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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This paper focuses on the European Union as a military power. It starts with an introduction to SAFE – Security Action for Europe as a financial instrument designed to make the EU a formidable military power.The second part of the paper provides an account of debates regarding the nature of the EU (civilian, normative through ethical to military). Next, a brief historical account of European defence cooperation is presented.The central part of the analysis examines the key characteristics of the EU as a military power, which is marked by a gap between its declared motivations and the actual application of military and political means.The paper ends with the expression of scepticism regarding the role of SAFE in the future of European Security. Key Words: SAFE, Geopolitics, Security, Europe, Ukraine. Introduction SAFE (Security Action for Europe) is a financial instrument introduced by the European Commission to bolster defence capabilities across EU member states. Proposed in March 2025 as part of the broader ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, SAFE aims to provide up to €150 billion in loans by the end of the decade to support joint defence procurement and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).1 This initiative is driven by concerns over a potential Russian attack and growing uncertainty about long-term U.S. security commitments to Europe. To qualify for SAFE funding, 65% of a project’s value must originate from companies within the EU, the European Economic Area, or Ukraine.  Rationale behind SAFE The EU Council formally adopted SAFE on 27 May 2025. SAFE is part of the €800 billion ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan, which also includes other pillars such as fiscal flexibility (national escape clauses), cohesion funds, and private capital mobilisation. It appears that several geopolitical and strategic factors drive the establishment of SAFE. Firstly, there is the case of ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine: The war, starting in February 2022, has exposed deficiencies in European defence capabilities and highlighted the need for rapid rearmament and increased self-reliance.2 The return of high-intensity warfare on European soil has prompted a reevaluation of defence priorities. Secondly, the shifting of the U.S. role. Concerns over reduced U.S. military support, particularly following political shifts in Washington.3 Thirdly, experts indicate the issue of capability gaps and industrial weaknesses. The EU has identified critical gaps in areas like air and missile defence, drones, and military mobility. The need to scale up production and reduce reliance on non-European suppliers has driven the creation of the SAFE initiative. Fourthly, support for Ukraine. SAFE includes provisions to integrate Ukraine’s defence industry, ensuring continued support for Kyiv amid uncertainties in global alliances.4 The evolving nature of EU power In recent history, it is Francois Duchene’s idea of “Civilian Power Europe” (CPE) that has dominated debates about the role of Europe and European institutions in the world.  Duchêne's concept of (CPE) refers to a particular role for Europe in the world that emphasises non-military means of influence and the promotion of international values. Duchêne's original idea, articulated in the early 1970s, suggested that Europe could play a distinctive role based on low politics, non-state actors, ideational influences, and international interdependence rather than traditional military power. The CPE concept highlights Europe's potential to exercise considerable non-military power, combining the power dimension akin to a "European Trading State" with a normative foreign policy perspective aimed at promoting values such as equality, justice, and concern for people with low incomes abroad.5 Fast forward to the 21st century, and Ian Manners proposes another equally influential concept – “normative power”. Ian Manners' main argument is that the European Union (EU) should be understood not only in terms of traditional conceptions of "civilian power" or "military power" but rather as a "normative power" in international relations. He contends that the EU's international role is fundamentally based on its ability to shape norms and define what is considered "normal" in world politics. This normative power stems from the EU's unique historical context, hybrid political structure, and constitutional basis, which predispose it to act normatively by promoting principles such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Manners argues that this normative dimension is crucial for understanding the EU's identity and influence internationally, as exemplified by the EU's active pursuit of the international abolition of the death penalty. He emphasises that the EU's power lies less in its military or economic capabilities and more in its capacity to diffuse norms and reshape international standards, making the concept of "normative power Europe" not a contradiction but a significant form of power in world politics.6  Shortly afterwards, Lisbeth Aggestam proposes yet another concept regarding the nature and role of the European Union in the world – “ethical power.” The concept of 'ethical power Europe' (EPE) in EU foreign policy represents a shift from focusing on what the EU 'is' to what it 'does. It articulates the EU's ambition to be a proactive global actor that not only serves as a positive role model but actively works to change the world in the direction of a "global common good." This involves the EU taking on new tasks in crisis management, peacekeeping, state-building, and reconstruction of failing states, complementing its existing roles in development aid and humanitarian assistance. The EU positions itself as a "force for good" and a peacebuilder in the world, justifying its acquisition of both civilian and military power capabilities in these terms.7 EPE encompasses both civilian and military power, as well as social and material power, thereby broadening the scope beyond earlier concepts, such as civilian power in Europe, as proposed by Duchene, and normative power, as emphasised by Manners, which primarily focused on civilian and normative influence. The EPE concept also reintroduces the international and national dimensions into the analysis of the EU's role, recognising the importance of member states' interests and acknowledging that material interests and ethical considerations often overlap. Importantly, EPE is not presented as an empirical reality but rather as a concept that opens new lines of critical reflection on the EU's role, motivations, and ethical dilemmas in foreign policy. It recognises the complexity of ethical foreign policy, given competing visions of order and justice in the world and the challenges of translating ethical ambitions into practice. The concept invites analysis of the ethical values the EU promotes, the relationship between ethics and interests, the just use of power (including military force), and the problems inherent in pursuing a consistent ethical foreign policy. Conversely, Karen Smith asserts that CPE is definitively dead, and the EU now finds itself somewhere along a spectrum between civilian and military power like most other international actors. Rather than debating whether the EU is a civilian power, the focus should be on critically analysing what the EU does and what it should do in international relations.8 According to Smith, the implications of the EU employing military means are significant and multifaceted.  Firstly, the EU's acquisition and use of military instruments challenge the notion that the EU remains a purely "civilian power." Clinging to the civilian power label stretches the term beyond its breaking point, as military means are fundamentally non-civilian in nature. Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, often considered civilian activities, frequently involve military personnel and can evolve into military operations, thereby further blurring the distinction between civilian and military roles.  Secondly, by using military instruments—even as a "residual" tool to safeguard other means—the EU complicates the clear-cut distinction between civilian and military power. This leads to fuzzy interpretations about when the EU ceases to be a civilian power, making it difficult to establish a clear cut-off point or assess changes along the civilian-military spectrum.  Thirdly, employing military means signals a shift from a post-modern, law-based international identity toward a more traditional power politics approach. This militarization risks discrediting the EU's earlier vision of transforming international relations through law and civilian influence alone. The EU moves closer to a "Hobbesian" model where military force backs diplomacy, which may undermine its unique post-modern identity and soft power.  Fourthly, the use of military force raises complex questions about the EU’s ends and means, including the justifications for intervention, the legitimacy of coercion, and democratic control over foreign policy decisions.  Finally, the continued use of military means necessitates moving beyond simplistic categorisations of civilian power to a more nuanced analysis of what the EU does in international relations. The EU, like most actors, falls somewhere along a spectrum between civilian and military power, and its military capabilities must be critically assessed rather than dismissed or downplayed. With this in mind, let us look at the EU as a military actor. A brief history of European defence cooperation Signed on March 4, 1947, the Treaty of Dunkirk was a bilateral alliance between France and the United Kingdom, primarily aimed at preventing renewed German aggression following World War II. Effective from September 8, 1947, and set to expire in 1997, it was also seen as a pretext for defence against the USSR. It laid the foundation for formal European defence collaboration, emphasising mutual assistance and alliance.9 In 1948, the Treaty of Brussels expanded this framework, encompassing Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and established the Western Union. This alliance focused on defence, economic, cultural, and social collaboration. By 1955, following the signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty, it evolved into the Western European Union (WEU), with Italy and West Germany joining, marking the establishment of a broader European defence structure. Parallel to these developments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was established on April 4, 1949, by 12 countries, including the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations, to counter Soviet expansion. NATO's Article 5, which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all, has become a cornerstone of transatlantic security. During the Cold War, NATO served as a bulwark against Soviet influence, with significant military and political cooperation among members. The WEU, while secondary to NATO, played a complementary role. In 1950, its defence structures were transferred to NATO, reducing its authority, but it remained active in fostering European defence collaboration. The WEU's social and cultural roles were transferred to the Council of Europe in 1960, with its focus shifting to security and defence.  The end of the Cold War in the 1990s prompted a shift towards greater European autonomy in defence. The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 established the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), aiming to coordinate foreign policy and security. This was followed by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, which introduced the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), enabling the EU to conduct military and civilian missions independently. The 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, prompted by the Kosovo War, endorsed a European security and defence policy, including the development of autonomous military forces. The 2002 Berlin Plus agreement allowed the EU access to NATO assets for peacekeeping, reflecting the close cooperation between the two organisations. The Petersberg Declaration of 1992, initially under the WEU, defined tasks such as humanitarian and rescue operations, which were later integrated into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).  The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 further strengthened EU defence capabilities, incorporating the WEU's mutual defence clause. This rendered the WEU superfluous, leading to its dissolution on 30 June 2011, with its functions being transferred to the EU. The European Union Institute for Security Studies and Satellite Centre, previously WEU entities, were integrated into the EU framework in 2002, marking a consolidation of defence.   *Generated with Grok and gamma.app (9 June, 2025). EU as a military actor As of mid-2025, the EU has approximately 3,500 military personnel and 1,300 civilian personnel deployed worldwide. Since the first CSDP missions and operations were launched in 2003, the EU has undertaken over 40 overseas operations, utilising both civilian and military missions in several countries across Europe, Africa, and Asia. As of today, there are 21 ongoing EU CSDP missions and operations, comprising 12 civilian, eight military, and one combined civilian and military initiative.10  According to the EU itself, “Their (Security and Defence Policy ((CSDP)) Missions) aim is to help prevent or resolve conflicts and crises, enhance the capacities of partner countries and, ultimately, protect the European Union and its citizens. EU decisions to deploy a mission or operation are typically made at the request of the partner country receiving assistance and/or based on a United Nations Security Council Resolution, always in full respect of international law. These decisions take into account the EU’s security interests, EU strategic efforts and regional engagement strategies. They are tailored to the local circumstances and to the tasks that need to be implemented”.11 Scholars researching the topic conclude that the political motivations behind EU military operations are complex, driven by a combination of national interests, strategic considerations, and internal EU dynamics. While the EU often justifies its operations with humanitarian rhetoric, the sustained deployment of military forces is often driven by broader strategic and political considerations. The influence of key member states, such as France and Germany, plays a significant role in shaping the EU's military agenda. However, the EU's ability to project influence is constrained by internal divisions and resource limitations. National Interests One of the most significant political motivations behind EU military operations is the pursuit of national interests by its member states. While the EU often presents a unified front, the decision to deploy military operations is heavily influenced by the interests of its most powerful members, particularly France and Germany. These states often use EU military operations as a means to advance their own strategic and economic interests while framing them as collective EU actions. For instance, France has been a key driver of several European Union (EU) military operations in Africa, such as the EUFOR mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). Critics argue that these operations were motivated by French geo-strategic and economic interests in the region rather than purely humanitarian concerns.12 Similarly, the EU's naval operation, Atalanta, off the coast of Somalia, was influenced by the interests of member states with significant maritime trade routes in the region.13  The dominance of national interests is further evident in the EU's decision-making process. Member states often prioritise their security and economic concerns over broader EU objectives, leading to inconsistencies in the deployment of military operations. For example, the EU's reluctance to intervene in the 2006 Lebanon war, despite initial plans for a military operation, was primarily due to divergent national interests among member states.14 Power Politics and Strategic Culture The EU's military operations are also shaped by power politics within the organisation. The distribution of power among member states plays a crucial role in determining the scope and nature of these operations. France, in particular, has historically played a key The EU often justifies its military operations with humanitarian rhetoric, emphasising the need to protect civilians, prevent human rights abuses, and promote stability in conflict zones. However, this rhetoric often masks more pragmatic strategic considerations. For instance, the EU's intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2006 was officially framed as a humanitarian operation. However, it was also driven by the strategic interests of EU member states in the region's natural resources and political stability.15  Likewise, the EU's naval operation Sophia in the Mediterranean was initially justified as a humanitarian response to the migrant crisis. However, the operation also served strategic purposes, such as enhancing the EU's maritime security capabilities and addressing the political priorities of member states like Italy and France.16 The gap between humanitarian rhetoric and strategic reality is a recurring theme in European Union (EU) military operations. While humanitarian concerns may play a role in the initial justification for intervention, the sustained deployment of military forces is often driven by broader strategic and political considerations.17 Ukraine and EU’s Involvement Against Russia The EU has consistently condemned Russia's actions, viewing them as a violation of international law, and supports Ukraine's right to self-defence. This includes diplomatic efforts to isolate Russia and coordinate with partners like the US and NATO. Ukraine's EU candidacy, granted in June 2022, reflects long-term integration goals, though the process is expected to take years.18 So far, the EU has imposed 17 sanction packages by May 2025, targeting Russia's economy, military, and individuals, including measures against Belarus, Iran, and North Korea for supporting Russia. These aim to weaken Russia's war capabilities, with recent packages focusing on export bans and measures to prevent circumvention.19 The EU has committed €147.9 billion in aid, with €50.3 billion allocated for military support, €77 billion for financial and humanitarian assistance, and €17 billion for refugee support. This includes weapons, training, and emergency relief, as well as support for Ukrainian refugees under the Temporary Protection Mechanism. To counter the impacts of war, the EU reduced its Russian gas imports from 40% in 2021 to 15% in 2023, thereby diversifying its energy sources. It also facilitates Ukrainian grain exports through solidarity lanes, addressing global food security.20 Now, as noble as it sounds and as much as it fits into the self-perception of Brussels’s elites (the EU being a force for good), the critics of the West's support of Ukraine make a couple of formidable points. Firstly, the longer the war continues, the more destroyed Ukraine becomes and the greater the number of Ukrainians killed. Secondly, the longer the war continues, the greater the likelihood of escalation, which poses a threat to the entire European continent. Thirdly, despite mainstream media reports, the Russian Federation appears to have adapted to operating effectively despite the sanctions, which may strengthen its economy in the short to medium term and, more importantly, bring it closer to cooperating with China and North Korea. Finally, since every war serves as a testing ground for new technologies, the Russians, especially the North Koreans and the Chinese, are gaining invaluable insight into the nature of modern warfare, which is often referred to as the next Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  Conclusion To answer the question introduced at the beginning of this analysis, “Can SAFE make Europe safe?” the author of this piece remains sceptical, to say the least. It appears that despite some initial intentions to end the Ukrainian war as early as April 2022, it is the European elites, especially French, German and Polish, who stand for the prolongation, if not escalation, of the Ukrainian war, potentially at the expense of the security of the whole European continent and definitely at the expense of Ukrainians and their country.  References:  1. La Rocca, M. (2025, May 27). Defence, final go-ahead for the SAFE fund. Von der Leyen: “Exceptional measures for exceptional times.” Eunews. https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/05/27/defence-final-go-ahead-for-the-safe-fund-von-der-leyen-exceptional-measures-for-exceptional-times/ 2. COUNCIL REGULATION establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of European defence industry Instrument. (2025, March 19). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0122&qid=1749479407767 3. Tidey, A. (2025, May 21). Everything you need to know about SAFE, the EU’s €150bn defence instrument. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/21/everything-you-need-to-know-about-safe-the-eus-150bn-defence-instrument/4. Scazzieri, L. (2025, March 26). One step forward for Europe’s defence. Centre for European Reform. https://www.cer.eu/insights/one-step-forward-europes-defence 5. Orbie, J. (2006). Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates. Cooperation and Conflict, 41(1), 123-128. Sage Publications, Ltd. https://www.jstor.org/stable/450844256. Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–258.7. Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: Ethical power Europe? International Affairs, 84(1), 1-11. https://www.jstor.org/stable/251447118. Smith, K. E. (2005). Beyond the civilian power EU debate. Politique européenne, (17), 63-82. L'Harmattan. https://www.jstor.org/stable/450177509. The road to European defence cooperation. (1947). European Defence Agency. https://eda.europa.eu/our-history/our-history.html10. European Union External Action, (2025, January 30). Missions and Operations. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en#87694E11. EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS. (2025, April). https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/EU-mission-and-operation_2025.pdf 12. See more at: Bono, G. (2011). The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5(1), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2011.541781 and Olsen, G. R. (2009). The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe? International Peacekeeping, 16(2), 245–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310802685828 13. See more at: Dombrowski, P., & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comparative European Politics, 17(6), 860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/S41295-018-0131-4 and Riddervold, M. (2018). Why Not Fight Piracy Through NATO? Explaining the EU’s First Naval Mission: EU NAVFOR Atalanta (pp. 195–217). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66598-6_10 14. Engberg, K. (2013). The EU and Military Operations: A comparative analysis. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203381663/eu-military-operations-katarina-engberg15. Engberg, K. (2013). The EU and Military Operations: A comparative analysis. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203381663/eu-military-operations-katarina-engberg 16. Dombrowski, P., & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comparative European Politics, 17(6), 860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/S41295-018-0131-4 17. Bono, G. (2011). The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5(1), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2011.541781   18. EU response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-russia-military-aggression-against-ukraine-archive/19. Russia’s war against Ukraine. (n.d.). https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/topics/russia-s-war-against-ukraine/ 20. See more at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/where-does-the-eu-s-gas-come-from/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction The geopolitical upheavals of the 1990s directly affected the Baltic Sea region: the USSR collapsed, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, and Germany was reunited. The logic of the “end of history” introduced completely new principles of international order across the European continent. Trade, economic, and military-political cooperation were based on shared development goals and universal practices of international interaction. Rapidly growing trade, economic, cultural, educational, and investment ties in the Baltic region helped overcome the recent legacy of Cold War bloc confrontation. Regional organizations and formats of cooperation, even if they did not create a new “Baltic” identity (an idea proposed in the early 1990s), certainly established working mechanisms for joint regional projects. These initiatives were implemented by countries ready for mutually beneficial cooperation. However, these carefully built formats and projects proved fragile in the face of global challenges. The decline of global governance institutions and growing tensions between the collective West and a resurging Russia — economically, politically, and militarily — led to a global political crisis. The increasingly militarized Baltic Sea region became a logistical hub for strategic rivals — Russia and NATO / the EU. A Region of Cooperation In March 1992, at a conference of foreign ministers of the Baltic Sea countries and Norway, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was established. The main initiators of this idea were German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Danish counterpart Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. The creation of a common regional international organization marked the symbolic start of a phase of intensive interstate cooperation in the region, based on the principles of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, and other CSCE documents. At the political level, CBSS member states declared their readiness to act together in the common interest. They confirmed their commitment to cooperation, including the peaceful resolution of regional disputes in a spirit of good neighborliness and partnership. The idea of building a system of regional organizations and initiatives under the CBSS political umbrella was seen as a more effective solution for regional development than relying on international organizations focused on global issues and the many military and humanitarian crises of the early 1990s. By the start of the 21st century, the Baltic region had a range of functioning projects and initiatives across various fields: from regulating the use of Baltic Sea biological resources to a joint online university (the Baltic University Programme), from a platform for marine spatial planning (Vision and Strategies Around the Baltic Sea, VASAB) to festivals organized by the Union of the Baltic Cities (UBC). One of the most important issues requiring practical cooperation between the EU and Russia was the development of the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation. This semi-exclave (due to its access to the sea) is separated from mainland Russia by the territories of Poland and Lithuania — countries that declared their intention to join Euro-Atlantic institutions, which was seen as a confrontational move by Russia — and Belarus. The “Kaliningrad Puzzle” was about finding the best strategy between Russia and the EU to support the daily life and sustainable economic development of the Kaliningrad region after Poland and Lithuania joined NATO and the EU. This brought restrictions on the transit of passengers and goods, on trade and energy cooperation with neighboring countries, and on maintaining the military security of the region. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, there were only few scenarios discussed for resolving the "Kaliningrad Puzzle." One seemingly attractive idea was the concept of a “Hong Kong on the Baltic”, but it had no real prospects due to a lack of political will — both from neighboring countries and from the Russian central government. Moreover, the very idea of a demilitarized zone with open access for foreign investment and visitors, offering special conditions for business and governance, did not gain support at the federal level. It was removed from the agenda already during expert discussions. It is likely that this concept was viewed as a possible threat of “creeping separatism,” especially against the background of growing anti-federal sentiments in the region. Another concept discussed in parallel was that of a “land-based aircraft carrier.” This scenario involved limited trade and economic cooperation with neighboring countries, a significant reduction in cross-border passenger flow, and the strengthening of the region’s defensive (and in some proposals, offensive) military potential. This would mean creating an “island model” for the region's economy and energy system. From today’s perspective, it is clear that this unlikely scenario is exactly what has been implemented. In the 1990s, a research group led by Professor G. M. Fedorov of Kaliningrad University proposed the idea of “Kaliningrad as a region of cooperation between Russia and the EU.” It envisioned the region as a platform for building cooperation networks to enhance economic (a free or special economic zone), political (a venue for dialogue and negotiations), scientific and educational (development and internationalization of the university complex), and cultural (creation of a cultural cluster) ties with the EU. This could have helped establish a new model of international relations in the Baltic — a model of “EU–Russia cooperation in the region.” The proposal included a recommendation to legally define Kaliningrad’s development strategy at the federal level as a region of intensive interaction with the EU. This idea was perceived by both Russia and the EU more as a reflection of the spirit of the time than as a real plan of action. Implementation took place without formal legal support and with little political enthusiasm. Each side interpreted the idea of cooperation in its own way, based on its own interests — both open and hidden. When analyzing the implementation of the “region of cooperation” concept, it becomes clear that it was undermined by the efforts of Poland and the Baltic States, which, in the context of their Euro-Atlantic integration, worked to securitize nearly all forms of interaction with Russia. The accession of Poland and the Baltic States to the EU on May 1, 2004, had critical consequences for the regional landscape. The new EU members made “Eastern Policy” their foreign policy priority, aiming not only to offer expert assessments of the post-Soviet space but also to actively shape the EU’s policy toward Russia. This approach aligned with the Polish interpretation of the Giedroyc–Mieroszewski Doctrine, which argued that a long-term goal of Polish foreign policy should be the existence of post-Soviet states independent from Russian influence. Poland, the Baltic States, and later Germany saw the EU as the key moderator of the political and economic agenda in the Baltic Sea region. This was reflected in the development and adoption of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. In the field of security, they relied on NATO while also building bilateral military ties with the United States and strengthening their own defense capacities. “Cool War” and a Region of Conflict Professor K. K. Khudoley from St. Petersburg State University describes the growing tensions between Russia and Western countries in the Baltic Sea region as a period of “Cool War.” This phase is marked by decreased predictability and manageability of international processes due to a major rift between Russia and other regional actors. In the Baltic region, the development of multilateral cooperation networks and accumulated experience of interregional engagement failed to act as “political shock absorbers.” Instead, regional cooperation dynamics were defined by Russia’s relations with NATO and the EU. At that time, neutral countries like Sweden and Finland started participating in limited military-political cooperation with NATO countries, raising doubts in Russia about the permanence of their non-aligned status. In this context, scholar Y. M. Zverev accurately noted that the idea of the Baltic as a region of cooperation with Western neighbors gradually collapsed. It was a result of accumulating contradictions and rising global tensions, eventually leading to near-complete breakdown of cooperation — except for dwindling trade relations. Russia’s formal exclusion in 2022 from regional cooperation formats was preceded by processes inside NATO and the EU, aimed at building alternative cooperation mechanisms and strengthening their political, economic, and military presence in the Baltic region. On August 12, 2008, during the five-day war in Georgia, Polish President Lech Kaczyński addressed a rally in Tbilisi, with the presidents of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Ukraine present. He voiced concern over what he saw as an existential threat from Russia: “Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the Baltic States, and then possibly my own country, Poland.” From that point, Warsaw actively promoted its view of regional security within Euro-Atlantic structures, emphasizing rivalry with Moscow — despite growing trade and energy ties between Russia and various EU countries. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia took an active role in developing the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, promoting a vision of the Baltic as a zone of priority EU interests. In this framework, relations with Russia, Iceland, Belarus, and Norway were seen as external. The European Commission was viewed as the main source of political influence and funding for transforming the region and reducing Russia’s role in the regional agenda. The adoption of the Strategy in 2009 became a turning point, undermining the earlier idea of a “Sea of Cooperation.” EU member states in the region prioritized EU-centered mechanisms that effectively excluded Russia — even though special cooperation formats were formally included. It’s important to highlight that the dismantling of the “region of cooperation” logic and the move toward a conflict-driven “Cool War” scenario was mainly caused by external, non-regional factors: the erosion of the dominant world order, worsening tensions between NATO and Russia, and the acute phase of that conflict — the Ukraine crisis. The escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022 turned the situation in the Baltic into a conflict zone. Russia was removed from nearly all key cooperation frameworks — mechanisms that were originally created to absorb tensions, align interests, and prevent crises from becoming irreversible. On March 3, 2022, foreign ministers of all non-Russian member states of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs adopted a Declaration suspending Russia’s participation “until conditions allow for renewed cooperation based on fundamental principles of international law.” On May 17, 2022, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced the country’s withdrawal from the CBSS, describing the organization as a tool of anti-Russian policy. A similar fate befell the Northern Dimension — another highly effective and well-developed cooperation framework. It covered areas like the environment, nuclear safety, healthcare, energy, transport, trade, research, education, and culture. The Northern Dimension had real impact, including in global-scale nuclear safety. On March 8, 2022, the EU, Iceland, and Norway suspended all cooperation with Russia and Belarus under this program. Today, all foreign countries of the Baltic region support Ukraine and run national programs of political and military assistance. They also participate in NATO, EU, and “Baltic-format” initiatives. Poland has become a key logistics hub for delivering humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine, while also building up its military infrastructure and increasing the size and capabilities of its armed forces. A key milestone was the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, which confirmed the trend of militarization and strategic alignment of the region in favor of the U.S. and NATO. In NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, Russia was declared “the most significant and direct threat” to the security of allies and the Euro-Atlantic area. Similar statements appeared in updated security strategies of Sweden and Finland. Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, stated that after Sweden and Finland joined NATO, the non-nuclear status of the Baltic Sea was no longer relevant. Since 2022, the Baltic has turned into a region of rapid militarization, with NATO and Russia both increasing operational capabilities — especially along shared borders. For Finland, which shares a long border with Russia, joining NATO marked a major shift in its security policy. Previously, Finland maintained non-alignment, focusing on national defense and cooperation with Sweden while keeping stable relations with Russia. According to researcher S. V. Andreyev, the NATO debate in Finland started after the 2014 Ukraine crisis, but received little public support back then. However, Matti Pesu, senior researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, noted that although Finland had cooperated with NATO since the 1990s, the events of 2022 caused a decisive public shift: “The majority of Finns supported the decision.” In 2024, Finland’s military spending reached €6.8 billion (more than 2.4% of GDP). Sweden defines its role in NATO as a security guarantor in the Baltic region. Stockholm is developing military-technical cooperation with Finland and Norway, promoting the idea of a unified NATO operational command in Northern Europe (JFC Norfolk). Sweden is also interested in building joint defense capabilities with the Baltic States, Germany, and Poland. In Sweden’s strategic documents, Russia is identified as the main threat, “supported by other authoritarian states such as Iran and China.” On December 17, 2024, the Swedish parliament approved the national defense strategy for 2025–2030, which includes an increase in military spending from 122 billion kronor (2.2% of GDP) in 2024 to 186 billion kronor (2.6% of GDP) by 2030. To understand the scale of militarization, it is important to note that in 2024, NATO adopted its first-ever Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy — a comprehensive plan to modernize the Alliance’s digital infrastructure and capabilities. The public section of this document highlights the prioritization of cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructure, including undersea cables and energy nodes. These priorities provide a basis for creating preventive response capabilities to threats — including scenarios involving damage or destruction of undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea in case of conflict escalation with Russia. The growth of NATO’s military presence in the region has led to new priorities in strategic planning, reflected in large-scale exercises held in 2023 and 2024. On April 29, 2025, Russian presidential aide and chairman of the Maritime Board, Nikolai Patrushev, stated that NATO was rehearsing offensive scenarios near Russia’s borders — including the seizure of the Kaliningrad region and blockade of shipping in the Baltic Sea. Some experts assess that the threat of a maritime blockade of Russia in the Baltic, long discussed by NATO politicians, is not only possible but realistic. A naval blockade of Kaliningrad and Saint Petersburg would almost certainly be seen by Russia as a casus belli, with corresponding consequences. Conclusion As of June 2025, the Baltic Sea has effectively become a “region of cooperation without Russia”. Russia has been excluded from all functioning regional cooperation mechanisms, while the military, energy, and economic collaboration among the other regional states and extra-regional actors (such as the United States and France) has intensified. The rapid militarization of the region and the loss of its non-nuclear status are reinforcing a long-term trend toward confrontation. At the level of military planning, regional actors are openly preparing for scenarios of full-scale conflict, which increases tensions between Russia and NATO. The idea of such a conflict is no longer unthinkable — it has strategic foundations, and the leading players in the region are preparing for it. When assessing the likelihood of this scenario, it is important to understand that the current intensity of the Baltic conflict is shaped by the short-term agendas and interests of the countries involved. A degree of cautious optimism about the future of the Baltic region is based on the possibility that post-conflict agreements between Russia and extra-regional actors could become a key factor in shaping the future model of international relations in the region. Global political dynamics are capable of changing rapidly, potentially reversing current trends and creating a new political reality — overriding the inertia of existing military planning. In the Baltic, there remains a solid legacy of cooperative networks. Across the region, direct links between participants of political, academic, and civic projects — both bilateral and multilateral — have not disappeared. Countries in the region still share objective common interests, especially in areas such as environmental protection and economic cooperation. This historical experience serves as a source of moderate optimism: in the foreseeable future, relations in the Baltic may move from a state of “cool war” and confrontation to one of selective cooperation. A “cool peace” and selective cooperation would clearly be more aligned with Russia’s long-term interests in the Baltic region than a scenario of full-scale conflict. About the Author Igor I. Zhukovsky — PhD in Political Science, Senior Research Fellow at the Baltic Region Comprehensive Research Group, Center for Strategic Planning Studies, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. Sources Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. President of Russia. 27 October 2022. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69695 (accessed: 30.06.2025). 1992 CBSS 1st Ministerial Session – Copenhagen Declaration. Council of the Baltic Sea States, 5–6 March 1992. URL: https://cbss.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/1992CBSS1stMinisterialSessionCommunique.pdf (accessed: 30.06.2025). Zhukovsky I. "Council of the Baltic Sea States: New Wine in Old Bottles?" Valdai Club. 19 September 2024. URL: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/sovetgosudarstvbaltiyskogomorya/ (accessed: 30.06.2025). Joenniemi P., Dewar S., Fairlie L.D. The Kaliningrad Puzzle: A Russian Region Within the European Union. COPRI Working Papers, Vol. 6, 2000. Oldberg I. "The Emergence of a Regional Identity in the Kaliningrad Oblast." Cooperation and Conflict, 2000, Vol. 35, pp. 269–288. Khlopetsky A.P., Fedorov G.M. Kaliningrad Region as a Region of Cooperation: A Monograph. Kaliningrad: Yantarny Skaz, 2000. See also: "Eastern Policy of the EU" is understood as the Union's external policy toward its eastern neighbors. Polish foreign ministers R. Sikorski and A. Rotfeld have repeatedly emphasized the significance of the "Giedroyc–Mieroszewski Doctrine." Ofitserov-Belsky D.V. "Eastern Policy of Poland: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Aspects." Russia and the New States of Eurasia, 2023, No. 4(61), pp. 51–61. Khudoley K.K. "The 'Cool War' in the Baltic Sea Region: Consequences and Future Scenarios." Baltic Region, 2019, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 42–54. Zverev Yu.M. "Three Russian Regions on the Baltic Amidst Russia–West Confrontation." Baltic Region, 2023, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 24–41. Speech by Polish President Lech Kaczyński in Tbilisi, 12 August 2008. URL: https://www.prezydent.pl/kancelaria/archiwum/archiwumlechakaczynskiego/aktualnosci/rok2008/wizytaprezydentarpwgruzji,26753,archive (accessed: 30.06.2025). EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR, 2009) — its development experience was later applied to other EU macro-regional strategies. Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania “On the Baltic Sea Strategy”, 19 April 2007. URL: https://eseimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalActPrint/lt?documentId=TAIS.295996 (accessed: 30.06.2025). Zhukovsky I.I. "Some Issues in the Evolution of Modern International Relations in the Baltic Region." Baltic Region, 2024, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 145–160. Declaration by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2022. Government of Poland. URL: https://www.gov.pl/web/finlandia/federacjarosyjskazawieszonawpracachradypanstwmorzabaltyckiego (accessed: 30.06.2025). Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry on Withdrawal from the CBSS, 17 May 2022. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1813674/ (accessed: 30.06.2025). See, for example, the term “NATO internal sea” — used by various politicians and experts in relation to the Baltic. NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 9 June 2022. URL: https://www.act.nato.int/wpcontent/uploads/2023/05/290622strategicconcept.pdf (accessed: 30.06.2025). National Security Strategy. Government Offices of Sweden, 2024. URL: https://www.government.se/informationmaterial/2024/07/nationalsecuritystrategy/ (accessed: 30.06.2025). Government Defence Report 2024. Ministry of Defense of Finland. URL: https://www.defmin.fi/en/themes/defence_policy_reports#1f47ed12 (accessed: 30.06.2025). "The Baltic May Lose Its Nuclear-Free Status." RIA Novosti. 14 April 2022. URL: https://ria.ru/20220414/baltika1783465933.html (accessed: 30.06.2025). In 2024, Poland allocated over 4% of GDP to military modernization — the highest share in NATO. Andreev S. "Finland: Two Years in NATO." RIAC. 28 April 2025. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analyticsandcomments/analytics/finlyandiyadvagodavnato/ (accessed: 30.06.2025). Pesu M. “Logical, but Unexpected – Finland’s Road to NATO from a Close Perspective.” NATO Review, 30 August 2023. URL: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/pl/articles/2023/08/30/logicznealenieoczekiwanedrogafinlandiidonatozbliskiejperspektywy/index.html (accessed: 30.06.2025). Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2024). NATO. URL: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617defexp2024en.pdf (accessed: 30.06.2025). Defence Resolution 2025–2030. Government Offices of Sweden. URL: https://www.government.se/governmentpolicy/totaldefence/defenceresolution202520302 (accessed: 30.06.2025). NATO’s Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy. NATO. URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_229801.htm (accessed: 30.06.2025). According to NATO, more than 11 undersea cables were damaged in the last 18 months, raising concerns about potential “grey zone” attacks. "Patrushev: NATO Rehearses Kaliningrad Seizure Scenarios in Military Drills." TASS. 29 April 2025. URL: https://tass.ru/politika/23809423 (accessed: 30.06.2025). Stryukovatyy V.V. "Russia's Geostrategic Position on the Baltic and the Threat of Maritime Blockade in Modern Conditions." Bulletin of the I. Kant Baltic Federal University. Series: Natural and Medical Sciences, 2024, No. 1, pp. 57–75.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On 30 May 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore – Asia’s premier security summit – and his comments were unusually blunt. He warned that the West – Europe and the US – risk losing credibility over the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and unless these conflicts are resolved with integrity and consistency, the broader rules-based international order and Europe’s place in it will unravel. Macron’s concern wasn’t just about the tactical consequences of geopolitical instability, but something deeper: the symbolic and normative weight Europe claims to carry in global affairs. His comments mark a turning point, one that exposes the crisis of coherence at the heart of the European Union’s foreign policy – and the growing tension between the EU’s aspirational identity as a “normative power” and the harsh realities of a world governed by realpolitik. For over two decades, the EU has presented itself as a values-based actor, using diplomacy, development aid, legal harmonisation and multilateralism rather than coercion to wield influence. The concept of the EU as a “normative power” – famously coined by Ian Manners – is based on the idea that Europe seeks to shape global affairs by promoting norms such as human rights, democracy and international law. But the simultaneous occurrence of two deeply symbolic and contested wars – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s bombardment of Gaza – makes it increasingly hard for the EU to maintain this self-image without being accused of hypocrisy and selective morality. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the gap between Europe’s response to Ukraine and Gaza. In Ukraine, the EU has mounted one of the largest and most united responses in its history: military aid, sanctions, diplomatic isolation of Russia and open arms for Ukrainian refugees. In Gaza, the response has been fragmented, inconsistent and – by many accounts – morally ambiguous. Some European states like Ireland and Spain have called for recognition of Palestinian statehood and condemned Israeli actions, others have hesitated or doubled down on support for Israel in the name of counterterrorism and alliance politics. This has not gone unnoticed in the Global South, where Europe’s normative claims are increasingly seen as hollow, if not ridiculous. Macron’s talk of credibility reflects an elite awareness that Europe’s legitimacy is no longer taken for granted outside its borders. The credibility crisis he describes is not just about diplomacy – it’s about identity. If the EU says territorial integrity is sacred in Ukraine, how can it do nothing when the same principles are being flouted elsewhere? If the Union says human rights are universal, can it be silent – or ambiguous – on the civilian casualties in Gaza? These are not questions asked by foreign policy analysts; they are asked in international forums, in Asian capitals courted by Brussels and in the protests that fill European streets. The more the EU fails to match its words with its actions, the more its normative brand erodes. But there’s another layer to Macron’s intervention that needs to be looked at. His comments on “strategic autonomy” and not being caught in the crossfire of the US-China rivalry suggest Europe is dealing with more than just a credibility crisis. It’s facing a strategic choice that will redefine its global role: whether to double down on the postwar transatlantic compact or to chart a more independent course that allows it to mediate between blocs in a multipolar world. Macron’s consistent advocacy of strategic autonomy (however controversial) means he recognises the EU can’t outsource its geopolitical relevance to Washington indefinitely, especially with the return of Donald Trump to the White House. This dilemma is made worse by the structural weaknesses within the EU itself. The Union’s foreign policy is crippled by institutional fragmentation, national interests and a consensus-based decision-making process that often leads to lowest-common-denominator positions. While the EU was impressive in its initial unity on Ukraine, the Gaza crisis has shown the limits of that unity when values collide with political alliances or domestic political considerations. This is not just a crisis of perception but of capacity. Can the EU actually be a geopolitical player when its member states can’t even agree on what is legitimate force, occupation or humanitarian necessity? The illusion of normative power, then, is not just an external branding problem – it is an internal governance challenge. For Europe to maintain credibility abroad, it must first reconcile its internal contradictions. That means rethinking the balance between values and interests, between ideals and strategic imperatives. It may also require a degree of institutional boldness: deeper integration in foreign and security policy, a greater role for the High Representative, or a shift toward qualified majority voting in foreign affairs. At the same time, Europe must also acknowledge the changing global landscape in which it seeks to operate. In a world no longer dominated by Western hegemony, the EU’s normative influence depends not only on its coherence but on its ability to listen and engage with actors in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as equals rather than as recipients of European lectures. Macron’s call for a “positive new alliance” between Europe and Asia, one that resists domination by any superpower, hints at a potential path forward. But such an alliance will only be credible if Europe demonstrates that it is willing to apply its principles even when inconvenient—especially when those principles are tested not just by adversaries but by allies. In the end, Macron’s speech serves as a mirror held up to the European project itself. It reflects both its aspirations and its anxieties, its potential and its paradoxes. Whether Europe can move beyond this moment of crisis to forge a foreign policy that is both principled and strategic remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that credibility cannot be commanded—it must be earned. And in an era of increasing global scrutiny, that will require more than rhetoric. It will require resolve. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Arctic order historically, currently, and in the future reflects the world order. The idea of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ is not valid and is a poor guide for policy. During Cold War bipolarity, the Arctic was divided between the Soviet Arctic and the Nordic and North American Arctic. US victory and Soviet defeat in the Cold War led to US unipolarity and hegemony which was the basis for a circumpolar (including Russia) liberal (as opposed to realist) Arctic order with organizations, such as the Arctic Council, International Arctic Science Committee, University of the Arctic, Barents and Bering regional cooperation, all on liberal topics such as science, environment, Indigenous rights, people-to-people cooperation.Footnote1 US unipolarity and hegemony are slipping away to world order characteristics of continued US unipolarity and hegemony, Sino-American bipolarity in economics and S&T and multipolarity illustrated by BRICS+. Sino-US competition and US-Russia conflict to the extent of proxy-war in Ukraine reflect these changes. The Arctic, which is de facto divided between the US-led NATO-Arctic and the Russian Arctic, where Russia reaches out to the BRICS+ in diplomacy, economics, and S&T, reflects these changes to world order. There is wishful thinking in the West of returning to post-Cold War US unipolar and hegemonic ‘liberal world order’ or ‘rules-based order’ and the circumpolar liberal Arctic order with it. This wish is probably unrealistic for global trends in demography, economics, S&T, legitimacy, etc. Significant conflict can be expected between the US/West and China and Russia on developments in world order, with the Global South standing by. The Arctic is likely to remain divided between the US-led NATO Arctic and the Russian Arctic seeking engagement with the BRICS+ world for the future with extremely limited cooperation and risk of spill-over from the Ukraine War and other US-Russia-China conflicts. The Arctic in international order There are two common, but invalid, narratives about the Arctic, which are poor guides for policy: First, ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, that the Arctic was apart from international politics and allowed for West-Russia cooperation unlike elsewhere, especially between the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Second, a presentist discourse, where international interests in the Arctic are seen as rising in the last 15 years, driven by climate change, the Russian flag planting on the seafloor of the North Pole in 2007, and the United States Geological Survey’s assessment of oil and gas resources in 2008, north of the Arctic Circle. Rather, the Arctic has for centuries closely mirrored the international system, whether multipolar with Western colonial empires before the World Wars, bipolar Cold War between the US and the USSR, post-Cold War US unipolarity and hegemony, or the current emerging Sino-American bipolarity and multipolarity. During 2014–2022, cooperation in the Arctic was not exceptional compared to US-Russia non-proliferation cooperation, most notably with the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, or removing chemical weapons from Syria. There was extensive US-Europe-Russia and wider collaboration around the International Space Station. There was extensive energy trade and investment between Russia and Europe, most notably with the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines under the Baltic Sea. The bipolar Cold War Arctic in the bipolar Cold War order Bipolarity with two superpowers standing out from all other great powers due to their demographic, economic, science and technology, military, and ideological weight and global claims, the US and the USSR, shaped the the Cold War order. Bipolar logic shaped the international order. John Mearsheimer explains well the structural logic of a nuclear-armed bipolar superpower security competition, and he points out how each superpower formed ‘bounded orders’ of allies and clients to discipline them and mobilize their resources. These bounded orders were the West for the US with its institutions, and the East Bloc for the USSR.Footnote2 This bipolar logic was also clear in the Arctic, divided between the Nordic and North American Arctic of the West and the Soviet Arctic by the Iron Curtain in Europe and the Ice Curtain in the Bering Strait. Circumpolar Arctic cooperation was limited to the Polar Bear Treaty of 1973 between the USSR, Norway, Kingdom of Denmark, Canada, and the US, Norwegian Soviet joint fisheries management in the Barents Sea, and some Bering Strait cooperation. The Arctic was exceptionally militarized during the Cold War driven by the mutual nuclear deterrence between the US and the USSR, where the Arctic played a central role for geostrategic and technological reasons. The Arctic was the shortest flight path for bombers and missiles, and sea ice offered cover for nuclear ballistic submarines. This exceptional militarization of the Arctic harmed the human security of Arctic local and indigenous communities through forced displacement, security service surveillance, and pollution, including notable nuclear accidents, as the 1968 B52 bomber crash off Northwest Greenland with four H-bombs causing extensive radioactive contamination of much Soviet nuclear material in and around the Kola Peninsula, including sunken submarines with nuclear fuel or weapons on board.Footnote3 Circumpolar liberal Arctic order under US unipolarity The Cold War ended with US victory and Soviet defeat and dissolution, also caused by the US pressuring the USSR into a strategic nuclear arms race, that the Soviet economy could not support. US Navy operations near the Soviet Northern Fleet nuclear bastion around the Kola Peninsula were an important part of this pressure.Footnote4 The Arctic was also part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to save the USSR by reform and lowering external tension. Gorbachev called the Arctic as a zone of peace, environmental protection and scientific collaboration in his 1987 Murmansk speech, in contrast to being at the heart of a strategic nuclear arms race with the US, which the USSR could not sustain. Gorbachev’s reforms failed to avert the dissolution of the USSR and deep socio-economic, public health, and law and order crisis in Russian society during the 1990s. The Russian State withdrew to a significant extent from its Arctic, leaving military facilities and society behind. Sino-American bipolarity comes to the Arctic The relative distribution of comprehensive material and immaterial power of the strongest States shapes international order. States stay the predominant actors since the emergence of a state system, not denying powerful non-State actors historically and today. The US unipolarity after the Cold War was an exceptional time of international history and not the ‘End of History’ as believed by some quarters in the West (Fukuyama). History is returning to normal with the return of major centres of economic output and science and technology outside the West. Ironically, US unipolarity laid the foundation for the ‘Return of history’, rather than the ‘End of History’. Since the 1990s, the world experienced globalization with economic, science and technology, and cultural integration. The US as the sole superpower provided public goods and facilitated and coordinated many of these economic, scientific, and technological, and cultural flows. Globalization undermined US unipolarity, facilitating the faster relative growth of non-Western States. China’s export-oriented growth, returning it to its historical position as one of the world’s largest economies is the most important dimension for changes to world order. In parallel, other emerging markets have grown adding multipolar dimensions to international order. International Relations theory serves to think about how to respond to the return of China. About 20–25 years ago, Professor Joseph S. Nye (Harvard University) and Professor John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) articulated two major approaches with coherent theoretical and strategic visions for the Sino-American relationship. Nye, as a liberal institutionalist scholar and policymaker in the Bill Clinton Administration, presented a vision of ‘integrate, but hedge’. China integrated in the US-led world economy as member state of the World Trade Organization, while the US hedged against the rise of China by reinforcing its alliance with Japan.Footnote5 There were strong US and Western liberal expectations of Chinese economic growth and openness leading to political openness and reform. These expectations proved to be belied and ethnocentric. Mearsheimer, in line with his offensive realist theory, clearly outlined how the US had to keep China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia through a containment strategy.Footnote6 The US’ China strategy has shifted from the Nye perspective to the Mearsheimer perspective, while Mearsheimer himself is ostracized for his valid, but politically unacceptable, analysis of the Ukraine War. Mearsheimer explains how Sino-American bipolarity works with realist great power State security competition, and how competing great powers form their ‘bounded orders’ of allies and clients to discipline and mobilize these.Footnote7 The US is shaping a NATO+ order of the NATO member states and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. The US is increasingly engaging in trade and technology wars with China to slow down its growth rate, clearly denying its access to fundamental technologies of future knowledge-based economies. A realist focus on relative gains explains US policy to reduce China’s growth rate. China has a population more than three times that of the US with an absolute economy approaching the US economy. The US cannot allow China to catch up relatively with it, as that would imply a much larger Chinese economy than that of the US. Liberals (politically and theoretically) would ascribe the US policy to different domestic political systems, but the logic of anarchy points out how domestic political systems are of secondary concern, and empirically the US firmly bypassed and disciplined the previous Anglo-Saxon superpower, Britain. US-India relations can be expected to deteriorate with India’s socio-economic development, where India has a much younger population than China with great economic growth potential. China predicted the US abandoning its own open and globalized international economic policy out of concern for China’s relative rise to the US. China pursued a domestic and international economic policy much less dependent on US benevolence. In the domestic sphere, China pursued an economy based on domestic demand. Externally, China built up a parallel international economic and science and technology system with the Belt and Road Initiative with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Other bodies, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in security reflect parallel orders and institutions to the US-led Western institutions. Sino-American bipolarity also became clear in the Arctic about 10–15 years ago. China started to appear as a diplomatic, economic, science and technology actor in the Arctic. Western surprise and consternation to this development reflects the great difficulties many Westerners have in facing a world, where the Rest takes an interest in the West, and not only the West taking an interest in the Rest as during centuries of imperialism and colonialism. It should not be surprising that China as one of the world’s two largest national economies and science and technology systems (with the US) has interests in the Arctic, or anywhere else in the world. The US is globally present in politics, defence, diplomacy, economics, science and technology, culture, etc. The unfortunate Chinese term of ‘near-Arctic State’ to legitimize Chinese involvement in the Arctic drew much Western ridicule and opposition. In comparison, the US and the West seem to be ‘near-everywhere’ States. One place where the Sino-American bipolar logic appeared soon and clearly has been the Kingdom of Denmark with the North Atlantic and Arctic overseas autonomies of the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The US applies pressure on the Kingdom of Denmark to exclude Chinese investment, science and technology, in line with Mearsheimer’s argument of a superpower building bounded orders to mobilize and discipline allies and clients in security competition with a competing great or superpower. The Faroe Islands are located between Iceland, Norway, and Scotland. They are centrally placed in the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap controlling North-South access and blocking the Soviet-Russian Northern Fleet going south for NATO or the US and NATO navies going north for USSR/Russia. The Faroe Islands are becoming increasingly independent from Denmark. Huawei has long been a partner for the Faroese telecom company, which planned to continue with Huawei for 5G. This partnership came under increasing scrutiny from Danish and US sides. The Chinese ambassador to Copenhagen during a visit to the Faroe Islands linked the Faroe Islands choosing Huawei with prospects for a Sino-Faroese free trade agreement (the Faroe Islands are outside the EU and pursue an independent trade policy).Footnote8 The US ambassador to Copenhagen publicly spoke strongly against the Faroe Islands collaborating with Huawei for 5 G.Footnote9 Greenland is geographically North American (remember the Monroe Doctrine), crucial to US (North American) homeland defence, and pursuing independence from the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland and China have for some time eyed each other for investment and science and technology opportunities. Greenlandic independence primarily rests on economic independence from Denmark and human capital. The economic independence should be through, among other domains, mining, where China and Chinese companies were considered as very important likely investors. Copenhagen regarded Sino-Greenlandic mutual interest with great suspicion for a long time, which was evident from the report on Greenlandic mining from 2014.Footnote10 In 2014, the Royal Danish Navy abandoned Grønnedal, a small, remote old naval facility, established by the US during the Second World War, which was put up for sale. A Chinese mining company showed interest in the facility as a logistics hub for future operations in Greenland. The Danish government promptly took the facility off the market maintaining a token naval presence.Footnote11 Developing Greenlandic tourism requires upgrading the airport infrastructure, which is an enormous project for a nation of 57,000 on a 2 M km2 island. One of the finalists to an international tender was the China Construction Communication Company (4C), which might also have provided financing.Footnote12 The Danish government convinced the Greenlandic government to accept a Danish financing (with a Danish stake) of the renovated and new airports against choosing a Danish construction company.Footnote13 The Greenlandic government was reshaped over this intervention with a coalition party leaving in protest over accepting such Danish interference in Greenlandic affairs. In 2017, China publicly presented its interest in a research station in Greenland, including a satellite ground station, which the Government of Greenland might have been positive towards.Footnote14 This idea has never materialized, first probably delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, but Denmark and the US would never accept a Chinese research station and/or satellite station in Greenland. The US government has made its pressure on the Danish government public, through former Secretary of Defense, General Jim Mattis.Footnote15 China and Iceland spearheaded Sino-Nordic Arctic research cooperation from the official visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao to Iceland in 2012. In 2013, the China Nordic Arctic Research Center was founded, a virtual centre of Chinese and Nordic institutions hosted by the Polar Research Institute of China in Shanghai. CNARC has hosted an annual symposium between China and a Nordic country as well as researcher exchange. Today, Sweden has withdrawn from CNARC, and Denmark does not participate, as the participating Nordic Institute of Asian Studies at the University of Copenhagen has been closed. PRIC and RANNÍS (The Icelandic Center for Research, equivalent to Research Council) held the groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of the China-Iceland Aurora Observatory, now China Iceland Arctic Observatory, at Kárhóll, Northeast Iceland, in June 2014, which I attended. The Observatory opened formally—although unfinished—in October 2018. This collaboration had been hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic and negligence from central authorities and research institutions in the capital, Reykjavik. Today, Iceland is under pressure from the US, including a recent visit by US Congressional staffers, to close CIAO.Footnote16 US-Russia Eastern European security competition divides the Arctic US-Russia security competition, especially in Eastern Europe, became increasingly clear from around 2007–2008. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he unsurprisingly denounced US unipolarity. Russia had rejected US unipolarity and called for multipolarity since the Primakov Doctrine of the 1990s calling for Russia, China, and India to balance the US. In spring 2008, at the initiative of the US—and with French and German reservations—the NATO Bucharest summit invited Georgia and Ukraine to become member states. In the autumn, fighting broke out between Georgia and Russian forces in the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia leading to Georgia’s defeat. In autumn 2013, the EU proposed an agreement to Ukraine, which forced Ukraine to choose between Russia and the EU. The Ukrainian President rejected the EU’s proposal, leading to popular protests met with government violence and eventually the President fleeing the country. Russia intervened annexing Crimea and supporting an insurgency in the Donbas.Footnote17 In December 2021, Russia proposed a treaty to the US blocking former Soviet Republics from joining NATO and rolling back NATO troops and equipment in Central and Eastern Europe, which was rejected by the US and allies in January 2022. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which had led to a war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine. The West extends wide-ranging political, military, economic, and further support to Ukraine and tries to isolate Russia as much as possible. The Rest of the world follows Western policy of isolating Russia to a very limited extent. The Russian annexation of Crimea affected the Arctic in limited ways. The West stopped military dialogues with Russia in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum. The West imposed sanctions on Russian Arctic energy projects, as the US $27 billion Yamal LNG project, which initially had Russian Novatek (60 per cent), French Total (20 per cent), and China National Petroleum Cooperation (20 per cent) ownership. Sanctions forced Novatek to sell 9.9 per cent to the Chinese government’s Silk Road Fund and rely on Chinese bank funding. Russia responded to these sanctions with counter sanctions on Western food exports to Russia, which also affected some Arctic seafood export to Russia. Russia accepted Faroese salmon exports, which led to a boom in Faroese economy. In 2014, there was some protests in the Arctic Council from the Chair, Canada. Otherwise, Arctic Council and other scientific, people-to-people, cooperation continued between Russia and the seven other Arctic States. For Northern Norway, extensive regional cooperation in the Barents region continued. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine led to an almost complete Western cessation of Arctic collaboration with Russia. The other seven Arctic countries refused to collaborate with Russia in the Arctic Council, chaired by Russia 2021–2023. The Seven—now all NATO member states—Arctic Council member states have since backed down significantly. The Arctic Council was always more important to them than to Russia, suggesting that this Western brinkmanship was poorly thought through. There are extensive Western sanctions against the Russian economy, including against Russian Arctic energy projects, which were a key basis for developing the Russian Arctic. Russia had sought to develop a Europe-Russia-East Asia energy system with Russian Arctic oil and gas being exported both West to Europe and East to East Asia and with balanced Western and East Asian investments.Footnote18 The West has almost completely cut science and technology relations with Russia, also in the Arctic. The rare exceptions to continued Arctic science collaboration between West and Russia are for instance, the Norway-Russia Barents Sea Fisheries Commission because Norway also depends on this collaboration. The US continues more academic collaboration with Russia than European countries allow themselves; for instance, receiving Russian Fulbright professors. Norway pursued an extensive regional cooperation policy with Russia, Finland, and Sweden in the Barents Region since 1993 with much support for cross-border people-to-people exchange for youth, in education, academia, culture, environment, business development, and further. This collaboration built extensive insight, experience, networks, and access in Russia at North Norwegian institutions, as UiT The Arctic University of Norway, UNN The University Hospital of Northern Norway, the Norwegian Polar Institute, the Arctic Frontiers Conference, businesses such as Akvaplan-Niva marine environmental consultancy, and in academia, civil society, education, and government. The border town of Kirkenes depended for about a third of its economic turnover on trade with Russia. These connections are now almost completely cut by Norwegian government policy. Russian society and politics did become much more closed and authoritarian during this period, but that was for internal political reasons and not directed against Norway. Personally, I had successful high-level academic cooperation with some of the key Russian academic institutions funded by Norwegian public funds until they were forbidden by Norwegian government policy after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. My last personal visit to Moscow was in December 2019, and I was planning to visit with a sizeable group of Norwegian faculty and PhD candidates in April 2020, postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The rapid division of world order in a NATO+ and a BRICS++ world The world is separating into a NATO+ grouping of NATO countries and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, under clear US leadership, and the Rest. The Rest, I call BRICS++ for the BRICS+ grouping and many other countries. This separation is clear through demography, economy, and science and technology. Humanity is about 8 billion people, compared to the West, which is about 1 billion, making it a small minority. Humanity is expected to grow to 10 billion, where the West will remain at about 1 billion, a shrinking small minority. The dominance of the West has rested on economic development and science and technology, translated into military force, with a shrinking demographic share of the world economy, scientific and technological development and relative power shifts from the West to the Rest. Legitimacy and credibility divisions are also clearly visible between the NATO+ and the BRICS++ worlds concerning the war in Ukraine, where the West is astonished by its own isolation. To great surprise, the Rest of the world have not followed the West’s attempts to isolate Russia diplomatically and economically. This rejection of the West’s position was clear from the very first UN Security Council debate on the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Russian veto and Chinese and Indian abstentions were not surprising, but the abstention by the United Arab Emirates was remarkable considering the close security and other partnerships between the GCC countries and the US and historically the UK. The speech during the debate on 21 February 2022, a few days prior, by the Kenyan ambassador to the Security Council, condemning Russia’s recognition of breakaway regions but reminding that other UNSC permanent members had also violated international law, showed the lack of Western credibility and legitimacy on the issue.Footnote19 Western credibility and legitimacy have eroded further by supporting Israel’s genocide in Gaza since the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. The Division of the Arctic in a NATO Arctic and Russian BRICS++ Arctic. The effects of world order on the Arctic are clear, applying the analytical lenses of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar traits of world order to the Arctic. The world is increasingly becoming Sino-American bipolar, where the US seeks to maintain unipolarity through a global containment strategy of China. This struggle is also evident in the Arctic; for instance, US pressure on the Kingdom of Denmark to exclude Chinese investment, science and technology in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The US keeps up an ever-stronger anti-Chinese Arctic discourse from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s 2019 speech in Rovaniemi, Finland, to US Senator Lisa Murkowski at the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik in 2024. Russia has opposed US unipolarity since the 1990s, seeking multipolarity. The conflict between US and Russian multipolarity ultimately escalated via the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the proxy war in Ukraine. This conflict has led to an almost complete division of the Arctic into NATO-Arctic (collaborating with the wider NATO+ world and further) and the Russian Arctic. Russia reaches out all it can diplomatically, economically, and in science and technology to the BRICS++ world, especially China and India. The Rest of the World seems restrained from pursuing Russian Arctic opportunities by the risk of US and Western secondary sanctions and other NATO Arctic pushbacks. Conclusion: looking forward for world and Arctic order The world is—as usual for international history—marked by the struggle over the world order among the strongest State actors. This struggle was forgotten especially by European observers during the post-Cold War era, with the illusion of End of History and confounding globalization and modernization with Westernization. Instead, we have had the Return of History and the return of historically very large non-Western economic, science and technology actors as China, followed by others. The current struggle over the world order also shapes the Arctic, as was historically clear, especially during the Second World War and the Cold War. The US is determined to prolong post-Cold War unipolar dominance expressed as ‘rules-based order’, where the US defines the rules, to whom, and when they apply. Europe has found an apparently comfortable and completely dependent position in this US-led order. The Rest of the World less so, with China and Russia explicitly rejecting this US-led order. The conflict over world order between the US and its bounded order in the NATO+ world in Europe, Oceania, and East Asia and the Rest of the World, can only be expected to escalate. The US must either stop Chinese economic, science and technology development (and later other peer competitors), or demographics, economy, science and technology will lead to a more bipolar and multipolar world. Europe by its dependence on the US is forced to follow this US strategy. The war in Ukraine can lead to a frozen conflict, where the overall Russia-West relationship remains highly conflictual, including in the Arctic. Ukrainian defeat or a negotiated settlement with a neutralized Ukraine and cessation of territory to Russia will also probably lead to a decadal severance of economic, science and technology, people-to-people ties between Russia and the West, including in the Arctic. A Russian defeat is unlikely because of difference in Russian and Ukrainian manpower and resources. China is unlikely to allow Russia to succumb to the US, which would put defeated Russia on China’s Northern frontier in China’s own conflict with the US. All in all, world order seems highly conflictual and with increased separation between the NATO+ and the BRICS++ world, which will only bring humanity more conflict and less economic development and growth, unlike the age of post-Cold War globalization. This division will be replicated in the Arctic. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsRasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen is Professor at UiT The Arctic University of Norway. Views expressed are personal. Notes 1. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, ‘Unipolarity and Order in the Arctic’. Nina Græger, Bertel Heurlin, Ole Wæver, Anders Wivel, (Eds.), Polarity in International Relations. Governance, Security and Development, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05505-8_16. 2. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 43 (4), 2019, pp. 7–50 at https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342 3. George Lindsey, ‘Strategic Stability in the Arctic’, Adelphi Papers 241, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989. 4. Steven E. Miller, ‘The Return of the Strategic Arctic’, in The Arctic Yearbook, 2023 at https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/6C_AY2022_Miller.pdf. 5. Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Challenge of China’, in Stephen Van Evera (Ed.) How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security, The Tobin Project, Cambridge, MA 2006 at https://tobinproject.org/sites/default/files/assets/Make_America_Safe_The_Challenge_Of_China.pdf. 6. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All’, The Australian, 18 November 2005 at https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The-Australian-November-18-2005.pdf. 7. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 43 (4), pp. 7–50, 2019 athttps://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342. 8. Thomas Foght, ‘Hemmelig lydoptagelse: Kina pressede Færøerne til at vælge Huawei’ [Secret Sound Recording: China Pressured the Faroe Islands to Choose Huawei]. Danmarks Radio, 2019 at https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/hemmelig-lydoptagelse-kina-pressede-faeroeerne-til-vaelge-huawei. 9. Adam Satariano, ‘At the Edge of the World, a New Battleground for the US and China’, New York Times, 2019 at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/technology/faroe-islands-huawei-china-us.html. 10. The Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society, ‘To the Benefit of Greenland’. Ilisimatusarfik-University of Greenland; University of Copenhagen, 2014 at https://vbn.aau.dk/ws/files/208241864/To_the_benefit_of_Greenland.pdf. 11. Martin Breum, ‘Analyse: Stoppede Danmarks statsminister kinesisk opkøb i Grønland?’ [Analysis: Did the Danish Prime Minister Stop Chinese Acquisition in Greenland?]. High North News, 2018 at https://www.highnorthnews.com/nb/analyse-stoppede-danmarks-statsminister-kinesisk-opkob-i-gronland. 12. Teis Jensen, ‘Greenland shortlists Chinese company for airport construction despite Denmark’s concerns’, Reuters, 2018 at https://www.reuters.com/article/world/greenland-shortlists-chinese-company-for-airport-construction-despite-denmarks-idUSKBN1H32XG/. 13. Statsministeriet, ‘Aftale mellem regeringen og Naalakkersuisut om dansk engagement i lufthavnsprojektet i Grønland og styrket erhvervssamarbejde mellem Danmark og Grønland’ [Agreement Between the [Danish] Government and Naalakkersuisut [Government of Greenland] on Danish Involvement in the Airport Project in Greenland and Enhanced Business Collaboration Between Denmark and Greenland] Statsministeriet. Formandens Departement, 2018 at https://www.stm.dk/media/8148/10-09-2018_aftale_mellem_regeringen_og_naalakkersuisut.pdf. 14. Martin Breum, ‘Kina vil bygge kontroversiel forskningsstation i Grønland’. [China Wants to Build Controversial Research Station in Greenland], 2017 at https://www.information.dk/udland/2017/10/kina-bygge-kontroversiel-forskningsstation-groenland. 15. Damian Paletta and Itkowitz Colby, ‘Trump Aides Look into US Purchasing Greenland after Directives from President’. The Washington Post, 2019 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/16/america-first-greenland-second-is-trumps-latest-white-house-directive/. 16. ‘Letter to Anthony Blinking and Lloyd Austin’, Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, United States Congress, 2017 at https://democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/10.16.24_PRC%20dual%20use%20research%20in%20the%20Arctic__.pdf. 17. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2014 at https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf. 18. Mariia Kobzeva and Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, ‘European-Russian-Chinese Arctic Energy System’,in Xing Li (Ed) China-EU Relations in a New Era of Global Transformation, London: Routledge, London, 2021, 22p. 19. Martin Kimani, ‘Statement by Amb. Martin Kimani, during the Security Council Urgent Meeting on the Situation in Ukraine’, The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya, United Nations Security Council, February 2022 at https://www.un.int/kenya/sites/www.un.int/files/Kenya/kenya_statement_during_urgent_meeting_on_on_ukraine_21_february_2022_at_2100.pdf.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, following the military actions that began with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The conflict is having devastating consequences, including widespread death and displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and a global energy crisis, also heightening geopolitical tensions (Kurapov et al., Citation2023). Pertiwi (Citation2024) contended that since the crisis in Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the European Union (EU) has adopted sanctions as the key policy response targeting Russia’s aggressive behaviour. These restrictive measures were applied by the EU in multiple rounds and packages and gradually became the cornerstone of the EU’s policy towards Russia. (p. 61) There is extant literature studying the direct consequences of the war, such as humanitarian crises, economic impacts and geopolitical instability. Numerous countries have experienced food shortages and rising prices due to disruptions in supply chains, worsened by the crisis in Ukraine and the closure of airspace (Hellegers, Citation2022). Concurrently, the war has caused an unprecedentedly volatile energy market, as many European countries were obliged to seek alternative energy sources to Russian imports, demanding more oil and natural gas from alternative suppliers (Liadze et al., Citation2022). The invasion has also fuelled inflation across the EU, not only affecting energy, which is essential in all the sectors of the economy but also other sectors like food, for example, as Ukraine is a major global grain producer (Ozili, Citation2024). The added value and main contribution of this paper is based on the use of grounded social scientific methods like the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS and the Ordered Probit, to analyse the EU citizens’ support of the sanctions against Russia, providing more nuanced insights on what factors are the most important to be in favour and against the sanctions. Thus, in particular, our study contributes to filling one of the important gaps mentioned by Pertiwi (Citation2024) in the analysis of the literature on the EU’s approach to sanctions on Russia. Concretely, our study fills in part the fifth gap in the analysis of causal mechanisms that examine the sanctions, including relevant actors like the EU citizens. Thus, we first provide an in-depth analysis of European citizens’ views on EU sanctions to weaken Russia and support Ukraine. And then, we analyse the main factors that affect the EU citizens’ support of the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia and in favour of Ukraine. The study includes data from 26,461 respondents across the 27 EU Member States, collected through the 98th Eurobarometer survey (Winter 2022–2023), which examined the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature review. Section 3 presents the dataset used, and the methodological approach. In Section 5, the results are presented, followed by Section 5, which offers a thorough discussion of the findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper by summarising the main conclusions drawn from the study, identifying implications, limitations of the study, and potential directions for future research. Literature reviewAttitudes towards EU’s sanctions against Russia war in Ukraine Public sentiment for the EU is a complex phenomenon to study and needs to be approached from different angles, including identity, governance, security and the economy. How the public perceives the EU as a guardian of democratic values and good governance directly influences support for its policies, including sanctions on Russia. Boomgaarden et al. (Citation2011) argue that if the people believe that the EU is going to safeguard democratic principles, then they will identify sanctions as a proper means of safeguarding such principles. However, if there is a lack of trust in the EU to defend such values, there will be little support for such sanctions. The purpose of European identity is primarily to determine people’s views on the EU’s actions. Kende et al. (Citation2018) believe that European identity can have a profound impact on solidarity with common EU policies, such as sanctions. This would imply that the framing of a common European identity can become the most important factor in eliciting public consent for EU programmes, especially in the midst of geopolitical crises. Thus, public opinion on sanctions is also based on perceptions of the EU’s ability to act in the interests of citizens. According to McLean and Roblyer (Citation2016), if citizens perceive the EU as doing the best it can for its citizens, particularly in terms of economic stability and governance, they are more likely to support sanctions against Russia. However, if the EU is perceived as wasteful, or its policies are perceived as economically harmful, then the potential for support for sanctions will be low. This explains the need to ensure that EU action is consistent with shared perceptions of political effectiveness and economic benefit. The imposition of economic sanctions is one of the highest prioritised tools in the modern world, especially against threats to stability and security. The EU sanctions on Russia, especially after the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine, have stimulated an immensely wide public discussion (Karlović et al., Citation2021). An important question is: What is the role of perceived security threats in shaping public opinion about these sanctions? It has been made known through investigation that subjective security risk strongly predicts public opinion regarding EU sanctions against Russia. Frye (Citation2019) argues that sanctions are not always supported but vary depending on how people view security threats. Public support is higher when sanctions are framed as protection against an external threat. When sanctions are perceived as a threat to national or economic security, they can generate opposition. The EU’s collective response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict also shows that public opinion on sanctions is shaped by both security interests and normative expectations of justice and self-determination (Bosse, Citation2024). This mutual influence can lead to mixed public responses, with some seeing sanctions as an ethical necessity, while others withdraw their support due to perceived economic and national security risks. The way EU sanctions are proposed and implemented also influences public opinion. According to Sjursen (Citation2015), citizens will be more supportive of sanctions if they see EU institutions as representative and transparent. Conversely, an image of bureaucratic distance or lack of public participation in decision-making can undermine trust and lead to opposition. Thus, in line with this background, we pose our first research question as follows: (1) How do European values and security threats influence the intensity of public support for EU sanctions against Russia?Socioeconomic factors in shaping attitudes towards EU sanctions Support for economic sanctions against Russia is widespread among the EU, varying according to socioeconomic status, demographic characteristics and political engagement. As Frye (Citation2017) has noted, economic prosperity is a key predictor of support for sanctions. Those who are financially ‘safe’ are more likely to support EU-imposed sanctions, as they are less directly affected by the economic burden. Previous studies have shown that those in more affluent income groups or with stable household finances are more likely to support foreign policy actions, such as sanctions, that represent broader European values, even if they are economically costly (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). This is consistent with the findings of Lepeu (Citation2025), which recognises that citizens who rate their own economic situation as ‘very good’ are far more likely to support sanctions than those facing financial hardship. On the other hand, citizens facing economic hardship are less likely to be sanction-supportive if they believe that sanctions will negatively impact inflation, increase unemployment or suppress national economic stability. Onderco (Citation2017) found that economic hardship is associated with higher scepticism towards foreign policy decisions that lack tangible personal benefits. This means that the economic price of sanctions is likely to disproportionately affect support among lower-income individuals. Generational differences also play a role in shaping public opinion on sanctions. Older individuals (over 55 years) are more supportive of EU sanctions, as they have a historical perspective on European security and are more politically engaged (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). On the other hand, younger people (15–34 years) have weaker support, possibly because they have different priorities, such as financial stability and employment, which could be considered more pressing than geopolitical concerns (Onderco, Citation2017). Alexandrescu (Citation2024) also suggests a new generational divide in attitudes towards coercive diplomacy, suggesting that efforts to build popular support for sanctions must consider young Europeans’ concerns and values about economic consequences and political transparency. Political interest is a second important predictor of support for EU sanctions. Politically knowledgeable and engaged citizens tend to be more supportive of EU foreign policy decisions, including sanctions (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). Thus, there is political ideology duality: left and centre-left voters support sanctions if they are anchored in a broader vision of upholding international law and human rights, while centre-right and populist voters are likely to be more sceptical if sanctions are perceived as infringing on national sovereignty (Onderco, Citation2017). As in the literature, the likelihood of being a strong supporter of EU sanctions depends on several socioeconomic and demographic factors, our second research question builds on the following: (2) Do socioeconomic characteristics influence the likelihood of being a strong supporter of EU sanctions against Russia?Dataset and methodology The dataset of the study is based on the Standard Eurobarometer 98.2 (EB98) survey Winter 2022–2023 which was conducted from 12 January to 6 February 2023 in 39 countries or territories. In the study, we only use the dataset from the 27 Member States of the EU, without considering the data from the other twelve additional countries included. The dataset was collected about a year after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, covering the following five topic areas identified by the European Commission (Citation2024): (1) The EU’s response to the invasion of Ukraine; (2) the actions taken as a unified EU response to the invasion; (3) the consequences of the war in Ukraine; (4) the European security threat; and (5) the future EU actions in the wake of the war., and aims to analyse the solidarity of European citizens with the Ukrainian people. The sample size for each country was around 1000 respondents except for Malta with 503, making a total of 26,461 respondents. The endogenous variable of the study is obtained by applying the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS approach to the items of the survey included to measure the degree of support of the respondents towards the measures taken by the EU in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The following five items were included in the analysis: (1) financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine; (2) imposing economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals; (3) providing financial support to Ukraine; (4) providing humanitarian support to the people affected by the war; and (5) welcoming into the EU people fleeing the war. The question introduction was the same for all the items: The EU has taken a series of actions as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of these actions taken? The responses to the question for each item were given using a complete 5-point Likert scale, where: 1 = totally agree; 2 = tend to agree; 3 = do not know; 4 = tend to disagree; and 5 = totally disagree. The scale was reversed to enhance interpretability, ensuring that higher values are aligned with those citizens who expressed higher support for the measures taken by the EU. The analysis of the variables affecting the citizens’ support was based on the selection of 14 exogenous variables, including age, gender, political interest, perception of the situation in the country, employment personal perception, financial household perception, the labour market perception of the country, the provision of public services perception, the overall image of the EU, the perception of the threat posed by the Russian war in Ukraine to security in the EU and the country itself, the personal perception that standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is defending European values, and the political orientation. More information about the exogenous variables can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. The Ordered Probit model will provide interesting and nuanced results of whether some exogenous variables affect the support of the EU sanctions taken by the EU in response to the Russian invasion. For example, for each of the variables included in the analysis, it will be possible to analyse to what extent some of the categories support more or less the sanctions. Similarly, it will be possible to determine if some of the variables have a significant effect on the level of support. Methodology Opinion surveys are affected by the subjective judgments of respondents, leading to potential inaccuracy in interpreting response categories (Disegna et al., Citation2018). For instance, ‘totally agree’ for one respondent could be equivalent to simply ‘tend to agree’ for another. For this reason, Fuzzy Set Logic methods are becoming very popular in social sciences to manage the uncertainty associated with survey responses effectively (Cantillo et al., Citation2021; Indelicato & Martín, Citation2024). The study uses the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS Approach to calculate the endogenous variable that measures the support (sup) of the respondents towards the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia. The method is grounded in the fuzzy set theory proposed by Zadeh (Citation1965), which was introduced for handling the inherent uncertainty and vagueness of information provided by answers to social surveys (Carlsson & Fullér, Citation2001; Disegna et al., Citation2018; Mamdani & Assilian, Citation1999). There are multiple fuzzy set representations that can be used to associate the categories of the answers given in the survey (Nguyen et al., Citation2005). In the study, we use the Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFNs), which are the most used fuzzy sets (Anand & Bharatraj, Citation2017; Wang, Citation2017). The final representation of the answers from the dataset is as follows: (1) totally disagree is represented by (0, 0, 30); (2) tend to disagree by (20, 30, 40); (3) do not know by (30, 50, 70); (4) tend to agree by (60, 70, 80); and (5) totally agree by (70, 100, 100). The hybrid nature of the method is based on the application of the Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), which calculates the synthetic indicator (Hwang & Yoon, Citation1981). We omit the mathematical formulation of the method for simplicity and ease of exposition. Interested readers can consult many existing papers, such as (Cantillo et al., Citation2023; Indelicato et al., Citation2023; Martín et al., Citation2020; Martín & Indelicato, Citation2023). We will use sup which provides relative support for the sanctions on Russia taken by the EU after invading Ukraine, as the dependent variable for the econometric model. The variable will be categorised into five quintiles according to the ranking of the indicator in order to use an ordered probit model. The marginal effects of the results will be used to analyse the main determinants that explain the highest support of EU citizens. In the study, we use the Daly normalisation for all the categories that act as exogenous variables in the model. Thus, it is possible to determine the marginal effects of each category with respect to the sample-weighted average. We omit the discussion of the technicalities of the model and exogenous variables normalisation. Interested readers can consult Daly et al. (Citation2016), Greene and Hensher (Citation2010), Hensher et al. (Citation2015) and Martin and Roman (Citation2021). Results Figure 1 shows the kernel density of the exogenous variable that measures the support of EU individuals for the sanctions against Russia taken by the EU for the whole sample (panel a) and for those who totally agree and totally disagree with the EU imposing the sanctions to defend European values (panel b). The results indicate that a small number of respondents do not support the sanctions imposed by the EU at all, with 170 citizens giving a score of 1 to all survey items included in the scale. Conversely, a significant portion of the population holds a more neutral position, as shown by responses falling in the range of 0.3–0.6. Additionally, a substantial number of citizens – specifically, 6430 – express their strong support for the sanctions by responding with a score of 5 to all items.  Figure 1. Support kernel density. Panel (b) of the figure clearly distinguishes between the two categories of respondents. It shows that those who strongly support the defence of European values are more in favour of the sanctions compared to those who strongly oppose them. Similar figure patterns are obtained for the categories of those who have a positive or negative image of the EU, and for those who think that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is seen as an important threat to the security of the EU. Nevertheless, this will be further discussed with the results of the ordered probit model. Table 1 shows the main drivers to support or not the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia. The table is obtained from the marginal effects obtained from the ordered probit model, which is in the fifth quintile of the support distribution, and refers to the citizen group of the strong supporters (Table A3, in the appendix). It can be seen that the main drivers to support the sanctions are totally agreeing that by standing against the Russian invasion, the EU is defending European values, having a very good or rather good image of the EU, totally agreeing that the EU security is under threat with the Russian invasion, and to have a very good financial situation in the household. All the coefficients are significant at 999 per thousand. The results of the ordered probit model, as well as the complete table of the marginal effects, can be consulted in the appendix. Table A2 shows that all the exogenous variables affect the support level except the area in which the respondent resides, so the support is transversal to whether the European lives in a rural, middle town or large town. It is also interesting to observe that all the threshold parameters of the ordered probit model result significant, i.e. the five different quintiles of the distribution can be allocated without the need to collapse some of the categories used in the estimation.  