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Understanding the Chinese Perspective The relationship between the United States and China is one of the most important and mutually beneficial bilateral relationships in the world. Nonetheless, it is also complex and contentious, with both countries vying for geopolitical influence and economic dominance. This brief examines drivers of U.S.-China strategic competition from the perspective of Beijing incorporating the prism of MarxistLeninist ideology, domestic politics in the U.S., China's needed alignment with Russia, nationalism, technological advancements such as AI, the role of regional players such as ASEAN, Japan, and the E.U., and Comprehensive National Power (CNP). Understanding this analytical lens contributes to deeper comprehension of China's security anxieties and world view that may provide insight to enhance engagement, resilience, and deterrence in bilateral relations with China. Introduction The relationship between the United States and China is one of the most important and mutually beneficial bilateral relationships in the world today. To illustrate, according to data published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), total imports and exports grew 2.5 percent year-on-year to reach US$690.6 billion in 2022, breaking the previous record of US$658.8 billion set in 2018. This increase is despite the divisions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and mutual unfavorable ratings. Nonetheless, the U.S.-China relationship is also complex and contentious, with both countries vying for geopolitical influence and economic dominance. Whether it is the rules-based Free and Open IndoPacific or the realization of Xi Jinping’s China dream, the competition for primacy between the U.S. and China will impact friends, partners, and foes of both states. Viewed from Beijing, Chinese scholars and analysts base their assessment of the trajectory of the U.S.-China strategic competition through several lens including the prism of Marxist-Leninist ideology, domestic politics in the U.S., China’s needed alignment with Russia, nationalism, technological advancements such as AI, the role of regional players such as ASEAN, Japan, and the EU, and Comprehensive National Power (CNP). Shaped by Marxist-Leninist Ideology Marxist-Leninist ideology has played a leading if not central role in shaping the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) approach to governance and foreign relations. The CCP came to power in 1949 following a successful revolution led by Mao Zedong. Mao was heavily influenced by Marxist-Leninist thought. Since then, the CCP has maintained a commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology, although its interpretation and application have evolved over time. Today, as former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and author of The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping's China writes, Xi’s China leans left in terms of Marxist-Leninist socio-economic organization and right in terms of nationalism. Rudd’s analysis echoes President Xi’s speech on “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects” in his report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC. In that speech, Xi stressed that “Marxism is the fundamental guiding ideology upon which our Party and our country are founded and thrive. Our experience has taught us that, at the fundamental level, we owe the success of our Party and socialism with Chinese characteristics to the fact that Marxism works, particularly when it is adapted to the Chinese context and the needs of our times.” At its core, Marxist-Leninist ideology emphasizes the importance of class struggle and the need for the working class to overthrow the ruling class to achieve a classless society. In the Chinese context, this has translated into a focus on creating a socialist society and promoting the welfare of the Chinese people under the umbrella term ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’. In terms of China’s relationship with the U.S., Marxist-Leninist ideology has contributed to a view of the U.S. as a capitalist and imperialist power that seeks to undermine China’s socialist system. This view is rooted in the Marxist-Leninist belief that capitalist powers are inherently expansionist and seek to dominate other countries to secure their own economic and political interests. They see the U.S. as an imperialist power seeking to maintain its hegemony over the world, while China represents a rising power challenging the established order, as written by Graham Allison in his book Thucydides’ Trap. Chinese analysts believe that the U.S. is threatened by China’s rise and is seeking to contain it through various means, including economic sanctions, military posturing, and diplomatic pressure as evidenced by the Trump administration’s trade war, its network of alliances throughout the region, the advent of minilateral cooperation such as the Quad and AUKUS, and the perceived fomenting of independent movements in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan.  They argue that the U.S. is using its military alliances and partnerships with countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia to encircle China and limit its influence in the region. These perspectives ignore that the U.S. alongside with Japan and others openly supported China’s entry into the WTO, the 2008 Summer Olympics, and gave China a leadership position at the Paris Climate Accord. These initiatives demonstrated that the U.S. and other countries were willing to work with China on global issues and support its development. Destabilizing Influence of U.S. Domestic Politics While Marxist-Leninist perspectives of U.S.-China relations offer a macro-level understanding of how China views the inevitability of great power rivalry between Washington and Beijing, Chinese analysts also pay close attention to domestic politics in the U.S. and its impact on U.S.-China relations. Chinese analysts believe that the current political climate in the U.S. is highly polarized, and that these domestic political dynamics are affecting U.S. foreign policy, including its stance towards China. They see the Trump administration’s trade war with China as a reflection of this polarization, and argue that it has damaged the relationship between the two countries. They also note that the Biden administration has continued many of the same policies as the Trump administration, including maintaining tariffs on Chinese goods and pursuing a tough stance on technology transfer and intellectual property theft. The build-up to the 2024 presidential election for most will be one of intensifying securitization of relations with China. President Biden will not be in a position to show any weakness in his China policy. Equally so, the Republicans, whether it is former President Trump or an alternative GOP candidate will take an “All because of China” approach, when it comes to foreign policy, like advocating for a hard decoupling of the economies or even more provocatively, possibly migrating away or redefining the “One China” policy. Developing China-Russian Alignment Chinese analysts also view the relationship between China and Russia as an important factor in the trajectory of U.S.-China relations. They see the two countries as natural partners, sharing a common interest in challenging U.S. dominance of the world. They believe that the China-Russia all-weather partnership is growing stronger and that it poses a significant challenge to U.S. interests. For Russia, Pax Sinica would offer it a much more hospitable environment than the one provided by the Pax Americana, according to the authors of The Beijing-Moscow Axis: The Foundations of an Asymmetric Alliance published by the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). For China, a tightening of the alignment with Russia will be critical to ensuring that U.S. does not drive a wedge between China and Russia by pursuing a policy of containment against both countries, a policy that Chinese analysts view as unlikely to succeed. The invasion of Ukraine is a case in point. Despite Russia’s invasion violating the U.N. Charter and China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, Beijing has taken a pro-Russian neutrality position refusing to condemn Russia. This is not an endorsement of the invasion or of Putin. It is a clear indication of the importance China places on the deepening Sino-Russian alignment and the reality that neither country can afford a geopolitical divorce. In fact, the recent paper ‘China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis’ continues to echo President Xi’s Workers Report at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, which explicitly used the expression that “no country’s security should come at the expense of another country’s security,” an explicit rejection of the U.S. and Western countries’ views that Russia has engaged in an unprovoked attack against the sovereign state of Ukraine.  Intensifying Nationalism Chinese nationalism is another important factor by which Chinese analysts understand the trajectory of U.S.-China relations. They view Chinese nationalism as a natural response to the country’s history of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, including the U.S. Carefully curated since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Zheng Wang writes in his book Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations that Beijing has placed the century of humiliation at the center of China’s national building process and a nationalist movement in which victimhood, national rejuvenation, and a perineal sense of insecurity concerning the West and particularly the U.S. is the major pillar. These narratives have been meticulously manipulated and deployed to build a national identity in which China must resist anti-China forces and those states that wish to prevent “China’s rightful rise.” Events such as the 70th Anniversary of Victory of Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and World Anti-Fascist War, 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, or national aspirations such as the China Dream are all constructed with the purpose of infusing into Chinese citizens a nationalism linked to the CCP’s selective understanding of history. Based on these selective views of history, scholars such as Qin Pang in their co-authored article on “China’s Growing Power Makes Its Youth Hawkish?” Evidence from the Chinese Youth’s Attitudes toward the U.S. and Japan’ find that Chinese citizens view the United States as seeking to contain China’s rise and limit its influence in the region, and that this is seen by many Chinese as an affront to their national pride. Chinese analysts believe that Chinese nationalism is a powerful force that will shape the country's foreign policy for years to come, and that it will continue to be a source of tension in U.S.-China relations. For the U.S. and other like-minded states, Chinese nationalism that is based on victimhood, national rejuvenation, and a perennial sense of insecurity concerning the West will not be a platform for stabilizing and creating constructive relations, especially if this nationalism drives territorial expansion in the South and East China Seas, the Himalayan plateau or across the Taiwan straits.  Dominating AI and Other Technologies  The rapid advancement of technology, particularly in the areas of AI and 5G, is another factor that Chinese analysts believe will shape the trajectory of U.S.-China relations. They see China as a leader in these areas, with the potential to surpass the United States in terms of technological innovation and economic growth. Chinese analysts argue that the U.S. is threatened by China’s technological progress and is seeking to limit its access to advanced technology, particularly in the areas of AI and 5G. They also believe that the United States is using national security concerns as a pretext for restricting Chinese access to these technologies. The U.S. Chips Act and the growing first tier semiconductor and technology firewall that is being erected around China by the U.S. in cooperation with Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands and Taiwan demonstrate the centrality the U.S places on dominating these spheres of technology. The consequence for China according to analysts in and out of China is that it will no longer have access to the most sophisticated semi-conductors, semiconductor producing machines and the associated expertise to keep up in the race to be the first mover when it comes to AI and other technologies that rely on first tier semi-conductor chips. In concrete terms, this means that as the U.S. and its allies will form a chips coalition among like-minded countries resulting in their collective abilities to generate scientific breakthroughs that can be translated into military and economic advantages that will preserve U.S. dominance and the existing rules-based order. Beijing is aware of this challenge and has attempted to reduce its reliance on the U.S. and Western states through its Made in China 2025 strategy and Dual Circulation Strategy. Whether these initiatives will be sufficient to outmaneuver U.S. initiatives to dominate semi-conductors and ultimately AI and other sensitive technologies is yet to be determined. Role of ASEAN, Japan, and the EU Chinese analysts also pay close attention to the role of regional players such as ASEAN, Japan, and the EU in the trajectory of U.S.-China relations. They believe that these countries have a significant influence on the balance of power in the region and that their relationships with the United States and China are critical. Japan’s release in December 2022 of three strategy documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Defense Buildup Program aims to uphold the current rules-based order and prevent the emergence of Chinese hegemony in the IndoPacific region. Meanwhile, the new Washington Declaration between the United States and the Republic of Korea (RoK) commits to engage in deeper, cooperative decision-making on nuclear deterrence, including through enhanced dialogue and information sharing regarding growing nuclear threats to the ROK and the region. The recent meeting between U.S. President Biden and Philippine President Marcos reaffirms the United States’ ironclad alliance commitments to the Philippines, underscoring that an armed attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific, including in the South China Sea, would invoke U.S. mutual defense commitments under Article IV of the 1951 U.S.- Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.”. These are explicit examples of how U.S. allies, through their cooperation and partnerships with the U.S., are aiming to preserve U.S. hegemony. In short, Chinese analysts argue that the United States is seeking to use its relationships with these countries to contain China’s rise, while China is seeking to build closer relationships with its neighbors and BRI partners to expand its influence and build win-win relationships based on its Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Lastly, U.S. and ASEAN watchers in China believe that the United States is losing influence in the region, particularly with ASEAN countries, and that China is poised to fill the power vacuum owing to its extensive economic ties in the region, ties that many in Southeast Asia are dependent on for sustainable development despite reservations over the possible negative ramifications of increased Chinese economic and diplomatic influence in the region. Heft of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) Sensitive to the changing power balances and what this means for China’s ability to achieve its core national interests, China places enormous weight on Comprehensive National Power (CNP) as a key measure of a country’s overall strength and capability in all aspects of national development, including economic, military, technological, cultural, and diplomatic power as Hu Angang and Men Honghua write in their article title “The rising of modern China: Comprehensive national power and grand strategy”. The concept of CNP has been used by Chinese leaders since the 1980s to assess China’s relative strength compared to other countries, particularly the United States. In recent years, China has focused on increasing its CNP as part of its strategic competition with the U.S. Beijing aims to surpass the U.S. in terms of overall power and influence, believing that a higher CNP will enable the country to better protect its national interests, enhance its global influence, and achieve its long-term strategic goals. To increase its CNP, China has pursued a range of policies and initiatives. One of the key areas of focus has been economic development, with China becoming the world’s second-largest economy and a major player in global trade and investment. Through the Made in China 2025, the Belt Road Initiative (BRI), and the Dual Circulation Model, China has also invested heavily in science and technology, with a particular emphasis on emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and 5G networks.  In addition, China has modernized its military and expanded its global military presence based on the civil-military fusion (MCF), with the goal of becoming a world-class military power by the middle of the century. China has also pursued a more assertive foreign policy, seeking to expand its influence in key regions such as Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Concurrently, China has also sought to promote its soft power, through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to enhance connectivity and economic cooperation between China and other countries. China has also sought to promote its culture and values through the Confucius Institutes and its latest Global Civilization Initiative calling for “called for respecting the diversity of civilizations, advocating the common values of humanity, valuing the inheritance and innovation of civilizations, and strengthening international people-to-people exchanges and cooperation.”  