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Diplomacy
Ursula von der Leyen & Emmanuel Macron - Choose Europe for Science event at La Sorbonne - 2025

Opinion – European Credibility and the Illusion of Normative Power

by Joseph Black

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On 30 May 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore – Asia’s premier security summit – and his comments were unusually blunt. He warned that the West – Europe and the US – risk losing credibility over the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and unless these conflicts are resolved with integrity and consistency, the broader rules-based international order and Europe’s place in it will unravel. Macron’s concern wasn’t just about the tactical consequences of geopolitical instability, but something deeper: the symbolic and normative weight Europe claims to carry in global affairs. His comments mark a turning point, one that exposes the crisis of coherence at the heart of the European Union’s foreign policy – and the growing tension between the EU’s aspirational identity as a “normative power” and the harsh realities of a world governed by realpolitik. For over two decades, the EU has presented itself as a values-based actor, using diplomacy, development aid, legal harmonisation and multilateralism rather than coercion to wield influence. The concept of the EU as a “normative power” – famously coined by Ian Manners – is based on the idea that Europe seeks to shape global affairs by promoting norms such as human rights, democracy and international law. But the simultaneous occurrence of two deeply symbolic and contested wars – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s bombardment of Gaza – makes it increasingly hard for the EU to maintain this self-image without being accused of hypocrisy and selective morality. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the gap between Europe’s response to Ukraine and Gaza. In Ukraine, the EU has mounted one of the largest and most united responses in its history: military aid, sanctions, diplomatic isolation of Russia and open arms for Ukrainian refugees. In Gaza, the response has been fragmented, inconsistent and – by many accounts – morally ambiguous. Some European states like Ireland and Spain have called for recognition of Palestinian statehood and condemned Israeli actions, others have hesitated or doubled down on support for Israel in the name of counterterrorism and alliance politics. This has not gone unnoticed in the Global South, where Europe’s normative claims are increasingly seen as hollow, if not ridiculous. Macron’s talk of credibility reflects an elite awareness that Europe’s legitimacy is no longer taken for granted outside its borders. The credibility crisis he describes is not just about diplomacy – it’s about identity. If the EU says territorial integrity is sacred in Ukraine, how can it do nothing when the same principles are being flouted elsewhere? If the Union says human rights are universal, can it be silent – or ambiguous – on the civilian casualties in Gaza? These are not questions asked by foreign policy analysts; they are asked in international forums, in Asian capitals courted by Brussels and in the protests that fill European streets. The more the EU fails to match its words with its actions, the more its normative brand erodes. But there’s another layer to Macron’s intervention that needs to be looked at. His comments on “strategic autonomy” and not being caught in the crossfire of the US-China rivalry suggest Europe is dealing with more than just a credibility crisis. It’s facing a strategic choice that will redefine its global role: whether to double down on the postwar transatlantic compact or to chart a more independent course that allows it to mediate between blocs in a multipolar world. Macron’s consistent advocacy of strategic autonomy (however controversial) means he recognises the EU can’t outsource its geopolitical relevance to Washington indefinitely, especially with the return of Donald Trump to the White House. This dilemma is made worse by the structural weaknesses within the EU itself. The Union’s foreign policy is crippled by institutional fragmentation, national interests and a consensus-based decision-making process that often leads to lowest-common-denominator positions. While the EU was impressive in its initial unity on Ukraine, the Gaza crisis has shown the limits of that unity when values collide with political alliances or domestic political considerations. This is not just a crisis of perception but of capacity. Can the EU actually be a geopolitical player when its member states can’t even agree on what is legitimate force, occupation or humanitarian necessity? The illusion of normative power, then, is not just an external branding problem – it is an internal governance challenge. For Europe to maintain credibility abroad, it must first reconcile its internal contradictions. That means rethinking the balance between values and interests, between ideals and strategic imperatives. It may also require a degree of institutional boldness: deeper integration in foreign and security policy, a greater role for the High Representative, or a shift toward qualified majority voting in foreign affairs. At the same time, Europe must also acknowledge the changing global landscape in which it seeks to operate. In a world no longer dominated by Western hegemony, the EU’s normative influence depends not only on its coherence but on its ability to listen and engage with actors in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as equals rather than as recipients of European lectures. Macron’s call for a “positive new alliance” between Europe and Asia, one that resists domination by any superpower, hints at a potential path forward. But such an alliance will only be credible if Europe demonstrates that it is willing to apply its principles even when inconvenient—especially when those principles are tested not just by adversaries but by allies. In the end, Macron’s speech serves as a mirror held up to the European project itself. It reflects both its aspirations and its anxieties, its potential and its paradoxes. Whether Europe can move beyond this moment of crisis to forge a foreign policy that is both principled and strategic remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that credibility cannot be commanded—it must be earned. And in an era of increasing global scrutiny, that will require more than rhetoric. It will require resolve. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

Defense & Security
The flags of the Russia, United States, China and are drawn on a piece of ice in the form of an Arctic iceberg against a blue sky. Conflict of interests in the Arctic, Cold War, Arctic shelf

Divided Arctic in a Divided World Order

by Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Arctic order historically, currently, and in the future reflects the world order. The idea of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ is not valid and is a poor guide for policy. During Cold War bipolarity, the Arctic was divided between the Soviet Arctic and the Nordic and North American Arctic. US victory and Soviet defeat in the Cold War led to US unipolarity and hegemony which was the basis for a circumpolar (including Russia) liberal (as opposed to realist) Arctic order with organizations, such as the Arctic Council, International Arctic Science Committee, University of the Arctic, Barents and Bering regional cooperation, all on liberal topics such as science, environment, Indigenous rights, people-to-people cooperation.Footnote1 US unipolarity and hegemony are slipping away to world order characteristics of continued US unipolarity and hegemony, Sino-American bipolarity in economics and S&T and multipolarity illustrated by BRICS+. Sino-US competition and US-Russia conflict to the extent of proxy-war in Ukraine reflect these changes. The Arctic, which is de facto divided between the US-led NATO-Arctic and the Russian Arctic, where Russia reaches out to the BRICS+ in diplomacy, economics, and S&T, reflects these changes to world order. There is wishful thinking in the West of returning to post-Cold War US unipolar and hegemonic ‘liberal world order’ or ‘rules-based order’ and the circumpolar liberal Arctic order with it. This wish is probably unrealistic for global trends in demography, economics, S&T, legitimacy, etc. Significant conflict can be expected between the US/West and China and Russia on developments in world order, with the Global South standing by. The Arctic is likely to remain divided between the US-led NATO Arctic and the Russian Arctic seeking engagement with the BRICS+ world for the future with extremely limited cooperation and risk of spill-over from the Ukraine War and other US-Russia-China conflicts. The Arctic in international order There are two common, but invalid, narratives about the Arctic, which are poor guides for policy: First, ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, that the Arctic was apart from international politics and allowed for West-Russia cooperation unlike elsewhere, especially between the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Second, a presentist discourse, where international interests in the Arctic are seen as rising in the last 15 years, driven by climate change, the Russian flag planting on the seafloor of the North Pole in 2007, and the United States Geological Survey’s assessment of oil and gas resources in 2008, north of the Arctic Circle. Rather, the Arctic has for centuries closely mirrored the international system, whether multipolar with Western colonial empires before the World Wars, bipolar Cold War between the US and the USSR, post-Cold War US unipolarity and hegemony, or the current emerging Sino-American bipolarity and multipolarity. During 2014–2022, cooperation in the Arctic was not exceptional compared to US-Russia non-proliferation cooperation, most notably with the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, or removing chemical weapons from Syria. There was extensive US-Europe-Russia and wider collaboration around the International Space Station. There was extensive energy trade and investment between Russia and Europe, most notably with the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines under the Baltic Sea. The bipolar Cold War Arctic in the bipolar Cold War order Bipolarity with two superpowers standing out from all other great powers due to their demographic, economic, science and technology, military, and ideological weight and global claims, the US and the USSR, shaped the the Cold War order. Bipolar logic shaped the international order. John Mearsheimer explains well the structural logic of a nuclear-armed bipolar superpower security competition, and he points out how each superpower formed ‘bounded orders’ of allies and clients to discipline them and mobilize their resources. These bounded orders were the West for the US with its institutions, and the East Bloc for the USSR.Footnote2 This bipolar logic was also clear in the Arctic, divided between the Nordic and North American Arctic of the West and the Soviet Arctic by the Iron Curtain in Europe and the Ice Curtain in the Bering Strait. Circumpolar Arctic cooperation was limited to the Polar Bear Treaty of 1973 between the USSR, Norway, Kingdom of Denmark, Canada, and the US, Norwegian Soviet joint fisheries management in the Barents Sea, and some Bering Strait cooperation. The Arctic was exceptionally militarized during the Cold War driven by the mutual nuclear deterrence between the US and the USSR, where the Arctic played a central role for geostrategic and technological reasons. The Arctic was the shortest flight path for bombers and missiles, and sea ice offered cover for nuclear ballistic submarines. This exceptional militarization of the Arctic harmed the human security of Arctic local and indigenous communities through forced displacement, security service surveillance, and pollution, including notable nuclear accidents, as the 1968 B52 bomber crash off Northwest Greenland with four H-bombs causing extensive radioactive contamination of much Soviet nuclear material in and around the Kola Peninsula, including sunken submarines with nuclear fuel or weapons on board.Footnote3 Circumpolar liberal Arctic order under US unipolarity The Cold War ended with US victory and Soviet defeat and dissolution, also caused by the US pressuring the USSR into a strategic nuclear arms race, that the Soviet economy could not support. US Navy operations near the Soviet Northern Fleet nuclear bastion around the Kola Peninsula were an important part of this pressure.Footnote4 The Arctic was also part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to save the USSR by reform and lowering external tension. Gorbachev called the Arctic as a zone of peace, environmental protection and scientific collaboration in his 1987 Murmansk speech, in contrast to being at the heart of a strategic nuclear arms race with the US, which the USSR could not sustain. Gorbachev’s reforms failed to avert the dissolution of the USSR and deep socio-economic, public health, and law and order crisis in Russian society during the 1990s. The Russian State withdrew to a significant extent from its Arctic, leaving military facilities and society behind. Sino-American bipolarity comes to the Arctic The relative distribution of comprehensive material and immaterial power of the strongest States shapes international order. States stay the predominant actors since the emergence of a state system, not denying powerful non-State actors historically and today. The US unipolarity after the Cold War was an exceptional time of international history and not the ‘End of History’ as believed by some quarters in the West (Fukuyama). History is returning to normal with the return of major centres of economic output and science and technology outside the West. Ironically, US unipolarity laid the foundation for the ‘Return of history’, rather than the ‘End of History’. Since the 1990s, the world experienced globalization with economic, science and technology, and cultural integration. The US as the sole superpower provided public goods and facilitated and coordinated many of these economic, scientific, and technological, and cultural flows. Globalization undermined US unipolarity, facilitating the faster relative growth of non-Western States. China’s export-oriented growth, returning it to its historical position as one of the world’s largest economies is the most important dimension for changes to world order. In parallel, other emerging markets have grown adding multipolar dimensions to international order. International Relations theory serves to think about how to respond to the return of China. About 20–25 years ago, Professor Joseph S. Nye (Harvard University) and Professor John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) articulated two major approaches with coherent theoretical and strategic visions for the Sino-American relationship. Nye, as a liberal institutionalist scholar and policymaker in the Bill Clinton Administration, presented a vision of ‘integrate, but hedge’. China integrated in the US-led world economy as member state of the World Trade Organization, while the US hedged against the rise of China by reinforcing its alliance with Japan.Footnote5 There were strong US and Western liberal expectations of Chinese economic growth and openness leading to political openness and reform. These expectations proved to be belied and ethnocentric. Mearsheimer, in line with his offensive realist theory, clearly outlined how the US had to keep China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia through a containment strategy.Footnote6 The US’ China strategy has shifted from the Nye perspective to the Mearsheimer perspective, while Mearsheimer himself is ostracized for his valid, but politically unacceptable, analysis of the Ukraine War. Mearsheimer explains how Sino-American bipolarity works with realist great power State security competition, and how competing great powers form their ‘bounded orders’ of allies and clients to discipline and mobilize these.Footnote7 The US is shaping a NATO+ order of the NATO member states and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. The US is increasingly engaging in trade and technology wars with China to slow down its growth rate, clearly denying its access to fundamental technologies of future knowledge-based economies. A realist focus on relative gains explains US policy to reduce China’s growth rate. China has a population more than three times that of the US with an absolute economy approaching the US economy. The US cannot allow China to catch up relatively with it, as that would imply a much larger Chinese economy than that of the US. Liberals (politically and theoretically) would ascribe the US policy to different domestic political systems, but the logic of anarchy points out how domestic political systems are of secondary concern, and empirically the US firmly bypassed and disciplined the previous Anglo-Saxon superpower, Britain. US-India relations can be expected to deteriorate with India’s socio-economic development, where India has a much younger population than China with great economic growth potential. China predicted the US abandoning its own open and globalized international economic policy out of concern for China’s relative rise to the US. China pursued a domestic and international economic policy much less dependent on US benevolence. In the domestic sphere, China pursued an economy based on domestic demand. Externally, China built up a parallel international economic and science and technology system with the Belt and Road Initiative with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Other bodies, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in security reflect parallel orders and institutions to the US-led Western institutions. Sino-American bipolarity also became clear in the Arctic about 10–15 years ago. China started to appear as a diplomatic, economic, science and technology actor in the Arctic. Western surprise and consternation to this development reflects the great difficulties many Westerners have in facing a world, where the Rest takes an interest in the West, and not only the West taking an interest in the Rest as during centuries of imperialism and colonialism. It should not be surprising that China as one of the world’s two largest national economies and science and technology systems (with the US) has interests in the Arctic, or anywhere else in the world. The US is globally present in politics, defence, diplomacy, economics, science and technology, culture, etc. The unfortunate Chinese term of ‘near-Arctic State’ to legitimize Chinese involvement in the Arctic drew much Western ridicule and opposition. In comparison, the US and the West seem to be ‘near-everywhere’ States. One place where the Sino-American bipolar logic appeared soon and clearly has been the Kingdom of Denmark with the North Atlantic and Arctic overseas autonomies of the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The US applies pressure on the Kingdom of Denmark to exclude Chinese investment, science and technology, in line with Mearsheimer’s argument of a superpower building bounded orders to mobilize and discipline allies and clients in security competition with a competing great or superpower. The Faroe Islands are located between Iceland, Norway, and Scotland. They are centrally placed in the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap controlling North-South access and blocking the Soviet-Russian Northern Fleet going south for NATO or the US and NATO navies going north for USSR/Russia. The Faroe Islands are becoming increasingly independent from Denmark. Huawei has long been a partner for the Faroese telecom company, which planned to continue with Huawei for 5G. This partnership came under increasing scrutiny from Danish and US sides. The Chinese ambassador to Copenhagen during a visit to the Faroe Islands linked the Faroe Islands choosing Huawei with prospects for a Sino-Faroese free trade agreement (the Faroe Islands are outside the EU and pursue an independent trade policy).Footnote8 The US ambassador to Copenhagen publicly spoke strongly against the Faroe Islands collaborating with Huawei for 5 G.Footnote9 Greenland is geographically North American (remember the Monroe Doctrine), crucial to US (North American) homeland defence, and pursuing independence from the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland and China have for some time eyed each other for investment and science and technology opportunities. Greenlandic independence primarily rests on economic independence from Denmark and human capital. The economic independence should be through, among other domains, mining, where China and Chinese companies were considered as very important likely investors. Copenhagen regarded Sino-Greenlandic mutual interest with great suspicion for a long time, which was evident from the report on Greenlandic mining from 2014.Footnote10 In 2014, the Royal Danish Navy abandoned Grønnedal, a small, remote old naval facility, established by the US during the Second World War, which was put up for sale. A Chinese mining company showed interest in the facility as a logistics hub for future operations in Greenland. The Danish government promptly took the facility off the market maintaining a token naval presence.Footnote11 Developing Greenlandic tourism requires upgrading the airport infrastructure, which is an enormous project for a nation of 57,000 on a 2 M km2 island. One of the finalists to an international tender was the China Construction Communication Company (4C), which might also have provided financing.Footnote12 The Danish government convinced the Greenlandic government to accept a Danish financing (with a Danish stake) of the renovated and new airports against choosing a Danish construction company.Footnote13 The Greenlandic government was reshaped over this intervention with a coalition party leaving in protest over accepting such Danish interference in Greenlandic affairs. In 2017, China publicly presented its interest in a research station in Greenland, including a satellite ground station, which the Government of Greenland might have been positive towards.Footnote14 This idea has never materialized, first probably delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, but Denmark and the US would never accept a Chinese research station and/or satellite station in Greenland. The US government has made its pressure on the Danish government public, through former Secretary of Defense, General Jim Mattis.Footnote15 China and Iceland spearheaded Sino-Nordic Arctic research cooperation from the official visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao to Iceland in 2012. In 2013, the China Nordic Arctic Research Center was founded, a virtual centre of Chinese and Nordic institutions hosted by the Polar Research Institute of China in Shanghai. CNARC has hosted an annual symposium between China and a Nordic country as well as researcher exchange. Today, Sweden has withdrawn from CNARC, and Denmark does not participate, as the participating Nordic Institute of Asian Studies at the University of Copenhagen has been closed. PRIC and RANNÍS (The Icelandic Center for Research, equivalent to Research Council) held the groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of the China-Iceland Aurora Observatory, now China Iceland Arctic Observatory, at Kárhóll, Northeast Iceland, in June 2014, which I attended. The Observatory opened formally—although unfinished—in October 2018. This collaboration had been hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic and negligence from central authorities and research institutions in the capital, Reykjavik. Today, Iceland is under pressure from the US, including a recent visit by US Congressional staffers, to close CIAO.Footnote16 US-Russia Eastern European security competition divides the Arctic US-Russia security competition, especially in Eastern Europe, became increasingly clear from around 2007–2008. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he unsurprisingly denounced US unipolarity. Russia had rejected US unipolarity and called for multipolarity since the Primakov Doctrine of the 1990s calling for Russia, China, and India to balance the US. In spring 2008, at the initiative of the US—and with French and German reservations—the NATO Bucharest summit invited Georgia and Ukraine to become member states. In the autumn, fighting broke out between Georgia and Russian forces in the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia leading to Georgia’s defeat. In autumn 2013, the EU proposed an agreement to Ukraine, which forced Ukraine to choose between Russia and the EU. The Ukrainian President rejected the EU’s proposal, leading to popular protests met with government violence and eventually the President fleeing the country. Russia intervened annexing Crimea and supporting an insurgency in the Donbas.Footnote17 In December 2021, Russia proposed a treaty to the US blocking former Soviet Republics from joining NATO and rolling back NATO troops and equipment in Central and Eastern Europe, which was rejected by the US and allies in January 2022. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which had led to a war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine. The West extends wide-ranging political, military, economic, and further support to Ukraine and tries to isolate Russia as much as possible. The Rest of the world follows Western policy of isolating Russia to a very limited extent. The Russian annexation of Crimea affected the Arctic in limited ways. The West stopped military dialogues with Russia in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum. The West imposed sanctions on Russian Arctic energy projects, as the US $27 billion Yamal LNG project, which initially had Russian Novatek (60 per cent), French Total (20 per cent), and China National Petroleum Cooperation (20 per cent) ownership. Sanctions forced Novatek to sell 9.9 per cent to the Chinese government’s Silk Road Fund and rely on Chinese bank funding. Russia responded to these sanctions with counter sanctions on Western food exports to Russia, which also affected some Arctic seafood export to Russia. Russia accepted Faroese salmon exports, which led to a boom in Faroese economy. In 2014, there was some protests in the Arctic Council from the Chair, Canada. Otherwise, Arctic Council and other scientific, people-to-people, cooperation continued between Russia and the seven other Arctic States. For Northern Norway, extensive regional cooperation in the Barents region continued. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine led to an almost complete Western cessation of Arctic collaboration with Russia. The other seven Arctic countries refused to collaborate with Russia in the Arctic Council, chaired by Russia 2021–2023. The Seven—now all NATO member states—Arctic Council member states have since backed down significantly. The Arctic Council was always more important to them than to Russia, suggesting that this Western brinkmanship was poorly thought through. There are extensive Western sanctions against the Russian economy, including against Russian Arctic energy projects, which were a key basis for developing the Russian Arctic. Russia had sought to develop a Europe-Russia-East Asia energy system with Russian Arctic oil and gas being exported both West to Europe and East to East Asia and with balanced Western and East Asian investments.Footnote18 The West has almost completely cut science and technology relations with Russia, also in the Arctic. The rare exceptions to continued Arctic science collaboration between West and Russia are for instance, the Norway-Russia Barents Sea Fisheries Commission because Norway also depends on this collaboration. The US continues more academic collaboration with Russia than European countries allow themselves; for instance, receiving Russian Fulbright professors. Norway pursued an extensive regional cooperation policy with Russia, Finland, and Sweden in the Barents Region since 1993 with much support for cross-border people-to-people exchange for youth, in education, academia, culture, environment, business development, and further. This collaboration built extensive insight, experience, networks, and access in Russia at North Norwegian institutions, as UiT The Arctic University of Norway, UNN The University Hospital of Northern Norway, the Norwegian Polar Institute, the Arctic Frontiers Conference, businesses such as Akvaplan-Niva marine environmental consultancy, and in academia, civil society, education, and government. The border town of Kirkenes depended for about a third of its economic turnover on trade with Russia. These connections are now almost completely cut by Norwegian government policy. Russian society and politics did become much more closed and authoritarian during this period, but that was for internal political reasons and not directed against Norway. Personally, I had successful high-level academic cooperation with some of the key Russian academic institutions funded by Norwegian public funds until they were forbidden by Norwegian government policy after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. My last personal visit to Moscow was in December 2019, and I was planning to visit with a sizeable group of Norwegian faculty and PhD candidates in April 2020, postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The rapid division of world order in a NATO+ and a BRICS++ world The world is separating into a NATO+ grouping of NATO countries and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, under clear US leadership, and the Rest. The Rest, I call BRICS++ for the BRICS+ grouping and many other countries. This separation is clear through demography, economy, and science and technology. Humanity is about 8 billion people, compared to the West, which is about 1 billion, making it a small minority. Humanity is expected to grow to 10 billion, where the West will remain at about 1 billion, a shrinking small minority. The dominance of the West has rested on economic development and science and technology, translated into military force, with a shrinking demographic share of the world economy, scientific and technological development and relative power shifts from the West to the Rest. Legitimacy and credibility divisions are also clearly visible between the NATO+ and the BRICS++ worlds concerning the war in Ukraine, where the West is astonished by its own isolation. To great surprise, the Rest of the world have not followed the West’s attempts to isolate Russia diplomatically and economically. This rejection of the West’s position was clear from the very first UN Security Council debate on the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Russian veto and Chinese and Indian abstentions were not surprising, but the abstention by the United Arab Emirates was remarkable considering the close security and other partnerships between the GCC countries and the US and historically the UK. The speech during the debate on 21 February 2022, a few days prior, by the Kenyan ambassador to the Security Council, condemning Russia’s recognition of breakaway regions but reminding that other UNSC permanent members had also violated international law, showed the lack of Western credibility and legitimacy on the issue.Footnote19 Western credibility and legitimacy have eroded further by supporting Israel’s genocide in Gaza since the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. The Division of the Arctic in a NATO Arctic and Russian BRICS++ Arctic. The effects of world order on the Arctic are clear, applying the analytical lenses of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar traits of world order to the Arctic. The world is increasingly becoming Sino-American bipolar, where the US seeks to maintain unipolarity through a global containment strategy of China. This struggle is also evident in the Arctic; for instance, US pressure on the Kingdom of Denmark to exclude Chinese investment, science and technology in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The US keeps up an ever-stronger anti-Chinese Arctic discourse from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s 2019 speech in Rovaniemi, Finland, to US Senator Lisa Murkowski at the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik in 2024. Russia has opposed US unipolarity since the 1990s, seeking multipolarity. The conflict between US and Russian multipolarity ultimately escalated via the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the proxy war in Ukraine. This conflict has led to an almost complete division of the Arctic into NATO-Arctic (collaborating with the wider NATO+ world and further) and the Russian Arctic. Russia reaches out all it can diplomatically, economically, and in science and technology to the BRICS++ world, especially China and India. The Rest of the World seems restrained from pursuing Russian Arctic opportunities by the risk of US and Western secondary sanctions and other NATO Arctic pushbacks. Conclusion: looking forward for world and Arctic order The world is—as usual for international history—marked by the struggle over the world order among the strongest State actors. This struggle was forgotten especially by European observers during the post-Cold War era, with the illusion of End of History and confounding globalization and modernization with Westernization. Instead, we have had the Return of History and the return of historically very large non-Western economic, science and technology actors as China, followed by others. The current struggle over the world order also shapes the Arctic, as was historically clear, especially during the Second World War and the Cold War. The US is determined to prolong post-Cold War unipolar dominance expressed as ‘rules-based order’, where the US defines the rules, to whom, and when they apply. Europe has found an apparently comfortable and completely dependent position in this US-led order. The Rest of the World less so, with China and Russia explicitly rejecting this US-led order. The conflict over world order between the US and its bounded order in the NATO+ world in Europe, Oceania, and East Asia and the Rest of the World, can only be expected to escalate. The US must either stop Chinese economic, science and technology development (and later other peer competitors), or demographics, economy, science and technology will lead to a more bipolar and multipolar world. Europe by its dependence on the US is forced to follow this US strategy. The war in Ukraine can lead to a frozen conflict, where the overall Russia-West relationship remains highly conflictual, including in the Arctic. Ukrainian defeat or a negotiated settlement with a neutralized Ukraine and cessation of territory to Russia will also probably lead to a decadal severance of economic, science and technology, people-to-people ties between Russia and the West, including in the Arctic. A Russian defeat is unlikely because of difference in Russian and Ukrainian manpower and resources. China is unlikely to allow Russia to succumb to the US, which would put defeated Russia on China’s Northern frontier in China’s own conflict with the US. All in all, world order seems highly conflictual and with increased separation between the NATO+ and the BRICS++ world, which will only bring humanity more conflict and less economic development and growth, unlike the age of post-Cold War globalization. This division will be replicated in the Arctic. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsRasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen is Professor at UiT The Arctic University of Norway. Views expressed are personal. Notes 1. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, ‘Unipolarity and Order in the Arctic’. Nina Græger, Bertel Heurlin, Ole Wæver, Anders Wivel, (Eds.), Polarity in International Relations. Governance, Security and Development, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05505-8_16. 2. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 43 (4), 2019, pp. 7–50 at https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342 3. George Lindsey, ‘Strategic Stability in the Arctic’, Adelphi Papers 241, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989. 4. Steven E. Miller, ‘The Return of the Strategic Arctic’, in The Arctic Yearbook, 2023 at https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/6C_AY2022_Miller.pdf. 5. Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Challenge of China’, in Stephen Van Evera (Ed.) How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security, The Tobin Project, Cambridge, MA 2006 at https://tobinproject.org/sites/default/files/assets/Make_America_Safe_The_Challenge_Of_China.pdf. 6. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All’, The Australian, 18 November 2005 at https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The-Australian-November-18-2005.pdf. 7. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 43 (4), pp. 7–50, 2019 athttps://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342. 8. Thomas Foght, ‘Hemmelig lydoptagelse: Kina pressede Færøerne til at vælge Huawei’ [Secret Sound Recording: China Pressured the Faroe Islands to Choose Huawei]. Danmarks Radio, 2019 at https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/hemmelig-lydoptagelse-kina-pressede-faeroeerne-til-vaelge-huawei. 9. Adam Satariano, ‘At the Edge of the World, a New Battleground for the US and China’, New York Times, 2019 at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/technology/faroe-islands-huawei-china-us.html. 10. The Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society, ‘To the Benefit of Greenland’. Ilisimatusarfik-University of Greenland; University of Copenhagen, 2014 at https://vbn.aau.dk/ws/files/208241864/To_the_benefit_of_Greenland.pdf. 11. Martin Breum, ‘Analyse: Stoppede Danmarks statsminister kinesisk opkøb i Grønland?’ [Analysis: Did the Danish Prime Minister Stop Chinese Acquisition in Greenland?]. High North News, 2018 at https://www.highnorthnews.com/nb/analyse-stoppede-danmarks-statsminister-kinesisk-opkob-i-gronland. 12. Teis Jensen, ‘Greenland shortlists Chinese company for airport construction despite Denmark’s concerns’, Reuters, 2018 at https://www.reuters.com/article/world/greenland-shortlists-chinese-company-for-airport-construction-despite-denmarks-idUSKBN1H32XG/. 13. Statsministeriet, ‘Aftale mellem regeringen og Naalakkersuisut om dansk engagement i lufthavnsprojektet i Grønland og styrket erhvervssamarbejde mellem Danmark og Grønland’ [Agreement Between the [Danish] Government and Naalakkersuisut [Government of Greenland] on Danish Involvement in the Airport Project in Greenland and Enhanced Business Collaboration Between Denmark and Greenland] Statsministeriet. Formandens Departement, 2018 at https://www.stm.dk/media/8148/10-09-2018_aftale_mellem_regeringen_og_naalakkersuisut.pdf. 14. Martin Breum, ‘Kina vil bygge kontroversiel forskningsstation i Grønland’. [China Wants to Build Controversial Research Station in Greenland], 2017 at https://www.information.dk/udland/2017/10/kina-bygge-kontroversiel-forskningsstation-groenland. 15. Damian Paletta and Itkowitz Colby, ‘Trump Aides Look into US Purchasing Greenland after Directives from President’. The Washington Post, 2019 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/16/america-first-greenland-second-is-trumps-latest-white-house-directive/. 16. ‘Letter to Anthony Blinking and Lloyd Austin’, Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, United States Congress, 2017 at https://democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/10.16.24_PRC%20dual%20use%20research%20in%20the%20Arctic__.pdf. 17. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2014 at https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf. 18. Mariia Kobzeva and Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, ‘European-Russian-Chinese Arctic Energy System’,in Xing Li (Ed) China-EU Relations in a New Era of Global Transformation, London: Routledge, London, 2021, 22p. 19. Martin Kimani, ‘Statement by Amb. Martin Kimani, during the Security Council Urgent Meeting on the Situation in Ukraine’, The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya, United Nations Security Council, February 2022 at https://www.un.int/kenya/sites/www.un.int/files/Kenya/kenya_statement_during_urgent_meeting_on_on_ukraine_21_february_2022_at_2100.pdf.

