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Abstract The right to freedom of expression is currently facing a global crisis unleashed by the conflict in Gaza. The conflict has led to a high polarisation of public opinion, with opposing factions supporting either Israel's actions or the Palestinian cause. Yet, the right to freedom of expression of Palestinian activists and their supporters is facing systematic suppression worldwide. In this column, I shed light on how state and non-state actors have been active vehicles for the restriction of the right to freedom of expression by targeting voices in support of the Palestinian cause and I consider the application and scope of the right to freedom of expression in this context. The column concludes that the failure to protect the right of Palestinians to have their voices heard contributes to the erosion of our collective right to freedom of expression and has wider repercussion on the promotion and protection of human rights more generally. KeywordsFreedom of expression, Gaza, peaceful protests, media freedom, academic freedom‌, International Law Department, Geneva Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland 1. INTRODUCTION Since 7 October 2023, the right to freedom of expression has been severely restricted worldwide. Irene Khan, current UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, has depicted the current situation as ‘a global crisis of freedom of expression’ unleashed by the conflict in Gaza.1 The threats to the exercise of this fundamental human right have been so extensive and granular that, for instance, in early October 2024, a beekeeper was fined in Italy for merely having exposed a banner at his market stall reading ‘Stop bombing Gaza – stop genocide’.2 Despite the fact that the International Court of Justice has confirmed that what we see on our screens and read about in the newspapers (which cannot even fully reflect the reality that Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank face every day) may amount to a real and imminent risk of genocide already in January 2024,3 the right to freedom of expression of Palestinian activists and their supporters is severely restricted, especially in North America and Europe. It has been commented that ‘rarely has a conflict challenged freedom of opinion and expression so broadly and so far beyond its borders’.4 As a result, in this column I shed light on how both state and non-state actors have been active vehicles for the restriction of the right to freedom of expression in the context of the conflict in Gaza by targeting voices in support of the Palestinian cause in different ways. I then consider the application and scope of the right to freedom of expression in this context and I draw some conclusions on the wider implications that restrictions imposed on freedom of expression bear for the protection and promotion of human rights more generally. 2. SILENCING THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE: THE ROLE OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS Since the beginning of the conflict in Gaza, public opinion has become highly polarised, with opposing factions supporting either Israel's actions or the Palestinian cause. Yet, Palestinian voices and their supporters have faced systematic suppression, with both states and non-state actors actively taking measures to silence their positions. Protests in support of the Palestinian cause have been severely restricted in many countries across the world, often on the grounds that these measures are necessary to protect public order and security, to counter “support of terrorism”, and/or to “prevent antisemitism”. Governments, and Western ones in particular, have imposed specific restrictions, blanket bans or pre-emptive bans on demonstrations in support of Palestine.5 Additionally, law enforcement officials have often resorted to excessive use of force and arbitrary detention to disrupt the protests.6 Although in some instances these protests have seen incidents of violence or vandalism, oftentimes the imposed restrictions have been disproportionate. In Germany, for instance, public authorities have imposed pre-emptive bans on several solidarity gatherings in support of Palestinians, based on concerns for ‘public security’, a need to prevent the ‘public celebration of the Hamas terrorist attacks’ of 7 October 2023, and ‘the increase in antisemitic attacks’ in the country.7 These decisions, however, were often grounded on ‘unspecified risks of “inciting, antisemitic exclamations, glorification of and incitement to violence, and acts of violence”’.8 In Italy, protests have been met with excessive use of force by police. For instance, during a protest organised in Pisa in February 2024, riot police and police vehicles were deployed against protesters to block the route to the university square, where participants were directed. In an effort to prevent the participants to reach the square, police charged forward and hit students with batons.9 The disproportionate response by law enforcement led to an unprecedented statement by Italian President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella, who criticised the policing of the protest.10 These restrictions have not been limited to public demonstrations. Academic freedom, in fact, has also faced severe challenges. In many university campuses across the world, students have set up encampments, in solidarity with the Palestinian people, to call for a ceasefire as well as to demand that their universities divest from corporations profiting from the conflict and occupation of the Palestinian territories.11 However, these initiatives have also been met with restrictions: university administrations and local authorities have forcibly removed the encampments, often employing excessive use of force and arbitrarily arresting protestors.12 Students who have participated in the protests have even faced disciplinary measures: as underscored by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, these have included ‘suspension, possible expulsion, eviction from campus housing and the threat of deportation of some foreign students, which could jeopardize their scholarships and future careers’.13 Universities have also increasingly cancelled and even prohibited the holding of events on Israel and Palestine. The recent suspension of a planned event with Francesca Albanese, current UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 by the University of Munich14 and by the Free University of Berlin15 are only the latest example in a long list of events on Palestine canceled by universities across the globe.16 Journalists, and the media more generally, have been subjected to an unprecedented level of attacks. Israel has not only denied access to Gaza to foreign press,17 thereby preventing proper reporting from the ground, but those journalists with access to Gaza have been deliberately killed or arbitrarily detained: according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, as of 3 February 2025, 167 journalists and media workers were confirmed killed (159 Palestinian, 2 Israeli, and 6 Lebanese), 49 journalists were reported injured, 2 journalists were reported missing, and 75 journalists were reported arrested.18 Under international humanitarian law, the deliberate killing of journalists is prohibited and the killing of civilians is a war crime.19 Israel has also banned Al-Jazeera20 and raided its offices.21 Recently, the Israeli government has additionally sanctioned the newspaper Haaretz and banned government funding bodies from communicating or placing advertisements with the newspaper on the grounds that Hareetz published ‘many articles that have hurt the legitimacy of the state of Israel and its right to self-defence, and particularly the remarks made in London by Haaretz publisher Amos Schocken that support terrorism and call for imposing sanctions on the government.’22 Additionally, the Israeli government relies on a military censor, which is empowered to fully or partially redact any article dealing with “security issues”: in 2023, 613 articles were barred from publication, and 2,703 articles were redacted.23 Traditional and social media have also played a huge role in censoring pro-Palestinian content. While journalists reporting from Gaza and the West Bank have been silenced by Israel, a worrying majority of media outlets from North America and Europe have consistently failed to perform their watchdog role and speak truth to power: newspaper headlines and TV shows have regularly dehumanised Palestinians,24 and their coverage of the situation in Gaza has consistently employed wording that contributes to the creation a “normality” where, as also underscored by Fuad Zarbiyev, Palestinian lives are not as grievable as Israeli ones.25 Social media platforms have played a crucial role in providing real-time information about the situation in Gaza. This is especially so given that, as mentioned, Israel has severely restricted foreign media access. Nonetheless, despite their crucial role for providing access to information on the situation in Gaza, social media platforms have also significantly contributed to censoring Palestinian content, either because of their inadequate and biased content moderation systems, or following governmental requests for content removal. A human rights due diligence exercise reviewing the impact of Meta's policies and activities during the May 2021 crisis in Israel and Palestine confirms that Meta's policies and practices have resulted in biased outcomes which have specifically impacted Palestinian and Arabic speaking users.26 For instance, the report revealed that Arabic content had greater over-enforcement, meaning that platforms were erroneously removing Palestinian voices.27 While platforms’ content moderation systems already disproportionately restrict Palestinian voices, governmental requests for content removal further exacerbate the issue. As reported by Human Rights Watch, between 7 October and 14 November 2023 alone, Israel's Cyber Unit sent social media platforms 9,500 content takedown requests, 60% of which went to Meta, and platforms overwhelmingly complied with these requests in 94% of cases.28 Content that was shared in support of the Palestinian cause was frequently removed by social media platforms, including the slogan “From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be Free”. Although this slogan has been meant and interpreted by many as a peaceful call for the right to self-determination of Palestinians,29 it has been removed by the platforms.30 The slogan has even been criminalised or sanctioned in some countries.31 Taken together, this range of measures represent a substantial and highly problematic attack on the right to freedom of expression and access to information and, in turn, to the promotion and protection of human rights more generally. I will now set out the application and relevance of the contours of this right in this context. 3. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION The right to freedom of opinion and expression is protected by article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),32 as well as under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).33 Additionally, article 20 of the ICCPR prohibits ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’.34 The right to freedom of expression also includes the ‘freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice’.35 Freedom of expression is integral to the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of assembly and association,36 protected under article 20 of the UDHR, article 21 of the ICCPR37 and article 11 of the ECHR.38 Crucially, for the right to freedom of expression to be restricted, such restriction must meet three cumulative criteria: (1) it must be provided by law; (2) it must pursue a legitimate aim (the respect of the rights or reputations of others or the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals); and (3) the restriction must be necessary and proportionate for pursuing such aim.39 Because the right to freedom of expression is considered to be an enabler for the exercise of other fundamental rights,40 any restriction must be construed narrowly so as not to impair its exercise. Restrictions to freedom of expression, even when pursuing the legitimate aims of protecting the rights of others (for example, the right to non-discrimination of Jewish people and the fight against antisemitism) or public order, need to be proportionate. The rise of antisemitism, Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism requires all states to take the necessary measures to protect Jews, Muslims, Palestinians and Arabs from discrimination and hate speech. However, oftentimes restrictions to freedom of expression have relied upon a definition of “antisemitism” which is, in itself, contrary to international human rights law. Many governments rely, in fact, on the working definition of antisemitism provided by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.41 This definition is overly broad, does not contain the element of “incitement”, and conflates criticism of the state of Israel with antisemitism, therefore contravening the right to freedom of expression since international human rights law allows for criticism of all states.42 The reliance by many governments on this working definition has been considered as a ‘politically motivated instrumentalization of the fight against antisemitism’,43 primarily harming Palestinians and human rights defenders advocating on their behalf.44 As also underscored by Irene Khan, ‘[t]he central conceptual flaw of the “working definition” is the inherent conflation of Zionism, a political ideology, with antisemitism’, which results in “the suppression of legitimate criticism of Israel, not the enhancement of protection of Jews from racial and religious hatred and intolerance”.45 The disruption or prohibition of peaceful protests through the means of excessive use of force, the forcible removal of peaceful student encampments, or even the prohibition of events addressing the topic of Palestine or criticising the state of Israel's actions without it being necessary and proportionate for pursuing a legitimate aim cannot be considered measures in compliance with international human rights law. As also underscored by the UN Human Rights Committee and the Special Rapporteur on the right to Freedom of Assembly and Association, isolated instances of violent conduct are not sufficient to taint an entire assembly as non-peaceful46 and ‘[w]here isolated instances of violence take place in the context of a protest, law enforcement personnel must make all efforts to locate and remove the violent individuals, to allow other protesters to exercise their rights to assemble peacefully and express themselves’.47 Likewise, the attacks on journalists and on media freedom violate everyone's right to freedom of expression and to access to information and, in some instances, they also contravene international humanitarian law. These violations become even more troublesome given the ‘allegations of targeted attacks on media as part of a strategy to cover up evidence of war crimes’.48 At the same time as governments are violating their own obligations under international human rights law, corporate entities such as traditional media and social media are acting in contravention of their own responsibility to respect human rights. By virtue of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, ‘[b]usiness enterprises should respect human rights’, meaning that “they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved”.49 As such, both traditional media and social media platforms should ensure that their business activities do not infringe on the rights to freedom of expression and access to information. This would include ensuring that reporting does not perpetuate double standards and that content moderation systems do not disproportionately censor Palestinian content. Precisely because the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and access to information acts as a catalyst for the exercise of other fundamental rights, its restriction has wider repercussion on the promotion and protection of human rights more generally. Not only the right to freedom to peaceful assembly is also heavily impacted, but, more crucially, the right to self-determination of Palestinian people is also affected. The blanket ban on the use of Palestinian symbols is but one example of the impact that restrictions on the right to freedom of expression have on the Palestinian right to self-determination. The lack of proper protection of the right to freedom of expression also results in the failure to shed light on a variety of human rights violations that Palestinians are subjected to everyday in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including the right to life and the right to be free from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.50 4. CONCLUSION That a beekeeper is fined for exposing a banner calling for the end of a genocide, that students lose their scholarship or visas for calling on their government to demand a ceasefire and on their university to divest from corporations profiting from the conflict and occupation, that a professor is prevented from giving a lecture about Gaza in a university premise, that our governments respond to student peaceful protests with violence – these are issues that should concern each of us. Each of these restrictions, when failing to comply with the standards of legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality (as set out in international human rights law), violates our fundamental right to freedom of expression. The right to freedom of expression is considered to be an enabler to the exercise of other fundamental rights. As reiterated by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, ‘the genocide in Gaza, the violation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian Territory and the failure of Israel to respect its international legal obligations, including the occupation of Palestinian territory, are matters of global public interest’.51 By failing to stand up for the exercise of our right to freedom of expression in support of the Palestinian cause, and by failing to demand accountability from those actors who consistently violate it, we contribute to its erosion. And by failing to stand up for the rights of Palestinians, including their right to have their voices heard, we fail to stand up for human rights. Declaration of conflicting interestsThe author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Notes1. Irene Khan, Global threats to freedom of expression arising from the conflict in Gaza - Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression 2024 [A/79/319] para 1.2. Federico Berni, ‘Striscione pro Palestina al mercato di Desio, arrivano i carabinieri: multa di 430 euro all’apicoltore’ Corriere della Sera (16 October 2024) <https://milano.corriere.it/notizie/lombardia/24_ottobre_16/striscione-pro-palestina-al-mercato-di-desio-arrivano-i-carabinieri-multa-di-430-euro-all-apicoltore-7c08956e-a16b-4070-a1e7-93b3c5b31xlk.shtml> accessed 3 February 2025.3. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel) (International Court of Justice). See also, Francesca Albanese, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 - Anatomy of a genocide 2024 [A/HRC/55/73].4. Khan (n 1) para 1.5. ibid 34.6. ‘Europe: Under Protected and Over Restricted: The State of the Right to Protest in 21 European Countries’ (Amnesty International, 2024) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur01/8199/2024/en/> accessed 3 February 2025.7. ibid 97.8. ibid, emphasis added.9. ibid 98.10. ibid.11. Khan (n 1) para 40; Michael Williams, ‘Pro-Palestinian Student Protests around the World – in Pictures’ the Guardian (7 May 2024) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2024/may/07/pro-palestinian-student-protests-around-the-world-in-pictures> accessed 3 February 2025.12. Khan (n 1) para 41.13. ibid 42.14. Francesca Albanese, UN Special Rapporteur oPt [@FranceskAlbs], ‘The University of Munich Has Canceled My Talk, a Decision I Hope They Will Reconsider. If Not, I Look Forward to Seeing You Elsewhere, German Friends. May Freedom of Expression and Your Right to Be Informed Prevail. @LMU_Muenchen’ <https://x.com/FranceskAlbs/status/1885703501516267743> accessed 4 February 2025. On how anti-Palestinian racializing processes and repression operate within a framework of liberal freedom in German education, see Anna Younes and Hanna Al-Taher, ‘Erasing Palestine in Germany's Educational System: The Racial Frontiers of Liberal Freedom’ (2024) 33 Middle East Critique 397.15. ‘Statement Regarding the Planned Public Lecture and Discussion with Francesca Albanese and Eyal Weizman on February 19, 2025’, Freie Universität Berlin (12 February 2025) <https://www.fu-berlin.de/en/presse/informationen/fup/faq/nahost/wissenschaftliche-veranstaltung/index.html> accessed 24 February 2025. On the gravity of these actions for academic freedom, see Isabel Feichtner, ‘Where Is Our Outcry?' (Verfassungsblog, 19 February 2025) <https://verfassungsblog.de/where-is-our-outcry/> accessed 24 February 2025; Khaled El Mahmoud, ‘Special Editorial: A Nation in Crisis: The Suppression of Academic Freedom and the Rise of Ideological Conformity’ (Völkerrechtsblog, 21 February 2025) <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/special-editorial-a-nation-in-crisis/> accessed 24 February 2025.16. See, for example, Vimal Patel and Anna Betts, ‘Campus Crackdowns Have Chilling Effect on Pro-Palestinian Speech’ The New York Times (17 December 2023) <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/17/us/campus-crackdowns-have-chilling-effect-on-pro-palestinian-speech.html> accessed 4 February 2025; ‘Harvard Medical School Cancels Class Session With Gazan Patients, Calling It One-Sided’ The Harvard Crimson (22 January 2025) <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2025/1/23/hms-cancels-gaza-patient-panel/> accessed 4 February 2025.17. ‘Open up Access to Gaza and Protect Journalists’ Le Monde (29 October 2023) <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2023/10/29/open-up-access-to-gaza-and-protect-journalists_6212695_23.html> accessed 4 February 2025.18. ‘Journalist Casualties in the Israel-Gaza War’ (Committee to Protect Journalists, 3 February 2025) <https://cpj.org/2025/02/journalist-casualties-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict/> accessed 4 February 2025.19. Under art. 79 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (signed on 12 December 1977, entered into force on 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 3. “Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as civilians within the meaning of Article 50, paragraph 1”; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3, art 8(2).20. Al Jazeera Staff, ‘Israel Bans Al Jazeera: What Does It Mean and What Happens Next?’ Al Jazeera (6 May 2024) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/6/israel-bans-al-jazeera-what-does-it-mean-and-what-happens-next> accessed 4 February 2025.21. ‘Israel Raids and Shuts down Al Jazeera's Bureau in Ramallah in the West Bank’ AP News (22 September 2024) <https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-al-jazeera-gaza-war-hamas-4abdb2969e39e7ad99dfbf9caa7bb32c> accessed 4 February 2025.22. ‘Israel Sanctions Haaretz Due to Articles That “Hurt” Israeli State’ Al Jazeera (24 November 2024) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/24/israel-sanctions-haaretz-due-to-articles-that-hurt-israeli-state> accessed 4 February 2025.23. Amjad Iraqi, ‘Israeli Military Censor Bans Highest Number of Articles in over a Decade’ +972 Magazine (20 May 2024) <https://www.972mag.com/israeli-military-censor-media-2023/> accessed 4 February 2025.24. The dehumanisation of Palestinians in traditional media is a longstanding phenomenon. See, for example, Laura Albast and Cat Knarr, ‘Opinion | How Media Coverage Whitewashes Israeli State Violence against Palestinians’ Washington Post (28 April 2022) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/04/28/jerusalem-al-aqsa-media-coverage-israeli-violence-palestinians/> accessed 4 February 2025.25. Fuad Zarbiyev, ‘“What about October 8? What about October 9? What about October 10? What about October 11?” On the Grievability of Palestinian Lives’, Geneva Graduate Institute (14 October 2024) <https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/the-grievability-of-palestinian-lives> accessed 4 February 2025.26. ‘Human Rights Due Diligence of Meta's Impacts in Israel and Palestine | Reports | Sustainable Business Network and Consultancy’, BSR (22 September 2022) <https://www.bsr.org/en/reports/meta-human-rights-israel-palestine> accessed 4 February 2025.27. ibid 5.28. Rasha Younes, ‘Meta's Broken Promises’, Human Rights Watch (21 December 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/12/21/metas-broken-promises/systemic-censorship-palestine-content-instagram-and> accessed 4 February 2025.29. Ellen Ioanes, ‘“From the River to Sea,” the Phrase Used amid the Israel-Hamas War, Explained’ Vox (24 November 2023) <https://www.vox.com/world-politics/23972967/river-to-sea-palestine-israel-hamas> accessed 17 February 2025.30. Human Rights Watch has found that “[i]In hundreds of cases, th[e] slogan [“From the River to the Sea”], as well as comments such as “Free Palestine,” “Ceasefire Now,” and “Stop the Genocide,” were repeatedly removed by Instagram and Facebook under “spam” Community Guidelines or Standards without appearing to take into account the context of these comments.”, ibid 27.31. See, for example, Federal Ministry of the Interior, “Announcement of a ban on associations in accordance with Section 3 of the Association Act Ban on the association ‘HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya)” in German), 2 November 2023, available at <https://www.bundesanzeiger.de/pub/publication/M0JVrk5Qop55DhqscjE/content/M0JVrk5Qop55DhqscjE/BAnz%20AT%2002.11.2023%20B10.pdf?inline>32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art 19.33. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), art 10.34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 32), art 20.35. ibid 19(2).36. Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (2011) CCPR/C/GC/34 para 4.37. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 32), art 21.38. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (n 33), art 11.39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 32), art 19(3).40. Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression 2011 [A/HRC/17/27] para 22.41. Khan (n 1) para 79.42. ibid, para 80.43. Tendayi Achiume, Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance - Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, E. Tendayi Achiume 2022 [A/77/512] para 71.44. ibid 76.45. Khan (n 1) para 81.46. Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 37, (2020) on the Right of Peaceful Assembly (Article 21)’ (2020) CCPR/C/GC/37 para 19; Clément Voule, Protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests during crisis situations - Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Clément Nyaletsossi Voule 2022 [A/HRC/50/42] para 40.47. Voule, (n 46), para 40.48. Khan (n 1) paras 17 & 89.49. OHCHR, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (2011) HR/PUB/11/04 Principle 11.50. OHCHR, ‘Israel's Escalating Use of Torture against Palestinians in Custody a Preventable Crime against Humanity: UN Experts’ (5 August 2024) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/08/israels-escalating-use-torture-against-palestinians-custody-preventable> accessed 18 February 2025; Amnesty International, ‘Israel/OPT: Horrifying Cases of Torture and Degrading Treatment of Palestinian Detainees amid Spike in Arbitrary Arrests’ (8 November 2023) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/11/israel-opt-horrifying-cases-of-torture-and-degrading-treatment-of-palestinian-detainees-amid-spike-in-arbitrary-arrests/> accessed 18 February 2025.51. Khan (n 1) para 88.*This column is based and expands upon a short article previously published on the Geneva Graduate Institute website, available here https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/silenced-voices-freedom-expression-gazaCorresponding author(s):Stefania Di Stefano, International Law Department, Geneva Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland. Email: stefania.distefano@graduateinstitute.ch