China’s focus on increasing its CNP is driven by its desire to become a major global power and to challenge the U.S.’ dominant position in the international system. While China’s rise has brought many benefits to the country and the world, it has also raised concerns among some countries, particularly the U.S., about the potential implications of China’s growing power and influence. This is especially true as we have seen a growing track record of economic coercion, grey zone tactics, and rejecting international law such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s July 2016 decision against its claims in the South China Sea.Conclusion Chinese analysts clearly view the relationship between the United States and China through a complex lens. They see the relationship with the United States as one of the most important in the world and believe that it will continue to shape the trajectory of global politics and economics for years to come. While there are significant challenges and tensions in the relationship between the two countries, Chinese analysts also see opportunities for cooperation and collaboration, particularly in areas such as climate change and global health.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As Beijing’s investment approach to Latin America focuses on industries of strategic importance, the EU and US will need to contend with growing Chinese competition China is pouring less foreign direct investment (FDI) into Latin America. But while this may seem like a sign of Beijing’s disinterest in the region, data suggests that Chinese companies are simply recalibrating, not retreating. In doing so, they are becoming important players in sectors key to Western interests: critical minerals, fintech, electric vehicles, and green energy. While the European Union and the United States have long been top investors in Latin America, increased competition with Chinese investment now jeopardises their interests in the Latin American industries that will become most crucial to the digital and green transitions. The number of Chinese projects in Latin America grew by 33 per cent from 2018-2023, compared with the previous five-year period of 2013-2017, even as the total value declined. In other words, Chinese companies are making more investments in the region but are pursuing smaller-scale projects on average. These investments are also more focused on what China calls “new infrastructure“ (新基建), a term which encompasses telecommunications, fintech, renewable energy, and other innovation-related industries. In 2022, 60 per cent of China’s investments were in these frontier sectors, a key economic priority for the country. Beijing also views smaller projects in these industries as incurring less operational and reputational risk, especially compared to some of the large-scale infrastructure investment projects often associated with the Belt and Road initiative. Like China, the investment priorities of the G7 grouping – particularly the US and the EU – are centring on critical minerals, fintech, electric vehicles, and green energy as they aim to grow and reinforce existing economic and political partnerships in Latin America. However, both the US and the EU risk falling short of China’s investment strategy in the region. The US has signalled want for greater economic engagement with the region, especially in sectors of strategic interest. However, to date, US efforts to compete with China remain largely focused on building US domestic capacity in these strategic sectors, even as some US companies, such as Intel, are increasingly focused on including regional partners in their supply chains. Some see opportunity for Latin America in Joe Biden’s landmark legislation, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which is aimed at incentivising the energy transition while also de-risking critical supply chains. For example, certain countries in the region may benefit from preferential market access for their lithium or other key inputs to new energy and technology supply chains. However, the reach of the IRA – which remains a largely domestic policy – does not stretch as far as China’s current investment reshuffle. The Americas Act, announced by members of Congress in March could generate promising new investment opportunities for the region, as it encourages US companies and others to move their operations out of China, to which Latin America stands as a promising replacement. But Americas Act reshoring would primarily incentivise textiles and potentially medical equipment manufacturing, with less overall focus on the range of “new infrastructure” industries that China is prioritising. Chinese interests in information and communication technologies reveal a similar story. While the US has focused its policy on 5G equipment sales, China is undertaking a process of vertical integration in Latin American tech sectors that will dramatically boost its competitiveness. For instance, Chinese company Huawei is rapidly expanding its focus to include data centres, cloud computing, cybersecurity, and other services, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. (Computing accounted for a sizable 41 per cent of total Chinese information technology investment in the region between 2018 and the first half of 2023.) At the same time, Global Gateway, the EU’s proposal for a global investment initiative is yet to reach its potential in the region. Brussels is looking to be Latin America’s partner of choice by building local capacity for making batteries and final products like electric vehicles, as European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen noted last year. Yet even as the EU signals renewed commitment, China is becoming increasingly dominant in the electric vehicle market in Latin America and other regions. China surpassed the US in electric vehicle sales in 2023, with Chinese companies accounting for 45 per cent of total global sales and three times that of Germany’s. What is more, China has invested $11 billion in lithium extraction in the region since 2018, as part of a bid to control a third of global lithium-mine production capacity. Meanwhile the EU has secured some access to lithium as part of trade deals with Chile, alongside other nations, but this pales in comparison to what will be required to fuel the future of EU battery production. Latin America as a whole accounts for an estimated 60 per cent of the world’s lithium reserves. Based on its current levels of engagement in the region, the EU risks falling short of lithium, stalling its battery production and subsequently, its electric vehicle sales, just as China advances in this field. The window is closing for the EU, the US, and other partners looking to both maintain market share and compete with China in these Latin American industries, despite still-high rates of US and EU investment in and trade with the region. Indeed, US automakers increasingly see Chinese competition across the globe as an “extinction-level event.” Ensuring competitiveness in “new infrastructure” and related sectors will require a continuous commitment by partners to building and supporting project pipelines, and to delivering products and services at price points that can compete with China’s subsidised offerings. Both the EU and the US remain critical economic partners for Latin America and are contributing in ways that China is not. Still, complacency risks allowing China to take the lead in emerging industries in the region, some of which weigh heavily in the EU’s green and digital transformation. To protect their own future industries, the EU and the US need to first take a longer look at Latin America’s – especially as China vies for a dominant position.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In October 2023, the EU Commission identified four technology fields as critical: advanced semiconductors; artificial intelligence (AI); quantum, and; biotechnologies.[1] All four areas are greatly impacted by the U.S.-China rivalry in technology, making it essential for Europeans to understand the Sino-American competition. This article examines this rivalry from the Chinese and U.S. perspectives. It recounts their prevailing attitudes, which are shaped by recent events, and that, in turn, mold Chinese and American strategic approaches. From the Chinese policymakers’ perspective, its geo-technological competition with the U.S. is novel and passively learned. During Xi Jinping’s first term, the Chinese government still positioned technology under the economic-oriented strategy of innovation-driven development. This stance followed the idea that ‘science and technology constitute a primary productive force’ and the ‘peaceful development’ principles set during Deng Xiaoping’s era. However, around 2018, two sanctions incidents that targeted Chinese telecommunications giants shifted Chinese leaders’ understanding of tech strategy into the geopolitical context. The first sanction incident involved ZTE, China’s second-largest communications equipment manufacturer. In 2016, the Barack Obama administration accused ZTE of selling telecom equipment containing American chip technology to Iran, which violated U.S. sanctions. In 2017, ZTE pleaded guilty and paid a fine of $1.2 billion. However, in 2018, Trump’s government stated that ZTE did not comply with the settlement agreement, coupling previous sanctions with export controls on ZTE in April 2018. The second incident involved Meng Wanzhou, then Vice-Chairwoman and CFO of the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, who was arrested in Vancouver, Canada, during a layover in December 2018. Her detention was at the extradition request of the Trump administration, which levied charges related to alleged violations of U.S. sanctions against Iran. These included bank and wire fraud and outright violations of U.S. sanctions via a subsidiary called Skycom Tech, which allegedly concealed Huawei’s activities in Iran. The necessity of a strategic adjustment These two incidents caused an uproar in the Chinese media, followed by a surge in public patriotic sentiment. However, for the Chinese government, the impact and significance of the two cases were quite different. The essence of the ZTE case was commercial sanctions, which meant that ZTE violated business norms and deserved economic punishment. The official Chinese government stance was that ‘this is just an individual case of corporate violation.’ Despite this position, the fact that the government was actively involved nonetheless politicized the incident within China. It was Xi Jinping himself who negotiated with Trump to save ZTE from bankruptcy after which ZTE became a state-owned enterprise with absolute state control—a move that ultimately resulted in ZTE gaining a greater domestic market share than Huawei. At the international level, the top-level nature of negotiations prevented the ZTE incident from overly politicizing then-ongoing trade frictions between the U.S. and China. While the ZTE episode was resolved with little rancor, Chinese senior officials became concerned about the impact that the U.S. might have on China’s strategic technology companies.[2] In November 2018, Tan Tieniu, then Deputy Secretary-General of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, reported to China’s top leaders that they should learn from the ZTE incident. They should avoid overreliance on imports of core electronic components and chips, and they should not repeat mistakes made by ZTE. In the same month, Xi Jinping mentioned in a speech that ‘internationally, advanced technology and key technology is more and more difficult to obtain… forcing us to travel the road of self-reliance.’ Terms like technological security, technology ‘chokepoints’ (卡脖子), and core technologies in key fields (关键核心技术) began to appear frequently in Chinese official discourse. These reflected Chinese leadership’s views about the ZTE incident that were in turn shaping strategic thoughts on the geopolitical technology competition with the United States. It was the Meng Wanzhou incident at the end of 2018 that for Chinese leaders confirmed the necessity of a strategic adjustment. As in the ZTE case, Huawei was involved in a business violation that from the Chinese perspective should have resulted in corporate punishment. Instead, a personal arrest warrant was issued for Meng, thereby escalating a commercial sanction into a political and diplomatic incident. Le Yucheng, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, urgently summoned the U.S. and Canadian ambassadors to China and issued a stern protest. The Chinese government also arrested two Canadian citizens in China, sentencing one to 11 years in prison. The Chinese Ambassador to Canada wrote that the Meng Wanzhou case was a ‘premeditated political act in which the United States wields its regime power to hunt a Chinese high-tech company out of political consideration.’ Chinese Defensive Deterrence These two episodes shaped and reinforced Chinese leaders’ strategic thinking about its geopolitical technology competition with the U.S. The 14th Five-Year Plan issued by the CCP in 2020 proposed ‘making technological self-reliance’ a strategic goal. Soon all official documents established a new tone for China’s technology strategy based on self-reliance. Previously, China pursued a reassurance strategy, a strategy that showed goodwill towards the U.S. and the system it led. Thus, in theory, China had two strategic options: reassurance and/or deterrence. The former strategy involves showing friendliness towards the U.S. and its allies, thereby releasing tension, and maybe re-joining the U.S.-led system. A reassurance strategy allowed China more time for stable development—the logic of ‘keeping a low profile’ of the Deng Xiaoping era. The Xi Jinping government picked the second option, deterrence, which is to show strength or use countermeasures to reduce the likelihood of further U.S. trade or coercive action. To make a deterrence strategy work, however, Xi further believed China needed to gain strong capacity in key tech fields. Therefore, Xi first mobilized domestic R&D resources and tried to acquire advanced technologies before using diplomatic countermeasures. The core logic underlying this geopolitical technology strategy is one of ‘defensive deterrence.’ A typical example of this strategy in play concerns the semiconductor industry. Facing export controls on semiconductor equipment from the U.S., the Netherlands, and Japan, the Chinese government first increased R&D investment in the sector, trying to overcome ‘chokepoint’ technologies. As a result, China’s investment in semiconductor R&D grew from $10 billion in 2018 to $25 billion in 2022, an increase of 150%. At the same time, the Chinese government increased investment in the production of key raw materials (silicon, gallium nitride, etc.) and semiconductor production bases. It also guided industries upstream while also pushing for downstream integration through policies to improve and strengthen supply-chain security. Chinese policy also moved to increase international supply-chain dependence on China through its comparative advantages in the semiconductor industry (and even other industries) in a hedging move against the U.S. and its allies. For example, in the automotive chip sector, in the supply of vital raw materials, and in the semiconductor equipment markets, China sought to utilize its significant comparative advantages. In August 2023, the Chinese government announced export controls on gallium and germanium, two key materials for manufacturing semiconductors. China Seeking More Regulatory Power But in addition to responding to what was perceived as U.S. containment policies in the area of technology, China’s strategic use of technology followed another approach, one led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). This third approach sought more regulatory power, for example, in the areas of civilian AI where China has huge potential.[3] Starting in 2018, the Chinese government showed a strong determination to introduce and study AI ethics and technical standards.[4] Based on these domestic framework policies, various diplomatic initiatives, and standards proposals, the MFA and MIIT expanded China’s regulatory influence in the field of AI. For example, the MFA proposed the ‘Global Data Security Initiative’ in 2020 and the ‘Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative’ in 2023. Minister Wang Yi explicitly stated ‘We hope to provide a blueprint for related international discussions and rule-making.’ The China Electronics Standardization Institute, affiliated with the MIIT, also actively participates in the formulation of international new technology standards. Selectively decoupling: U.S. Attitudes and Strategies When it comes to strategic technologies, the Joe Biden administration has generally maintained a stance toward China that aligns closely with the previous administration led by Donald J. Trump. This is especially the case concerning competitive technologies such as 5G/6G, the specialized processors designed to handle the computational demands of AI, quantum computing, and electric vehicles (EVs). Taking a page from U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s Cold War playbook of outspending the Soviet Union, president Biden initiated a $2.25 trillion infrastructure plan. This plan, not unlike China’s policy to increase domestic innovation and strength, allocated funds for sectors such as transportation, manufacturing, renewable energy, clean water, and high-speed broadband for both wired and wireless technologies. The justification for these investments, part of the Build Back Better Act (BBB) policy and later incorporated into the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act, was that they were a response to Xi Jinping’s ambitious goals of doubling China’s economy by 2035, intending to establish China as a global leader in biotechnology, green energy, and AI. In addition to a spending strategy to boost U.S. competitiveness in strategic technologies, the Biden administration continued with some of Trump’s punitive measures. For example, Biden maintained tariffs amounting to approximately $300 billion. He also continued action against Huawei, which has the potential to outcompete in 5G/6G mobile network technology. The Trump administration used the Bureau of Industry and Security to exclude Huawei from global semiconductor supply chains and it placed the company on the Commerce Department’s Entity List, thus requiring U.S. companies to obtain a license before exporting to Huawei. As discussed above, Trump’s executive branch also brought fraud allegations against Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer Meng. While Biden kept in place Trump-era prohibitions on sales of U.S. goods to companies like Huawei, as well as maintaining restrictions on exports of U.S. critical technology, he did quickly resolve the dispute over Meng. Within hours of the deal for her release, the two men caught up in the game of hostage diplomacy left China on a flight back to Canada. Highlighting the political nature of the incident, when Meng returned to China, senior local officials at the airport met her. Encourage Multilateralism to meet Global Challenges Along with strident measures, the Biden administration also sought a more nuanced stance. Indications that suggest a less hawkish approach to China include emphasizing a collaborative approach toward global challenges like climate change and future pandemics. Biden further pushed for engagement in high-level meetings with, for example, Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, and National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, who held talks with their Chinese counterparts, Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi, in Anchorage, Alaska, in March 2021. These talks were frostier than U.S. officials would have preferred but they got the two sides to engage in some dialogue. Similarly, Biden sought to engage with China in multilateral forums and organizations where both countries are members, such as the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that Biden hosted in November 2023. Even the choice of San Francisco as the venue was designed to be conciliatory as it has historic ties to Asia as well as a central role in global technology as the home of Silicon Valley. Still, one must keep in mind that in deciding on a strategy towards China, Biden must also contend with a Congress and public opinion that are growing increasingly skeptical of doing business with China, which they believe steals good jobs and sends balloons over American territory to spy on U.S. critical infrastructure. One primary shaper of U.S. attitudes towards China are the leaders of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, Republican Representative Mike Gallagher and Democratic Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi, who lead one of the last bastions of functioning bipartisanship in Washington, D.C. With their many investigations, subpoenas, and policy recommendations, the House China Committee has become the ‘beating heart’ of U.S. Congressional policy, which, with regards to technology, argues for selectively decoupling from China for national security reasons.[5] A way forward Faced with the U.S.’ decoupling or blunting strategies and China’s defensive deterrence strategy, what steps might European nations take to navigate through the choppy, contentious waters of strategic technologies? Are there also steps that Europeans can take to mitigate the impact on their own strategic technology vulnerability? First, recognizing the pivotal role of technology in the rapidly digitizing global economy, Europeans need to stress that it is in the collective interest of everyone to establish institutions, norms, and policies for effective global governance. Rather than engaging in reactive geopolitical maneuvers resembling a chess game, these institutions could concentrate on constructing a more cooperative foundation for crucial technology sectors. Second, along with this recognition, efforts could be directed toward the development of future institutions, policies, and norms that set standards for next-generation and sensitive technologies. Such efforts should take into account initiatives already made by the Chinese and the Americans. Such efforts could also coincide with a third approach of encouraging the Biden administration to adopt a comprehensive multilateral approach. The U.S. needs to push for collaboration beyond issues such as climate change and economic inequality to encompass the intensely competitive areas in technology like those discussed in this article. For one, Europeans could point out that U.S. blunting strategies are simply not working and may even be backfiring by accelerating Chinese technological advances. In September 2023, Huawei released the Mate 60 Pro smartphone equipped with a 7nm domestic chip, revealing that China has overcome some hurdles that U.S. bans were designed to stymie.[6] Since no one knows how long China’s defensive deterrence strategy will hold (and shift to what Chinese leaders believe is a more offensive deterrence), nor whether Trump or someone as equally anti-multilateral as Trump will be (re)elected, Europeans have many incentives to encourage a softer engagement between China and the U.S. Changing the narrative is a fourth important recommendation. It is essential to recognize that the essence of the Sino-American technology competition is more about narrative construction than a description of the current situation. One indication of this is that both sides believe that the other side started what has been described as the ‘new Cold War.’[7] It does not help that both sides have engaged in behavior that supports the other side’s narrative with some hawkish actors employing similar bash-the-other tactics to gain political advantage.[8] Typically, the factual basis for technological competition is grounded in industrial competition, corporate rivalry, or intellectual property disputes. However, the high-tech relationship between China and the United States has been one of complementarity as well as rivalry. Both China and the United States, as well as European stakeholders, need to be careful of the narratives they espouse, lest they become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This work has been funded by the REMIT project, funded from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 101094228 Footnotes [1] EU Commission Recommendation of 3.10.2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States. [2] Gregory C. Allen. 2023. ‘China’s New Strategy for Waging the Microchip Tech War.’ csis.org, May 3. [3] Jing Cheng and Jinghan Zeng. 2023. ‘Shaping AI’s Future? China in Global AI Governance.’ Journal of Contemporary China 32(143): 794-810. [4] See White Paper on AI Standardization, a Guide to the Building of a National Standard Framework for New Generation AI, a report on Ethical Norms for New Generation AI, a White Paper on Trustworthy AI as well as other regulatory documents. [5] Robbie Gramer. 2023. ‘The Masterminds: Washington wants to get tough on China, and the leaders of the House China Committee are in the driver’s seat.’ foreignpolicy.com, November 27. [6] Weiwen Wang. (2023). ‘China Breaks Through 7nm Chip Technology, Has the China-U.S. Tech War Entered Phase 2.0?’ (中国突破7纳米芯片技术 中美科技战进入2.0阶段？). Lianhe Zaobao (联合早报), September 17. Retrieved from https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20230917-1433739 [7] Patricia M. Kim, Matthew Turpin, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Jessica Chen Weiss, Eun A Jo, Ryan Hass, and Emilie Kimball. 2023. ‘Should the US pursue a new Cold War with China?’ Brookings.edu, September 1. [8] Roberta N. Haar. 2020. ‘Will China replace the U.S. as the world’s predominant power?’ Atlantisch Perspectief 44(3):9-13.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In a complex new multipolar world, a country’s allies and friends will determine the global pecking order. Despite its large population, Africa is a small global player. Its combined economy is less than 3% of the world economy, and Africa’s political heterogeneity makes it difficult to stand united on contentious issues such as China’s claim over Taiwan or the war in Ukraine. Although most African countries aren’t part of global value chains, external economic challenges and tensions affect them deeply. Africa’s most violent period since independence was in the years before the Berlin Wall collapse in 1989. At the time, tensions between the United States (US) and former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) led to intense proxy wars in the Horn of Africa and Angola. Based on that experience, a new era of competition between the US and China doesn’t augur well for the continent. At its peak, the USSR’s economy was only half that of the US, whereas the US and China will be roughly equivalent in the next decade. China is already larger when using purchasing power parity. By 2050, the Chinese economy will be almost 30% bigger. China is the world’s factory, manufacturing cheaper and more than anyone else. It has flooded the world with affordable solar and wind products to fuel the green transition. China is the global trade destination for many and it builds much of Africa’s infrastructure. China and surrounding Asian countries are emerging as the most important source of economic growth globally. According to an in-depth study by The Economist in May 2022, ‘No other country comes near the breadth and depth of China’s engagement in Africa.’ In contrast, US trade and investment with Africa is declining. If the US wants to maintain its influence on the continent, it should find ways to collaborate rather than compete with China. The bill proposed in April by a bipartisan group of senators to renew the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for another 16 years shows that influential US groups are willing to engage with Africa for the long haul. With its low levels of trade reciprocity, the AGOA trade model is well suited to Africa’s needs. The US should use AGOA as a carrot to boost Africa’s exports, not a stick for economic coercion to achieve political objectives. The rise of China in a crowded world means the future will be quite different to previous periods of competition and cohabitation. Many of Africa’s ruling elites cast longing eyes towards China’s autocratic development model as a means to reduce poverty. Democracy and the free market haven’t delivered development, they argue. There is a sense of restlessness in Africa, where the median age is only 19. The youth bulge is expanding with limited prospects for formal employment, a healthy life or meaningful education. To analyse the impact of various global futures on Africa’s development, the Institute for Security Studies’ African Futures and Innovation programme has examined recent and likely global power shifts. For the past century, the US has been the most powerful country in the world. It has successfully presented a narrative that equates global development, stability and progress with American interests and values. Many Africans look to the US, given its freedoms and opportunities – although positive views of the US are dropping in number. The image of a violent mob descending on the Capitol in January 2021 shattered the myth of American exceptionalism, exposing a country torn asunder by its political divisions. Rural America’s reaction to globalisation and the rise of domestic populism detracts from US soft power. At the same time, its declining ability to deter others is on display in the Middle East, which is on a knife edge. Instead of oil from Africa, the next commodities boom for the continent will come from minerals needed for the renewable energy transition. This is reflected in a recent United States Institute of Peace report exploring Africa’s role in diversifying US critical mineral supply chains and strengthening the rule of law, transparency and environmental and labour standards. The US faces an uphill struggle since China has already secured much of Africa's known supply of critical minerals. China’s dominant position regarding these resources reflects the extent to which it is in a different league to the former USSR. Instead of confronting China in Africa, the US must find ways to collaborate with it. Africa cannot again serve as an arena for proxy conflicts and competition, this time between the US and China. Plus, it is Russia, not China, that is now the spoiler in Africa. The extent to which Sahelian countries are experiencing a resurgence of military coups with regime protection provided by Russia’s Africa Corps (previously Wagner) augurs poorly for the continent’s future. The more significant challenge is that the West faces a much larger and more powerful cohort of detractors, perhaps most readily depicted as the G7 versus BRICS+. The impunity that the West has provided to Israel for its war in Gaza and further afield reinforces global south views that different standards apply to them compared to the developed north. Current indications point to China becoming more influential in Africa, with many countries turning eastward. Rather than a new unipolar or even bipolar order, the trend is towards a complex, multipolar global power configuration where one’s allies and friends will determine the international pecking order. Learning to rely on them will be a new experience for the US. This article was first published in Africa Tomorrow, the African Futures and Innovation blog. Exclusive rights to re-publish ISS Today articles have been given to Daily Maverick in South Africa and Premium Times in Nigeria. For media based outside South Africa and Nigeria that want to re-publish articles, or for queries about our re-publishing policy, email us.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском MAY 2024.- Speaking about the spectacular growth of China's GDP, someone might argue that GDP is not the only indicator to observe in a country's improvement, and that is true. What explains that a country like China, with a per capita GDP ($25.02 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity) three times lower than that of the United States ($85.37 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity) has surpassed the latter in life expectancy of its inhabitants? The answer is none other than the quality of human rights enjoyed by Chinese citizens compared to that of American inhabitants. (Datosmacro.com. Expansión)   What explains that a country like China, with a per capita GDP ($25.02 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity) three times lower than that of the United States ($85.37 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity), has a much lower poverty rate than the United States? The answer is none other than the quality of human rights enjoyed by Chinese citizens compared to that of American inhabitants. (Datosmacro.com. Expansión)   What are human rights for the West? The most evident thing is that human rights for the West are a media weapon to attack China. Every time Western media mention China, they inevitably, as a self-imposed style guide, have to vilify China for its lack of human rights. “Tell me what you boast of, and I will tell you what you lack.” For the West, human rights focus on defending Western "Democracy" against what they term Chinese “Autocracy." If we look at this Western-style "Democracy," we see that it is characterized (primarily in Anglo-Saxon countries and to a lesser extent in other Western countries) by the alternation in government between two political parties that uphold the same political system. The exclusive dominance of these two parties over the state is built upon the absolute repression of organizations opposed to the system. This repression is executed through various means: Firstly, elections are designed on a marketing basis that requires mobilizing large sums of money to have any chance; secondly, the media, which shapes the population's thinking, is controlled by the same business groups that control the two parties; and thirdly, when any political force emerges with fresh air in this neoliberal jungle, the entire legal and illegal machinery of the state is unleashed upon it until it is annihilated. A system that has been working for two centuries now and has allowed the American empire to rise. The West fills its mouth with the word "Democracy" to cover up all its democratic shortcomings and deficiencies. A "Representative Democracy" based on elections every four or five years where the parties of the neoliberal system always "win" because other parties are prevented from having the necessary means to have any chance. And it uses this supposed legitimacy it claims due to its presumption of democracy to deny human rights to its citizens. (Of course, while the human rights of its citizens are denied, the human rights of citizens in the rest of the world are directly massacred. In addition to the hundreds of interventions in numerous countries, in Latin America and other continents, to manipulate and change their governments in favor of American interests, in just the current century, the United States has waged war with its military against the following countries or regions: Afghanistan -2001/2021-, Iraq -2003/2011-, Somalia -2007/2021-, Indian Ocean -2009/2016-, Libya -2011-, Uganda -2011/2017-, Iraq -2014/present-, Syria -2014/present-, Libya -2015/2020-, Mozambique -2021/present-, and Yemen -2023/present-.) The Political System of China Firstly, and it seems unlike the West, human rights in China consist of 30 rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations), and not just neoliberal democracy. Let's start with "Democracy." In China, there are nine political parties with parliamentary representation, and all of them support the existing participatory democracy in the country: Ø Communist Party of China Ø Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang Ø China Democratic League Ø China Association for Promoting Democracy Ø China National Democratic Construction Association Ø China Association for Promoting Democracy Ø Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party Ø China Zhigong Party Ø Jiusan Society Ø Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League The political membership of Chinese citizens in these parties is much higher than in the West, and the majority far exceeds one hundred thousand members. If we look at Article 21 of the Declaration of Human Rights, which focuses on the Right to participate in public affairs, we see that it establishes that: 1. "Everyone has the right to take part in the government of their country, directly or through freely chosen representatives." 