Defense & Security
Black Sea marked with Red Circle on Realistic Map.

War in the Black Sea: The revival of the Jeune École?

by Tobias Kollakowski

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском ABSTRACT This article analyses the naval dimension of the Russo-Ukrainian War in order to examine in which ways Ukraine’s approach to naval warfare in the Black Sea fits with Jeune École concepts – one of the leading naval strategic schools of thought. Having elaborated on the considerable success Ukraine has been able to achieve by applying a Jeune École approach and having explained the limits of Jeune École thinking in the conflict at sea, the article argues that Ukraine should be careful when considering to evolve the war at sea into a symmetrical conflict between conventional fleets.ARTICLE HISTORY Received 7 July 2024; Accepted 18 February 2025KEYWORDS War in the Black Sea; Jeune École; Russo-Ukrainian War; naval strategy; Ukrainian Navy The war that has been raging in the Black Sea since February 2022 is not a clash of titans. Its predominant characteristic are not naval battles between conventional fleets but, on the contrary, the absence of such engagements. Furthermore, as subsequent sections will further detail, most of these actions take place in the littoral. While the maritime dimension of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian War has joined the Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971 and the 1982 Falklands War as among the most destructive naval wars since the end of WW2, the way in which it is waged involves coastal-defence batteries, pin prick attacks by uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), air-launched missile strikes and an asymmetric campaign carried out by uncrewed surface vehicles (USV). Not least important, the divergence between asymmetric and conventional naval warfare has not only informed the ways in which military actions have been carried out. Rather, it goes to the heart of a much larger debate over Ukraine’s fleet design and naval strategy. In this debate between adherents of a blue-water school of thought and advocates of the so-called ‘mosquito fleet’, both fractions have argued over the most appropriate develop- ment of the Ukrainian Navy and its future capabilities. To adopt an analytical framework that is well-suited to the nature of the conflict, both lethal and inter- state in the Black Sea and intellectual and within Ukraine’s military establishment, this article refrains from applying theories connected to prominent theoreticians associated with the blue-water school of thought (the ‘Old School’),1 such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Philip Howard Colomb or Sir Julian Corbett.2 Literature on contem- porary naval strategy has indeed adopted concepts associated with these schools of thought, for example in the case of Japan (Corbett), the People’s Republic of China and India (Mahan).3 While blue-water concepts may prove beneficial when interpreting the oceanic ambitions and strategies of Asia’s mightiest naval powers, this article instead refers to Jeune École (Young School) naval strategic school of thought – one of the leading schools of thought in naval theory developed by 19th century French naval theoreticians and practitioners. As argued throughout this article, concepts and controversies affiliated with Jeune École (JÉ) are well-suited to explain the developments, circumstances and debates concerning the maritime theatre of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Scholars and experts have recently paid considerable attention to the mar- itime dimension of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Seth Cropsey, for example, argues that access to, and control of, the Black Sea is critical to the outcome of the war and Brent Sadler elaborates on lessons identified from the War in the Black Sea for a potential war involving Taiwan.4 Furthermore, scholars have examined the circumstances and implications of the transformation of a maritime gray zone conflict into a conventional war and the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War on maritime commerce and the regional naval balance of power.5In a recent study, Md. Tanvir Habib and Shah Md Shamrir Al Af have also usefully explored Ukraine’s innovative usage of naval drones, tracing the lessons, conditions and implications of Ukraine’s approach to the War in the Black Sea and arguing in favour of the adoption of maritime asymmetric warfare strategies and capabilities by smaller countries.6 However, while deeply engaging in the discussion on asymmetric warfare Habib’s and Md Al Af’s analysis does not address the ‘Young School’ of naval strategic thought or matters of naval theory more generally. In contrast to the above-mentioned authors, in his review of the book Vaincre en mer au XXIe siècle, Michael Shurkin does take note of the fact that naval drones ‘perhaps breathe new life into the old vision of the Jeune École’ when he addresses the fact that the authors have not included the Russo-Ukrainian War due to the date of publication. However, given the nature of his article as a book review, Shurkin doesn’t elaborate on this idea.7 This article differs from the existing literature by embedding the War in the Black Sea and differing perceptions on the development of the navy and the appropriate fleet design within larger strategic debates discussed in naval theory. As elaborated in section six of this paper, a traditional assumption expressed by many authoritative voices has it that a JÉ approach is not a viable approach to wage war at sea, especially against an opponent enjoy- ing a much greater superiority in available means. Based on the examination of the case study of the Russo-Ukrainian War, this article shows how many debates surrounding the original 19th century JÉ also apply to the ongoing war in the Black Sea and demonstrates that Ukrainian success at sea and at the coast is closely linked with JÉ thinking. Given the length of the conflict and the great number of events at sea and onshore involving a broad range of topics, a comprehensive summary of the conflict at sea would go far beyond the scope of a single article. Consequently, maritime-related devel- opments are only covered as far as relevant for this article’s research design and to support or dismiss concepts associated with the JÉ naval strategic school of thought. This also means that this paper covers comparatively little on the actual conduct of naval operations. For the level of interpretation as applied in this article, tactics and operations are largely irrelevant. Ultimately, the debate on anti-access and area denial (A2/AD), a topic that has been covered in great depth within the two recent decades,8 has been largely omitted from this article. The reason is as follows. There is some conceptual overlap between the JÉ and the A2/AD debate – especially con- cerning the JÉ’s rebirth in form of the Soviet Molodaya Shkola (Young School). While JÉ could only influence naval policy in France for a few years at the end of the 19th century, elements of JÉ thinking gained prominence approxi- mately three decades later in the newly-established Soviet Union. Taking into consideration the harsh economic situation and the disastrous state of the navy in the early USSR and denouncing blue-water ‘Old School’ thinking as imperialist, advocates of the Molodaya Shkola favoured a naval strategy based on an inshore defence made up of small surface vessels, submarines, mines, coastal artillery and land-based aviation. In contrast to the Molodaya Shkola’s approach to use asymmetric means to counter conventionally super- ior navies that was effectively similar to the French JÉ, there were some differences between the two schools. Probably, the most significant differ- ence concerned the JÉ’s focus on offensive commerce raiding.9 However, whereas denying enemy major surface combatants access to one’s own littoral by employing small heavily armed craft qualifies as being very much in line with A2/AD, JÉ and Molodaya Shkola thinking, the same cannot be said for the extensive use of land-based systems. For example, the traditional ‘Central Mine and Artillery Position’ [RUS: TS͡ entral’naia͡ minno-artilleriĭskaia͡ pozits͡ iia͡ ], the stationary SSC-1 Sepal10 of the Cold War era and the contemporary Russian SSC- 5 Stooge [RUS designation: Bastion] and SSC-6 Sennight [RUS designation: Bal] coastal defence missile systems or Ukraine’s R-360 Neptune anti-ship missiles11 all count as essential elements of the A2/AD discourse. Conceptually, however, they fit much better into ‘coastal defence theory’ and the ‘brick-and-mortar school’ rather than the JÉ.12 Trying to cover all the facets of the naval dimension of the Russo-Ukrainian War would blur the conceptual lines between the differ- ent naval strategic schools of thought. It would deviate this article ever further away from its selected theoretical framework: the original 19th century ideas associated with JÉ thinking. This article comprises seven parts. Part one briefly summarises the princi- pal ideas of the 19th century JÉ as the analytical framework for interpreting Ukraine’s approach to the War in the Black Sea. The second section examines how Ukraine, having successfully withstood the initial Russian offensive, waged naval war against the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and how the conduct of warfare fits within JÉ thinking. Having elaborated on derivations from JÉ theory as far as commerce warfare is concerned, parts three and four elaborate on the limitations of the applicability of the theory. As shown at different points throughout the article, many essentials of the debate are remarkably similar despite a time difference of 150 years. The fifth section elaborates on the ways in which Ukraine attacks Russia’s maritime critical infrastructure and argues that Ukraine’s approach blends well with the JÉ strategic school of thought. Towards the end, the article presents ongoing debates on Ukraine’s naval future which once again reveal the long-standing aversion of naval leaders to embrace JÉ ideas. While the article does address certain aspects of the Russo-Ukraine War at various points throughout the text, it is in these concluding sections that the debate between ‘Old School’ proponents and the fraction advocating the development of the ‘mosquito fleet’ is illustrated. Readers only interested in this element of the academic discussion may wish to fast-forward to section six. Ultimately, the article argues that essential elements of JÉ thinking have demonstrated their worth as a viable naval strategy, at least on the narrow seas, and should receive more positive appreciation by inferior conflict parties. The origins of Jeune école During the 19th century, French naval thinkers had to tackle the issue of British naval supremacy that rested on a battle fleet vastly superior to its French counterpart while being confronted with the financial and industrial capacities of the British Empire and a redistribution of the military budget prioritising continental warfare as a result of the 1870–71 Franco-German War.13 As a result, JÉ proposed an approach to naval warfare that seeks to avoid the enemy’s fleet and targets the enemy’s sea lines of communication. For this purpose, Baron Richild Grivel, one of the forerunners of JÉ, had already proposed commerce raiding as the ‘the most economical for the poorest fleet’ and ‘at the same time the one most proper to restore peace, since it strikes directly [. . .] at the very source of the prosperity of the enemy’.14 The ideal unit to conduct such a kind of warfare was the cruiser. Drawing conclusions from the Napoleonic Wars, Grivel points out that the immense resources Napoleon had spent in constructing ships of the line (FRA: vaisseaux) would have been much better invested in the construction of quick and well-armed ships capable of waging ‘partisan warfare’.15 Furthermore, late 19th century technological advances played a major role in the calculations of JE supporters. Torpedoes, mines, and submarines made major surface combatants much more vulnerable,16 while the introduction of steam propulsion made naval battles between unlike opponents rather improbable.17 In combination, these developments led Admiral Théophile Aube, a founding father of JÉ, to the conclusion that the ship of the line was not the desired naval vessel for the future.18 When Aube became Naval Minister in 1886, the ideas of JÉ, focusing on means to wage asymmetric warfare,19 were, though only for a relatively short period, practically implemented: Aube halted battleship production, prioritis- ing the acquisition of cruisers, torpedo boats, and gunboats and ordering the construction of the Gymnote, the first French torpedo-equipped submarine.20 Still, there was substantial resistance against JÉ even during its heydays not least because of legal considerations. French naval officers, such as Commander Heuette and Admiral Bourgois, were strongly opposed to the blatant violations of international law JÉ was proposing as it demanded reckless and merciless commerce raiding (FRA: guerre de course).21 Fast, small and numerous – how Ukraine crippled the black sea fleet At the end of March 2022, it had become clear that Russia’s gambit for a quick offensive victory over Ukraine had ended in disaster. At sea, the Russians had achieved some success, among others achieving sea control and capturing Snake Island close to the Ukrainian shoreline, but had failed to carry out a decisive landing operation in the northwestern Black Sea. However, a few weeks after the beginning of the invasion, in April 2022, the Ukrainians employed their land- based sea denial capabilities and following attacks against Russian warships, most notably the cruiser Moskva, by Ukrainian coastal defence forces, the BSF’s position off Ukraine’s Black Sea coast could no longer be sustained.22 Subsequently, Ukraine went on the offensive. As a forward position, main- taining a presence on the island and re-supplying the deployed forces proved particularly difficult for the Russians as Ukrainian forces shelled the island from the Ukrainian coast and targeted vessels carrying out resupply runs to the island. According to different sources, the BSF suffered the loss of several smaller units as, among others, strikes carried out by Bayraktar UAS targeted Russian patrol boats and auxiliary vessels operating in proximity to Snake Island.23 In May 2022, the Russians claimed to have shot down 30 UAS in the Snake Island region in three days.24 Even if these numbers were correct, the effects that relatively cheap, mass-produced drones could exert on Russian equipment at land and at sea, which was expensive and hard to replace, was devastating. After a struggle that had lasted for several months, the Russian military finally withdrew its troops from Snake Island by 30 June 2022.25 Following the withdrawal of BSF from the northwestern Black Sea, the Ukrainians launched an extensive sea denial campaign throughout the entire Black Sea region. Over the next years, numerous Russian warships were reported having been attacked and sometimes fatally damaged by Ukrainian USVs. Examples include the alleged destruction of the corvettes Ivanovets (January/ February 2024) and Sergey Kotov (attacked in September 2023/supposedly sunk in March 2024) and the tank landing ship Tsezar Kunikov (February 2024).26As Habib and Md Al Af argue, the employment of such an asymmetric approach was critical for Ukraine’s ability to withstand the Russian invasion at the time of writing. Asymmetric capabilities both in the air, at sea and on land have made significant contributions to denying the Russians a quick, decisive victory and have pro- tracted the conflict.27 The BSF reacted in various ways, among others, by use of electromagnetic warfare and adding fire power to their naval assets.28 Still, even while Russian naval forces were seeking to adapt, losses were accumulating. After two years of war, naval expert Igor Delanoë assessed, ‘the BSF has not been able to overcome all the difficulties emanating from an asymmetric warfare at sea caused by the Ukrainians’ employment of naval drones and cruise missiles’.29 Already as early as August 2022, British intelligence assessed that Russian patrols were ‘generally limited to waters within sight of the Crimean coast’.30 As elaborated in the following sections, however, neither was navigating close to the shore nor staying in port going to be a viable naval strategy for the Russians. Ukrainian drone tactics involved attacks by swarms of fast USVs that were continuously improved and specialised.31 As in the case of UAS attacks, by employing comparatively cheap USVs Ukraine benefited from a great advan- tage in terms of cost-efficiency when targeting expensive assets such as warships.32 ‘Speed and numbers’, in the words of Røksund the ‘mantra’ of JÉ, 33 stood at the heart of Ukraine’s approach to naval warfare. It is therefore little wonder that Ukrainian scholars themselves have also drawn compar- isons with the Molodaya Shkola school of thought. Ukrainian military journal- ist and historian Oleksandr Vel’mozh͡ ko, for example, points out,In fact, I see here a new ‘edition’, so to speak, of the ‘young school’ - the theory of creating naval forces on the basis of small mine-torpedo, missile, or other currently high-tech weapons that would cost relatively cheap and could be used against large warships.34 Furthermore, various videos released by Ukrainian security agencies show attacks under conditions of low visibility, especially at night, when the drones could take full advantage of their small signatures.35 Immediately, nighttime torpedo boat attacks against bigger and much more heavily armed comba- tants – one of the JÉ’s leitmotif’s [FRA: ‘de nuit, l’avantage est pour les torpilleurs’ – at night, the advantage is for the torpedo boats] – come to mind.36 Essentially, the means and ways which Ukraine applied to erode the BSF’s strength resembled JE thinking at its core. While the asymmetric ways in which Ukraine has countered Russian conven- tional superiority at sea have proven to be exceptionally successful and can serve as a 21st century role model for a JÉ style of naval warfare, the second pillar of JÉ’s warfare concept – offensive commerce raiding – requires elaboration. Firstly, apart from very few instances reported by the Russian conflict party right at the outbreak of hostilities – Russia claimed that Ukrainian missiles had hit the mer- chantmen SGV Flot and Seraphim Sarovsky – Ukraine has abstained from carrying out attacks against Russian civilian shipping. As Raul Pedrozo argues, unless there were specific conditions (see the following section) which qualified both Russian merchant vessels as legitimate military targets, attacks on these vessels would have been inconsistent with the law of naval warfare.37 Whatever the conditions surrounding the alleged attacks against these two civilian ships during the first 24 hours of the war, as far as analysts can tell from publicly accessible information about the war at sea, they were isolated incidents. By no means did Ukraine pursue a naval strategy in which the deliberate targeting of enemy civilian vessels played any role. Secondly, on 5 August 2023, Russian sources reported that the Russian tanker Sig had been struck by Ukrainian forces close to Crimea – a claim that was later confirmed by the Ukrainian conflict party.38 According to various sources, how- ever, Sig was carrying fuel for military purposes to Syria.39 Thus, in this particular case, it was ‘integrated into the enemy’s war-supporting effort’ and ‘due to its behaviour fulfilled the requirements of a military objective’ which also includes ‘transporting war material or transporting or supplying troops’. Consequently, Sig lost its protected status as a merchant vessel and became a legitimate target.40 Thirdly, it is true that on 20 July 2023 the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence published a warning that from 21 July, all vessels headed to Russian ports or Russian-occupied Ukrainian ports may be considered as those carrying military cargo.41 Subsequently, this declaration was also reinforced by remarks made by various Ukrainian senior representatives in the context of the drone strike on tanker Sig who claimed that (every) Russian ship sailing in the Black Sea was now a legitimate target.42 However, the situation surrounding these declarations needs to be taken into consideration. In the context of the termination of the U.N. Grain Initiative and before the Ukrainians, the Russian Ministry of Defence had released a statement which declared that from ‘Moscow time on 20 July 2023, all vessels sailing in the waters of the Black Sea to Ukrainian ports will be regarded as potential carriers of military cargo’.43 Furthermore, at the time, Russia also targeted Ukrainian ships, ports and infrastructure connected with the export of grain.44 As Oleg Ustenko, an economic adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, points out, Ukraine’s ‘move was retaliation for Russia withdrawing from the U.N.-brokered Black Sea grain deal and unleashing a series of missile attacks on agricultural stores and ports’.45 The attack on the port of Novorossiysk had immediate effects on the movement of shipping and the calculation of war risk premiums (marine insurance).46 When both sides had given the opponent a taste of what a potential war on commercial shipping could look like, the smokescreen dispersed. Ukraine abstained from carrying out its threats. Thus, rather than interpreting Ukrainian activities within the framework of JÉ, theories on (non-nuclear) deterrence and strategic communication are much better suited to explain the events concerning civilian shipping in July and August 2023. Nothing remotely resembling a guerre de course-strategy had occurred. Why was this the case, especially in light of the enormous costs Ukraine could cause to Russian seaborne trade in comparison with the small investment associated with a few USVs? Legal constraints associated with the protection of mer- chant ships need to be primarily mentioned in this context.47  Limits to Jeune école – the legal and political dimension Although a comprehensive discussion of the law of naval warfare goes beyond the aims of this article, it is useful to recapitulate a few legal aspects concerning the war at sea. As a matter of principle, hostile merchant vessels do not qualify as legitimate military targets.48 The 1936 London Protocols awarded further protection to the status of merchant ships and clarified the rules of submarine warfare. They state, In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship’s papers in a place of safety.49 To act in accordance with the law of armed conflict Ukraine would have had to seize Russian merchant vessels as prises and/or proclaim a maritime block- ade against the Russian Federation. In doing so, the Ukrainian Navy would have to enforce this blockade and, as a consequence, could/should have employed a belligerent’s right of visit and search.50 In order to interdict maritime traffic to the Russian coast and given the illegality of non- enforced blockades, both approaches – seizing individual enemy merchant ships and blockading the coastline – would require Ukrainian naval (and/or air) force (surface combatants) detecting civilian vessels, ascertaining their character and cargo and seizing vessels.51 Thus, as Ukraine lacked the surface units and the necessary sea control to seize ships, to enforce a blockade that requires ‘ensuring vessels trying to pass the blockade with sufficient probability’ and to exercise the belligerent’s right of visit, there were basically no options available to Ukraine to take actions against merchant shipping bound for Russian ports, if Ukraine was to act in accordance with the law of naval warfare.52 There are certain conditions when a merchant ship loses its protected status and becomes a legitimate military target, for example, when acting as naval auxiliaries, resisting capture or the belligerent’s right of visit and search or carrying out intelligence or communications functions.53 However, these conditions would not apply to a hypothetical scenario in which Ukraine would wage economic warfare against merchant shipping. Neither were merchant vessels bound for Russian ports sailing in convoys nor could merchantmen sailing towards Russian Black Sea ports generally be considered ‘integrated in Russia’s [and Ukraine’s] war effort’. All the conditions under which merchant ships may be eligible to attack during armed conflicts would not apply. While attacks on unarmed merchant vessels – especially for the weaker side – remains a tempting option in the 21st century as much as it was in the 19th century, the fear to commit blatant breaches of international law have had a discipling effect throughout the centuries. As outlined in section two of this article, the disapproval of the illegal ways of warfighting at sea that had been proposed by JÉ have been as old as this school of thought itself. In addition to the legal constraints that apply to commerce raiding, both sides’ decision not to follow the path leading to unrestricted economic warfare at sea should also be interpreted within the political context. For Ukraine acting in accordance with the law of armed conflict was significant as its support by the global community of liberal-minded states was shaped by these states’ normative understanding of the rules-based world order and international politics.54 Furthermore, both Ukraine and Russia were important exporters of various raw materials and food – particularly as far as the countries of the Global South were concerned. For example, in 2020, 15 countries in Africa imported over 50% of their wheat products from Ukraine or Russia. The impact of the war on the continent was profound as Africa suffered from a shortage of approximately 30 million tons of grains and serious inflation.55 Against this background, it seems clear that the targeting of merchant ships loaded with cargo desperately needed by the most vulner- able regions in the world would have only come at a tremendous political cost for the war parties. As Timothy Heck sums it up, Both the Ukrainians and the Russians wanted the benefits of international commerce and, diplomatically, to gain/earn/keep the goodwill of recipient nations by allowing regulated commercial traffic to escape the war zone.56 Again, similarities with the 19th century debates concerning JÉ are striking. Already in the 1880s influential opponents to JÉ, such as Admiral Bourgois, had criticised that tactics proposed by JÉ and illegal acts of naval warfare would rally neutral countries against France – the last thing an inferior French Navy in a military confrontation with Britain needed.57 While both sides largely refrained from directly targeting merchant ship- ping apart from a few exceptions, strikes against maritime critical infrastruc- ture and onshore facilities, which enabled both maritime commercial and naval operations at sea, evaded many of these constraints. Indeed, as each side intended to attrit the opponent’s ability to use the sea for one’ s own purposes, repeated attacks by various weapon systems against a wide range of maritime targets ashore became another principal characteristic of the Russo-Ukrainian War.  