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском I. Introduction On 13 June 2025, Israel attacked more than a dozen locations across Iran in the largest assault on the country since the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Beginning on the evening of 13 June, Iran retaliated by launching ballistic missiles and drones at Israel. Conflicts between the two countries have intensified. Amid intensified conflicts between Israel and Iran, the US attacked Iran by bombing three Iranian nuclear sites on 22 June 2025. In retaliation for these attacks from the US and Israel, Iran may consider closing or blocking the Strait of Hormuz. In fact, Iran’s parliament has reportedly approved of the closing of the Strait of Hormuz on 22 June 2025. However, on 24 June 2025, President Trump announced a ceasefire between Iran and Israel, thereby reducing the possibility of the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran. Nonetheless, there is still a possibility that conflicts between Iran and Israel continue and then Iran may reconsider the closing of the Strait. This is because the ceasefire is so fragile that the conflicts between Israel and Iran can take place at any time. If the closing of the Strait of Hormuz happens, it will have significant impacts on global economy, in particular on Asian economies, because 84% of the crude oil and condensate and 83% of the liquefied natural gas that moved through the Strait of Hormuz went to Asian markets in 2024. This paper analyzes the impacts of Iran’s closure or blockage of the Strait of Hormuz on the global economy with a focus on Asian economies. II. Examples of Geopolitics Impacting Energy Prices Crude oil remains the world's most geopolitically charged commodity. Despite robust supply growth and growing energy transitions, as Figure 1 shows, turmoil in oil-producing regions such as Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 continues to ripple through prices.   Figure1: Examples of Geopolitics Impacting Crude Oil Prices As Figure 2 shows, in June 2025, global oil price surged into the mid‑$70s per barrel amid escalating Iran–Israel tensions and threats to the Strait of Hormuz. In mid‑June 2025, Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure led to an immediate 7–11% increase in the Brent crude oil price. The market reacted swiftly to the geopolitical risk, particularly over fears of supply disruption through the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian lawmakers, who threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, finally approved of closing the Strait on 22 June 2025. While tanker traffic continued, the Brent crude oil price briefly climbed to $79.50 and then dropped to $74.85.   Figure 2: Movements of crude oil (WTI) and Brent oil prices III. The importance of the Strait of Hormuz 1. Location of the Strait of Hormuz As Figure 3 shows, the Strait of Hormuz, located between Oman and Iran, connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The strait is deep enough and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil tankers, and it is one of the world's most important oil chokepoints.  Figure 3: Picture of the Strait of Hormuz 2. Oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz As Table 1 shows, large volumes of oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz, and very few alternative options exist to move oil out of the strait if it is closed. In 2024, oil flow through the strait averaged 20 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption. In the first quarter of 2025, total oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz remained relatively flat compared with 2024.  Table 1: volume of crude oil, condensate, petroleum transported through the Strait of Hormuz Although we have not seen maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz blocked following recent tensions in the region, the price of Brent crude oil (a global benchmark) increased from $69 per barrel (b) on June 12 to $74/b on June 13, 2025. This fact highlights the importance of the Strait to global oil supplies. Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes that are critical to global energy security. The inability of oil to transit a major chokepoint, even temporarily, can create substantial supply delays and raise shipping costs, potentially increasing world energy prices. Although most chokepoints can be circumvented by using other routes—often adding significantly to transit time—some chokepoints have no practical alternatives. Most volumes that transit the Strait of Hormuz have no alternative means of exiting the region, although there are some pipeline alternatives that can avoid the Strait. 3. Destinations Flows through the Strait of Hormuz in 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 made up more than one-quarter of total global seaborne oil trade and about one-fifth of global oil and petroleum product consumption. In addition, around one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade also transited the Strait of Hormuz in 2024, primarily from Qatar. Based on tanker tracking data published by Vortexa, Saudi Arabia moves more crude oil and condensate through the Strait of Hormuz than any other country. In 2024, exports of crude and condensate from Saudi Arabia accounted for 38% of total Hormuz crude flows (5.5 million b/d). As Figure 4 shows, 84% of the crude oil and condensate and 83% of the liquefied natural gas that transported through the Strait of Hormuz went to Asian nations in 2024. China, India, Japan, and South Korea were the top destinations for crude oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz. Asia accounted for a combined 69% of all Hormuz crude oil and condensate flows in 2024. These Asian markets would likely be most affected by supply disruptions at Hormuz.  Figure 4: volume of crude oil and condensate transported through the strait of Hormuz In 2024, the United States imported about 0.5 million b/d of crude oil and condensate from Persian Gulf countries through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for about 7% of total U.S. crude oil and condensate imports and 2% of U.S. petroleum liquids consumption. In 2024, U.S. crude oil imports from countries in the Persian Gulf were at the lowest level in nearly 40 years as domestic production and imports from Canada have increased. IV. Economic Effects of the Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz Iran has repeatedly threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, notably during crises with the United States in 2011, 2018 and 2020. So far, these threats have never materialized into a total closure, but the mere mention of them is enough to provoke crude oil price rises. According to many economists and energy experts, a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would have significant economic impacts, including sharp increases in oil prices, disruptions to global supply chains, and potential economic sanctions. These effects could ripple through various sectors, affecting businesses, consumers, and global economies alike. The 2021 Suez Canal blockage provides a relevant, if smaller-scale, precedent. The six-day disruption in the Suez Canal caused approximately $9.6 billion per day in global trade delays according to Lloyd's List Intelligence. A Strait of Hormuz closure would likely generate significantly larger economic impacts given the strategic importance of the energy resources involved. 1. Short-term Impacts of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz Main short-term effects of the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz are as follows:· Increased Oil Prices:A blockage would likely lead to temporary spikes in global oil prices, potentially above $100 per barrel, due to supply disruptions and increased demand. · Disrupted Supply Chains:The Strait of Hormuz is a vital transit point for oil and LNG, and any disruption could cause significant delays and disruptions to global supply chains. · Higher Shipping Costs:With increased demand and reduced supply, shipping costs, including insurance premiums, would rise. · Energy Costs:Higher oil prices would translate to higher energy costs for consumers and businesses, impacting various sectors.  2. Long-term Impacts of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz Main long-term effects of the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz are as follows:· Reduced Oil Production:Oil exporters might reduce production to conserve resources or diversify export routes, potentially leading to long-term supply shortages. · Economic Sanctions:In response to a blockade, major oil buyers might exert pressure on oil-producing states to increase supply, potentially leading to economic sanctions against Iran. · Diversification of Trade Routes:Oil-producing states and major oil importers might explore alternative trade routes to reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz, potentially shifting trade patterns. · Geopolitical Instability:The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic chokepoint, and any disruption could lead to increased geopolitical tensions and conflicts.  3. Overall Economic Consequence  Overall economic effects of the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz are as follows:· Increased inflation:Higher energy costs would contribute to inflation in various countries, impacting consumers and businesses.· Global economic slowdown:Disruptions to supply chains and increased costs could lead to a slowdown in global economic growth.· Regional economic instability:The Strait of Hormuz is a key economic artery for the Middle East, and any disruption could lead to significant economic instability in the region.  V. Analysis of Economic Effects of the Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz According to several Western banks, a complete closure of the Strait could cause crude Oil prices to soar above $120 to $150 a barrel, or even more if the conflict between Israel and Iran is prolonged. According to Deutsche Bank, the scenario of a total closure of the Strait, causing an interruption of 21 million barrels a day for two months, could push oil price to over $120 a barrel, or even beyond if global supplies are permanently disrupted. Analysts from Rabobank, a Dutch multinational banking and financial services company, even mention a spike towards $150 a barrel, recalling that in 2022, after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Brent crude oil price briefly touched $139. But the difference here is major: Persian Gulf oil is geographically concentrated and trapped in a single access point, they note. TD Securities, a Canadian multinational investment bank, points out that the oil market is currently in a situation of oversupply, but if the Strait of Hormuz are blocked, even temporarily, no production capacity - neither from OPEC nor the United States - can immediately compensate for a shortfall of 17 to 20 million barrels/day. According to analyses from these Western banks, consequences of the shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz are below: • Energy inflation: Crude oil and gas prices would soar, affecting household bills, industrial costs and overall inflation. An oil price surge above $120 would trigger a drop in global growth, similar to 1973, 1990 or 2022, claims Deutsche Bank. • Energy shock in Europe and Asia: Europe is still largely dependent on Qatari LNG, which transits through Hormuz. And for Asia, the closure of the Strait would be a major blow, particularly for China, India and South Korea, according to ING, a Dutch multinational banking and financial services corporation. • Disruption of supply chains: Beyond energy, Hormuz is also a key axis of global maritime trade. A prolonged closure would increase marine insurance premiums, impacting the prices of imported goods, and delaying many imports. According to JP Morgan, the situation remains fluid, and the magnitude of potential economic impact is uncertain. However, the impact is likely to be uneven globally.S&P Global projects substantial economic consequences across multiple regions if disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz take place:· Middle East: Direct production and export disruptions would immediately impact regional economies dependent on energy revenues.