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Abstract The transatlantic relationship is undergoing a period of critical recalibration, marked by the return of a more transactional US administration and a world order moving towards multipolarity. The return of Donald Trump to the helm of the White House with an ‘America First’ doctrine raises serious questions about US involvement in the transatlantic alliance. President Trump’s repeated claims that the EU was set up to ‘screw’ the US reflect both that his administration is unwilling to engage productively with the EU and that it distrusts multilateral forums, preferring bilateral, nation-to-nation contacts. This article seeks to bring clarity to the future US–EU relationship by identifying some of the points of contention and offering a perspective on how the transatlantic partnership can move forward constructively. KeywordsTransatlantic relations, EU–US relations, Trump administration, EU, Bilateral relations, Multipolar world order Introduction Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a new axis of power is taking form, led by Russia and China and supported by North Korea, Iran and Belarus. This shift brings a profound transformation within the global balance of power and is a direct threat to the liberal international world order. In the midst of this geopolitical recalibration, the return of Donald Trump to the helm of the White House with an ‘America First’ doctrine poses serious questions about US engagement with the transatlantic alliance. There are growing worries about the US’s willingness to continue to honour its Article 5 commitments within NATO and maintain an active role in the collective defence of Europe, but also about the role of the US as a supporter of Ukraine and the liberal multilateral rule-based system. State of play in the EU–US partnership During the first Trump administration, at the state funeral of former US president George H. W. Bush, the EU’s ambassador to the US, David O’Sullivan, was asked to stand at the back of the line-up to pay his respects, breaking diplomatic protocol (Knigge 2019). He politely acquiesced, but in the days that followed it came to light that during the first Trump administration, the US Department of State had downgraded the diplomatic status of the EU in the second half of 2018 without informing the EU Delegation in Washington (Smith 2019). Beyond the failure to communicate this important diplomatic status change, which was not well received in Brussels, and in addition to the protocol issue of having a long-serving foreign ambassador downgraded on the spot at a state funeral, this sent a clear message: the Trump administration does not respect the EU, and nor does it view the Union as an interlocutor. On many occasions during his first administration, Trump’s officials clashed with the EU. In a major foreign policy speech in Brussels, then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo openly questioned the continued value of the EU and urged European countries to reassert their national sovereignty (Pompeo 2018). As the second Trump administration begins its work with unprecedented vigour, so far the EU has hardly featured as a consideration for the president or his top officials. At the time of writing, the nominated US ambassador to the EU, Andrew Puzder, has not yet testified (Singh and Jones 2025). In his early remarks as secretary of state, Marco Rubio has hardly mentioned the EU at all. On 29 January, the first call between High Representative Kaja Kallas and Rubio took place, alleviating some concerns about the distinct lack of US–EU dialogue taking place due to the change in administration (Liboreiro 2025). However, at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, the new US administration went beyond the usual call for European allies to spend more on defence. Vice-President JD Vance drove home the seismic shift underway in the US commitment to European defence and upended decades of policy (Quinville 2025). Moreover, on the European side, the attempts by some members of the Trump administration to support far-right candidates in Europe (as done by Elon Musk and Vance in Germany and Romania) bring a new level of discomfort and mistrust, as it looks like parts of the administration and Trump’s brand of conservatism, colloquially known as ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA), want to export their domestic cultural wars to Europe, thus attacking the core shared value of the transatlantic partnership: liberal democracy. A divorce or just a rough patch in transatlantic relations? Over the past seven decades, successful cooperation between the US and European institutions has helped to build the liberal multilateral world order and to uphold the UN Charter by promoting global stability and prosperity. With a combined population of nearly 800 million people, the US and the EU have the most integrated economic cooperation in the world, accounting for 43% of global GDP and 30% of global trade in goods and services (European Council 2025). President Trump’s repeated claims that the EU was set up to ‘screw’ the US reflect the Trump administration’s unwillingness to engage productively with the EU and its distrust of multilateral forums, and hence its preference for bilateral, nation-to-nation contact. The administration’s growing distrust of the EU also reflects the changing public perception of the EU among segments of the American public, such that 29% of Republicans view the EU as ‘unfriendly’ or ‘hostile’, up from 17% last year, and negative perceptions of Europe among Democrats are also slowly rising (The Economist 2025). This represents an inward turn in American society as politics becomes increasingly polarised. On the other hand, favourable attitudes among Europeans towards the US have fallen below 50%, with only around a third of Germans (32%) and the French (34%) having a positive view of the current American administration, with the least favourable views being held in Denmark, where only 20% approve (Britton 2025). Less than 100 days into his second term, at the time of writing, Trump has already broken long-standing norms and practices in US–European relations. Vance’s critical discourse at the Munich Security Conference, which harshly attacked European values, brought a major departure from traditional diplomatic language. The US vote alongside Russia and North Korea, and against traditional allies, on a UN resolution condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine and calling for the return of occupied territory to Kyiv further deepened concerns (Landale and Jackson 2025). Additional actions, such as the controversial Oval Office meeting between the Trump administration and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the temporary suspension of intelligence and military assistance to Ukraine, the exclusion of Europeans from Ukrainian peace negotiations, and the disproportionate and unjustified tariffs on the EU have heightened European anxiety. These moves have raised fears of a possible end to the transatlantic partnership and a wider US retreat from global leadership. For most Europeans, the second Trump administration appears to be strategically prepared, driven not only by revenge in domestic politics, but also by a sense of retribution in foreign policy. But while distrust has never been higher, it would be a mistake to take the path of severing the relations between the US and the EU. The Euro-Atlantic partnership has suffered similar lows in the past, from vastly different perspectives on the US invasion of Iraq, the Obama administration’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific and the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan. Points of tension and contentionTech On tech regulation, storm clouds are already gathering as Trump has lashed out at the EU for regulating big tech companies (Doan and Stolton 2025). During the transition, the new Trump administration has been noted for the active participation of several tech CEOs. This was most evidently on display during Trump’s inauguration, which saw the likes of Mark Zuckerberg (Meta), Jeff Bezos (Amazon) and Elon Musk (Tesla), as well as other billionaires from around the world (including TikTok’s CEO) gather to welcome in the new administration (Kelly 2025). These tech CEO supporters, not usually as prominently on display in American politics, are flocking to the new administration, which has pledged massive tax cuts for billionaires, the promotion and deregulation of cryptocurrencies, and the removal of restrictions on free speech and fact-checking (Samuel 2025). The EU’s attempts to regulate big tech companies under this new administration will be even more difficult, given their close proximity to and influence on the second Trump presidency. Energy Another likely area of divergence between the US and the EU is in their approaches to energy policy and climate policy. Trump has pledged to ‘drill baby drill’, promising to fund more fossil fuel extraction and curbing green and renewable projects. He has openly called climate change a hoax and ended US participation in the Paris Climate Agreement. Meanwhile, the EU and its member states continue to invest heavily in renewables, with clean energy sources accounting for 70% of the bloc’s electricity demand in 2024 (Vetter 2025). The US, already trailing in wind power and investment in renewables, now risks falling irrevocably behind most of the developing world in clean energy production. Trump might find less of a market for fossil fuels in the EU as a result of its heavy investment in renewables, instead having to turn to other markets. Trade and tariffs On the campaign trail, Trump vowed that as president he would impose tariffs on everyone from China to neighbours, Mexico and Canada, to allies such as the EU. Although the initial tariffs placed on Mexico and Canada were swiftly lifted, a new wave of tariffs of 25% on foreign steel and aluminium was announced on 11 February. This move mirrors that of his first administration (Wiseman 2025). The EU was swift to respond, announcing a slew of counter-measures targeting iconic US products such as jeans, bourbon, peanut butter, whiskey and motorcycles. European steel companies could see as much as 3.7 million tons of steel exports lost as a result of US-imposed tariffs. Together, as noted above, the US and the EU account for about 30% of global trade, with deeply intertwined production and supply chains. However, this does not appear to be part of the Trump administration’s reasoning behind its decision to impose ‘reciprocal’ tariffs of 20% on almost all other EU products as part of its Liberation Day plan. The proposed tariffs could affect around 70% of EU exports to the US, worth around €532 billion ($585 billion) in 2024, with potential tariffs on copper, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and timber still on the cards (Blenkinsop 2025). As the trade wars begin again, US–EU trade and economic relations will undoubtedly face difficult times over the next four years and risk undermining or limiting cooperation in other areas as a result. Responding to Trump’s announcement, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, astutely summed up: ‘The global economy will massively suffer. Uncertainty will spiral and trigger the rise of further protectionism. The consequences will be dire for millions of people around the globe’ (European Commission 2025). The EU, in addition to planning and implementing counter-measures to Trump’s tariffs, has to walk a difficult tightrope to maintain its investment ties (Casert 2025). The Arctic Trump’s approach to the Arctic in the days leading up to the transition and in his first three months, most notably his refusal to promise not to invade Greenland by force, if deemed necessary (Kayali 2025), sparked widespread condemnation from European leaders. Trump raised the idea of purchasing Greenland from Denmark in 2019 during his first term, and reasserted his intention to acquire the vast island, rich with rare earth minerals, on a fiery phone call with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen. In response, the Danish premier garnered support among European heads of state. However, Trump’s focus on Greenland could have profound implications for the balance of power in the Arctic region. Although the Arctic is increasingly discussed in geopolitical terms, in part due to Russia’s and China’s interests in new shipping routes, it remains a zone of peace. The implications of potential NATO infighting over Greenland, and the possibility that this could accelerate Greenland’s independence, could work to China’s or Russia’s advantage and risk disrupting the balance of power in the Arctic region that has allowed peace to prevail. Defence spending The Trump administration’s renewed push for European NATO allies to spend at least 5% of their GDP on defence has reignited tensions over transatlantic burden-sharing. During his first visit to a NATO defence ministers’ meeting, US Secretary of Defense Hegseth made it clear that the US no longer sees an indefinite American presence in Europe as guaranteed (Erling 2025). While these pressures reflect Washington’s frustration over decades of unequal defence spending, they also risk undermining alliance cohesion by demanding an unrealistic increase in European defence budgets. Most European states have already significantly increased their military spending, jointly spending €326 billion on defence in 2024, an increase of 30% since 2021 (European Defence Agency 2024). And the European Commission’s recently launched ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 initiative proposes an additional €800 billion to help EU member states fill their defence gaps and increase their military production and capacity (Gomez 2025). However, calling for a sudden escalation to 5% of GDP overlooks the political, economic and social constraints within Europe and could provoke backlash rather than cooperation. A more realistic target of 3% to 3.5% of GDP offers a more balanced and politically realistic path, consistent with strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and could be discussed as a new NATO defence commitment at the upcoming Hague Summit this summer. EU defence market The EU is developing its European Defence Technological and Industrial Base in response to the challenging new security and geopolitical reality. A key focus within the plan is strengthening the European internal market for defence, which remains heavily underdeveloped and dependent on non-EU suppliers, notably the US, which accounts for more than half of the EU’s defence procurement. The European Defence Industrial Strategy, launched in 2024 by the European Commission, proposes some ambitious objectives: by 2030, at least 50% of member states’ defence acquisitions should go to the European defence industry, rising to 60% by 2035, and 40% of these procurements should be through collaborative projects (European Commission 2024). Nevertheless, this strategy is not without challenges, as some EU member states, particularly the Eastern European countries, still favour US suppliers and see buying American defence systems as a way to foster security ties with Washington. The return of Trump, along with signs of US disengagement from Europe, has led to a renewed debate within the EU about reducing reliance on American defence capabilities and investing more in equipment ‘Made in Europe’. At the same time, the evolving US position has complicated transatlantic defence industrial cooperation. While Rubio has recently stressed the importance of continued American participation in European defence procurement, the latest EU proposals to prioritise the European defence industry have raised concern in Washington (Cook and Croucher 2025). Any move to limit access for American defence companies might provoke a political backlash, even as European leaders become increasingly worried about the credibility of the US defence commitments. Recent events such as the politicisation of US military aid to Ukraine and the unpredictability of future armament deliverables have further shaken European confidence. But despite the growing uncertainty, EU countries should remain interested in cooperation with the US, not exclusion. The challenge now is to strike a balance: to build a more autonomous and resilient European defence market while maintaining a constructive and cooperative relationship with the US. Ukraine peace negotiations The peace negotiations for Ukraine are becoming a major point of divergence between the US administration under Trump and its European allies. Trump’s main goal is to quickly end the conflict in Ukraine and position himself as a successful deal maker on the global stage. So far, his administration has shown a willingness to make significant concessions to Russia, often unilaterally and without securing reciprocal commitments from Moscow. This approach might be part of a broader strategy that includes weakening Russia’s alliance with China, securing American access to Ukrainian rare earth resources and continuing a larger US strategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific (Mills 2025). So far, this conciliatory ‘deal making’ has caused anxiety among European leaders, who fear that a hasty or unbalanced peace agreement might lead to a forced Ukrainian