Table 1. Main drivers to be or not a strong supporter of the EU sanctions. Interestingly, the main drivers to be in the population segment of those who do not strongly support the EU sanctions are the opposite categories of supporting the sanctions: totally disagreeing or tending to disagree with the defence of European values, totally disagreeing or tending to disagree with the fact that the invasion of Ukraine is a security threat to the EU and having a very bad image of the EU. The coefficients of Table 1 have been extracted from Table A3, and need to be interpreted as follows: the coefficients are the marginal effects of the category to be or not a strong supporter of the EU sanctions. For example, the coefficient of 0.105 for individuals who totally agree that the EU is defending European values by standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine indicates that this group has a 10.5 per cent higher likelihood of being strong supporters of EU sanctions compared to the average citizen in the overall sample. In a similar manner, the coefficient of −0.225 for the category of total disagreement indicates a 22.5 per cent lower probability of being a strong supporter. Other interesting results that can be seen in the complete marginal effects table (Table A3, in the appendix) are that the type of urbanisation where the respondent lives, namely rural village, small and mid-size town or large town, is the only variable of the twelve under analysis which does not have any significant effect on being a strong supporter of the sanctions. For the rest of the variables, there is always a category with more odds of being or not in the category of strong supporters. It is interesting to note that the younger generations (between 15 and 24 and between 25 and 34) are less likely to be in the category of strong supporters than those over 55, who are significantly more likely to be in this category. Similarly, those who have a strong political interest, have a good personal job situation, think that the economic situation of their country is rather good, are leftist or left-centre, think that the employment situation of the country is rather good, are males, or have a rather good financial situation have a higher probability of being in the category of strong supporters. Conclusions In a recent speech by Jens Stoltenberg, former Secretary General of NATO, the following assessment was made: In just a few weeks, NATO leaders will meet in Madrid. We will make important decisions. To continue to strengthen and adapt our Alliance to a new security reality and protect our people and our values. I look forward to the day when we can welcome both Finland and Sweden into our Alliance. This will make Finland and Sweden safer. NATO stronger. And the whole Euro-Atlantic area more secure. (NATO, Citation2022) Although NATO’s strategic decision affects the entire geopolitical landscape, public perceptions of EU sanctions need to be addressed through a more nuanced, evidence-based approach. Public opinion on sanctions is driven not only by security concerns but also by economic and political factors that underpin individual belief systems. To measure the determinants of support for such policies, this study applies both the fuzzy hybrid approach and the ordered probit model. The first method calculates the endogenous variable that measures the level of support of each respondent. The second method is used to find the main factors of a set of 14 exogenous variables or covariates that affect the support. Our results reveal that there are four important drivers to be a strong supporter of the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in early 2022: (1) totally agreeing that by standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is defending European values, (2) having a very good overall EU image, (3) totally agreeing that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a threat to the security of the EU, and (4) having a very good household financial situation. Other factors, such as age, gender, or political orientation, among others, are less determinant in explaining the strong support category. The dataset for the study was obtained from the 98th Eurobarometer, covering winter 2022–2023, providing a solid foundation for the objectives pursued in the study. Our results imply that, at least in the salient category of being a strong supporter of the EU sanctions, European Parliamentarians and the political parties involved should promote a triad: the defence of European values (Anghel & Jones, Citation2023), a more integrated security defence system that will permit the EU to be more independent from NATO and US (Del Sarto Citation2016; Howorth Citation2018), and a solid campaign of improving the EU image, highlighting the benefits of being in the union (Elmatzoglou, Citation2020). The European values of human rights and dignity, as well as the principles of living in liberal democracies, should not be undermined by misinformation campaigns from autocratic regimes. The invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest security threat in Europe since the end of the Cold War, fostering a wave of fear and real politics about the necessity of increasing the military budget. Europeans have seen more closely how the lives of human beings are worth almost nothing when their homes are bombed, and they have to leave with just the bare minimum, stopping their daily lives and becoming refugees in countries that may not welcome them with open arms. There is a need for effective communication campaigns that change the focus from generic issues such as ‘Europeanness’ fostering a common national identity or sense of belonging to a pragmatic branding strategy that achieves a power actor in the new turbulent geopolitical battlefield. Recent developments, in the light of newly elected President Donald Trump’s views on NATO and US foreign aid, have added uncertainty to the EU’s strategic calculus on sanctions. Trump’s concerns about NATO’s burden-sharing and his ambivalent stance on continued US military aid to Ukraine have set off alarm bells among EU policymakers and underscored the need for a European security policy that is less dependent on US leadership (Sorgi, Citation2025). Thus, it is the time for a more than-less European Union mentality that decreases Euroscepticism, a time to strengthen public support for the EU. This shift requires an emphasis on the tangible benefits that EU membership brings to member states, including economic stability, enhanced security, and the promotion of shared values like democracy and human rights. By fostering greater awareness and understanding of the EU’s role in addressing cross-border challenges, citizens can better appreciate the advantages of unity over division. Engaging with local communities, encouraging open dialogues, and actively involving citizens in EU decision-making processes can further bridge the gap between the EU and its citizens, reinforcing a sense of belonging and shared purpose. This study has some limitations that can be addressed in future studies. First, the dataset is a point-in-time measure of public opinion, surveyed in the winter of 2022–2023. Due to the dynamic nature of the geopolitical environment, longitudinal studies are needed to examine how public support for EU sanctions may change over time in response to political, economic and military events. Second, other external factors can also be examined to gain a better picture of how other factors could shape people’s opinions. These range from cultural equivalence with Ukraine to geographical proximity to the war zone, exposure to social media narratives, and interaction with Ukrainian refugees. The role of media frames and disinformation campaigns in determining views on EU sanctions is another area that would require more work. Third, latent variables such as societal resilience, institutional trust, geopolitical affinity, and adherence to European values could provide a better understanding of the reasons for support or opposition to EU sanctions. Such variables could also explain the differences in public opinion between EU member states and between different demographic groups. Furthermore, as previous studies on public support (Onderco et al., Citation2023) have also shown, a comparative analysis with previous surveys, for example, in 2008 (Russia-Georgia war), 2014 (annexation of Crimea and Donbas war) with the full invasion of Ukraine in 2022–2023, could also be very useful. Although not directly compared in the current study, future research would benefit from a historical analysis component to explore the continuities and shifts in public opinion during these major geopolitical events and how they change in different EU countries. This would provide a better insight into how threat perceptions, economic concerns and EU identity evolve in response to Russian aggression and EU foreign policy initiatives. Supplemental Material Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2025.2476484. Additional informationFunding Dr Alessandro Indelicato research is funded by the research fellowship “Catalina Ruiz,” provided by the Consejo de Economía, Conocimiento y Empleo of the Gobierno de Canarias, the Agencia Canaria De Investigación Innovación Y Sociedad De La Información (ACIISI), and Fondo Social Europeo of the EU, through the Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain). Martín, J. C., & Indelicato, A. (2025). 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском April 2025 marks the second anniversary of Finland’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although the prospect of joining the alliance began to be seriously considered after the escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, a final decision was repeatedly postponed due to the unclear advantages of this move and insufficient public support. Despite close economic ties with Russia and a tradition of cautious diplomacy known as the “Paasikivi–Kekkonen line” (often criticized as “Finlandization”), the 2022 international crisis pushed Finland to join NATO. Since then, the once-neutral country has shifted its foreign policy, increased defense spending, and expanded its arms exports. Government and Military Perspectives In December 2024, the Finnish government presented a new Defense Report in Helsinki, replacing the previous strategy issued in September 2021. Back in 2021, Finland had highlighted the growing military activity in the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions, along with the increased interest of major powers in the natural resources of the North and the Northern Sea Route. Notably, the country didn’t name any specific enemy, choosing to keep its message broad and carefulThe 2024 document takes a much more serious tone. It clearly names Russia as the main source of global instability and describes China as a growing power that challenges the U.S. and its allies. Terrorism is mentioned too, but much less often. Some of the main points about global security include the following - The return of a "large-scale, protracted war" to the European continent;- The Special Military Operation (SMO) is interpreted as a continuation of Russia’s aggressive actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, as well as in Georgia in 2008;- An increase in hybrid attacks and incidents involving critical infrastructure;- Growing Chinese influence on Finland and its neighboring countries;- An unpredictable and unstable defense and international security environment, with a clear tendency toward further deterioration;- The largest NATO military buildup on the eastern flank since the end of the Cold War;- Accession to NATO is described as “the most significant transformation in Finland’s defense policy since World War II”;- Ongoing integration of Finland’s armed forces into NATO’s structures and joint defense planning;- Finland is now planning its defense together with NATO, focusing not just on its own territory but also on the Baltic States, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the North Atlantic. In the section on shifts in global power, Russia is named as the main cause of instability. It is described as “the most significant and immediate threat to the Allies, to security, and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.” Other claims include: a long-standing effort to weaken the European Union, a push to restore its great power status, and an attempt to divide Europe into spheres of influence using military force. Russia is also accused of using hybrid tactics—such as spreading fear, influencing public opinion, stirring political divisions, and blocking decisions—to target European countries and their people. Its Special Military Operation is seen as the beginning of a broader, more direct, and unpredictable conflict with the West. China is characterized as a less aggressive player. It is noted that Beijing is rapidly modernizing its armed forces, has intensified intelligence activities in the United States and Europe, and has strengthened military and economic cooperation with Russia, the development of which will determine Moscow’s ability to exert influence over Europe. At the same time, Finnish strategists place greater emphasis on the ongoing competition between China and the United States for global political, military, economic, and technological dominance. In matters concerning NATO’s role in defense, it is noted that the Alliance has intensified its cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, increased its military presence on the eastern flank and the number of military exercises, and is continually updating both general and regional defense plans in the event of a large-scale conflict. With the accession of Finland and Sweden, NATO has become geographically closer to strategically important areas for Russia, including Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad, the Kola Peninsula, Belarus, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic region. Within the Alliance, ensuring the security of maritime transport routes and the modernization of military infrastructure in Northern European countries is viewed as a key condition for the potential reinforcement of troops from North America. The role of the European Union is described as complementary to NATO, while it is also noted that the EU is increasing defense spending and expanding technological cooperation. The report was published after the election victory of Republican U.S. President Donald Trump, known for his isolationist views, which is partially reflected in the document through emphasis on European independence in security matters and the need for further military expenditures. On intra-European regional issues, the report focuses on cooperation with the member states of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Baltic States, and the United Kingdom, as well as on Germany’s shift in security policy, France’s increased defense spending, and Poland’s growing purchases of military equipment. In military and technology matters, the document highlights the growing role of unmanned systems (both remote-controlled and autonomous), artificial intelligence, and advanced human capabilities like improved thinking and synthetic biology. It stresses the need to use the latest scientific and tech innovations in developing weapons — a step that could help make up for fewer soldiers on the battlefield. Cyberspace and outer space are seen as new areas of military and technological competition. This view is based on several factors: the rapid growth of space technologies (driven by private companies), easier access to space, and heavy reliance on cyber tools and satellites for both military and civilian use. Information warfare is also becoming more influential alongside traditional combat. The document notes that small countries can benefit in such conflicts by using innovations smartly and managing resources well. Still, Helsinki does not rely only on high-tech solutions. A key part of Finland’s military strategy is preparing both its army and population for long-term, grinding conflicts. This includes signing long-term arms supply contracts, building strategic reserves, keeping supply chains strong, and staying ready to protect their way of life. Among the main conclusions, the authors of the report present the following: - Finland and Europe are facing a significant decline in security, with no short-term improvement expected.- Russia poses and will continue to pose a constant security threat to Europe and Finland;- Finland will provide military assistance to Ukraine for as long as necessary;- Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Nordic countries, the Baltic Sea region, and the High North have formed a unified geostrategic space; the Baltic Sea region holds strategic importance for Finland;- Finland’s defense will rely on maintaining conscription, strengthening the training of its military reserve, a strong public will to defend the country, and support from NATO membership.- Commitment to total defense — a combination of all national and international military and civilian measures that ensure the protection of the country under any circumstances (seven components are listed: government administration, international relations, defense capability, internal security, economy, functional capabilities of the population, and psychological resilience of people); There is a need to improve working conditions in the defense industry, increase production, and secure steady, reliable supply chains. A gradual increase in Finland’s military spending. - The development of the EU’s defense potential, and movement toward greater independence of the European Union both in policy and in the development of military technologies and defense supplies;- NATO’s readiness to provide the full spectrum of forces necessary for large-scale, high-intensity combat operations; Finland, in turn, must also create all the necessary conditions for the presence of allied troops on its territory. Similar assessments are presented in the Military Intelligence Review of Finland — 2025 (previous publications date back to 2021 and 2023), prepared by the General Staff of the Finnish Defence Forces. Russia is also named as the main threat there, which “seeks to reduce Western influence, secure its sphere of influence,” “views security policy as a zero-sum great power game in which NATO expansion strengthens the position of the United States and thereby weakens Russia’s security,” and “the interests or security of neighboring countries are not an important factor in Moscow’s calculations.” In addition, Russia is accused of seeking to turn the Global South against Western countries, in particular, there is a reference to “an attempt to present the BRICS group as part of an anti-Western ‘global majority’” . As for the Northern European direction, the Finnish General Staff notes the buildup of Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula and in the Arctic region, attributes to Moscow attempts to gain unrestricted access to the Northern Sea Route and to weaken the integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO structures. Helsinki predicts that after the end of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s priority will be the accelerated buildup and modernization of forces in the reestablished Leningrad Military District, bordering Scandinavia. Finnish military officials do not believe in a quick settlement of the situation in Ukraine and forecast a deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West in the coming years, a struggle by Russia for shipping in the Baltic Sea “by any means,” continued attacks on underwater infrastructure in the Baltic (a reference to damage to undersea cables, although no exact culprit is named), escalation of the race between the West, Russia and China for the resources of the High North, and increased intelligence and sabotage activities by Russian special services in Finland. China is not viewed in an entirely negative light; instead, there is recognition of Beijing's ambition to become a political, economic, military, and technological leader by 2049, marking the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. China's growing influence over countries of the Global South is also noted. Russia–China relations are seen as a "lifeline" for the Russian economy and a means of circumventing sanctions. However, Beijing is not seen as an equal partner, but as someone benefiting from Russia’s growing isolation. This makes Russia more dependent on China. The war in Ukraine is seen as helping China, since it distracts the West from China's global rise. At the regional level, Helsinki plans to enhance cooperation and update the foundational NORDEFCO agreement during its presidency of the organization in 2025. This push for renewal is driven by the evolving security environment and Finland’s recent accession to NATO alongside Sweden. Back in April 2024, the defense ministers of the member states signed a memorandum outlining a new vision for NORDEFCO. According to the document, by 2030 the countries plan to improve joint military planning and operations, make it easier to move troops across borders, boost cooperation and intelligence sharing, both directly and through NATO and the EU, and keep strengthening the defense industries of the Nordic countries. NORDEFCO is not officially seen as a mutual defense agreement or a command system like NATO; however, in recent years, it has started to show features usually found in a defense alliance, mostly because of the actions of some of its members. In 2021, the defense ministers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden signed a deal to strengthen cooperation, allowing for "joint action in times of peace, crisis, or conflict." In 2022, they gave each other permission to use their airspace and military bases. That same year, the defense ministers of Finland, Norway, and Sweden updated their three-way agreement, further growing their military cooperation. After Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway made a joint promise to fully support them if either country were attacked. While NORDEFCO has not yet become an organization like NATO, the current level of defense cooperation between the Nordic countries at the regional level — and repeated promises to help each other in case of conflict — suggest that in the coming years, this effort might start to look like a smaller version of NATO in Northern Europe. This kind of setup would likely be less full of red tape, quicker at making decisions, and made up of countries that share similar views and speak with one voice. It would also have a lower risk of going backward — unlike some NATO members who, in recent years, have threatened to block decisions, added extra demands for new members, or even talked about leaving the Alliance. Defense and Military-Industrial Complex Expenditures Threats identified by Finnish politicians and the military automatically require growing expenditures and an acceleration of the defense industry. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2014 to 2020, Finland’s military spending remained annually at the level of 1.5% of GDP, while in absolute terms it gradually increased — from $3.57 billion to $3.9 billion. Amid the pandemic in 2021, the figure dropped to $3.65 billion, but by the end of 2022 it amounted to $4.47 billion, and in 2023 — to $6.85 billion, or 2.4% of GDP. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) provides similar estimates: growth from $3.72 billion in 2014 to $6.89 billion in 2024, with the budget for 2025 estimated at $7.47 billion. Helsinki does not intend to stop there — on April 1, 2025, following recommendations from the Ministry of Defense, the government began preparations for a phased increase of the military budget to at least 3% of GDP by 2029. Over four years, it plans to raise allocations by €3.7 billion, expand the state defense order, and develop new rearmament programs for the 2030s. Helsinki also views the prospects of its domestic defense industry with optimism — according to the Finnish think tank SaferGlobe (which, according to its website, is “engaged in the study and development of tools to promote sustainable peace and security”), in 2023 arms exports reached €333 million (of which €141 million accounted for weapons intended for civilian use in self-defense, sports, and hunting) — a record since record-keeping began in 2002. About 85% of military exports were distributed within Europe. The largest importing countries by value were Sweden (€51 million), Latvia (€34 million), and Lithuania (€19 million) — together, these three countries accounted for more than half of all military product exports. In value terms, the largest share of exported military products (32%) consisted of land vehicles and their components. The next largest export categories were ammunition (17%), as well as explosives and charges (15%). The largest exports of civilian weapons were to the United States (€52 million), Canada (€15 million), and Australia (€9 million). The year 2023 also set a record for issued export licenses for military products — €667 million. The largest recipient countries of export licenses were Slovakia (€201 million), Japan (€154 million), and Ukraine (€88 million). Similar conclusions were reached by the state investment company Finnish Industry Investment (Tesi), which in autumn 2024 surveyed 368 domestic defense companies: 144 of them were identified as “fast-growing startups and growth companies,” while the rest were described as “more established players with a long history, mainly providing consulting services to the Finnish Defence Forces.” The highest growth rates were shown by producers of dual-use goods, whose net profit has increased annually by 30–40% since 2022. At the same time, companies engaged exclusively in the military sector faced difficulties in attracting investment. 50% of defense companies were located in the capital region of Uusimaa, where the leaders were Helsinki (74 companies) and its satellite city Espoo (65); another 16% were based in the Pirkanmaa region centered around Tampere (40). Rounding out the top five were the high-tech “capital” Oulu (21) and another satellite of Helsinki, Vantaa (14). By type of activity, the majority of companies (246) operated in the support and logistics sector; 70 were engaged in the design of combat command and control systems (C4I — Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence); 20 firms cooperated with the land forces, 13 with the navy, 10 with the air force, five worked in joint operations, and the remaining four were involved in space technologies. A New Strategy — A New President Finland’s entry into NATO happened during the second and final term of President Sauli Niinistö. While he followed the West’s general approach on the war in Ukraine and supported anti-Russian sanctions, he still tried to keep some level of political dialogue with Russia. After February 2022, this became almost impossible, and Finland officially ended its nearly 80-year policy of staying neutral. In the two-round election held in January and February 2024, Finnish voters chose Alexander Stubb from the National Coalition Party as their new president. Stubb studied in the United States and France, and previously worked as a Member of the European Parliament, as well as Finland’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. Back in 2014, when Finland still followed the "Paasikivi–Kekkonen line" of cautious foreign policy, Stubb was one of the only top officials who openly supported joining NATO. On the topic of relations with Russia, he said that “Russia’s integration with the West was an illusion.” This view may be influenced by his family history. Stubb’s father, Göran Stubb, was born in Käkisalmi — a town that was given to the Soviet Union after the Soviet–Finnish War of 1939–1940, renamed first as Kexholm (in Swedish), and later as Priozersk. On his father's side, Stubb’s grandparents came from Vyborg, which also became part of the Soviet Union after the war. However, the family had already moved to Helsinki before the conflict started. In his inaugural speech on March 1, 2024, Alexander Stubb uncompromisingly stated to the citizens of Finland that “the post–Cold War era is over” (placing the blame on Russia), “the instruments of cooperation have been turned into weapons,” “the world is in a transitional state,” and “the creation of a new world order takes time.” He added that Finns “will have to respond quickly to changing circumstances, as was the case with NATO membership,” and that “when times become difficult, I too will be ready to make tough decisions to ensure the security of our country.” In addition to his campaign promises, the newly elected president confirmed his commitment to the previously introduced “value-based realism” (arvopohjainen realismi), which he pledged to be guided by in the conduct of foreign policy if elected. Later, this was officially included in the government’s report on foreign and security policy in June 2024. Among other ideas, the report especially highlighted the following: commitment to democratic values, the rule of law, international law, and human rights; strengthening the country’s defense; staying out of military conflicts; and being open to dialogue with countries that do not share these values. The election of A. Stubb as president strengthened the pro-Western trends in Finland’s foreign policy. On September 1, 2024, the Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States entered into force, under which Finland opens 15 of its military facilities for possible use by U.S. forces, while Helsinki will not charge rent for premises or land made available to the United States. On September 27 of the same year, the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced the placement of NATO headquarters on Finnish territory — in Mikkeli in the southwest of the country, 140 km from the border with the Russian Federation, and in the northern region of Lapland. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish authorities announced preparations to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines (a similar step had previously been taken by the defense ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia), stating that this is “a cost-effective way to supplement the capabilities of the armed forces,” but adding that the country would remain “committed to the humanitarian goals of the convention” even after a possible withdrawal. On April 15, 2025, a Finnish servicemember took part for the first time in a flight aboard a NATO E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft during Ramstein Alloy 2025 exercises in the Baltic region. The NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force (NAEW&CF) includes personnel from 17 countries, in addition to which Canada, France, Finland, and Lithuania also contribute their staff. NATO noted that the E-3A is the first multinational flying unit created by the Alliance. Statements regarding Russia, despite initial uncompromising tone, began to soften after the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, who held a different view of the Ukrainian conflict compared to the strongly pro-Ukrainian administration of Joe Biden. As early as April 2024, Alexander Stubb stated that there was no need to conduct political dialogue with Russia, and considered military action the only path to peace in the context of Ukraine. Under the new Washington administration, the Finnish president approved of the negotiations between the U.S. and Russian leaders, but again repeated the Ukrainian position on the need for a “just peace” and Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO. During his March 2025 visit to Florida, Stubb attempted to dissuade Donald Trump from cooperating with Russia and also called for tougher sanctions against Moscow. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish president admitted that European countries had started talking about renewing contact with Russia. He said that Finland must "morally prepare" for rebuilding political ties with Russia, since "nothing changes the fact that Russia exists and will always be a neighbor." However, he did not give any timeline for when relations might be restored. The situation around the war in Ukraine is made more difficult by the Trump administration’s growing isolationism, along with threats to pull out of talks and a trade war that Washington has launched against almost the entire world (though some parts of it have been paused). This raises fears of a new “Great Depression.” The European Union’s success at the negotiating table will depend on how united its member states are, since they have different geopolitical interests. Although Finland supports calls for a ceasefire, it does not plan to stop its military support for Ukraine or oppose Ukraine joining NATO. Alexander Stubb, on at least two occasions (in November 2024 and March 2025), publicly warned Ukraine against following a “Finnish scenario.” This would mean giving up on NATO membership and possibly giving up territory—similar to what Finland did after World War II, when it accepted neutrality and lost 11% of its land. In a comment on efforts to resolve the conflict in 2025, Stubb criticized Finland’s past policy of “good neighborliness” with the Soviet Union. He said that while Finland kept its independence in 1944, it lost land, part of its sovereignty, and the ability to make its own decisions freely.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This paper departs from an assumption derived from Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory: Germany is a de facto leader of European integration processes and the European Union as an institution.The first part of the analysis explores priorities and their corresponding challenges for the new German CDU-led cabinet. It examines issues around the ongoing war in Ukraine, transatlantic relations, and outstanding questions about German-China cooperation.The second part looks at the recently proposed Security and Defence Union (SDU) project and its various challenges.In conclusion, it is suggested that Germany will likely dominate future defence efforts, the actual shape of which will also be determined by other players such as the US, Russia, China, Iran, Israel, India or Turkey.Key Words: Germany, Foreign Policy, EU, Geopolitics Introduction According to the Federal Election Commission, the German election on February 23 saw a record-breaking voter turnout of 82.5%. That's an increase from 76.6% in 2021 and the highest voter participation since unification in 1990.  With vote counting finished, preliminary results show that the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by Chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz, and its sister Christian Social Union (CSU) won the election with 28.6% of the vote. (As of the writing of this paper, the coalition negotiations are in progress, and the new Merz-Lead government will likely be formed by Easter this Year).  Before we analyse the challenges ahead of Merz's Government, let us briefly note that Friedrich Merz belongs to the so-called 'Davos Crowd'. He regularly attends the World Economic Forum Meetings. Before fully dedicating himself to politics, Merz worked as a corporate lawyer and held a significant position at BlackRock, a leading global investment management firm. He served as the head of the supervisory board of BlackRock's German branch, a role that has drawn scrutiny due to BlackRock's CEO, Larry Fink, being a key figure at the WEF. By his critics, Merz is seen as a 'globalist puppet' who is likely to promote Agenda 2030-related policies and the Klaus Schwab Great Reset initiative at the expense of German citizens.   Challenges ahead of Germany and its new political leadership Under the new CDU-led Government, Germany will face significant international challenges in supporting Ukraine, managing US relations, and balancing China ties. - The war in Ukraine The ongoing war in Ukraine is a pressing issue, requiring Germany to sustain its support for Ukraine while managing its own energy security and economic interests. This involves coordinating with other EU and NATO members, which could be challenging given potential fatigue and differing national priorities.  The ongoing war in Ukraine, initiated by Russia's invasion in 2022, remains a critical challenge for Germany. The new CDU-led Government must sustain this support amidst potential fatigue and economic pressures. It goes without saying that the war has disrupted energy supplies, with Germany suspending the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and facing higher energy costs. The CDU, under Merz, has advocated for a strong stance against Russia. Still, challenges include maintaining EU unity, especially with some member states favouring dialogue with Moscow, and managing domestic economic impacts, such as inflation and cost-of-living pressures. This support towards sustained support to sanctions against Russia seems necessary, but it may strain Germany's resources and require coordination with NATO and EU partners. - Navigating Transatlantic Relations Germany's relationship with the United States, mainly through NATO, is vital for its security and economic interests. Even before the Trump election, German experts were ready to address the incoming challenges.  Trump's opposition to previous policies, such as climate commitments and trade agreements, has led to tensions. Traditionally aligned with the US, the CDU knew the need to balance cooperation on security issues, such as defence spending, with potential trade and climate policy disagreements. This challenge is compounded by the need to prepare for a world where Germany must pay more for its security, especially given the war in Ukraine.  Today, Germans are painfully aware that the relations with the United States are crucial, especially given that Trump's presidency has already led to tensions over trade and security policies. Germany seems willing to balance cooperation with the US while asserting its interests and those of the EU. This will be complicated due to conflicting interests regarding trade and the economy. Trump is expected to continue his protectionist policies, imposing tariffs on German goods like cars to address the trade deficit. This will likely lead to retaliatory measures from Germany and the EU, straining economic ties.  In fact, the European Commission already declared it would impose "countermeasures" from April 1 in response to US tariffs of 25 per cent on steel and aluminium imports.   Regarding defence and security - Trump will likely pressure Germany to increase defence spending, possibly threatening to reduce US troops in Germany, as he did in his first term by announcing a withdrawal of 12,000 troops (later reversed by Biden). This could push Germany to enhance its defence capabilities and meet NATO targets.  As for climate change and energy - Trump's scepticism towards climate agreements, such as the Paris Accord, will likely continue, clashing with Germany's leadership in renewable energy and its goal to phase out coal by 2038 at the latest.   Finally, there is the question of foreign policy, especially Russia and Ukraine - Trump's potential alignment with Russia could complicate Germany's position, particularly given its significant support for Ukraine. Reports suggest Trump might cut Ukraine out of negotiations with Russia, forcing Germany to take a more independent stance.   - Balancing Economic Relations with China Germany's economic ties with China are significant, with China being a primary export market and investment partner. However, the new German Government faces the challenge of addressing security and human rights concerns, such as intellectual property theft and China's assertive foreign policy. The CDU-lead coalition may push for greater diversification of supply chains and stricter regulations, as suggested by recent analyses.   This balancing act is crucial, as economic dependence on China could limit Germany's ability to take a firm stance on delicate issues regarding human rights. The challenge is maintaining economic benefits while mitigating risks, potentially through EU-level coordination and bilateral agreements, which could create diplomatic pressures and affect Germany's global trade position. Economic ties and the challenge of de-risking. Germany has deep economic ties with China, with significant trade and investment flows, particularly in the automotive and manufacturing sectors. However, the new government will face the challenge of reducing economic dependence, as outlined in the CDU's election platform, which calls for "reducing reliance on China".  This is driven by concerns over supply chain vulnerabilities, as seen in the CDU's criticism of previous decisions like allowing a Chinese state-owned company to invest in Hamburg's port.  The challenge lies in implementing de-risking strategies without triggering economic repercussions, such as reduced exports or investment pullbacks. Recent statements from Merz, such as warning German firms about the "great risk" of investing in China, indicate a stricter stance. Still, experts question whether this rhetoric will translate into firm policy, given the economic interests at stake.   Security concerns and strategic competition are at the forefront - Friedrich Merz recently grouped China with Russia, North Korea, and Iran in an "axis of autocracies," highlighting perceived threats to German and European security.  The CDU's position paper, adopted around Easter 2023, states that the idea of peace through economic cooperation "has failed with regard to Russia, but increasingly also China," signalling a shift toward a more security-focused approach.  This includes addressing issues like technology transfer, intellectual property theft, and cybersecurity, which could strain bilateral relations. The challenge is strengthening defence and economic security measures without escalating tensions, particularly as China's military capabilities grow. Merz's focus on European strategic autonomy, especially in light of US policy shifts under Donald Trump, may lead to increased cooperation with EU partners in China. Human rights and values-based diplomacy are important for the incoming CDU-led government. Therefore, it is likely to take a firmer stance on human rights issues, reflecting the CDU's emphasis on preserving the rule-based international order.  Merz has consistently called China "an increasing threat to [German] security," suggesting a values-based approach that could lead to diplomatic tensions.  The challenge is maintaining constructive engagement while addressing these issues, especially as China has offered a "stable, constructive partnership" post-election, seeking to inject "new vitality" into China-EU relations. Balancing economic interests with values-based diplomacy will be a key test for Merz's government.  As for the coordination with EU partners, Germany's China policy should probably align with the EU's broader strategy, which has shifted toward de-risking under the European Commission. This requires coordination with other member states, some of whom may prioritise economic ties over security concerns, creating potential friction. The challenge is to ensure a united EU front, particularly in trade negotiations and investment screening, where Germany's leadership will be crucial. Merz's advocacy for improved coordination with major European allies such as France and Poland suggests focusing on EU unity. However, coalition dynamics, potentially involving the dovish Social Democrats, could dilute this approach.  Compared to Angela Merkel's pragmatic approach and Olaf Scholz's cautious stance, Merz's leadership is expected to mark a "Zeitenwende" or turning point, with a more critical and security-focused China policy.  However, the extent of change depends on coalition dynamics, with potential partners like the SPD possibly moderating his approach, creating tension between rhetoric and policy implementation. The EU as a security actor This section of the paper outlines the significant challenges ahead for the EU, considering Germany's influence and the broader geopolitical landscape, especially regarding the future EU defence cooperation and its potential relations with NATO. According to German experts and policymakers, The EU must maintain unity in supporting Ukraine amid Russia's ongoing invasion. Under the CDU, Germany will most likely continue its policy in this regard, providing military aid and economic support. According to the Federal Foreign Office, the German Government has, since the start of the war, made available around 43.62 billion euros in bilateral support for Ukraine (as of 31 December 2024); this aid includes the critical area of air defence, a substantial winter assistance programme and energy assistance, help for those who have fled Ukraine, humanitarian aid, mine clearance operations and assistance with efforts to investigate and document war crimes. Furthermore, Ukraine and Germany signed a bilateral agreement on security cooperation on 16 February 2024.  European Army The former Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, at Charles University in Prague on 24 August 2022, recently elaborated on German leadership's vision regarding the Europen defence efforts. His presentation paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four 'revolutionary' ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to potentially 35 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.   The German leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's 'special responsibility' for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government's 'special responsibility' for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity.   In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the 'best equipped armed force' in Europe.  Former Chancellor Scholz would, however, make it an open claim at times: "As the most populous nation with the greatest economic power and a country in the centre of the continent, our army must become the cornerstone of conventional defence in Europe, the best-equipped force".  The re-entrance of Trump into global politics only reinvigorated German calls for stronger defence cooperation. Amid a drive to shore up support for Ukraine after Donald Trump halted US military aid and intelligence sharing, European leaders held emergency talks in Brussels (6 March 2025). They agreed (Hungary did not support the document) on a massive increase in defence spending. According to the European Council's Conclusions, the European Commission is to propose a new EU instrument to provide Member States with loans backed by the EU budget of up to EUR 150 billion.  Apart from that, the document mentions several other instruments that are supposed to enhance Europe's defence capabilities: additional funding sources, new EU instrument for loans, support from the European Investment Bank (EIB), mobilising private financing, priority areas for defence capabilities (air and missile defence; artillery systems, including deep precision strike capabilities; missiles and ammunition; drones and anti-drone systems; strategic enablers, including in relation to space and critical infrastructure protection; military mobility; cyber; artificial intelligence and electronic warfare), joint procurement and standardisation, simplification of legal frameworks and finally coordination with NATO. Overall, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, presented a plan worth EUR 800 billion to increase European defence spending against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  Will it be enough to create actual European defence capabilities, finally? Time will show. Europeans have been talking about common European defence for decades. So far, most of their achievements fall short of lofty political declarations.  Consequently, on March 19 this year, the European Commission unveiled the Joint White Paper for European Defence 2030.  (White papers are policy documents produced by the Governments that set out their proposals for future legislation.) Accordingly, the 22-page-long document consists of numerous 'bold' ideas to advance European defence cooperation toward a European Army. The key threats to European Security include correspondingly: military aggression from Russia, strategic competition (there is increasing strategic competition in Europe's wider neighbourhood, from the Arctic to the Baltic to the Middle East and North Africa), transnational challenges (issues such as rapid technological change, migration, and climate change are seen as serious stressors on political and economic systems), actions of authoritarian states (countries like China are asserting their influence in Europe and its economy, posing a strategic challenge due to their authoritarian governance style), hybrid threats (these include cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, and the weaponisation of migration. The document notes that these threats are interconnected and increasingly prevalent), geopolitical rivalries (ongoing geopolitical tensions in various regions, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, are highlighted as contributing to instability that directly affects Europe) and last but not least instability from neighboring Regions (proximity to conflict zones, especially in North Africa and the Middle East, leads to spillover effects such as migration and economic insecurity).  Notably, at the very beginning of the document, the EC makes an unequivocal statement: "The future of Ukraine is fundamental to the future of Europe as a whole. Since 2022, we have seen a full-scale, high-intensity war on the borders of the European Union with hundreds of thousands of casualties, mass population displacement, huge economic costs and deliberate destruction of vital energy systems and cultural heritage. The outcome of that war will be a determinative factor in our collective future for decades ahead". The document proposes several measures to support Ukraine amid its ongoing conflict, mainly through a "Porcupine strategy" to enhance Ukraine's defence and security capacity. The "Porcupine strategy" includes elements such as:  Increased Military Assistance - The EU and its Member States should significantly step up military and other assistance to Ukraine (providing large-calibre artillery ammunition with a target of delivering a minimum of 2 million rounds per year, supplying air defence systems, missiles (including deep precision strikes), and drones, supporting Ukraine's procurement of drones and further developing its production capacity through joint ventures with European industries and training and equipping Ukrainian brigades and supporting the regeneration of battalions). Direct Support to Ukraine's Defense Industry (the document emphasises the importance of directly supporting Ukraine's defence industry (encouraging EU Member States to procure directly from Ukraine's defence industry for donations to Ukraine and utilising EU loans to boost Ukraine's defence industry spending, estimated to reach around EUR 35 billion in productive capacity by 2025). Enhanced Military Mobility (the EU aims to improve military mobility corridors extending into Ukraine, facilitating smoother deliveries of military assistance and enhancing interoperability). Access to EU Space Assets (Ukraine should have enhanced access to EU space-based governmental services, which would aid in its defence capabilities). Coordination of Military Support (the EU Military Staff Clearing House Cell will coordinate military support for Ukraine, enhancing collaboration with NATO and other partners). Integration of Ukraine into EU Defense Initiatives (the document proposes integrating Ukraine's defence industry into EU initiatives and encouraging its participation in collaborative defence projects. Conclusion A 'Security and Defence Union' (SDU) has been recently proposed as a new institutional form of military cooperation among EU Members.  It is suggested that the SDU includes the UK, and given the special attention paid to Ukraine in the White Paper, it is logical to surmise that it (Ukraine) will also be a de facto member. The devil lies in details, however, and so financially speaking, Europeans have to address numerous challenges. For example, the European Defence Fund (EDF) details Euro 8 billion over 7 years (approx. Euro 1.12 billion/year), supports R&D, and has committed Euro 5.4 billion since May 2021.        Meeting these ambitious goals will be especially challenging given the funding constraints (EU instruments like EDF and EDIP have limited impact; EDIP at €750 million/year is less than 1% of €90 billion 2024 procurement, needs €9 billion/year for 10% impact), capability and industry gaps (post-Cold War cuts left significant gaps, needing €160 billion by 2018 if 2008 levels maintained, €1.1 trillion if all spent 2% GDP 2006-2020), political and partnership issues (US scepticism, especially under second Trump administration, makes EU states cautious), policy integration (balancing security and economic priorities).  Against this backdrop, Germany claims to rise to the occasion and take the leading role, passing a new defence budget, referred to by media as 'bazooka'.  A massive increase in military spending is paralleled by another military aid package to Ukraine (The €3 billion package approved by the Bundestag Budget Committee comes on top of the €4 billion in military aid to Ukraine already planned in the 2025 budget).  Where does it leave NATO? 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The New York Times, 23 February, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/22/world/europe/germany-election-trump.html    Chaney, Eric. “What Challenges is Germany Facing?”. Institut Montaigne. https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/what-challenges-germany-facing   Alkousaa, Riham. “Germany election: what are the policies of the CDU conservatives”. Reuters, 25 February 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/policies-german-election-favourites-cdu-conservatives-2025-02-18/   South China Morning Post. “Will Merz’s tough talk on China fizzle out if he becomes leader of Germany?” https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3292397/will-merzs-tough-talk-china-fizzle-out-if-he-becomes-leader-germany   Rhodium Group, “Wind of Change: German China Policy After the Election – Rhodium Group.” 12 February 2025. https://rhg.com/research/wind-of-change-german-china-policy-after-the-election/   Rhodium Group, “Wind of Change: German China… op.cit.  Rinaldi, Gabriel. “German Christian Democrats rewrite Merkel’s China playbook”. Politico. 26 March 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/german-christian-democrats-to-overturn-angela-merkels-china-policy/   Radunski, Michael. “German conservatives call for China policy Zeitenwende • Table.Media.” Table Briefings. 19 March 2023. https://table.media/en/china/feature/union-calls-for-china-policy-turnaround/   South China Morning Post. “Will Merz’s tough talk on China fizzle out if he becomes leader of Germany? | South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3292397/will-merzs-tough-talk-china-fizzle-out-if-he-becomes-leader-germany   South China Morning Post. “China offers ‘stable, constructive’ partnership with Germany after Friedrich Merz’s election win.” https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3299946/china-offers-stable-constructive-partnership-germany-after-friedrich-merzs-election-win   Verhelst, Koen. “Friedrich Merz wants to lead Europe on the economy. Can he?” POLITICO. 19 February, 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/friedrich-merz-wants-to-lead-europe-on-the-economy-can-he/   Rinaldi, Gabriel. “German Christian Democrats… op.cit.  Federal Foreign Office, “Germany continues to stand with Ukraine – the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion”. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/ukraine-node/ukraine-solidarity-2513994   The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles University In Prague On Monday, August 29 2022. https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752   National Security Strategy. Robust. Resilient. Sustainable.  Integrated Security for Germany (2023). Federal Foreign Office, Werderscher Markt 1, 10117 Berlin. https://www.nationalesicherheitsstrategie.de/National-Security-Strategy-EN.pdf   “Germany must become 'the best equipped armed force in Europe', Scholz says.” Euronews, September 16, 2022. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/09/16/germany-must-become-the-best-equipped-armed-force-in-europe-scholz-says   “Germany must become 'the best equipped armed force in Europe', Scholz says”, Euronews, 16 September, 2022. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/09/16/germany-must-become-the-best-equipped-armed-force-in-europe-scholz-says   European Council. "Conclusions – 6 March 2025." EUCO 6/25. Brussels: General Secretariat of the Council, March 6, 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/06/special-european-council-6-march-2025/   See more at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/06/watershed-moment-eu-leaders-close-to-agreeing-800bn-defence-plan-ukraine   The European Intervention Initiative (EI2) is a joint military project between 13 European countries outside of existing structures, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union's (EU) defence arm. The Initiative was first proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron in his Sorbonne keynote in September 2017. ASee more at: https://archives.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/535740/9215739/file/LOI_IEI%2025%20JUN%202018.pdf   A week before on 12th of March 2025 European Parliament adopted a ‘resolution on the ehite paper on the future of European defence’ which includes 89 points. See more at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0034_EN.html   European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. "Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030." Brussels, March 19, 2025. JOIN(2025) 120 final. https://defence-industryspace.ec.europa.eu/document/download/30b50d2c-49aa-4250-9ca6-27a0347cf009_en?filename=White%20Paper.pdf   See more at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/34278_en   See more at: https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission_en   See more at: https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2025/towards-eu-defence-union   See more at: https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en   “Germany's historic spending plan has passed - so what is the money going to be spent on?”, The Journal, 22 March 2025. https://www.thejournal.ie/germany-spending-plan-explainer-6656255-Mar2025/   Sexton Karl and  Hubenko Dmytro, “Germany approves $3 billion in military aid for Ukraine”. DW, 21 March 2025. https://www.dw.com/en/germany-approves-3-billion-in-military-aid-for-ukraine/a-72001265

