICS Pay), where BRICS countries would trade with each other without converting to US dollars by utilising blockchain technology and tokens to circumvent the SWIFT financial payment system. Although BRICS Pay is still only a concept, its development would seriously undermine the US dollar’s long-standing dominance. Today, the inter-governmental organisation boasts of 10 full members with the inclusion of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in January 2024, and Indonesia in January 2025; and has nine official partner countries—Nigeria is the ninth partner country of BRICS (admitted on 17 January 2025), joining Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Statistically put, BRICS member countries comprise about 45 percent of the world’s population, 28 percent of the global economy, and collectively they produce more than a third of the world’s crude oil. And if Saudi Arabia joins the group (which it is yet to consider the BRICS invitation), the grouping would then produce some 43 percent of global crude oil. This growth among emerging nations is set to widen the gap between BRICS+ and the G7 nations. As IMF estimates suggest, BRICS+ will account for 37.6 percent of world GDP at purchasing power parity in 2027, compared with 28.2 percent for the G7. This will signify a shift in economic power towards emerging economies, enhance intra-BRICS trade and regional networks rather than relying on G7 markets, and also lead to the creation of alternate alliances and institutions. Apart from expanding its membership, BRICS has also broadened its agenda beyond economics to include global challenges. The two main pillars of BRICS are practical cooperation in various fields through meetings of Working Groups and Senior Officials, and consultation on matters of shared interests through meetings of Leaders and Ministers of Finance, Trade, Health, Science & Technology, Education, Agriculture, Communication, and Labour, among others. The intra-BRICS collaboration now includes social welfare, intellectual property, tourism, science & technology, culture, outer space, think tanks, and internet governance and security. With BRICS+, emerging economies are establishing new standards for order making. In other words, despite its informal existence, BRICS has emerged as a strong contestant for building an alternative discourse on global governance—one that is non-western. The expansion gives BRICS a greater economic and demographic weight as well as a stronger voice to the Global South, potentially reshaping discussions in institutions like the UN and WTO. However, the long-term success of an expanded BRICS will depend on its ability to balance diverse interests and act as a unified voice on the global stage. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From January 20 to 24, 2025, the traditional World Economic Forum (WEF) took place in Davos. The organizers registered approximately 2,000 participants from over 130 countries, including around 1,600 executives from major corporations, among them 900 CEOs. The political agenda of the WEF was supported by more than 50 heads of state and government. As part of the official program, about 300 sessions were held, 200 of which were broadcast live. Press accreditation was granted to 76 media companies. For official events, 28,043 square meters of space were allocated, accommodating 117 meeting rooms and 23 lounge areas. Additionally, several participating companies (such as HSBC, EY, and Cognizant) rented additional venues separately for their own events. WEF President Børge Brende, announcing this meeting, emphasized that in 2025, due to geopolitical conflicts, ongoing economic fragmentation, and the acceleration of climate change, the forum would be held under conditions of exceptionally high global uncertainty for the first time in decades. The theme of the Forum was “Cooperation in the Age of Intelligence”. On January, WEF experts presented four reports. The first one, a traditional report and the 20th edition, analyzed the most significant global risks and threats facing the international community. The study is based on a survey of over 900 experts from various fields and covers short-term (2025), medium-term (until 2027), and long-term (until 2035) perspectives. The key risks identified for these periods include the following:- in 2025 the most serious threat for most respondents is interstate armed conflicts, followed by extreme weather events and geoeconomic conflicts, including sanctions and trade measures;- by 2027 key risks include disinformation and fake news, which undermine trust in institutions and intensify social polarization, tension, and instability, as well as an increase in cyberattacks and espionage cases;- by 2035 environmental threats are a major concern, including extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, ecosystem destruction, critical changes in Earth's systems, and natural resource shortages. Additionally, technological risks such as the negative consequences of artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies are highlighted.The authors emphasize the need to strengthen international cooperation and increase resilience to global threats. According to them, rising geopolitical tensions, climate challenges, and other risks require coordinated global action to prevent the escalation of existing issues and the emergence of new crises. The second report presents the perspectives of leading experts on the global economic outlook for 2025. They predict moderate economic slowdown, driven by geoeconomic fragmentation and protectionist measures. The most resilient economic growth is expected in the United States and South Asian countries, while Europe, China, and Latin America may face significant challenges. Inflation is projected to rise in most countries, primarily due to increased government spending and shifts in global supply chains. Most experts consider a further escalation of the U.S.-China trade war likely, along with continued regionalization of global trade, leading to the formation of more isolated economic blocs and reduced global interdependence. While experts acknowledge the high potential of artificial intelligence (AI), they emphasize the need for greater investment in infrastructure and human capital to fully leverage its benefits. The third study provides a comprehensive analysis of employment issues. The main conclusion is that ongoing changes, global trends and new technologies will cause 92 million people to leave the labor market worldwide by 2030, but will also create 170 million new jobs. One of the challenges in this regard is the need to improve skills and train for new specialties. The fourth report assesses the state of global cooperation across five key areas: trade and capital, innovation and technology, climate and natural capital, health and well-being, and peace and security. After analyzing more than 40 indicators, the authors conclude that due to heightened geopolitical tensions and instability, overall cooperation remains at the same level. However, positive trends are observed in areas such as climate, innovation, technology, and health. Davos as a Symbolic Benchmark of Switzerland Despite existing criticism, the Davos Forum remains a key platform for the annual interaction of leading figures in global politics, business, and the expert community. Without Switzerland's neutral status, the Davos Forum likely would not exist. However, it was Klaus Schwab, who founded the World Economic Forum (WEF) on January 24, 1971, who played a crucial role in transforming this event and its host location into one of Switzerland’s comparative advantages in political and economic terms. Despite his advanced age, Schwab continues to be an active ideologue and architect of Davos, moderating key discussions while fine-tuning his creation and addressing annual criticism. Yet, he has his own limitations—despite Switzerland’s neutrality and his personal reputation for impartiality, Schwab once again refrained from inviting Russian representatives, even at the level of individual entrepreneurs and experts. Such a move, rather than formal attempts to broaden participation and accessibility, could have enhanced the forum’s status. The participation of a Russian delegation would have been particularly relevant in this critical year for global politics, marked by the unpredictable presidency of Donald Trump, which is set to shape most geopolitical and geo-economic processes worldwide. Including Russian representatives could have strengthened the WEF’s competitive standing, but once again, it did not happen. The Swiss leadership highly values the opportunities that the Davos platform provides, particularly in the realm of foreign policy and, most notably, foreign economic relations. In September 2024, both chambers of the Swiss Parliament—the Council of States (the smaller chamber) and the National Council (the larger chamber)—decided to continue state support for the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos and allocated budget funding for the period 2025–2027. During the discussions, lawmakers emphasized that the event strengthens Switzerland’s role as a global hub for international dialogue, while also having a positive economic impact on the Graubünden region. As the host country of the forum, Switzerland actively leverages it to advance its own interests. This year, six out of the seven members of the Swiss Federal Council (Cabinet of Ministers) attended the WEF. As part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Swiss Economy Minister Guy Parmelin signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Kosovo and Thailand, bringing Switzerland’s total number of FTAs to 37. There are also plans to adapt and update the existing FTA with China. One of Bern’s key priorities remains securing an FTA with the MERCOSUR bloc. As a result, a focal point of this year’s WEF was Argentine President Javier Milei, who, during an “exceptionally warm bilateral meeting,” invited Swiss President Karin Keller-Sutter to visit Buenos Aires in 2025. The Trump Factor The opening of the current WEF coincided with the inauguration of Donald Trump, who, in recent months, has made numerous provocative statements and promises, swiftly beginning their implementation upon taking office on January 20. The U.S. president signed nearly 100 executive orders, including the repeal of 78 regulations enacted by his predecessor, Joe Biden. Among these were directives for all federal agencies and departments to address rising living costs and to end government-imposed censorship of free speech. The most significant orders included the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization, as well as the declaration of a state of emergency at the U.S.-Mexico border to enforce strict immigration controls. In one way or another, the presence of the “new-old” president was felt across nearly all discussion platforms at the forum. On January 23, Donald Trump addressed the participants of the Davos Forum via video conference, outlining the following agenda:- NATO defense spending: Member states should increase their defense budgets from 2% to 5% of GDP to ensure a more equitable distribution of financial burdens within the alliance.- Trade tensions with the EU: The EU and its member states treat economic relations with the U.S. unfairly. European business regulations, including tax policies, disadvantage American companies, particularly in the tech sector, prompting Trump’s call for tariffs on European imports.- Criticism of the EU’s Green Deal: Labeling it as a “new green scam”, Trump emphasized that the U.S. would ramp up oil and gas production and expand power plant construction to become the “capital of artificial intelligence and cryptography”.- Oil prices and the Ukraine conflict: Trump suggested that lower oil prices from Saudi Arabia could help resolve the Ukraine conflict and urged Saudi leadership to take necessary steps, emphasizing their responsibility in the matter.- Tariffs on companies outsourcing production: Countries whose companies manufacture outside the U.S. will face tariffs to incentivize production relocation to American soil.- China's role in Ukraine: Trump called on China to support ending the Ukraine conflict, while stating his own efforts to mediate a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine.- U.S. domestic policy shift: A large-scale deregulation program is underway in the U.S., including tax cuts and potential elimination of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, which Trump views as discriminatory.Trump’s speech elicited mixed reactions among forum participants. His focus on protectionist policies and sharp criticism of international partners raised concerns about potential consequences for the global economy, particularly among European attendees. Additionally, his stance signaled an escalation in the strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing, which is expected to play out through potential trade conflicts, tensions in the South and East China Seas, continued arms sales to Taiwan, and other geopolitical developments. The Europe Factor   At Davos, Europe is traditionally represented by the European Union, with the United States as its primary political and economic partner. Ursula von der Leyen, re-elected as President of the European Commission and beginning her new term on December 1, 2024, addressed the forum on January 21. Her speech largely responded to challenges outlined by Donald Trump before the WEF began, setting out the EU’s key priorities for the coming years: overcoming economic stagnation, enhancing competitiveness, and further integrating the single market across all 27 member states. A central theme of her address was the “Competitiveness Compass” initiative, first introduced in late 2024. This strategy, shaped by recommendations from Mario Draghi’s influential report, aims to drive economic reform and growth within the EU. The European Commission planned to unveil the full document by the end of January. At Davos, Ursula von der Leyen effectively introduced the concept of “Europe United” as a counterbalance to “America First” and cautioned the U.S. against igniting a trade war with the European Union. She emphasized the importance of early engagement and dialogue on shared interests, stating: “Our priority will be to initiate discussions as early as possible, focusing on common interests and readiness for negotiations. We will be pragmatic, but we will always adhere to our principles. Protecting our interests and defending our values is the European way”. At the same time, the European Commission president highlighted the high level of interdependence between the European and American economic models. She underscored that the era of global cooperation has given way to intense geostrategic competition, stating: “The world's largest economies are competing for access to raw materials, new technologies, and global trade routes—from artificial intelligence to clean technologies, from quantum computing to space, from the Arctic to the South China Sea. The race is on”. Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (ECB) emphasized that Brussels must be prepared for U.S. trade tariffs which are expected to be more “selective and targeted”, especially given the “existential crisis” facing the EU economy. She also noted that the ECB is not overly concerned about the impact of inflation from other countries, including the U.S., on the eurozone. The UK was also represented at Davos, with its delegation led by Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves. She used the trip primarily to promote Britain’s economic landscape, focusing on the country’s political and economic stability, its business-friendly environment, and recent government efforts to reduce regulatory barriers—all under the central message: “Now is the time to invest in Britain”. However, the extent to which this narrative aligns with reality remained beyond the scope of the Forum. The true assessment was left to the executives of major corporations with whom Reeves held meetings, including JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs, discussing investment opportunities in the UK's infrastructure and green projects. Additionally, the UK delegation engaged in negotiations aimed at restoring and strengthening ties with sovereign wealth funds and private investors from the U.S. and the Gulf states. The Ukraine Factor Due to the ongoing Ukraine conflict, Davos once again served as a prelude to the Munich Security Conference, which traditionally takes place in early February in Bavaria. While the war and Donald Trump’s influence shaped many discussions, Ukraine was not the central focus of the forum, resulting in a somewhat reduced emphasis compared to previous years. Ukraine’s interests at the World Economic Forum (WEF) were primarily represented by V.Zelensky, who took it upon himself to “educate” European politicians and “interpret” the signals previously sent by Donald Trump. His focus was on defense spending, emphasizing that a significant portion should go toward supporting the Kyiv regime, the presence of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory, and the need for “real security guarantees”. In the first days after taking office, the U.S. president made several key clarifications regarding his previously stated 24-hour timeline for resolving the Ukraine conflict — this period has now been significantly extended. The reason lies in the fact that, regardless of the revocation of Zelensky’s well-known decree, Ukraine must have a head of state authorized to negotiate and officially confirm any agreements or their outcomes. As of late January, no such figure was present in Kyiv, and Washington is aware of this reality. Switzerland, while emphasizing its neutral status (despite being designated by Russia as an “unfriendly state”), consistently maintains that it provides Ukraine only humanitarian aid and diplomatic support at Kyiv’s request. At the 2024 WEF, the well-known Bürgenstock Conference was announced, which later took place in the summer. However, in 2025, no similarly large-scale initiatives were introduced. Nevertheless, discussions at the Forum once again touched on the possibility of granting Switzerland the right to represent Kyiv’s interests on the international stage. Additionally, it was reported that a Swiss-Ukrainian memorandum was signed, with Ukrainian Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko representing Kyiv. The agreement focuses on the participation of Swiss private businesses in Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts. V.Zelensky used Davos as an opportunity to meet with world leaders, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who had recently blocked additional aid to Ukraine. However, his main competitor in Germany’s upcoming snap Bundestag elections, Friedrich Merz, was more open to the idea of support, and Zelensky also held a discussion with him. Both meetings were held behind closed doors, and no details were disclosed. Meanwhile, German Green Party leader Robert Habeck managed to avoid an impromptu conversation with Zelensky, who had attempted to engage with him on the spot. At a January 23 briefing, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova commented on V.Zelensky’s speeches at Davos 2025, describing them, among other things, as “narcotic madness”. The Germany Factor Germany, still holding its position as the political and economic leader of the European Union, was represented at Davos by key political heavyweights: Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Economy and Climate Protection Minister (and Vice-Chancellor) Robert Habeck, and CDU/CSU Chairman Friedrich Merz. All three have been selected by their respective parties as key candidates for chancellor in Germany’s snap Bundestag elections scheduled for February 23, 2025. Given this, it was no surprise that they used the Swiss platform as part of their election campaigns. The current head of the German government had an objective advantage: he delivered a keynote speech on behalf of Germany, in which he focused on the presence of traditional standard factors (the largest economy in the EU; efficient small, medium and large businesses; government support for investments; low level of government debt), which should help to overcome the crisis. Regarding the United States, he declared his interest in maintaining close relations with the new administration, but “without false fawning and servility”. D. Trump and his team, according to him, will keep the whole world on edge in the coming years, but the German leadership will be able to cope with this. O. Scholz's main message is that constructive European-American interaction “is of decisive importance for security throughout the world and is the engine of successful economic development”. It is noteworthy that there were many empty seats in the hall and after the Chancellor's speech there were no questions for him for a long time, which greatly surprised the moderator of the session, K. Schwab. O. Scholz's closest associate, Finance Minister J.Kukis, who was appointed to this position to replace K. Lindner, who was dismissed in early November 2024, was participating in the Forum. He was unable to provide any special pre-election support to his boss during the Forum, and did not distinguish himself in any special way. Incidentally, K. Lindner himself preferred to remain in Germany and continue to fight there for the votes of voters, which are extremely necessary for the liberals to overcome the five percent barrier and get into the Bundestag. F.Merz, who is very likely the future head of the German Cabinet, and his possible future deputy R. Habeck also sought to prove their chances of winning the elections during their speeches. O. Scholz and F.Merz organized meetings with leading representatives of German business, trying to show which of them understood their problems better and was ready to solve them constructively. Despite all their differences, they were united on one issue - the need to soften the provision on the “debt brake” enshrined in the Basic Law (Constitution) and increase support for entrepreneurs. External observers considered that F.Merz was more convincing, including regarding the transatlantic economic vector. R.Habeck unexpectedly engaged in self-criticism during the podium discussion, stating that he initially believed that the difficult economic situation in the country was due to a short-term cyclical crisis, but it turned out that this was a consequence of a long-term structural crisis. Such “self-education” of the minister cost Germany dearly. During the Forum (January 22) in the Bavarian town of Aschaffenburg, an Afghan refugee subject to deportation committed a crime, killing a child and an adult who was protecting him. This event pushed the issue of migration regulation to the top of the election campaign agenda. Unexpectedly, F.Merz found himself in a sticky situation, when his parliamentary request as the leading representative of the opposition in the current Bundestag for stricter controls at the external borders of the FRG could only count on success with the support of the unpopular Alternative for Germany and the center-left Sahra Wagenknecht Union. From Davos, Olaf Scholz traveled to Paris for a meeting with Emmanuel Macron. The French president was unable to attend the Forum due to domestic political circumstances and the need to manage the situation on the ground. The two leaders discussed the prospects for cooperation between their countries in strengthening their economic and political frameworks, as well as the European Union as a whole. None of the three key chancellor candidates managed to present a clear vision for Germany’s economic and political future, one that would be based on creativity, radical progress, technological breakthroughs, and prosperity—transforming the country into an innovation powerhouse not only for Europe but for the collective West as a whole. This means that Germany risks falling behind, failing to establish itself as an economic model capable of competing on equal terms with Donald Trump’s transforming North American economic space.Under Friedrich Merz, Olaf Scholz, and Robert Habeck, Germany faces the danger of remaining trapped in the past, relying too heavily on its post-war economic miracle—Made in Germany—which was achieved through the brilliance of ordoliberal economists and engineers. Davos 2025 made it clear that leaning solely on past achievements is no longer enough to drive a radical leap toward the future. If the German political elite, represented by the “handshake” established parties, remains in such reactionary positions in relation to the need for qualitative changes in economic policy, then the German standard will have no chance to take a leading place among the world's innovation locations. Here we will briefly indicate that, according to the estimates of the authors of the global risks report, the main ones for Germany are (in descending order): a shortage of highly qualified labor, recession / stagnation of the economy, illegal migration, disinformation, and a shortage of energy resources. They are the ones that largely determine the content of the current election campaign for the German parliament. The China Factor Among the political heavyweights representing the countries of the Global South at Davos 2025, the participation of the Chinese delegation, led by Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Ding Xuexiang, stands out. In his keynote speech, he emphasized Beijing's commitment to economic globalization, which is “not a zero-sum game, but a process of mutual benefit and common progress” and declared that protectionism does not lead to success, and trade wars have no winners. Among the key messages were that China is economically attractive, does not seek a trade surplus, is ready to import more competitive and high-quality goods and services to achieve balanced trade, is open to investment from foreign companies, and is ready to solve problems faced by both domestic and foreign firms. While condemning protectionism, he emphasized the importance of multilateralism and the role of the UN. While mildly critical of the “new-old” US president, he never mentioned him by name. Ding repeatedly referred to Xi Jinping, including his initiatives on global development and security. As part of the Forum, Ding Xuexiang hosted a private luncheon with top global financiers and business leaders, including the CEOs of BlackRock, Bridgewater Associates, JPMorgan, Blackstone, and Visa. Discussions centered on China’s ongoing economic reforms, efforts to stabilize the real estate market, stimulate domestic demand, and attract foreign investment. Experts noted that global business leaders responded positively to Ding Xuexiang’s statements, signaling growing confidence in China’s economic direction. In general, he fulfilled the standard mission assigned to him: to increase the international community's confidence in China's economic policy and confirm its role as a key player in the global economy. At the same time, the Forum participants remained concerned about a slowdown in China's economic growth, especially in the context of a possible increase in tariffs by the United States. The Artificial Intelligence Factor One of the leitmotifs of the forum, along with rethinking economic growth, industrial development prospects, climate and restoring trust, were discussions on the rapid development of AI, its impact on the labor market, prospects and challenges associated with the integration of this technology into various sectors of the economy. Experts identified a few trends that will emerge by 2030. AI and automation will increase the demand of enterprises for specialists in the field of AI, big data analysis, digital marketing, and cybersecurity. About half of the current skills of such employees in these areas may become obsolete, which suggests the need for timely adaptation of secondary and higher education to such a challenge. Employees whose professions will become unclaimed due to automation, especially in traditional sectors, will have to undergo advanced training programs. Special attention in the expert sessions was given to the ethical aspects of AI application and the related problems of developing the necessary standards. Issues of international cooperation took an important place, including in the context of ensuring a fair distribution of the benefits of AI application, as well as minimizing the potential risks it generates for society (for example, possible discrimination and bias in algorithms, as well as the protection of users' personal data). In terms of geopolitical rivalry in the field of AI, the global race for leadership in this area, which has already begun between the United States, China and several EU countries, was discussed. Experts pointed out the concerns of the leaders of the latter regarding the need to strengthen the positions of European companies in this area. Strategies for government stimulation of innovation and support for businesses developing AI were discussed. In addition, the participants in the discussions considered the possibilities of using artificial intelligence technologies to achieve sustainable development goals, including combating climate change, improving healthcare and increasing resource efficiency. Examples of using AI to monitor the environment, optimize energy consumption, develop new methods of treating diseases, and improve various aspects of life were of interest. *** The World Economic Forum 2025 in Davos was predictably held under the sign of global challenges, the Ukraine conflict, and increased economic competition, set against the backdrop of geopolitical and geoeconomic changes. Børge Brende, summarizing the event, accurately noted that the current time is “a moment of serious consequences and uncertainties”. This is largely linked to the return of Donald Trump to the White House. At the Forum, the United States’ priorities in strengthening national interests were outlined, including the goal of reducing import flows. This move drew criticism from the European Union and other participants, who expressed growing concerns about the escalation of trade conflicts and the fragmentation of the global economy. The President of the European Commission highlighted the prospects for strengthening the EU’s competitiveness and increasing its independence, considering the intensifying rivalry between the American and Chinese economic spheres. In this regard, representatives of China advocated for reducing trade tensions and strengthening regional alliances, while Germany emphasized the current risks facing its economic standard, outlining the difficulties of finding ways to minimize them. The Ukrainian conflict once again became one of the central topics, but with the formal support of the leaders of the collective West, delegations from the global South showed a restrained reaction to V.Zelensky's speech and messages. Discussions about AI became quite meaningful. Overall, Davos 2025 and its participants confirmed the important role of the WEF as a platform for discussing global challenges and finding constructive answers to them. The need for collective efforts to solve the most pressing issues was noted. One of B. Borge's final messages: the only way to achieve progress in solving global problems is to work together and “find solutions that will make the world a better place”. It is evident that Russia could have significantly contributed to enhancing the effectiveness of this approach.