capitulation and would undermine long-term European security and stability. Therefore, European countries are insisting on being part of the discussions on defining what a just, long-standing and sustainable peace should look like, a peace that secures Ukraine’s sovereignty and deters further Russian aggression on the country or continent. In parallel, European countries are formulating their own vision for a lasting peace, independent of American leadership. Recent discussions and meetings led by the UK and France are proposing a ‘coalition of the willing’ that would send 10,000 to 30,000 troops to Ukraine to enforce a future ceasefire (O’Sullivan and Khatsenkova 2025). But current plans face significant obstacles: disagreements among European states over troop commitments and mandate, fears of escalation in a direct conflict with Russia and a lack of critical defence enablers that only the US can provide. While countries such as the UK, France and Sweden are considering ‘boots on the ground’ in Ukraine, Eastern European states, notably Poland, remain reluctant, preferring to commit to logistical roles rather than direct engagement. Moreover, European allies are seeking explicit US backstop support (logistical, intelligence and political) to enhance the credibility of the deterrence of these peacekeeping forces against future Russian aggression. The way in which the Ukraine peace negotiations unfold could be a source of further tension between the US and European partners in the months and years to come. A way forward The transatlantic relationship is undergoing a period of critical recalibration, marked by the return of a more transactional US administration and a world order migrating towards multipolarity. A possible way forward in Euro-Atlantic relations is to adopt a pragmatic approach that preserves cooperation where possible while accepting a more interest-based partnership. Paradoxically, as the US pivots towards the Indo-Pacific to counterbalance China’s global rise, this may offer a new avenue for transatlantic rapprochement. Both the US and the EU increasingly recognise the need to address China’s more assertive economic and geopolitical behaviour, and both see the growing socio-political and security threats from the rise of this axis of upheaval formed of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. For Europeans, navigating this increasingly unstable geopolitical landscape will require clarity, political maturity and a greater sense of strategic responsibility. The EU must continue to invest in its strategic autonomy—not to disengage from the US, but to become a more equal and reliable transatlantic partner. The coming months will be vital in charting a new course for transatlantic cooperation, one that emphasises increased European defence investment, a coordinated approach to the Russian and Chinese threats, the need for a deeper EU–NATO cooperation, a responsible resolution to the war in Ukraine, and a more balanced EU–US partnership. As such, European leaders will need to make a concerted effort to build bridges with the Trump administration by focusing on areas of convergence and mutual strategic interest. What lies ahead is a period of repositioning, a reordering of the transatlantic relationship from one rooted primarily in shared norms, values and principles towards a more pragmatic and transactional partnership based on common interests and careful management of differences. While challenging, this transformation could lead to a more resilient and mature transatlantic alliance, shaped by partners on an equal footing, capable of adapting to the demands of an unstable and unpredictable multipolar world order. ReferencesBlenkinsop P. (2025). EU seeks unity in first strike back at Trump tariffs. Reuters, 7 April. https://www.reuters.com/markets/eu-seeks-unity-first-strike-back-trump-tariffs-2025-04-06/. Accessed 7 April 2025.Britton H. (2025). 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Abstract The international system is currently undergoing a process of reconfiguration that is having an impact on all areas of global development. In this process of reordering power relations, there is a tendency to move towards multipolarity, leaving behind the unipolar coalition established after the Second World War. In this context, several emerging powers are gaining increasing international power, which has led to changes in the hierarchy of power on the international geopolitical chessboard. Such is the case of the People's Republic of China, which has established itself not only as a power of great impact and relevance in the Asian region, but also in the entire international system. Namely, the management of the government and the Party in terms of innovation, industrialization, informatization, productivity, expansion and internationalization of its economic model, positions this country as the most dynamic center of the international economy. Evidencing that alternative models to the capitalist system are possible and viable, which strengthens the trend towards a systemic transition and multipolarity in the International System Introduction In the last two decades, a set of geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions and conflicts have become evident, with significant implications extending throughout the International System. As a result, we are currently experiencing a convulsion of the established order, giving way to a process of new global reconfigurations. In this context, several researchers and academics such as Jorge Casals, Leyde Rodríguez, Juan Sebastián Schulz, among others, have noted that these conditions have led to a crisis and hegemonic transition process, with a trend toward multipolarity in which the Asia-Pacific region is gaining increasing relevance. This article, titled "The International Reconfiguration’s Process Towards Multipolarity: The Role of China as an Emerging Power," is dedicated to analyzing the position of this country within the current international reconfiguration of power. Accordingly, the first section will systematize some essential guidelines to understand the current crisis and the decline of the hegemonic order established in the post-World War II period. The second section will address China's positioning amid the international reconfiguration of power. In this regard, it is important to note that China's rapid rise highlights how development management aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals can lead to a shift in the paradigm of international relations, as well as power reconfigurations that challenge the current balance of forces. Thus, it can be affirmed that China's rise constitutes a decisive element within the current trend toward multipolarity. DevelopmentNew International Order: Approaches to the Multipolar Reconfiguration of the International System The current international context is marked by a process of crisis. This crisis reflects the fact that the world order no longer aligns with the correlation of forces that gave rise to it during the post-World War II period. It is not a circumstantial crisis, but rather the interlinking of various interconnected crises that span across all sectors of life. That is to say, the effects of one crisis often become the causes of another, involving economic, political, social, cultural, ethical, moral, technological, commercial, and environmental components. In other words, it is a structural and systemic crisis—one that cannot be resolved unless a similarly systemic transformation occurs. To gain greater clarity, it is important to consider that the consolidation of the capitalist system brought about the process of globalization. This, in turn, introduced large-scale production and technological development capable of increasing output. This process, along with other characteristics of the system, has exponentially accelerated social inequalities between developed and developing countries. It has also led to strategic tensions over the control of resources, raw materials, and inputs, resulting in geopolitical conflicts. Furthermore, the capitalist system has imposed an extremely high environmental cost, demonstrating that it is exceeding both its own limits and those of the planet. Specifically, in its constant pursuit of profit and maximization of gains, negative environmental impacts are not factored into cost-benefit analyses, leading to widespread environmental degradation. Among other harms caused by the system, we observe a decline in investment rates, an increase in public debt, loss of autonomy in monetary policy, rising unemployment levels, reductions in real wages, and growing inequality, among others. In short, capitalism has become an unsustainable system whose primary concern is profit generation—something that is currently entirely incompatible with environmental preservation and the responsible use of natural resources. Therefore, it can be affirmed that some of its most alarming effects include: vast amounts of currency without backing, increasingly concentrated in fewer hands; acceleration of capital concentration in the West; rising military expenditures; and environmental pollution and destruction (Casals, J., 2023). On the other hand, it is necessary to clarify that, for a particular state to be considered hegemonic, it must not only exert its influence predominantly within the system of international relations; its hegemonic role must also be linked to the founding and establishment of a universally accepted concept of world order. That is, the majority of other states must recognize it as such and identify with the model promoted by the hegemon. Therefore, it is not merely a matter of a hierarchical order among states, but rather the adoption of a dominant model of production that involves those states. As a result, certain mechanisms or general rules of conduct are established for the participating states. For this reason, a hegemonic crisis involving the dominant actor in the system of international relations leads to a crisis in the social, economic, political, and institutional structures upon which that actor’s dominance was built. In light of these elements, we currently observe a set of powers within the International System that are vying to establish a new distribution of power—one that moves away from the unipolar coalition led by the United States following World War II. From this perspective, Juan Sebastián Schulz asserts: “A hegemonic crisis occurs when the existing hegemonic state lacks either the means or the will to continue steering the interstate system in a direction broadly perceived as favorable—not only for its own power, but also for the collective power of the dominant groups within the system.” (Schulz, J. S., 2022) As a result, strategic alliances have been formed and new power groups have emerged that influence international relations.These blocs are precisely what the new polarity is forming around, increasingly reinforcing the trend toward multipolarity. This is a system in which hegemonic influence is not determined by a single power, but by two, three, or more. In this regard, Juan Sebastián Schulz further notes that a process of insubordination is becoming evident, particularly in the Western peripheries. As a consequence, several countries have begun to criticize the configuration of the contemporary world order, initiating efforts to organize and propose alternative models (Schulz, J. S., 2022). This reveals the emergence of a new kind of power hierarchy, generating a global order in which a diversity of forces and actors prevails. In this context, China has experienced rapid growth, thereby contributing to the trend toward multipolarity. While this does not imply that the United States will cease to be one of the central powers in the system of international relations—given its considerable global influence—it is evident that there is a noticeable decline in the dominance it held during the unipolar era that emerged after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This process of intersystemic transition unfolds in various phases. First, there is an observable economic transition marked by a shift in the center of gravity of the global economy toward emerging and developing economies. This shift is accompanied by a necessary technological transition, characterized by a new struggle—this time to lead the technological revolution. These changes, in turn, must be supported by a political transition. Currently, countries from the Global South have gained increasing prominence on the international stage [1]. From this foundation, a geopolitical transition is also underway, where the center of gravity and decision-making—once concentrated in the Anglo-Saxon West—is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, a cultural or civilizational transition is taking place, wherein the previously dominant value system is giving way to the rise of a new worldview. Based on this, the phases of the transition process can be outlined as follows: Existence of a stable order that brings together the majority of nation-states in the International System. - A crisis of legitimacy begins to affect the established global order. - A deconcentration and delegitimization of power emerges, impacting the hegemonic power. - An arms race and formation of alliances ensue in an attempt to preserve the hierarchical order by any means. This leads to a widespread crisis and the rise and emergence of new actors. - A necessary resolution of the international crisis. - Renewal of the system. (Schulz, J. S., 2022) In light of the above, it can be stated that a “new international order” is taking shape. Its manifestations are multifaceted, such as: - The rise of movements and associations of states that serve as alternatives to the neoliberal order. - Emerging powers like China and Russia are gaining strength in various sectors of the international geopolitical arena. - Russia's confrontation with NATO in the context of the conflict with Ukraine. - Sanctions imposed by the United States on various NATO and European Union countries have strengthened the BRICS nations. - The incorporation of new members into BRICS can be seen as an attempt to counterbalance the economic and political dominance of the United States and the European Union. - The expansion of anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal integration mechanisms that promote South-South cooperation, such as the G-77 + China group. - The financial sanctions imposed by the West on Russia in the context of the Ukraine conflict have sparked a debate about the viability of the international monetary system and the role of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. - China and Russia conduct transactions in yuan and sell oil in this currency to Iran, Venezuela, and Gulf countries. China has increased its economic and political influence in the world, which can be seen as a challenge to U.S. hegemony. Its leadership within BRICS and its growing role in the global economy may be indicators of a shift in the balance of power. All these developments reflect a growing awareness within the International System of States regarding the importance of international cooperation to address global challenges such as the climate crisis, pandemics, and food security. They also serve as indicators that a transformation is underway in the way countries interact with each other, resulting in a shift in the economic, political, and strategic center of gravity. In this context, the United States has unleashed a global hybrid war as a desperate attempt to defend and maintain its hegemonic position, which once appeared unshakable in the postwar world. To this end, it has targeted China, as the latter represents its main threat in the economic and scientific-technological order. From this perspective, tensions between the United States and China have significantly deteriorated since the Republican administration of President Donald Trump. Beginning in 2017, his policy took on an aggressive stance toward China, manifesting through a trade war and economic attacks aimed at preserving U.S. global hegemony. This demonstrates that, in response to a process of decline already underway, nationalist and protectionist efforts intensified in the U.S., with policies targeting some of the emerging pillars of the crisis-ridden world order—China being a primary example. Under the administration of Joseph Biden, the focus shifted toward competition, emphasizing the commitment to protect U.S. sovereignty from potential Chinese threats. A significant shift in U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan became evident with the approval of arms sales to Taiwan in August 2023, which escalated tensions in the region (Collective of Authors). Furthermore, in recent years, the United States has increasingly worked to generate geopolitical and geoeconomic motivations aimed at fostering tensions between China and Russia, potentially sparking conflict between the two. It has strengthened alliances with neighboring countries of these powers—most notably Taiwan and Ukraine—which has triggered concerns and tensions in both nations. A containment policy has also been deployed, including the imposition of trade barriers and tariffs on Chinese products; restricting Chinese companies’ access to U.S. technology and markets; and promoting the diversification of supply chains to reduce