The degradation of Russia’s geostrategic position at the Black Sea Having elaborated on the applicability and the limits of the JÉ approach on the war at sea, the following section takes into consideration the second component of the systematic destruction of Russian naval capabilities in the Azov-Black Sea region: the targeting of Russian maritime infrastructure ashore and in port. In October 2022, a large-scale Ukrainian drone attack against Russian littoral positions attracted wide attention when several unmanned aerial vehicles and autonomous surface vehicles attacked the port of Sevastopol.58 Over the course of the next years, Ukraine repeatedly attacked Russian naval assets stationed on Crimea ashore and at the coast of the peninsula. Examples include strikes against Russian naval aviation at Saky airfield in August 2022, against various targets in the port of Sevastopol in March 2024 – apparently impacting the Ropucha-class tank landing ships Azov and Yamal – or against the Karakurt-class corvette Tsiklon in May 2024.59 Shortly after attacks against Russian infrastructure on Crimea had been reported, reports about Ukrainian strikes against Novorossiysk were pub- lished. In November 2022, a Ukrainian sea drone was reported having struck the Sheskharis oil terminal in Novorossiysk at night.60 As later reported by the newspaper Ukrainska Pravda, the following July, at a presidential meeting, Ukraine’s leadership had decided to launch strikes against Russian port infra- structure as a retaliatory measure for Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian ports in the aftermath of the termination of the grain initiative.61 Subsequently, in early August 2023 movement of vessels was temporarily halted at the Port of Novorossiysk following a Ukrainian drone attack and the Russian tank landing ship Olenegorsky Gornyak suffering serious damage caused by a USV attack.62 Ukrainska Pravda reports on the moment when the Ukrainian drone operators came across various merchantmen while navigat- ing their USVs towards Novorossiysk. ‘Somewhere en route the operators saw a tanker. They asked if it could be perceived as a target. No tankers! If we hit a tanker in neutral waters, then we’ll be branded as some kind of terrorists. Your target is the port. (. . .) ’ a head of the mission said.63 Although this statement was reported by a conflict party and cannot independently be verified, it supports the argument made in the previous section about the limits of the JÉ approach in the case study of the Russo- Ukrainian War as far as the targeting of civilian shipping is concerned.64 Furthermore, and also exactly as in the case of the war on the open sea, the conflict parties had to consider third party opinions. As Ukrainska Pravda reports, following the Ukrainian strike against the port of Novorossiysk, ‘the Country’s Leadership received Warnings from partners at all levels’.65 In 2024, Ukrainian strikes against critical maritime infrastructure continued. In May, for example, Ukrainian attacks were reported on Novorossiysk’s seaport, an oil refinery in Tuapse and the Sevastopol Bay area.66 In early April 2024, Ukrainian Military Intelligence (HUR) published footage of a strike against an oil pipeline in Rostov Oblast that supposedly was used to transport oil products to the local oil depot for tankers in the Azov Sea. According to HUR, ‘the loading of tankers with oil products has been suspended indefinitely’.67 While the claim cannot be confirmed, the concept of striking the production and transport facilities before transportation rather than the merchant ships transporting the cargo highlights approaches to deal with the limits on economic warfare in the maritime dimension as detailed above. Although the BSF had to redeploy further to the eastern part of the Black Sea and Russia attempted to set up maintenance infrastructure further east, Ukraine continuously expanded the range of target locations and has thus been gradually degrading the Russian ability to make use of the sea. In the words of a retired U.S. admiral, ‘If you’re on a Russian naval ship, you’re not safe anywhere in the Black Sea’.68 As another element of Ukraine’s strike campaign, Ukraine has also targeted objectives whose destruction had a long-term impact on Russian naval capabilities and its war-making potential. For example, in July 2022 and in September 2023, Ukraine was reported having struck the naval staff/the headquarters of the BSF in Sevastopol – the latter attack causing devastating effects.69 As far as attacks against Russia’s industrial base and logistical infrastructure are concerned, examples include Ukrainian attacks against the Zaliv shipyard in Kerch, Crimea on 4 November 2023, which reportedly damaged the not yet commissioned Karakurt-class corvette Askold, and the strike against the Ropucha-class tank landing ship Novocherkassk that left the ship sunk at the bottom of the harbour. The strike has thus, extremely likely, rendered one of the main berths of the Feodosia port, which had been in use as an important logistical hub, unusable.70 A particularly devastating strike was carried out on 13 September 2023 when a Ukrainian missile strike hit dry docks of the Sevmorzavod shipyard, maintenance facilities of the BSF, in effect causing extensive damage to the Ropucha-class tank landing ship Minsk and the Kilo-II-mod-class conventional submarine Rostov-on-Don and consequently severing ‘Sevastopol’s ability to undertake maintenance and repairs of Black Sea Fleet vessels, at least until the dry docks at the Sevmorzavod facility (. . .) can be returned to regular use’, as Thomas Newdick points out.71 As the second year of the war was approaching its end, independent experts and Ukrainian military representatives were pointing at serious maintenance support issues confronting the BSF in the future as adequate repair infrastructure in this maritime theatre became a scarce resource.72 In combination, the accumulation of all these strikes over the long term had a serious attrition effect on Russia’s ability to utilise the sea for its purposes. This concerned primarily the military dimension but, as the war progressed and Ukrainian strikes against refineries and port infrastructure accumulated, also gradually the commercial dimension. British representa- tives assessed that 13% to 14% (December 2023) and subsequently 25% (February 2024) of Russia’s Black Sea combatant fleet had been destroyed.73 Moreover, on 26 March 2024, Ukraine’s navy spokesman Dmytro Pletenchuk released Ukraine’s assessment that up to that point in time, approximately a third of the BSF had been destroyed or disabled. 74 After more than two years of war, the strength and presence of the BSF had diminished consider- ably and British Defence Minister Grant Shapps considered the BSF ‘function- ally inactive’ – an assessment further substantiated by the UK Defence Intelligence update the following month75 The BSF has largely withdrawn its ships and submarines from Sevastopol further eastwards to Novorossiysk. Since the removal of the BSF commander in March 2024, the fleet has been the least active since the war began.76 How do these strikes against Russian targets in port and ashore fit within the JÉ school of thought? Firstly, while not a principal feature that is com- monly associated with JÉ naval strategy,77 the foundational literature written by the originators of JÉ does mention attacks on an enemy’s coastal facilities. This primarily includes bombardment of civilian coastal settlements for the purpose of terror but also includes military facilities when the opportunity arises. Aube, for example, writes: The masters of the sea will turn the power of attack and destruction, in the absence of adversaries evading their blows, against all the cities of the littoral, fortified or not, peaceful or warlike, burn them, ruin them or at least ransom them without mercy.78 Equally connecting strikes against military facilities at the coast with this naval strategic school, journalist and JÉ theoretician, Gabriel Charmes, argues,: The bombardment of Alexandria further showed that, if the heavy artillery of a battleship risked being quickly reduced to impotence by the resistance of the forts, the only weapon which could cause them serious damage was small artillery carried on fast ships.79 Secondly, if attention is paid to the connotated message the founding fathers of this naval school of thought tried to convey, a good argument can be made that Ukraine’s targeting of Russian infrastructure at the coastline fits well with a JÉ approach. Ukrainian strikes consist of numerous fast strikes and well- placed pin prick attacks that outmanoeuvre enemy defences and hit unex- pectedly. They are not built on sea control and air superiority because Ukraine did not enjoy dominance of these domains. Thus, the strikes were not ‘decisive’ in a Mahanian sense but rather the modern adoptions of concepts already presented by Admiral Aube during the 1880s. With the extreme mobility that steam gives to all warships, whatever the special weapon with which they are equipped, with the speed and security of informa- tion that the electric telegraph allows, with the concentration of force that is ensured by the railway, on the one hand side, no point on the coast is safe from attack.80 If one were to exchange the concept of steam power with modern forms of power generation, the telegraph with modern ISR and command and control systems and the railway with all forms of transportation available at the beginning of the 21st century, Aube’s article could very well describe a military scenario of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Repeated attacks against – and thus attrition of – the opponent’s naval geostrategic position could seriously degrade the opponent’s ability to operate, sustain and reinforce a fleet over a longer time period without having to destroy the opposing fleet in a symmetrical battle is essentially the quintessence of JÉ thinking. Granted, in Aube’s age, it would have been difficult to imagine how non- conventional means could assemble the necessary amount of firepower to cause the substantial damage to the opponent’s position as shown by the War in Ukraine. But since the development of weapon systems of ever greater ranges, a stakeholder’s position may be vulnerable to repeated attacks by an opponent even if the opponent has not been able to establish sea control and is using asymmetric styles of warfare. To sum up, technological advances have enabled the inferior side to pursue a naval strategy that contributed to driving down the opponent’s fleet’s capabilities without actually seeking a symmetrical engagement with his fleet. This, of course, is completely in line with JÉ thinking – a so-called ‘material school’ of naval strategic thought.81 Thus, in contrast to the deliberate targeting of merchantmen, in the case of attacks against Russian maritime infrastructure the Ukrainian approach can be interpreted as continuing and complementing JÉ thinking. The way ahead: Old school or young school? Ukraine’s asymmetric approach to naval warfare and the adoption of ideas associated with JÉ have secured Ukrainian successes in the maritime domain few experts could have predicted at the beginning of the hostilities.82 It is not exaggerated to claim that the significance of these events is historical. Generally speaking, many scholars and historical studies have not been particularly positive in their verdicts about JÉ as a viable strategic school of thought. As Arne Røksund elaborates, even when Théophile Aube was Minister of Marine (1886–1887), he could not overcome the French admiralty’s resistance to giving up entirely on battlefleets. The same holds true for the second generation of JÉ proponents during the latter 1890s.83 By the time De Lanessan was appointed Minister of Marine in 1899, ideas about great quan- tities of fast but mostly smaller vessels gave way for naval concepts based on comparatively fewer warships of high quality as ‘the French Navy should concentrate on what he regarded as core elements of a first-rank navy’.84 Subsequently, as Røksund, recapitulates, ‘The French Navy did not fight any war following the theory of the Jeune école.’85 Ian Speller comes to a similar conclusion as he underlines that  Even in France there was never a consensus in favour of their [Jeune École’s – author’s note] policies, and French naval policy remained divided (. . .) Ultimately, the Jeune École failed in their attempt to bring radical change to French naval policy.86 Similar to the fate of the French original, the Soviet Molodaya Shkola was replaced rather quickly by grand visions of ‘Stalin’s Big Ocean-going Fleet’ deemed more adequate for Soviet great power status.87 Of what relevance could JÉ ever be when – referring to a leading British naval historian – there has never been a historical example when the approach proposed by this strategic school of thought has ever worked in practice.88 Such criticism was very much in line with the writings of another prominent naval practitioner and theoretician: Admiral Gorshkov, Chief of the Soviet Navy. According to Gorshkov, the naval strategy pursued by the German naval leadership during WW2 had failed because it left the U-boats alone in their fight against the Allied navies without support by other subbranches of the navy. Without the danger of German naval and naval air forces attacking their surface vessels, Allied navies could focus on anti-submarine warfare and ‘the priority devel- opment of only one warfare branch, the subsurface forces, ultimately had to lead to a drastic limitation of the German fleet’s spectrum of tasks when fighting against the enemy’s fleets’, was his argument.89 As a consequence, Gorshkov strongly argues in favour of a balanced fleet which could potentially even defeat a numerically superior but unevenly developed opponent.90 In contrast, the war in the Black Sea has demonstrated that a JÉ approach can actually succeed in neutralising a superior, opposing naval force, at least in a narrow sea.91 Given recent events, the critical perception of JÉ should be carefully re-evaluated. Apart from the historical point of debate that the German military leadership had to fight WW2 with a different fleet than the ‘balanced fleet’ of the Z-Plan that it had originally envisioned but that had not been realised in time, there is also a conceptual issue worth debating from a strategic studies perspective. As various experts and, in fact, the German naval leadership,92 have repeatedly touched upon, the German Navy was doomed to lose the war at sea due to the greater strategic conditions (e.g., fleet sizes, war-making potential including shipbuilding capacity etc.) under which it had to fight WW2.93 If there was no winning condition in a conventional naval war, however, and if, consequently, the sense in carrying out the conflict at sea was not to ‘rule the waves’ but to cause the maximum amount of damage and bind a large Allied force in a way as resource-efficient as possible it has to be critically examined whether a JÉ may have actually been the smartest approach the German Navy could have chosen.94 As elaborated below, similar strategic calculations should be taken into consid- eration when debating the case of Ukraine and the War in the Black Sea. Commerce raiding, another feature of the JÉ approach, has equally been dismissed as futile. As far as targeting of individual merchant ships is con- cerned, the blue-water prophet himself, Alfred T. Mahan viewed this style of warfare as ‘the weakest form of naval warfare’95 and criticises ‘A strong man cannot be made to quit his work by sticking pins in him’.96 A hundred twenty years after Mahan, this assessment also may have lost some of its persuasive power. At the beginning of the 21st century, global sea-based commerce has become very sensitive to changes in the security environment and much more risk averse. Furthermore, the differentiation between flag states, ship owners, cargo owners, crews and charterers has greatly reduced ‘national interest’ within maritime commerce. As a consequence, the outbreak of hostilities in the northwestern Black Sea at the beginning of the Black Sea has – not discounting other factors, such as the closing of ports and Ukrainian authorities prohibiting merchant ships from leaving ports – led to a drastic collapse of merchant shipping to and from Ukraine.97 Similarly, the drastic effects of the 2023 attack against the port of Novorossiysk and the Sig on the maritime commercial sector have already been mentioned. Against this background, it seems extremely likely that if Ukraine struck or sank even a small number of merchantmen destined to call in ports such as Novorossiysk, Taganrog, Taman or Tuapse this would have devastating effects for Russian sea-based transportation in the entire Azovo-Black Sea basin. However, as already noted, as far as commerce warfare is concerned, the limiting factor was less of operational and more or of legal and political nature. While some of the aspects of warfighting associated with JÉ were already considered immoral and contrary to international law during the 19th century, the weight of politico-legal circumstances and the necessity to fight a ‘just war’ are even more significant during the 21st century. This is particu- larly true for Ukraine which depends on the support of the Global West – a value-driven community. In summary, an approach to warfare closely associated with JÉ has awarded Ukraine great successes for more than two years of war in the Black Sea. But as Ukraine has to fight the war at sea solely based on a sea denial approach, the country is also faced with severe limitations. Any opera- tion that requires sea control as a precondition is effectively beyond Ukrainian means if not in immediate proximity of the Ukrainian coastline such as the reported landings of Ukrainian soldiers on drilling platforms.98 Keeping all these more abstract considerations in mind, the debates on (applied) naval strategy that are currently ongoing in Ukraine become much more comprehensible. Following – from Kyiv’s point of view – a successful campaign at sea, in which the reinforced BSF was pushed out of the western Black Sea and suffered considerable losses, a debate is taking place about the future devel- opment of Ukrainian Navy and Ukraine’s approach to warfighting in the maritime dimension. On the one hand, there are the proponents of building a symmetrical naval force. The ‘Doctrine of the Naval Forces of Ukraine’ that was released in 2021 was an ambitious strategic document. As far as the ‘expansion of the fleet composition through the construction and modernisa- tion of the existing fleet composition’ was concerned, the doctrine detailed ‘new generation missile boats, landing ships of various classes, patrol ships and boats for the protection of the territorial waters and the EEZ, uncrewed underwater vehicles, new types of supply vessels of various types’ and ‘the construction of new mine warfare vessels and small submarines’.99 Most breathtaking, the ‘Doctrine of the Naval Forces of Ukraine’ defined capabil- ities for ‘sea control on the open ocean’ as the number one priority for the development of the Ukrainian Navy in the period following 2030.100 It is also in this context that Ukraine’s interest in procuring frigates through the UK capability development initiative and developing the design of the Volodymyr Velykyi-class corvettes have to be interpreted.101 Taking into consideration the point from where the Ukrainian Navy had to restart in 2014, these acquisition goals were bold to say the least. More than two years into the war, visions about the future of the Ukrainian Navy have lost nothing of their grandness. According to this school of thought, among other things, the air defence capability of the Ukrainian Navy is to be strengthened, long-range strike capabilities are to be acquired, surface comba- tants of different classes are to be put into service and amphibious forces are to be set up in the form of additional naval infantry brigades with landing vehicles.102 This expansion of capabilities is intended to gradually create the conditions for achieving sea control. Having established sea control, Ukraine would be in a position to conduct amphibious operations on its own and even think about establishing a naval blockade of the Russian Black Sea coast. The construction of Milgem project corvettes for the Ukrainian Navy at the RMK Marine Shipyard in Istanbul103 and capabilities gained through the British-Norwegian Maritime Capability Coalition104 are important steps in this direction. On the other hand, another faction opposes the above-mentioned views. Proponents of this second philosophy of warfare emphasise that Ukraine has been able to wage the war at sea so successfully because it has used an asymmetrical approach. According to their view, it is important to maintain this approach and Ukraine should under no circumstances aim to fight a symmetrical naval war with the Russian fleet. The Ukrainian fleet design should therefore be based on a so-called mosquito fleet – a fleet consisting of small naval assets applying asymmetrical doctrine.105 This argument is not new. Already Ukraine’s 2018 ‘Strategy of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 2035’ elaborates, Recovery of the surface forces during the first two stages of the Strategy will be executed due to the boats of the ‘mosquito fleet’. This solution is the most realistic in terms of cost-effectiveness ratio. Due to its speed, manoeuvrability and armament, such boats are capable of performing practically the whole spectrum of tasks that are inherent to classical surface ships, but they have smaller sea worthiness and operational range from the coast.106 Although Ukrainian strategic documents repeatedly referred to the term ‘mosquito fleet’, the official Ukrainian naval discourse did not explicitly mention JÉ terminol- ogy. This detail stands in contrast to the above-mentioned remarks about the Molodaya Shkola by Ukrainian civilian commentators. It is also, on first sight, surprising given the actual approach to warfare in the Black Sea region that Ukraine – although not primarily the Ukrainian Navy as mentioned further below – has chosen which has paralleled what the JÉ espoused. However, as Admiral (ret.) Ihor Kabanenko, former deputy minister of defence of Ukraine, points out, ‘this term [Molodaya Shkola – author’s note] is not widely used in Ukraine – apparently, because our experts mostly look to the UK and the US and therefore appeal to the old school of sea power and sea mastery [Soviet/Russian/Ukrainian terminological equivalent of the English term “command of the sea”107 – author’s note], missing out on important experience of waging war in the continental sea’.108 The relative silence on JÉ within the official Ukrainian naval discourse is even less astonishing if the development since 2020, approximately, is taken into consideration. As Kabanenko argues, at some point around the turn of the third decade of the 21st century, Ukrainian naval strategy changed course and while abandoning ideas associated with a mosquito fleet, the ‘later document [the 2021 Doctrine – author’s note] instead calls for ambitious symmetric decisions and actions’ in turn stretching budgetary resources and making very costly, long-term investments.109 What had happened? In June 2020, Oleksiy Neizhpapa was appointed Commander of the Ukrainian Navy.110 Neizhpapa – an ‘Old School’ commander – favoured conventional naval forces.111 Talking at the launch of the UK/Norway/Ukraine Maritime Capability Coalition at Admiralty House in London in December 2023, Neizhpapa clung to his visions of a long-term plan for a capable conventional fleet until 2035 and clearly expressed that a powerful and capable navy is not only a tool to deter Russian aggression from the sea, but also a guarantee of the prosperity of our country and security in the region.112 It is thus not a surprise that the 2021 strategic document of the Ukrainian Navy took a sharp turn. Furthermore, as various sources point out, Ukraine’s most successful maritime assets, naval drones, have been predominantly although not exclusively operated by the civilian (SBU) and military (HUR) intelligence services rather than the navy.113 Many Ukrainians who adhere to the second faction view these grand fleet ambitions critically. As Captain (ret.) Andrii Ryzhenko argues, the cost of building up a conventional fleet as envisioned by the Ukrainian naval leadership would be extremely expensive. Such resources could be spent much wiser, especially, if the fact that Ukraine’s current naval strategy that enables effective sea denial operations is taken into consideration.114 Essentially, the ideas supported by Kabanenko, Ryzhenko and other proponents of this school of thought can be attributed to the long-standing tradition of JÉ thinking. In contrast, whereas throughout this article this author has argued that means and ways which Ukrainian security organs applied to erode its Russian opponent closely resembled a JÉ style of naval warfare, this evaluation is descriptive not prescriptive. Unlike civilian experts, such as Vel’mozh͡ ko, who have equally compared Ukraine’s approach to the War in the Black Sea with Young School thinking, there is no evidence supporting that Ukraine’s post-2020 naval leadership was deliber- ately pursuing a JÉ-informed strategy. On the contrary, available evidence points in the direction that for the decision-makers at the time of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine the JÈ was not a source of direct inspiration. In fact, Ukraine’s naval leaders were informed by Old School thinking and capabilities for conventional, symmetric naval warfare were favoured. Revival of Jeune École? The discussion of attacks on merchant shipping has shown that if Ukraine really wanted to interfere with Russian merchant shipping or potentially even enforce a blockade itself, it would have to acquire a fleet consisting of at least some surface combatants. It is highly questionable that under the conditions of (this) war such an aim can be accomplished. Already before the full-scale invasion in February 2022, various experts criticised Ukraine’s apparent shift in naval strategy and the country’s ambitious plans to create a balanced fleet capable of, among others, conducting offensive maritime operations which they deemed unrealistic and a waste of resources arguing instead for the establishment of an effective mosquito fleet.115 Given that Ukraine is fighting an existential struggle in a mostly land- dominated theatre of war, Ukraine should carefully assess how many resources it would want to invest in capabilities in the maritime domain. Ultimately, Russia retains significant long-range strike capabilities as demon- strated by the strike campaign which the Russian military has been waging against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure since autumn 2022.116 So far, one of the great advantages Ukraine’s Navy has enjoyed over the course of this war has been that its mosquito fleet was difficult to track and neutralise by the enemy. Introducing large, tangible objects – naval vessels – into the arsenal of the Ukrainian military would deprive Ukraine of this advantage and make the life for the Russian targeting process a lot easier. Furthermore, given Ukraine’s geographic and geopolitical situation it has to be critically questioned whether Anglo-Saxon ‘Old School’ blue-water theories are the best fit for the Ukrainian Navy. As Gorshkov argues, it is ‘wrong to attempt to build a fleet according to the model and example of the strongest naval power’ as ‘every country has its specific needs for naval forces.’117 Thus, Ryzhenko is correct to emphasise time and again the necessity to pursue an asymmetric strategy at least as far as the enclosed theatre of the Azov-Black Sea-region is concerned. In his words,  Ultimately, small, fast, maneuverable and well-armed boats as well as unmanned aerial and surface vehicles comprising a well-equipped ‘mosquito fleet’ could quickly and efficiently strengthen the Ukrainian Navy and improve the chances to execute successful operations within confined and contested areas where, for now, Russia enjoys dominance in the air and sea. 118 Considering the fate of the JÉ and the Soviet Molodaya Shkola, the – one could almost say libidinal – desire of naval leaders to aim beyond the stage of JÉ weapons and doctrine and acquire a conventional fleet (in the old days a battlefleet) has been prevalent. More than 130 years after Aube, Grivel and the other founding fathers of JÉ, the temptation remains strong. Ironically, even in pursuing an actual war-winning JÉ-based strategy Ukrainian decision- makers are still tempted to revert to warfare capabilities associated with classical naval warfare. The Ukrainian naval leadership should consider care- fully before continuing to steer down this waterway. NOTES 1 Ian Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare, 2nd ed. (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2019), 43ff. 2 See, for example, these authors’ most prominent works: Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1890); Philip Howard Colomb, Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated (London: W. H. Allen & Co., Ltd., 1891); Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911). Corbett has indeed also addressed several elements of naval warfare which are essential to the JÉ school of thought. For example, Corbett argues ‘The vital, most difficult, and most absorbing problem has become not how to increase the power of a battle-fleet for attack, which is a comparatively simple matter, but how to defend it. As the offensive power of the flotilla developed, the problem pressed with an almost bewildering intensity. With every increase in the speed and sea-keeping power of torpedo craft, the problem of the screen grew more exacting’ (Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 122). Due to limitations in aim and scope, this article limits itself to literature and theoreticians associated with the JÉ. Interpreting the War in the Black Sea from a Corbettian perspective may be an area for further research. 3 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2008); David Scott, ‘India’s Drive For A “Blue Water” Navy’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2007–08, 10/2 (2008); and Alessio Patalano, Post-War Japan As a Sea Power: Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience and the Making of a Navy (London: Bloomsburry, 2016). 