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This departs from an assumption that the EU is an outstanding example of liberal institutionalism. It has been very successful in providing lasting peace for Europeans who are now facing a series of existential challenges.The central hypothesis of this paper is that if these challenges are not addressed effectively, the EU may not survive in the long term.The first part of the analysis explores five external challenges that affected the macroeconomic and political environments of the EU in the third decade of the 21st century.The second part of the analysis signals five internal and more profound challenges the EU must face if it wants to continue in any viable form.The author concludes that the future of the world order and, by extension, the environment of the EU will most likely be decided by three great powers: the US, China, and Russia. Keywords: EU, Great Powers, World Order, US, China, Russia Introduction 2024 is exactly 20 years since the so-called ‘Big Bang enlargement’, which is why the author of this paper takes the liberty of looking at the future of the European Union (EU). The EU is, according to voluminous literature, the best working example of Liberal Institutionalism, which at its very core is about prescribing peace and security. Yet, the EU project seems derailed in the last few years and is becoming increasingly dysfunctional. This lack of internal cohesion is arguably based on several political phenomena: overregulation, ideologisation, and bureaucratisation being the proverbial tip of the iceberg. This paper examines the EU's economic and political environment and then lists five most pressing challenges it must face to survive as an institution. British citizens have already shown the first ‘red card.’ Core external challenges - the macroeconomic and political environments To say that the contemporary world is complex is to state an obvious truism. However, five phenomena should be outlined here as significant variables regarding the EU’s environment. Firstly and most fundamentally, the changes in the international political economy and corresponding structural changes that undermine states’ positions. What we are witnessing is the emergence of non less than the New World Order, which not only challenges the so-called traditional great powers by shifting the centre of gravity to the East but, perhaps most importantly, challenges the position of state actors as ‘shakers and movers’ of the international system. The Great Reset and the Fourth Industrial Revolution are phenomenal examples of the challenges ahead. Secondly, the ongoing war in Ukraine. Apart from obvious regional European relevance, it should also be analysed globally. Russian invasion threatens principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. If allowed and left unchecked, it encourages other acts of aggression, and in doing so, it confirms a worrying trend according to which the so-called great powers stand above international law. The war draws attention to Ukraine's strategic importance as a large European country. In that sense, the outcome of the conflict will shape the balance of power on the continent. It tests the Western alliance and its response to such challenges. Moreover, it bears global economic consequences—Ukraine & Russia are significant exporters of grain, energy, and raw materials. Prolonged conflict involving these two risks, long-term inflation and food/fuel shortages abroad, is equivalent to the global spread of instability. The Ukrainian-Russian conflict bears an uncanny resemblance to a proxy war between the East and the West competition. An argument could be made that it can be seen as a battle between democracy and authoritarianism, where Russia’s victory strengthens authoritarianism abroad. Finally, let us not forget the nuclear aspects of the conflict. A risk of direct Western involvement would raise the threat of nuclear escalation. The outcome could influence nonproliferation norms for security assurance. Thirdly, and partly as a response to the above two phenomena, there comes the question of German leadership/vision of the future of the EU. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Two stand out among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.[1] Fourthly, and again in significant part as a response to the first two phenomena, we are witnessing unprecedented resistance among large sections of European societies. In particular, the now openly verbalised and physically demonstrated dissatisfaction mainly, but not exclusively by the farmers, to the seemingly inevitable plan for the green transition as heralded by the ‘Fit-for-55’. It is a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 [2]. This ambitious initiative includes actions in fourteen areas, from the reform of the EU’s emissions trading system through reducing emissions from transport, buildings, agriculture, and waste to regulation on methane emissions reduction. Effectively, this means that EU farmers will have to accept an unprecedented and unequal burden. On top of that, there is a question of Ukrainian farming products that enter the European market in equally unprecedented quantities. This prompts many farmers to demonstrate their objections towards their governments and the European Commission by blocking capital cities and transportation arteries across the block. The protests are massive in their character, with thousands upon thousands across most EU member states. Political elites in Europe probably had not expected this and possibly have not experienced such a level of dissatisfaction and resistance towards their policies since the creation of the European Union. Farmers have been aided by other professional groups, from truckers to taxi drivers and even ordinary citizens. Notably, the protests are a bottom-up initiative, though they have also drawn the attention of right-wing parties.[3] Last but not least, there is the question of massive immigration to the EU from outside Europe and consequent challenges to social cohesion in countries such as Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium. As of the writing of this paper (2025), more and more members of the societies of Western EU countries challenge the official narrative of their governments based on the assumption that massive immigration is primarily positive for the economies and that large numbers of non-Europeans pose no threat to the quality of life and security of ordinary citizens (the phenomenon referred to earlier by the author of this paper as ‘a-securitisation’ – Sliwinski, 2016).[4] Worse still, the differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ members of the EU, namely Hungary under Victor Orban, pose a formidable challenge to the immigration policy of the entire EU and, consequently, the future of the EU's integrity. It is not unimaginable at this stage to fathom a day when Hungary, like Britain before, decides to leave the EU,[5] pressured by Brussels and Berlin to accept thousands of immigrants from the Middle East or Africa. Slovakia could follow suit. Core internal challenges – the weakness from within Many of these problems were accidentally quite openly expressed by J. D. Vance, US Vice President, during his speech at the latest Munich Security Conference (February 14th, 2025). Vance did not spare strong criticism directed at European elites and, in a typical ‘American fashion’, called a spade a spade. His criticism of the EU included six general points: retreat from democratic values, censorship and limitations on the freedom of speech, limitations of religious liberties, lack of election integrity, uncontrolled mass migration, and the general unwillingness of the political elites to engage with views other than those of the left and even tendency to suppress dissent.[6] - Centralisation (Federalisation) Today, the EU continues to centralise, particularly in response to challenges like the economic crisis COVID-19, taking on more fiscal policy, health, and security responsibilities. This trend is evident in recent proposals, such as the European Commission’s role in determining budgetary paths, but it faces resistance from member states concerned about losing sovereignty. Historically, the EU has been moving to a federation through recent treaty revisions: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). According to Alberto Mingardi from the GIS, there is a so-called ‘creeping power grab’ phenomenon.  “It assumes that Brussels should become more powerful while Rome, Berlin and Paris less so. [...] europhiles tend to look for opportunities that might allow them to give carte blanche to Brussels, albeit beginning with apparently limited endeavours. Hence, the EU is supposed to grow through crises, and thanks to crises, whatever the problem or issue, it could foster a slice of national sovereignty that can be cut and brought up to a higher level. Behind this, there is an overarching belief in the higher efficiency of centralisation, which is perhaps the true landmark of modern politics. Politicians trust themselves more than the taxpayers; they seek a single control room, and the more it controls, the better. This approach fits well with a protectionist outlook of economics, which sees Europe (‘fortress Europe’, as some say) as one trading bloc set to countervail others (the US, China).”[7] The centralisation (federalisation) logic rests heavily on the arguments presented by legalism. On the one hand, it derives from the strict and literal reading of regulations. On the other, it implies that no sphere of life should be left unregulated. Consequently, overregulation has become a characteristic feature of the European Union.[8] Additionally, the overregulation leads to the often cited democratic deficit,[9] exemplified by the fact that the majority of European legislation that EU member states are obliged to follow is proposed by nonelected technocrats working for the European Commission. - Demographic Decline and Social Welfare An ageing population and falling birth rates threaten the EU’s long-term economic stability and social welfare systems. With a shrinking workforce, funding pensions, healthcare, and social services is increasingly difficult, particularly in weaker economies. This demographic shift also amplifies labour shortages, prompting debates over immigration as a solution—yet one that risks further political backlash as it will inevitably affect European identity. According to available data, Europe is the only continent projected to experience population decline until 2070, with the EU's working-age population (20–64 years) expected to decrease by around 20%. Concurrently, the share of older individuals (65 years or older) will be the second highest globally among large economies. This demographic shift poses significant challenges, potentially undermining the EU's economic and social model, exacerbating existing disparities, and creating political divisions among Member States if not adequately addressed.[10] According to Eurostat, The natural population change (difference between live births and deaths) has been negative since 2012. This is primarily due to the ageing population described in this publication and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2022.[11] - Economic Competitiveness and Growth After the so-called Big Bang Enlargement, all available data suggests that the gap between the EU and the US with regards to GDP output has been steadily growing, that is to say, that the US economy, which recently has been experiencing huge problems, still has been developing faster than the EU.[12] Contemporary the EU is grappling with stagnating economic growth and a loss of competitiveness compared to global powers like the United States and China. High regulatory burdens, internal market fragmentation, and insufficient investment in innovation and technology hinder its ability to keep pace. The growing threat of US tariffs under a second Trump administration will only likely exacerbate these issues, disrupting supply chains and increasing costs. Additionally, the EU’s energy dependence—highlighted by the shift away from Russian gas after the Ukraine invasion—has driven up costs, further straining industries and economies, particularly in countries like Germany.[13] - Weakness as an international actor Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to pose a significant security challenge. The conflict has exposed the EU’s reliance on NATO and the US for defence while increasing pressure to bolster its own military capabilities—sometimes referred to as a ‘European Defence Union’. Tensions with China, particularly over trade and technology, and uncertainty about US commitment to transatlantic alliances add to the geopolitical strain. The EU must also address hybrid threats (e.g., cyberattacks, disinformation) targeting critical sectors like energy, transport, and digital infrastructure. In light of this, Americans are already calling for much more input from the European members of NATO regarding their defence budgets (5% of GDP).[14] This will most likely reinvigorate calls for creating a European Army,[15] which no doubt will be dominated by Germany and France. German domination will be met with considerable unease by some Central and Eastern European Countries (members of the EU). At the same time as the recent meeting, Ryiad shows the US is not even treating the EU as a partner worthy of a place at the negotiating table.[16]When pressed by the likes of Trump and charged with not sharing a fair part of their own security costs, European political leaders invoke the notion of Europe as a normative power. Supposedly, though weak militarily, the EU and its members are a beacon of values such as peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In his seminal publications, Iaan Manners, argued that the EU's unique historical context, hybrid political structure, and legal constitution enable it to promote norms that go beyond state-centric concerns, particularly in areas such as human rights and the abolition of the death penalty. Manners claims that the EU's ability to define what is considered 'normal' in world politics is a significant aspect of its power, and this normative approach is crucial for understanding the EU's role in shaping international relations.[17] As nice as it sounds, it does not seem to bear much weight in the practice of international security in recent decades. It is the EU, in fact, as an institution and the political leadership of France, Germany, and the European Commissioner, who stand accused now of contradicting all of the above-mentioned values. The latest visit by President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen to Kiev, and her strong support for the continuation of war against Russia is a case in point.[18]   - Ideologisation 'Europeanism' has become an ideology shared among intellectual, political, judicatory, societal,  and even dominant economic elites that influence or shape the European Union as an institution and its major policies. As an ideology, 'Europeanism' is a somewhat exotic mixture of various seemingly incoherent trends that give the current European Union its intriguing characteristics. On the one hand, economically, one can easily identify numerous elements of neoliberalism, especially regarding the financial aspects of European integration. Likewise, arguments used by the major proponents of European integration vis-à-vis the USA, China, or Japan are of neoliberal character. At the same time, regarding international trade in agricultural products, intellectual property, or internal (single market) competition (freedom of labour), one quickly spots distinct elements of protectionism and overregulation. Finally, regarding philosophical outlook and especially moral issues, 'Europeanism' seems to focus mainly on the progressive agenda and a particular ‘obsession’ with climate change revocation. Conclusion As the Munich Security Conference confirmed, EU political elites are way out of touch with reality and a rapidly changing world. Their proverbial Europocentrism is based on, among others, self-precepted moral high grounds, a history of economic and political domination and exploitation, and an undiscerning belief in bureaucratic, if not technocratic, policy-making and regulation of every sphere of life and institutionalism. Their weakness is probably most accurately depicted by the reaction of the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Christoph Heusgen, who broke down during his closing remarks, unable to finish his speech.[19] He was patted on the back and given a hug. (This reaction must have undoubtedly caused bewilderment, if not pity, in Washinton, Beijing, and Moscow.) The original integration goals have little to do with today’s Eureaucrats’ obsessions with saving the planet or pushing for Diversity, Equality, and Inclusivity (DEI). With the election of Donald Trump, the world of the ‘Davos Men’ seems to be stalled. Interestingly, the EU is now one of the last standing actors to represent the ideology of globalism, with its tenets based on neoliberalism - unlimited free trade and the capturing role of international transnational companies. The rest of the world, including the US, seems to be moving in the opposite direction – the world driven by state actors. The world order, therefore, is likely to be directed by strong and nationally based governments from no, possibly the US, China and Russia – a ‘Concert of Powers’ of sorts. References ________________________________________[1] The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles University In Prague On Monday, August 29 2022. Available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752[2] “Fit for 55”, European Council. Council of the European Union. European Green Deal. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/[3] Tanno, Sophie and Liakos, Chris. “Farmers’ protests have erupted across Europe. Here’s why.” CNN, World, Europe. Last modified February 10, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/03/europe/europe-farmers-protests-explainer-intl/index.html[4] Sliwinski, Krzysztof. “‘A-Securitization’ of Immigration Policy - the Case of European Union.” Asia–Pacific Journal of EU Studies 14, no. 1: 25 -56.[5] Körömi, Csongor. “Hungary reveals plan to send asylum-seekers to Brussels.” Politico August 22. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-asylum-plan-brussels-migration-refugees-gergely-gulyas/[6] Pangambam, S. “Full Transcript: VP JD Vance. Remarks at the Munich Security Conference”. The SIngju Post. https://singjupost.com/full-transcript-vp-jd-vance-remarks-at-the-munich-security-conference/?singlepage=1[7] Mingardi, Alberto, “The EU’s future: Like Switzerland or more like Italy?”GIS, May 20, 2022. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/eu-future/ see also: Dunleavy, P., and G. Kirchgässner. “Explaining the Centralization of the European Union: A Public Choice Analysis.” Edited by P. Moser, G. Schneider, and G. Kirchgässner. Decision Rules in the European Union, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62792-9_7.[8] Van Malleghem, Pieter-Augustijn. “Legalism and the European Union’s Rule of Law Crisis.” European Law Open 3, no. 1 (2024): 50–89. https://doi.org/10.1017/elo.2024.5.[9] Neuhold, C. Democratic Deficit in the European Union, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190228637.013.1141.[10] Zalai, Csaba. “Too Little Too Late?” Európai Tükör 27, no. 1 (December 13, 2024): 169–93. https://doi.org/10.32559/et.2024.1.9.[11] See more at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-publications/demography-2024#population-change[12] See more at: https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/wld/world/gdp-gross-domestic-product[13] See more at: https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/global-outlook-2025-the-impact-of-a-new-US-presidency?utm_campaign=MA00001133&utm_medium=paid-search&utm_source=eiu-google&utm_content=&gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQiA8fW9BhC8ARIsACwHqYqwk_M8I--YkZ_fiDS6leiOiRLjPXlG63SHjKwQZgP2kaovx_sc4qIaAkGYEALw_wcB[14] See more at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/trump-says-nato-members-should-spend-5-of-gdp-on-defence/ and https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-tells-allies-spend-5-percent-gdp-defense-nato/[15] See more at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgl27x74wpo[16] See more at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-russia-meeting-improving-relations-ukraine-war/[17] Manners, Ian. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–58. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.[18] See more at: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/24/ursula-von-der-leyen-arrives-in-kyiv-with-35-billion-in-fresh-aid-for-weapons[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BhNy0u5-ijY

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском War is a numbers game. Each side involved must marshal the supplies, troops and firepower needed to sustain the fight, thwart advancing armies and, hopefully, prevail. But it’s also a game of uncertainty. For the past three years, Ukraine’s military planners have had to approach every battle with a series of cold calculations: How much ammunition is left? How many air defense interceptors can be fired today, without running short tomorrow? Do we have the men and equipment needed to advance or hold position? But now, with U.S. military assistance on hold and European support constrained by economic realities, that uncertainty is growing. As an expert on warfare, I know this isn’t just a logistical problem; it’s a strategic one. When commanders can’t predict their future resource base, they are forced to take fewer risks, prioritize defense over offense and hedge against worst-case scenarios. In war, uncertainty doesn’t just limit options. It shapes the entire battlefield and fate of nations. Trump orders a pause On March 3, 2025, President Donald Trump announced a suspension to all U.S. military aid to Ukraine. It followed a fractious Oval Office meeting between the U.S. president and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, after which Trump declared the Ukrainian leader “not ready for peace.” Two days later, Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe announced Washington was also pausing all intelligence sharing and ordered key allies such as the United Kingdom to limit the information they give Kyiv. National security adviser Michael Waltz has linked the pause to ongoing U.S.-Ukrainian negotiations, stating that weapons supplies and intelligence sharing will resume once Ukraine agrees to a date for peace talks with Russia. A critical supplier of weapons Any pause, no matter how long, will hurt Ukraine. The U.S. has been the largest provider of military assistance to Kyiv since Russia’s 2022 invasion, followed by the European Union. While the level of support is debated – it is often skewed by how one calculates equipment donations using presidential drawdown authority, through which the president can dip into the Department of Defense’s inventory – the U.S. has undoubtedly delivered critical weapons systems and a wide range of ammunition. Though this assistance has decreased U.S. military stockpiles, it has helped Washington invest in its domestic defense industry and expand weapons production. In addition, while Europe is starting to increase its own defense expenditures, EU members are stuck with flat economic growth and limits on how much they can borrow to invest in their own militaries, much less Ukraine. This makes the U.S. a critical partner for Ukraine for at least another two years while Europe expands its military capacity. These conditions affect the design of Ukraine’s military campaigns. Planners in Kyiv have to balance predictions about the enemy’s strengths and possible courses of action with assessments of their own resources. This war ledger helps evaluate where to attack and where to defend. Uncertainty skews such calculation. The less certain a military command is about its resource base, the more precarious bold military maneuvers become. It is through this fog of uncertainty that any pause in assistance shapes the course of the war in Ukraine and the bargaining leverage of all parties at the negotiating table. A new uncertain world The White House has indicated that the pause in military aid and intelligence sharing will be lifted once a date for peace talks is set. But even if U.S. weapons and intel begin to flow again, Ukrainian generals will have to fight the duration of the war under the knowledge that its greatest backer is willing to turn off the taps when it suits them. And the consequences of this new uncertain world will be felt on the battlefield. Ukraine now faces a brutal trade-off: stretch limited resources to maintain an active defense across the front, or consolidate forces, cede ground and absorb the political costs of trading space for time. Material supply has shaped operational tempo over the course of the war. When Moscow expects Kyiv to be low on ammunition, it presses the attack. In fact, key Russian gains in eastern Ukraine in 2024 coincided with periods of critical supply shortages. Russia used its advantage in artillery shells, which at times saw Moscow firing 20 artillery shells to every Ukrainian artillery shell fired, and air superiority to make advances north and west of the strategic city of Avdiivka. Looking to the front lines in 2025, Russia could use any pause in supplies to support its ongoing offensive operations that stretch from Kherson in southern Ukraine to Kharkiv in the north and efforts to dislodge Ukrainian units in the Russian Kursk region. This means Ukraine will have to decide where to hold the line and where to conduct a series of delaying actions designed to wear down Russian forces. Trading space for time is an old military tactic, but it produces tremendous political costs when the terrain is your sovereign territory. As such, the military logic of delaying actions creates political risks in Ukraine – sapping civilian morale and undermining support for the government’s war management. A horrible choice This dilemma will drive where and how Ukraine weights its efforts on the battlefield. First, long-range strike operations against Russia will become increasingly less attractive. Every drone that hits an oil refinery in Russia is one less warhead stopping a Russian breakthrough in the Donbas or counterattack in Kursk. Ukraine will have to reduce the complexity of its defensive campaign and fall back along lines deeper within its own territory. Second, Russia doesn’t fight just on the battlefield – it uses a coercive air campaign to gain leverage at the negotiating table. With U.S. military aid on hold, Moscow has a prime opportunity to escalate its strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, forcing Kyiv into painful choices about whether to defend its front lines or its political center of gravity. From Vietnam to Ukraine, airpower has historically been a key bargaining tool in negotiations. President Richard Nixon bombed North Vietnam to force concessions. Russia may now do the same to Ukraine. Seen in this light, Russia could intensify its missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure – both to weaken defenses and to apply psychological and economic pressure. And because Kyiv relies on Western assistance, including intelligence and systems such as U.S.