2. "Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in their country." 3. "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." China's participatory democracy is based on People's Congresses, which currently have 2.77 million elected deputies. There are five levels of People's Congresses: municipality, county, city, province, and national. In last June elections, 921 million voters participated in municipal elections, representing 86.49% of registered voters, and 623 million voters participated in county elections, representing 85.63% of registered voters. The upper three levels of deputies (city, province, and national) are elected by deputies from the lower level. If we look at the XIV National People's Congress (NPC), it consists of 2,977 deputies. Some important characteristics to highlight about the composition of these deputies are as follows: Ø Ethnic minorities: There are 55 ethnic minorities in China represented by a total of 442 deputies. Ø Women: Their representation remains low. There are 790 female deputies, representing only 26.54% of the total NPC. Ø Workers and farmers: With 497 deputies, their participation reaches 16.69% of the total deputies. Ø Communist Party of China: There are 969 deputies, accounting for 32.55% of the total deputies. We can conclude that the North American political system is designed to perpetuate the neoliberal democracy upon which it is based. Similarly, the Chinese political system is designed to perpetuate Chinese socialist democracy. Both systems formally meet the three requirements of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. From the perspective of effectiveness, it seems that the neoliberal system, on one hand, in the current crisis situation, is generating a level of confrontation between the two parties that alternate in power (Republicans and Democrats in the United States, Socialists and Populars in Spain) that is hindering the government's work and muddying the political situation with the goal of obtaining power above any principle. On the other hand, the electoral marketing style on which it is based enhances government actions on short-term needs at the expense of medium and long-term plans, which cease to be an electoral priority. Looking towards China, the Chinese political system centered on grassroots People's Assemblies has two important advantages: on one hand, electoral confrontation does not occur between two national machineries geared to compete and win, but between grassroots individuals known to and neighbors of the voters who will elect them, where the individual holds greater value than the party itself. On the other hand, this system based on individuals allows for their selection based on their capabilities and promotes the rise to power of the most qualified. This phenomenon has been referred to as "Meritocracy" or the government of the best, and China today represents the clearest depiction of this meritocratic system. The other 29 articles of the Human Rights Declaration Without going deep into each of the Human Rights due to space constraints, let's focus on those that are driving the quality of life of Chinese citizens. In general, the United States uses human rights as a political tool for interference in the internal affairs of other countries, to influence and overthrow governments in its strategy of global domination. The State Department periodically publishes reports that are disseminated by Western media. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador expressed a few days ago regarding the latest U.S. report that "The State Department is talking about the human rights situation in Mexico being gray. The only thing is to ask [the agency] to review its recommendations because they violate the sovereignty of peoples. They are no-one to extend letters of good conduct to independent and sovereign countries and peoples." In relation to this latest report, many voices have risen up to rebuke the United States and assert that it lacks the capacity, or even the moral high ground, to criticize what happens in other countries regarding human rights. They point to everything happening with Julian Assange, the brutal repression of students in the United States, or the military support for the genocide of Palestinians, to express that this country cannot speak about human rights because it lacks moral authority. The right to equality and non-discrimination. Articles 1 and 2 are about the right to equality and the prohibition of discrimination. If we use their representation in the highest legislative body of each country for various minority groups to compare their level of discrimination, the result is as follows:   While ethnic minorities in China are overrepresented in the highest legislative body, in the United States, Latinos and African Americans together are discriminated against compared to non-Latino white individuals in the House of Representatives. The situation of women in both countries in their legislative bodies is discriminatory and at a similar level. In China, only 26.5% of deputies in the National People's Congress are women, and in the United States, only 28% of congresswomen in the House of Representatives are women. The respect for ethnic minorities and their national integration in China is notable. The most evident case is the Uyghur minority settled in the Xinjiang region, which is of Muslim origin and for which the United States has been financing all kind of Islamist terrorist groups to destabilize China without any success and launching worldwide discrediting campaigns. The Right to the Satisfaction of Economic, Social, and Cultural Needs According to Article 22, every person has the right to the satisfaction of these needs. China's progress in poverty alleviation, as seen in the previous graph, is spectacular. It shows how, starting from extremely high poverty levels (over 50% in the year 2000), China outpaces the United States from 2014 until its elimination. Meanwhile, no progress is observed in the United States over the last 50 years. Never before so many people have exited poverty in such a short time in human history. This result is the consequence from the different objectives of both societies; while in the United States the focus is on maximizing the benefits of the capitalist system, in China, the focus is on meeting the social needs of the entire population. The Right to Social Security in the Event of Illness, Disability, Widowhood, Old Age, or Other Circumstances Beyond One's Control Article 25 speaks of this right. We have already shown above the evolution of life expectancy in the United States and China, which is the best indicator of the satisfaction of this right. China's advantage in healthcare and social services does not come from higher healthcare spending by this country. On the contrary, the United States is the world's largest spender on healthcare in terms of percentage of GDP, but this expenditure is not distributed evenly and solidarily among all its citizens. Nearly 30 million people in the United States lack health insurance and have had no insurance at all throughout 2022, and worse, they have also lacked the financial means to meet their healthcare needs, which in the United States are all paid for. The U.S. Census does not provide information on how many, in addition to these 30 million, have only had access to health insurance at some point during the year. The Right to Education Article 26: Everyone has the right to education. Let's see how the United States and China spend their budgets:   China has opted for the widespread and open generalization of education. For example, it has been sending nearly 400,000 students each year to American universities until Biden began to prevent their access, and another 300,000 students to other countries worldwide. The gross enrollment ratio in higher education in China reached 59.6% in 2022. Today, Chinese universities host most students worldwide enrolled in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields. As a conclusión China draws its strength from human rights to drive its economy and progress. We find a country where the population shares the benefits of progress in solidarity, expanding social security, healthcare, and education nationwide. This has created the world’s most skilled workforce, setting annual records in patents, surpassing both the United States and all combined university systems of European Union countries in graduate students, with 11.6 million new graduates in the last academic year. And it's not just the labor force that the standard of living, healthcare, or education generate in a country; it's also the personal satisfaction of citizens with the respect of all their rights. The French company Ipsos is responsible for conducting worldwide studies on the level of happiness in different countries and has been pointing out China as the happiest country in the world. There is no doubt that Chinese society is a satisfied one. A satisfaction that hints at the pride of belonging to a country that has carried out the largest and fastest economic and social revolution in history.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском China's geopolitics and Russia's concessions While the Western media continues to speculate about China's role in the Russian war of aggression, Beijing is seeking to maximize its benefits: from China's point of view, the aim is to exploit Moscow's dependence on the People's Republic and expand cooperation in its own interests - and not just in economic terms. In geopolitical terms, this relates in particular to China's access to the Sea of Japan, but Beijing's plans extend as far as the Arctic. A paragraph from a joint statement by Presidents Xi and Putin, which at first glance seems inconspicuous, could have far-reaching geopolitical implications and become a serious security policy challenge for Japan and South Korea. New balance of power opens up room for maneuver for Beijing The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced a premiere of a special kind on July 24: for the first time, fighter jets from the USA and Canada had to take off over the Bering Sea as two Chinese H-6K bombers approached the coast of Alaska. These were accompanied by two Russian Tupolev Tu-95MSs.[i] Just a few days earlier, Russia and China had held a joint naval and air force exercise called "Joint Sea-2024" near the southern Chinese province of Guangdong. But while these joint military exercises attracted media attention, Beijing and Moscow are creating facts in the background that could have far-reaching consequences for the security architecture in the Sea of Japan and around the Korean peninsula: Russia's ruler Vladimir Putin and China's President Xi Jinping recently published a joint declaration on deepening their strategic partnership.[ii] The background to the paper was the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, or the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, 75 years ago. It contains the following resolution: "Russia and China wish to conduct a constructive dialog with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the navigation of Chinese ships across the lower reaches of the Tumen River." What seems inconspicuous could, from Seoul and Tokyo's perspective, change the strategic balance of power vis-à-vis China to their own disadvantage and have a decisive impact on the sensitive security architecture in the region. The Tumen River: will China's maritime impasse disappear? The 521-kilometre-long Tumen River forms the border between China and North Korea and becomes the border river between North Korea and Russia downstream before flowing into the Sea of Japan. At present, Chinese ships can only navigate the river freely as far as the village of Fangchuan at the eastern end of the inland province of Jilin. Permission from both Russia and North Korea is required for the remaining 15 kilometers to the Sea of Japan. A Soviet-era "Friendship Bridge" less than ten meters high also blocks the passage of larger ships. Historically, China held the area until the Russian Empire gained control in the 1860s. China has repeatedly called on Russia and North Korea to permanently allow Chinese ships to navigate the river to the Sea of Japan and has proposed the creation of a special economic zone along its banks. China's goal is clear: Beijing is keen to gain access to the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River. Japan and South Korea: concerns about geopolitical implications There is concern in Japan that the strategic balance of power vis-à-vis China could shift to Japan's disadvantage: In an interview with the daily newspaper Nikkei Asia, Chisako Masuo, professor of Chinese foreign policy at Kyushu University, warns that in the future, Chinese coast guard patrol vessels could enter the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River alongside larger ships. "This could force the Japanese navy to withdraw its coast guard vessels from the Senkaku Islands, which would weaken surveillance in the East China Sea."[iii] Japan and China are in dispute over the Senkaku Islands. Japan controls them, China calls them Diaoyu and claims them for itself. Recently, the presence of Chinese ships in the waters around the islands has increased again. "There are likely to be similar concerns in South Korea. Chinese ships could now reach the Korean peninsula from both sides. In addition, both Japan and South Korea are close allies of the USA. A deterioration in the security situation - even if it is only perceived - would therefore also have an impact on the plans of the US armed forces," analyses journalist Michael Radunski, who reported from Beijing as a correspondent for several years[iv]. The Sea of Japan: Gateway to the Arctic Beijing is pursuing a much broader goal beyond access to the Sea of Japan: access to the Arctic. In a paper published on May 13, 2024, researchers from northern China's Dalian Maritime University argue that access to the Sea of Japan could strengthen China's position in the Arctic and significantly advance Beijing's vision of a "Polar Silk Road."[v] If the Arctic is indeed largely ice-free by mid-century, new and shortened sea routes would open up for Chinese shipping. "With the Polar Silk Road, China is also embedding the Arctic region in the so-called New Silk Road (Belt and Road Initiative), a large-scale Chinese project to expand an intercontinental infrastructure and trade network. The potential shipping routes of the "Polar Silk Road" run west of Greenland along the Canadian coast (Northwest Passage), from Scandinavia along the Siberian coast of Russia (Northeast Passage) and centrally between Spitsbergen and Greenland (Transpolar Route) into the Bering Strait," states David Merkle, China expert at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in a comprehensive analysis of Chinese policy in the northern polar region. [vi] Currently, a significant proportion of Chinese trade has to pass through the narrow Strait of Malacca between Indonesia and Malaysia. A blockade of this strait, which is only around 50 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, would pose a serious threat to China's energy security. In addition, an ice-free Arctic would shorten the existing sea routes from Asia to Europe by around 8,000 kilometers and to North America by around 4,500 kilometers. Overcomeable challenges or deliberate uncertainty? Russia and North Korea have so far been extremely sceptical of China's plans. Moscow fears that China's influence in North-East Asia could increase. Meanwhile, North Korea also has a lot at stake: until now, all Chinese goods have crossed the Tumen River via a bridge and been transported overland to the port of Rajin. "Therefore, the idea of allowing China to ship directly to the Pacific via the Tumen River would make this port redundant. North Korea would lose a lot of revenue as a result," states Melik Kaylan from the business magazine Forbes.