· Asia-Pacific: The region’s high energy dependency creates a multiplier effect, where initial price shocks trigger broader economic impacts.· Europe: While less directly dependent on Gulf oil than Asia, Europe would face secondary supply chain bottlenecks and inflationary pressures. The Asia-Pacific region faces severe vulnerability, with approximately 84% of its crude oil imports transiting through the Strait of Hormuz according to International Energy Agency data from 2025. This dependency creates a significant economic exposure that extends far beyond immediate energy price effects. For example, nearly 90% of Iran’s oil exports go to China. China has relatively diversified oil import sources and large reserves. However, markets such as India, South Korea, Japan, and Indonesia, which rely heavily on Middle Eastern oil, will be more vulnerable. Higher sustained oil prices would have far-reaching economic consequences in Asia, including China. India, South Korea, and Japan. Even China, with their high dependence on Middle Eastern oil, would see their inflation rates accelerate, their economic growth drop and the price of goods rise because of an increase in energy prices. If rising fuel costs continue, they could be even more devastating for emerging markets in Southeast Asia. Specifically, India is highly exposed to Middle East energy. More than 60% of its oil comes via Hormuz. A $10 hike in global crude will cuts India’s GDP growth by 0.3% and raises inflation by 0.4%, according to India’s Ministry of Finance. Shipping insurers have already raised premiums by 20%. Cargo rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope adds 15–20 days and significant costs. Indian refiners are holding prices for now, but margins are tightening. According to Brig Rakesh Bhatia, an India security expert, it’s not just about energy. India’s trade with Iran, especially Basmati rice exports worth ₹6,374 crore in FY 2024–25, faces disruption due to insurance issues and port uncertainty. According to Amitendu Palit, a Senior Research Fellow and Research Lead (trade and economics) in the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore, the impacts of closing of the Strait of Hormuz or its disruptions on India are below: •  India, which imports about two-thirds of its crude and nearly half of its LNG through the Strait of Hormuz, stands to lose significantly in case of disruption. A closure or disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would spell trouble for India. Nearly 70% of its crude oil and almost 40% of its LNG imports pass through this route, with Qatar alone supplying nearly 10 million tonnes of LNG in 2024. Any blockage could severely impact energy security and prices.• Energy prices: Surging oil and gas costs could spike domestic inflation, especially in transport and food.• Currency pressure: Rising import bills would widen the current account deficit and weaken the rupee.• Sectoral impact: Aviation, logistics, tyres, and manufacturing sectors could face cost surges.• Though India holds strategic oil reserves, experts caution these are built for short-term supply shocks—not sustained disruption from a regional war. According to Palit, the major impacts on India result from the escalation in crude oil prices. India is one of the largest importers of crude oil in the world after China, Europe and the United States (US). However, unlike China, which is the largest global buyer of Iranian crude oil, India’s main sources of crude oil are Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Russia, followed by the United Arab Emirates and the US. Crude oil price rises will impact India’s overall import bill. Though many Indian refiners have long-period forward contracts to purchase crude oil at previously agreed prices, future such contracts entered into now will have to factor in the prevailing higher prices. Needless to say, spot purchases of crude oil, based on immediate requirements, will be at much higher prices. Higher crude prices will impact domestic prices across the board. Refiners are unlikely to absorb these prices and will pass them on to consumers. Liquefied petroleum gas, diesel and kerosene – all of which are refined petroleum products for common household use, including by low-income families – will become costlier. The multiplier effects of higher prices will be noticeable as energy demand is high during peak summer. Higher prices will also be experienced by civil aviation. Air travel is set to become more expensive as aviation turbine fuel prices go up. Apart from domestic air travel, international air travel will also become costlier. Air India and other Indian carriers are already taking longer routes by avoiding the Pakistani airspace. Now, more international airlines, particularly the Middle Eastern carriers, will be rerouting their flights to avoid Israeli and Iranian airspace, leading to longer routes and higher prices. This is certainly not good news during the peak tourist season, with Indians travelling to the West, especially to holiday spots in Europe. Apart from flying costs, there are major disruptions for travel agents and tour planners as they will be forced to rework itineraries. Domestic inflation prospects in India will be aggravated by the sharp escalation in gold prices. Geopolitical volatility never fails to trigger the urge to invest in ‘safe havens’. The tendency is visible through a sharp rise in the prices of the US dollar, and gold and silver. Unless there is a quick resolution of the Iran conflict, precious metal prices will remain high into the festive season, which commences in India in about three months. Consumer pockets and household budgets will feel the squeeze from the cumulative higher costs. For much of India, high prices from exogenous shocks such as the Iran conflict, is clearly not great news in a year when the overall prospects for economic growth are more subdued than in the previous years Unlike India, China appears more insulated. China has been over-importing crude for months, building strategic reserves of more than 1 billion barrels. Its diversified supply lines from Russia, Venezuela, and the Gulf provide flexibility. However, China has significant Belt and Road investments in Iran and Iraq, including infrastructure and power plants, thereby damaging China. Taiwan Minister of Economic Affairs Kuo Jyh-huei estimated on 23 June 2025 that if Iran moves to block the Strait of Hormuz, it would cause crude oil prices to rise and subsequently impact Taiwan's fuel prices and consumer price index (CPI). Currently, less than 20 percent of Taiwan's crude oil and natural gas import pass through the Strait of Hormuz. If the strait were to be blocked, ships would be forced to take longer alternative routes, delaying deliveries, causing oil prices to rise, Kuo claims that a 10 percent increase in oil prices would raise the CPI by approximately 0.3 percent. The ripple effects are already hitting Southeast Asia. As Al Jazeera reports, energy-importing nations like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam are facing higher shipping costs and insurance surcharges. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, already under economic strain, are especially vulnerable to energy supply delays and inflation. For Southeast Asia, this situation would result in escalating costs across various sectors. Energy-dependent industries, including manufacturing, transportation, and logistics, would face soaring operational expenses, which could reduce output and increase consumer prices. The manufacturing sector in Southeast Asia, a pivotal component of regional economic growth, would be particularly adversely affected by rising fuel costs, thereby diminishing its competitiveness in the global market. Additionally, inflationary pressures would undermine consumer purchasing power, dampening domestic consumption and subsequently slowing GDP growth throughout the region.  Iran itself would not escape unscathed. Closing the Strait would choke its own oil exports, which account for 65% of government revenue, risking economic collapse and domestic unrest for Iran. On the other hand, Europe’s demand for LNG has increased since the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, although reliance on the Middle East has fallen as Europe imported more from U.S. However, Europe remains highly sensitive to energy prices. Conversely, the U.S., as a net energy exporter, could be less impacted compared to previous oil crises when it relied more on oil imports. However, the U.S. is entering this period from a vulnerable state of increasing risks of inflation and an economic slowdown. It is estimated that a USD 10 increase in oil prices could add 0.3-0.4% to inflation, exacerbating current stagflationary risks given the surge in tariffs. This also complicates the Federal Reserve's (Fed) decision-making. Economic experts still expect the Fed to be slow to cut interest rates, as inflation risks remain larger than unemployment concerns for now.  