-built Patriot surface-to-air missiles to defend its skies, this coercive campaign could become effective. As a result, Ukraine could be faced with a horrible choice. It may have to concentrate dwindling air defenses around either key military assets required to defend the front or its political center of gravity in Kyiv. Interception rates of Russian drones and missiles could drop, leading to either opportunities for a Russian breakout along the front or increased civilian deaths that put domestic pressure on Ukrainian negotiators. Uncertainty reigns supreme The real problem for Ukraine going forward is that even if the U.S. resumes support and intelligence sharing, the damage is done. Uncertainty, once introduced, is hard to remove. It increases the likelihood that Ukraine’s leaders will stockpile munitions to reduce the risk of future pauses, rather than use them to take the fight to Russia. And with battlefield decision-making now limited, Ukraine’s military strategists will increasingly look toward the least worst option to hold the line until a lasting peace is negotiated.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском I. Introduction Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. As the invasion enters its third year, its most immediate and visible consequences have been loss of life and large numbers of refugees from Ukraine. However, given the interconnected structure of the international political, economic, and policy systems, the ramifications of the conflict can be felt well beyond Ukraine and Russia.Much of the recent literature and commentaries have focused on the military and strategic lessons learned from the ongoing Ukraine conflict (Biddle 2022; 2023; Dijkstra et al. 2023). However, the conflict has potentially much wider global consequences for various policy areas. Robert Jervis noted that the international system is not only interconnected but also often displays nonlinear relationships and that “outcomes cannot be understood without adding together the units or their relations.” (Jervis 1997, 6).  This article focuses on the economic effects of the Ukraine war, emphasizing the energy issue, because Russia has been a major player in the global energy market.  II. Literature on the effects of wars Wars have the potential to alter the parties and “transform the future” of belligerents (Ikle 1991), they also bring about fundamental changes to the international system (Gilpin 1981).  Scholars in Economics have provided considerable analysis of the macroeconomic effects of a conflict across spatial levels: locally, nationally, regionally and internationally. Studies have examined the effects of specific wars such as the Syrian civil war (Kešeljević and Spruk, 2023) or the Iraq war (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). They have also examined the effects of war in general. For instance, Reuven Glick and Alan Taylor (2010) examine bilateral trade relations from 1870 to 1997 and find “large and persistent impacts of wars on trade, and hence on national and global economic welfare.” Similarly, Vally Koubi (2005) investigates the effects of inter- and intrastate wars on a sample of countries and finds that the combined pre-war contemporaneous and postwar effects on economic growth are negative.  A “war ruin” school emphasizes that the destruction caused by wars is accompanied by higher inflation, unproductive resource spending on the military, and war debt (Chan 1985; Diehl and Goertz 1985; Russett 1970). By contrast, a “war renewal” school argued that there could be longer-term positive economic effects from war because war can lead to increased efficiency in the economy by reducing the power of rent-seeking special interests, triggering technological innovation, and advancing human capital (Olson 1982; Organski and Kugler 1980). Early analysis estimated that the Russian invasion of Ukraine had an economic cost of 1% of global GDP in 2022 (Liadze et al. 2023)Some political scientists focused on the domestic consequences of war. For example, Electoral political scientists have often examined the effects of war on public opinion. A key concern has been whether war produces a “rally around the flag effects” to bolster the support of incumbent leaders – or whether war weariness can contribute to declining support for governments, including those governments committed to conflicts abroad. John Mueller (1970) was the first scholar to develop the concept of the “rally-round-the-flag”, with later scholars identifying some of the factors that may shape or mitigate the effect (Dinesen and Jaeger 2013). Kseniya Kizilova and Pippa Norris (2023) considered any rally effects during the first few months of the Ukraine war. They claim that the reason that motivated Putin’s military invasion was an attempt to boost popular support among the Russian electorate. They show evidence of a surge in support for Putin following the invasion, which persisted longer than usual in democratic systems. However, Kizilova and Norris question whether this will likely be sustained as the economic costs of the war increase.   III. Brief Summary of the Ukraine War The roots of the Ukraine war go back to the early 1990s when Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union. While the Ukrainian economy was still firmly tied to the Russian economy, the country shifted its political focus towards the EU and NATO. This shift culminated in the Orange Revolution 2004 and the “Euromaidan” demonstrations in 2013. Portraying the “Euromaidan” protests as a Western-backed coup, Russia invaded Crimea and declared the annexation of Crimea into Russia in March 2014. Conflict soon erupted in the Eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, where Russia supported pro-Russian separatist forces (Walker 2023a). Despite attempts to negotiate a ceasefire through the Minsk Agreement I and II, the conflict in the Eastern part of Ukraine had continued (Walker 2023a), resulting in over 14,000 deaths between 2014 and 2021. Against this backdrop, on 21 February, 2022, Russia recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. Three days later, confounding most Western observer’s expectations, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, calling it a “special military operation”. During the initial weeks, Russia made substantial advances (CIA Fact-book 2024) but failed to take Kyiv in the face of strong Ukrainian resistance supported by Western allies. In October 2022, Russia declared the annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia (even though they were not entirely under Russian control) (Walker 2023b). As of February 2025, the meeting between the US and Russia to end the war is underway. IV. The Effects of the Ukraine war The impacts of war are far-reaching and devastating. War causes immense destruction of property and loss of life. It also creates psychological trauma for those who have experienced it firsthand. War can also have long-term economic impacts, such as increased unemployment and poverty. War can also lead to the displacement of people, as we have seen the millions of refugees who have been forced to flee their homes due to conflicts. War can also have political effects, such as creating new states or weakening existing nations. It can also lead to the rise of authoritarian regimes in many post-war nations. War can also increase militarization as nations seek to protect themselves from future conflicts.  Regarding the effects of the Ukraine war, Bin Zhang and Sheripzhan Nadyrov (2024) claimed that in addition to inexpressible human suffering and the destruction of infrastructure, the economic and financial damage inflicted on European countries would be profound, especially in the context of rising inflation. The positive changes due to the conflict may occur in four areas: acceleration of the Green Deal, increased European attention to defense, improved prospects for individual countries to join the European Union (EU), and the unfolding of broader Eurasian economic integration.  The Ukraine war might have broader economic consequences. The supply chains may be affected because of the destruction of infrastructures and resources. War mobilization may affect the workforce and economic production. Actors in the economy may also act strategically to deploy resources elsewhere, to support the war effort or because the war has affected incentive structures or decide to cease production altogether because of expected losses. These effects can be local to geographical areas engulfed in conflict but also cause ripple effects to a broader regional area and the global economy. Trade, production, consumption, inflation, growth and employment patterns may all be influenced.  Figure 1: Global implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the European and World Economies. Source: Peterson K. Ozili. (2022)  Ozili (2022) claimed that the scale of the Ukraine war had a negative impact on the economies of almost all countries around the world. As Figure 1 shows, the main effects of the Ukraine war on the global economy are: Rising Oil and Gas Prices – European countries import about a quarter of their oil and 40% of their natural gas from the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is the second largest oil producer in the world and the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe. After the invasion, European oil companies will have problems getting these resources from the Russian Federation. Even before the Russian invasion, oil prices rose because of growing tensions between countries, the COVID-19 pandemic, and other factors, but remained in the $80–95 per barrel range. After the invasion, this price reached $100 and could reach $140. Natural gas prices have risen 20% since the war began. Rising gas prices can drive high inflation and increase public utility bills.  Decline in production and economic growth, rising global inflation, and the cost of living are more related to the consequences of the above-mentioned factors, especially rising oil and gas prices, which lead to high inflation and, therefore, a decline in supply and demand.  Impact on the global banking system: This factor’s negative effect will be felt more strongly by Russian banks and is associated with international financial sanctions. Foreign banks that will suffer significant damage from sanctions are those that have conducted large operations in the Russian Federation.  The Russian Federation’s export ban and its own counter-ban on imports of foreign products disrupted the global supply chain, resulting in shortages and higher prices for imported commodities. As Ozili (2022) claimed, higher inflation is a perceived negative consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 2 shows, inflation in the EU jumped in the first month of the invasion, and the increasing trend continues. EU inflation in 2022 peaked in October and amounted to 11.5%, a historical record. However, inflation has slowly declined as energy prices have gone down.  This higher inflation in Europe resulted from an increase in energy prices. As Figures 3, 4, and 5 show, energy prices in Europe skyrocketed in 2022. As Figure 3 shows, energy prices have been the most important component of inflation in the EU. Figure 2: Average inflation rate in the EU (%). Source: EurostatCreated with Datawrapper   Figure 3: Main components of inflation rate in the Euro areas.  Figure 4: Natural gas prices in Europe, January 2021- end 2024  Figure 5: Crude oil price, January 2020-January 2025 Source: Eurostat Created with Datawrapper As Figure 6 shows, the inflation rate in major EU countries such as Germany and France followed the pattern of EU countries in which inflation skyrocketed in 2022 and then slowly declined over time. Figure 6: Inflation rate in major EU countries. Source: Eurostat Created with Datawrapper  As Ozili claimed, a lower growth rate was also a perceived negative consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 7 shows, GDP in the EU was down to 3.5 % in 2022 compared to 6.3% in 2021, and it was further down to 0.8 % in 2023 because economic stagnation and high inflation caused by the Ukraine war impacted European economies. The European Commission forecasts that the European economy will grow by 0.9 % in 2024 and 1.5% in 2025.  Figure 7: Average annual GDP growth rate in EU, 1996-2025. Following the pattern of entire EU countries, growth rates in four big European countries declined in 2022 & 2023 after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and are expected to grow moderately in 2024. The growth rates in four big European countries are in Table 1 and Figures 8-11.    Figure 8: Growth rate in Germany  Figure 9: Growth rate in France  Figure 10: Growth rate in the UK   Figure 11: Growth rate in Italy    Regarding the effect of the Ukraine war on the global banking system, the effect was minimal because most international financial sanctions targeted Russian banks. The sanctions, including the ban of selected Russian banks from SWIFT, only affected foreign banks with significant operations in Russia. Many foreign banks experienced losses after several Western countries imposed financial sanctions on Russian banks, the Russian Central Bank, and wealthy Russian individuals. The most affected banks were Austria’s Raiffeisenbank, Italy’s Unicredit, and France’s Société Générale. Other foreign banks recorded huge losses when they discontinued their operations in Russia. The losses were significant for small foreign banks and insignificant for large foreign banks.  After almost 20 months into the full-scale war, Ukraine’s banking sector continued demonstrating remarkable resilience and functioning as the backbone of the real economy. No bank runs have occurred, and access to cash was maintained. In addition to crucial reforms since 2014, comprehensive measures by the National Bank of Ukraine and a strong level of digitalization are key reasons for the observed stability. However, a significant liquidity buffer is not only a sign of resilience. It also reveals a lack of lending. The bank loan portfolio declined by around 30% compared to pre-war levels in real terms.  Regarding the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on European stock markets, Figures 12 and 13 show the movement of the FTSE 100 and Euro Area Stock Market Index (EU50). As seen from Figures 12 & 13, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, both indices showed a noticeable decline in 2022, particularly early 2022. However, both indexes showed a noticeable rise after late 2022. Although there were ups and downs in both indices in 2023 and 2024, they show upward movement from 2023 to 2025.  Figure 12: The FTSE 100 index in Europe  Figure 13: Euro Area Stock Market Index (EU50)   Regarding the global supply chain, military operations during the Russian invasion of Ukraine disrupted multiple sectors. In particular, Russia’s ban on exports and retaliatory ban on imports, including its refusal to allow foreign cargoes to pass through its waterways and airspace during the early phase of the invasion, disrupted the global supply chain.  Regarding global supply chain disruption, this article focuses on Russian oil and gas because they are the most important Russian products that affect not only Europe but also the world.  Figures 14 and 15 show a world map of the countries that exported oil and gas to Europe: the color of the country corresponds to the percentage share of the country’s exports (indicated below the Figure). In 2021, around a third of Europe’s energy came from gas (34%) and oil (31%), according to Al Jazeera’s data analysis from BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy. Europe was the largest importer of natural gas in the world. Russia provided roughly 40% and 25% of the EU’s imported gas and oil before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 16 shows, major gas importers from Russia in 2021 were European countries. Figure 14: EU oil import sources in 2021. Figure 15: EU natural gas import sources in 2021. Source: Eurostat  Figure 16: Major EU importers from Russian Gas in 2021.  However, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, more than 9,119 new economic sanctions have been imposed on Russia, making it the most sanctioned country in the world. At least 46 countries or territories, including all 27 EU nations, have imposed sanctions on Russia or pledged to adopt a combination of US and EU sanctions. The sanctions have strongly affected, resulting in a 58% decline in exports to Russia and an 86% drop in imports from Russia between the first quarter of 2022 and the third quarter of 2024 (see Figure 17). Figure 17: EU trade with Russia  Russia has blamed these sanctions for impeding routine maintenance on its Nord Stream I gas pipeline which is the single biggest gas pipeline between Russia and Western Europe. In response, Russia cut its gas exports to the EU by around 80% since the Russian invasion, resulting in higher gas price in Europe, as Figure 18 shows. As a result, many European countries had to rethink their energy mix rapidly. The ripple effects of higher natural gas prices were felt in Europe and around the world. One of the most immediate consequences of Russia’s cut in gas delivery and sanctions on Russia, as well as sanctions on Russian was a sharp increase in European demand for LNG imports: in the first eight months of 2022, net LNG imports in Europe rose by two-thirds (by 45 billion cubic meters compared with the same period a year earlier).  Russia’s pipeline gas share in EU imports dropped from over 40% in 2021 to about 8% in 2023. Russia accounted for less than 15% of total EU gas imports for pipeline gas and LNG combined. The drop was possible mainly thanks to a sharp increase in LNG imports and an overall reduction in gas consumption in the EU. Figure 18: Natural gas price in Europe, January 2021- December 2024  Figure 19 shows how gas supply to the EU changed between 2021 and 2023. Import from Russia declined from over 150 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2021 to less than 43 bcm. This was mainly compensated by a growing share of other partners. Import from US grew from 18.9 bcm in 2021 to 56.2 bcm in 2023. Import from Norway grew from 79.5 bcm in 2021 to 87.7 in 2023. Import from other partners increased from 41.6 bcm in 2021 to 62 bcm in 2023. Source: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-gas-supply/#0) Figure 19: Major EU import sources of Gas.  However, as Figure 20, shows the EU’s import from Russian gas increased in volume in 2024.  Figure 20: EU trade of natural gas with Russia     EU imports of Russian petroleum oil also dropped. Russia was the largest provider of petroleum oil to the EU in 2021. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a major diversion in the trade of petroleum oil took place. In the third quarter of 2024, the volume of petroleum oil in the EU imported from Russia was 7% of what it had been in the first quarter of 2021 (see Figure 21) while its value had dropped to 10% in the same period.  The EU’s share of petroleum oil imports from Russia dropped from 18% in the third quarter of 2022 to 2% in the third quarter of 2024 (see Figure 22). The shares of the United States (+5 pp), Kazakhstan (+4 pp), Norway (+3 pp), and Saudi Arabia (+2 pp) increased in this period. The U.S. and Norway became the EU’s no.1 and no.2 petroleum oil providers, respectively. Figure 21: EU trade of petroleum oil with Russia    Figure 22: EU’s leading petroleum oil providers  The EU’s de-Russification policy has successfully reduced the EU’s dependence on Russian energy. However, the EU’s de-Russification policy allowed Russian fossil fuels to flow into other regions. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), a think-tank in Finland, compiles estimates of the monetary value of Russian fossil fuels procured by each country and region (Figure 23). Figures 23 & 24 show the countries that imported Russian coal, oil and gas since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China has been no. 1 country that imported Russian fossil fuels most, followed by India, Turkey, and the EU. Asian countries such as Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan are among the major importers of Russian fossil fuels.  Figure 23: Value of Russian fossil fuels purchase (January 1, 2023 to January 24, 2024)  Figure 24: Largest importers of Russian fossil fuels (January 1, 2023 to February 16, 2025)  Moreover, according to Statista, value of fossil fuel exports from Russia from February 24, 2022 to January 27, 2025, by country and type is as follows as Figure 25 shows. China have been no. 1 country that imported Russian fossil fuels most, followed by India, Turkey, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and South Korea. Figure 25: value of fossil fuel exports from Russia from February 24, 2022 to January 27, 2025, by country and type.  However, Figures 23, 24, and 25 show some differences among major importers of Russian fossil fuels. China, India, and Turkey imported more Russian oil than gas or coal, while EU imported more Russian gas than oil or coal. Interestingly, South Korea imported more Russian coal than oil or gas. If we focus on Russian oil, we know that China and India’s imports of Russian oils significantly increased, as shown in Figures 26, 27, and 28. Since the EU imposed its embargo on Russian crude oil shipments, China purchased the most from Russia, at EUR 82.3 billion, followed by India and Türkiye, at EUR 47.0 billion and EUR 34.1 billion, respectively. The EU came in fourth, with oil and gas imports continuing mainly through pipelines to Eastern Europe. Notably, the oil-producing countries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) purchased oil (crude oil and petroleum products) from Russia.  Figure 26: Russian Oil Exports, by country and region, 2021-2024. (Navy blue: EU, Blue: US & UK, Light green: Turkey, Green: China, Yellow: India, Orange: Middle Eastern nations) Since the advent of the Ukraine crisis, China and India have been increasing the amount of crude oil they imported from Russia. According to statistics compiled by China’s General Administration of Customs, as Figure 27 shows, monthly imports increased from 6.38 million tons in March 2022 to 10.54 million tons in August 2023. Annual imports in 2023 exceeded 100 million tons for the first time.  Figure 27: China’s monthly crude oil imports from Russia (2021 to 2023)   As Figure 28 shows, India, which historically imported little crude oil from Russia, rapidly increased its imports partly due to the close geographical distance since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to statistics compiled by India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry, its imports of Russian crude oil increased from March 2022 onward, with the total amount imported during 2022 exceeding 33 million tons. Crude oil imports from Russia grew into 2023, with monthly imports in May 2023 reaching a record-high level of 8.92 million tons. Annual crude oil imports from Russia in 2023 were expected to be at least 80 million tons. Figure 28: India’s monthly crude oil imports from Russia (January 2021 to November 2023)  In conclusion, after EU ban on Russia until January, 2025, the biggest buyers of Russia’s fossil fuels are as follows as Figure 29 shows: China has been no. 1 country that imported Russian coal, and crude oil the most, while the EU has been the largest importer of Russian Gas, both pipeline and LNG. Figure 29: Which country bought Russia’s fossil fuels after EU ban until January 2025 Still, although the EU has significantly reduced gas imports from Russia since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU still is no. 1 importer of Russian gas. However, China replaced EU as the biggest buyer of Russian crude oil. China is also the biggest buyer of Russian coal. Data from January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2025 show how Russian fossil fuels have flowed by geography as Figure 30 shows. The flows of Russian energy to EU have significantly declined, while the supply of Russian energy to China, India, and Turkey has significantly increased.  Figure 30: The flows of Russian energy to regions    Despite the EU’s restrictions on Russian-sourced energy, Russia has maintained a substantial revenue level by selling it to other countries. As Figure 31 shows, Russian energy revenues have somewhat declined between January 2022 and January 2025. Russian energy export revenue was a little less than 750 million Euro in January 2025 compared to 1000 million Euro in January 2022 just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, considering that Russia’s total oil and gas revenues were 72.6 billion dollars in 2020, 122.9 billion in 2021, 169.5 billion in 2022, and 102.8 billion in 2023 and that 2022 was the best year for energy revenues in recent years, Russian energy revenues after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was not insufficient. This in turn has blunted the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the West.   Figure 31: Russian energy export revenue between 2022 and 2025.  V. Conclusion  This article examined the economic effects of the Ukraine war based on the argument of Ozili (2022). This article investigated four economic aspects (Inflation, economic growth, global banking, and global supply chain) on which the Ukraine war has had impacts. This article focused on Europe and the global supply chain because Russia and Ukraine were parts of Europe and because Russian energy has had a significant impact on Europea and all around the world.  This article showed that the Ukraine war significantly affected European inflation, economic growth, stock markets, and energy markets while the war had minimal impact on global banking. However, this article showed that the economic effects of the Ukraine war on inflation, economic growth, stock markets, and energy markets in Europe were short-term. The oil and gas prices in Europe skyrocketed in 2022 and then declined slowly and continuously. In addition, growth in Europe declined in 2022 & 2023 after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and energy prices jumped up. However, European countries grew moderately in 2024 and are expected to increase in 2025. The same thing happened to European stock markets. The FTSE 100 and Euro Area Stock Market Index (EU50) showed a noticeable decline in 2022, in particularly early 2022. However, both indices showed a noticeable rise after late 2022.  On the other hand, after Russia invaded Ukraine, European countries significantly reduced imports of Russian fossil fuels. The EU’s de-Russification policy allowed Russian fossil fuels to flow into other regions. After EU’s imposition of sanctions on Russian energy, Russian fossil fuels mainly went to Asian and Middle East markets, mainly to China, India, and Turkey. 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