dependence on China. Nevertheless, the ongoing sanctions and restrictions have only served to reaffirm the shared survival interests of both powers, strengthening corporate ties and relations between them. These actions also reflect the growing concern among U.S. power groups over the decline of their hegemonic dominance. The Emergence of China and Its Role in the Transition Toward Multipolarity In a previous article titled "The Synergy Between Economy and Environment in China Through the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals," (‘La sinergia entre economía y medio ambiente en China mediante la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible’) the process of socioeconomic transformations experienced in the People's Republic of China over the past decade was discussed. These transformations have been primarily aimed at revitalizing the nation in preparation for its centenary in 2049. This strategy is rooted in aligning the Centenary Goals with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set for 2030, under the leadership of the Communist Party and the momentum driven by President Xi Jinping. The results of this strategy have had an impact not only on the Asian Giant itself—now a decisive actor in the Asian region—but also on the international order as a whole. As a result, China has emerged as a powerful rising power, with promising prospects for further elevating its development standards. This is backed by sustained GDP growth, averaging between 6% and 8% annually, indicating a robust economy. In addition, China holds vast foreign exchange reserves, granting it economic stability and the capacity to withstand potential external shocks. It also invests heavily in modern infrastructure and cutting-edge sectors such as artificial intelligence, 5G technology, and renewable energy—all of which enhance its competitiveness and lay the groundwork for long-term sustainable growth (Lagarde, CH). Nonetheless, China has also had to confront significant challenges in its gradual and progressive approach to the desired development model. Among these is the environmental cost associated with its rapid economic growth. For instance, China still experiences high levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, along with air, water, and soil pollution. In response, measures have been implemented such as the establishment of a national monitoring network and the replacement of coal heating systems in Beijing. Efforts have also been made to purify water resources polluted by industrial processes, and imports of solid waste have been reduced to help decontaminate soils affected by industrial and agricultural activities (González, R., 2023). In general, the development of renewable energy and a circular economy model is being promoted to enable a gradual transition toward a green economy, grounded in the concept of an ecological civilization. For this reason, China’s new era is committed to scientific and technological innovation as a means of driving economic growth that is both sustainable and capable of ensuring a higher quality of life for its population. This, in turn, leads gradually toward a new model of political leadership and economic management. In this regard, Jin Keyu, Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), has stated that “trillions of dollars of investment are needed for the global green transition, and China is going to play an essential role in that transformation” (Feingold, S., 2024). Based on the aforementioned elements, various authors such as Dr. C. Charles Pennaforte, Dr. C. Juan Sebastián Schulz, Dr. C. Eduardo Regalado Florido, among others, have indicated that the millenary nation represents a threat to the hegemony held by the United States since World War II. Consequently, it is recognized that a process of hegemonic crisis and transition is currently underway, with the Asia-Pacific region emerging as the center of gravity of the global power, thereby contributing to the multipolar transformation of the International System. The authors of “Is China Changing the World?” argue that “market socialism with “Chinese characteristics” must gradually and more clearly diverge from capitalism if it is to embody a genuinely alternative path for all of humanity.” In pursuit of this goal, China bases its policy of peaceful coexistence on five fundamental principles:Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, regardless of a country's size, power, or wealth. Mutual non-aggression Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, acknowledging that each nation has the right to freely choose its own social system and path of development. Equality and mutual benefit Peaceful coexistence. (Herrera, R.; Long, Z.; and Andréani, T., 2023) The rise of China as a major international power under these principles has been consolidating since 2012 under the leadership of Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China (CPC), gaining particular momentum from 2020 to the present. Thus, China has not only become the leading power within the Asian regional balance but has also expanded its presence across Europe, Africa, and Latin America—primarily through loans, investments, and multilateral cooperation initiatives such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Africa and the China-CELAC Forum in Latin America. In addition, China has positioned itself as a leader in several sectors, and it is projected that its economy may surpass that of the United States, increasing its Gross Domestic Product (Rodríguez, L., 2022). It has also undergone a process of opening up, energizing both its international trade and its overall foreign relations, all under the control of the Government and the Party. This, combined with its rise and development initiatives, has made China a focal point of interest for many countries within the International System seeking to jointly advance projects based on cooperation, the principle of shared advantage, and multilateralism. In this regard, the white paper "China and the World in the New Era," published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2019, states: “The world is moving rapidly toward multipolarity, diverse models of modern development, and collaboration in global governance. It is now impossible for a single country or bloc of countries to dominate world affairs. Stability, peace, and development have become the common aspirations of the international community.” (People’s Republic of China, 2019. Quoted in Schulz, J. S., 2022) Undoubtedly, this rise has become a source of concern for U.S. power groups, which have increasingly applied geostrategic pressure. Notably, the United States has strengthened military alliances with India, Japan, and Australia in an effort to encircle China and attempt to control or obstruct its maritime routes—this also being a manifestation of the intensification of the imperialist arms race. Nonetheless, China has maintained its development strategy and, as part of it, has strengthened its diplomatic network and its relations with multiple countries across all world regions. For all these reasons, China has become the most dynamic center of the global economy. Notably, it went from representing 4% of global GDP in 1960 to 16% in 2020—undeniable evidence of rapid economic growth. Moreover, it has become the world’s largest exporter of goods and also the leading importer, establishing itself as a major industrial power. In this regard, United Nations data reveal that China leads global industrial production, accounting for 30% of the total. This figure surpasses other industrial powers such as the United States (16%), Japan (7%), Germany (5.7%), and South Korea (3.2%) (Schulz, J. S., 2022). In addition, China has remained the world’s leading manufacturing power for approximately 15 consecutive years, according to statements from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology at the beginning of this year. This sector alone has contributed over 40% to overall growth. Likewise, in 2024, China experienced a significant increase in foreign investment, reflecting its interest in strengthening international cooperation for development. Efforts are also underway for urban renewal in 2024, with around 60,000 projects being implemented across various cities. These initiatives are primarily aimed at transforming underdeveloped neighborhoods and creating smarter urban areas (Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in the People's Republic of China, 2025). In this regard, the following graphs illustrate the value of China’s international trade during the 2016–2024 period, highlighting a strong presence of exports compared to imports. A second chart shows China's global export share, where it holds a dominant position.   Thus, China has risen as a center of power in the international system, with leadership not only in the economic domain but also in science and technology. At the same time, it has promoted a series of investments and a process of internationalizing its national currency. Accordingly, the Asian Giant offers an alternative model of development—one that is more comprehensive and sustainable—allowing it to propel the new phase of Chinese development. This phase aims not only to fulfill the dream of national rejuvenation but also to ensure the survival of its unique political, economic, and social model. Nevertheless, the significant challenges of sustaining growth cannot be overlooked. From this perspective, experts believe that new avenues of growth will be necessary for China to maintain the trajectory it has been experiencing. Specifically, the country must continue expanding its industrial sector while strengthening areas such as artificial intelligence, digital financial services, and green technologies (Feingold, S., 2024). It is also important to highlight the projected continuity and leadership of the Chinese government, with Xi Jinping identified as a key figure in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in China, in conjunction with the socioeconomic transformation strategy toward the 2049 centenary. This has been pursued through the defense of multilateralism, economic openness, and international integration and cooperation in support of global development. Conclusions In light of the above, a decline in U.S. hegemony can be observed, even though this process is not linear—nor is it certain whether any single power or coalition has come to occupy a hegemonic position. What is clear, however, is the existence of a trend toward multipolarity, driven by emerging powers and the strategic ties they are establishing. This is giving rise to a non-hegemonic reconfiguration of power blocs, which are building a multilateral and multipolar institutional framework. It can also be affirmed that China has become the most dynamic center of the global economy. This has been supported by its growth strategy focused on industrialization, digitalization, innovation, productivity, expansion, and internationalization of its development model—while maintaining a strong emphasis on environmental sustainability. A range of key initiatives and development projects have been implemented to support the country's rise, consolidating its role in the multipolar reconfiguration of the International System. All of this has been essential in driving China’s new phase of development and contributing to the broader process of multipolar transformation. Undoubtedly, China’s rapid ascent represents a significant challenge to the International System, as it reflects a shift in international relations and a transformation in the distribution and hierarchy of global power. Notes [1] It is important to clarify that the so-called Global South should not be equated with the Third World, as the distinction between the First and Third Worlds is primarily based on economic and technological differences, which do not align with the current circumstances of the International System of States. In contrast, the term Global South emerges from a new geopolitical perspective that arose in the post–Cold War context, driven by the need to promote South-South cooperation. 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Recent news from Ukraine has generally been bad. Since the end of May, ever larger Russian air strikes have been documented against Ukrainian cities with devastating consequences for civilians, including in the country’s capital, Kyiv. Amid small and costly but steady gains along the almost 1,000km long frontline, Russia reportedly took full control of the Ukrainian region of Luhansk, part of which it had already occupied before the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. And according to Dutch and German intelligence reports, some of Russia’s gains on the battlefield are enabled by the widespread use of chemical weapons. It was therefore something of a relief that Nato’s summit in The Hague produced a short joint declaration on June 25 in which Russia was clearly named as a “long-term threat … to Euro-Atlantic security”. Member states restated “their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine”. While the summit declaration made no mention of future Nato membership for Ukraine, the fact that US president Donald Trump agreed to these two statements was widely seen as a success. Yet, within a week of the summit, Washington paused the delivery of critical weapons to Ukraine, including Patriot air defence missiles and long-range precision-strike rockets. The move was ostensibly in response to depleting US stockpiles. This despite the Pentagon’s own analysis, which suggested that the shipment – authorised by the former US president Joe Biden last year – posed no risk to US ammunition supplies. This was bad news for Ukraine. The halt in supplies weakens Kyiv’s ability to protect its large population centres and critical infrastructure against intensifying Russian airstrikes. It also puts limits on Ukraine’s ability to target Russian supply lines and logistics hubs behind the frontlines that have been enabling ground advances. Despite protests from Ukraine and an offer from Germany to buy Patriot missiles from the US for Ukraine, Trump has been in no rush to reverse the decision by the Pentagon.   Another phone call with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on July 3, failed to change Trump’s mind, even though he acknowledged his disappointment with the clear lack of willingness by the Kremlin to stop the fighting. What’s more, within hours of the call between the two presidents, Moscow launched the largest drone attack of the war against Kyiv. A day later, Trump spoke with Zelensky. And while the call between them was apparently productive, neither side gave any indication that US weapons shipments to Ukraine would resume quickly. Trump previously paused arms shipments and intelligence sharing with Ukraine in March, 2025 after his acrimonious encounter with Zelensky in the Oval Office. But the US president reversed course after certain concessions had been agreed – whether that was an agreement by Ukraine to an unconditional ceasefire or a deal on the country’s minerals. It is not clear with the current disruption whether Trump is after yet more concessions from Ukraine. The timing is ominous, coming after what had appeared to be a productive Nato summit with a unified stance on Russia’s war of aggression. And it preceded Trump’s call with Putin. This could be read as a signal that Trump was still keen to accommodate at least some of the Russian president’s demands in exchange for the necessary concessions from the Kremlin to agree, finally, the ceasefire that Trump had once envisaged he could achieve in 24 hours. If this is indeed the case, the fact that Trump continues to misread the Russian position is deeply worrying. The Kremlin has clearly drawn its red lines on what it is after in any peace deal with Ukraine. These demands – virtually unchanged since the beginning of the war – include a lifting of sanctions against Russia and no Nato membership for Ukraine, while also insisting that Kyiv must accept limits on its future military forces and recognise Russia’s annexation of Crimea and four regions on the Ukrainian mainland. This will not change as a result of US concessions to Russia but only through pressure on Putin. And Trump has so far been unwilling to apply pressure in a concrete and meaningful way beyond the occasional hints to the press or on social media. Coalition of the willing It is equally clear that Russia’s maximalist demands are unacceptable to Ukraine and its European allies. With little doubt that the US can no longer be relied upon to back the European and Ukrainian position, Kyiv and Europe need to accelerate their own defence efforts. A European coalition of the willing to do just that is slowly taking shape. It straddles the once more rigid boundaries of EU and Nato membership and non-membership, involving countries such as Moldova, Norway and the UK. and including non-European allies including Canada, Japan and South Korea. The European commission’s white paper on European defence is an obvious indication that the threat from Russia and the needs of Ukraine are being taken seriously and, crucially, acted upon. It mobilises some €800 billion (£690 billion) in defence spending and will enable deeper integration of the Ukrainian defence sector with that of the European Union. At the national level, key European allies, in particular Germany, have also committed to increased defence spending and stepped up their forward deployment of forces closer to the borders with Russia. US equivocation will not mean that Ukraine is now on the brink of losing the war against Russia. Nor will Europe discovering its spine on defence put Kyiv immediately in a position to defeat Moscow’s aggression. After decades of relying on the US and neglecting their own defence capabilities, these recent European efforts are a first step in the right direction. They will not turn Europe into a military heavyweight overnight. But they will buy time to do so.