VI. Conclusion This paper showed that the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz will increase oil & other energy prices, inflation, and shipping costs, while it reduces economic growth in the world. This paper claimed that these negative impacts will be largest in Asian countries because 84% of the crude oil and condensate and 83% of the liquefied natural gas that transported through the Strait of Hormuz went to Asian markets in 2024.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Strategically located on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, the Gaza Strip is a crucially important enclave in the Levant. Its proximity to Israel and Egypt places it in an area of high strategic sensitivity, and it is deeply involved in the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Territorial disputes, rooted in sovereignty claims, overlap with the involvement of international actors with different economic and strategic interests.This territory, which is no more than 12 kilometers wide and a little more than 40 kilometers long, has been the scene of a confrontation between the State of Israel and the political, military and social organization Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya, Islamic Resistance Movement) for the last two years. In this war scenario, three main actors can be mentioned. On the one hand, the State of Israel, created in 1948, which has a great military and technological capacity thanks to the help of the United States. Israel distinguishes that Hamas is a permanent threat to the Israelis, hence its policy of land, naval and maritime blockade, arguing that it must defend itself from the aggressions of this group which has repeatedly launched missiles in this century. Secondly, Hamas, an organization created in 1987 during the first Intifada (rebellion or uprising), which exercises control of the Gaza Strip and leads the resistance to the State of Israel seeking the creation of a Palestinian State. Hamas' capabilities range from military development with the launching of missiles, to public administration and social work in the area. Third, the United States is an external actor in the region, but one that wields considerable influence, for while it sees itself as an arbiter in the Israeli-Palestinian issue, it has done little more than deploy over the decades military, political and financial support for the State of Israel. The choice of the period of analysis from 2023 to early 2025 is due to the succession of events in the area that have demanded specific attention, since the military escalation has denoted a more radical change in the posture of the main actors. Given this situation, the central research question is the following: How have the power dynamics between Israel, Hamas and the United States manifested themselves in the Gaza Strip during the period 2023-2025, and what have been the main implications of their actions. Hence, the main objective of this paper is to analyze the interactions between these three main actors from 2023 to early 2025. Israel, founded in 1948 and with great military and technological power thanks to U.S. support. Hamas, established in 1987, controls the Gaza Strip and leads the resistance, seeking the creation of a Palestinian state that does not recognize Israel. The United States, while presenting itself as an arbiter, has historically provided substantial military, political and financial support to Israel. The October 7, 2023 Hamas's attack, "Operation Al-Aqsa Storm," provoked the Israeli "Iron Swords" counteroffensive. This response included heavy aerial and ground bombardment throughout Gaza, causing widespread destruction and a severe humanitarian crisis. Israel seeks to dismantle Hamas' military capability, eliminate its leadership and release hostages, in addition to the establishment of a security zone. The U.S. position under the administrations of Joseph Biden and Donald Trump has been supportive of Israel, justifying its right to defend itself. However, concerns about civilian casualties and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza have led to calls for "humanitarian pauses." The "cease-fire" that is announced from time to time has not served to definitively stop the fighting; on the contrary, after its termination, the Israeli Defense Forces continue to gain ground. The fighting between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip has been imposed since 2007, and its level of intensity has varied over the years, but what has not changed is the justification for it, which is related to security issues, to prevent the entry of arms and supplies that could be used by Hamas to attack Israeli territory. According to the State of Israel, the air, naval and land blockade is a fundamental part of its defense to protect its people from rockets launched from the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, the Hamas takeover came after Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement, a Palestinian political and military organization founded in the late 1950s, and a leading member of the Palestine Liberation Organization, PLO) lost the 2006 parliamentary elections, and Hamas fighters fought against them. Both parties claim to represent the Palestinians. The battle won by Hamas meant the dissolution of the existing unity government and the division of the Palestinian territories: West Bank for Fatah and the Gaza Strip for Hamas. Hamas' stated goal is the creation of a Palestinian state occupying the entire territory of Palestine, which means non-recognition of the State of Israel. The region has been characterized by rocket fire from Gaza into Israel and Israeli military incursions into Gaza, all within the framework of the Israeli naval, land and sea blockade, although Hamas rearmament has continued due to tunnels linking Gaza to Egypt. Background to the escalation of Violence The escalation of violence between Palestinians and Israelis in 2023, has been a process of accumulation of facts between both parties for decades. One of them has been the stalemate of the Peace Process that has promoted a radicalization of the parties' positions encouraging armed struggle. Secondly, the increasing expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, considered illegal by a large part of the international community, which causes, on the one hand, the fragmentation of Palestinian sovereignty in the territory due to the inability to establish a related communication infrastructure between Palestinian lands, and on the other hand, resentment towards the Israeli occupation, which manifests itself in an armed resistance that is seen as the only solution in the absence of a political settlement. Thirdly, the problem of Jerusalem and the Holy Places (Al-Aqsa Mosque, the Dome of the Rock and other mosques), where there are restrictions on entering the mosque area by Israeli security. This is seen as a violation of religious rights. Jerusalem is claimed to be the capital of the future Palestinian state. Israel denies this because it declared it as the eternal and indivisible capital in 1980 through a law passed by the Knesset (Assembly).Fourthly, the blockade of the Gaza Strip with the resulting humanitarian crisis has generated a lot of poverty, high unemployment, limited access to basic services such as water, electricity and health, which has increased the radicalization of the population.Fifth, the situation of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, some of whom have no open criminal cases, whereby hunger strikes and the conditions in which they live are a cause for protest by Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Finally, the competition between Hamas and Fatah, one in Gaza and the other in the West Bank, only encourages violence to see who represents the Palestinians more, i.e., to settle the representation of the Palestinian people, thereby increasing attacks on Israel, which in turn responds militarily: "Israeli forces need to wrest territorial control from Hamas to demonstrate to Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank that they do not guarantee their security from Israel, just as Hamas's assault has called into question Israeli confidence in its Armed Forces" (Arteaga, 2023, 3). Israel may not need to occupy the entire Gaza Strip, but what it needs is to "dismantle as much of Hamas' military prestige as it can to challenge its Palestinian leadership, otherwise Hamas will increase its ability to influence the rest of the factions in Gaza and the West Bank to the detriment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)" (ibidem). Hamas attack on Israel in 2023 During 2023, incidents in the Jerusalem area in front of mosques increased, prompting Israeli security forces to intervene, with Palestinians considering it an attack on all Muslims. Simultaneously, Israeli attacks on the West Bank increased to dismantle cells considered terrorists hiding in refugee camps or villages. Israeli settlers living in the West Bank also attacked Palestinian communities, causing damage and casualties. Israeli targeted assassinations of militants in Gaza or the West Bank, leading to hunger strikes in prisons and rebellions by the Palestinian population, should be placed in this context.Faced with this situation, on October 7, 2023, Hamas developed the operation "Al-Aqsa Storm" which involved the infiltration and coordination of fighters using paragliders, attacking Israeli security posts and using boats to infiltrate Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip. The attacks were carried out on villages, military bases, including a music festival, resulting in an estimated death toll of more than 1,200 