[vii] He points out that massive dredging and widening would be required to make the Tumen navigable for large ships. In his view, the idea of restoring Chinese access seems like a fantasy, "an improbable one". So why did Putin and Xi bring up this idea? His explanation: "The coastal strip was ceded to Russia by the Qing dynasty in the 19th century and the People's Republic of China has been demanding it back for decades. Putin is running out of incentives he can offer Beijing to support his war in Ukraine. Such an offer goes down well with the Chinese public - but triggers anger in Moscow among supporters of the Putin regime, who are filled with Great Russian fanaticism. (...) But Putin is making a certain point: if Beijing gains direct access to the Sea of Japan, the strategic equation will change radically. Currently, the Chinese navy has to sail around the entire Korean peninsula to get to this area. Suddenly, Beijing could directly threaten Japan (and various disputed islands)."[viii] Consequently, the burden on the US and its allies to expand maritime projection, protection, readiness and resources would increase dramatically. So is it all just a PR stunt designed to create uncertainty among the US and its allies - and also generate applause among the Chinese public? This theory is contradicted by the fact that there are hardly any reports in the state media of the People's Republic that address the issue. Furthermore, there is increasing movement in the matter: Chinese online portals have reported that Putin agreed further resolutions at his meeting with North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un in mid-June. Accordingly, North Korea and Russia are said to have already signed a bilateral agreement on the construction of a new bridge over the Tumen River. "It can be seen that cooperation between Russia and China is becoming ever closer in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and increasing Western sanctions. The redesign of this bridge is not only an infrastructure project, but also a symbol of strategic cooperation between the two countries [Russia and China] and heralds a new era of economic cooperation," judges Yi Dan Qing Cheng, who writes under a pseudonym and is one of the few commentators from China to have dealt with the issue in a journalistic capacity.[ix] Outlook There is no question that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has changed the balance of power and relations between Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang. Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in Pyongyang in June. Putin traveled to North Korea for the first time in a quarter of a century to personally deepen relations between the two states. Meanwhile, Russia is dependent on Chinese goods: in 2023, goods worth a record value of more than 240 billion US dollars were traded between Russia and China, an increase of 26.3 percent compared to the previous year. These shifts in Russia's power and dependencies open up new opportunities for the People's Republic, including geopolitically. If the project to provide Chinese access to the Sea of Japan is successfully pursued, China could develop the Tumen Delta as a secondary shipyard for its naval and patrol vessels and position them strategically close to Japan's international maritime borders. The region appears to be preparing for growing tensions: The foreign ministers of Australia, India, Japan and the USA announced in Tokyo at the end of July that they would be expanding their cooperation within the framework of the so-called Quad. Specifically, this involves the area of cyber security - but also maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. References [i] Siehe ausführlicher: Zwerger, Patrick 2024: Uralt-Bomber aus Russland und China treffen auf US-Jets, abrufbar unter: https://www.flugrevue.de/militaer/tupolew-tu-95ms-und-harbin-h-6-uralt-bomber-aus-russland-und-china-vor-alaskas-kueste/, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [ii] Außenministerium der Volksrepublik China 2024: Gemeinsame Erklärung der Volksrepublik China und der Russischen Föderation zur Vertiefung der umfassenden strategischen Kooperationspartnerschaft im neuen Zeitalter anlässlich des 75. Jahrestages der Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Ländern, abrufbar unter: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [iii] Tajima, Yukio 2024: China eyes Sea of Japan access via Russia-North Korea border river, Nikkei Asia, abrufbar unter: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-eyes-Sea-of-Japan-access-via-Russia-North-Korea-border-river, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [iv] Radunski, Michael 2024: Chinesisch-russische Partnerschaft: Wie Peking sich Zugang zum Japanischen Meer verschaffen will, China.Table, 28.06.2024. [v] Chang, Yen-Chiang, Xingyi Duan, Xu (John) Zhang & Ling Yan 2024: On China’s Navigation Rights and Interests in the Tumen River and the Japanese Sea, abrufbar unter: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08920753.2024.2347817?src=exp-la, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [vi] Merkle, David 2023: Der selbsternannte Fast-Arktisstaat: Chinas Politik in der nördlichen Polarregion, in: Auslandsinformationen, abrufbar unter: https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/der-selbsternannte-fast-arktisstaat, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [vii] Kaylan, Melik 2024: Russia Offers China A River To The Sea In The Pacific, abrufbar unter: https://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan/2024/06/25/russia-offers-china-a-river-to-the-sea-in-the-pacific/, letzter Zugriff 30.7.2024. [viii] Ebd. [ix] Yi Dan Qing Cheng 2024: Was er unserem Land versprochen hat, hat Putin eingehalten. Die Umgestaltung der Tumen-Brücke hat die Sorgen der chinesischen Seite gemildert, abrufbar unter: https://www.163.com/dy/article/J6JBCD8K0552P34A.html, letzter Zugriff 30.7.2024.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The concept of a multipolar (or polycentric) world order [1] was first coined by Academician Yevgeny Primakov in 1996 [Primakov 1996]. Like everything new, it was not immediately accepted, but ultimately became a significant contribution to both domestic and world theory of international relations, offering a compelling alternative to Western approaches, particularly the one proposed in Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations [Huntington 1993]. It informed the idea of trilateral cooperation between Russia, China and India, implemented by Primakov and later embodied in the BRICS group. By now, the idea of multipolarity has been recognized in global political science, has entered the conceptual framework and the language of international diplomacy and is used in Russia’s doctrinal documents. In 2015, we proposed the scenario of a new bipolarity [2] as one of the possible trajectories for global development. Today, many scholars, both Chinese and American, [3] suggest that China-centric and U.S.-centric poles are emerging. This article discusses the “multipolarity — new bipolarity” dichotomy. Long Global Macro-Transformations World history shows that a new world order typically emerges after the end of a major war (see Table 1). Table 1. International system (world order)    Source: systematized by A.A. Dynkin, IMEMO RAS Europe was usually the “kitchen” where the world order was cooked. Take the last 200 years. After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Concert of Europe emerged and lasted for 100 years. The century-long stability of that system could be explained by the homogeneity of the political organization of its guarantor states. All members of the Concert of Europe were monarchies. World War I produced the Versailles system, which lasted only 20 years. One of the reasons for its short life was the exclusion of the Soviet Union, Germany and China. The Yalta-Potsdam system was formed by the victors in World War II. Its guarantors were the “Big Three” powers—the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the UK—along with France and China. The three defeated powers—Germany, Japan and Italy—were discriminated and disenfranchised. This system existed for 45 years and was initially thought to be polycentric, but quickly degenerated into a bipolar order, and the Cold War commenced. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the system became unipolar, dominated by the West, primarily the U.S. It disregarded Russia’s interests and, from 2018 onward, began discriminating against China as well. February 2022 can be considered the formal date of the unipolar world’s demise. However, today’s predictions suggest it will take at least 10 years before the new post-unipolar system becomes stable. The economic center of gravity is a spatial indicator of the economic strength of states, borrowed from physics. To put it simply, this is a geographical point of equilibrium for GDP, trade and investment flows of different countries. Figure 1 shows a map of how the world’s economic center of gravity shifted for over a thousand years. It appeared in Central Asia, on the territory of the Ghaznavid Empire (modern-day Afghanistan). The center then migrated northwest, while the devastation in post-war Europe forcefully pushed it (within just 10 years) to the West, toward Greenland. Then it turned east again. The sharpest shift, to the southeast, occurred in 2000–2010 and is associated with the rise of China. The economic center of gravity has almost returned to the same meridian but remained more than 2,000 km north of the starting point, which indicates a return to the millennial balance of economic power between the West and the East. Figure 1. “Journey” of the three-dimensional economic center of gravity    Source: Dobbs R., Remes J., Manyika J. et al. Urban world: Cities and the rise of the consuming class. McKinsey Global Institute, 2012. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/urbanization/urban-world-cities-and-the-rise-of-the-consuming-class. Statistic calculations by IMEMO RAS for 60 years of peace (1960–2021) indicate the stability of the center’s latitudinal (horizontal) position. This suggests a relatively consistent proportion of GDP production by the countries in the Global South and Global North, under the economic leadership of the Northern Hemisphere. The shift to the East has also been clearly confirmed. According to our projections up to 2050, the future position of the globe’s center of economic activity will lie on the border of India and China. This method of analysis reveals a high level of inertia in time and geographic monotonicity of changes in the balance of economic power of states. It also shows that wars can drastically disrupt the natural course of events. The center of gravity method can also be applied to the arsenals of strategic and tactical weapons (see Figure 2). For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. had a huge advantage, but then there was a clear pivot to the northeast—the creation of superior nuclear capabilities in the Soviet Union. With the onset of arms control in 1993, a reversing loop emerged, heading southwest. This was followed by a curve to the east with an implied southward inclination, which reflects the growing nuclear stockpiles of India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the rapid buildup of strategic and tactical nuclear forces in China. The military center of gravity follows its economic peer with a lag of 20 years, reflecting the geopolitical ambitions of Asian powers. These interpretations also clearly demonstrate the end of unipolarity and point to the rise of multipolarity. Figure 2. Movement of the nuclear center of gravity Source: calculations by K.V. Bogdanov, Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS, based on the data from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/. Technology. Politicians tend to be techno-optimists. Barack Obama predicted that 3D printing would transform the entire world. [4] George W. Bush promised that decoding the human genome would revolutionize medicine. [5] All false starts. Economists traditionally measure the rate of technological progress (TP) using the total factor productivity (TFP) index. To put it simply, this is the part of economic growth driven not by an increase in inputs—labor and capital—but rather by improvements in the efficiency of their use. Technological progress means not only the generation of new scientific and technological ideas but also their mass replication. Without economic validation of the impact of wide dissemination of innovations, scientific or technological achievements remain in history as brilliant breakthroughs with only local economic effects, giving rise to journalistic generalizations at best, such as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” or “the sixth techno-economic paradigm.” Statistical metrics rely on data of technologically advanced nations, while catching-up countries have room for growth by approaching the TP frontier, i.e. adopting and improving existing ideas and technologies. Technological leaders spend more resources pushing the TP frontier, while those catching up can accelerate at lower costs, effectively staying in the “wind shadow” of the leaders. The TFP index growth rate has been steadily declining in developed countries for many years, but this has been especially conspicuous since the mid-2000s. Today, the growth is below 1.5% and even 1% per year (see Figure 3). Figure 3. Average annual growth of total factor productivity, % Source: calculations by IMEMO RAS based on the data from the International Productivity Monitor. No. 38, Spring 2020. http://www.csls.ca/ipm/ipm38.asp#:~:text=Martin%20Neil%20Baily%2C%20Barry%20P.%20Bosworth%20and %20Siddhi%20Doshi%0ALessons%20from%20Productivity%20Comparisons%20 of%20Germany%2C%20Japan%2C%20and%20the%20United%20States%C2%A0; Innovative China: New Drivers of Growth. World Bank Group, and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P.R. China. 2019. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1335-1. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/833871568732137448/pdf/Innovative-China-New-Drivers-of-Growth.pdf. A similar pattern of dramatic TFP deceleration was observed in China. The consensus interpretation of these figures is that the main effects of the Third Industrial (i.e., computer) Revolution have largely been exhausted, and no new general-purpose breakthrough technologies (such as electricity, internal combustion engines, or computers and mobile communications) have emerged. However, it seems that the intellectualization of technologies and approaches to project management, as well as informatization, simply do not fit into the traditional factor-based view of progress that was established many years ago. The scale of knowledge is growing, new professions are springing up, the role of emotional intelligence and cognitive functions is increasing. All this dramatically changes the structure of capital assets (see Figure 4). From the beginning of the 21st century and until the 2008 crisis (2000–2007), equipment accounted for over 50% of the increase in capital’s contribution (investment) to output growth, whereas in 2019–2021, almost 63% of this increase was attributable to intellectual property assets. This result of our research suggests a refocusing of technological progress from final products to intellectual technologies, enabling the production of a range of innovative goods and services tailored to highly segmented demand. Figure 4. Transformation of the capital structure in the U.S. private sector Source: Total Factor Productivity for Major Industries—2022. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/prod3_03232023.htm. There are now hopes that the pace of technological progress may accelerate due to the development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, which will spark a new industrial revolution. An indirect sign of its imminence is the sharp rise in the rate of business births and deaths in the U.S. economy in 2020–2022. [6] The spillover of labor from companies that are losing efficiency to corporations with increasing market shares has also accelerated. These are some sort of leading indicators that suggest the structural results of TP are approaching. Similar developments occurred 30 years ago, on the cusp of the computer revolution. The above-mentioned intellectualization of fi ed capital, where trusted AI will be applied, adds credibility to these hopes. In addition, AI is one of the critical areas of technological sovereignty. It is no coincidence that Vladimir Putin described AI as “crosscutting, universal and essentially revolutionary technology.” [7] The Russian President announced the preparation of a new edition of the National AI Development Strategy and a respective decree. I believe that this prioritization is justified. China’s experience in the semiconductor race is a good model to be emulated (see Figure 5). Its distinguishing feature is the focus on companies as drivers of development, with massive, cumulatively growing state support. Figure 5. Focusing on China’s priorities (nanometer chip race) Source: Systematized by I.V. Danilin, IMEMO RAS The U.S. strategy of curbing technological development of Russia (in all areas) and China (in semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing and electric cars) leads to stiff competition in high technology, which is fraught with fragmentation, diversification of technical standards, legal norms and rules. And this is another argument in favor of a new bipolarity. Demographic processes. According to UN projections, by the middle of the 21st century, Russia will drop from its current 9th place to 14th in terms of population, while remaining the most populous country in Europe. [8] A more significant problem for Russia is population aging. The proportion of elderly people, who are typically not part of the labor force, is increasing. Japan, Spain and Italy are leading this process today, but neither China nor India will be spared. Nigeria appears to be the only major country where population and the share of young people will continue to grow until the end of the 21st century. As of December 2023, one in 10 people worldwide was aged 65 or over, with health spending taking up 10% of global GDP. [9] In this context, the importance of medical technologies cannot be overstated, as they can extend not only people’s life expectancy but also the duration of their healthy and socially active life, thereby easing labor market pressures. Needs always steer technological progress toward overcoming economic growth constraints tied to the scarcest resource in any given historical period. A serious risk associated with the problem of aging is a slowdown in innovation, since it is people under 40—the age group that will shrink throughout the 21st century—who are the primary drivers and consumers of innovation. So far, this risk has been mitigated by the large youth cohorts in China and India. This is why these two nations are experiencing almost exponential growth in patenting, massive reengineering and, consequently, in middle-class numbers. Demographics give India an edge until around 2060, which is already evident in the growth rates of Indian economy. Combined with the influx of hi-tech investments and the contribution of the Indian diaspora, India has good prospects, making its position crucial to the future architecture of the world order, regardless of how it evolves. The U.S. understands this and has been figuratively “clinging” to this nation for the past 20 years. I believe that the Russian Academy of Sciences should significantly bolster scientific and educational ties with India and its dynamically developing neighbors in Southeast Asia—Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. The anticipated tension in the global market of new generations of innovators aggravates inter-country competition for this scarcest resource. I think that the international reputation of the Russian Academy of Sciences is a powerful tool to attract and retain young people and foster their creative motivation. We should reassert this as we celebrate the 300th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences. Ideology. Dirigisme [10], or statism, is the main trend in both economic theory and economic policy of the West. A pivot to a more state-controlled economy began with the disappointing outcomes of the Washington Consensus, which aimed to guide post-socialist countries from planned to market economies. The 2008–2009 financial crisis cemented the trend toward statism, and the COVID-19 pandemic elevated it to unprecedented proportions. In the U.S., Democrats are among the most vocal proponents of greater government intervention in all spheres of life, but they are not alone. Republicans are also actively advocating industrial policy, repudiation of free trade, as well as strict control over Big Tech, among other measures. The popularity of the so-called cultural Marxism is on the rise. [11] Its origins go back to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (H. Marcuse, E. Fromm and others). These ideas are moving from the realm of ideological and theoretical confrontations into political activism. For example, the leaders of the BLM movement publicly self-identify as “trained Marxist organizers.” The essence of the strategy inspired by “cultural Marxism” is the rejection of direct political struggle on the barricades, since the proletariat has been “bought off by the bourgeoisie and is no longer capable of anything,” and the ranks of the classic proletariat are rapidly thinning. The direction of social change is set, on the one hand, by intellectuals with personal power and, on the other hand, by marginalized groups seeking to assert their “right to identity.” The strategy of activists who form this paradoxical combination of intellectuals and marginalized individuals is the creeping takeover of the main institutions of power and society by planting “correct” ideas in the mass consciousness. In the U.S., the fighters for political correctness have already hijaked the school system, university campuses, major media outlets and the entertainment industry (Hollywood). Civil servants are forced to take courses in critical race theory, which postulates not only the socially constructed nature of race and the recognition of systemic racism [Delgado, Stefancic 2017: 45] but also a sense of guilt in one part of society toward another. This, in turn, allegedly requires addressing moral and material injustices by organizing public life in line with such an ideology. Similar concepts are being pushed into public discourse as well. It is already dominated by the ideas of radical feminism, cancel culture, anti-systemic racism and postcolonialism, the fight against global warming and the green agenda, which claims to be universal and non-negotiable. As a result, the energy transition is motivated more by ideology than by the comparative market efficiency of energy supplies. Different environmental-political discourses—eco-nationalism, eco-imperialism and green growth—are competing in shaping the green agenda, eroding the attractiveness of the dominant sustainable development model. Another universal weapon in fighting any dissent is political correctness. Large corporations, government agencies and universities are developing and implementing strategies to promote DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) principles, which are nothing but tools of ideological control over employees. Universities are required to fi reports on their compliance with such principles and efforts to promote them, which causes mounting criticism as they violate academic freedom and cultivate ideological conformity. [12] However, ideological censorship has already taken deep root in various spheres of public life, and questioning its compatibility with democracy is deemed politically incorrect. Revising cultural norms has become a cultural norm in and of itself, deepening divisions in modern polarized societies, primarily in the U.S., but also in Old Europe [Semenenko 2023: 27-35]. Another curious phenomenon is associated with the new agenda. In the 20th century, the left championed progress, advocating faster economic growth, rapid technological advancement and better social welfare. Now the ideas of zero or even negative growth and post-growth are popular among them. [Buchs, Koch 2017: 218]. Such ideological narratives exacerbate the question of how to treat the poor countries of the South, but also their own poor: the welfare state for all no longer fit into this agenda. On the contrary, it becomes a selective tool of backing the “right” minorities. This creates a breeding ground for stronger positions of populist forces. Such contradictory internal political processes distort public consciousness as well as domestic and foreign policy decision-making. The new elites are extremely ideologized. The U.S. political system is becoming less effective at regulating the economy. Two rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings, have downgraded the U.S. credit rating to AA+ from the top mark of AAA. In November 2023, Moody’s lowered its outlook on the U.S. credit rating to “negative” from “stable.” All three agencies agree on the main reason for the downgrade: the growing dysfunctionality of the political system. In foreign policy, the U.S. has withdrawn from 16 major international treaties and agreements on arms control, global trade, climate and the Arctic since the beginning of the century [Dynkin 2020]. In other words, the unipolar world order with its unbridled appetite for expansion has brought the world into a zone of extra-high risks. And the paradigms that are dominant in the West have proven incompatible with either Russian or Chinese value-oriented political projects. Therefore, the ideological sphere will inevitably see increased confrontation, marking another step toward bipolarity. IMEMO RAS researchers have repeatedly warned about the West’s miscalculated strategic hopes: 1) that Russia would face an economic catastrophe because of an unprecedented sanctions war in modern history; 2) that the unipolar world order would remain unchallenged; 3) that a global blockade of Russia’s export-oriented economy would be feasible. And we were not the only ones who made these warnings. In response, we only heard propagandistic clichés like “a gas station masquerading as a country,” “a regional power” and “Russia is isolated with its economy in tatters”. This kind of “expertise” led the Washington establishment to believe that Russia is a “declining power” whose strategic interests could be safely neglected. This “strategic lunacy” is a consequence of a universalist mindset—a product of the West’s political experience and culture, which tends to elevate Anglo-Saxon and European historical tradition to absolutes—and of a failure to understand the shifts in the balance of power in the 21st century. Today, Russia is the world’s fourth-largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP), while the top fi e global economic powers include three BRICS nations and none from the blooming “garden” of Josep Borrell, the EU foreign policy chief who has recently been fired. Now a new narrative has been launched into the propaganda orbit: “Russia is about to attack Eastern Europe.” The logical gap between the image of a declining power and that of an “aggressive bear” is conveniently ignored. This primitive, one-dimensional perception of complex non-linear processes can only lead to disappointment—just as it did when the West lulled itself into believing that Chinese reforms would eventually lead to political pluralism. As a result, the West has an inexhaustible stream of surprises. It appears that their experts are increasingly out of touch with Russian (and any other non-Western) realities. Figuratively speaking, they are staring into a distorting rearview mirror constructed by their own rhetoric and propaganda. But the main real surprise was the fantastic resilience of the Russian economy. I dare say that no other economy in the world, not even China’s, could withstand such aggressive pressure. The high resistance of the Russian economy to external shocks can be explained by three fundamental reasons. First, it is the result of difficult, sometimes agonizing institutional and structural reforms. These efforts have ultimately produced a self-sufficient, adaptive and highly diversified market economy. Second, the crisis of 2022 was the fifth (!) in the history of post-Soviet Russia. The government, federal regulators and the Bank of Russia have accumulated hard-earned professional experience in crisis management and counter-cyclical strategies. The same can be said about business. Our economic entities have demonstrated time and again that there are always more effective solutions than there are problems. Finally, the West miscalculated its ability to isolate our economy. The dual containment of Russia and China, in fact, only strengthens ties between the BRICS member states. Transformations of the 2020s. The first half of the 2020s has fi y buried what was once known as “European security.” It is impossible to glue this “broken cup” back together without Russia. The unwillingness of the Ukrainian side and the West to stop the armed conflict at its very beginning, the dangerous escalation, NATO’s constant violation of its own “red lines” and the accession of Sweden and Finland to the North Atlantic Alliance are all symptoms of the European security system transforming into a transatlantic one. Meanwhile, the Eurasian security system is taking shape. The outcomes of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China hint that the “political East” is starting to form, if not as an alternative to the long-standing “political West,” then at least as an equal partner. Without considering its interests, any debate about “rules-based” global security will be mere fantasy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Moscow after his recent reelection is in the same vein. Of course, geography cannot be changed, and Russia has been and will remain a European power. However, it is also the geographic center of Eurasia, providing the infrastructure backbone for the Eurasian partnership—from the Northern Sea Route and up to the Trans-Siberian Railway, Baikal–Amur Mainline, Trans-Asian Highway and cross-continental pipelines. The “post-Ukrainian” world seems to be moving toward a new, indivisible Eurasian security architecture, relying on existing institutions: the Union State, CSTO, EAEU, CIS, BRICS, SCO and ASEAN. Minsk has put forward an initiative to develop a Eurasian Charter for Diversity and Multipolarity—a strategic vision for a new system of international relations to replace the “rules-based” world order. An important event of 2024 in this context is the expansion of the BRICS club (see Figure 6). Its combined economic power could potentially reach $67 trillion, surpassing the total GDP of the G7 countries. Figure 6. Economic potential of BRICS countries Source: calculations by A.A. Dynkin, IMEMO RAS, based on the data from the IMF, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Steel Association, Energy Transition Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2023, International Energy Agency. And there are still 28 more countries on the “waiting list”. In several important markets such as metals, automotive industry, oil and mineral fertilizers, BRICS already matches or exceeds the potential of the G7 nations. Russia, which took over the BRICS rotating presidency in 2024, faces the task of energizing the harmonized economic and technological policies of the members. This approach is the institutional cornerstone of the future polycentric world. What will the coming world order look like? It is difficult to say which of the two trends—bipolarity or polycentrism—will prevail in the end. It is more likely that they will coexist: for example, rigid bipolarity in the Global North and polycentrism in the Global South. Signs of military, economic and technological bipolarity are already visible in the North. Interestingly, New Delhi tends to categorize China as a country of the North [Jaishankar 2020: 240]. This viewpoint has substance, as China is far ahead of other countries of the Global South in terms of GDP per capita ($12,541). For comparison, India’s GDP per capita is $2,612. [13] The decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies has not affected trade flows yet, but only technology and investment. In 2023, China saw a reversal of foreign direct investment inflows, with funds previously invested being withdrawn. Negative trends took hold, and the outflow approached negative $1.5 trillion (see Figure 7). Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific macro-region is gaining greater internal dynamics, unlike Europe or North America. Figure 7. U.S.–China Economic Decoupling Source: UN Comtrade Database. https://comtradeplus.un.org/; State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) of the People’s Republic of China. https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/. Meanwhile, the trend toward political polycentricity persists. For example, New Delhi and Ankara were initially poles apart on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. This is also the dawning of post-unipolarity, where the new centers of power are increasingly guided by their own interests in decision-making rather than by any “rules” or advice from Washington, Beijing or Moscow. It would be unrealistic to expect that the future world order will be free of conflict. The world will retain its diversity, with different potentials of countries and their competition. It is crucial that, despite their differences, the interests of larger and smaller nations are respected, and problems are solved through constructive dialogue. Russia was the first to challenge the notorious unipolar world order. Today we can state that most countries in the Global South have responded to this challenge and refused to subscribe to the Western interpretation of the conflict in Ukraine . The future world order is taking shape right before our eyes. I am sure that a multipolar world is preferable for Russia as a developed, self-sufficient and sovereign nation. But this world also requires a new system of global governance, development and strengthening of its institutions, such as BRICS, G20, SCO and EAEU. For instance, the EAEU member states (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan) are faring much better than the five other post-Soviet countries. In 2022, GDP per capita in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union was 3.5 times higher than the average for the fi e other CIS states that are not part of the EAEU (Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) (see Figure 8). Our strategy in these organizations requires a solid approach and “stereoscopic” vision from socio-economic, scientific, technological and political perspectives. Here, the Russian Academy of Sciences should play a major role as a leader of scientific and expert community. Figure 8. Economic trends of EAEU and CIS countries Source: EEC. https://eec.eaeunion.org/?ysclid=lr7rtdg7np631919243; IMF. https://www.imf.org/; World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/.  