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The social dimension of the Alliance The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the organization created by the signatory states of the Washington Treaty to achieve the goals set by the Alliance, is an institution characteristic of the democratic realm, where governments depend on their respective public opinions when trying to establish a security policy. The people matter – and this is something we must keep in mind – when reflecting on their future. The simplest and most logical answer to the question posed in the title of this conference, the one that responds to common sense, is wherever its member states want. And this is the core of the problem. Do the allies have a common vision? Do they share interests as they did in 1949? Do they still believe they are a community united by their commitment to democracy? Is it reasonable to consider that they form a “collective defense system”? Without clearly answering these questions, it becomes very difficult to move forward with this analysis. We would be venturing into speculative territory. On the other hand, we cannot ignore reality, and this leads us to acknowledge that it is unlikely we will receive clear answers due to a set of considerations characteristic of the present time. The first refers to the lack of reliability of the State because of the high fragmentation of public opinion. Globalization and the Digital Revolution are causing social and economic changes that have led the population to distrust their political elites. Traditional parties are disappearing or losing seats, while new political forces emerge, questioning many of the paradigms we have been working with for years. The societies of the member states no longer have as clear a sense of the purpose of the Alliance as they did a decade ago, because there is confusion about what the actual risks, challenges, and threats they face are. The second is the absence of prominent figures with the authority to exercise leadership at the heads of the allied governments. We cannot ignore that in times of uncertainty, leadership is more necessary than ever, because in its absence, it becomes extremely difficult to shape a sufficiently common position among the citizens. The third is the empirical realization that the Alliance has not been able to manage the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine in a competent and professional manner. In the first case, the European allies decided to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty even though it wasn’t necessary, but wanting to show their solidarity with the state that had guaranteed their security for decades. However, on the battlefield, the vast majority shield themselves behind their ‘rules of engagement’ to avoid complicated situations. The goal was to comply with the United States more than to commit to victory. For its part, the United States was unable to maintain consistent objectives and strategy over time, which led to a humiliating defeat. What was the point of the waste of lives and money if, in the end, the same people returned to power? What was the point of the Alliance's technological superiority if it was defeated by poorly armed militias? In the second case, we have observed that despite the obvious incompetence of its armed forces, its limited capabilities, and its dire economic situation, Russia has managed to consolidate its control over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and continues to advance. For the average citizen, it is incomprehensible that, having committed ourselves to reclaim all Ukrainian sovereign territory and being much wealthier, our strategy has led Ukraine to the unfortunate situation it finds itself in. Why didn’t we offer them the weapons they needed from the very beginning? Why have we deprived them of the victory we formally committed to? The fourth is a derivative of the previous one. In this context, does it make sense for the citizen to trust the Alliance? Isn’t it understandable that they try to seek refuge within the national framework and fear that the Alliance, in the hands of unqualified people, will drag them into scenarios that are not critical to their lives? Whether we like it or not, the citizen's distrust in NATO is as justified as their intuition that only NATO can guarantee their security, which includes both their freedom and their well-being. What is the Alliance today? In circumstances as complex as those we are currently experiencing, it is virtually impossible for an organization composed of thirty-two member states to be a community committed to the defense and promotion of democracy. The mere reference to Turkey, Hungary, or Spain is proof of how far there are nations within it that are heading in a different direction. The evolution of European political systems points to a worsening of the situation rather than the exceptional nature of the mentioned cases. The community, as well as the idea that it constitutes a "collective defense system," falls within the realm of aspirations. The Alliance has been a “collective defense system,” and I have no doubt that there are allies who continue to act consistently with this idea. However, putting aside formalities, I believe that when assessing the transatlantic relationship, we must focus on its strict condition as an alliance. NATO is an asset that no one wants to lose, even though in its current state, it leaves much to be desired. Its strength does not lie in the common perception of the threat, the solidarity of its members, the available capabilities, or in sharing a strategy, which is clearly nonexistent. What makes its members want to keep it alive is the accumulated legacy after 75 years of shared experiences and the deep sense of insecurity in the face of the dual realization of a world undergoing profound change and poorly prepared national defenses from any point of view. Outside the Alliance, it’s even colder. NATO provides us with a starting point to try to react collectively, knowing that, in reality, except for the United States, no member state has the critical size to act as a "strategic actor." We have a history, an institutional framework, civilian and military bodies, doctrines, resources... that allow us to try to adapt without having to start from scratch. The European Perspective In recent years, the European states that are members of the Alliance have experienced the contrast between the claim that the European Union should assume the role of a "strategic actor" and the harsh, relentless reality of its impotence to effectively and competently address the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. In parallel, they have shifted from contempt for the United States, due to its erratic foreign policy and its inability to successfully complete its foreign initiatives, to seeking shelter once again under its military strength, considering the evidence of their own inability to understand international politics and act accordingly. It seems beyond doubt that the dynamics of the European integration process are heading towards the establishment of a federation. The transfer of sovereignty represented by the single currency was a milestone, marking the creation of "political Europe" through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, we are moving toward a single fiscal policy, with banking union, European monetary fund... ultimately towards the consolidation of an economic and monetary policy. Such significant common economic interests demand both a shared legal framework and a unified foreign policy. However, the factor of time plays a fundamental role. The passing of generations has allowed us to make progress, overcoming nationalist prejudices. Despite the formidable progress made, which is easily reflected in the recognition by young people that we live in a common cultural environment, the reality is that we are still far from forming what Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón referred to decades ago as a "European people." One thing is to delegate certain public policies to European institutions, and another, undoubtedly very different, is the exercise of actions that are characteristically sovereign. History and geography matter, and we must acknowledge that we have not yet formed that continental identity that would allow us to credibly face the formidable challenge of establishing a common foreign policy. The advantages of planning together and having the same capabilities are obvious, but above all, what matters is its viability. The Union is still not in a position to replace American leadership. This humbling realization transforms into a flow of energy in favor of the Alliance, assuming as inevitable the implementation of changes that allow it to adapt to a new international environment. For years, we have been aware that the Washington Treaty, and especially its Article 5, are anachronistic. The emergence of new domains – space, cyber, and cognitive – and the development of hybrid strategies challenge some of its foundations. Even so, we try to adapt without facing a reform of the treaty, in an exercise of understandable but risky caution. We are aware that the European theater is no longer the same as it was in 1949, that globalization and the "competition among great powers" in the race to win the "Digital Revolution" have shaped a considerably different scenario that we must integrate into, but we feel dizzy at the thought of leaving our own geographic zone, when we are not even in a position to effectively address our own problems. The American Perspective Since the creation of the United States, American society has lived with the contradiction between its isolationist vocation and its dependence on foreign trade. It fears becoming involved in the affairs of others at a high cost. However, the commercial dimension of its economy demands freedom of navigation, legal security, access to raw materials, and the ability to penetrate other markets, conditions that lead to an international role. From the First and Second World Wars, they learned that it was impossible to turn their back on what was happening in other countries, that they had to commit to international security, trying to establish an order that would guarantee their national interests. After years of involvement in international conflicts that seemed to have no end, isolationist and nationalist sentiment has grown, as a classic pendulum effect. In this context, it is understandable that the public debate openly questions its presence in the Atlantic Alliance. Is NATO a guarantee of the security of the United States? In the years immediately preceding the Madrid Summit, it was evident that the Alliance lacked a threat to unite it, a strategy to guide its steps, and capabilities that would allow it to carry out combined activities. It should therefore come as no surprise that since the second term of the Bush Administration, statements from senior officials have been warning of the dangerous drift of the Organization or threatening its withdrawal. There has been much talk about the low defense spending by many of the European allies. It is evident that without investment, there is no modernization, and without it, there is a technological disconnect that prevents the joint action of the armed forces of the different member states. However, what is truly concerning is what this implies in terms of abuse and disregard towards the United States. Hence, the heated reactions we receive from the other side. It is indecent that we spend on welfare, reaching levels that are unattainable for the average American, while we let them bear the cost of our security, both in economic terms and in human lives. As grave as, or even more than, the lack of investment is the absence of a shared vision and strategy, but it is understandable that the debate has focused on investment, an instrumental element. For European allies, increasing defense spending under the current economic circumstances will be as difficult as it is painful, but it will not be any less difficult or painful to reach an agreement that gives meaning to NATO's existence in the coming years. One of the few consensuses in the Capitol is to consider China as its main rival, around which all its economic, foreign, and defense policies revolve. In the Strategic Concept approved in Madrid, we can read that China is a “systemic challenge” for all of us. What policy have we derived from this categorical statement? Is there an Atlantic vision on this? It is hard to imagine that the Alliance can have a future if the states on both sides of the Atlantic do not reach a common position on how to engage with the great Asian power. In the same document, we find the statement that Russia is a “threat,” which does not align with statements from American leaders of both parties, though more from the Republican side than the Democratic one. It is neither acceptable nor responsible that, after the approval of such an important document, just two and a half years later, the United States acts as if the problem is not theirs. Putting formal aspects aside, is Russia a threat to the United States? To what extent does the behavior of the Moscow government in Eastern Europe affect U.S. national interests? Does it make sense for the United States to get involved in the war in Ukraine? Was Biden's behavior a reflection of a Cold War veteran, detached from the international circumstances of today? The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance was not the result of U.S. leaders in the early postwar years being convinced that the Soviet Union posed a threat to their national interests. On the contrary, they were fully aware that it did not. What concerned them was the extreme weakness of the European states, ravaged by a brutal war, the absence of a democratic culture, the high risk of totalitarian currents feeding off misery and uncertainty, and leading the Old Continent to a Third World War. European governments felt Soviet pressure. The area occupied by the Red Army was experiencing the extermination of representative institutions, Germany was torn between neutrality and partition, communist parties were gaining parliamentary positions in significant countries like France and Italy, supported by the prestige earned in the Resistance. For U.S. analysts, the European perception of the Soviet threat was exaggerated, but its effects could be concerning. The United States chose to engage in European reconstruction to prevent its drift towards fragmentation and totalitarianism, as the consequences of this drift could directly affect their national interests. They established a comprehensive strategy based on two pillars, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance. NATO has been and continues to be an instrument to guarantee cohesion and democracy on the Old Continent. The second Trump administration must resolve the tension between the isolationist demand of the citizenry, the need to create jobs on domestic soil through the erection of tariff barriers, the necessity of securing supply and distribution chains, and the consolidation of alliances or understandings between different regional blocs in response to Chinese initiatives. It is a set of contradictory actions wrapped in the populist demagoguery characteristic of our time, but which will require decisions in times marked by a succession of crises. Time for decisions An organization inhabited by officials does not need meaning to continue functioning. From 9 AM to 5 PM, qualified staff will move papers from one office to another, showcasing their professionalism and operational efficiency. However, it is important not to confuse NATO with the Alliance. The latter does need meaning, which is now in question. Whether we like it or not, the coming years will be crucial for its future. We will witness how the decisions made regarding a set of circumstances and debates will ultimately determine it, as well as the link between the two shores of the Atlantic. As happened at its origin, that link will go far beyond security, which is instrumental in consolidating that community which was the original aspiration and is now marked by its absence. The war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the central issue in the transatlantic relationship, as it brings to the negotiation table many of the fundamental issues that question its very existence. We are facing a continental conflict that arises after a Russian diplomatic attempt to reach an agreement on a new balance of power. Moscow's proposal demanded the withdrawal of U.S. units from areas bordering its territory and the removal of its nuclear weapons stationed in the Old Continent. Putin’s government felt threatened by NATO and the European Union's eastward expansion and demanded compensation. When it was not granted, it launched its third campaign on Ukraine and its fifth on territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. This is not a campaign that can be understood in a bilateral Russia-Ukraine logic, but rather as part of an effort by a revived Russian imperialism to reconstitute its historical sphere of influence. This invasion is not the first, and unless the Alliance acts wisely, it will not be