4 Seth Cropsey, ‘Naval Considerations in the Russo-Ukrainian War’, Naval War College Review, 75/4 (2022), Article 4; and Brent Sadler, ‘Applying Lessons of the Naval War in Ukraine for a Potential War with China’, The Heritage Foundation, 5 January 2023, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/applying-lessons-the-naval-war-ukraine-potential-war-china. 5 Borys Kormych and Tetyana Malyarenko, ‘From Gray Zone to Conventional Warfare: the Russia-Ukraine Conflict in the Black Sea’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 34/7 (2023), 1235–70; Silviu Nate et. alii, ‘Impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War on Black Sea Trade: Geoeconomic Challenges’, Economics & Sociology, 17/1 (2024), 256–79; and Nick Childs, ‘The Black Sea in the Shadow of War’, Survival, 65/3 (2023), 25–36. 6 Md. Tanvir Habib and Shah Md Shamrir Al Af, ‘Maritime asymmetric warfare strategy for smaller states: lessons from Ukraine’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 36/1 (2025), 29–58. 7 Michael Shurkin, ‘Plus Ça Change: A French Approach to Naval Warfare in the 21st Century’, War on the Rocks, 13 Oct. 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/plus-ca-change-a-french-approach-to-naval-warfare-in-the-21st-century/. 8 Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry Watts, ‘Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 20 May 2003, https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/a2ad-anti-access-area-denial; Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, ‘NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge’, Survival, 58/2 (2016), 95–116; and Douglas Barrie, ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial: Bursting the “no-go” bubble?’, IISS Military Balance Blog, 29 Mar. 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/04/anti-access-area-denial-russia-and-crimea. 9 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1989), 94,95; Mikhail Monakov and Jürgen Rohwer, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programs, 1935–53 (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2001), 20ff. and Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 4th ed. (London and New York, NY: Routledge 2018), 94,95. 10 The Land-Based Variant of the SS-N-3 Shaddock. 11 R-360 Neptune Anti-Ship Missiles are Believed to have Critically Damaged the Russian Cruiser Moskva in April 2022. Ellen Uchimiya and Eleanor Watson, The Neptune: The Missiles that Struck Russia’s flagship, the Moskva, CBS News, 16 Apr. 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/moskva-ship-sinking-russian-flagship-neptune-missiles/. 12 Till, Seapower, 93; Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), 225,226. 13 Arne Røksund, The Jeune École: The Strategy of the Weak (Brill, 2007), iX; Martin Motte, Une Éducation Géostratégique. La Pensée Navale Française de la Jeune École à 1914 (Paris:: Economica, 2004), 99. 14 Richild Grivel, De la guerre maritime avant et depuis les nouvelles Inventions (Paris: Arthus Bertrand and J. Dumaine 1869), 7. 15 Ibid., 259. 16 Till, Seapower, 91. 17 Røksund, The Jeune École, 6. 18 Hyacinthe Laurent Théophile Aube, ‘La guerre maritime et les ports militaires de la France’, 320, Revue des Deux Mondes, March 1882, 314–46. 19 Till, Seapower, 91. 20 Røksund, The Jeune École, xii. 21 Ibid., 29–31, 121. 22 Defense Express, ‘First Target of Ukraine’s Neptune Missile’, 12 Jan. 2024, https://en.defence-ua.com/events/first_target_of_ukraines_neptune_missile_how_the_moskva_flagship_killer_scored_its_first_hit_and_prevented_amphibious_assault-9162.html. 23 Hannah Ritchie, ‘Ukrainian Drone Destroys Russian Patrol Ships off Snake Island, says Defense Ministry’, CNN, 2 May 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-05-02-22#h_a73ac98f2400af01f729e23a7e01ae88; and AFP, ‘Ukraine Says Sank Russian Landing Craft at Snake Island’, The Moscow Times, 11 May 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/07/ukraine-says-sank-russian-landing-craft-at-snake-island-a77614. 24 Tass, ‘Kiev loses 30 drones in attempt to seize Snake Island – Russian Defense Ministry’, 10 May 2022, https://tass.com/defense/1449051?utm_source=google.com=organic=google.com=google. com/amp/amp/amp. 25 Deutsche Welle, ‘Russia Pulls Back Forces from Snake Island – as it Happened’, 30 June 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-russia-pulls-back-forces-from-snake-island-as-it-happened/a−62,309,716>. 26 Robert Greenall, ‘Ukraine “hits Russian Missile boat Ivanovets in Black Sea”, BBC, 1 Feb. 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68165523; Tom Balmforth and Yuliia Dysa, ‘Ukraine attacks Russian Warships in Black Sea, Destroys Air defences in Crimea, Kyiv says’, Reuters, 14 Sept. 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-destroys-russian-air-defence-system-near-crimeas-yevpatoriya-source-2023-09-14/; and Sergeĭ Koval’, ‘U beregov kryma potoplen rossiĭskiĭ raketnyĭ kater. Chto o nem izvestno?’, Krym Realii, 01 Feb. 2024, https://ru.krymr.com/a/krym-potoplen-ros-raketnyy-kater/32801464.html. 27 Habib and Md Al Af, ‘Maritime asymmetric warfare strategy for smaller states’, p. 34. 28 Andrew E. Kramer, ‘In a Tough Year on Land, Drones Give Ukraine Some Success at Sea’, 20 Dec. 2023, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/20/world/europe/ukraine-drones-sea.html. 29 Igor Delanoë, ‘Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine’, 7 Feb. 2024, https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/02/russias-black-sea-fleet-in-the-special-military-operation-in-ukraine/. 30 UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Latest Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine − 16 Aug. 2022’, X, 16 Aug. 2022, https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1559411321581572098. 31 Kramer, ‘In a Tough Year on Land’; Roman Romaniuk, Sam Harvey and Olya Loza, ‘Sea drones, Elon Musk, and high-precision missiles: How Ukraine dominates in the Black Sea’, Ukrainska Pravda, 1 Jan. 2024, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/01/1/7435326/. 32 Joshua Cheetham, ‘Sea drones: What are they and how much do they cost?’ BBC, 13 Sept. 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe−66,373,052. 33 Røksund, The Jeune École, 139. 34 Oleksandr Vel’moz͡hko, ‘Rosiĭs’kyĭ flot znovu vidstupai͡e u bazi (VIDEO)’, Pivdennyĭ Kur’i͡er, 10 Dec. 2022,https://uc.od.ua/news/navy/1248235. 35 Greenall, ‘Ukraine ‘hits Russian missile boat Ivanovets in Black Sea’; and Milana Golovan, ‘MAGURA V5 drones attack Tsezar Kunikov ship: Russian occupiers release first-person video footage’, LIGABusinessInform, 6 Mar. 2024, https://news.liga.net/en/politics/video/kak-drony-magura-v5-atakovali-tsezarya-kunikova-okkupanty-pokazali-video-ot-pervogo-litsa. 36 Un ancien officier de marine, ‘Torpilleurs et Torpilles’, 47, La Nouvelle revue, 7/32 (January-February 1885), 42–71. 37 Raul Pedrozo, ‘Maritime Exclusion Zones in Armed Conflicts’, International Law Studies 99/526 (2022), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3018&context=ils, 531. 38 Interfaks, ‘Tanker Povrezhden Na Podkhode K Kerchenskomu Prolivu, Predpolozhitel’No,Morskim Dronom’, 5 Aug. 2023, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/914933; and Romaniuk, Harvey and Loza, ‘Sea drones, Elon Musk, and high-precision missiles’. 39 Sofiia Syngaivska, ‘Russia Uses Civilian Vessels for Military Purposes, Including Recently Attacked Sig Merchant Tanker’, 10 Aug. 2023, https://en.defence-ua.com/news/russia_uses_civilian_vessels_for_military_purposes_including_recently_attacked_sig_merchant_tanker-7590.html; and Daria Shulzhenko, ‘Ukraine’s security chief: Attacks on Russian ships, Crimean bridge ‘logical and legal’, The Kyiv Independent, 5 Aug. 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/sbu-head-says-attacks-on-russian-ships-crimean-bridge-are-logical-and-legal/. 40 Udo Fink and Ines Gillich, Humanitäres Völkerrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2023), 212; Interview with a legal advisor for Law of Naval Operations on 11 June 2024. 41 Ministerstvo oborony Ukraïny, ‘Zai͡ava Ministerstva oborony Ukraïny’, Facebook, 20 July 2023, https://www.facebook.com/MinistryofDefence.UA/posts/pfbid02fGmqenfANV5TABt16PgMpJRT7k5sbkeUhkEAsbkeUhkEAVZuvxxS2dgPkH2qAR7yl. 42 Sluz͡hba bezpeky Ukraïny, ‘golova SBU Vasil’ Mali͡uk prokomentuvav neshchodavni ataky nadvodnymy dronamy na korabli rf,‘ 5 Aug 2023, https://t.me/SBUkr/9185; Gabriel Gavin, ‘Ukraine declares war on Russia’s Black Sea shipping’, Politico, 8 Aug. 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-declares-war-on-russia-black-sea-shipping/. 43 Lloyd’s List, ‘Russia warns that Ships Heading to Ukraine are now a Military Target’, 20 July 2023, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1145965/Russia-warns-that-ships-heading-to-Ukraine-are-now-a-military-target. 44 Shaun Walker, ‘Odesa suffers “Hellish Night” as Russia Attacks Ukraine Grain Facilities’, The Guardian, 19 July 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/19/odesa-suffers-hellish-night-as-russia-attacks-ukraines-grain-facilities; UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and James Cleverly, ‘New intelligence shows Russia’s targeting of a cargo ship’, 11 Sept. 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-intelligence-shows-russias-targeting-of-a-cargo-ship. 45 Gavin, ‘Ukraine declares war on Russia’s Black Sea shipping’. 46 Michelle Wiese Bockmann, ‘Western Tankers Abandon Black Sea crude markets after Ukraine drone attacks’, Lloyd’s List, 07 Aug. 2023, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1146178/Western-tankers-abandon-Black-Sea-crude-markets-after-Ukraine-drone-attacks. 47 Interview with an authoritative Ukrainian source in May 2024. 48 Louise Doswald-Beck (ed.), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) [SRM], paragraphs [59]-[61]; Andreas von Arnauld, Völkerrecht (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2019), 577. 49 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Procès-verbal relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare set forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of 22 April 1930. London, 6 November 1936’, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/assets/treaties/330-IHL-45-EN.pdf. 50 SRM paragraphs [93]-[104]; Robert Kolb and Richard Hyde, Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2008), 252. 51 Kolb and Hyde, Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts, 252; James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, International Maritime Security Law (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 888; Arnauld, Völkerrecht, 578. 52 Arnauld, Völkerrecht, 578. Offensive mine warfare is not considered in this article (Conversation with Dr Marc De Vore, University of St. Andrews, at the Finnish National Defence University in Helsinki on 13 February 2025). 53 SRM, paragraph [60]. For a discussion, see, Kraska and Pedrozo, International Maritime Security Law, 868. 54 UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, ‘G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting communiqué (Capri, 19 April, 2024) – steadfast support to Ukraine’, 19 Apr. 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g7-foreign-ministers-meeting-communiques-april-2024/g7-foreign-ministers-meeting-communique-capri-19-april-2024-steadfast-support-to-ukraine. 55 Bitsat Yohannes-Kassahun, ‘One Year Later: The impact of the Russian conflict with Ukraine on Africa’, United Nations Africa Renewal, 13 Feb. 2023, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/february-2023/one-year-later-impact-russian-conflict-ukraine-africa. 56 Timothy Heck, speech given at the Kiel International Seapower Symposium 2024 on 28 June 2024. 57 Røksund, The Jeune École, 27. 58 Tim Lister, ‘A Russian naval base was targeted by drones. Now Ukrainian grain exports are at risk’, CNN, 31 Oct. 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/31/europe/sevastopol-drone-russia-ukraine-grain-intl-cmd/index.html. 59 Shephard News, ‘UK says Saky explosions leave Russian Navy Black Sea aviation fleet ‘significantly degraded’, 12 Aug. 2022, https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/defence-notes/uk-says-explosions-leave-russian-navy-black-sea-aircraft-significantly-degraded/; Cameron Manley, ‘Ukraine says it has taken out another 2 warships in Russia’s Black Sea fleet’, Business Insider, 24 Mar. 2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-taken-out-another-2-ships-russias-black-sea-fleet-2024–3; and Nate Ostiller and The Kyiv Independent news desk, ‘General Staff confirms Russian missile ship Tsiklon struck in occupied Crimea’, The Kyiv Independent, 21 May 2024, https://kyivindependent.com/general-staff-confirms-russian-missile-ship-zyklon-struck-off-occupied-crimea. 60 HI Sutton, ‘Ukraine’s Maritime Drone Strikes Again: Reports Indicate Attack On Novorossiysk’, Naval News, 18 Nov. 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/11/ukraine-maritime-drone-strikes-again-reports-indicate-attack-on-novorossiysk/. 61 Romaniuk, Harvey and Loza, ‘Sea drones, Elon Musk, and high-precision missiles’. 62 Lloyd’s List, ‘Ukraine attacks Russian port of Novorossiysk’, 4 Aug. 2023, https://lloydslist.com/LL1146152/Ukraine-attacks-Russian-port-of-Novorossiysk; UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Latest Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine − 05 August 2023’, X, 5 Aug. 2023, https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1687697529918373889?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1687697529918373889%7Ctwgr%5E751b5a68b67ea91d2ca704e56fc3a0c7c88c3053%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.forces.net%2Frussia%2Frussian-war-ship-damaged-significant-blow-russias-black-sea-fleet-mod-says. 63 Romaniuk, Harvey and Loza, ‘Sea drones, Elon Musk, and high-precision missiles’. 64 It can certainly be argued that states do not always comply with international humanitarian law. The Second World War provides numerous examples including in the field of commerce raiding. However, the Manichaean distinction between Russia, the aggressor violating public international law, and Ukraine, which is legitimately defending itself, is essential to Kyiv’s political strategy. Against this background, consideration of international law is fundamental for Ukraine’s naval warfare and this study. 65 Romaniuk, Harvey and Loza, ‘Sea drones, Elon Musk, and High-Precision Missiles’. 66 Alona Sonko, ‘Aerial Shots Detail Drone Damage at Novorossiysk Port’, The New Voice of Ukraine, 19 May 2024, https://english.nv.ua/nation/satellite-images-show-aftermath-of-may-17-attack-on-novorossiysk-seaport−50,419,745html. 67 Martin Fornusek, ‘Military intelligence: Oil Pipeline Blown up in Russia’s Rostov Oblast’, The Kyiv Independent, 06 Apr. 2024, https://kyivindependent.com/military-intelligence-oil-pipeline-in-russias-rostov-oblast-on-fire/. 68 Jack Detsch, ‘Russia’s Home Port in Occupied Crimea Is Under Fire’, Foreign Policy, 13 Sept. 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/13/crimea-ukraine-russia-war-attack-black-sea-fleet/. 69 Interfaks, ‘Chislo postradavshikh pri atake na stab Chernomorskogo flota vyroslo do shesti’, 31 July 2022, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/854608; Maria Kostenko, Tim Lister and Sophie Tanno, ‘Ukraine says strike on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet HQ left Dozens Dead and Wounded ‘Including Senior Leadership’, CNN, 23 September 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/23/europe/special-ops-black-sea-strike-dozens-dead-intl-hnk/index.html. 70 The Maritime Executive, ‘Ukraine Strikes Another Naval Shipyard in Russian-Occupied Crimea’, 05 Nov. 2024, https://maritime-executive.com/article/ukraine-strikes-another-naval-shipyard-in-russian-occupied-crimea; Defense Express, ‘Destruction of Russian Novocherkassk Ship has Blocked One of Logistic Channels to Crimea (Satellite Photo)’, 12 Apr. 2024, https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/destruction_of_russian_novocherkassk_ship_has_blocked_one_of_logistic_channels_to_crimea_satellite_photo−10,152html. 71 UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Update on Ukraine’, X, 15 Sept. 2023, https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1702561936179630440?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1702561936179630440%7Ctwgr%5E64b3d174bc910eae91016ef92e9b0b07e88b9194%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.twz.com%2Frussian-submarine-shows-massive-damage-after-ukrainian-strike; Thomas Newdick, ‘Russian Submarine Shows Massive Damage After Ukrainian Strike’, The Warzone, 18 Sept. 2024, https://www.twz.com/russian-submarine-shows-massive-damage-after-ukrainian-strike. 72 Craig Hooper, ‘Why Ukraine’s Strike On Sevastopol Naval Infrastructure Is A Big Deal’, Forbes, 14 Sept. 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2023/09/13/why-ukraines-strike-on-sebastopol-naval-infrastructure-is-a-big-deal/; Mike Eckel, ‘Russia’s Navy Has A Dry Dock Problem. Again’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 Sept. 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-navy-dry-dock-problem-ukraine-/32595547.html. 73 UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and Nicholas Aucott, ‘Russia is Diminished in The eyes of The International Community through its Own Actions: UK Statement to the OSCE’, 06 Dec. 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russia-is-diminished-in-the-eyes-of-the-international-community-through-its-own-actions-uk-statement-to-the-osce; Sinéad Baker, ‘Putin doesn’t really want a war with NATO because “Russia will lose and lose quickly”, UK military chief says’, Business Insider, 28 Feb. 2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-doesnt-want-nato-war-russia-would-lose-quickly-uk-2024–2?r=US&IR=T. 74 AP News, ‘Ukrainian navy says a Third of Russian warships in the Black Sea have been Destroyed or Disabled’, 26 Mar. 2024, https://apnews. 75 Mia Jankowicz, ‘Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is “Functionally Inactive” After being Pummeled Hard by Ukraine, UK says’, Business Insider, 25 Mar. 2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-black-sea-fleet-functionally-inactive-after-ukraine-strikes-uk-2024–3.: 76 UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Latest Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine − 18 April 2024’, X, 18 Apr. 2024, https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1780878487068242335/photo/3. 77 Speller takes only brief note of Attacks Against Enemy Ports whereas Geoffrey Till doesn’t mention them at all. The Commerce Raiding Component of Jeune ÉCole has been awarded much greater attention. Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare, 57–60; Till, Seapower, 91–93. 78 Aube, ‘La guerre maritime’, 331. 79 Gabriel Charmes, La Réforme de la Marine (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1886), 56–57. 80 Aube, ‘La guerre maritime’, 332. 81 Shurkin, ‘Plus Ça Change’. For Further Literature on The Subject of the ‘Material School’ see, Kevin McCranie, Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021), 55ff. 82 Gustav Gressel, ‘Waves of ambition: Russia’s military build-up in Crimea and the Black Sea’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 21.09.2021, https://ecfr.eu/publication/waves-of-ambition-russias-military-build-up-in-crimea-and-the-black-sea/; Tayfun Ozberk, ‘Analysis: Russia To Dominate The Black Sea In Case Of Ukraine Conflict’, Naval News, 30 Jan. 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/01/analysis-russia-to-dominate-the-black-sea-in-case-of-ukraine-conflict/; Welt, ‘Militärexperte Gressel: Darum hat die ukrainische Armee kaum eine Chance gegen Russen’, 24 Jan. 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aNzUf3zllJ4. 83 Røksund, The Jeune École, 84, 132. 84 Ibid., 166. 85 Ibid., 228. 86 Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare, 60. 87 Monakov and Rohwer, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet, 62–109, 221–4. 88 Andrew Lambert in December 2018. M.A. Seminar Navies and Seapower offered by the War Studies Department at King’s College London 2018–2019. 89 Sergej G. Gorschkow, Die Seemacht des Staates (Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1978) [Morskai͡a Moshch‘ gosudarstva. Voenizdat 1976], 172, 355. 90 Ibid., 341, 372. 91 The author is aware of the ongoing debate on the extent to which the technological developments – especially the use of uncrewed systems – which have shaped the War in the Black Sea can be generalised. Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald, for example, examine the relation between autonomous/uncrewed systems and revolutions in military affairs and come to the conclusion that ‘these systems may be most revolutionary is in cost mitigation—both political and economic.’ In contrast, Oleksandr Vel’moz͡hko does acknowledge the advantages, such as mass-production and cost-efficiency, inherent to a ‘young school’–inspired navy consisting of high-tech small crafts but also points at serious disadvantages connected with such systems, for example their inability to operate on the open ocean and their high vulnerability. Duncan Redford further elaborates on the limitations concerning the use of unmanned surface vehicles, among others, arguing that ‘environmental conditions in the Baltic and High North are such that they are highly likely to severely restrict the use of’ Ukrainian style one-way attack USVs. Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald, ‘Looking back to look forward: Autonomous systems, military revolutions, and the importance of cost’, 162, Journal of Strategic Studies, 47/2 (2024), 162–184; Vel’moz͡hko,‘Rosiĭs’kyĭ flot znovu vidstupai͡e u bazi (VIDEO)’; Duncan Redford, ‘Maritime Lessons from the Ukraine-Russia Conflict: USVs and the Applicability to the Baltic and High North’, #GIDSstatement 11/2024, (14 Oct. 2024), https://gids-hamburg.de/maritime-lessons-from-the-ukraine-russia-conflict-usvs-and-the-applicability-to-the-baltic-and-high-north/. 92 For example, in September 1939, in December 1940 and October 1942. Bernd Stegemann, ‘Vierter Teil: Die erste Phase der Seekriegsführung’, 162, in: Klaus A. Maier, Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegemann and Hans Umbreit (eds.), Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Vol. II (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt 1979), 159–188; Werner Rahn, ‘The Atlantic in the Strategic Perspective of Hitler and his Admirals, 1939–1944’, 160, 164, in: N.A.M. Rodger, J. Ross Dancy, Benjamin Darnell and Evan Wilson (eds.), Strategy and the Sea: Essays in Honour of John B. Hattendorf (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press 2016), 159–168. 93 Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945 Vol. I (Frankfurt am Main und München: Bernard & Graefe 1970), 128; Stegemann, ‘Vierter Teil: Die erste Phase der Seekriegsführung’, 162; Rahn, ‘The Atlantic in the Strategic Perspective of Hitler and his Admirals, 1939–1944’, 160, 164. 94 See Adolf Hitler on 31 May 1943: ‘The number of resources that submarine warfare would tie up, even if it were no longer to achieve great success, is so extraordinarily large that I cannot allow the enemy to free up these resources’ Gerhard Wagner (ed.), Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939–1945 (München: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1972), 510. 95 Craig Symonds, ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan’, 33, in: Geoffrey Till (ed.), Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (London and Basingstoke: MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd, 1990)) [1984], 28–33. 96 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain and other Articles (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1899), 300. 97 Elisabeth Braw , ‘The Invasion of Ukraine Is Causing Crisis at Sea’, Foreign Policy, 7 March 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/07/ukraine-shipping-supply-war/; Interview with a Representative of an anonymous maritime stakeholder that was heavily affected by the War in Ukraine on 25 October 2023. 98 Paul Adams, ‘Ukraine Claims to Retake Black Sea Drilling Rigs from Russian Control’, BBC, 11 Sept. 2023, https://www.bbc. com/news/66779639. 99 Instytut Viĭs’kovo-Mors’kykh Syl, ‘Doktrina: Viĭs’kovo-Mors’ki Syly Zbroĭnykh syl Ukraïny’, January 2021, 79, https://ivms.mil.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/doktryna_vijskovo-morski-syly-zbrojnyh-syl-ukrayinydiv.pdf. 100 Ibid., 76. 101 Militarnyi, ‘Frigates for Ukrainian Navy: the construction agreement was included into contract with the United Kingdom’, 25 Nov. 2021, https://mil.in.ua/en/news/frigates-for-ukrainian-navy-the-construction-agreement-was-included-into-contract-with-the-united-kingdom/. 102 Vitaly Semenov, ‘Prospects for the Development of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Until 2035’, Forum: ‘State Maritime Strategy. Development and implementation of maritime potential of Ukraine’ at the National Defence University of Ukraine on 23 May 2024. 103 Tayfun Ozberk, ‘Turkish Shipyard Lays Keel Of Ukraine’s 2nd MILGEM Corvette’, Naval News, 18 Aug. 2023, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/08/turkish-shipyard-lays-keel-of-ukraine-2nd-milgem-corvette/. 104 UK Ministry of Defence, ‘British minehunting Ships to Bolster Ukrainian Navy as UK and Norway Launch Maritime Support Initiative’, 11 Dec. 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-minehunting-ships-to-bolster-ukrainian-navy-as-uk-and-norway-launch-maritime-support-initiative#:~:text=The%20UK%20will%div20lead%20a,ships%20for%20the%20Ukrainian%20Navy. 105 Bern Keating, The Mosquito Fleet (New York, NY: Scholastic Book Services, 1969) [Originally Published 1963]. 106 Viĭs’kovo-Mors’ki Syly Zbroĭnykh syl Ukraïny, ‘Strategy of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 2035’, 11 Jan. 2019, https://navy.mil.gov.ua/en/strategiya-vijskovo-morskyh-syl-zbrojnyh-syl-ukrayiny-2035/. 107 Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas, 2nd ed. (Abingdon and New York, NY: Cass, 2003), 110. 108 Interview with Admiral (ret.) Ihor Kabanenko on 06 November 2024. 109 Ihor Kabanenko, ‘Ukraine’s New Naval Doctrine: A Revision of the Mosquito Fleet Strategy or Bureaucratic Inconsistency?’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 25 May 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/ukraines-new-naval-doctrine-a-revision-of-the-mosquito-fleet-strategy-or-bureaucratic-inconsistency/. 110 Prezydent Ukraïny, ‘Ukaz Prezydenta Ukraïny No. 217/2020’, 2020, https://www.president.gov.ua/docdivuments/2172020–34,085. 111 Interview with an authoritative Ukrainian source in June 2024. 112 Lee Willett, ‘Ukrainian Navy Chief Details Future Force Requirements’, Naval News, 18 Dec. 2023, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/12/ukrainian-navy-chief-details-future-force-requirements/. 113 Sergej Sumlenny, ‘Naval Drones in Russo-Ukrainian War: from the current stand to the future development’, presentation given at the German Command and Staff College on 19 June 2024; Kramer, ‘In a Tough Year on Land’. See also various articles by the newspaper The Kyiv Independent. Militarnyi, ‘The Ukrainian Navy received naval drones equipped with strike FPV drone’, 8 Dec. 2024, https://mil.in.ua/en/news/the-ukrainian-navy-received-naval-drones-equipped-with-strike-fpv-drones/. 114 Andrii Ryzhenko, ‘Ways of Developing the Naval Capabilities of Ukraine to Ensure the Military Security of the State at Sea, Taking into Account the Experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war’, forum: ‘State Maritime Strategy. Development and implementation of maritime potential of Ukraine’, National Defence University of Ukraine on 23 May 2024. 115 Sanders, Deborah ‘Rebuilding the Ukrainian Navy’, Naval War College Review, 70/4 (2017), Article 5, 74; Jason Y. Osuga (2017), ‘Building an Asymmetric Ukrainian Naval Force to Defend the Sea of Azov, Pt. 2’, CIMSEC, 2 Oct. 2017, https://cimsec.org/tag/ukraine/page/2/; Defense Express, ‘Ukraine’s Navy Looking To Acquire 30 New Warships By 2020’, 12 Apr. 2018, https://old.defence-ua.com/index.php/en/news/4367-ukraine-s-navy-looking-to-acquire-30-new-warships-by-2020; Kabanenko, ‘Ukraine’s New Naval Doctrine’. 116 Adam Schreck and Hanna Arhirova, ‘Russia Unleashes Biggest attacks in Ukraine in Months’, The Associated Press News, 11 Oct. 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-government-and-politics-8f625861590b9e0dd336dabc0880ac8c; Michael N. 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Defense & Security
Brussels, Belgium – November 06 2023: new pack of economic EU sanctions against Russia, vector cartoon illustration on white