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On September 24, 2024, speaking from the gargantuan Kazan International Exhibition Centre during the BRICS Summit in Russia, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphatically extolled the “collective rise of the Global South [as] a distinctive feature of the great transformation across the world.” While celebrating “Global South countries marching together toward modernization [as] monumental in world history and unprecedented in human civilization,” the Chinese leader hastened to add that China was not quite a part of but at the Global South’s “forefront”; that “will always keep the Global South in [their] heart, and maintain [their]roots in the Global South. As emerging powers in the BRICS+ grouping thronged Kazan in a clear sign to the West that they would not unwittingly entrench Vladimir Putin’s full-scale diplomatic isolation, China’s message was clear: as a great power, they would not ignore or undermine the interests of the Global South.  The rise of the Global South as a central voice in world politics concurs with the emergence of cyber diplomacy as a diplomatic field. This is not a coincidence, as they are both intimately related to broader changes in the international order, away from a US-led liberal international order, toward a post-liberal one, whose contours are still being defined, but where informal groupings, such as the BRICS+ play a key role. One could even argue that it is this transition to a new order that has pushed states to engage diplomatically on issues around cyberspace. What was once the purview of the Global North, and particularly the US, is now a contested domain of international activity. In this text we explore how the Global South has entered this contestation, and how it articulates its ever-growing presence in shaping the agenda of this domain. However, as cyber diplomacy is mainstreamed across the Global South, it is unclear whether it will continue to be a relevant collective force in forging the rules and norms that govern cyberspace, or whether the tendency will be for each country to trace their own path in service of their independent national interests. The evolution of cyber diplomacy in a post-liberal world Cyber diplomacy is very recent. One could argue that its practice only really started in the late 1990s, with Russia’s proposal of an international treaty to ban electronic and information weapons. Cyber diplomacy, as “the use of diplomatic resources and the performance of diplomatic functions to secure national interests with regard to the cyberspace” (or more simply, to the “the application of diplomacy to cyberspace”  is even more recent, with the first few writings on the topic emerging only in the last 15 years.   To be sure, the internet was born at the zenith of the US-led liberal international order and was viewed as an ideal tool to promote based on liberalism, free trade and information exchange with limited government intervention and democratic ideals. Cyber libertarians extolled the virtues of an independent cyberspace, free from state control and western governments, particularly the US, did not disagree. They viewed the internet as the perfect tool for promoting US global power and maintaining liberal hegemony -“ruling the airwaves as Great Britain once ruled the seas.” The internet was ensconced in the relatively uncontested unipolar geopolitical moment. As the pipe dreams of a liberal cyberspace began to unravel with China and Russia pushing for an alternate state-centric vision of cyberspace, cyber diplomacy began to emerge both as a “response to and continuing factor in the continuing battle in and over cyberspace.” Explicitly, we can pin down its origin to two factors. First, is the perception that cyberspace was becoming an increasingly intertwined with geopolitics and geo-economics, with states starting to better understand its threats, but also its opportunities. Moonlight Maze, the 2007 attacks against Estonia or even Stuxnet were all cases that helped focus the mind of policymakers around the world. Second, the broader context of underlying changes in the international order necessitated cyber diplomacy as a bridge-building activity both to mitigate great power rivalry and to preserve the stability of cyberspace and the digital economy. Private companies, till then the beneficiaries of an open and de-regulated internet, also had to step in to ensure that their own interests and profit motives were safeguarded. These two intertwined factors dominated the discussions around cyber diplomacy for most of the 2000s. Initially, the predominant focus was arms control, reflected in the composition of the first few Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) iterations, the forum created by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to discuss the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in international security. And although experts appointed by countries from the Global South were present since the first meeting in July 2004 the debate was very much framed as a discussion among great powers. As discussions progressed, and the GGE became a process in itself, some states outside the permanent members’ group started to engage more actively. This also coincided with the progressive creation of cyber diplomacy posts and offices in foreign ministries around the world. The field was becoming more professional, as more states started to realise that these were discussions that mattered beyond the restrictive group of power politics. Countries such as South Africa, Brazil, or Kenya started to push for the discussion of issues that affected a larger group of states, with a particular focus on cyber capacity building not just at the UN-GGE but also at other multilateral and multi-stakeholder processes and conferences including the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The creation of a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) at the UN First Committee (after an acrimonious diplomatic process) had an important effect in the diversification and democratisation of the discussions, as these were now open to the whole UN membership, and non-state actors were given the opportunity to observe and participate in these sessions. Further, in 2022, the UN set up an Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) to negotiate a cybercrime convention (adopted by consensus by UNGA members in December 2024) that also enabled all UN members to participate in the negotiations. The opening up of these processes exposed many states, particularly in the Global South, to the field, and it forced them to actively engage in discussions that until recently were seen as the dominion of great powers. The African Group and the G77 were now able to actively participate in the discussions, with frequent statements and contributions. Conceptualising the Global South in cyber diplomacy As cyber diplomacy progressed, policy-maker and academics alike understood global cyber governance to be divided along three main blocs of states. The status quo defenders were led by the US and (mostly Western) like-minded states, focused on the promotion of liberal values and non-binding norms shaped by a multi-stakeholder approach and adherence to existing tenets of international law but resisted significant changes in the governance of cyberspace. A revisionist group, led by Russia and China, advocated for a new binding international treaty and multilateral governance with the objective of guaranteeing security and order rather than necessarily promoting liberal values. Given this impasse, the role and influence of a group of states termed ‘swing states’ or ‘digital deciders’ has been recognized as critical to determining the future of cyberspace, most prominently in a detailed 2018 report by the Washington DC-based think-tank New America . This grouping that largely includes emerging powers from the Global South including India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, are understood as countries that are yet to “gravitate towards either end of the spectrum, some undecided and others seeking a third path.” Given these groupings, it is worth considering how the Global South fits in with present conceptualisations of cyber diplomacy, or whether it is a grouping at all. The term ‘Global South’ has come in for some criticism given the heterogeneity of countries it describes and its geographical inaccuracy (many Global South countries are not quite in the geographical South.) To be fair, the term never aspired for terminological accuracy and was instead coined to conceptually represent a group of countries during the Vietnam dissatisfied with the political and economic exploitation from the Global North. In that regard, Global South is a “mood,” a metaphor for developing countries aiming to find their way in an increasingly contested world. The war in Ukraine only augmented these fissures as the West were confounded by the Global South’s refusal to take a stand against brazen Russian aggression in Europe. The developing world saw it differently though: in an international order long-built on racism and inequality, expecting these countries to take a stand in their “petty squabbles” while they had also carried out “similarly violent, unjust, and undemocratic interventions—from Vietnam to Iraq” was a bridge too far. The Ukraine war helped clarify the combination of behaviours that countries within the Global South exhibit to attain this strategic goal: ideological agnosticism or neutrality; selective engagement with norms and rules; and finally, multi-pronged bilateral and minilateral groupings, with equidistance from the major powers. These three approaches helped illuminate the multiple different forms of agency that each developing country exercises vis-à-vis the international order based on their own interests and quest for strategic autonomy. However, what became evident as Russians bombs started to fall on the street of Kyiv, was already visible in these states’ interactions in cyber diplomacy. First, much of the Global South has refused to take an explicit stand on the controversial fissures that the leading powers have spent much of their time debating, including whether cyberspace governance should be state-centric or driven by new rules or existing international law.  Throughout the negotiating processes at the UN OEWG and AHC, as Russia and China clashed with the United States and its allies on the text of several controversial proposals, most developing countries took an agnostic approach, neither explicitly endorsing or opposing any of these potential treaty provisions. (There are naturally some exceptions: an analysis of voting patterns suggests that Iran and North Korea have firmly pegged themselves to the Russian and Chinese side of the aisle whereas some smaller developing countries have gravitated towards the US side of the aisle.) Second, there has been selective engagement when security or developmental interests are directly impacted. For example, in its joint submission to the UN’s Global Digital Compact (GDC), the G77+China asserted the need for equitable cross-border data flows that maximize development gains. The GDC is the UN’s first comprehensive framework for global digital cooperation. Long concerned about the misuse of the multi-stakeholder model by private actors for profit at the expense of developmental interests, the G77 also highlighted the need for “multilateral and transparent approaches to digital governance to facilitate a more just, equitable and effective governance system.” Finally, countries in  the Global South have entered into multiple technology partnerships across political and ideological divides. US efforts at restricting the encroachment of Chinese hardware providers like Huawei and ZTE into the core technological periphery of several Global South countries using allegations of surveillance were sometimes rebuked, given the Five Eyes’ proclivity and reputation for also conducting similar surveillance, including on top officials. By being agnostic on controversial ideological issues, countries in the Global South have been able to maintain ties with great powers on all sides of the political spectrum and foster pragmatic technological partnerships. Will the Global South rise? The Global South’s rise as a potent force in cyber diplomacy will, however, depend on three factors. Can it maintain ideological consistency on developmental and rights concerns, including on how the internet is governed at home? Can they continue to work with multiple partners without succumbing to pressure either from Washington or Beijing? Will emerging powers in the Global South (like India, Brazil and Indonesia) bat for the interests of the larger developing world, rather than simply orchestrating global governance to service their own interests or that of the regime in power? Given that cyber diplomacy emerged and developed as the playground of great powers, analysing it through the perspective of the Global South enables us to focus on cyber governance as an issue that goes beyond (cyber)security concerns – including economic development and identity (cutting across issues of race, gender, and colonialism) – and to see the world from a perspective that goes beyond the dynamics of great power competition. Analytically, it is useful to understand how these states position themselves and justify their actions on behalf of the whole. When looking inside the box, we see some collective movement but also a desire on part of the great powers, including China to incentivise the developing world to see the world as they do. The Global South remains relevant as a construct that captures the mood of the developing world on the geopolitics of technology of cyber issues. Its “great strength” will emerge not from swinging between Washington and Beijing or being orchestrated through New Delhi or Brasilia. It will instead come through standing their ground, in service of their own security and developmental interests in cyberspace. And as they progress, it remains to be seen whether the “Global South” retains its relevance as an analytical construct or whether it will give way to other denominations that better capture the developing world’s nuances and differences vis-à-vis the international cyber order. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском April 2025 marks the second anniversary of Finland’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although the prospect of joining the alliance began to be seriously considered after the escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, a final decision was repeatedly postponed due to the unclear advantages of this move and insufficient public support. Despite close economic ties with Russia and a tradition of cautious diplomacy known as the “Paasikivi–Kekkonen line” (often criticized as “Finlandization”), the 2022 international crisis pushed Finland to join NATO. Since then, the once-neutral country has shifted its foreign policy, increased defense spending, and expanded its arms exports. Government and Military Perspectives In December 2024, the Finnish government presented a new Defense Report in Helsinki, replacing the previous strategy issued in September 2021. Back in 2021, Finland had highlighted the growing military activity in the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions, along with the increased interest of major powers in the natural resources of the North and the Northern Sea Route. Notably, the country didn’t name any specific enemy, choosing to keep its message broad and carefulThe 2024 document takes a much more serious tone. It clearly names Russia as the main source of global instability and describes China as a growing power that challenges the U.S. and its allies. Terrorism is mentioned too, but much less often. Some of the main points about global security include the following - The return of a "large-scale, protracted war" to the European continent;- The Special Military Operation (SMO) is interpreted as a continuation of Russia’s aggressive actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, as well as in Georgia in 2008;- An increase in hybrid attacks and incidents involving critical infrastructure;- Growing Chinese influence on Finland and its neighboring countries;- An unpredictable and unstable defense and international security environment, with a clear tendency toward further deterioration;- The largest NATO military buildup on the eastern flank since the end of the Cold War;- Accession to NATO is described as “the most significant transformation in Finland’s defense policy since World War II”;- Ongoing integration of Finland’s armed forces into NATO’s structures and joint defense planning;- Finland is now planning its defense together with NATO, focusing not just on its own territory but also on the Baltic States, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the North Atlantic. In the section on shifts in global power, Russia is named as the main cause of instability. It is described as “the most significant and immediate threat to the Allies, to security, and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.” Other claims include: a long-standing effort to weaken the European Union, a push to restore its great power status, and an attempt to divide Europe into spheres of influence using military force. Russia is also accused of using hybrid tactics—such as spreading fear, influencing public opinion, stirring political divisions, and blocking decisions—to target European countries and their people. Its Special Military Operation is seen as the beginning of a broader, more direct, and unpredictable conflict with the West. China is characterized as a less aggressive player. It is noted that Beijing is rapidly modernizing its armed forces, has intensified intelligence activities in the United States and Europe, and has strengthened military and economic cooperation with Russia, the development of which will determine Moscow’s ability to exert influence over Europe. At the same time, Finnish strategists place greater emphasis on the ongoing competition between China and the United States for global political, military, economic, and technological dominance. In matters concerning NATO’s role in defense, it is noted that the Alliance has intensified its cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, increased its military presence on the eastern flank and the number of military exercises, and is continually updating both general and regional defense plans in the event of a large-scale conflict. With the accession of Finland and Sweden, NATO has become geographically closer to strategically important areas for Russia, including Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad, the Kola Peninsula, Belarus, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic region. Within the Alliance, ensuring the security of maritime transport routes and the modernization of military infrastructure in Northern European countries is viewed as a key condition for the potential reinforcement of troops from North America. The role of the European Union is described as complementary to NATO, while it is also noted that the EU is increasing defense spending and expanding technological cooperation. The report was published after the election victory of Republican U.S. President Donald Trump, known for his isolationist views, which is partially reflected in the document through emphasis on European independence in security matters and the need for further military expenditures. On intra-European regional issues, the report focuses on cooperation with the member states of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Baltic States, and the United Kingdom, as well as on Germany’s shift in security policy, France’s increased defense spending, and Poland’s growing purchases of military equipment. In military and technology matters, the document highlights the growing role of unmanned systems (both remote-controlled and autonomous), artificial intelligence, and advanced human capabilities like improved thinking and synthetic biology. It stresses the need to use the latest scientific and tech innovations in developing weapons — a step that could help make up for fewer soldiers on the battlefield. Cyberspace and outer space are seen as new areas of military and technological competition. This view is based on several factors: the rapid growth of space technologies (driven by private companies), easier access to space, and heavy reliance on cyber tools and satellites for both military and civilian use. Information warfare is also becoming more influential alongside traditional combat. The document notes that small countries can benefit in such conflicts by using innovations smartly and managing resources well. Still, Helsinki does not rely only on high-tech solutions. A key part of Finland’s military strategy is preparing both its army and population for long-term, grinding conflicts. This includes signing long-term arms supply contracts, building strategic reserves, keeping supply chains strong, and staying ready to protect their way of life. Among the main conclusions, the authors of the report present the following: - Finland and Europe are facing a significant decline in security, with no short-term improvement expected.- Russia poses and will continue to pose a constant security threat to Europe and Finland;- Finland will provide military assistance to Ukraine for as long as necessary;- Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Nordic countries, the Baltic Sea region, and the High North have formed a unified geostrategic space; the Baltic Sea region holds strategic importance for Finland;- Finland’s defense will rely on maintaining conscription, strengthening the training of its military reserve, a strong public will to defend the country, and support from NATO membership.- Commitment to total defense — a combination of all national and international military and civilian measures that ensure the protection of the country under any circumstances (seven components are listed: government administration, international relations, defense capability, internal security, economy, functional capabilities of the population, and psychological resilience of people); There is a need to improve working conditions in the defense industry, increase production, and secure steady, reliable supply chains. A gradual increase in Finland’s military spending. - The development of the EU’s defense potential, and movement toward greater independence of the European Union both in policy and in the development of military technologies and defense supplies;- NATO’s readiness to provide the full spectrum of forces necessary for large-scale, high-intensity combat operations; Finland, in turn, must also create all the necessary conditions for the presence of allied troops on its territory. Similar assessments are presented in the Military Intelligence Review of Finland — 2025 (previous publications date back to 2021 and 2023), prepared by the General Staff of the Finnish Defence Forces. Russia is also named as the main threat there, which “seeks to reduce Western influence, secure its sphere of influence,” “views security policy as a zero-sum great power game in which NATO expansion strengthens the position of the United States and thereby weakens Russia’s security,” and “the interests or security of neighboring countries are not an important factor in Moscow’s calculations.” In addition, Russia is accused of seeking to turn the Global South against Western countries, in particular, there is a reference to “an attempt to present the BRICS group as part of an anti-Western ‘global majority’” . As for the Northern European direction, the Finnish General Staff notes the buildup of Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula and in the Arctic region, attributes to Moscow attempts to gain unrestricted access to the Northern Sea Route and to weaken the integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO structures. Helsinki predicts that after the end of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s priority will be the accelerated buildup and modernization of forces in the reestablished Leningrad Military District, bordering Scandinavia. Finnish military officials do not believe in a quick settlement of the situation in Ukraine and forecast a deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West in the coming years, a struggle by Russia for shipping in the Baltic Sea “by any means,” continued attacks on underwater infrastructure in the Baltic (a reference to damage to undersea cables, although no exact culprit is named), escalation of the race between the West, Russia and China for the resources of the High North, and increased intelligence and sabotage activities by Russian special services in Finland. China is not viewed in an entirely negative light; instead, there is recognition of Beijing's ambition to become a political, economic, military, and technological leader by 2049, marking the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. China's growing influence over countries of the Global South is also noted. Russia–China relations are seen as a "lifeline" for the Russian economy and a means of circumventing sanctions. However, Beijing is not seen as an equal partner, but as someone benefiting from Russia’s growing isolation. This makes Russia more dependent on China. The war in Ukraine is seen as helping China, since it distracts the West from China's global rise. At the regional level, Helsinki plans to enhance cooperation and update the foundational NORDEFCO agreement during its presidency of the organization in 2025. This push for renewal is driven by the evolving security environment and Finland’s recent accession to NATO alongside Sweden. Back in April 2024, the defense ministers of the member states signed a memorandum outlining a new vision for NORDEFCO. According to the document, by 2030 the countries plan to improve joint military planning and operations, make it easier to move troops across borders, boost cooperation and intelligence sharing, both directly and through NATO and the EU, and keep strengthening the defense industries of the Nordic countries. NORDEFCO is not officially seen as a mutual defense agreement or a command system like NATO; however, in recent years, it has started to show features usually found in a defense alliance, mostly because of the actions of some of its members. In 2021, the defense ministers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden signed a deal to strengthen cooperation, allowing for "joint action in times of peace, crisis, or conflict." In 2022, they gave each other permission to use their airspace and military bases. That same year, the defense ministers of Finland, Norway, and Sweden updated their three-way agreement, further growing their military cooperation. After Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway made a joint promise to fully support them if either country were attacked. While NORDEFCO has not yet become an organization like NATO, the current level of defense cooperation between the Nordic countries at the regional level — and repeated promises to help each other in case of conflict — suggest that in the coming years, this effort might start to look like a smaller version of NATO in Northern Europe. This kind of setup would likely be less full of red tape, quicker at making decisions, and made up of countries that share similar views and speak with one voice. It would also have a lower risk of going backward — unlike some NATO members who, in recent years, have threatened to block decisions, added extra demands for new members, or even talked about leaving the Alliance. Defense and Military-Industrial Complex Expenditures Threats identified by Finnish politicians and the military automatically require growing expenditures and an acceleration of the defense industry. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2014 to 2020, Finland’s military spending remained annually at the level of 1.5% of GDP, while in absolute terms it gradually increased — from $3.57 billion to $3.9 billion. Amid the pandemic in 2021, the figure dropped to $3.65 billion, but by the end of 2022 it amounted to $4.47 billion, and in 2023 — to $6.85 billion, or 2.4% of GDP. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) provides similar estimates: growth from $3.72 billion in 2014 to $6.89 billion in 2024, with the budget for 2025 estimated at $7.47 billion. Helsinki does not intend to stop there — on April 1, 2025, following recommendations from the Ministry of Defense, the government began preparations for a phased increase of the military budget to at least 3% of GDP by 2029. Over four years, it plans to raise allocations by €3.7 billion, expand the state defense order, and develop new rearmament programs for the 2030s. Helsinki also views the prospects of its domestic defense industry with optimism — according to the Finnish think tank SaferGlobe (which, according to its website, is “engaged in the study and development of tools to promote sustainable peace and security”), in 2023 arms exports reached €333 million (of which €141 million accounted for weapons intended for civilian use in self-defense, sports, and hunting) — a record since record-keeping began in 2002. About 85% of military exports were distributed within Europe. The largest importing countries by value were Sweden (€51 million), Latvia (€34 million), and Lithuania (€19 million) — together, these three countries accounted for more than half of all military product exports. In value terms, the largest share of exported military products (32%) consisted of land vehicles and their components. The next largest export categories were ammunition (17%), as well as explosives and charges (15%). The largest exports of civilian weapons were to the United States (€52 million), Canada (€15 million), and Australia (€9 million). The year 2023 also set a record for issued export licenses for military products — €667 million. The largest recipient countries of export licenses were Slovakia (€201 million), Japan (€154 million), and Ukraine (€88 million). Similar conclusions were reached by the state investment company Finnish Industry Investment (Tesi), which in autumn 2024 surveyed 368 domestic defense companies: 144 of them were identified as “fast-growing startups and growth companies,” while the rest were described as “more established players with a long history, mainly providing consulting services to the Finnish Defence Forces.” The highest growth rates were shown by producers of dual-use goods, whose net profit has increased annually by 30–40% since 2022. At the same time, companies engaged exclusively in the military sector faced difficulties in attracting investment. 50% of defense companies were located in the capital region of Uusimaa, where the leaders were Helsinki (74 companies) and its satellite city Espoo (65); another 16% were based in the Pirkanmaa region centered around Tampere (40). Rounding out the top five were the high-tech “capital” Oulu (21) and another satellite of Helsinki, Vantaa (14). By type of activity, the majority of companies (246) operated in the support and logistics sector; 70 were engaged in the design of combat command and control systems (C4I — Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence); 20 firms cooperated with the land forces, 13 with the navy, 10 with the air force, five worked in joint operations, and the remaining four were involved in space technologies. A New Strategy — A New President Finland’s entry into NATO happened during the second and final term of President Sauli Niinistö. While he followed the West’s general approach on the war in Ukraine and supported anti-Russian sanctions, he still tried to keep some level of political dialogue with Russia. After February 2022, this became almost impossible, and Finland officially ended its nearly 80-year policy of staying neutral. In the two-round election held in January and February 2024, Finnish voters chose Alexander Stubb from the National Coalition Party as their new president. Stubb studied in the United States and France, and previously worked as a Member of the European Parliament, as well as Finland’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. Back in 2014, when Finland still followed the "Paasikivi–Kekkonen line" of cautious foreign policy, Stubb was one of the only top officials who openly supported joining NATO. On the topic of relations with Russia, he said that “Russia’s integration with the West was an illusion.” This view may be influenced by his family history. Stubb’s father, Göran Stubb, was born in Käkisalmi — a town that was given to the Soviet Union after the Soviet–Finnish War of 1939–1940, renamed first as Kexholm (in Swedish), and later as Priozersk. On his father's side, Stubb’s grandparents came from Vyborg, which also became part of the Soviet Union after the war. However, the family had already moved to Helsinki before the conflict started. In his inaugural speech on March 1, 2024, Alexander Stubb uncompromisingly stated to the citizens of Finland that “the post–Cold War era is over” (placing the blame on Russia), “the instruments of cooperation have been turned into weapons,” “the world is in a transitional state,” and “the creation of a new world order takes time.” He added that Finns “will have to respond quickly to changing circumstances, as was the case with NATO membership,” and that “when times become difficult, I too will be ready to make tough decisions to ensure the security of our country.” In addition to his campaign promises, the newly elected president confirmed his commitment to the previously introduced “value-based realism” (arvopohjainen realismi), which he pledged to be guided by in the conduct of foreign policy if elected. Later, this was officially included in the government’s report on foreign and security policy in June 2024. Among other ideas, the report especially highlighted the following: commitment to democratic values, the rule of law, international law, and human rights; strengthening the country’s defense; staying out of military conflicts; and being open to dialogue with countries that do not share these values. The election of A. Stubb as president strengthened the pro-Western trends in Finland’s foreign policy. On September 1, 2024, the Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States entered into force, under which Finland opens 15 of its military facilities for possible use by U.S. forces, while Helsinki will not charge rent for premises or land made available to the United States. On September 27 of the same year, the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced the placement of NATO headquarters on Finnish territory — in Mikkeli in the southwest of the country, 140 km from the border with the Russian Federation, and in the northern region of Lapland. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish authorities announced preparations to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines (a similar step had previously been taken by the defense ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia), stating that this is “a cost-effective way to supplement the capabilities of the armed forces,” but adding that the country would remain “committed to the humanitarian goals of the convention” even after a possible withdrawal. On April 15, 2025, a Finnish servicemember took part for the first time in a flight aboard a NATO E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft during Ramstein Alloy 2025 exercises in the Baltic region. The NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force (NAEW&CF) includes personnel from 17 countries, in addition to which Canada, France, Finland, and Lithuania also contribute their staff. NATO noted that the E-3A is the first multinational flying unit created by the Alliance. Statements regarding Russia, despite initial uncompromising tone, began to soften after the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, who held a different view of the Ukrainian conflict compared to the strongly pro-Ukrainian administration of Joe Biden. As early as April 2024, Alexander Stubb stated that there was no need to conduct political dialogue with Russia, and considered military action the only path to peace in the context of Ukraine. Under the new Washington administration, the Finnish president approved of the negotiations between the U.S. and Russian leaders, but again repeated the Ukrainian position on the need for a “just peace” and Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO. During his March 2025 visit to Florida, Stubb attempted to dissuade Donald Trump from cooperating with Russia and also called for tougher sanctions against Moscow. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish president admitted that European countries had started talking about renewing contact with Russia. He said that Finland must "morally prepare" for rebuilding political ties with Russia, since "nothing changes the fact that Russia exists and will always be a neighbor." However, he did not give any timeline for when relations might be restored. The situation around the war in Ukraine is made more difficult by the Trump administration’s growing isolationism, along with threats to pull out of talks and a trade war that Washington has launched against almost the entire world (though some parts of it have been paused). This raises fears of a new “Great Depression.” The European Union’s success at the negotiating table will depend on how united its member states are, since they have different geopolitical interests. Although Finland supports calls for a ceasefire, it does not plan to stop its military support for Ukraine or oppose Ukraine joining NATO. Alexander Stubb, on at least two occasions (in November 2024 and March 2025), publicly warned Ukraine against following a “Finnish scenario.” This would mean giving up on NATO membership and possibly giving up territory—similar to what Finland did after World War II, when it accepted neutrality and lost 11% of its land. In a comment on efforts to resolve the conflict in 2025, Stubb criticized Finland’s past policy of “good neighborliness” with the Soviet Union. He said that while Finland kept its independence in 1944, it lost land, part of its sovereignty, and the ability to make its own decisions freely.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Less than a fortnight after Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky had their now-notorious row in the Oval Office and US-Ukrainian relations appeared irretrievably damaged, the two countries have reached an agreement. After nine hours of negotiations behind closed doors in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, negotiators signed off on a US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, allowing the resumption of military aid and intelligence sharing by the US. This does not mean that the guns in the war will now immediately fall silent. No ceasefire agreement between the warring parties – Russia and Ukraine – has been signed. In fact, it is not even clear how much detail is contained in the proposal and how much of it has already been discussed with Russia during earlier talks between senior US and Russian officials. Nonetheless, the deal signals a major step forward. From a Ukrainian perspective, it has several advantages. First, the major rift between Kyiv and Washington has at least been partially patched up. The minerals agreement – on hold since the White House shouting match on February 28 –is back on. Trump has extended an invitation to Zelensky to return to Washington to sign it. Equally importantly for Kyiv, the resumption of US weapons deliveries to Ukraine and the lifting of the ban on intelligence sharing were part of the deal, and with immediate effect. This restores critical US battlefield support for Ukraine, including for Kyiv’s capability to strike targets deep inside Russia. By contrast, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is now in a somewhat trickier position. He has to balance his war aims in Ukraine with the arguably more strategically important goal of rapprochement with the US. Talks between senior US and Russian officials on February 18, in the Saudi capital Riyadh, seemed to indicate that Moscow had won significant concessions from Washington – including on retaining illegally occupied territory and no Nato membership for Ukraine. These concessions may still be on the table, alongside other US offers to normalise relations and end Russia’s isolation from the west. But this does not mean that Russia will be in any particular hurry to bring the fighting in Ukraine to an end. The country’s economy has weathered western sanctions remarkably well so far. Putin is also likely to be keen on capitalising further on the momentum that his troops still have on the frontlines inside Ukraine. And he is unlikely to want to sit down to talk about a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, with Zelensky as long as Ukraine still holds territory in the Kursk region inside Russia. While Ukrainian troops have come under increasing pressure there recently and are in danger of being encircled, it is likely to take Russia some more time to force them to withdraw completely or to surrender.   Putin is therefore likely to play for more time in an effort to push his advantage on the ground while avoiding upsetting Trump. The deputy head of the upper house of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council, and chairman of its international affairs committee, Konstantin Kosachev, signalled as much after the US-Ukraine deal was announced. He insisted that any agreements would have to be on Russian, rather than American – let alone Ukrainian – terms. This indicates a willingness to talk but also signals that an agreement, even on a ceasefire, will still require further negotiations. Pressure points Playing for time will also allow Putin to avoid rebuffing the American proposal outright. To do so would be a huge gamble for the Russian president. Trump has already proven his willingness to exert maximum pressure on Ukraine – and he seems to have got his way. Ahead of the US-Ukraine meeting in Jeddah, he was also clear that he would consider further sanctions on Russia to force Moscow to accept an end of the fighting in Ukraine. Both of these steps – pressure on Ukraine and on Russia – are part of a plan developed by Trump’s special Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg back in May 2024. Crucially, Kellogg also envisaged continuing “to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a cease-fire or peace agreement”. If Putin were to reject the current proposal, he would therefore not only risk a broader reset of US-Russia relations but potentially also lose his current battlefield advantage, as well as territory Moscow currently controls. That’s because a boost to Ukrainian military capabilities would likely shift the balance of power, at least on some parts of the front line. The most likely scenario going forward is a two-pronged Russian approach. The Kremlin is likely to engage with the White House on the American ceasefire proposal that has now been accepted by Ukraine while pushing hard for further territorial gains before US-Russia talks conclude. The peculiar set-up of the negotiations also plays into the Kremlin’s hands here. Short of direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow, Washington has to shuttle between them, trying to close gaps between their positions with a mixture of diplomacy and pressure. This has worked reasonably well with Ukraine so far, but it is far less certain that this approach will bear similar fruit with Russia. The temporary ceasefire currently on the table may, or may not, be an important step towards a permanent cessation of violence and a sustainable peace agreement. Whether it will become a milestone on the path to peace will depend on Trump’s willingness to pressure Russia in a similar way to Ukraine. It’s important to remember that Ukraine has already paid a huge price as a result of Russia’s aggression. Any further delay on the path to a just peace will inflict yet more pain on the victim instead of the aggressor. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [add link: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/] 

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump has claimed that he could end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours of taking office. He now calls for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and the beginning of negotiations. However, history shows that what cannot be achieved on the battlefield is unlikely to be obtained at the negotiating table. Immediate ceasefire of the Ukraine war could be a double-edged sword for the United States under the current circumstances. Russia occupies significant Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and parts of Zaporizhzhia, amounting to approximately 18% of Ukraine’s territory. Ukraine has made incursions into the Russian regions of Belgorod and Bryansk, only amounting to less than 1% of Russia’s total territory. How can both sides achieve their goals at the negotiating table?  Trump’s special envoy Keith Kellogg suggests ending the war by halting weapon supplies to Ukraine if it refuses to engage in peace talks — and increasing weapon deliveries to Ukraine if Russia fails to do the same. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has suggested the possibility of negotiating a cease-fire deal with Russia, proposing that the status of occupied territories could be addressed diplomatically at a later stage. This reflects Ukraine’s constrained position under various pressures. Russia is open to a peace talk but is unlikely to make a huge compromise with Ukraine. Despite NATO’s extensive support, sufficient military resources such as ammunition and air defense systems have not been provided to enable Ukraine to effectively counter Russian advances and produce decisive outcomes in strategic offensives due to unclear strategic objectives and effective implementation measures.   Sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies have not crippled the Russian economy as intended; instead, the Russian economy grew by 3.1% in the third quarter of 2024, and its national debt remains at 14.6% of GDP—approximately the same level as when the war began in 2022.  In 2023, Russia spent $160 billion on military needs, accounting for about 40% of its budget. For 2025, Russia has already allocated 13.5 trillion rubles (over $145 billion) for national defense, representing 32.5% of the budget. With support from North Korea, Iran, China, and other countries, Russia is likely to sustain its efforts on Ukrainian soil. In contrast, Ukraine is unlikely to achieve a decisive victory in the short term. If its allies continue with the current strategy while reducing financial aid, Ukraine risks depleting its resources and prolonging the conflict into an unpredictable stalemate, potentially leaving it at a disadvantage during negotiations. Without doubt, an immediate ceasefire could help stop further casualties and bring some much-needed relief to the people affected by the conflict. It can also ease the immediate burden of supporting Ukraine militarily and financially, freeing resources for domestic priorities and addressing other international challenges, particularly countering China’s challenges. However, an immediate ceasefire according to the current battlefield map could also benefit U.S. rivals—authoritarian regimes. First, it would solidify Russia’s control over occupied territories, allowing Moscow to claim a partial victory and bolster domestic support. Such an outcome rewards territorial aggression and undermines international norms. Second, it could weaken the U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, signaling to adversaries that aggression can succeed if sustained long enough. European allies might interpret a ceasefire as a sign of wavering U.S. resolve, leading to fractures within NATO and weakening transatlantic unity. Allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, may question the reliability of U.S. security commitments in the region. Third, China has been closely watching the West’s response to the Ukraine crisis, focusing on the cohesion of alliances, the impact of sanctions, and the dynamics of military support. An immediate freeze of the war would demonstrate limited Western resolve and suggest that territorial aggression can yield lasting gains. This reinforces Beijing’s belief that the international community would hesitate to intervene militarily in Taiwan and encourages China to change the status quo over the Taiwan Strait, believing it can manage economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures. Fourth, an immediate ceasefire does not guarantee long-term peace. The lack of a comprehensive peace agreement leaves underlying issues unaddressed, and it merely postpones hostilities, making the prospect of sustainable peace elusive. Historically, frozen conflicts like those in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Moldova’s Transnistria have fostered prolonged instability, enabling aggressors to consolidate control over occupied territories and exert leverage over affected states. The lesson from Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea demonstrates that tolerating an aggressor only encourages further expansion of their ambitions. Instead of an immediate ceasefire agreement, it is necessary to further support Ukraine in reclaiming its territory by changing the current strategy before reaching any cease-fire deal. Historical patterns show that successful territorial recaptures often require asserting military strength before engaging in peace talks. A cease-fire without the necessary restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty risks legitimizing Russia’s invasion. A successful Ukrainian counteroffensive could not only enhance Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations but also serve as a powerful deterrent against future territorial ambitions by other authoritarian regimes globally. The United States will not compromise American national interests when mediating a cease-fire agreement between Ukraine and Russia. However, it will be an extremely challenging task for any American president to broker a peace deal at this time because a deal should uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and internationally recognized borders, align with U.S. support for a rules-based international order, and ensure a balance between both parties instead of rewarding Russian aggression. It should strengthen U.S.-European relations rather than undermine allied unity, adhere to longstanding U.S. foreign policy principles rather than prioritize political gains, and enhance the U.S.’s reputation as a reliable global leader. Otherwise, immediately freezing the war could potentially harm U.S. national interests in the long term and directly encourage the ambitions of aggressors worldwide. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/]