the last. The role played by the Europeans has been disappointing. Their response to previous aggressions – Moldova, Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas – was the perfect example of how supposedly educated elites learn nothing from history. The French, Germans, and Italians collectively made the same mistakes as Chamberlain in Munich, thinking that the aggressor would be satisfied by acknowledging their right to aggression, when, in reality, they were encouraging them to proceed and prepare for new expansionist ventures. This attitude provoked the logical irritation and distrust in the Slavic-Scandinavian space, which was never deceived by the ongoing process under the Russian government. These powers refused to believe U.S. intelligence warnings about Russia's willingness to invade and reacted too late and poorly. All this, combined with the old problem of lack of investment in defense, made European armed forces ineffective and their industry powerless in responding to a demand for military capabilities in a short period of time. If the Europeans do not take their defense seriously, if they have become accustomed to parasitizing U.S. leadership, the frustration of their elites with their European allies is understandable. The Biden administration tried to use the Ukraine War to reconstitute the Alliance, but the strategy of attrition applied, renouncing victory out of fear of its political and military consequences, has led to a very high number of Ukrainian casualties and to public fatigue, which, following the Russian plan, is pushing through new political formations from both the right and the left to reach an unfeasible understanding with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. In the new international scenario, characterized by competition among great powers to achieve technological hegemony within the framework of the Digital Revolution, the United States needs Europe as much as Europe needs the United States. Russia does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, but it has become a vassal of China and an instrument of Beijing to weaken the cohesion of the Western bloc. The Trump administration must not fall into the temptation of turning its back on its allies, no matter how irresponsible and incompetent they may be, as this would cede ground to the rival. An even more protectionist policy could push European states, if not the Union itself, to seek alternative markets in China. A policy of greater withdrawal would encourage both division among continental powers and the pursuit of a middle ground between the two superpowers. What is at stake is much more than tariffs or investment in defense. What we will decide soon is whether we are a community or not, whether we face the challenges of a new era together, or if we choose separation. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States has valuable allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the Slavic and Scandinavian blocs. Attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine War could mean a victory for Russia by recognizing its right to alter Europe's borders by force, and the loss of trust from these allies, who are aware that even Trump would have fallen into the Munich trap, and despite his brash rhetoric, he would have ended up playing Chamberlain’s role. This would be a grave mistake for the United States, which, on the contrary, should rely on these countries to contain Russian expansionism and send a very clear message to Beijing about its commitment to updating and maintaining the cohesion of the Western community. Such an update would require allies, this time for real, to commit to defense investment and be prepared to use their capabilities when necessary. The Alliance needs a strategy. The concept approved in Madrid was merely the political framework to develop it. It is up to the Trump administration to lead its development in order to ultimately agree on what to do about the "Russian threat" and the "systemic challenge" posed by China. The Middle East crisis is unfolding in a scenario defined by two fronts established after years of diplomatic work: the "Abraham Accords" and the Axis of Resistance. Hamas’ aggression towards Israel has materialized in a harsh military campaign in the Gaza Strip, which has severely damaged the political and military capabilities of the Islamist group, and has extended to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is also suffering a heavy blow. In addition, Iran has seen its defense industry, anti-aircraft artillery systems, and, more limitedly, its nuclear network has suffered significant damage, while its intelligence system has been humiliated and degraded. In this context, despite the damage suffered by the Gazan population, the block formed by the Abraham Accords has remained cohesive, aware of Hamas' blackmail and the cost of yielding to it. On the other hand, Europe has presented itself as divided, lacking a strategic vision, not understanding that this was not a problem between Israelis and Palestinians, but an instrumental conflict aimed at undermining the regimes of Arab countries not aligned with the Axis of Resistance. Its criticism of Israel for the effects of its military campaign on the Gazan population consciously ignored both Hamas’ responsibility in turning them into human shields and the cost that accepting Hamas' blackmail would have had for all of us — Arabs, Israelis, and Europeans — if the campaign had not continued. How is it possible that we have so easily forgotten how the Axis powers were defeated? What would have happened in Europe during WWII if we had followed the European Union's demands during the Gaza War? The Middle East is a critical space for the Atlantic Alliance. It is understandable that the United States is frustrated with many of its European allies who, once again, have acted in a frivolous and irresponsible manner, unable to think in strategic terms. Israel has long chosen to turn its back on Europe, in response to a behavior it associates with a new form of anti-Semitism. The Arab bloc appreciates the European sensitivity to the suffering of the Gazan or Lebanese people, but it seeks security under the umbrella of the United States and Israel in the face of the Axis of Resistance, which poses a challenge of internal subversion, asymmetric warfare, and nuclear threat. A renewed Alliance needs to establish a strategy for the MENA region focused on containing Islamism and consolidating moderate regimes. China and Russia are taking advantage of the instability to infiltrate and hinder our missions. For them, instability on our southern front is a strategic objective, one that would fuel migration and insecurity, and with them, division within the Alliance and the Union. The Arab-Israeli bloc distrusts the United States due to its inability to maintain a strategy over time and does not rely on the Europeans. Only a firm stance from the Alliance in favor of this group of countries and against the Axis of Resistance could overcome this situation and guarantee both the cohesion of the Alliance and its authority in the region. The circumstances that led to the creation of the Alliance are behind us. They are history. However, today the Alliance is more necessary than ever. The circumstances have changed, but the community of values and interests remains the same, even though not everyone may understand this. Dissolving this community would be a grave mistake that would only benefit those powers whose goal is nothing more than to "revise" our legacy. Reviving it will not be easy. It will require political awareness and high-level diplomacy. Challenges that are impossible to achieve without leadership that matches the times. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump has sparked diplomatic controversy by suggesting the U.S. needs to acquire Greenland for reasons of “national security” and refusing to definitively rule out using military force to do so. Greenland, a self-governing Danish territory, “is not for sale,” said Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen. Trump’s interest in Greenland is not new. He first expressed interest in the territory in 2019, but it never developed into any action. Whether or not Trump has actual plans this time around to advance any attempt in Washington to own Greenland is far from clear. But given the incoming president’s repeated statements and invocation of national security, it’s worth considering what strategic value Greenland might actually have from the perspective of the U.S.’s geopolitical priorities. As a scholar of geopolitical conflicts involving natural resources and the Arctic, I believe Greenland’s value from an international political perspective can be viewed in terms of four fundamental areas: minerals, military presence, Arctic geopolitics and the territory’s potential independence. A matter of minerals Greenland’s most valuable natural resources lie with its vast mineral wealth, which holds real potential to advance its economy. Identified deposits include precious metals such as gold and platinum, a number of base metals – zinc, iron, copper, nickel, cobalt and uranium – and rare earth elements, including neodymium, dysprosium and praseodymium. A detailed 2023 summary published by the Geologic Survey of Denmark and Greenland suggests new deposits will be found with the continued retreat of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Greenland’s rare earth resources are particularly significant. These elements are essential not only to battery, solar and wind technology but also to military applications. If fully developed, the Kvanefjeld – or Kuannersuit in Greenlandic – uranium and rare earth deposit would place Greenland among the top producers worldwide. During the 2010s, Greenland’s leaders encouraged interest from outside mining firms, including leading Chinese companies, before finally granting a lease to the Australian company Energy Transition Minerals (formerly Greenland Minerals Ltd). When China’s Shenghe Resources took a major share in Energy Transition Minerals, it raised red flags for Denmark, the European Union and the U.S., which felt China was seeking to expand its global dominance of the rare earth market while reducing Europe’s own potential supply. The issue was put to rest in 2021 when Greenland’s parliament banned all uranium mining, killing further development of Kvanefjeld for the time being. That same year saw the government also prohibit any further oil and gas activity. Predictably, a majority of mining companies have subsequently steered clear of Greenland due to perceived concern of any investment being jeopardized by future political decisions. Fears of China abroad China’s interest in Greenland stretches back at least a decade. In 2015, Greenland Minister of Finance and Interior Vittus Qujaukitsoq visited China to discuss possible investment in mining, hydropower, port and other infrastructure projects. One firm, China Communications Construction Company, bid to build two airports, one in the capital, Nuuk, the other in Ilulissat. Another Chinese firm, General Nice Group, offered to purchase an abandoned Danish naval base in northeastern Greenland, while the Chinese Academy of Sciences asked to build a permanent research center and a satellite ground station near Nuuk. None of this sat well with the first Trump administration, which put pressure on Denmark to convince Greenland’s government that a significant, official Chinese presence on the island was unwanted. The Danes and Greenlanders complied, rebuffing Chinese attempts to invest in Greenland-based projects. The Trump administration, in particular, viewed China’s interest in Greenland as having hidden commercial and military motives, concerns that continued under the Biden administration in its recent lobbying of another Australian mining firm not to sell any of its Greenland assets to Chinese companies. Long-standing US interest The U.S. has had a long-standing security interest in Greenland dating from 1946, when it offered Denmark US$100 million in gold bullion for it. The Danes politely but firmly declined, with their foreign minister saying he didn’t feel “we owe them the whole island.” In the early 1950s, the U.S built Thule Air Force Base 750 miles (about 1,200 kilometers) north of the Arctic Circle. Originally a missile early warning and radio communications site, it was transferred to the newly formed U.S. Space Force in 2020 and renamed Pituffik Space Base in 2023.   The northernmost military facility of the U.S., Pituffik has updated radar and tracking capabilities to provide missile warning, defense and space surveillance, and satellite command missions. While it also supports scientific research focused on the Arctic, the base is intended to increase military capabilities in the Arctic region for both the U.S. and its allies. The base has the ability to track shipping as well as air and satellite positions, giving it both real and symbolic importance to American strategic interests in the Arctic. As a result, much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, not just those in Trump’s orbit, view any notable Chinese presence in Greenland, whether temporary or permanent, with concern. Geopolitics of the Arctic Greenland is geographically situated between the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, two Arctic shipping routes whose importance is growing as sea ice shrinks. By around 2050, a Transpolar Sea Route is likely to open through the central Arctic Ocean, passing Greenland’s eastern shores. Furthermore, the island is the basis of Denmark’s sovereignty claim to the North Pole – rivaled by claims by Russia and Canada. While international law recognizes no national sovereignty in international waters, that has done little to end the diplomatic tug-of-war over the pole. The matter is far from trivial: Sovereignty would give a country access to potentially significant oil, gas and rare earth resources, as well as superior scientific and military access to the future Transpolar Sea Route. Yet, this dispute over ownership of the North Pole is only one part of the geopolitical struggle for offshore territory in the region. Russia’s growing militarization of its enormous coastal area has been countered by NATO military exercises in northern Scandinavia, while China’s own moves into the Arctic, aided by Moscow, has seen the launch of several research stations supported by icebreakers and agreements for research and commercial projects. China’s government has also asserted it has rights in the region, for navigation, fishing, overflight, investment in oil and gas projects, and more. Greenland for Greenlanders? All of these factors help decipher the realities involved in the U.S.-Denmark-Greenland relationship. Despite Trump’s words, I believe it is extremely unlikely he would actually use U.S. military force to take Greenland, and it’s an open question whether he would use coercive economic policies in the form of tariffs against Denmark to give him leverage in negotiating a purchase of Greenland. Yet while Trump and other foreign policy outsiders view Greenland through an external strategic and economic lens, the island is home to nearly 60,000 people – 90% of them indigenous Inuit – many of whom treat the designs of foreign nations on their territory with skepticism. Indeed, in 2008, Greenland voted to pursue nationhood. The island receives an annual subsidy of 500 million euros ($513 million) from Denmark, and to further economic independence, it has sought foreign investment. Interest from China has accompanied Greenland’s moves toward independence, backed by Beijing’s strategy to be an Arctic player. The thinking in Beijing may be that an independent Greenland will be less shackled to NATO and the European Union, and as such, more open to investment from further afield. Ironically, Trump’s recent comments have the potential of achieving something very different than their aim by encouraging Greenland’s prime minister, Mute Egede, to propose a referendum in 2025 on full independence. “It is now time for our country to take the next step,” he said. “We must work to remove … the shackles of colonialism.”