Who supports EU sanctions against Russia’s war in Ukraine? The role of the defence of European values and other socioeconomic factors

by Alessandro Indelicato , Juan Carlos Martína

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, following the military actions that began with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The conflict is having devastating consequences, including widespread death and displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and a global energy crisis, also heightening geopolitical tensions (Kurapov et al., Citation2023). Pertiwi (Citation2024) contended that since the crisis in Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the European Union (EU) has adopted sanctions as the key policy response targeting Russia’s aggressive behaviour. These restrictive measures were applied by the EU in multiple rounds and packages and gradually became the cornerstone of the EU’s policy towards Russia. (p. 61) There is extant literature studying the direct consequences of the war, such as humanitarian crises, economic impacts and geopolitical instability. Numerous countries have experienced food shortages and rising prices due to disruptions in supply chains, worsened by the crisis in Ukraine and the closure of airspace (Hellegers, Citation2022). Concurrently, the war has caused an unprecedentedly volatile energy market, as many European countries were obliged to seek alternative energy sources to Russian imports, demanding more oil and natural gas from alternative suppliers (Liadze et al., Citation2022). The invasion has also fuelled inflation across the EU, not only affecting energy, which is essential in all the sectors of the economy but also other sectors like food, for example, as Ukraine is a major global grain producer (Ozili, Citation2024). The added value and main contribution of this paper is based on the use of grounded social scientific methods like the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS and the Ordered Probit, to analyse the EU citizens’ support of the sanctions against Russia, providing more nuanced insights on what factors are the most important to be in favour and against the sanctions. Thus, in particular, our study contributes to filling one of the important gaps mentioned by Pertiwi (Citation2024) in the analysis of the literature on the EU’s approach to sanctions on Russia. Concretely, our study fills in part the fifth gap in the analysis of causal mechanisms that examine the sanctions, including relevant actors like the EU citizens. Thus, we first provide an in-depth analysis of European citizens’ views on EU sanctions to weaken Russia and support Ukraine. And then, we analyse the main factors that affect the EU citizens’ support of the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia and in favour of Ukraine. The study includes data from 26,461 respondents across the 27 EU Member States, collected through the 98th Eurobarometer survey (Winter 2022–2023), which examined the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature review. Section 3 presents the dataset used, and the methodological approach. In Section 5, the results are presented, followed by Section 5, which offers a thorough discussion of the findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper by summarising the main conclusions drawn from the study, identifying implications, limitations of the study, and potential directions for future research. Literature reviewAttitudes towards EU’s sanctions against Russia war in Ukraine Public sentiment for the EU is a complex phenomenon to study and needs to be approached from different angles, including identity, governance, security and the economy. How the public perceives the EU as a guardian of democratic values and good governance directly influences support for its policies, including sanctions on Russia. Boomgaarden et al. (Citation2011) argue that if the people believe that the EU is going to safeguard democratic principles, then they will identify sanctions as a proper means of safeguarding such principles. However, if there is a lack of trust in the EU to defend such values, there will be little support for such sanctions. The purpose of European identity is primarily to determine people’s views on the EU’s actions. Kende et al. (Citation2018) believe that European identity can have a profound impact on solidarity with common EU policies, such as sanctions. This would imply that the framing of a common European identity can become the most important factor in eliciting public consent for EU programmes, especially in the midst of geopolitical crises. Thus, public opinion on sanctions is also based on perceptions of the EU’s ability to act in the interests of citizens. According to McLean and Roblyer (Citation2016), if citizens perceive the EU as doing the best it can for its citizens, particularly in terms of economic stability and governance, they are more likely to support sanctions against Russia. However, if the EU is perceived as wasteful, or its policies are perceived as economically harmful, then the potential for support for sanctions will be low. This explains the need to ensure that EU action is consistent with shared perceptions of political effectiveness and economic benefit. The imposition of economic sanctions is one of the highest prioritised tools in the modern world, especially against threats to stability and security. The EU sanctions on Russia, especially after the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine, have stimulated an immensely wide public discussion (Karlović et al., Citation2021). An important question is: What is the role of perceived security threats in shaping public opinion about these sanctions? It has been made known through investigation that subjective security risk strongly predicts public opinion regarding EU sanctions against Russia. Frye (Citation2019) argues that sanctions are not always supported but vary depending on how people view security threats. Public support is higher when sanctions are framed as protection against an external threat. When sanctions are perceived as a threat to national or economic security, they can generate opposition. The EU’s collective response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict also shows that public opinion on sanctions is shaped by both security interests and normative expectations of justice and self-determination (Bosse, Citation2024). This mutual influence can lead to mixed public responses, with some seeing sanctions as an ethical necessity, while others withdraw their support due to perceived economic and national security risks. The way EU sanctions are proposed and implemented also influences public opinion. According to Sjursen (Citation2015), citizens will be more supportive of sanctions if they see EU institutions as representative and transparent. Conversely, an image of bureaucratic distance or lack of public participation in decision-making can undermine trust and lead to opposition. Thus, in line with this background, we pose our first research question as follows: (1) How do European values and security threats influence the intensity of public support for EU sanctions against Russia?Socioeconomic factors in shaping attitudes towards EU sanctions Support for economic sanctions against Russia is widespread among the EU, varying according to socioeconomic status, demographic characteristics and political engagement. As Frye (Citation2017) has noted, economic prosperity is a key predictor of support for sanctions. Those who are financially ‘safe’ are more likely to support EU-imposed sanctions, as they are less directly affected by the economic burden. Previous studies have shown that those in more affluent income groups or with stable household finances are more likely to support foreign policy actions, such as sanctions, that represent broader European values, even if they are economically costly (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). This is consistent with the findings of Lepeu (Citation2025), which recognises that citizens who rate their own economic situation as ‘very good’ are far more likely to support sanctions than those facing financial hardship. On the other hand, citizens facing economic hardship are less likely to be sanction-supportive if they believe that sanctions will negatively impact inflation, increase unemployment or suppress national economic stability. Onderco (Citation2017) found that economic hardship is associated with higher scepticism towards foreign policy decisions that lack tangible personal benefits. This means that the economic price of sanctions is likely to disproportionately affect support among lower-income individuals. Generational differences also play a role in shaping public opinion on sanctions. Older individuals (over 55 years) are more supportive of EU sanctions, as they have a historical perspective on European security and are more politically engaged (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). On the other hand, younger people (15–34 years) have weaker support, possibly because they have different priorities, such as financial stability and employment, which could be considered more pressing than geopolitical concerns (Onderco, Citation2017). Alexandrescu (Citation2024) also suggests a new generational divide in attitudes towards coercive diplomacy, suggesting that efforts to build popular support for sanctions must consider young Europeans’ concerns and values about economic consequences and political transparency. Political interest is a second important predictor of support for EU sanctions. Politically knowledgeable and engaged citizens tend to be more supportive of EU foreign policy decisions, including sanctions (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). Thus, there is political ideology duality: left and centre-left voters support sanctions if they are anchored in a broader vision of upholding international law and human rights, while centre-right and populist voters are likely to be more sceptical if sanctions are perceived as infringing on national sovereignty (Onderco, Citation2017). As in the literature, the likelihood of being a strong supporter of EU sanctions depends on several socioeconomic and demographic factors, our second research question builds on the following: (2) Do socioeconomic characteristics influence the likelihood of being a strong supporter of EU sanctions against Russia?Dataset and methodology The dataset of the study is based on the Standard Eurobarometer 98.2 (EB98) survey Winter 2022–2023 which was conducted from 12 January to 6 February 2023 in 39 countries or territories. In the study, we only use the dataset from the 27 Member States of the EU, without considering the data from the other twelve additional countries included. The dataset was collected about a year after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, covering the following five topic areas identified by the European Commission (Citation2024): (1) The EU’s response to the invasion of Ukraine; (2) the actions taken as a unified EU response to the invasion; (3) the consequences of the war in Ukraine; (4) the European security threat; and (5) the future EU actions in the wake of the war., and aims to analyse the solidarity of European citizens with the Ukrainian people. The sample size for each country was around 1000 respondents except for Malta with 503, making a total of 26,461 respondents. The endogenous variable of the study is obtained by applying the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS approach to the items of the survey included to measure the degree of support of the respondents towards the measures taken by the EU in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The following five items were included in the analysis: (1) financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine; (2) imposing economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals; (3) providing financial support to Ukraine; (4) providing humanitarian support to the people affected by the war; and (5) welcoming into the EU people fleeing the war. The question introduction was the same for all the items: The EU has taken a series of actions as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of these actions taken? The responses to the question for each item were given using a complete 5-point Likert scale, where: 1 = totally agree; 2 = tend to agree; 3 = do not know; 4 = tend to disagree; and 5 = totally disagree. The scale was reversed to enhance interpretability, ensuring that higher values are aligned with those citizens who expressed higher support for the measures taken by the EU. The analysis of the variables affecting the citizens’ support was based on the selection of 14 exogenous variables, including age, gender, political interest, perception of the situation in the country, employment personal perception, financial household perception, the labour market perception of the country, the provision of public services perception, the overall image of the EU, the perception of the threat posed by the Russian war in Ukraine to security in the EU and the country itself, the personal perception that standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is defending European values, and the political orientation. More information about the exogenous variables can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. The Ordered Probit model will provide interesting and nuanced results of whether some exogenous variables affect the support of the EU sanctions taken by the EU in response to the Russian invasion. For example, for each of the variables included in the analysis, it will be possible to analyse to what extent some of the categories support more or less the sanctions. Similarly, it will be possible to determine if some of the variables have a significant effect on the level of support. Methodology Opinion surveys are affected by the subjective judgments of respondents, leading to potential inaccuracy in interpreting response categories (Disegna et al., Citation2018). For instance, ‘totally agree’ for one respondent could be equivalent to simply ‘tend to agree’ for another. For this reason, Fuzzy Set Logic methods are becoming very popular in social sciences to manage the uncertainty associated with survey responses effectively (Cantillo et al., Citation2021; Indelicato & Martín, Citation2024). The study uses the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS Approach to calculate the endogenous variable that measures the support (sup) of the respondents towards the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia. The method is grounded in the fuzzy set theory proposed by Zadeh (Citation1965), which was introduced for handling the inherent uncertainty and vagueness of information provided by answers to social surveys (Carlsson & Fullér, Citation2001; Disegna et al., Citation2018; Mamdani & Assilian, Citation1999). There are multiple fuzzy set representations that can be used to associate the categories of the answers given in the survey (Nguyen et al., Citation2005). In the study, we use the Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFNs), which are the most used fuzzy sets (Anand & Bharatraj, Citation2017; Wang, Citation2017). The final representation of the answers from the dataset is as follows: (1) totally disagree is represented by (0, 0, 30); (2) tend to disagree by (20, 30, 40); (3) do not know by (30, 50, 70); (4) tend to agree by (60, 70, 80); and (5) totally agree by (70, 100, 100). The hybrid nature of the method is based on the application of the Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), which calculates the synthetic indicator (Hwang & Yoon, Citation1981). We omit the mathematical formulation of the method for simplicity and ease of exposition. Interested readers can consult many existing papers, such as (Cantillo et al., Citation2023; Indelicato et al., Citation2023; Martín et al., Citation2020; Martín & Indelicato, Citation2023). We will use sup which provides relative support for the sanctions on Russia taken by the EU after invading Ukraine, as the dependent variable for the econometric model. The variable will be categorised into five quintiles according to the ranking of the indicator in order to use an ordered probit model. The marginal effects of the results will be used to analyse the main determinants that explain the highest support of EU citizens. In the study, we use the Daly normalisation for all the categories that act as exogenous variables in the model. Thus, it is possible to determine the marginal effects of each category with respect to the sample-weighted average. We omit the discussion of the technicalities of the model and exogenous variables normalisation. Interested readers can consult Daly et al. (Citation2016), Greene and Hensher (Citation2010), Hensher et al. (Citation2015) and Martin and Roman (Citation2021). Results Figure 1 shows the kernel density of the exogenous variable that measures the support of EU individuals for the sanctions against Russia taken by the EU for the whole sample (panel a) and for those who totally agree and totally disagree with the EU imposing the sanctions to defend European values (panel b). The results indicate that a small number of respondents do not support the sanctions imposed by the EU at all, with 170 citizens giving a score of 1 to all survey items included in the scale. Conversely, a significant portion of the population holds a more neutral position, as shown by responses falling in the range of 0.3–0.6. Additionally, a substantial number of citizens – specifically, 6430 – express their strong support for the sanctions by responding with a score of 5 to all items.  Figure 1. Support kernel density. Panel (b) of the figure clearly distinguishes between the two categories of respondents. It shows that those who strongly support the defence of European values are more in favour of the sanctions compared to those who strongly oppose them. Similar figure patterns are obtained for the categories of those who have a positive or negative image of the EU, and for those who think that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is seen as an important threat to the security of the EU. Nevertheless, this will be further discussed with the results of the ordered probit model. Table 1 shows the main drivers to support or not the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia. The table is obtained from the marginal effects obtained from the ordered probit model, which is in the fifth quintile of the support distribution, and refers to the citizen group of the strong supporters (Table A3, in the appendix). It can be seen that the main drivers to support the sanctions are totally agreeing that by standing against the Russian invasion, the EU is defending European values, having a very good or rather good image of the EU, totally agreeing that the EU security is under threat with the Russian invasion, and to have a very good financial situation in the household. All the coefficients are significant at 999 per thousand. The results of the ordered probit model, as well as the complete table of the marginal effects, can be consulted in the appendix. Table A2 shows that all the exogenous variables affect the support level except the area in which the respondent resides, so the support is transversal to whether the European lives in a rural, middle town or large town. It is also interesting to observe that all the threshold parameters of the ordered probit model result significant, i.e. the five different quintiles of the distribution can be allocated without the need to collapse some of the categories used in the estimation.  Table 1. Main drivers to be or not a strong supporter of the EU sanctions. Interestingly, the main drivers to be in the population segment of those who do not strongly support the EU sanctions are the opposite categories of supporting the sanctions: totally disagreeing or tending to disagree with the defence of European values, totally disagreeing or tending to disagree with the fact that the invasion of Ukraine is a security threat to the EU and having a very bad image of the EU. The coefficients of Table 1 have been extracted from Table A3, and need to be interpreted as follows: the coefficients are the marginal effects of the category to be or not a strong supporter of the EU sanctions. For example, the coefficient of 0.105 for individuals who totally agree that the EU is defending European values by standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine indicates that this group has a 10.5 per cent higher likelihood of being strong supporters of EU sanctions compared to the average citizen in the overall sample. In a similar manner, the coefficient of −0.225 for the category of total disagreement indicates a 22.5 per cent lower probability of being a strong supporter. Other interesting results that can be seen in the complete marginal effects table (Table A3, in the appendix) are that the type of urbanisation where the respondent lives, namely rural village, small and mid-size town or large town, is the only variable of the twelve under analysis which does not have any significant effect on being a strong supporter of the sanctions. For the rest of the variables, there is always a category with more odds of being or not in the category of strong supporters. It is interesting to note that the younger generations (between 15 and 24 and between 25 and 34) are less likely to be in the category of strong supporters than those over 55, who are significantly more likely to be in this category. Similarly, those who have a strong political interest, have a good personal job situation, think that the economic situation of their country is rather good, are leftist or left-centre, think that the employment situation of the country is rather good, are males, or have a rather good financial situation have a higher probability of being in the category of strong supporters. Conclusions In a recent speech by Jens Stoltenberg, former Secretary General of NATO, the following assessment was made: In just a few weeks, NATO leaders will meet in Madrid. We will make important decisions. To continue to strengthen and adapt our Alliance to a new security reality and protect our people and our values. I look forward to the day when we can welcome both Finland and Sweden into our Alliance. This will make Finland and Sweden safer. NATO stronger. And the whole Euro-Atlantic area more secure. (NATO, Citation2022) Although NATO’s strategic decision affects the entire geopolitical landscape, public perceptions of EU sanctions need to be addressed through a more nuanced, evidence-based approach. Public opinion on sanctions is driven not only by security concerns but also by economic and political factors that underpin individual belief systems. To measure the determinants of support for such policies, this study applies both the fuzzy hybrid approach and the ordered probit model. The first method calculates the endogenous variable that measures the level of support of each respondent. The second method is used to find the main factors of a set of 14 exogenous variables or covariates that affect the support. Our results reveal that there are four important drivers to be a strong supporter of the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in early 2022: (1) totally agreeing that by standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is defending European values, (2) having a very good overall EU image, (3) totally agreeing that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a threat to the security of the EU, and (4) having a very good household financial situation. Other factors, such as age, gender, or political orientation, among others, are less determinant in explaining the strong support category. The dataset for the study was obtained from the 98th Eurobarometer, covering winter 2022–2023, providing a solid foundation for the objectives pursued in the study. Our results imply that, at least in the salient category of being a strong supporter of the EU sanctions, European Parliamentarians and the political parties involved should promote a triad: the defence of European values (Anghel & Jones, Citation2023), a more integrated security defence system that will permit the EU to be more independent from NATO and US (Del Sarto Citation2016; Howorth Citation2018), and a solid campaign of improving the EU image, highlighting the benefits of being in the union (Elmatzoglou, Citation2020). The European values of human rights and dignity, as well as the principles of living in liberal democracies, should not be undermined by misinformation campaigns from autocratic regimes. The invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest security threat in Europe since the end of the Cold War, fostering a wave of fear and real politics about the necessity of increasing the military budget. Europeans have seen more closely how the lives of human beings are worth almost nothing when their homes are bombed, and they have to leave with just the bare minimum, stopping their daily lives and becoming refugees in countries that may not welcome them with open arms. There is a need for effective communication campaigns that change the focus from generic issues such as ‘Europeanness’ fostering a common national identity or sense of belonging to a pragmatic branding strategy that achieves a power actor in the new turbulent geopolitical battlefield. Recent developments, in the light of newly elected President Donald Trump’s views on NATO and US foreign aid, have added uncertainty to the EU’s strategic calculus on sanctions. Trump’s concerns about NATO’s burden-sharing and his ambivalent stance on continued US military aid to Ukraine have set off alarm bells among EU policymakers and underscored the need for a European security policy that is less dependent on US leadership (Sorgi, Citation2025). Thus, it is the time for a more than-less European Union mentality that decreases Euroscepticism, a time to strengthen public support for the EU. This shift requires an emphasis on the tangible benefits that EU membership brings to member states, including economic stability, enhanced security, and the promotion of shared values like democracy and human rights. By fostering greater awareness and understanding of the EU’s role in addressing cross-border challenges, citizens can better appreciate the advantages of unity over division. Engaging with local communities, encouraging open dialogues, and actively involving citizens in EU decision-making processes can further bridge the gap between the EU and its citizens, reinforcing a sense of belonging and shared purpose. This study has some limitations that can be addressed in future studies. First, the dataset is a point-in-time measure of public opinion, surveyed in the winter of 2022–2023. Due to the dynamic nature of the geopolitical environment, longitudinal studies are needed to examine how public support for EU sanctions may change over time in response to political, economic and military events. Second, other external factors can also be examined to gain a better picture of how other factors could shape people’s opinions. These range from cultural equivalence with Ukraine to geographical proximity to the war zone, exposure to social media narratives, and interaction with Ukrainian refugees. The role of media frames and disinformation campaigns in determining views on EU sanctions is another area that would require more work. Third, latent variables such as societal resilience, institutional trust, geopolitical affinity, and adherence to European values could provide a better understanding of the reasons for support or opposition to EU sanctions. Such variables could also explain the differences in public opinion between EU member states and between different demographic groups. Furthermore, as previous studies on public support (Onderco et al., Citation2023) have also shown, a comparative analysis with previous surveys, for example, in 2008 (Russia-Georgia war), 2014 (annexation of Crimea and Donbas war) with the full invasion of Ukraine in 2022–2023, could also be very useful. Although not directly compared in the current study, future research would benefit from a historical analysis component to explore the continuities and shifts in public opinion during these major geopolitical events and how they change in different EU countries. This would provide a better insight into how threat perceptions, economic concerns and EU identity evolve in response to Russian aggression and EU foreign policy initiatives. Supplemental Material Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2025.2476484. Additional informationFunding Dr Alessandro Indelicato research is funded by the research fellowship “Catalina Ruiz,” provided by the Consejo de Economía, Conocimiento y Empleo of the Gobierno de Canarias, the Agencia Canaria De Investigación Innovación Y Sociedad De La Información (ACIISI), and Fondo Social Europeo of the EU, through the Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain). Martín, J. C., & Indelicato, A. (2025). 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Diplomacy
KYIV, UKRAINE - May 1, 2022. Flags of Finland and NATO.