Israelis and 250 prisoners of whom more than 50 remain in Hamas hands. The release of the hostages has been a strategy to obtain the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Israel's response The Israeli counter-offensive, called "Iron Swords", included intensive aerial bombardments against Hamas military targets in the Gaza Strip, but affected thousands of Palestinian civilians who were killed or wounded and their homes destroyed. The Israelis mobilized reservists for an all-out offensive against the entire Gaza Strip to completely eliminate Hamas, while imposing a total blockade on the supply of water, food, medicine and fuel, increasing the already humanitarian crisis. The destruction reached Hamas military infrastructure and civilian infrastructure such as public buildings, through ground and naval artillery and aerial bombardment. The Israeli ground incursions reached the entire Gaza Strip, because they are aimed at dismantling Hamas' military capacity, tunnels, missile launcher bases, supply sites, arsenals, etcetera. They also aim to dismantle Hamas by eliminating its leaders and the militants responsible for the offensive, to rescue the Israeli hostages, and to establish a future security zone to prevent further Palestinian attacks. Israel has been criticized for the disproportionate response of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to the Hamas attack, the failure to distinguish between civilian and military targets and to plan the attacks in such a way as to avoid civilian casualties. Israel has responded that Hamas uses the civilian population as a shield, and that the territory is densely populated so that war casualties could not be avoided, however, despite having the advantage in war material, so far it has not been enough to defeat Hamas militarily. Guerrilla warfare is the tactic employed by Hamas and that has been a complication for Israel, as it had been for the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Hamas blends in among civilians making it even more difficult to locate its fighters, while the Israeli response causes collateral damage among civilians and what little infrastructure is left standing after nearly two years of conflict: "Gaza's demographic characteristics as a 'soft' factor are an advantage against Israel's 'hard' capabilities, where Hamas operatives can intrude into the population to set up ambushes against IDF armored columns" (Trujillo Borrego, 2025, 16). The government of Benjamin Netanyahu gained a great deal of public support for the military operation, however, the rising number of casualties along with the destruction caused in Gaza, brought down support. The families of the hostages are urging the government to enter into negotiations with Hamas to get them back, which clashes with the government's objectives. The mobilization of the reservists, together with the prolongation of the war, has generated social and economic problems, questioning the Netanyahu government, and also the intelligence agencies that were surprised by the preparation and the surprise of the Hamas attack. The position of the United States Historically, the United States has supported Israel economically, politically and militarily based on strategic and geopolitical interests. The Israeli lobby in the US Congress, the veto to UN Security Council Resolutions and the presidential statements, have strengthened the bond between both countries: "Israel remains the main recipient of US aid, an aid that has allowed it to transform its Armed Forces and maintain the "qualitative military edge" (QME) against its neighbors. It has always been guaranteed by the US Congress and has had the support of both major parties, in part thanks to the promotion at the domestic level of organizations in defense of Israel since the Yom Kippur War in 1973 (García Encina, 2023, 3). The US justification during the administration of President Joseph Biden (2021-2025), was that Israel had the right to defend itself by condemning Hamas in solidarity with its traditional ally. Support was maintained until the US administration began to worry about civilian casualties and the humanitarian crisis. Hence the calls for a "humanitarian pause" and a "cease-fire" for the hostage exchange. The position of current US President Donald Trump has been one of absolute support for Israel. While he has stated that "a lot of people are starving" and that "bad things are happening", his relationship with the Israeli Prime Minister has not changed despite mentioning that humanitarian aid is needed. In that sense, he has stated that Hamas has to be completely disarmed in order for the Gaza Strip to be a territory without weapons. Also, one of his proposals is that the United States take control of Gaza and relocate Palestinians to other countries because it is a pile of rubble, violating international law by the principle of self-determination of peoples and determining a forced displacement of Palestinians: “Despite its support for a two-state solution, the lack of effective pressure on Israel and the focus on Israeli security over justice for Palestinians have hindered significant progress toward peace. U.S. policy in the region has oscillated between attempts at mediation and unconditional support for Israel, making it impossible for the U.S. to act as an impartial mediator.” (Donoso, 2025, pp. 27–28) However, Trump has hinted at Israel's unwillingness to negotiate an end to the war, and has expressed that hunger should not be used as a weapon. In addition, he has lifted sanctions against a historical enemy of Israel, Syria, whose president Ahmed al-Sharaa, was linked to Al Qaeda, although he now belongs to another group called Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) (Organization or Life for the Liberation of the Levant). Israel has opposed the lifting of sanctions and has bombed Syria. Trump’s tour of the Middle East this past May demonstrated that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has taken a back seat due to the intransigence of both Hamas and Israel. For this reason, the U.S. president—who did not visit Israel—traveled to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, seeking to invest in the oil sector and encouraging those countries to invest in the United States or purchase American products. For example, Saudi Arabia agreed to buy $142 billion worth of military equipment, including missiles, communication systems, and more. The total deal amounts to $600 billion, covering trade, investments, and arms purchases. Meanwhile, in contrast to the U.S. position of keeping control over the Gaza Strip, there is another initiative led by regional countries such as the United Arab Emirates to invest in Gaza’s reconstruction—without relocating Gazan residents to other countries in the region. Final Considerations The Gaza Strip, a narrow territory located on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, stands as an epicenter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Surrounded by Israel and Egypt, it represents a strategic geographic point in the region, and has witnessed violence, blockades and a complex interplay between local, regional and international actors, with Israel, Hamas and the United States playing crucial roles. Israel has exerted overwhelming influence with ground and aerial bombardments throughout the Strip to not only eliminate Hamas, but also to secure the release of the hostages. Although at the beginning Israeli society supported this campaign, the cost in lives is being negatively evaluated, in addition to the call for reservists. This call-up has damaged the Israeli economy by extracting more than 300,000 reservists, affecting the labor force in different sectors of the economy. Israel, supported by the United States, has so far declared that it will not end the operation until the elimination of Hamas, the latest [Hamas] has demonstrated a great defensive and organizational capacity, which has been beneficial to the international community that has begun to criticize the Israeli attack due to the high cost in Palestinian victims and the precarious situation of the Gazans. According to the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health in the Gaza Strip, more than 50,000 Gazans had been killed and more than 100,000 wounded as of March this year, but Israel contradicts these figures, while not allowing impartial observers and journalists into the area. In addition, more than 70% of the infrastructure and homes have been destroyed by Israeli air, land and naval bombardments. This has been compounded by the collapse of industrial production, rising inflation due to food and manufactured goods shortages, and an increase in both overall                 and youth unemployment—factors that further fuel resentment toward those considered responsible, namely the Israelis. Likewise, both exports (such as scrap metal, tropical fruits, and olive oil) and imports (especially food) have declined as a result of the conflict. The United States supported Israel's position from the beginning, but President Trump is now calling for the opening of a humanitarian corridor for the residents of Gaza. While Israel has managed to dismantle most of Hamas’ operational infrastructure, it has not succeeded in defeating the organization, nor in freeing all the hostages, and now is facing mounting international condemnation and accusations of war crimes. At the same time, Israel's public spending has increased significantly, primarily due to military operations, while the country's economic development and employment rates have fluctuated over the past two years. Naturally, the Palestinian economy has suffered far more than Israel’s.The escalation of violence between Palestinians and Israelis since 2023 is the result of a series of long-standing events and processes. Rocket attacks from Gaza, assaults by Israeli settlers on Palestinians in the West Bank, Israeli responses to missile fire, incidents near the mosques in East Jerusalem, the deplorable health conditions in Gaza due to the Israeli blockade, and the destruction of Gazan infrastructure have all prolonged the conflict and deepened tensions. In short, the intransigence of both parties—along with unwavering U.S. support for Israel and diplomatic efforts that have so far failed—has prolonged the conflict, preventing the achievement of a fair and lasting political solution for both sides. This has caused a high number of civilian casualties in Gaza, where a collapsing health system struggles to respond and food is scarce. At the same time, Palestinians living in the West Bank continue to suffer from attacks and displacement by Israeli settlers expanding their areas of control. Bibliography Arteaga, F. (2023). The war between Hamas and Israel: long and hard. 