Conclusion In conclusion, there are compelling arguments both for multipolarity and for a new bipolarity. Leading U.S. experts are asking similar questions: “What order will replace the crumbling US-led system is far from certain. Will China push aside the United States as the global hegemon to lead a world according to rules written in Chinese characters? Will the world become bipolar, divided between two more or less rigidly defined blocs led by the United States and China? Will a genuinely multipolar world emerge based on several states or coalitions of more or less equal strength?” [Graham 2023: 272]. These questions are yet to be answered, and definitive conclusions in this case are premature. Given this high uncertainty, one should be prepared for any scenario. The essential prerequisite for such readiness is Russia’s strategic autonomy based on military-strategic parity with the U.S. The fundamental question to which the author has no answer today is: how likely is the emergence of a new world order without a major war? In 2024, presidential or parliamentary elections will take place (or have already taken place) in 50 countries, which account for more than 45% of the world’s GDP and population. Perhaps their results will clarify our vision of the near future. Dynkin A.A. (2024). World order transformation: economy, ideology, technology. Polis. Political Studies, 5, 8-23. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2024.05.02 This article was prepared with the support of a grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation for major scientific projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development No. 075-15-2024-551 “Global and regional centers of power in the emerging world order”. The author expresses gratitude to his colleagues at IMEMO RAS R.I. Kapelyushnikov, V.D. Milovidov, I.S. Semenenko, I.V. Danilin, S.V. Zhukov, K.V. Bogdanov, A.P. Guchanova for consultations and assistance in preparing this article. References Büchs, M., & Koch, M. (2017). Critiques of growth. In M. Büchs, & M. Koch. Postgrowth and Wellbeing: Challenges to Sustainable Welfare (pp. 39-56). London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3319-59903-8_4 Delgado, R.,& Stefancic, J. (2017). Critical race theory. Anintroduction. New York: New York University Press. Graham, T. (2023). Getting Russia right. UK: Polity Books. Huntington, S.P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22-49. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations Jaishankar, S. (2020). The India way: strategies for an uncertain world. New Delhi; New York: Harper Collins Publishers India. Kupchan, C. (2021). Bipolarity is back: why it matters. The Washington Quarterly, 44(4), 123-139. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020457 Yan Xuetong. (2016). Political leadership and power redistribution. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 9(1), 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow002 Dynkin, A.A. (2020). International turbulence and Russia. Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 90(2), 127-137. https://doi.org/10.1134/S101933162002001X. Primakov, E.M. (1996). Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya nakanune XXI veka: problemy, perspektivy [International Relations on the eve of 21st century: problems, prospects]. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’, 10, 3-13. (In Russ.) Semenenko, I.S. (2023). Razdelyonnye obshchestva [Divided societies]. In I.S. Semenenko (Ed.), Identichnost’: lichnost’, obshchestvo, politika. Novye kontury issledovatel’skogo polya [Identity: The Individual, Society, and Politics. New Outlines of the Research Field] (pp. 27-35). Moscow: Ves’ Mir. (In Russ.) https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/publ/2023/Identichnost-Semenenko-2023.pdf Литература на русском языке Дынкин А.А. 2020. Международная турбулентность и Россия. Вестник РАН. Т. 90. № 3. С. 208-219. https://doi.org/10.31857/S0869587320030032. EDN: WINCQO. Примаков Е.М. 1996. Международные отношения накануне XXI в.: проблемы, перспективы. Международная жизнь. № 10. С. 3-13. Семененко И.С. 2023. Разделенные общества. Идентичность: личность, общество, политика. Новые контуры исследовательского поля. Отв. ред. И.С. Семененко. М.: Весь Мир. С. 27-35. https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/publ/2023/Identichnost-Semenenko-2023.pdf. EDN: NTQYRB. 1. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract  This paper looks at the development of Chinese exports to Central Asian countries after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The analysis, which relies on export data from China to Asian countries at a general product level, shows that China’s exports to Central Asia have significantly increased since the start of the war. In particular, exports to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have increased significantly. The analysis focuses on exports in Harmonized System (HS) categories 84, 85, 87, and 90. Many of the products sanctioned by the West in trade with Russia belong to these categories, but the categories also include many non-sanctioned products. Although the value of China’s exports to Central Asia is still smaller than direct trade with Russia, China’s exports – especially to Kyrgyzstan – have seen dramatic increases in the HS 84, 85, 87, and 90 categories. Along with the export growth from China to Central Asia, exports in these categories from Central Asia to Russia have also increased significantly.  Keywords: China, Central Asia, Russia, exports 1. Introduction  This policy brief sheds light on the development of Chinese exports to Central Asia after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. The analysis, which focuses on China’s dollar-denominated exports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan between 2018 and 2023, is based on the monthly and yearly customs data on goods exports from CEIC, China Customs Administration, Kazakhstan Bureau of National Statistics, and UN Comtrade. The analysis considers exports from Central Asian countries to Russia in some key product categories in the same time frame. Data on Chinese exports to Russia and the rest of the world (excluding Russia and Central Asian countries) help broaden the analysis.  The European Union, the United States, as well as a number of other countries, imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The sanctions packages targeted trade, investment, and cooperation with Russia, including sanctions on exports and imports of goods and services. While China has yet to impose sanctions on Russia, Chinese companies increasingly face the threat of secondary sanctions.  There is evidence that trade sanctions imposed against Russia have been circumvented by redirecting trade through Russia's neighboring countries (e.g. Chupilkin et al., 2023) and that China exports to Russia dual-use goods exploited by the Russian military (Kluge, 2024). This analysis shows that Chinese exports to Central Asia increased significantly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The soaring trade with Kyrgyzstan, a relatively tiny economy, is particularly notable. Chinese exports to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also rose sharply. Exports from Central Asian countries to Russia in selected key export categories increased in 2022, with Kazakhstan’s exports growing significantly, making it the largest exporter to Russia among Central Asian countries.  The paper analyzes the export of China to Central Asia by examining Harmonized System (HS) categories 84 (Machinery), 85 (Electrical equipment), 87 (Vehicles), and 90 (Optical and medical instruments). Categories 88 (Aircraft) and 89 (Ships) were omitted from the analysis since their export volumes were irregular and the data are inconsistent. These categories are important since many of the sanctions goods belong to these broad categories and often involve sophisticated technologies essential to Russian military efforts. Additionally, China is a major technology producing country and Russia’s main supplier of sanctioned technology products (Simola, 2024). Not all products in these categories are subject to sanctions and instead the analysis here only provides a broad view of the development of categories with sanctioned products.  The three-part analysis in this brief begins with a discussion of the development of Chinese exports to Central Asian countries at a general level. We then consider Chinese exports to Central Asia in HS categories 84, 85, 87 and 90, and conclude with an overview of Central Asia country exports to Russia in the same HS categories.  2. Chinese trade relations with Central Asia  From a trade perspective, China dominates trade relations with Central Asian countries. Most Central Asian countries run trade deficits with China. While Central Asian countries are geographically proximate with China (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan share borders with China), total exports to these countries have traditionally represented a small slice of China’s total exports. In 2018, for example, Kazakhstan accounted for around 0.5 % of China’s total exports, and the shares of China’s exports to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were between 0.01 % and 0.2 %. China’s exports to Russia in 2018 were around 2 % that year. In 2023, however, exports to Kazakhstan had grown to 0.7 % of China’s total exports, and exports to other Central Asian economies were between 0.03 % and 0.6 %. The share of exports to Kyrgyzstan grew from 0.2 % to 0.6 % in terms of China’s total exports. In comparison, Chinese exports to Russia in 2023 represented 3 % of China’s total exports. In terms of annual growth, Kyrgyzstan on-year increase between stands out, with Chinese exports (measured in dollars) growing by 150 % in 2021 and 110 % in 2022.  The countries in the region are not a homogeneous group. Their economies differ in size and trade patterns. Measured by GDP, Kazakhstan was the largest regional economy in 2023, with a GDP of $260 billion. The second largest was Uzbekistan ($90 billion), followed by Turkmenistan ($59 billion), Kyrgyzstan ($14 billion), and Tajikistan ($12 billion) (World Bank, 2024). China’s top export destination in 2023 was Kazakhstan ($25 billion) and Kyrgyzstan ($20 billion). Turkmenistan had the least exports ($1 billion).  In addition to Russia’s war of aggression, new trade routes and warm bilateral relations may have played a role in Chinese exports to Central Asia. New trade routes have opened under the Belt & Road Initiative, and Xi Jinping’s relations with the leaders of Central Asian countries have been generally friendly.  China has been particularly active in Kyrgyzstan, where it has helped to build several transport infrastructure projects to improve transport connections within the country and the region. Especially in mountainous areas, new transport routes and improved logistics connections could have a major impact on trade volumes. Kyrgyzstan also changed presidents in 2021 following snap elections to quell a wave of protest. Kyrgyzstan’s newly elected president, Sadyr Zhaparov, emphasizes China’s importance as Kyrgyzstan’s trading partner and investor, and has called for closer relations with China.  A new trade route from China to Kazakhstan was opened in the summer of 2023 during the China-Central Asia Summit. During Xi Jinping’s visit to Kazakhstan in 2022, the leaders announced to deepen bilateral relations.  Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan have established friendly relations with Xi and China. With regard to vehicle exports, it is worth noting that the re-export of cars through the Eurasian Economic Union to Russia previously received tax relief, a policy that ended this year. 3. An overview of  Chinese exports to Central Asia Between 2018 and 2023, China primarily exported textile and wood-related products, as well as machinery, electronics, and vehicles to Central Asia (Figure 1). Compared to China’s overall export structure to the world (Figure 2), the share of textile and wood products in China’s exports to Central Asia is significantly higher. In contrast, approximately 50 % of China’s global exports consist of machinery, electronics, and vehicles, whereas these categories account for about 30–40 % of China’s exports to Central Asia.   In dollar terms, Chinese exports to Central Asia grew by 170 % from 2018 to 2023. This growth parallels China's export growth to Russia, which increased by 130 % over the same period. For comparison, Chinese exports to the rest of the world grew by around 40 % in that period. The largest export growth was seen in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (Figure 3), with exports to Kyrgyzstan experiencing an explosive increase at the beginning of 2021. While more moderate, export growth to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also took off in the first half of 2022. Chinese exports to Kazakhstan, which were valued at $11 billion in 2018, surged to $25 billion in 2023. Chinese exports to Uzbekistan tripled from $4 billion in 2018 to $12 billion in 2023. Chinese exports more than tripled to Kyrgyzstan during the period from $6 billion in 2018 to $20 billion in 2023. Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan are significant given the country’s modest GDP. Growth in Chinese exports to Russia mirrors the growth in exports to Central Asia (Figure 3). In dollar terms, however, China's exports to Russia are about double to those of China’s total exports to Central Asia.   The largest export categories to Central Asia in China’s 2023 export structure were footwear, textiles, and clothes ($20 billion); machinery and vehicles ($11 billion); electronics ($3 billion); and iron and steel ($2 billion). Exports of iron and steel to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan were minimal, but significant for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with growth starting in early 2023.  Chinese exports of footwear, textiles and clothes to Kyrgyzstan (and exports generally) began took off in early of 2021 (Figure 4). Kazakhstan’s export growth in the same category started after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Exports of machinery and vehicles to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan (Figure 4) skyrocketed in 2023. Chinese exports of iron and steel to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also soared in 2023 (Figure 5). In the export of electronics, Uzbekistan stands out as exports from China more than doubled in 2023 from 2022 levels (Figure 5). Electronics exports to Kyrgyzstan started increase in early 2021 (Figure 5).     When examining annual changes in these export categories, the dollar-based annual growth of Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan clearly stands out from other Central Asian countries across all export categories (see Figures 6 and 7). The annual growth to Kyrgyzstan began to increase in early 2021 and remains high throughout 2022. For instance, Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan in electronics and in footwear, textiles and clothes peaked around 300 % in early 2022. Chinese exports to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are significantly smaller in dollar terms than for other Central Asian countries, so they do not stand out in earlier figures. However, annual growth patterns show that China’s annual export growth to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan also rose in 2022.     This section examines Chinese exports to Central Asian countries in the HS categories 84 “Machinery,”1 85 “Electrical equipment,”2 87 “Vehicles”,3 and 90 “Optical and medical instruments.”4 HS categories 88 “Aircraft”5 and 89 “Ships”6 were omitted from the analysis since the export volumes were irregular and inconsistent. The data used in the analysis is the sum of HS8-level customs data for the respective category, so values may slightly differ from the actual HS2-level values.  China’s dollar-denominated exports in machinery (HS 84) increased in 2022 and 2023 from the pre-invasions period (Figure 8). Growth in exports is already apparent in 2022 for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, while the rise in Uzbekistan begins in 2023. Exports of machinery to Russia started to increase in 2021, with higher growth in 2022 and 2023 (Figure 9). China’s exports to the rest of the world in the same category rose through 2021, and decreased from 2022 to 2023 (Figure 9).   For electrical equipment (HS 85), China’s exports increased significantly compared to the period before the war, especially to Kyrgyzstan, where exports surged in 2022 and continued to grow in 2023 (Figure 10). China’s exports to Uzbekistan also surged in 2023. Exports to Kazakhstan decreased from 2021 to 2022, but grew in 2023, slightly surpassing the 2021 level. When examining Chinese exports to Russia, dollar-denominated changes follow a similar trend (Figure 11). During the same period, China’s exports to the rest of the world increased from 2021 to 2022 and decreased in 2023, a trend similar to that of machinery (Figure 11).   In the export of vehicles (HS 87), China’s exports to Central Asia followed a similar trend in exports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, i.e. initial growth in 2022 and strong growth in 2023 (Figure 12). Chinese exports to Russia also surged in 2023 (Figure 13). In the vehicle category, Chinese exports to the rest of the world grew steadily in 2021, 2022, and 2023 (Figure 13).   