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Paris Agreement will be ten years old in 2025. It is a good opportunity, then, to reassess the feasibility of its long-term goals and understand what they mean for the current and for the next generations. In a very optimistic scenario, if the goals of the Paris Agreement are achieved, the climate crisis will have been solved by the end of the 21st century. In the meantime, though, the crisis will worsen, as temperature overshoot is very likely to occur by the middle of the century. During the overshoot period, our planet’s average temperature exceeds 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, which is the threshold proposed by the Paris Agreement. At the end of the overshoot period, which could last from one to several decades, the temperature will begin to fall until it eventually stabilises at 1.5°C at the turn of the century (IPCC 2023, 1810). Expectedly, the success of the Paris Agreement would greatly benefit the “post-overshoot generation”, namely the generation that will live in the first half of the 22nd century. But to ensure the success of the Paris Agreement, the generation that will live in the overshoot period – the “overshoot generation” – will have to remove an enormous amount of GHG (Greenhouse Gases) from the atmosphere. For now, though, it is unclear whether CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technologies will be available at a scale that might enable the overshoot generation to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. To aggravate the problem, the overshoot generation will also probably have to rely on as-yet untested geoengineering technologies to promote their own survival. As we can see, conflicting interests of three different generations are at stake here, namely: (1) the interests of the current generation, (2) those of the overshoot generation, and (3) the interests of the post-overshoot generation. Given the unequal distribution of power across generations (Gardiner 2011, 36), it is likely that the current generation will tend to further their own interest to the detriment of the overshoot generation, even if, in the end, the climate policies enforced by the current generation do indeed fulfil the interests of the post-overshoot generation. The best possible world is one in which the goals of the Paris Agreement are achieved. Yet, depending on the choices that we make today, the best possible world could also mean the worst possible world that human beings will ever have met on our planet. That will be the fate of the overshoot generation, squeezed between the self-serving policies of the current generation and the climate hopes of the post-overshoot generation. The implications for international relations are momentous, as we intend to show in this article. Possible pathways The Paris Agreement did not establish a concrete deadline for the achievement of the goals set out in Article 2, namely: Maintain the increase in the global average temperature well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and make efforts to limit this temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognising that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. The scientific community generally understands that the Paris Agreement aims at climate stabilization at the end of the 21st century. There are two main reasons for this. The first is a constraint imposed by our planet’s climate system. The second is a constraint imposed by agreed upon principles of justice. As for the first reason, we have to bear in mind that an immediate reduction of GHG emissions would not be followed by an immediate decline of global temperature (Dessler 2016, 91). Even if all countries decided to eliminate their respective emissions today, the global temperature would continue to rise for several decades, until it begins to recede and stabilises at the turn of the century. As for the second reason, the Paris Agreement assumed that developing countries could not immediately reduce their own emissions without compromising their own development and the prospect of eradicating poverty. Thus, the Paris Agreement also established in Article 4 that each country could continue to emit GHG until their respective emissions peaked as soon as possible. After peaking, emissions should be rapidly reduced. Thus, the attempt to achieve the goals set out in Article 2 well before the end of the 21st century might turn out to prove inconsistent with the reality of our planet’s climate system and unfair towards developing countries. The problem, however, is that the Paris Agreement did not establish a specific pathway for the achievement of its long-term goals (Figure 1). There is, indeed, a multitude of pathways, but many (if not most) of them involve an overshoot period (Geden and Löschel 2017, 881; Schleussner et al. 2016). And as there are “different interpretations for limiting global warming to 1.5°C”, there emerges the question, then, as to which interpretation could do justice to the conflicting claims of the three different generations considered as a whole, namely the claims of the current generation, those of the overshoot generation, and the claims of the post-overshoot generation (Figure 2). There has been much discussion now on the concept of a “just transition”. But this debate has focused entirely on the claims that the members of the current generation can raise against each other, and not on claims that could be raised – or presumed – across the three generations referred to above. The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Glossary from 2023, for instance, contains a specific entry on this topic: “Just transitions. A set of principles, processes and practices that aim to ensure that no people, workers, places, sectors, countries or regions are left behind in the transition from a high-carbon to a low carbon economy” (IPCC 2023, 1806). The IPCC entry ends with some considerations regarding past generations: “Just transitions may embody the redressing of past harms and perceived injustices”. Interestingly, though, the entry says nothing about the normative implications of a just transition for future generations. A 2023 United Nations document defines the concept of just transition along similar lines (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2023, 3, 12–13). But, again, it understands “just transition” in terms of claims that stakeholders within the current generation, whether at national or international level, can raise against each other. As for the international level, the United Nations document makes the following statement concerning the concept of just transition as applied to international relations: “As countries pick up the pace of their climate change mitigation strategies, it is critical that developed countries do not transfer the burden of the transition onto developing countries” (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2023, 8). The problem, however, is that, as a matter of justice, it is equally critical that the current generation does not transfer the burden of the transition onto the overshoot generation, even if that burden, in the end, turns out to benefit the post-overshoot generation. Such an unequal distribution of burdens across three generations would certainly conflict with the requirements of intergenerational justice (Moellendorf 2022, 161–70; Meyer 2021). Overshoot generation and retroactive mitigation One might perhaps argue that no extra burden is being imposed on the overshoot generation, for the current generation is already having to face challenges that the overshoot generation, supposedly, will not have to face. The overshoot generation, one might suggest, will inherit from the current generation all the benefits resulting from the energy transition, but without having to bear the costs that the transition imposes on the current generation. The idea here is that by the middle of this century global emissions will have already peaked and will be declining at an accelerated pace, towards stabilisation at 1.5°C above the pre-industrial level at the end of this century. Thus, the overshoot generation can arguably reap the benefits of green energy, as long as the current generation remains free, at least for the time being, to emit GHG further, which is necessary to finance the human and technological development that the overshoot generation will need later. This claim, however, overlooks a crucial fact about the climate crisis – a fact that has not been given due attention in the public debate on climate policies. In a very optimistic scenario, the overshoot generation will not have the burden of reducing their own emissions because they will be able to rely on carbon-free energy. The problem, however, is that the overshoot generation will still have to retroactively mitigate the emissions of previous generations – including, of course, the emissions of the current generation. We call this process “retroactive mitigation”, for what is at stake here is not reduction and phasing out of one’s own emissions, but the removal of massive amounts of GHG, which previous generations failed to mitigate in the past. In a 2014 report, the IPCC realised that simply reducing GHG emissions would no longer be enough to preclude irreversible climate change. Removal of GHG would also be necessary (IPCC 2014, 12). The IPCC called attention to yet another problem: it was unclear whether CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technologies, including DAC (Direct Air Capture), could be deployed on a global scale in time to avoid a climate disaster. In a 2018 report, the IPCC was even less confident about the future development and scaling-up of CCS technologies (IPCC 2018, 136). To make matters worse, two further factors must be taken into consideration. (1) Recent studies show that there are practically no pathways left for the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals without the massive deployment of CCS (Smith et al. 2023). And (2) it has become increasingly probable that the overshoot generation will also have to deploy geoengineering technologies to cope with ever more frequent heatwaves (Moellendorf 2022, 161–70). It could perhaps be argued that afforestation and preservation of existing forests could be used instead of CCS technologies. However, the amount of land and water that would be necessary for the creation of new forests is probably larger than the amount of land and water available. Moreover, the attempt to create new forests on such a large scale might compromise the water and food security that the overshoot generation will need to promote their own climate adaptation (Shue 2017, 205). It is also necessary to take into account the amount of time new forests need to grow, not to mention the risk of fire. In this case, forests stop absorbing GHG and become GHG emitters themselves (Gatti et al. 2021). Implications for international relations In the aftermath of the Second World War, human being’s capacity to trigger catastrophic events at a global scale became increasingly apparent. As Garrett Hardin aptly put the problem in 1974: “No generation has viewed the problem of the survival of the human species as seriously as we have” (Hardin 1974b, 561). But while even realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau and John Herz argued for international cooperation in the face of global threats, Hardin himself advanced what he called the “lifeboat ethics”. According to Hardin, instead of engaging in international cooperation, richer states should behave like lifeboats and resist the temptation to help individuals from poorer states to cope with environmental disasters or famines. This, he argued, might undermine richer states’ capacity to secure their own survival (Hardin 1974a; 1974b). In his The Limits of Altruism: An Ecologist’s View of Survival from 1977, Hardin resumes his criticism of international cooperation to alleviate the plight of poorer states: We will do little good in the international sphere until we recognize that the greatest need of a poor country is not material: call it psychological, moral, spiritual, or what you will. The basic issue is starkly raised in a story of personal heroism that unfolded in South America a few years ago (Hardin 1977, 64). Hardin goes on to recall the 1972 Andes plane crash, turned into a feature film in 2023. Hardin suggests that the passengers who had survived the crash would not have taken the initiative to save their own lives had they not heard on the radio that the search efforts to rescue them had been called off. Hardin’s conclusion is this: “This true story, I submit, bears a close resemblance to the moral situation of poor countries. The greatest gift we can give them is the knowledge that they are on their own” (Hardin 1977, 65). Hardin, of course, does not take into consideration the extent to which richer states themselves may be responsible for the plight of poorer states. Hardin’s self-help approach to international relations is in line with political realism. But when major realist thinkers themselves addressed the question of human survival, around the same time Hardin advocated his lifeboat ethics, they came to entirely different conclusions. Authors such as Morgenthau and Herz realized that nation-states had become unable to protect their own citizens in the face of global catastrophes triggered by the depletion of the environment or the outbreak of a nuclear war. As Morgenthau put the problem in 1966: “No nation state is capable of protecting its citizens and their way of life against an all-out atomic attack. Its safety rests solely in preventing such an attack from taking place” (Morgenthau 1966, 9). In a 1976 article on the emergence of the atomic age, Herz made a similar point: “Nuclear penetrability had rendered the traditional nation-state obsolete because it could no longer fulfill its primary function, that of protection” (Herz 1976a, 101). Both Morgenthau and Herz argued for international cooperation – or perhaps even the dissolution of the system of states (Morgenthau 1978, 539) – as the better strategy to avert global catastrophic risks (Herz 1976a, 110; 1976b, 47). Herz later also theorized about the concept of “ecological threat” and argued for the development of a new interdisciplinary field, which he aptly named “survival studies” (Herz 2003; Seidel 2003; Laszlo and Seidel 2006, 2–3; Graham 2008; Stevens 2020). During the overshoot period, as heatwaves and other climate-related extreme events become more severe and frequent, people in poorer countries are likely to suffer the most. Mass migrations are likely to occur on an unprecedented scale (Vince 2022). Given the current popularity of anti-migration measures both in the United States and Europe, it is imaginable, then, that the lifeboat ethics will strike a chord with future conservative governments. That would be an error, for the assumption that governments will be protecting their own citizens by way of making their borders impenetrable to climate migrants is misleading. The “ecological threat” cannot be held back by higher walls. Lifeboat ethics will make everyone worse-off. Back in the 1960s, Martin Luther King may not have had climate change or mass migration in mind, but his words strike us as even more poignant now: “We may have all come on different ships, but we’re in the same boat now” (as quoted by former American President Barack Obama). There is only one boat, carrying three generations of hopeful passengers with equal legitimate claims to a better climate. It is a long journey. Let us not allow our only boat to go down. Final remarks The scenario in which the overshoot generation will have to live is not an encouraging one, but it is even less inhospitable than the scenario that the post-overshoot generation will have to face if the goals of the Paris Agreement are not met. It is up to the current generation to make sure that the overshoot period is as short as possible, and that the overshoot generation will not only be in a position to adapt to unprecedented climate scenarios in the history of human civilization, but also fulfil hopes of the post-overshoot generation. Figures Figure 1: Pathways compatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement (IPCC 2018, 62). FIGURE01  Figure 2: Pathways that would limit global warming to 1.5°C (IPCC 2018, 160).   