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine faces mounting challenges as battlefield victory becomes unlikely, with Donald Trump’s proposed “peace plan” offering a ceasefire based on territorial concessions. While Russia’s vulnerabilities may push Vladimir Putin toward negotiations, the outcome risks freezing the conflict and undermining the international rules-based order. Winning the war against Russian through  “victory on the battlefield” does not look good for Ukraine. The odds are just too high:  from the overall sobering strategic outlook for Ukraine on the battlefield, Ukraine’s limitations in terms of overall military power, the weakening support from Western nations and their fear of a further escalation (falling for Putin’s red lines regarding nuclear escalation); to the president-elect Donald Trump’s newly touted “peace plan”  for Ukraine. Trump has made ending the war in Ukraine one of his election promises. The reasons for his optimism include his perceived personal diplomatic potential, but also necessity in US economic concerns, political strategy, and the ability to able to focus on the China challenge. Russia is weakened and needs a pause in the fighting Vladimir Putin’s own challenges, of course, might make him more inclined to listen to a US led “peace plan” for Ukraine. These include the worsening economic downturn, the erosion of his military power, and recent setbacks of Russian brinkmanship in the Middle East and its alliances with both Iran and Syria. Last week’s dramatic events in Syria with Bashar Al Assad’s regime finally toppling has revealed several miscalculations in Russia. The events of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war in Palestine has shifted regional power dynamics, not only diminishing Russia’s role but also its ally Iran whose  ‘Axis of  Resistance’ , including Hamas and Hezbollah, hasbeen severely weakened. The fall of Syria is a major strategic loss for Putin and has serious consequences for Russia’s role and standing not only in the Middle East but beyond. The “strong” and perhaps “wise” man image is falling apart. Not a good prospect when it comes to China and the “no limits” partnership: a weak Russia is not what President Xi Jinping needs in his challenge to the current political and military Western order. Given these strategic circumstances it is in Putin’s interest to find a diplomatic solution for ending “his” war in Ukraine. A negotiated freezing of the conflict, with Russia keeping the current occupied parts of Ukraine and Crimea, might be a way out for Putin to declare “mission accomplished.” Ukraine’s precarious position President Volodymir Zelensky’s five step victory plan of November 2024, is already dead. its two main conditions, full NATO membership in the very near future and a step up in Western military assistance, will not happen. NATO maintains that Ukraine is on an “irreversible path to NATO membership,” subject to the Alliance members’ agreement and conditions being met, and the end of hostilities. Perhaps more concerning, the mood seems to have shifted among Ukrainians: recent polls show a majority of Ukrainians supporting a negotiated peace with Russia as current battlefield gains by the Russian Armed Forces continue. This poll also reveals that Ukrainians have become increasingly wary of promises of  support of the West. President Zelensky, maintaining optimism in the face of grave difficulties, has openly stated that he is looking forward to Trump’s return to the White House. He now also suggests  that the war may  end sooner with Trump’s re-election. The most contentious points remaining are NATO membership and no territorial concessions. Zelensky has recently indicated a willingness to trade (at least temporarily) territory for NATO membership. Given NATO’s clear messaging during the 2024 Washington Summit that this would not happen without peace first he might need to change his position in respect to NATO membership as well. How would Trump’s peace plan look like Trump’s “Peace Plan” is still vague but it will be a cease fire agreement with territorial concessions, a potential demilitarised zone, continuing security assistance, and potentially “boots on the grounds,” with sanctions relief for Russia as a further stimulus. In signposting his seriousness with the proposal, Trump has appointed retired General Keith Kellogg as a special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, and has met with Zelensky about ending the war during last week’s meeting of world leaders in France at the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral. President Zelensky called his discussions with Trump “good and productive.” An armistice in Ukraine cannot be just an extension of the Minsk II agreement of 2015. The agreement did not work for multiple reasons, but most importantly because of Russian non-compliance and a lack of a deterrence element. Such an armistice would need to be a modern day Korean Armistice Agreement with a potential UN monitoring presence in a demilitarised zone, and a sizeable military deterrence component from Western militaries for Ukraine. NATO membership in the immediate future would be the best option, but likely off the cards due to Russia’s opposition and lack of support from NATO. A twenty year moratorium on Ukraine’s NATO bid, as proposed by the Trump team, could be a way forward. A “West German model of NATO membership” for the unoccupied territories of Ukraine would also be a possible option for Ukraine, which President Zelenksy seems to support. Again, such a proposal seems unlikely given the headwinds from both NATO and Russia. A European permanent military presence in the unoccupied parts of Ukraine (inclusive of US military support), like the US in South Korea, would in theory be possible as they would explicitly be in the respective national but not NATO capacity. This option would rejuvenate an idea of French President Emmanuel Macron madeearlier this year, and if mandated by the UN could be a potential security safeguard for Ukraine. Whatever the outcome, care needs to be taken that this temporary “freezing” of hostilities does not become a de facto “victory for Putin” and a loss for the Rules Based Order. Trump’s attitude towards solving diplomatic and other issues has been described in the past as being “transactional” in essence: ending the Ukraine War has now become the first major test for Trump, the transactional president. Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann is Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra), University of Canberra, and a Research Fellow with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also a Fellow with NATO SHAPE – ACO Office of Legal Affairs where he works on Hybrid Threats and Lawfare. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the rise of Russia and China, the world is shifting dramatically from a unipolar US-dominated order to a multipolar one. Russia’s strategic alliances, along with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and economic growth, are reshaping global power dynamics. On the other hand, the United States’ military interventions and isolationist moves have raised a critical question: can it adapt to this new global reality, or will it continue to lose influence on these emerging powers? The Decline of U.S. Global Dominance The global order is witnessing a transformative period, from a unipolar order under US dominance to a multipolar one. The latter provides other major powers an extensive opportunity to challenge the US-led global system. China, Russia, and even the middle powers use this waning US influence to expand their global political clout. The rise of these powers is altering the global balance of power. Numerous US policy decisions have weakened its position in the global sphere. The militarization approach of the United States and the successive unpopular government policies have made its fall inevitable. The realist theorists attempt to attribute these changes in global power distribution as a result of the anarchic world system. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its growing economic might present the strongest challenge to the US economic and military hegemony in the world. The BRI has posed it as an indispensable economic partner of the countries across the three continents including Africa, Asia, and Latin America due to the investment of trillions of dollars in infrastructural projects. Moreover, its trade volume reached $6 trillion in 2022 surpassing the US trade volume of $4.9 trillion. This economic might has enabled it to entice states that became weary of the US’s harsh approach towards the developing and underdeveloped world. The Emergence of a Multipolar World Order Furthermore, globalization has also prompted the Third World countries to partake in knowledge and economic competitions with the Western world.   The liberal theorists hold that the leveling effect of globalization enables it to redistribute power. The emergence of this new multipolar world order has made it difficult for the US to establish and maintain its influence over the globe and remain relevant in global governance. The rise of BRICS, with its share of 37.4 percent in the global GDP in 2023, and its decision to introduce its currency for mutual trade have challenged the US financial system, hastening the decline of the US-led economic and political order. Moreover, the US policies under a few former presidents have also contributed to the rapid decline of the country’s hegemony. United States military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, its covert involvement behind sparking the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and its compliance in Israel’s war crimes in Gaza have all damaged Washington’s global standing. Its deadliest invasion of Iraq, under the pretext of unverified reports of WMDs, undermined its credibility and destabilized the whole Middle Eastern region. In addition, the United States failed invasion of Afghanistan also contributed to its malignity around the globe. Russia and China were emboldened by such US failures and challenged it economically, militarily, and ideologically. Leadership crises in the United States have also undermined its international standing. President-elect Donald Trump’s previous government damaged America’s reputation to a great extent. His decision to withdraw from the Paris Accord and his criticism of NATO also inculcated distrust among the country’s allies. The US also holds a reputation for betraying its allies after achieving its ambitions. Pakistan is one of the best examples of this. The United States had always had a transactional relationship with Islamabad. After achieving its regional ambitions, it has always imposed sanctions on the country. Therefore, the US allies have started thinking of it as an unreliable ally. President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election has once again inculcated frustration among the US allies. His stance on Ukraine has already been criticized by its allies. President-elect Donald Trump seeks an immediate and peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Recently, he called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine after meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He advocates a non-interventionist policy. Therefore, it is believed that the Russia-Ukraine conflict would come to an end after his final selection as the US President. Moreover, his presidency might also affect the unity of NATO, as he has always been critical of funding it. His “America First” approach also contributes to decreasing US influence and dominance over the world. President-elect Donald Trump’s crackdown against immigrants has also contributed to the United States’ isolation in the American region and beyond. In addition, Russia and China’s rise and BRICS expansion have also provided the middle powers and third-world countries a novel opportunity to form new alliances. The election of President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election, de-dollarization by BRICS, and the swift rise of Russia and China, along with other middle powers, all are contributing to the rapid decline of the US influence and dominance over the world.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This analysis focuses on possible short and medium-term effects of Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States. This paper starts with a brief account of Trump’s first presidency and then continues to account for major challenges that Trump’s administration will have to face domestically,The central part of the analysis focuses on the geopolitical consequences of Trump’s election. In particular, the author looks at Europe (the ongoing war in Ukraine): Middle East and Far East – especially China.The paper concludes with the author's conviction that the next few years will bring decisive changes likely to usher in the new world order.Keywords: Trump, US, Europe, Security, Geopolitics Introduction Donald Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States in 2017 had significant and far-reaching effects on world politics, marking a departure from previous administrations' approaches to foreign policy and international relations. Trump's presidency shifted from globalization to isolationism, protectionism, and nationalism (Kawashima, 2017). His "America First" strategy emphasized unilateral action and challenged the liberal international order the United States had led and protected since World War II (Mansbach, 2021). This approach has strained relationships with traditional allies, particularly in Europe, while simultaneously raising authoritarian leaders (Mansbach, 2021). Interestingly, Trump's election immediately negatively impacted trust in the U.S. government in Latin America, as demonstrated by a regression discontinuity design study (Carreras et al., 2021). Additionally, his controversial policies, such as the trade war with China, have had significant impacts on the global economy (Sahide et al., 2024). The Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Islamic World was notably less friendly compared to the Obama era, causing tensions in US-Islamic World relations (Bahari & Sahide, 2022). There seems to be a consensus that Trump's presidency accelerated societal processes, undermined democratic institutions, and encouraged hyperpartisanship within political institutions (James, 2021). While he did not always succeed in implementing major policy changes or fulfilling campaign promises, his leadership style and policy decisions significantly altered the global perception of the United States and its role in world politics, creating what some scholars describe as " a more dangerous world" (Mansbach, 2021).  Admittedly, Trump does not seem to be exceptionally hawkish when it comes to using military tools in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Let us remember that Barak Obama (Democratic Party), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, ordered airstrikes in seven different countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria) (Liptak, 2014). During first Trump’s presidency, no new campaigns were started, although the intensification of the existing ones allegedly increased. Ultimately, it was Trump who was mainly behind the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Trump 2.0 November 2024 Presidential elections brought sweeping changes to the American political kaleidoscope. Donald Trump took a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Kamala Harris, securing 312 electoral votes (with 270 being a victory threshold). Republicans also won the Senate with 52 seats against 47 and the House with 218 seats against 212. (Election Centre 2024).  This is arguably one of the most important political events in the world in 2024. Already Trump’s declarations regarding the first decisions to be taken once sworn in office on the 20th of January next year, plus his appointments for top offices in the U.S. administration, have caused a furore – a phenomenon referred to by many as the so-called ‘Trump Effect’. As much as political scientists, cognitive anthropologists or psychologists usually use this term to refer to racially inflammatory Elite Communication (Newman et al., 2020), this short analysis will look at the tectonic shifts in international relations, international security system and geopolitics that have already happened or are likely to occur after the 20th of January 2025. U.S. – politics Undoubtedly, the U.S. economy, society, and political system are in deep crisis. Economically, the Americans have been doing worse than ever since the Second World War. Inflation is rampant; economic inequality is very high; unemployment is on the rise; the state of infrastructure is relatively poor, and the level of public services is far from desirable, whereas taxation is reaching new heights amidst a slowing economy and diminishing number of small and medium enterprises (USA FACTS). Societywise, the problems are equally severe. According to Pew Research, the top issues facing the U.S. in this category are in the order of importance from top to bottom: the affordability of healthcare, drug addiction, illegal immigration, gun violence, violent crime, the state of moral values, the quality of public k-12 schools, Climate change, international terrorism, infrastructure condition, domestic terrorism and racism (Pew Research Centre, 2024). One should also add here the rising “wokeness’ of the American educational system, which poses a great challenge to the cohesion of the society and its future in terms of military power.  