Finland: Two Years in NATO

by Sergey Andreev

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском April 2025 marks the second anniversary of Finland’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although the prospect of joining the alliance began to be seriously considered after the escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, a final decision was repeatedly postponed due to the unclear advantages of this move and insufficient public support. Despite close economic ties with Russia and a tradition of cautious diplomacy known as the “Paasikivi–Kekkonen line” (often criticized as “Finlandization”), the 2022 international crisis pushed Finland to join NATO. Since then, the once-neutral country has shifted its foreign policy, increased defense spending, and expanded its arms exports. Government and Military Perspectives In December 2024, the Finnish government presented a new Defense Report in Helsinki, replacing the previous strategy issued in September 2021. Back in 2021, Finland had highlighted the growing military activity in the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions, along with the increased interest of major powers in the natural resources of the North and the Northern Sea Route. Notably, the country didn’t name any specific enemy, choosing to keep its message broad and carefulThe 2024 document takes a much more serious tone. It clearly names Russia as the main source of global instability and describes China as a growing power that challenges the U.S. and its allies. Terrorism is mentioned too, but much less often. Some of the main points about global security include the following - The return of a "large-scale, protracted war" to the European continent;- The Special Military Operation (SMO) is interpreted as a continuation of Russia’s aggressive actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, as well as in Georgia in 2008;- An increase in hybrid attacks and incidents involving critical infrastructure;- Growing Chinese influence on Finland and its neighboring countries;- An unpredictable and unstable defense and international security environment, with a clear tendency toward further deterioration;- The largest NATO military buildup on the eastern flank since the end of the Cold War;- Accession to NATO is described as “the most significant transformation in Finland’s defense policy since World War II”;- Ongoing integration of Finland’s armed forces into NATO’s structures and joint defense planning;- Finland is now planning its defense together with NATO, focusing not just on its own territory but also on the Baltic States, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the North Atlantic. In the section on shifts in global power, Russia is named as the main cause of instability. It is described as “the most significant and immediate threat to the Allies, to security, and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.” Other claims include: a long-standing effort to weaken the European Union, a push to restore its great power status, and an attempt to divide Europe into spheres of influence using military force. Russia is also accused of using hybrid tactics—such as spreading fear, influencing public opinion, stirring political divisions, and blocking decisions—to target European countries and their people. Its Special Military Operation is seen as the beginning of a broader, more direct, and unpredictable conflict with the West. China is characterized as a less aggressive player. It is noted that Beijing is rapidly modernizing its armed forces, has intensified intelligence activities in the United States and Europe, and has strengthened military and economic cooperation with Russia, the development of which will determine Moscow’s ability to exert influence over Europe. At the same time, Finnish strategists place greater emphasis on the ongoing competition between China and the United States for global political, military, economic, and technological dominance. In matters concerning NATO’s role in defense, it is noted that the Alliance has intensified its cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, increased its military presence on the eastern flank and the number of military exercises, and is continually updating both general and regional defense plans in the event of a large-scale conflict. With the accession of Finland and Sweden, NATO has become geographically closer to strategically important areas for Russia, including Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad, the Kola Peninsula, Belarus, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic region. Within the Alliance, ensuring the security of maritime transport routes and the modernization of military infrastructure in Northern European countries is viewed as a key condition for the potential reinforcement of troops from North America. The role of the European Union is described as complementary to NATO, while it is also noted that the EU is increasing defense spending and expanding technological cooperation. The report was published after the election victory of Republican U.S. President Donald Trump, known for his isolationist views, which is partially reflected in the document through emphasis on European independence in security matters and the need for further military expenditures. On intra-European regional issues, the report focuses on cooperation with the member states of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Baltic States, and the United Kingdom, as well as on Germany’s shift in security policy, France’s increased defense spending, and Poland’s growing purchases of military equipment. In military and technology matters, the document highlights the growing role of unmanned systems (both remote-controlled and autonomous), artificial intelligence, and advanced human capabilities like improved thinking and synthetic biology. It stresses the need to use the latest scientific and tech innovations in developing weapons — a step that could help make up for fewer soldiers on the battlefield. Cyberspace and outer space are seen as new areas of military and technological competition. This view is based on several factors: the rapid growth of space technologies (driven by private companies), easier access to space, and heavy reliance on cyber tools and satellites for both military and civilian use. Information warfare is also becoming more influential alongside traditional combat. The document notes that small countries can benefit in such conflicts by using innovations smartly and managing resources well. Still, Helsinki does not rely only on high-tech solutions. A key part of Finland’s military strategy is preparing both its army and population for long-term, grinding conflicts. This includes signing long-term arms supply contracts, building strategic reserves, keeping supply chains strong, and staying ready to protect their way of life. Among the main conclusions, the authors of the report present the following: - Finland and Europe are facing a significant decline in security, with no short-term improvement expected.- Russia poses and will continue to pose a constant security threat to Europe and Finland;- Finland will provide military assistance to Ukraine for as long as necessary;- Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Nordic countries, the Baltic Sea region, and the High North have formed a unified geostrategic space; the Baltic Sea region holds strategic importance for Finland;- Finland’s defense will rely on maintaining conscription, strengthening the training of its military reserve, a strong public will to defend the country, and support from NATO membership.- Commitment to total defense — a combination of all national and international military and civilian measures that ensure the protection of the country under any circumstances (seven components are listed: government administration, international relations, defense capability, internal security, economy, functional capabilities of the population, and psychological resilience of people); There is a need to improve working conditions in the defense industry, increase production, and secure steady, reliable supply chains. A gradual increase in Finland’s military spending. - The development of the EU’s defense potential, and movement toward greater independence of the European Union both in policy and in the development of military technologies and defense supplies;- NATO’s readiness to provide the full spectrum of forces necessary for large-scale, high-intensity combat operations; Finland, in turn, must also create all the necessary conditions for the presence of allied troops on its territory. Similar assessments are presented in the Military Intelligence Review of Finland — 2025 (previous publications date back to 2021 and 2023), prepared by the General Staff of the Finnish Defence Forces. Russia is also named as the main threat there, which “seeks to reduce Western influence, secure its sphere of influence,” “views security policy as a zero-sum great power game in which NATO expansion strengthens the position of the United States and thereby weakens Russia’s security,” and “the interests or security of neighboring countries are not an important factor in Moscow’s calculations.” In addition, Russia is accused of seeking to turn the Global South against Western countries, in particular, there is a reference to “an attempt to present the BRICS group as part of an anti-Western ‘global majority’” . As for the Northern European direction, the Finnish General Staff notes the buildup of Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula and in the Arctic region, attributes to Moscow attempts to gain unrestricted access to the Northern Sea Route and to weaken the integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO structures. Helsinki predicts that after the end of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s priority will be the accelerated buildup and modernization of forces in the reestablished Leningrad Military District, bordering Scandinavia. Finnish military officials do not believe in a quick settlement of the situation in Ukraine and forecast a deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West in the coming years, a struggle by Russia for shipping in the Baltic Sea “by any means,” continued attacks on underwater infrastructure in the Baltic (a reference to damage to undersea cables, although no exact culprit is named), escalation of the race between the West, Russia and China for the resources of the High North, and increased intelligence and sabotage activities by Russian special services in Finland. China is not viewed in an entirely negative light; instead, there is recognition of Beijing's ambition to become a political, economic, military, and technological leader by 2049, marking the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. China's growing influence over countries of the Global South is also noted. Russia–China relations are seen as a "lifeline" for the Russian economy and a means of circumventing sanctions. However, Beijing is not seen as an equal partner, but as someone benefiting from Russia’s growing isolation. This makes Russia more dependent on China. The war in Ukraine is seen as helping China, since it distracts the West from China's global rise. At the regional level, Helsinki plans to enhance cooperation and update the foundational NORDEFCO agreement during its presidency of the organization in 2025. This push for renewal is driven by the evolving security environment and Finland’s recent accession to NATO alongside Sweden. Back in April 2024, the defense ministers of the member states signed a memorandum outlining a new vision for NORDEFCO. According to the document, by 2030 the countries plan to improve joint military planning and operations, make it easier to move troops across borders, boost cooperation and intelligence sharing, both directly and through NATO and the EU, and keep strengthening the defense industries of the Nordic countries. NORDEFCO is not officially seen as a mutual defense agreement or a command system like NATO; however, in recent years, it has started to show features usually found in a defense alliance, mostly because of the actions of some of its members. In 2021, the defense ministers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden signed a deal to strengthen cooperation, allowing for "joint action in times of peace, crisis, or conflict." In 2022, they gave each other permission to use their airspace and military bases. That same year, the defense ministers of Finland, Norway, and Sweden updated their three-way agreement, further growing their military cooperation. After Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway made a joint promise to fully support them if either country were attacked. While NORDEFCO has not yet become an organization like NATO, the current level of defense cooperation between the Nordic countries at the regional level — and repeated promises to help each other in case of conflict — suggest that in the coming years, this effort might start to look like a smaller version of NATO in Northern Europe. This kind of setup would likely be less full of red tape, quicker at making decisions, and made up of countries that share similar views and speak with one voice. It would also have a lower risk of going backward — unlike some NATO members who, in recent years, have threatened to block decisions, added extra demands for new members, or even talked about leaving the Alliance. Defense and Military-Industrial Complex Expenditures Threats identified by Finnish politicians and the military automatically require growing expenditures and an acceleration of the defense industry. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2014 to 2020, Finland’s military spending remained annually at the level of 1.5% of GDP, while in absolute terms it gradually increased — from $3.57 billion to $3.9 billion. Amid the pandemic in 2021, the figure dropped to $3.65 billion, but by the end of 2022 it amounted to $4.47 billion, and in 2023 — to $6.85 billion, or 2.4% of GDP. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) provides similar estimates: growth from $3.72 billion in 2014 to $6.89 billion in 2024, with the budget for 2025 estimated at $7.47 billion. Helsinki does not intend to stop there — on April 1, 2025, following recommendations from the Ministry of Defense, the government began preparations for a phased increase of the military budget to at least 3% of GDP by 2029. Over four years, it plans to raise allocations by €3.7 billion, expand the state defense order, and develop new rearmament programs for the 2030s. Helsinki also views the prospects of its domestic defense industry with optimism — according to the Finnish think tank SaferGlobe (which, according to its website, is “engaged in the study and development of tools to promote sustainable peace and security”), in 2023 arms exports reached €333 million (of which €141 million accounted for weapons intended for civilian use in self-defense, sports, and hunting) — a record since record-keeping began in 2002. About 85% of military exports were distributed within Europe. The largest importing countries by value were Sweden (€51 million), Latvia (€34 million), and Lithuania (€19 million) — together, these three countries accounted for more than half of all military product exports. In value terms, the largest share of exported military products (32%) consisted of land vehicles and their components. The next largest export categories were ammunition (17%), as well as explosives and charges (15%). The largest exports of civilian weapons were to the United States (€52 million), Canada (€15 million), and Australia (€9 million). The year 2023 also set a record for issued export licenses for military products — €667 million. The largest recipient countries of export licenses were Slovakia (€201 million), Japan (€154 million), and Ukraine (€88 million). Similar conclusions were reached by the state investment company Finnish Industry Investment (Tesi), which in autumn 2024 surveyed 368 domestic defense companies: 144 of them were identified as “fast-growing startups and growth companies,” while the rest were described as “more established players with a long history, mainly providing consulting services to the Finnish Defence Forces.” The highest growth rates were shown by producers of dual-use goods, whose net profit has increased annually by 30–40% since 2022. At the same time, companies engaged exclusively in the military sector faced difficulties in attracting investment. 50% of defense companies were located in the capital region of Uusimaa, where the leaders were Helsinki (74 companies) and its satellite city Espoo (65); another 16% were based in the Pirkanmaa region centered around Tampere (40). Rounding out the top five were the high-tech “capital” Oulu (21) and another satellite of Helsinki, Vantaa (14). By type of activity, the majority of companies (246) operated in the support and logistics sector; 70 were engaged in the design of combat command and control systems (C4I — Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence); 20 firms cooperated with the land forces, 13 with the navy, 10 with the air force, five worked in joint operations, and the remaining four were involved in space technologies. A New Strategy — A New President Finland’s entry into NATO happened during the second and final term of President Sauli Niinistö. While he followed the West’s general approach on the war in Ukraine and supported anti-Russian sanctions, he still tried to keep some level of political dialogue with Russia. After February 2022, this became almost impossible, and Finland officially ended its nearly 80-year policy of staying neutral. In the two-round election held in January and February 2024, Finnish voters chose Alexander Stubb from the National Coalition Party as their new president. Stubb studied in the United States and France, and previously worked as a Member of the European Parliament, as well as Finland’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. Back in 2014, when Finland still followed the "Paasikivi–Kekkonen line" of cautious foreign policy, Stubb was one of the only top officials who openly supported joining NATO. On the topic of relations with Russia, he said that “Russia’s integration with the West was an illusion.” This view may be influenced by his family history. Stubb’s father, Göran Stubb, was born in Käkisalmi — a town that was given to the Soviet Union after the Soviet–Finnish War of 1939–1940, renamed first as Kexholm (in Swedish), and later as Priozersk. On his father's side, Stubb’s grandparents came from Vyborg, which also became part of the Soviet Union after the war. However, the family had already moved to Helsinki before the conflict started. In his inaugural speech on March 1, 2024, Alexander Stubb uncompromisingly stated to the citizens of Finland that “the post–Cold War era is over” (placing the blame on Russia), “the instruments of cooperation have been turned into weapons,” “the world is in a transitional state,” and “the creation of a new world order takes time.” He added that Finns “will have to respond quickly to changing circumstances, as was the case with NATO membership,” and that “when times become difficult, I too will be ready to make tough decisions to ensure the security of our country.” In addition to his campaign promises, the newly elected president confirmed his commitment to the previously introduced “value-based realism” (arvopohjainen realismi), which he pledged to be guided by in the conduct of foreign policy if elected. Later, this was officially included in the government’s report on foreign and security policy in June 2024. Among other ideas, the report especially highlighted the following: commitment to democratic values, the rule of law, international law, and human rights; strengthening the country’s defense; staying out of military conflicts; and being open to dialogue with countries that do not share these values. The election of A. Stubb as president strengthened the pro-Western trends in Finland’s foreign policy. On September 1, 2024, the Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States entered into force, under which Finland opens 15 of its military facilities for possible use by U.S. forces, while Helsinki will not charge rent for premises or land made available to the United States. On September 27 of the same year, the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced the placement of NATO headquarters on Finnish territory — in Mikkeli in the southwest of the country, 140 km from the border with the Russian Federation, and in the northern region of Lapland. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish authorities announced preparations to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines (a similar step had previously been taken by the defense ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia), stating that this is “a cost-effective way to supplement the capabilities of the armed forces,” but adding that the country would remain “committed to the humanitarian goals of the convention” even after a possible withdrawal. On April 15, 2025, a Finnish servicemember took part for the first time in a flight aboard a NATO E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft during Ramstein Alloy 2025 exercises in the Baltic region. The NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force (NAEW&CF) includes personnel from 17 countries, in addition to which Canada, France, Finland, and Lithuania also contribute their staff. NATO noted that the E-3A is the first multinational flying unit created by the Alliance. Statements regarding Russia, despite initial uncompromising tone, began to soften after the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, who held a different view of the Ukrainian conflict compared to the strongly pro-Ukrainian administration of Joe Biden. As early as April 2024, Alexander Stubb stated that there was no need to conduct political dialogue with Russia, and considered military action the only path to peace in the context of Ukraine. Under the new Washington administration, the Finnish president approved of the negotiations between the U.S. and Russian leaders, but again repeated the Ukrainian position on the need for a “just peace” and Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO. During his March 2025 visit to Florida, Stubb attempted to dissuade Donald Trump from cooperating with Russia and also called for tougher sanctions against Moscow. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish president admitted that European countries had started talking about renewing contact with Russia. He said that Finland must "morally prepare" for rebuilding political ties with Russia, since "nothing changes the fact that Russia exists and will always be a neighbor." However, he did not give any timeline for when relations might be restored. The situation around the war in Ukraine is made more difficult by the Trump administration’s growing isolationism, along with threats to pull out of talks and a trade war that Washington has launched against almost the entire world (though some parts of it have been paused). This raises fears of a new “Great Depression.” The European Union’s success at the negotiating table will depend on how united its member states are, since they have different geopolitical interests. Although Finland supports calls for a ceasefire, it does not plan to stop its military support for Ukraine or oppose Ukraine joining NATO. Alexander Stubb, on at least two occasions (in November 2024 and March 2025), publicly warned Ukraine against following a “Finnish scenario.” This would mean giving up on NATO membership and possibly giving up territory—similar to what Finland did after World War II, when it accepted neutrality and lost 11% of its land. In a comment on efforts to resolve the conflict in 2025, Stubb criticized Finland’s past policy of “good neighborliness” with the Soviet Union. He said that while Finland kept its independence in 1944, it lost land, part of its sovereignty, and the ability to make its own decisions freely.

Defense & Security
Isolated broken glass or ice with a flag, EU

Will the EU even survive? Vital external and internal challenges ahead of the EU in the newly emerging world order.