Acknowledgements Marcelo de Araujo thanks Prof. Darrel Moellendorf for the invitation and the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation for the financial support. Support for this research has also been provided by the CNPq (The National Council for Scientific and Technological Development) and FAPERJ (Carlos Chagas Filho Research Support Foundation). An earlier draft of this article was presented at the University of Graz, Austria, Section for Moral and Political Philosophy, in 2024, with thanks to Prof. Lukas Meyer for the invitation. Pedro Fior Mota de Andrade benefited from financial supported provided by CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development). References Dessler, Andrew Emory. 2016. Introduction to Modern Climate Change. Second edition. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Gardiner, Stephen. 2011. A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gatti, Luciana V., Luana S. Basso, John B. Miller, Manuel Gloor, Lucas Gatti Domingues, Henrique L. G. Cassol, Graciela Tejada, et al. 2021. ‘Amazonia as a Carbon Source Linked to Deforestation and Climate Change’. Nature 595 (7867): 388–93. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-03629-6. Geden, Oliver, and Andreas Löschel. 2017. ‘Define Limits for Temperature Overshoot Targets’. Nature Geoscience 10 (12): 881–82. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-017-0026-z. Graham, Kennedy. 2008. ‘“Survival Research” and the “Planetary Interest”: Carrying Forward the Thoughts of John Herz’. International Relations 22 (4): 457–72. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117808097311. Hardin, Garrett James. 1974a. ‘Lifeboat Ethics: The Case against Helping the Poor’ 8 (September):38–43. ———. 1974b. ‘Living on a Lifeboat’. BioScience 24 (10): 561–68. ———. 1977. The Limits of Altruism: An Ecologist’s View of Survival. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Herz, John. 1976a. ‘Technology, Ethics, and International Relations’. Social Research 43 (1): 98–113. ———. 1976b. The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics: Essays on International Politics in the Twentieth Century. New York: D. McKay. ———. 2003. ‘On Human Survival: Reflections on Survival Research and Survival Policies’. World Futures 59 (3–4): 135–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/02604020310123. IPCC, ed. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change Working Group III Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. New York: Cambridge university press. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipcc_wg3_ar5_full.pdf. ———. 2018. ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty’. Edited by V Masson-Delmotte, P Zhai, HO Pörtner, D Roberts, J Skea, PR Shukla, A Pirani, et al. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. ———, ed. 2023. ‘Annex I: Glossary’. In Climate Change 2022 – Mitigation of Climate Change, 1st ed., 1793–1820. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.020. Laszlo, Ervin, and Peter Seidel, eds. 2006. Global Survival: The Challenge and Its Implications for Thinking and Acting. 1st ed. Change the World. New York: SelectBooks. Meyer, Lukas. 2021. ‘Intergenerational Justice’. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2021. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/justice-intergenerational/. Moellendorf, Darrel. 2022. Mobilizing Hope: Climate Change and Global Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press. Morgenthau, Hans. 1966. ‘Introduction’. In A Working Peace System, D. Mitrany, 7–11. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. ———. 1978. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred Knopf (Fifth Edition, Revised, 1978). Schleussner, Carl-Friedrich, Joeri Rogelj, Michiel Schaeffer, Tabea Lissner, Rachel Licker, Erich M. Fischer, Reto Knutti, Anders Levermann, Katja Frieler, and William Hare. 2016. ‘Science and Policy Characteristics of the Paris Agreement Temperature Goal’. Nature Climate Change 6 (9): 827–35. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3096. Seidel, Peter. 2003. ‘“Survival Research:” A New Discipline Needed Now’. World Futures 59 (3–4): 129–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/02604020310134. Shue, Henry. 2017. ‘Climate Dreaming: Negative Emissions, Risk Transfer, and Irreversibility’. Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 8 (2): 203–16. https://doi.org/10.4337/jhre.2017.02.02. Smith, Stephen, Oliver Geden, Gregory Nemet, Matthew Gidden, William Lamb, Carter Powis, Rob Bellamy, et al. 2023. ‘State of Carbon Dioxide Removal – 1st Edition’, January. https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/W3B4Z. Stevens, Tim. 2020. ‘Productive Pessimism: Rehabilitating John Herz’s Survival Research for the Anthropocene’. In Pessimism in International Relations: Provocations, Possibilities, Politics, edited by Tim Stevens and Nicholas Michelsen, 83–98. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, Springer Nature. United Nations Economic and Social Council. 2023. ‘Committee for Development Policy Report on the Twenty-Fifth Session (20–24 February 2023)’. Supplement No. 13 E/2023/33. Official Records. New York: United Nations. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/088/80/pdf/n2308880.pdf. Vince, Gaia. 2022. Nomad Century: How Climate Migration Will Reshape Our World. First U.S. edition. New York: Flatiron Books. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-N

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Less than a week away from the inauguration of Donald J. Trump as the 47th President of the United States of America, not only strategic allies and trading partners but also multilateral organisations and the UN system are bracing themselves for the certainty of unpredictability.  However, taking into consideration President Trump’s first term in office, his announcements on the campaign trail, his own personality, the nomination of personnel for positions of high relevance for the international system as well as the impact of the Republican trifecta and diminished checks and balances, a substantial re-positioning of the US within the international system can be expected.   The impact of the first Trump Administration Since the UN’s founding in 1945, the relationship between the US and the United Nations can at best be described as contradictory, which is largely the result of constant tensions between domestic considerations and foreign policy goals. As the leading advocate for a successor institution to the League of Nations, the US fundamentally shaped the objectives and values of the United Nations. This support, which had been driven by national interests, started to wane in the mid-70s when enlarged membership and the creation of the G77, a group of 77 developing countries, reduced US influence.  Although the US was a leading actor in the UN’s establishment, the UN has become a secondary platform of international cooperation. Various US administrations have engaged substantially with the UN system when it served national interests. However, domestic power constellations have frequently impeded any substantial engagement that has gone beyond financial contributions.1  However, Trump’s “America First” ideology stood out from his predecessors’ policies, and particularly conservative ones, in its obstructive approach to the United Nations and disdain towards institutions such as NATO, thus rebuking the closest allies of the US. Indifference and discord towards the United Nations not only damaged the institution but also the reputation of the US. President Trump’s unilateral “America First” policy and abject disregard for multilateral institutions damaged US legitimacy as a global leader and weakened the UN. Under Trump, the transactional nature of US engagement with the UN became obvious. As long as US interests were served, constructive engagement was applied.  US Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley even managed to gain the support of China and Russia on a Security Council Resolution (SC/RES/2397) that would impose harsh sanctions on North Korea (DPRK).2 However, in other areas the dominance of national interests guided US policies at the UN during the Trump administration. In showing its unconditional support for Israel, the Trump administration cut all of the US’s funding from the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and further reduced its potential role as mediator in the Middle East Peace Process.3 After accusing the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) of supporting coercive abortions and involuntary sterilisations in China without proof, the Trump administration cut all core funding for UNFPA and jeopardised many family planning programmes in developing countries.4 In the Security Council, the US position at times even aligned with Russia’s or China’s policy – particularly when other UNSC members tried to raise the nexus of climate change and security. This, as well as the US positions on the rights of victims of sexual violence in war and their reproductive health, further enhanced tensions with traditional Western allies. In addition, Trump withdrew the US from the Paris Climate Accords, the JCPOA5, the INF treaty6, and boycotted the UN Migration Pact7 negotiations.  However, the most obstructive political manoeuvres under President Trump have certainly been the scapegoating of the WHO and the labelling of the organisation as a Chinese puppet during the COVID-19 crisis, the suspension of funding for WHO, and the subsequent withdrawal from the UN body at the height of the pandemic. By doing so, the US squandered its reputation as a reliable partner and blocked any declaration by the UNSC on the pandemic for months.  Equally harmful was the US withdrawal from the UN Human Rights (HR) Council in 2018. Not only did the US abandon a platform for denouncing human rights violations worldwide, but its departure also allowed China to disseminate its own human rights narrative. Although autocratic regimes are regularly elected to the Council and use the opportunity to ensure their own HR violations are not addressed, the US withdrawal created a vacuum and took away a powerful ally for like-minded states, particularly the European Union (EU). In the HR Council, we see an increasingly assertive China, which previously only tried to shield its domestic situation from scrutiny, but which has now come up with its own interpretation of collective, developmental rights versus individual human rights. Swift action and a prepared agenda During his first term President Trump only slowly appointed key positions in foreign relations. It took him two years to appoint an Ambassador to Geneva, for example. His ambition to fundamentally cut financial support to the UN system found its limits in Congress. The US remained the world’s largest donor of development and humanitarian assistance. Even within in the Republican party and in conservative circles, particularly in the religious and evangelical constituencies the opinion prevailed that official development assistance still served the interests of the American people.  In January 2025, the situation is different. One of the first nominations of Donald Trump after his re-election in November has been Marco Rubio, as Secretary of State, and he appointed Republican Representative Elise Stefanik as his Ambassador to the United Nations in New York.  Senator Rubio has been known so far as a supporter of US global engagement as when it serves American economic interests and national security. He is hard on China and aims for more transparency and accountability in the aid sector. He supported the fight against Malaria and other preventable and treatable diseases in the past. Although a sigh of relief went through the development community when his name was circulated, it cannot be taken for granted that he will defend their interests against the MAGA dynamics in the party and administration. As with all Trump appointments, and considering experiences from the past, the question will always be how much autonomy can they preserve, and for how long will they endure in the system?8  Although Donald Trump distanced himself during the campaign from Project 2025, a blueprint for an incoming conservative administration by the Heritage Foundation, it is to be expected that those he has so far selected not only share the views on the multilateral order but also the criticism and preconceptions brought up against the institutions.  The frontline of Trump’s anticipated crusade against multilateral organizations might this time also include those who have been spared so far: World Bank, IMF, as well as the OECD. 9 In the case of others, he might continue where the end of his first term prevented further action or the Biden administration reversed the steps he had taken. Human Rights Council The latter has been the case of the Human Rights Council. In 2018 the Trump administration had been withdrawing from the Council arguing that it had become an “exercise in shameless hypocrisy – with many of the world’s worst human rights abuses going ignored, and some of the world’s most serious offenders sitting on the council itself.”10  In October 2021, the US got reelected to the Human Rights Council. In the context of its staunch support for Ukraine, the US became the driving force behind a Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine as well as on the creation of the Special Rapporteur on Russia. However, when its reelection came up again in October 2024, the Biden administration deliberately decided not to stand as a candidate. Although some observers argue that this decision has been taken in order to avoid a backlash from a majority of UN Member States who see the unwavering US position on the collateral implications for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights by Israel’s fight against Hamas and Hizbollah as a paramount example of double-standards. One could also argue that not being a sitting Member of the Human Rights Council at a time when the likelihood of another withdrawal is not too far away, reduces the reputational damage for the organization as well as for the standing of the US in the International System.  US Ambassadors to the United Nations in New York are generally Cabinet Members, thus directly involved in shaping policies. With Elise Stefanik, Trump has not only appointed a staunch supporter of Israel who has accused the UN of being “a den of antisemitism”11 but also a reliable anti-abortion proponent. Her positioning in New York will certainly influence dynamics in Geneva as well. And if Project 2025 is becoming the playbook that everybody expects it to be, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the US is a signatory might not remain the uncontested reference point anymore.  The U.S. Commission on Unalienable Human Rights created during the first Trump administration by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, produced a report which is projected by Project 2025 as an important guidepost for bilateral and multilateral engagements on human rights.12 The report sets out to define which rights are ‘unalienable,’ elevating religious liberty and the right to private property, while dismissing rights the report calls “divisive social and political controversies,” including sexual and reproductive rights, LGBTI rights, and the right to non-discrimination.13  The intention of Project 2025 is not only to reevaluate all multilateral engagements by the US in the light of the work of the Commission on Unalienable Human Rights, but also to forge a consensus among like-minded countries in support of human life, women’s health, support of the family as the basic unit of human society, and defense of national sovereignty. In 2020, the Trump administration sponsored in the UN General Assembly the Geneva Consensus Declaration on Women’s Health and the Protection of the Family (A/75/626) for which it gained the support of 34 Member States, including those whose human rights and women rights track records are anything but clean: e.g. Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Uganda, Pakistan.14  Taking into consideration initiatives like the Geneva Consensus, the in-coming Trump administration could besides of complete withdrawal also undermine Human Rights standards by introducing almost in a similar way as China is doing, new narratives. In this endeavour, the US could even find support amongst states who are normally staunch US critics but who will seize the moment and opportunity to dismantle the liberal rules-based order that they perceive as Western dominated anyway. World Trade Organisation (WTO) To avoid another blockage in the appointment of a WTO Director General in 2025 by the US, WTO members brought forward the re-election process of incumbent Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala by two months. President Trump had already in 2020 blocked her appointment, leaving the organisation without leadership for almost seven months.  From an “America first” perspective, “America gets fleeced every day in the global marketplace both by a predatory Communist China and by an institutionally unfair and nonreciprocal WTO.”15 Thus, Project 2025 recommends to reform the WTO or to build a successor organisation and limiting its membership to liberal democracies. The main red-flag for the US at WTO certainly is the developing-country status of China in the WTO and the alleged infringements on US sovereignty – albeit ignoring the veto right the US has as the WTO is a consensus-based organisation.  However, and although Trump’s announced tariffs applied on friends and foes will be disruptive for the international trade system, one must highlight that also during the Biden administration, the US has not been a WTO member easy to engage. This held particularly true for the reform of the appellate body of the dispute settlement mechanism whose appointment process remains dysfunctional since the Obama administration. For the in-coming administration, trade is considered also as a tool for development. In this regard it does not differ too much from the reforms out-going USAID Administrator, Samantha Power, had tried to initiate.16 And it could be an area where WTO Director General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who is seen as particularly focused on the development aspects of trade, and the Trump administration could perhaps find a common ground. Humanitarian and development assistance Humanitarian assistance that already faces substantial funding gaps will certainly face new vulnerabilities with the in-coming Trump administration. Despite substantial reductions which already kicked in in 2022, the US remains the largest donor for UN agencies such as the World Food Programme (2023: 36.53% of total WFP came from US); UNHCR (2023: 38.93%); and OCHA (2023: 19.9%). Although humanitarian aid and particularly funding for food security (WFP was run by the Trump ally, David Beasley) was not contentious during Trump’s first administration, this might change. According to Max Primorac who had been Deputy Administrator of USAID during Trump’s first term, and is the author of the Project 2025 chapter on the Agency for International Development, “’emergency’ aid distorts humanitarian responses, worsens corruption in the countries we support, and exacerbates the misery of those we intend to help.[...] humanitarian aid is sustaining war economies, creating financial incentives for warring parties to continue fighting, discouraging governments from reforming, and propping up malign regimes. Nefarious actors reap billions of dollars in profits from diversions of our humanitarian assistance, but so do international organizations.”17 While criticizing the overheads international agencies have to charge in order to deliver aid in emergency situations, Trump affiliated development experts highly advocate for localisation – albeit in a slightly different fashion as progressive voices would do. The quest of the latter for enhanced equity, inclusion, and ownership of local organizations from project design to implementation remains disregarded while a case is built for aid delivery by faith-based organisations. Although enhancing the inclusion of local organizations for the right reasons is laudable, it certainly will not diminish the need for strong oversight and staff capacities on donor level. One reason why multilateral and international organisations are often used as a type of “middlemen” in aid delivery relates to the lean project management structures in Foreign and Development Ministries these days and the need for accountability mechanisms where taxpayers’ money is spent.  Drawing on the visions presented by Project 2025, development assistance under the in-coming Trump administration will have a strong focus on countering Chinese influence and will align foreign and developmental with anti-abortion policies. What is labelled as “Protecting life in Foreign Assistance”18 will inter alia reintroduce the “global gag rule” which prohibits US funding to organisations abroad that provide abortion services or information. Trump had already in his first term expanded the interpretation of it to the “Protecting Life in Global Health Policy”, and it is expected that he will include now humanitarian and development assistance as well – making it extremely difficult to assess what is included under these new rules and what not.19 In this context it is almost a given that Trump will cut again all funding for the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) as its reproductive health services worldwide are a red-flag.20 Although UNFPA has gotten used to budget cuts by conservative US governments over the years, loosing 11% of its budget (2023) would not be easy to compensate for. World Health Organisation (WHO) and UNAIDS During the Covid-19 pandemic, the World Health Organisation (WHO) became a prime target for President Trump who inter alia accused the organisation of being too close to China and its handling of the early stages of the outbreak.21 He initiated a process to withdraw the US from it – a move that has been immediately reversed by his successor President Biden. Also for WHO, the US is currently the largest donor of assessed and voluntary contributions totalling 15.59% (2023).22 But with the negotiations of the Pandemic Treaty still underway, and the possibility for states to challenge the finalised amendments of the International Health Regulations until July 2025, it is much more at stake for WHO than just the financial implications of a disruptive relationship with the next Trump administration. With the nomination of Robert Francis Kennedy (RFK) Jr as the new Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the global health community is on high alert. On his campaign trail for president, RFK Jr. had already proclaimed to stop the pandemic treaty, as has done President elect Trump. In addition, RFK Jr has linked vaccines to autism, called the Covid-19 vaccines deadly, supports anti-vaccine organisations, and even questioned the proven fact that HIV causes AIDS.23 When 77 Nobel Laureates urged the US Senate in December 2024 to reject the nomination of RFK Jr.24, WHO Director General Dr Tedros Ghebreyesus called for a “wait and see” attitude. He and his team are looking for areas where it might be possible to engage the Trump administration and its new HHS secretary. One area could be the epidemic of non-communicable diseases faced by Americans and which is often cited by RFK Jr. who advocates for enhanced prevention by healthier diets, environments and an active lifestyle.25  Health security has in the past always been a matter of common concern, and parties were able to work across the aisle. However, polarisation has also become a characteristic feature here. With a trifecta in place, the majority of Republicans in the House as well as in the Senate could become an issue of survival for programs such as PEPFAR. Already this year, PEPFAR, the US global flagship initiative in the fight against HIV/AIDS that had been established under Republican President George W. Bush in 2003, failed to secure bipartisan support for a full, five-year legislative reauthorization. After conservative groups had launched a campaign accusing without evidence the Biden administration to use PEPFAR money for abortions, the program only secured a temporary one-year reauthorization until March 2025.26 PEPFAR funding (6.5 billion USD in 2024) is comprised of U.S. bilateral funding and U.S. contributions to multilateral organizations addressing HIV, primarily the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund: 1.65 billion USD from PEPFAR) and UNAIDS. Particularly the latter would be severely impacted if funding would get further reduced. In 2024 UNAIDS received 50 million USD from PEPFAR27 making the US its largest donor. Personality, Ideology and Money – a toxic cocktail For most UN Agencies, Funds and Programs the US is the largest contributor in assessed and voluntary contributions. 22% of the UN budget are financed by assessed US contributions. With voluntary contributions counted in, this figure amounted in 2023 to 27.9%.28 Thus, the UN leadership is bracing itself for the worst-case scenarios. However, scraping the bottom of the barrel at times when other donors are equally becoming reluctant in financing multilateral and developmental programs, is only sustainable in the short term. In addition, the much-lamented growing influence of autocratic states such as China will only grow further when the US is creating once again a vacuum that will be filled with pleasure by its adversaries. During the first Trump administration’s withdrawal from multilateralism, the EU and EU Member States were stepping up their engagement and managed in many cases to fill the void.  To preserve a rules-based multilateral order, European governments need to be prepared not only to contribute to the empty coffers of UN institutions but also to take on a leadership role and to forge new alliances with states who are still sharing the same values. In the future, Russia will not remain the only disruptor on the multilateral parquet and China will not be the only country trying to create new narratives around human rights. By disengaging from multilateral arrangements and disregarding established collective norms, the next Trump Presidency will certainly have a negative impact on the social fabric of international cooperation.  But this should not come to us as a surprise. Multilateralism needs as a minimum requirement moral commitment to the established principles of collective decision-making, including the precondition of pacta sunt servanda. Multilateralism strives for inclusive decision-making and equality amongst those sitting around the table. Multilateralism lives on tolerance for the point-of-view of others, and the acceptance of compromises for the sake of mutual benefits. In the transactional, zero-sum world of Donald Trump neither compromise, reciprocity nor empathy are part of the vocabulary. “America First” reflects his personality and illustrates a perceived incompatibility between US national interests and multilateral engagement.29  To keep up a rules-based international order in a geo-political era of manifold crisis, like-minded states and above all Europeans have to step up their action to preserve what they treasure. Despite all the headwinds coming out of Washington, DC starting January 20th, multilateralism is not doomed to fail without US engagement. Power relations will certainly change but it must be Europe’s core interest to safeguard its influence in shaping the global order. References 1 Ostheimer, Andrea E.: The United Nations and Global Multilateral Organisations as a Playground for American-Chinese Rivalry, in: New Realities of Multilateralism, Panorama 2022, pp. 7-26.[ Panorama 2022_01_Multilateralism_cover_v3_crop.indd https://www.kas.de/documents/288143/21303801/Panorama+2022+New+Realities+of+Multilateralism.pdf/d2ed886c-83fa-6423-90b8-eeaa48ef8620?version=1.0&t=1668409843028 ].  2 Runde, Daniel F.: Competing and Winning in the Multilateral System. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), 2020, p 4. [ https://www.csis.org/analysis/competing-andwinning-multilateral-system-us-leadership-united-nations ]. 3 Amr, Hady. 7 September 2018. Brookings. [ https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from chaos/2018/09/07/in-one-move-trump-eliminated-us-funding-for-unrwa-and-the-us-role-as-mideast-peacemaker/ ].  4 Morello, Carl. 4 April 2017. The Washington Post. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/trump-administration-to-eliminate-its-funding-for-un-population-fundover-abortion/2017/04/04/d8014bc0-1936-11e7-bcc2-7d1a0973e7b2_story.html]. 5 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) had been an accord that restricted the Iranian nuclear program to mere peaceful usage.  6 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty had limited the type of weapons systems the signatories, US and Russia could pursue.  7 The Global Compact for Safe, https://www.iom.int/resources/global-compact-safe-orderly-and-regular-migration/res/73/195 Orderly and Regular Migration is the first intergovernmental agreement covering all dimensions of international migration. It is a non-legally binding, cooperative framework that upholds the sovereignty of States and their obligations under international law. 8 Saldinger, Adva; Igoe, Michael: “We can work with him: Aid advocates react to Trump’s Rubio pick”, 14 November 2024, [‘We can work with him’: Aid advocates react to Trump’s Rubio pick | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/we-can-work-with-him-aid-advocates-react-to-trump-s-rubio-pick-108752 ]  9 Klingebiel, Stephan; Baumann, Max-Otto: Trump 2.0. in time of political upheaval? Implications of a possible second presidency for international politics and Europe, IDOS Policy Brief, No 24/2024, [https://doi.org/10.23661/ipb24.2024]. 10 Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State, 19 June 2028 [Remarks on the UN Human Rights Council - U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva https://geneva.usmission.gov/2018/06/21/remarks-on-the-un-human-rights-council/ ]  11 Elise Stefanik cited in King, Ryan; Spector, David, New York Post, 20 November 2024, [ICYMI: New York Post: Elise Stefanik vows to take on ‘den of antisemitism’ and ‘apologist for Iran’ at the UN | Press Releases | Congresswoman Elise Stefanik https://stefanik.house.gov/2024/11/icymi-new-york-post-elise-stefanik-vows-to-take-on-den-of-antisemitism-and-apologist-for-iran-at-the-un ].  12 2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-06.pdf https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-06.pdf  13 Commission on Unalienable Rights | https://bidenhumanrightspriorities.amnestyusa.org/commission-on-unalienable-rights/  14 n2034430.pdf https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n20/344/30/pdf/n2034430.pdf  15 Navarro, Peter: The case for fair trade, Project 2025, [2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-26.pdf https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-26.pdf ] 16 90% of USAID funding from US Congress is earmarked and dedicated to basic sectors such as health care, education and agriculture. At the start of the Biden administration only 5% of USAID’s budget went into economic growth programs. Miolene, Elissa: How economic growth became a forgotten priority at USAID, 10 December 2024, [How economic growth became a forgotten priority at USAID | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/how-economic-growth-became-a-forgotten-priority-at-usaid-108911#:~:text=At%20the%20start%20of%20the,lack%20of%20focus%20surprised%20her. ]  17 Primorac, Max: The Agency for International Development, Project 2025 [2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf ].  18 [2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf ] 19 Igoe, Michael: What we do and don’t know about Trump’s US aid plans, 15 November 2024, [What we do and don't know about Trump's US aid plans | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/what-we-do-and-don-t-know-about-trump-s-us-aid-plans-108719 ]  20 Lynch, Colum: Will Trump gut UN family planning funds….again?, 31 October 2024, [Will Trump gut UN family planning funds ... again? | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/will-trump-gut-un-family-planning-funds-again-108655 ] 21 Coronavirus: what are President Trump’s charges against WHO?, BBC Fact Check, 8 July 2020, Coronavirus: What are President Trump's charges against the WHO? https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52294623   22 WHO | Programme Budget Web Portal https://open.who.int/2022-23/contributors/top25  23 Lei Ravelo, Jenny: Will RFK Jr. ‘go wild’ on global health?, 4 December 2024, [Will RFK Jr. ‘go wild’ on global health? | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/will-rfk-jr-go-wild-on-global-health-108837 ]. 24 Nobel laureates oppose RFK Jr.'s confirmation to HHS https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/5031298-nobel-laureates-oppose-rfk-jr/  25 Fletcher, Elaine Ruth: ‘Give them some space’: WHO Director General on Trump Nomination of RFK Jr as US Health Secretary, 11 December 2024, [‘Give Them Some Space’: WHO Director General On Trump Nomination Of RFK Jr As US Health Secretary - Health Policy Watch https://healthpolicy-watch.news/give-them-some-space-who-director-general-comments-on-trump-nomination-of-rfk-jr-as-us-health-secretary/ ]  26 Igoe, Michael: PEPFAR chief warns waning political will could hurt AIDS fight, 22 July 2024, [PEPFAR chief warns waning political will could hurt AIDS fight | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/pepfar-chief-warns-waning-political-will-could-hurt-aids-fight-107022 ] 27 The U.S. Government and the World Health Organization | KFF https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/fact-sheet/the-u-s-government-and-the-world-health-organization/#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20in%20the%20previous%20budget%20period%20(2022%2D2023,totaled%20%2428.1%20million%20(0.4%25).  28 Revenue by Government donor | United Nations – CEB https://unsceb.org/fs-revenue-government-donor  29 Loewener, Franca/Cook, Justin D.: Trump re-elected. How the Trump Doctrine reshapes US multilateral engagement and global influence. 12.11.2024 [Publication - OI] https://observatoire-multilateralisme.fr/publications/trump-reelected-how-the-trump-doctrine-reshapes-us-multilateral-engagement-and-global-influence/  The text of this work is licensed under the terms of by "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike same conditions 4.0 international", CC BY-SA 4.0