For optical and medical instruments (HS 90), China’s exports to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan increased significantly in 2022, and grew further  in 2023, albeit at a more moderate pace (Figure 14). China’s exports to Uzbekistan increased post-invasion in 2022 and 2023, although export levels were similar to 2019 and 2020. Exports to Turkmenistan grew by 260 % in 2022 from the previous year, although this is less noticeable in the figures due to the smaller dollar value amounts related to other Central Asian countries. China’s exports of optical and medical instruments to Russia grew steadily, with a sharper increase beginning in 2022 (Figure 15). However, China’s exports to the rest of the world in this category decreased from 2021 to 2022 (Figure 15).   In summary, China’s dollar-denominated exports to Central Asia increased significantly over the past couple of years, particularly those to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Reflecting the general trend of China’s exports to Central Asian countries, the highest dollar amounts for Chinese exports involved products to Kazakhstan across all analyzed harmonized system categories. The most significant dollar-denominated export growth was observed for Kyrgyzstan: the annual growth rate of China’s exports in electrical equipment in 2022 approaches 400 %, and for vehicles nearly 500 % in 2022 and about 300 % in 2023. Additionally, in optical and medical instruments, China’s 2022 exports grew by nearly 300 % to Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan from the previous year. When comparing China’s exports to Central Asia with its exports to Russia, it is evident that the dollar value of China’s exports to Russia is higher than to Central Asian countries, and the dollar value changes in exports are also more significant. For instance, in 2023, China’s exports of machinery to Russia amounted to $24 billion, while exports to the entire Central Asia region were approximately $7 billion. In the electrical equipment category, China’s exports to Russia were $13 billion compared to $5 billion to Central Asia. In the vehicles category, exports to Russia were $18 billion, while exports to Central Asia were $8 billion. On the other hand, the annual growth rates of individual Central Asian countries are higher in percentage terms compared to Russia. For example, as illustrated in Figure 12, China’s exports to Kyrgyzstan grew from $41 million in 2021 to $1.5 billion in 2022, while China’s exports to Russia increased from $1.2 billion dollars to $1.8 billion in the same period. The annual growth rates for Russia do not exhibit similar spikes, nor do they significantly exceed the growth rates for any Central Asian country in any category. 5. Central Asian exports to Russia in HS categories 84, 85, 87 and 90 In the HS categories 84 (Machinery), 85 (Electrical equipment), 87 (Vehicles), and 90 (Optical and medical instruments), exports from Central Asian countries to Russia exhibited significant growth in 2022 (Figures 16 and 17), with continued expansion in 2023 (with the exception of Kazakhstan in vehicles and parts). In total, exports from Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) in these categories grew in 2022 by 600 % from the previous year. Notably, Kazakhstan was the biggest export in dollar terms. Its exports to Russia surged across all categories in 2022, with on-year growth rates for machinery, electrical equipment and sound devices, and optical and medical instruments ranging between 400 % and 600 %. In addition to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan recorded substantial increases in exports in 2022, particularly in the machinery and electrical equipment categories. Kyrgyzstan’s exports machinery increased from $2 million in 2021 to $49 million in 2022, a jump of about 2,500 %. However, when comparing the Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan in electrical equipment, the dollar value in exports to Russia seems considerably smaller. Thus, no direct conclusion should be drawn from the fact that higher quantities of electronics pass through Kyrgyzstan to Russia. Although not depicted in the graph, it is important to highlight Turkmenistan’s growth in the export of electrical equipment in 2023 when it grew from $2,075 (2022) to $3 million in 2023, onyear growth of approximately 200,000 %. Similarly, Uzbekistan’s annual growth in exports of optical and medical instruments was around 40,000 % in 2022. As to vehicles and parts, Kyrgyzstan’s export growth commenced already in 2021. In the optical and medical instruments category, both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan experienced notable export growth, particularly in 2023. At the HS category levels of 84, 85, 87 and 90, data for Tajikistan’s exports to Russia were unavailable.     6. Conclusion Chinese exports to Central Asia have significantly increased since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with concurrent growth China’s exports to Russia. Notably, there was a substantial surge in Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan prior to invasion. Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan, which has a modest GDP, saw the largest dollar-value increase from 2021 to 2023 in the categories of footwear, textiles, and clothes, as well as machinery and vehicles starting in 2022. The annual growth rates in Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan show clear increases in the major export categories in 2022.  In dollar terms, Chinese exports to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also rose significantly from 2018 to 2023. For Uzbekistan, the largest growth in China's exports began in 2021 in electronics. Exports to Kazakhstan grew the most in 2022–2023 in the categories of footwear, textiles, and clothes, and machinery and vehicles.  The trade categories with notable growth in Chinese exports to Central Asian countries were machinery (HS 84), electrical equipment (HS 85), vehicles (HS 87), and optical and medical instruments (HS 90). Generally, the steepest rise in Chinese exports to Central Asia occurred in the vehicles category, with significant increases in exports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in 2022 continuing to a sharp rise in 2023. The trend for Chinese vehicle exports to Russia is similar. It is worth noting that Chinese vehicle exports to the rest of the world also accelerated after 2020. Additionally, there was substantial growth in Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan in the electrical equipment category in 2022 and 2023. In these categories, Chinese exports to Russia are significantly higher in dollar terms that exports to Central Asia. However, the annual growth rates in between 2018 and 2023 of Chinses exports to individual Central Asian countries have generally seen larger increases in percentage terms than those for Russia.  Exports from Central Asian countries to Russia in the selected key export categories increased significantly across all examined categories in 2022. Among Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan was the largest exporter to Russia in dollar terms from 2018 to 2023, with sharp growth in 2022 in all four categories examined in this paper. Additionally, the exports of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to Russia grew significantly in 2022, particularly in the categories of machinery, and electrical equipment. The most notable annual growth in exports was posted by Turkmenistan – an increase from $2,075 in 2022 to $3 million in 2023, a 200,000 % increase in electrical equipment exports from the previous year. References Chupilkin, Maxim and Javorcik, Beata and Plekhanov, Alexander. (2023). The Eurasian Roundabout: Trade Flows Into Russia Through the Caucasus and Central Asia. EBRD Working Paper No. 276, Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4368618 or https://ssrn.com/abstract=4368618 Kluge, Janis. (2024). Russia-China economic relations: Moscow’s road to economic dependence, SWP Research Paper, No. 6/2024, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, https://doi.org/10.18449/2024RP06 Simola, H. (2024). Recent trends in Russia’s import substitution of technology products. BOFIT Policy Brief 5/2024, June 2024.  World Bank, 2024, read 14.8.2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca/brief/central-asia 1 Harmonized System code 84: Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof.  2 Harmonized System code 85: Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles.  3 Harmonized System code 87: Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof.  4 Harmonized System code 90: Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof. 5 Harmonized System code 88: Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof.  6 Harmonized System code 89: Ships, boats, and floating structures.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The world economy is underperforming as a result of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainty around the US election. An escalation of conflict in the Middle East could increase uncertainties, harming inflation reduction efforts and hurting growth. It has been over a year since the Hamas-led attack on Israel. Israel’s response in Gaza has resulted in widespread destruction and significant loss of life. The conflict has since expanded beyond Gaza, involving the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian strikes targeting Israel. In addition to the awful humanitarian cost of the conflicts, the war and the possibility of its further expansion pose significant repercussions for the global economy. This article discusses three potential ways in which the current conflict and a wider conflict in the Middle East could affect the global economy. Increased geopolitical uncertainties First and foremost, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could lead to greater geopolitical uncertainties. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the geopolitical risk (GPR) and geopolitical acts (GPRA) indices (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022) – these are text-based measures of heightened uncertainties due to adverse geopolitical events such as wars, terrorism and international tensions. (See this article for more discussion about these measures.) Following the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023, both the overall GPR index and its ‘war and terror acts’ component spiked strongly, to a level higher than that seen during the ISIS attack in Paris in November 2015. Both indices eased significantly in the months following October 2023 despite the continuation of the conflict. But they jumped again following Israel’s attack on southern Lebanon in September 2024. As of mid-October 2024, the GPR and GPRA remain, respectively, 21% and 35% higher than their historical averages.   What might be the consequences of such elevated levels of risk? Research tells us that higher geopolitical risk raises oil prices (Mignon and Saadaoui, 2024). It also reduces global investment and increases inflation (Caldara et al, 2022). Greater geopolitical risk has a significantly negative impact on business and consumer confidence in several advanced economies (de Wet, 2023). This is because consumers typically cut non-essential spending and businesses postpone investment decisions during turbulent times. This reduces firm-level investment, particularly for businesses with higher initial investment costs and greater market power (Wang et al, 2023). Higher geopolitical risks also reduce global trade and financial flows, causing greater volatility in capital flows in emerging markets (Kaya and Erden, 2023). Oil production cuts and higher energy prices The second way in which the Middle East conflict could affect the global economy is its impact on energy prices, both directly through production cuts and indirectly through greater uncertainties. In response to Israel’s actions against its neighbours, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could reduce oil production to penalise countries supporting Israel. A similar action in the 1970s led to a significant jump in oil prices, which contributed to years of stagflation, with higher global inflation and recessions in major economies. Before Israel's attack on Lebanon at the end of September, oil prices had been declining due to falling demand, particularly from China. On the supply side, oil production had increased in Canada and the United States, countering the production cuts by OPEC, and Saudi Arabia was expected to increase oil production from December. But the situation quickly reversed following Israel’s attack on Lebanon. Oil prices jumped by nearly $10 per barrel within a week, before easing by around $5 per barrel. While the immediate oil price impact of Israel’s attack has mostly faded, the potential for higher oil (and other energy) prices still poses a risk to global inflation and economic activity (Liadze et al, 2022). To provide further context for the potential scale of this impact, we can show what would happen if oil and gas prices were to remain $10 higher for two years than the baseline levels projected in the Summer Global Economic Outlook from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), using NIESR’s Global Macroeconometric Model (NiGEM). The results demonstrate that the $10 rise in oil and gas prices increases inflation by around 0.7 percentage points in major economies in the first year (see Figure 2). The impact is higher in China, where the economy relies relatively more on oil imports for its strong manufacturing industries. The inflationary pressures persist for two years despite central banks’ efforts to curb inflation by increasing interest rates.   The effect of higher oil and gas prices on real GDP is shown in Figure 3. In the scenario described above, GDP would fall by 0.1-0.2% in major economies immediately. Partly due to higher interest rates, real GDP would continue to weaken for three years following the shock. After this, economic activity would start to return to base levels as oil and gas prices revert to their levels in the baseline forecast.   Increased shipping costs and supply chain disruptions A wider conflict in the Middle East could also affect the economy through higher shipping costs and supply chain disruptions. Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in late 2023 showed that such disruptions can have a huge impact on global trade through shipping, which comprises 80% of world trade volume. Following the rocket attacks by the Houthi rebels, some commercial shipping re-routed from the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to significant delays in travel times and increased freight costs. As a result, the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index – a measure of sea freight rates – rose by around 260% in the second quarter of 2024 with additional disruptions to supply chains. Our analysis shows that an increase of 10 percentage points in shipping cost inflation can lead to import prices rising by up to around 1% and consumer inflation increasing by around 0.5% in OECD countries. As Figure 4 shows, the impact of shipping costs on inflation shows its full effects over six quarters. This means that inflationary concerns could be with us for the next year and a half as a result of higher shipping costs that may emerge from any possible escalation of the Middle East conflict.   Wider economic implications and policy responses While rising geopolitical risk and increased oil and shipping costs can each individually exert upward pressure on inflation and may slow down economic activity in the global economy, the combined impacts are likely to be greater. Countries with stronger trade and financial ties to the Middle East and those that rely heavily on oil imports as an input for domestic production would be most affected. On the monetary policy front, central banks may have to take a more hawkish stance in response to rising inflationary pressures from the Middle East conflict. This could lead to higher interest rates, which would further dampen economic activity, particularly in an environment where there are already recessionary concerns in some major economies. Beyond its immediate economic implications, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could trigger large-scale displacement of people, which would increase economic and social pressures on neighbouring countries. Many countries may also have to increase their military spending in response to growing regional tensions. Given that public debt levels are already elevated in many countries due to successive shocks to the global economy over the past decade, any additional defence spending could come at the expense of public infrastructure investments that would otherwise boost productivity growth. Overall, the global economy is already underperforming as a result of the lagged effects of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainties surrounding the upcoming US election and possible changes to US trade policy. A potential escalation of conflict in the Middle East could exacerbate the situation by increasing uncertainties, harming efforts to bring down inflation and reducing global GDP growth. Over the medium and long term, it could further damage the global economy, with the possibility of refugee crises as well as increased defence spending, making the effects more complex and longer lasting. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.