by Krzysztof Sliwinski

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This departs from an assumption that the EU is an outstanding example of liberal institutionalism. It has been very successful in providing lasting peace for Europeans who are now facing a series of existential challenges.The central hypothesis of this paper is that if these challenges are not addressed effectively, the EU may not survive in the long term.The first part of the analysis explores five external challenges that affected the macroeconomic and political environments of the EU in the third decade of the 21st century.The second part of the analysis signals five internal and more profound challenges the EU must face if it wants to continue in any viable form.The author concludes that the future of the world order and, by extension, the environment of the EU will most likely be decided by three great powers: the US, China, and Russia. Keywords: EU, Great Powers, World Order, US, China, Russia Introduction 2024 is exactly 20 years since the so-called ‘Big Bang enlargement’, which is why the author of this paper takes the liberty of looking at the future of the European Union (EU). The EU is, according to voluminous literature, the best working example of Liberal Institutionalism, which at its very core is about prescribing peace and security. Yet, the EU project seems derailed in the last few years and is becoming increasingly dysfunctional. This lack of internal cohesion is arguably based on several political phenomena: overregulation, ideologisation, and bureaucratisation being the proverbial tip of the iceberg. This paper examines the EU's economic and political environment and then lists five most pressing challenges it must face to survive as an institution. British citizens have already shown the first ‘red card.’ Core external challenges - the macroeconomic and political environments To say that the contemporary world is complex is to state an obvious truism. However, five phenomena should be outlined here as significant variables regarding the EU’s environment. Firstly and most fundamentally, the changes in the international political economy and corresponding structural changes that undermine states’ positions. What we are witnessing is the emergence of non less than the New World Order, which not only challenges the so-called traditional great powers by shifting the centre of gravity to the East but, perhaps most importantly, challenges the position of state actors as ‘shakers and movers’ of the international system. The Great Reset and the Fourth Industrial Revolution are phenomenal examples of the challenges ahead. Secondly, the ongoing war in Ukraine. Apart from obvious regional European relevance, it should also be analysed globally. Russian invasion threatens principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. If allowed and left unchecked, it encourages other acts of aggression, and in doing so, it confirms a worrying trend according to which the so-called great powers stand above international law. The war draws attention to Ukraine's strategic importance as a large European country. In that sense, the outcome of the conflict will shape the balance of power on the continent. It tests the Western alliance and its response to such challenges. Moreover, it bears global economic consequences—Ukraine & Russia are significant exporters of grain, energy, and raw materials. Prolonged conflict involving these two risks, long-term inflation and food/fuel shortages abroad, is equivalent to the global spread of instability. The Ukrainian-Russian conflict bears an uncanny resemblance to a proxy war between the East and the West competition. An argument could be made that it can be seen as a battle between democracy and authoritarianism, where Russia’s victory strengthens authoritarianism abroad. Finally, let us not forget the nuclear aspects of the conflict. A risk of direct Western involvement would raise the threat of nuclear escalation. The outcome could influence nonproliferation norms for security assurance. Thirdly, and partly as a response to the above two phenomena, there comes the question of German leadership/vision of the future of the EU. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Two stand out among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.[1] Fourthly, and again in significant part as a response to the first two phenomena, we are witnessing unprecedented resistance among large sections of European societies. In particular, the now openly verbalised and physically demonstrated dissatisfaction mainly, but not exclusively by the farmers, to the seemingly inevitable plan for the green transition as heralded by the ‘Fit-for-55’. It is a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 [2]. This ambitious initiative includes actions in fourteen areas, from the reform of the EU’s emissions trading system through reducing emissions from transport, buildings, agriculture, and waste to regulation on methane emissions reduction. Effectively, this means that EU farmers will have to accept an unprecedented and unequal burden. On top of that, there is a question of Ukrainian farming products that enter the European market in equally unprecedented quantities. This prompts many farmers to demonstrate their objections towards their governments and the European Commission by blocking capital cities and transportation arteries across the block. The protests are massive in their character, with thousands upon thousands across most EU member states. Political elites in Europe probably had not expected this and possibly have not experienced such a level of dissatisfaction and resistance towards their policies since the creation of the European Union. Farmers have been aided by other professional groups, from truckers to taxi drivers and even ordinary citizens. Notably, the protests are a bottom-up initiative, though they have also drawn the attention of right-wing parties.[3] Last but not least, there is the question of massive immigration to the EU from outside Europe and consequent challenges to social cohesion in countries such as Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium. As of the writing of this paper (2025), more and more members of the societies of Western EU countries challenge the official narrative of their governments based on the assumption that massive immigration is primarily positive for the economies and that large numbers of non-Europeans pose no threat to the quality of life and security of ordinary citizens (the phenomenon referred to earlier by the author of this paper as ‘a-securitisation’ – Sliwinski, 2016).[4] Worse still, the differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ members of the EU, namely Hungary under Victor Orban, pose a formidable challenge to the immigration policy of the entire EU and, consequently, the future of the EU's integrity. It is not unimaginable at this stage to fathom a day when Hungary, like Britain before, decides to leave the EU,[5] pressured by Brussels and Berlin to accept thousands of immigrants from the Middle East or Africa. Slovakia could follow suit. Core internal challenges – the weakness from within Many of these problems were accidentally quite openly expressed by J. D. Vance, US Vice President, during his speech at the latest Munich Security Conference (February 14th, 2025). Vance did not spare strong criticism directed at European elites and, in a typical ‘American fashion’, called a spade a spade. His criticism of the EU included six general points: retreat from democratic values, censorship and limitations on the freedom of speech, limitations of religious liberties, lack of election integrity, uncontrolled mass migration, and the general unwillingness of the political elites to engage with views other than those of the left and even tendency to suppress dissent.[6] - Centralisation (Federalisation) Today, the EU continues to centralise, particularly in response to challenges like the economic crisis COVID-19, taking on more fiscal policy, health, and security responsibilities. This trend is evident in recent proposals, such as the European Commission’s role in determining budgetary paths, but it faces resistance from member states concerned about losing sovereignty. Historically, the EU has been moving to a federation through recent treaty revisions: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). According to Alberto Mingardi from the GIS, there is a so-called ‘creeping power grab’ phenomenon.  “It assumes that Brussels should become more powerful while Rome, Berlin and Paris less so. [...] europhiles tend to look for opportunities that might allow them to give carte blanche to Brussels, albeit beginning with apparently limited endeavours. Hence, the EU is supposed to grow through crises, and thanks to crises, whatever the problem or issue, it could foster a slice of national sovereignty that can be cut and brought up to a higher level. Behind this, there is an overarching belief in the higher efficiency of centralisation, which is perhaps the true landmark of modern politics. Politicians trust themselves more than the taxpayers; they seek a single control room, and the more it controls, the better. This approach fits well with a protectionist outlook of economics, which sees Europe (‘fortress Europe’, as some say) as one trading bloc set to countervail others (the US, China).”[7] The centralisation (federalisation) logic rests heavily on the arguments presented by legalism. On the one hand, it derives from the strict and literal reading of regulations. On the other, it implies that no sphere of life should be left unregulated. Consequently, overregulation has become a characteristic feature of the European Union.[8] Additionally, the overregulation leads to the often cited democratic deficit,[9] exemplified by the fact that the majority of European legislation that EU member states are obliged to follow is proposed by nonelected technocrats working for the European Commission. - Demographic Decline and Social Welfare An ageing population and falling birth rates threaten the EU’s long-term economic stability and social welfare systems. With a shrinking workforce, funding pensions, healthcare, and social services is increasingly difficult, particularly in weaker economies. This demographic shift also amplifies labour shortages, prompting debates over immigration as a solution—yet one that risks further political backlash as it will inevitably affect European identity. According to available data, Europe is the only continent projected to experience population decline until 2070, with the EU's working-age population (20–64 years) expected to decrease by around 20%. Concurrently, the share of older individuals (65 years or older) will be the second highest globally among large economies. This demographic shift poses significant challenges, potentially undermining the EU's economic and social model, exacerbating existing disparities, and creating political divisions among Member States if not adequately addressed.[10] According to Eurostat, The natural population change (difference between live births and deaths) has been negative since 2012. This is primarily due to the ageing population described in this publication and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2022.[11] - Economic Competitiveness and Growth After the so-called Big Bang Enlargement, all available data suggests that the gap between the EU and the US with regards to GDP output has been steadily growing, that is to say, that the US economy, which recently has been experiencing huge problems, still has been developing faster than the EU.[12] Contemporary the EU is grappling with stagnating economic growth and a loss of competitiveness compared to global powers like the United States and China. High regulatory burdens, internal market fragmentation, and insufficient investment in innovation and technology hinder its ability to keep pace. The growing threat of US tariffs under a second Trump administration will only likely exacerbate these issues, disrupting supply chains and increasing costs. Additionally, the EU’s energy dependence—highlighted by the shift away from Russian gas after the Ukraine invasion—has driven up costs, further straining industries and economies, particularly in countries like Germany.[13] - Weakness as an international actor Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to pose a significant security challenge. The conflict has exposed the EU’s reliance on NATO and the US for defence while increasing pressure to bolster its own military capabilities—sometimes referred to as a ‘European Defence Union’. Tensions with China, particularly over trade and technology, and uncertainty about US commitment to transatlantic alliances add to the geopolitical strain. The EU must also address hybrid threats (e.g., cyberattacks, disinformation) targeting critical sectors like energy, transport, and digital infrastructure. In light of this, Americans are already calling for much more input from the European members of NATO regarding their defence budgets (5% of GDP).[14] This will most likely reinvigorate calls for creating a European Army,[15] which no doubt will be dominated by Germany and France. German domination will be met with considerable unease by some Central and Eastern European Countries (members of the EU). At the same time as the recent meeting, Ryiad shows the US is not even treating the EU as a partner worthy of a place at the negotiating table.[16]When pressed by the likes of Trump and charged with not sharing a fair part of their own security costs, European political leaders invoke the notion of Europe as a normative power. Supposedly, though weak militarily, the EU and its members are a beacon of values such as peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In his seminal publications, Iaan Manners, argued that the EU's unique historical context, hybrid political structure, and legal constitution enable it to promote norms that go beyond state-centric concerns, particularly in areas such as human rights and the abolition of the death penalty. Manners claims that the EU's ability to define what is considered 'normal' in world politics is a significant aspect of its power, and this normative approach is crucial for understanding the EU's role in shaping international relations.[17] As nice as it sounds, it does not seem to bear much weight in the practice of international security in recent decades. It is the EU, in fact, as an institution and the political leadership of France, Germany, and the European Commissioner, who stand accused now of contradicting all of the above-mentioned values. The latest visit by President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen to Kiev, and her strong support for the continuation of war against Russia is a case in point.[18]   - Ideologisation 'Europeanism' has become an ideology shared among intellectual, political, judicatory, societal,  and even dominant economic elites that influence or shape the European Union as an institution and its major policies. As an ideology, 'Europeanism' is a somewhat exotic mixture of various seemingly incoherent trends that give the current European Union its intriguing characteristics. On the one hand, economically, one can easily identify numerous elements of neoliberalism, especially regarding the financial aspects of European integration. Likewise, arguments used by the major proponents of European integration vis-à-vis the USA, China, or Japan are of neoliberal character. At the same time, regarding international trade in agricultural products, intellectual property, or internal (single market) competition (freedom of labour), one quickly spots distinct elements of protectionism and overregulation. Finally, regarding philosophical outlook and especially moral issues, 'Europeanism' seems to focus mainly on the progressive agenda and a particular ‘obsession’ with climate change revocation. Conclusion As the Munich Security Conference confirmed, EU political elites are way out of touch with reality and a rapidly changing world. Their proverbial Europocentrism is based on, among others, self-precepted moral high grounds, a history of economic and political domination and exploitation, and an undiscerning belief in bureaucratic, if not technocratic, policy-making and regulation of every sphere of life and institutionalism. Their weakness is probably most accurately depicted by the reaction of the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Christoph Heusgen, who broke down during his closing remarks, unable to finish his speech.[19] He was patted on the back and given a hug. (This reaction must have undoubtedly caused bewilderment, if not pity, in Washinton, Beijing, and Moscow.) The original integration goals have little to do with today’s Eureaucrats’ obsessions with saving the planet or pushing for Diversity, Equality, and Inclusivity (DEI). With the election of Donald Trump, the world of the ‘Davos Men’ seems to be stalled. Interestingly, the EU is now one of the last standing actors to represent the ideology of globalism, with its tenets based on neoliberalism - unlimited free trade and the capturing role of international transnational companies. The rest of the world, including the US, seems to be moving in the opposite direction – the world driven by state actors. The world order, therefore, is likely to be directed by strong and nationally based governments from no, possibly the US, China and Russia – a ‘Concert of Powers’ of sorts. References ________________________________________[1] The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles University In Prague On Monday, August 29 2022. Available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752[2] “Fit for 55”, European Council. Council of the European Union. European Green Deal. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/[3] Tanno, Sophie and Liakos, Chris. “Farmers’ protests have erupted across Europe. Here’s why.” CNN, World, Europe. Last modified February 10, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/03/europe/europe-farmers-protests-explainer-intl/index.html[4] Sliwinski, Krzysztof. “‘A-Securitization’ of Immigration Policy - the Case of European Union.” Asia–Pacific Journal of EU Studies 14, no. 1: 25 -56.[5] Körömi, Csongor. “Hungary reveals plan to send asylum-seekers to Brussels.” Politico August 22. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-asylum-plan-brussels-migration-refugees-gergely-gulyas/[6] Pangambam, S. “Full Transcript: VP JD Vance. Remarks at the Munich Security Conference”. The SIngju Post. https://singjupost.com/full-transcript-vp-jd-vance-remarks-at-the-munich-security-conference/?singlepage=1[7] Mingardi, Alberto, “The EU’s future: Like Switzerland or more like Italy?”GIS, May 20, 2022. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/eu-future/ see also: Dunleavy, P., and G. Kirchgässner. “Explaining the Centralization of the European Union: A Public Choice Analysis.” Edited by P. Moser, G. Schneider, and G. Kirchgässner. Decision Rules in the European Union, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62792-9_7.[8] Van Malleghem, Pieter-Augustijn. “Legalism and the European Union’s Rule of Law Crisis.” European Law Open 3, no. 1 (2024): 50–89. https://doi.org/10.1017/elo.2024.5.[9] Neuhold, C. Democratic Deficit in the European Union, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190228637.013.1141.[10] Zalai, Csaba. “Too Little Too Late?” Európai Tükör 27, no. 1 (December 13, 2024): 169–93. https://doi.org/10.32559/et.2024.1.9.[11] See more at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-publications/demography-2024#population-change[12] See more at: https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/wld/world/gdp-gross-domestic-product[13] See more at: https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/global-outlook-2025-the-impact-of-a-new-US-presidency?utm_campaign=MA00001133&utm_medium=paid-search&utm_source=eiu-google&utm_content=&gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQiA8fW9BhC8ARIsACwHqYqwk_M8I--YkZ_fiDS6leiOiRLjPXlG63SHjKwQZgP2kaovx_sc4qIaAkGYEALw_wcB[14] See more at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/trump-says-nato-members-should-spend-5-of-gdp-on-defence/ and https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-tells-allies-spend-5-percent-gdp-defense-nato/[15] See more at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgl27x74wpo[16] See more at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-russia-meeting-improving-relations-ukraine-war/[17] Manners, Ian. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–58. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.[18] See more at: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/24/ursula-von-der-leyen-arrives-in-kyiv-with-35-billion-in-fresh-aid-for-weapons[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BhNy0u5-ijY

Defense & Security
Military supply ad delivery USA american weapon for Ukraine. Weapon box with flags of USA and Ukraine. 3d illustration

Pause in aid has introduced uncertainty into Ukraine’s military planning − forever changing its war calculus

by Benjamin Jensen

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском War is a numbers game. Each side involved must marshal the supplies, troops and firepower needed to sustain the fight, thwart advancing armies and, hopefully, prevail. But it’s also a game of uncertainty. For the past three years, Ukraine’s military planners have had to approach every battle with a series of cold calculations: How much ammunition is left? How many air defense interceptors can be fired today, without running short tomorrow? Do we have the men and equipment needed to advance or hold position? But now, with U.S. military assistance on hold and European support constrained by economic realities, that uncertainty is growing. As an expert on warfare, I know this isn’t just a logistical problem; it’s a strategic one. When commanders can’t predict their future resource base, they are forced to take fewer risks, prioritize defense over offense and hedge against worst-case scenarios. In war, uncertainty doesn’t just limit options. It shapes the entire battlefield and fate of nations. Trump orders a pause On March 3, 2025, President Donald Trump announced a suspension to all U.S. military aid to Ukraine. It followed a fractious Oval Office meeting between the U.S. president and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, after which Trump declared the Ukrainian leader “not ready for peace.” Two days later, Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe announced Washington was also pausing all intelligence sharing and ordered key allies such as the United Kingdom to limit the information they give Kyiv. National security adviser Michael Waltz has linked the pause to ongoing U.S.-Ukrainian negotiations, stating that weapons supplies and intelligence sharing will resume once Ukraine agrees to a date for peace talks with Russia. A critical supplier of weapons Any pause, no matter how long, will hurt Ukraine. The U.S. has been the largest provider of military assistance to Kyiv since Russia’s 2022 invasion, followed by the European Union. While the level of support is debated – it is often skewed by how one calculates equipment donations using presidential drawdown authority, through which the president can dip into the Department of Defense’s inventory – the U.S. has undoubtedly delivered critical weapons systems and a wide range of ammunition. Though this assistance has decreased U.S. military stockpiles, it has helped Washington invest in its domestic defense industry and expand weapons production. In addition, while Europe is starting to increase its own defense expenditures, EU members are stuck with flat economic growth and limits on how much they can borrow to invest in their own militaries, much less Ukraine. This makes the U.S. a critical partner for Ukraine for at least another two years while Europe expands its military capacity. These conditions affect the design of Ukraine’s military campaigns. Planners in Kyiv have to balance predictions about the enemy’s strengths and possible courses of action with assessments of their own resources. This war ledger helps evaluate where to attack and where to defend. Uncertainty skews such calculation. The less certain a military command is about its resource base, the more precarious bold military maneuvers become. It is through this fog of uncertainty that any pause in assistance shapes the course of the war in Ukraine and the bargaining leverage of all parties at the negotiating table. A new uncertain world The White House has indicated that the pause in military aid and intelligence sharing will be lifted once a date for peace talks is set. But even if U.S. weapons and intel begin to flow again, Ukrainian generals will have to fight the duration of the war under the knowledge that its greatest backer is willing to turn off the taps when it suits them. And the consequences of this new uncertain world will be felt on the battlefield. Ukraine now faces a brutal trade-off: stretch limited resources to maintain an active defense across the front, or consolidate forces, cede ground and absorb the political costs of trading space for time. Material supply has shaped operational tempo over the course of the war. When Moscow expects Kyiv to be low on ammunition, it presses the attack. In fact, key Russian gains in eastern Ukraine in 2024 coincided with periods of critical supply shortages. Russia used its advantage in artillery shells, which at times saw Moscow firing 20 artillery shells to every Ukrainian artillery shell fired, and air superiority to make advances north and west of the strategic city of Avdiivka. Looking to the front lines in 2025, Russia could use any pause in supplies to support its ongoing offensive operations that stretch from Kherson in southern Ukraine to Kharkiv in the north and efforts to dislodge Ukrainian units in the Russian Kursk region. This means Ukraine will have to decide where to hold the line and where to conduct a series of delaying actions designed to wear down Russian forces. Trading space for time is an old military tactic, but it produces tremendous political costs when the terrain is your sovereign territory. As such, the military logic of delaying actions creates political risks in Ukraine – sapping civilian morale and undermining support for the government’s war management. A horrible choice This dilemma will drive where and how Ukraine weights its efforts on the battlefield. First, long-range strike operations against Russia will become increasingly less attractive. Every drone that hits an oil refinery in Russia is one less warhead stopping a Russian breakthrough in the Donbas or counterattack in Kursk. Ukraine will have to reduce the complexity of its defensive campaign and fall back along lines deeper within its own territory. Second, Russia doesn’t fight just on the battlefield – it uses a coercive air campaign to gain leverage at the negotiating table. With U.S. military aid on hold, Moscow has a prime opportunity to escalate its strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, forcing Kyiv into painful choices about whether to defend its front lines or its political center of gravity. From Vietnam to Ukraine, airpower has historically been a key bargaining tool in negotiations. President Richard Nixon bombed North Vietnam to force concessions. Russia may now do the same to Ukraine. Seen in this light, Russia could intensify its missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure – both to weaken defenses and to apply psychological and economic pressure. And because Kyiv relies on Western assistance, including intelligence and systems such as U.S.-built Patriot surface-to-air missiles to defend its skies, this coercive campaign could become effective. As a result, Ukraine could be faced with a horrible choice. It may have to concentrate dwindling air defenses around either key military assets required to defend the front or its political center of gravity in Kyiv. Interception rates of Russian drones and missiles could drop, leading to either opportunities for a Russian breakout along the front or increased civilian deaths that put domestic pressure on Ukrainian negotiators. Uncertainty reigns supreme The real problem for Ukraine going forward is that even if the U.S. resumes support and intelligence sharing, the damage is done. Uncertainty, once introduced, is hard to remove. It increases the likelihood that Ukraine’s leaders will stockpile munitions to reduce the risk of future pauses, rather than use them to take the fight to Russia. And with battlefield decision-making now limited, Ukraine’s military strategists will increasingly look toward the least worst option to hold the line until a lasting peace is negotiated.

Energy & Economics
The oil industry of Russia. Oil rigs on the background of the Russian flag. Mining in Russia. Russian oil export. Russia in the global fuel market. Fuel industry.