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The countries of the Alliance-Confederation of Sahel States continue to strengthen their sovereignty and their alignment with Pan-African values and a multipolar world. This development has deeply unsettled Western regimes and their agents on the African continent. The growing integration of the member states of the Alliance-Confederation of Sahel States (Alliance-Confédération des Etats du Sahel, AES) – namely Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – has reached a new level. The regional Pan-African organisation now has its own logo and motto. The motto is particularly symbolic: One Territory, One People, One Destiny. Today, Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey are not only reviving the dreams of the forefathers of Pan-African values but are also bringing to life the aspirations of great African leaders and millions of African citizens. In doing so, they are giving additional momentum to these projects. Naturally, this does not sit well with the puppets and subcontractors of the Western planetary minority on the continent, nor with their masters. The AES Project: A Nightmare for the West When the Alliance of Sahel States was established – now formalised as a confederation of three nations within the Sahel region (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) – the interests of the Western planetary minority suffered a significant blow, not only in the Sahel but across the African continent. This shift was reflected in the neighbouring state of Chad’s decision to demand the withdrawal of the French military contingent. At the same time, public sentiment in several African nations has increasingly called for the removal of the remnants of Western neocolonialism from their lands. But the setbacks for French and Western interests did not end there. Senegal, whose authorities have yet to fully determine their strategic direction in foreign policy, also announced the conclusion of French military presence on its soil. Most ironically, even in Côte d’Ivoire – where one of the last openly pro-Western regimes in Africa remains in power – statements have been made suggesting that French troops will eventually leave the country. However, in Côte d’Ivoire, this move appears more like a tactical manoeuvre aimed at temporarily appeasing the widespread anti-French and anti-Western sentiment among a large segment of the population. Meanwhile, in the same Côte d’Ivoire, the military presence of the leader of the Western bloc – the Washington regime – continues to expand. Nevertheless, in all these processes, there is no doubt today that the AES countries, allies of Russia and the multipolar world, have played and will continue to play a key role. They enjoy the support of millions, not only among the citizens of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger but also across many other countries in the region and Africa as a whole. Notably, in addition to the military and economic alliance of the Alliance-Confederation of Sahel States, the union is becoming significantly stronger in the media and information space. Recently, the communication ministers of the three countries approved the creation of a joint union internet television platform, as well as a shared television channel and radio station. This is a highly strategic decision that will enable maximum outreach, covering urban populations in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and neighbouring states, as well as the African diaspora living abroad. Crucially, it also aims to reach residents of remote rural regions, where radio often remains the most effective means of accessing information. The plan has been thoroughly thought out, leaving no detail overlooked. Importantly, the AES countries are also taking effective measures to counter Western propaganda. It is no coincidence that amidst these developments, anxiety is growing not only among Western powers – unable to dismantle the genuinely Pan-African AES alliance – but also within regional structures such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), where pro-Western interests remain strong. It is worth recalling that the AES member states announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS at the beginning of last year. However, ECOWAS has been reluctant to lose such significant members and is actively trying to persuade them to reconsider their decision. AES as a Reliable Ally of a Multipolar World Order Regional structures like ECOWAS, where Western influence still wields significant power, are acutely aware that African public opinion is largely not in their favour. The continued rise of AES could logically lead to a scenario where former ECOWAS members seek membership in AES. Consequently, this may eventually result in the dissolution of organisations like ECOWAS. In this context, those in Africa who still serve the neocolonial interests of the Western planetary minority understand their fate well. They recognise that there will be no place for them in the new African realities of a multipolar world. However, this does not mean that supporters of the multipolar world order can afford to become complacent. Quite the contrary. Given the radically revanchist sentiments of Western-NATO regimes, which are losing not only geopolitical influence in Africa but also their near-cost-free access to Africa’s strategic resources, and considering the growing unease among Western puppets and subcontractors on the continent who fear being left without a role, it is essential to remain fully prepared to counter any new attempts at Western destabilisation. Supporters of the multipolar world must continue their advance. Today, the position of Pan-African and multipolar world advocates in Africa is stronger than ever. This is partly due to the presence of patriotic leaders – in the case of AES, military officers guided by the hopes and expectations of their citizens. It is also bolstered by strategic support from Russia and China, leading forces of the multipolar world order. Moreover, the mass mobilisation of civil society and African youth plays a critical role – a force against which Soros-linked and other Western agents of chaos remain utterly powerless.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The meeting held on 6 December in Auckland, the second session of the “2+2 Format” established earlier this year, involving the foreign and defence ministers of both Australia and New Zealand, marked an important milestone in the rapidly advancing development of all aspects of bilateral relations. The Foreign Policy of New Zealand’s Conservative Government This process has become particularly evident since the conservative National Party government assumed power in New Zealand at the beginning of 2023. A few clarifications are warranted in this context. Firstly, the current government, led by Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and representing the NPNZ (New Zealand National Party), officially took office in January 2023. However, it initially functioned as a caretaker government, succeeding the Labour administration under Jacinda Ardern, who had resigned prematurely. This interim status lasted until November 2023, when it shed the “caretaker” label following the general election held the previous month. It is worth noting that the NPNZ-led coalition’s victory was far from decisive, necessitating complex negotiations with a minor party to retain power. Secondly, it would be inaccurate to suggest that New Zealand entirely disregarded the foreign policy concerns of other Anglophone nations in past decades, including under Labour governments. For instance, Wellington has consistently remained a member of the Five Eyes alliance, an intelligence-sharing cooperative among five Anglo-Saxon countries. However, until the conservative government came to power, New Zealand appeared to make every effort to ensure that the significant deterioration in international relations, which began at the end of the previous decade, had no adverse effect on its relations with China. Nevertheless, the global restructuring process initiated in the second half of 2019 (notably marked by the Skripal affair) inevitably impacted New Zealand, particularly given its location in the Indo-Pacific region, which has become the focal point of the current phase of the “Great Game”. Bilateral Engagements in Relations with Australia New Zealand’s involvement in the aforementioned global restructuring is primarily occurring within the surrounding region of the vast Indo-Pacific area. Naturally, the country’s leadership has prioritised its relations with Australia, its closest partner in every respect. Within two months of shedding its “caretaker” status, New Zealand’s government, alongside its Australian counterparts, inaugurated the “2+2 Format” platform for foreign and defence ministers. The first session of this format took place on 1 February of this year in Melbourne. The mere existence of such a platform underscores the particularly close and trusting relationship between the two nations. However, the intention for closer bilateral cooperation on a broad range of issues was signalled six months earlier, during the first session of a separate “2+2 Format” involving finance and environment ministers, held in Wellington on 8 June 2023. This platform was subsequently convened for the second time on 30 July 2024 in Brisbane, Australia. Both sessions concluded with a “Joint Statement”. From the perspective of the evolving Indo-Pacific situation, special attention should be given to the second session of the defence and foreign policy “2+2 Format”, held on 6 December in Auckland. The key points of the document adopted at the session can be reviewed here. Notably, the title of the first chapter, “The Australia-New Zealand Alliance”, stands out. This chapter opens with an acknowledgment of the “natural, neighbourly, and formalised” bond between the two nations. The final element of this statement is confirmed by a significant reference to the ANZUS trilateral military-political treaty (involving the United States), which was adopted back in 1951, during the height of the Cold War. It is worth noting that until the signing of the document under discussion in Auckland, the very existence of ANZUS was likely remembered by few. This is not surprising, as for decades, international treaty reference guides consistently noted that, although ANZUS had not been formally dissolved, the United States and New Zealand had long ceased to maintain an alliance in practice. This situation stems from New Zealand’s 1984 declaration as a nuclear-free country, which resulted in the closure of its ports to American vessels with nuclear propulsion systems, even if they did not necessarily carry nuclear weapons at the time. By contrast, Japan, despite a similar “three non-nuclear principles” policy, has never taken such a step. Following the 1984 decision, which effectively marked the withdrawal of one participant from this tripartite alliance, the remaining two members restructured it to suit new conditions. However, with the end of the Cold War, even its bilateral format barely showed signs of activity. This continued until the latter half of the previous decade, a period when the world seemingly turned upside down. During this time, the Australian government, led by the conservative coalition under Scott Morrison, adopted a policy of sharply intensifying military-political ties with allies. This course has been largely upheld by the current Labour government under Anthony Albanese, which has also accelerated the development of comprehensive relations with its new ally, Japan. Canberra is also closely monitoring another key regional player: India. In summary, a particularly noteworthy development occurred on 6 December of this year in Auckland, New Zealand, when viewed from the perspective of assessing the evolving situation in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR). New Zealand Increases Engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region The meeting held on that day fits into the broader trend of New Zealand’s comprehensive engagement in the region, following Australia’s example. Indeed, the main aspects of this trend are mentioned in the final document adopted in Auckland. During his visit to Australia in August of this year, New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon announced his country’s intention to join the AUKUS pact (Australia-United Kingdom-United States), specifically its “Pillar II,” which focuses on the development of cutting-edge military technologies. The “Pillar I” of AUKUS, by contrast, deals with the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Japan and the Republic of Korea are also potential candidates to join AUKUS Pillar II. However, due to internal turmoil in South Korea, Japan currently remains the more likely candidate. Incidentally, in June of this year, Christopher Luxon made a three-day visit to Japan. A government communiqué regarding the trip and his discussions with then-Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida noted the shared intention to develop various aspects of bilateral relations. This clearly signals a shift in New Zealand’s trajectory away from the popular (and to some extent accurate) stereotype of the country as a sleepy geopolitical backwater that also enjoys economic prosperity. This image has seemingly been satisfactory for New Zealanders until now. However, the geopolitical storms raging worldwide have inevitably reached even this distant nation. As New Zealand becomes increasingly involved in global disputes, it faces the prospect of previously unfamiliar challenges arriving on its shores. Finally, it is essential to note that the above developments weigh heavily on the negative side of the scale when assessing the current situation in the IPR. This does not mean, however, that there are no positive counterweights, albeit fewer in number. These positive elements suggest that the main players (at least for now) maintain control over the unfolding dynamics in the region. This is no small achievement in a world order that appears to be in upheaval.