Politically, the picture is not better. According to the same research institution (Pew), the biggest problems that the U.S. political system faces are: political leaders do not face the consequences if they act unethically, it is difficult to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics, Congress accomplishes less than people give it credit for, the Federal Government does less for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for. Other problems include the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in policymaking, the cost of political campaigns and the animosity between the Republicans and the Democrats, which, in consequence, causes the inability of the political system to solve critical societal problems (Pew Research Centre, 2023). The first and foremost task ahead of Trump is to rectify problems at home. His Agenda47 (Republican Platform) declares 20 core promises: seal the border and stop the migrant invasion, carry out the largest deportation operation in american history, end inflation, and make america affordable again, make america the dominant energy producer in the world, by far, stop outsourcing, and turn the United States into a manufacturing superpower, large tax cuts for workers, and no tax on tips, defend the constitution, the bill of rights, and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to keep and bear arms, prevent world war three, restore peace in europe and in the middle east, and build a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country -- all made in america, end the weaponization of government against the american people, stop the migrant crime epidemic, demolish the foreign drug cartels, crush gang violence, and lock up violent offenders, rebuild cities, including washington dc, making them safe, clean, and beautiful again, strengthen and modernize the military, making it, without question, the strongest and most powerful in the world, keep the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, fight for and protect social security and medicare with no cuts, including no changes to the retirement age, cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations, cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory, radical gender ideology, and other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on children, keep men out of women's sports, deport pro-hamas radicals and make college campuses safe and patriotic again, secure our elections, including same day voting, voter identification, paper ballots, and proof of citizenship and lastly unite the country by bringing it to new and record levels of success (Agenda 47).  International Politics Internationally, Trump faces many challenges. His presidency will have to address three primary regions defined geographically: Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. - Europe As far as Europe is concerned, the most pressing issue is the war in Ukraine. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly declared that his administration's support for the continuation of the U.S. support for the war effort against Russia would be terminated during the first 24 hours of his presidency (Hansler, 2024). As a consequence, shortly after Trump’s winning the White House race, the outgoing administration under POTUS Joe Biden finally allowed the Ukrainians to attack Russian territory with American long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS), which allegedly came in as a response to the North Korean decision to send its troops to support Russian soldiers against Ukraine (Entous, Schmitt and Barnes, 2024). Next, in counter-response, President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a new nuclear Doctrine into power. Chillingly, it declares that Russia may use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear state, even in case of a conventional attack (Associated Press, 2024). As of the beginning of December 2024, the media are full of reports of an alleged concentration of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border, fueling speculation about an imminent mass invasion, this time with cities such as Kyiv being targeted in a conventional terrain operation (Bodner, De Luce and Smith, 2024).  One can only speculate what all this means and how far we are from the outbreak of the III World War (Sky News, 2024). Some things are, however, more or less evident. Firstly, the current escalation of war in Ukraine is likely a direct effect of Trump's winning and his declaration to end the war as soon as possible. The more the Russian troops advance in the field, the higher they can bid once the peace talks begin. Similarly, the more complex the situation in the field (Biden’s decision regarding the use of ATACMS), the more challenging it will be for Trump and his administration to achieve peace. Knowing the radically different approach to conflict with Russia of President Trump, the outgoing administration and national security advisors most likely wanted to achieve militarily as much as possible before they were ousted from their jobs. Secondly, Trump declared on numerous occasions that if European members of NATO want to continue their support for Ukraine, they should take the whole responsibility. He singled Germany, France, and Poland out. Poland, for that matter, enthusiastically agreed to carry on the baton and declared that it was ready to bear the heavy burden. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, when participating in a radio broadcast, “We [Poland] are ready to take over the large part of the costs of supporting Ukraine” (Nczas Info, 2024). At the same time on the 3rd of December, the new Secretary General of NATO – Mark Rutte, during his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, openly declared: “The immediate priority must be to provide more arms to the country's forces as Russia gains territory along the battlefront in eastern Ukraine.The [Ukrainian] front is not moving eastwards. It is slowly moving westwards. So, we have to make sure that Ukraine gets into a position of strength, and then it should be for the Ukrainian government to decide on the next steps in terms of opening peace talks and how to conduct them." (VoA, 2024). To sum up, it looks like the current escalation, according to theoretical models such as those proposed by Herman Kahn in 1965 – a Cold War physicist - we are at stage 12 of 44 steps on the escalation ladder. As comforting as one might think it is, let us remember that according to Kahn’s theory, a local nuclear war takes place as early as at step 21 (Tinline, 2023). As history has proved many times, it is difficult, if impossible, to wage a systemic war on two fronts at the same time. Given the economic and military challenges perceived by Trump during his first tenure as U.S. President (See: A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017), China is the challenger number one for the position of the United States in the international system and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, China wants to reorder the area in its favour. Would it be too much of a stretch of the imagination to claim that most likely, given the context above, Trump will probably arrange for peaceful talks with Russia over Ukrainian political and military leadership heads’? What will he want? Probably Russia’s neutrality in the face of the coming escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and China. What can he offer? Probably a big part of Ukrainian territory and the amendment to the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the country should forever be neutral militarily and politically. At the same time, the American withdrawal from Europe will most probably create a void that is most likely to be filled by Germans. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts (The Federal Government, 2022).  The leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's ‘special responsibility’ for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government’s ‘special responsibility’ for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. (German National Security Strategy, 2023). In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the ‘best equipped armed force’ in Europe (Euronews, 2022). Let us also remember that Berlin vigorously supported the latest proposal for a European army, which presumably might serve as a vehicle for further European integration towards the federalization of Europe.  At the same time, the prospect of federalization will face two major challenges: firstly, the future of transatlantic relations is less than certain, especially the economic competition between the EU and the U.S. European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen signalled the possibility of an economic war with the U.S. as a response to Trump declared protectionism of the American economy (Berg, Meyers, 2024). Secondly, the EU is highly inefficient in energy, so the question of future energy security becomes a priority. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the redirection of Russian gas to China will profoundly affect the future of European economic development amid the so-called ‘Fit-for-55’ -  a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (Fit for 55, 2024). - Middle East As of the writing of this paper, one sees the escalation of the war in Syria. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “ongoing hostilities in northern Syria continue to expand to other parts of the country, endangering civilians and humanitarian workers, causing severe damage to critical infrastructure and disrupting humanitarian operations. As of 5 December, at least 178,000 people have been displaced due to the recent escalations in northern Syria, including 128,000 newly displaced and 39,000 displaced at least twice. Figures are still being reconciled, noting that UNHR and NGOs operating in the northeastern part of Syria estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people have been newly displaced there, including more than 25,000 currently hosted in collective centers”. (OCHA, 2024). According to international media (CBC News, 2024): ”Syria's long-running civil war came to a head Sunday when opposition forces entered the capital city of Damascus and the government of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. Russian state media later reported that Assad and his family had fled to Moscow. Crowds gathered in Damascus to celebrate the fall of Assad's government with chants, prayers and occasional gunfire, marking the end of a regime that, between the ousted President and his father, had ruled over Syria for half of a century.” […] "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen," President Biden said Sunday afternoon at the White House after convening his national security team to discuss the developments. He said the fall of Assad presented a "historic moment of opportunity" and pledged support for Syria and its neighbours against any threats” (Ott, 2024). Syria seems to be just another litmus test of the so-called regional security complex in the Middle East. As such, the war in Syria is obviously but a puzzle in a much bigger jigsaw that includes all major powers that operate in the region: the U.S.A, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran to name the most obvious ones. All of the above are deeply engaged in Middle East politics for the sake of their national interests and international security strategies. All of the above deserve separate analyses. For the sake of this paper, however, the author will focus only on the U.S. According to Douglas Macgregor and Dave Ramaswamy, “The fear in many nations’ capitals is that President Donald Trump’s return to Washington might make Israel feel more confident in attacking Iran. According to Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, “There is no world leader Trump respects more than Netanyahu.”  The evangelical leader also confides that President Trump would support an Israeli attack before his inauguration on the assumption that the destruction of Iran’s oil production facilities would devastate Iran’s economy, inducing Iran to end the war with Israel before President Trump assumes his office. This thinking by no means excludes an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear development sites as well.” (Macgregor & Ramaswamy, 2024). In their article, they state that “If America joins Israel in its war against Iran, the outcome will be a geopolitical showdown that could dramatically alter the world as we know it. It is the storm of the 21st century and, for the moment, the American ship of state is sailing right into it. “ They consequently pose four fundamental questions:  1. What is the American purpose in waging war against Iran? Is Washington’s purpose to destroy the Iranian state? To destroy its capability to wage war against Israel? To eliminate Iran’s developing nuclear capability? Or to decapitate the Iranian state in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow their national government? 2. How will U.S. military power achieve the objectives? 3. What is the desired end state? What does the President want Iran and the region that surrounds it to look like when the fighting ends? 4. What is the strategic cost to the American people if Washington declines to participate in a regional war begun by Israel?  They conclude by asking yet another, perhaps the most crucial question: what do Netanyahu’s goals mean for the health of the American economy and the stability of the international system? Can Israel survive without attacking its numerous enemies?  The next couple of months are likely to bring at least some answers to some of these questions. Importantly, expert voices concerning the future of Israel seem to be abounding more and more (Teller, 2024). - China and the Far East Finally, there is a question of China. As mentioned before, Trump sees China as a major challenger to the role and position of the U.S. in the international system. The Republicans and the Democrats may be divided by numerous issues, but there is at least one regarding which they stay united. The true bipartisanship revolves around the Chinese challenge. Both parties, therefore, claim that the possibility of a systemic conflict with China is not a science fiction scenario. On November 20, 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress heard that the U.S. had to prepare for a potential conflict with China by raising its defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP. (South China Morning Post, 2024). The recommendation came during an interactive exercise for members of the House Select Committee on China, based on a scenario predicted for 2026 and hosted by Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report titled: The First Battle of the Next War Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, authored by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham opens with a chilling question: “What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is, therefore, not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.” (The First Battle of the Next War, 2023). They go on to claim that: “China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.” China has grown increasingly assertive over the last decades and sees no reason to continue accepting a dominated world that facilitates the benefits of Western powers, especially the U.S.A. At a recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (November 2024), the President of China openly called for a multipolar world (Xinhua, 2024). In his words: “China and Brazil stay committed to peace, development, fairness and justice. We have similar or identical views on many international and regional issues. Both are staunch defenders of the basic norms of international relations and multilateralism, coordinating closely and consistently within the United Nations, G20, BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms on crucial issues, including global governance and climate change. Not long ago, China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Our initiative has received a positive response from the international community. China and Brazil, embracing our roles and responsibilities as major countries, have contributed to a multipolar world, conduced to greater democracy in international relations and injected positive energy into global peace and stability.” (Xinhua, 2024 b).  Conclusion Taiwan has long been a global security issue and a point of concern on the geopolitical maps of the national security planners of great powers. It is not the only one, though. The war between the Koreas is formally not over (recently, North Korea allegedly sent soldiers to back Russia in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine); the American military presence in the Far East and South East Asia is likely to remain an issue, especially from the point of view of Beijing. Central Asia, with its geopolitical environment, religious activism and economic challenges, is likely to rise in importance as a chessboard for great powers. As the weight and focus of International Relations is relocating back to Asia (Euroasia rather than the North Atlantic Area), China and Russia are more likely to hold the keys to international peace and security than the United States. On top of that, one needs to look out for North Africa as a source of continuing instability and massive migration, especially to Europe. 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