The Economic Impacts of the Ukraine War: focus on Russian Energy

by World & New World Journal Policy Team

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском I. Introduction Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. As the invasion enters its third year, its most immediate and visible consequences have been loss of life and large numbers of refugees from Ukraine. However, given the interconnected structure of the international political, economic, and policy systems, the ramifications of the conflict can be felt well beyond Ukraine and Russia.Much of the recent literature and commentaries have focused on the military and strategic lessons learned from the ongoing Ukraine conflict (Biddle 2022; 2023; Dijkstra et al. 2023). However, the conflict has potentially much wider global consequences for various policy areas. Robert Jervis noted that the international system is not only interconnected but also often displays nonlinear relationships and that “outcomes cannot be understood without adding together the units or their relations.” (Jervis 1997, 6).  This article focuses on the economic effects of the Ukraine war, emphasizing the energy issue, because Russia has been a major player in the global energy market.  II. Literature on the effects of wars Wars have the potential to alter the parties and “transform the future” of belligerents (Ikle 1991), they also bring about fundamental changes to the international system (Gilpin 1981).  Scholars in Economics have provided considerable analysis of the macroeconomic effects of a conflict across spatial levels: locally, nationally, regionally and internationally. Studies have examined the effects of specific wars such as the Syrian civil war (Kešeljević and Spruk, 2023) or the Iraq war (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). They have also examined the effects of war in general. For instance, Reuven Glick and Alan Taylor (2010) examine bilateral trade relations from 1870 to 1997 and find “large and persistent impacts of wars on trade, and hence on national and global economic welfare.” Similarly, Vally Koubi (2005) investigates the effects of inter- and intrastate wars on a sample of countries and finds that the combined pre-war contemporaneous and postwar effects on economic growth are negative.  A “war ruin” school emphasizes that the destruction caused by wars is accompanied by higher inflation, unproductive resource spending on the military, and war debt (Chan 1985; Diehl and Goertz 1985; Russett 1970). By contrast, a “war renewal” school argued that there could be longer-term positive economic effects from war because war can lead to increased efficiency in the economy by reducing the power of rent-seeking special interests, triggering technological innovation, and advancing human capital (Olson 1982; Organski and Kugler 1980). Early analysis estimated that the Russian invasion of Ukraine had an economic cost of 1% of global GDP in 2022 (Liadze et al. 2023)Some political scientists focused on the domestic consequences of war. For example, Electoral political scientists have often examined the effects of war on public opinion. A key concern has been whether war produces a “rally around the flag effects” to bolster the support of incumbent leaders – or whether war weariness can contribute to declining support for governments, including those governments committed to conflicts abroad. John Mueller (1970) was the first scholar to develop the concept of the “rally-round-the-flag”, with later scholars identifying some of the factors that may shape or mitigate the effect (Dinesen and Jaeger 2013). Kseniya Kizilova and Pippa Norris (2023) considered any rally effects during the first few months of the Ukraine war. They claim that the reason that motivated Putin’s military invasion was an attempt to boost popular support among the Russian electorate. They show evidence of a surge in support for Putin following the invasion, which persisted longer than usual in democratic systems. However, Kizilova and Norris question whether this will likely be sustained as the economic costs of the war increase.   III. Brief Summary of the Ukraine War The roots of the Ukraine war go back to the early 1990s when Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union. While the Ukrainian economy was still firmly tied to the Russian economy, the country shifted its political focus towards the EU and NATO. This shift culminated in the Orange Revolution 2004 and the “Euromaidan” demonstrations in 2013. Portraying the “Euromaidan” protests as a Western-backed coup, Russia invaded Crimea and declared the annexation of Crimea into Russia in March 2014. Conflict soon erupted in the Eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, where Russia supported pro-Russian separatist forces (Walker 2023a). Despite attempts to negotiate a ceasefire through the Minsk Agreement I and II, the conflict in the Eastern part of Ukraine had continued (Walker 2023a), resulting in over 14,000 deaths between 2014 and 2021. Against this backdrop, on 21 February, 2022, Russia recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. Three days later, confounding most Western observer’s expectations, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, calling it a “special military operation”. During the initial weeks, Russia made substantial advances (CIA Fact-book 2024) but failed to take Kyiv in the face of strong Ukrainian resistance supported by Western allies. In October 2022, Russia declared the annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia (even though they were not entirely under Russian control) (Walker 2023b). As of February 2025, the meeting between the US and Russia to end the war is underway. IV. The Effects of the Ukraine war The impacts of war are far-reaching and devastating. War causes immense destruction of property and loss of life. It also creates psychological trauma for those who have experienced it firsthand. War can also have long-term economic impacts, such as increased unemployment and poverty. War can also lead to the displacement of people, as we have seen the millions of refugees who have been forced to flee their homes due to conflicts. War can also have political effects, such as creating new states or weakening existing nations. It can also lead to the rise of authoritarian regimes in many post-war nations. War can also increase militarization as nations seek to protect themselves from future conflicts.  Regarding the effects of the Ukraine war, Bin Zhang and Sheripzhan Nadyrov (2024) claimed that in addition to inexpressible human suffering and the destruction of infrastructure, the economic and financial damage inflicted on European countries would be profound, especially in the context of rising inflation. The positive changes due to the conflict may occur in four areas: acceleration of the Green Deal, increased European attention to defense, improved prospects for individual countries to join the European Union (EU), and the unfolding of broader Eurasian economic integration.  The Ukraine war might have broader economic consequences. The supply chains may be affected because of the destruction of infrastructures and resources. War mobilization may affect the workforce and economic production. Actors in the economy may also act strategically to deploy resources elsewhere, to support the war effort or because the war has affected incentive structures or decide to cease production altogether because of expected losses. These effects can be local to geographical areas engulfed in conflict but also cause ripple effects to a broader regional area and the global economy. Trade, production, consumption, inflation, growth and employment patterns may all be influenced.  Figure 1: Global implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the European and World Economies. Source: Peterson K. Ozili. (2022)  Ozili (2022) claimed that the scale of the Ukraine war had a negative impact on the economies of almost all countries around the world. As Figure 1 shows, the main effects of the Ukraine war on the global economy are: Rising Oil and Gas Prices – European countries import about a quarter of their oil and 40% of their natural gas from the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is the second largest oil producer in the world and the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe. After the invasion, European oil companies will have problems getting these resources from the Russian Federation. Even before the Russian invasion, oil prices rose because of growing tensions between countries, the COVID-19 pandemic, and other factors, but remained in the $80–95 per barrel range. After the invasion, this price reached $100 and could reach $140. Natural gas prices have risen 20% since the war began. Rising gas prices can drive high inflation and increase public utility bills.  Decline in production and economic growth, rising global inflation, and the cost of living are more related to the consequences of the above-mentioned factors, especially rising oil and gas prices, which lead to high inflation and, therefore, a decline in supply and demand.  Impact on the global banking system: This factor’s negative effect will be felt more strongly by Russian banks and is associated with international financial sanctions. Foreign banks that will suffer significant damage from sanctions are those that have conducted large operations in the Russian Federation.  The Russian Federation’s export ban and its own counter-ban on imports of foreign products disrupted the global supply chain, resulting in shortages and higher prices for imported commodities. As Ozili (2022) claimed, higher inflation is a perceived negative consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 2 shows, inflation in the EU jumped in the first month of the invasion, and the increasing trend continues. EU inflation in 2022 peaked in October and amounted to 11.5%, a historical record. However, inflation has slowly declined as energy prices have gone down.  This higher inflation in Europe resulted from an increase in energy prices. As Figures 3, 4, and 5 show, energy prices in Europe skyrocketed in 2022. As Figure 3 shows, energy prices have been the most important component of inflation in the EU. Figure 2: Average inflation rate in the EU (%). Source: EurostatCreated with Datawrapper   Figure 3: Main components of inflation rate in the Euro areas.  Figure 4: Natural gas prices in Europe, January 2021- end 2024  Figure 5: Crude oil price, January 2020-January 2025 Source: Eurostat Created with Datawrapper As Figure 6 shows, the inflation rate in major EU countries such as Germany and France followed the pattern of EU countries in which inflation skyrocketed in 2022 and then slowly declined over time. Figure 6: Inflation rate in major EU countries. Source: Eurostat Created with Datawrapper  As Ozili claimed, a lower growth rate was also a perceived negative consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 7 shows, GDP in the EU was down to 3.5 % in 2022 compared to 6.3% in 2021, and it was further down to 0.8 % in 2023 because economic stagnation and high inflation caused by the Ukraine war impacted European economies. The European Commission forecasts that the European economy will grow by 0.9 % in 2024 and 1.5% in 2025.  Figure 7: Average annual GDP growth rate in EU, 1996-2025. Following the pattern of entire EU countries, growth rates in four big European countries declined in 2022 & 2023 after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and are expected to grow moderately in 2024. The growth rates in four big European countries are in Table 1 and Figures 8-11.    Figure 8: Growth rate in Germany  Figure 9: Growth rate in France  Figure 10: Growth rate in the UK   Figure 11: Growth rate in Italy    Regarding the effect of the Ukraine war on the global banking system, the effect was minimal because most international financial sanctions targeted Russian banks. The sanctions, including the ban of selected Russian banks from SWIFT, only affected foreign banks with significant operations in Russia. Many foreign banks experienced losses after several Western countries imposed financial sanctions on Russian banks, the Russian Central Bank, and wealthy Russian individuals. The most affected banks were Austria’s Raiffeisenbank, Italy’s Unicredit, and France’s Société Générale. Other foreign banks recorded huge losses when they discontinued their operations in Russia. The losses were significant for small foreign banks and insignificant for large foreign banks.  After almost 20 months into the full-scale war, Ukraine’s banking sector continued demonstrating remarkable resilience and functioning as the backbone of the real economy. No bank runs have occurred, and access to cash was maintained. In addition to crucial reforms since 2014, comprehensive measures by the National Bank of Ukraine and a strong level of digitalization are key reasons for the observed stability. However, a significant liquidity buffer is not only a sign of resilience. It also reveals a lack of lending. The bank loan portfolio declined by around 30% compared to pre-war levels in real terms.  Regarding the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on European stock markets, Figures 12 and 13 show the movement of the FTSE 100 and Euro Area Stock Market Index (EU50). As seen from Figures 12 & 13, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, both indices showed a noticeable decline in 2022, particularly early 2022. However, both indexes showed a noticeable rise after late 2022. Although there were ups and downs in both indices in 2023 and 2024, they show upward movement from 2023 to 2025.  Figure 12: The FTSE 100 index in Europe  Figure 13: Euro Area Stock Market Index (EU50)   Regarding the global supply chain, military operations during the Russian invasion of Ukraine disrupted multiple sectors. In particular, Russia’s ban on exports and retaliatory ban on imports, including its refusal to allow foreign cargoes to pass through its waterways and airspace during the early phase of the invasion, disrupted the global supply chain.  Regarding global supply chain disruption, this article focuses on Russian oil and gas because they are the most important Russian products that affect not only Europe but also the world.  Figures 14 and 15 show a world map of the countries that exported oil and gas to Europe: the color of the country corresponds to the percentage share of the country’s exports (indicated below the Figure). In 2021, around a third of Europe’s energy came from gas (34%) and oil (31%), according to Al Jazeera’s data analysis from BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy. Europe was the largest importer of natural gas in the world. Russia provided roughly 40% and 25% of the EU’s imported gas and oil before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As Figure 16 shows, major gas importers from Russia in 2021 were European countries. Figure 14: EU oil import sources in 2021. Figure 15: EU natural gas import sources in 2021. Source: Eurostat  Figure 16: Major EU importers from Russian Gas in 2021.  However, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, more than 9,119 new economic sanctions have been imposed on Russia, making it the most sanctioned country in the world. At least 46 countries or territories, including all 27 EU nations, have imposed sanctions on Russia or pledged to adopt a combination of US and EU sanctions. The sanctions have strongly affected, resulting in a 58% decline in exports to Russia and an 86% drop in imports from Russia between the first quarter of 2022 and the third quarter of 2024 (see Figure 17). Figure 17: EU trade with Russia  Russia has blamed these sanctions for impeding routine maintenance on its Nord Stream I gas pipeline which is the single biggest gas pipeline between Russia and Western Europe. In response, Russia cut its gas exports to the EU by around 80% since the Russian invasion, resulting in higher gas price in Europe, as Figure 18 shows. As a result, many European countries had to rethink their energy mix rapidly. The ripple effects of higher natural gas prices were felt in Europe and around the world. One of the most immediate consequences of Russia’s cut in gas delivery and sanctions on Russia, as well as sanctions on Russian was a sharp increase in European demand for LNG imports: in the first eight months of 2022, net LNG imports in Europe rose by two-thirds (by 45 billion cubic meters compared with the same period a year earlier).  Russia’s pipeline gas share in EU imports dropped from over 40% in 2021 to about 8% in 2023. Russia accounted for less than 15% of total EU gas imports for pipeline gas and LNG combined. The drop was possible mainly thanks to a sharp increase in LNG imports and an overall reduction in gas consumption in the EU. Figure 18: Natural gas price in Europe, January 2021- December 2024  Figure 19 shows how gas supply to the EU changed between 2021 and 2023. Import from Russia declined from over 150 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2021 to less than 43 bcm. This was mainly compensated by a growing share of other partners. Import from US grew from 18.9 bcm in 2021 to 56.2 bcm in 2023. Import from Norway grew from 79.5 bcm in 2021 to 87.7 in 2023. Import from other partners increased from 41.6 bcm in 2021 to 62 bcm in 2023. Source: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-gas-supply/#0) Figure 19: Major EU import sources of Gas.  However, as Figure 20, shows the EU’s import from Russian gas increased in volume in 2024.  Figure 20: EU trade of natural gas with Russia     EU imports of Russian petroleum oil also dropped. Russia was the largest provider of petroleum oil to the EU in 2021. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a major diversion in the trade of petroleum oil took place. In the third quarter of 2024, the volume of petroleum oil in the EU imported from Russia was 7% of what it had been in the first quarter of 2021 (see Figure 21) while its value had dropped to 10% in the same period.  The EU’s share of petroleum oil imports from Russia dropped from 18% in the third quarter of 2022 to 2% in the third quarter of 2024 (see Figure 22). The shares of the United States (+5 pp), Kazakhstan (+4 pp), Norway (+3 pp), and Saudi Arabia (+2 pp) increased in this period. The U.S. and Norway became the EU’s no.1 and no.2 petroleum oil providers, respectively. Figure 21: EU trade of petroleum oil with Russia    Figure 22: EU’s leading petroleum oil providers  The EU’s de-Russification policy has successfully reduced the EU’s dependence on Russian energy. However, the EU’s de-Russification policy allowed Russian fossil fuels to flow into other regions. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), a think-tank in Finland, compiles estimates of the monetary value of Russian fossil fuels procured by each country and region (Figure 23). Figures 23 & 24 show the countries that imported Russian coal, oil and gas since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China has been no. 1 country that imported Russian fossil fuels most, followed by India, Turkey, and the EU. Asian countries such as Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan are among the major importers of Russian fossil fuels.  Figure 23: Value of Russian fossil fuels purchase (January 1, 2023 to January 24, 2024)  Figure 24: Largest importers of Russian fossil fuels (January 1, 2023 to February 16, 2025)  Moreover, according to Statista, value of fossil fuel exports from Russia from February 24, 2022 to January 27, 2025, by country and type is as follows as Figure 25 shows. China have been no. 1 country that imported Russian fossil fuels most, followed by India, Turkey, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and South Korea. Figure 25: value of fossil fuel exports from Russia from February 24, 2022 to January 27, 2025, by country and type.  However, Figures 23, 24, and 25 show some differences among major importers of Russian fossil fuels. China, India, and Turkey imported more Russian oil than gas or coal, while EU imported more Russian gas than oil or coal. Interestingly, South Korea imported more Russian coal than oil or gas. If we focus on Russian oil, we know that China and India’s imports of Russian oils significantly increased, as shown in Figures 26, 27, and 28. Since the EU imposed its embargo on Russian crude oil shipments, China purchased the most from Russia, at EUR 82.3 billion, followed by India and Türkiye, at EUR 47.0 billion and EUR 34.1 billion, respectively. The EU came in fourth, with oil and gas imports continuing mainly through pipelines to Eastern Europe. Notably, the oil-producing countries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) purchased oil (crude oil and petroleum products) from Russia.  Figure 26: Russian Oil Exports, by country and region, 2021-2024. (Navy blue: EU, Blue: US & UK, Light green: Turkey, Green: China, Yellow: India, Orange: Middle Eastern nations) Since the advent of the Ukraine crisis, China and India have been increasing the amount of crude oil they imported from Russia. According to statistics compiled by China’s General Administration of Customs, as Figure 27 shows, monthly imports increased from 6.38 million tons in March 2022 to 10.54 million tons in August 2023. Annual imports in 2023 exceeded 100 million tons for the first time.  Figure 27: China’s monthly crude oil imports from Russia (2021 to 2023)   As Figure 28 shows, India, which historically imported little crude oil from Russia, rapidly increased its imports partly due to the close geographical distance since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to statistics compiled by India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry, its imports of Russian crude oil increased from March 2022 onward, with the total amount imported during 2022 exceeding 33 million tons. Crude oil imports from Russia grew into 2023, with monthly imports in May 2023 reaching a record-high level of 8.92 million tons. Annual crude oil imports from Russia in 2023 were expected to be at least 80 million tons. Figure 28: India’s monthly crude oil imports from Russia (January 2021 to November 2023)  In conclusion, after EU ban on Russia until January, 2025, the biggest buyers of Russia’s fossil fuels are as follows as Figure 29 shows: China has been no. 1 country that imported Russian coal, and crude oil the most, while the EU has been the largest importer of Russian Gas, both pipeline and LNG. Figure 29: Which country bought Russia’s fossil fuels after EU ban until January 2025 Still, although the EU has significantly reduced gas imports from Russia since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU still is no. 1 importer of Russian gas. However, China replaced EU as the biggest buyer of Russian crude oil. China is also the biggest buyer of Russian coal. Data from January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2025 show how Russian fossil fuels have flowed by geography as Figure 30 shows. The flows of Russian energy to EU have significantly declined, while the supply of Russian energy to China, India, and Turkey has significantly increased.  Figure 30: The flows of Russian energy to regions    Despite the EU’s restrictions on Russian-sourced energy, Russia has maintained a substantial revenue level by selling it to other countries. As Figure 31 shows, Russian energy revenues have somewhat declined between January 2022 and January 2025. Russian energy export revenue was a little less than 750 million Euro in January 2025 compared to 1000 million Euro in January 2022 just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, considering that Russia’s total oil and gas revenues were 72.6 billion dollars in 2020, 122.9 billion in 2021, 169.5 billion in 2022, and 102.8 billion in 2023 and that 2022 was the best year for energy revenues in recent years, Russian energy revenues after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was not insufficient. This in turn has blunted the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the West.   Figure 31: Russian energy export revenue between 2022 and 2025.  V. Conclusion  This article examined the economic effects of the Ukraine war based on the argument of Ozili (2022). This article investigated four economic aspects (Inflation, economic growth, global banking, and global supply chain) on which the Ukraine war has had impacts. This article focused on Europe and the global supply chain because Russia and Ukraine were parts of Europe and because Russian energy has had a significant impact on Europea and all around the world.  This article showed that the Ukraine war significantly affected European inflation, economic growth, stock markets, and energy markets while the war had minimal impact on global banking. However, this article showed that the economic effects of the Ukraine war on inflation, economic growth, stock markets, and energy markets in Europe were short-term. The oil and gas prices in Europe skyrocketed in 2022 and then declined slowly and continuously. In addition, growth in Europe declined in 2022 & 2023 after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and energy prices jumped up. However, European countries grew moderately in 2024 and are expected to increase in 2025. The same thing happened to European stock markets. The FTSE 100 and Euro Area Stock Market Index (EU50) showed a noticeable decline in 2022, in particularly early 2022. However, both indices showed a noticeable rise after late 2022.  On the other hand, after Russia invaded Ukraine, European countries significantly reduced imports of Russian fossil fuels. The EU’s de-Russification policy allowed Russian fossil fuels to flow into other regions. After EU’s imposition of sanctions on Russian energy, Russian fossil fuels mainly went to Asian and Middle East markets, mainly to China, India, and Turkey. 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Toronto, Canada - February 17 2024 Trump says he has spoken to Putin and agreed to negotiate Ukraine ceasefire

Ukrainian war: self-proclaimed winners and real losers

by Cyrille Bret

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Does the resolutely pro-Moscow approach of the new team in Washington mean that Russia is the big winner in the Ukrainian war at this stage? That Ukraine will have resisted for three years for (almost) nothing? That the United States will reap the long-term benefits of this strategic position in Europe? And will the EU be marginalized and reduced to a secondary role on its own continent? Visible success should not obscure the strategic setbacks of the self-proclaimed winners. Ever since the second Trump administration unilaterally opened direct and exclusive talks with Russia on the fate of Ukraine in Saudi Arabia on 18 February, MAGA communicators everywhere have heralded the end of the conflict. Even if a simple ceasefire now seems highly unlikely, the new American president proclaims that he will soon lead the "peace side" to victory, since he claims to be its leader. Who knows if he will have the courage to apply for the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize himself? After three years of war, if the terms of negotiation announced last week are confirmed, we must return to the essential question of victory and the corollary question of defeat: who can claim the title of victor in this armed conflict? And, conversely, who is to be condemned to the status of the vanquished? The war of narratives has long since doubled and intensified the military war: European geopolitics is now confronted with a viral narrative that portrays Russia and the United States as winners to relegate Europeans and Ukrainians to the status of "losers". But if geopolitics feed on narratives, narratives - especially propaganda narratives - do not exhaust the strategic situation. As Machiavelli noted in Chapter XVII of The Prince: "The politician knows how to create illusions, but when it comes to assessing the strengths and weaknesses of an enemy, he must avoid relying solely on his eyes (which judge appearances) and instead use his hands (which feel reality). Let us be clear: at this stage of Ukraine debate, the reality of victory and the irreversibility of defeat are still matters of narrative. Let us plunge into reality. Ukraine, now vilified and resilient According to the Trumpian narrative broadcast everywhere today, Ukraine and its president must be treated as losers, even defeated. Everything about the behaviour of the American president and his team is aimed at hastening and consecrating the country's defeat: After having been asked to surrender its rare earth resources at rock-bottom prices, Ukraine, like the vanquished in the two world wars, is being excluded from the negotiating table on its own destiny by its self-appointed protector; its legitimate government is being openly denigrated and its legitimacy undermined; it is even being threatened with "war sanctions" to compensate the United States for the financial effort it has made to support it in the face of an illegal invasion. Beneath the strategic shift and the military evasion lies a continuity: for the United States, Ukraine is not a participant but a stake. Ukraine's symbolic defeat - that of history - is obviously compounded by its real setbacks. In addition to the 80,000 to 120,000 soldiers killed on the battlefield, the country of forty-three million people has lost more than six million refugees and millions of citizens who have been incorporated into the Russian Federation. And more than 20% of its territory is now in danger of officially falling under Russian sovereignty. Deprived by the Trump administration of the prospect of NATO membership, it risks a demilitarization comparable to that imposed on Germany after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. At a time when symbolic defeat seems destined to go hand in hand with human and material misery, Ukraine can only save itself from despair by remembering that it has manifested its national identity - so often denied - with arms in hand. The narrative is that of a failed, slaughtered state, while the strategic reality is that of a state that has repelled the total occupation of its territory. The Ukrainians may not be the winners, but they are not "losers" reduced to an international minority. The United States, strategically discredited Can Washington, for its part, claim the trophy of strategic victory in Ukraine? Is the second Trump administration not determining the destiny of the old continent just as the Biden administration claimed to do, but in a different direction? Can't the United States now, more than ever, claim to be Europe's arbiter? Nothing is less certain: Ukraine's policies over the past decade (the Obama, Trump 1, and Biden administrations) have indeed demonstrated the United States' refusal to play a leadership role in Europe. They encouraged Ukraine's inflexibility towards Russia but failed to prevent it from annexing Crimea in 2014, escalating tensions under the first Trump administration, and then invading in 2022. It then supported it for almost three years, only to disown it in a political transition. Washington has behaved not as a leader but as an arsonist in Ukraine, declaring on the one hand that Kyiv should be free to pursue its alliance policy but ruling out any concrete prospect of NATO membership on the other. One of the main lessons of Washington's Ukraine policy is that being one of the United States' "allies" is a risky business: not only does it leave you at the mercy of sudden shifts in alliances, but it also exposes you to constant admonishment and vilification on the international stage. The Europeans have paid the price: criticized by the Biden administration for their pacifism at the start of the war, they are now being criticized, along with the Ukrainians, for failing to bring the war to an end. The United States has made no major strategic gains in this war: it has undermined its own network of allies, damaged its largest military alliance in the world, NATO, and failed to dislodge its strategic regional rival, Russia. Trump's communication tricks will not change this: the United States has suffered undeniable structural strategic setbacks in this conflict. The long Ukrainian crisis, from the Orange Revolution to the current talks, via Euromaidan and the annexation of Crimea, is the opposite of a show of strength for US international strategy: it is a financially costly and strategically ruinous fiasco. The contamination effect on Asian alliances is likely to be massive and rapid: who will want to rely on the American umbrella against the People's Republic of China? Russia, permanently "de-Europeanized What about Russia? Is it the big winner in all this? After all, hasn't it received the promise of Ukraine's non-membership of NATO, its demilitarization, and its transformation into a rump state between Russian and EU territory? In addition to the 20% of Ukrainian territory (population and natural resources) it has seized, it wants to enjoy the prestige of being treated as a strategic peer by the United States. But is this a victory, even a Pyrrhic one? In historical terms, Moscow has lost in just a few years all the investment it made in its dialogue with the West between 1990 and 2000. It has deliberately squandered its relations with its natural economic outlet: Europe. Russia has been permanently de-Europeanized and will pay the price of this divorce in the form of lower growth potential (loss of markets, investors, assets) and in the form of a substantial defence effort that it will have to maintain in the long term throughout its western part, unless political forces favorable to it come to power simultaneously in the main EU countries, which seems unlikely. Again, we must measure this success with our hands, not our eyes: Russia has not achieved all its war aims, far from it. It did not make Ukraine disappear, and it did not make NATO retreat. Will this strategic hiatus - deliberately pursued by Russia in this war - be compensated for by a successful "pivot to Asia"? At best, the People's Republic of China could give Russia the role of "brilliant second" that Prussia gave Austria-Hungary. It is not so much a Pyrrhic victory as a strategic gamble that China has taken, the payoff of which is neither certain nor substantial. The EU faces up to its responsibilities Despite the condescending statements of the second Trump administration, can the EU claim to have made any strategic gains in this war? Again, the gains are meagre and the costs high: it has made great strides in terms of its capabilities but has not moved into a war economy; it is supporting the Ukrainian state at arm's length but has not forced its way to the negotiating table. If it proves reactive and creative, it can, in the medium term, take advantage of the gaping holes left by Russia and the United States on the European scene. As a result, it can no longer attract states to its side without the threat of arms. The Union must therefore quickly resume its enlargement efforts in order not to leave any space on its doorstep. On the other hand, the United States has openly renounced its status as Europe's protector: it wants to be its ideological dynamo, its industrial and technological supplier, and its strategic dominator. If Europe does not want to be among the losers in the Ukrainian war, it must therefore resolutely take full responsibility for its own defence. The time has come.

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Unite State, Russia ,china and Ukraine on chessboard. High quality photo

Opinion – Ukraine’s Future Is Not in Its Own Hands

by Mazlum Özkan

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine is no longer in control of its own war; great power politics have overtaken its struggle for sovereignty, as seen in its exclusion from key diplomatic negotiations and its increasing reliance on external military and economic aid. While Kyiv fights for survival, the U.S. and Russia pursue larger strategic goals, reshaping the global order. This is not a war of democracy versus autocracy—it is a battle over power and influence, with Ukraine caught in the middle. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022, the U.S. has framed the war as a defense of democracy, shaping public perception and policy decisions by justifying increased military aid and economic sanctions against Russia. This framing has also strengthened NATO cohesion and rallied Western support for Ukraine, though critics argue it oversimplifies the conflict’s geopolitical realities. But this narrative masks a deeper reality: a geopolitical contest over Eastern Europe’s balance of power. The U.S. strengthens NATO to contain Russia; Russia fights to keep Ukraine in its orbit. As a result, Ukraine’s ability to act independently is shrinking. At the core of the conflict is a long-standing power struggle between Washington and Moscow. The U.S. aims to maintain dominance over European security, while Russia seeks to dismantle the post-Cold War order that placed NATO on its borders. The Kremlin has repeatedly warned that Ukraine’s Western alignment is a red line, but U.S. policymakers have dismissed these concerns as revisionist grievances rather than legitimate security threats. This deadlock has turned Ukraine into the focal point of an escalating power struggle. For Russia, the war is not just about territory—it is about status. Vladimir Putin frames the conflict as a defense against Western encirclement, citing NATO’s expansion and U.S. military aid to Kyiv as provocations. Moscow’s broader goal is to force a realignment in European security, one that recognizes Russia’s sphere of influence and weakens U.S. hegemony. Under Joe Biden, the U.S. provided billions in military and economic aid to Ukraine, arguing that supporting Kyiv was essential for upholding the liberal order. However, as the war drags on and domestic concerns over foreign spending grow, this approach is being reassessed. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, U.S. policy has shifted toward a transactional approach, a shift that became evident when he excluded Ukraine from recent U.S.-Russia negotiations in Saudi Arabia, dismissal of NATO allies’ calls for a unified stance against Russia, and willingness to negotiate directly with Vladimir Putin—effectively sidelining Kyiv from key discussions that will determine its future. His strategy prioritizes economic agreements over direct military support, shifting U.S. engagement toward a pragmatic recalibration of interests. This shift was further highlighted during the recent confrontation between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House. The meeting, originally intended to finalize a U.S.-Ukraine rare-earth minerals deal, devolved into a heated exchange. Trump accused Zelenskyy of being “disrespectful” and “gambling with World War III,” revealing deep fractures in U.S.-Ukraine relations. The cancellation of a planned joint press conference underscored the breakdown in diplomatic relations, signaling that Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations with Washington is diminishing. The Trump administration’s treatment of Zelenskyy serves as a stark warning to smaller nations reliant on Western support. It highlights the precarious nature of alliances based on strategic convenience rather than genuine commitment to democratic values or sovereignty. Ukraine, once a symbol of Western resolve against Russian aggression, is now being subjected to political maneuvering that undermines its struggle for self-determination. The world is witnessing how great powers prioritize their own interests above the survival of their supposed allies, reinforcing the notion that smaller states can never fully trust the policies of global hegemons. This behavior is not just characteristic of Trump and his administration but is a fundamental aspect of how great powers operate. They perceive their own interests and ideological positions as superior to those of smaller nations, imposing their will under the guise of strategic necessity. The treatment of Ukraine illustrates this dynamic vividly—portraying Ukraine’s justified struggle for sovereignty as though it were a reckless endeavor rather than an existential fight against aggression. The U.S. and its allies, despite claiming to defend Ukraine, have manipulated its war effort for their own geopolitical advantage while simultaneously blaming Ukraine for the very crisis it was forced into. Trump recently emphasized this approach in a statement following a meeting with President Emmanuel Macron at the G7 Summit. He highlighted a proposed “Critical Minerals and Rare-Earths Deal” between the U.S. and Ukraine, describing it as an “Economic Partnership” aimed at recouping American investments while aiding Ukraine’s economic recovery. Simultaneously, he revealed discussions with President Vladimir Putin regarding an end to the war and potential U.S.-Russia economic cooperation, signaling a shift away from military support toward economic and diplomatic agreements. However, tensions flared when Trump and Vice President JD Vance berated Zelenskyy during his February 28 visit, accusing him of ingratitude and pressuring him into a peace deal on U.S. terms. The heated exchange led to the cancellation of a joint press conference and minerals deal signing ceremony. Zelenskyy left the White House abruptly, further deepening the rift between Ukraine and its supposed ally. The public fallout reinforced how great powers prioritize their own strategic interests over the sovereignty of smaller nations, leaving Ukraine increasingly sidelined in decisions that determine its fate. As global power struggles intensify, Ukraine finds itself increasingly excluded from decisions about its own future. Kyiv remains committed to its defense, but external actors—Washington and Moscow—are negotiating their interests over Ukraine’s fate. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s exclusion from key diplomatic discussions, such as the Saudi-hosted talks, underscores this reality. While Biden framed Ukraine as a vital partner in the West’s struggle against Russia, Trump’s approach suggests that Kyiv’s role may be reduced to a bargaining chip in a larger geopolitical realignment.  The Ukraine crisis illustrates the brutal calculus of great power politics, where smaller states become instruments of broader strategic struggles. The U.S.-Russia rivalry has dictated the war’s course, with shifting U.S. policies—from Biden’s interventionism to Trump’s pragmatism—reshaping its trajectory. As Washington and Moscow explore possible diplomatic realignments, Ukraine’s sovereignty risks becoming secondary to great power interests. Great powers dictate the terms of war and peace, leaving Ukraine with fewer choices of its own. The question is not whether Ukraine will survive, but under whose terms it will exist. The text of this work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.  For proper attribution, please refer to the original source