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The United States: a partial and weak mediator in the Israel-Hamas conflict. In, Velasco, C. M. Á., Saint-Pierre, H. L., Mei, E., Borrego, E. T., Donoso, C., & Botta, P. Central theme: Reflections on a year of conflict: Israel and Palestine in the spotlight. Instituto de Altos Estudios del Estado, Paralelo Cero, Estudios estratégicos, geopolíticos y de seguridad, n° 8, pp. 23-30. https://editorial.iaen.edu.ec/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2025/01/PARALELO-0-Boletin-8-Final-1.pdfDoucet, L. (2025). What is the $53 billion plan for Gaza presented by Arab countries. BBC News World. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c5yx07841v9oGarcía Encina, C. (2023). USA and Israel: the strength of a relationship. Real Instituto Elcano, pp. 1-9. https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/eeuu-e-israel-la-fortaleza-de-una-relacion.pdfGoldman, A., Bergman, R., Kingsley, P., Koplewitz, G., (2024). Israel's subway war against Hamas tunnels in Gaza. Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/the-new-york-times/2024/01/17/la-guerra-subterranea-de-israel-contra-los-tuneles-de-hamas-en-gaza/Gómez Díaz, L. (2023). Hamas and Fatah, rivals with different visions of Israel and the future of the Palestinians. Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española. https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20231020/hamas-fatah-rivales-politicos-palestinos-israel-diferencias/2458571.shtml.Hamdar, M., Razek, H. (2023). The aerial operation Hamas used to infiltrate Israel undetected. BBC News Arabic. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cv20n56p5ynoInfobae. (2025). With the flag flying in Damascus after 13 years the U.S. embassy in Syria was reopened. https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2025/05/29/reabrieron-la-residencia-del-embajador-de-estados-unidos-en-damasco-mientras-washington-repara-los-lazos-con-siria/Infobae. (2025). Donald Trump spoke about the situation in the Gaza Strip: Many people are starving. https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2025/05/16/donald-trump-hablo-sobre-la-situacion-en-la-franja-de-gaza-mucha-gente-esta-muriendo-de-hambre/Knickmeyer, E. (2025). Trump's Mideast trip highlights deals and diplomacy, but shuts up on human rights. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/espanol/eeuu/articulo/2025-05-16/viaje-de-trump-a-oriente-medio-destaca-por-acuerdos-y-diplomacia-pero-calla-sobre-derechos-humanosMerino, A. (2023). The map of the Israeli blockade of Gaza or how to make a territory uninhabitable. https://elordenmundial.com/mapas-y-graficos/mapa-bloqueo-israeli-gaza-territorio-inhabitable/United Nations (2024). Gaza crimes, pollution deaths, Haiti...Wednesday's news. News United Nations. https://news.un.org/es/story/2024/06/1530656Radio France Internationale (2025). Hamas releases three hostages and defies Trump's Gaza plan. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c06r7nlr84koSaul, J., Farrell, S. (2023). The complex network of Hamas tunnels facing the Israeli army in Gaza. Infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2023/10/26/la-compleja-red-de-tuneles-de-hamas-de-cientos-de-kilometros-de-largo-a-la-que-se-enfrenta-el-ejercito-israeli-en-gaza/Seddon, S., Palumbo, D. (2023). How Hamas staged a blitz attack on Israel that no one thought possible. BBC News World. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c25we958pwqoTrujillo Borrego, E. (2025). The implicit goals of Israel in its war operations in the Gaza Strip. In, Velasco, C. M. Á., Saint-Pierre, H. L., Mei, E., Borrego, E. T., Donoso, C., & Botta, P. Central theme: Reflections on a year of conflict: Israel and Palestine in the crosshairs. Instituto de Altos Estudios del Estado, Paralelo Cero, Estudios estratégicos, geopolíticos y de seguridad, no. 8, pp. 13-22. https://editorial.iaen.edu.ec/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2025/01/PARALELO-0-Boletin-8-Final-1.pdf

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The relationship between the United States and Israel has been described as one of the most enduring and strategic alliances in modern politics. Beyond shared cultural ties and democratic values, this alliance has been heavily sustained by the systematic influence of pro-Israel state and lobbying groups within U.S political institutions. In this context, the Israeli lobby, most notably represented by organizations such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), has played a central role in shaping key foreign policy decisions, from military aid assistance to diplomatic recognition of Israeli interests on the international stage (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007).  While the presence of interest groups is a common feature of the U.S. democratic system, the Israeli lobby stands out due significant presence and impact on Middle East policy and America diplomacy. As some critics argue, this influence has at times, led to the subordination of U.S. strategic interest in favor of Israeli priorities (Pappé,2017). This article analyzes how the Israeli lobby operates, the mechanisms it employs, and the broader implications it holds for the independence of U.S. foreign policy. Mechanisms of Influence on U.S Foreign Policy         The Israeli state and lobby employs a wide array of tools to influence U.S foreign policy, combining financial, institutional, and narrative-based strategies. One of the most impactful methods is political funding. Pro-Israel Political Action Committees (PACs) have historically directed campaign contributions to congressional candidates who demonstrate unwavering support for Israel, in 2020 there a significant contribution of $30 million to federal campaigns. (OpenSecrest,2021). Lobbying efforts also extend to direct engagement with policy makers. AIPAC, for instance, organizes annual conferences that attract top U.S. officials, including presidents and congress members. Through strategic lobbying, the Israeli lobby has been instrumental in passing measures such as the US-Israel Strategic Partnership Act and ensuring continued military aid exceeding $3.8 billion annually (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007).  While often presented as an independent force acting within the American political landscape, the Israeli lobby maintains close ties with the Israeli government, which allows it to act as a semi- official conduit for its foreign policy objectives. One clear example of his coordination was evident during the Obama administration’s negotiations of the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). During the Obama administration, to finalize the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress in 2015 without the White House´s approval. This unprecedented move coordinated with Republican congressional leaders highlighted how the Israeli lobby facilitated direct access to U.S. political institutions, effectively bypassing executive authority (Beauchamp, 2015).     Over decades, Israeli influence within U.S foreign policy decision making has moved beyond traditional lobbying, a structural element in how Washington approaches the Middle East. What initially began as advocacy in cultural and strategic alignment has gradually evolved into a form of embedded influence that often shapes policy trajectories before they reach public debate. In recent years, the influence has been reinforced by Israel´s growing military modernization and significant victories against their enemies such as Iranian proxies in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. These developments and Israeli momentum have not only bolstered Israel´s image as a capable regional power but also fueled a more assertive posture in its foreign relations. The confidence generated by these military gains has translated into hardened political positions and intensified pressure on allies, particularly the United States.                  These examples illustrate that the Israeli state and lobby does not operate in isolation but often reflects, channels, and amplifies the geopolitical agenda of the Israeli state. This dynamic complicates the notion of national interest within the U.S. foreign policy, especially when lobbying efforts coincide with foreign governmental objectives. From Influence to Entrapment: The U.S.- Israeli Alliance in the Iran Conflict               Despite initial promises of restraint under the renewed “America First” vision, the current U.S. administration finds itself increasingly entangled in a regional conflict it once sought to avoid. Under President Trump´s second term, American foreign policy was publicly framed around non-intervention, prioritizing domestic renewal over costly military initiatives and strategic assertiveness, which have steadily eroded Washington’s space for independent decision making.               Israel´s sustained rhetorical pressure and military assertiveness have shaped U.S. involvement in the ongoing war with Iran. Drawing on a momentum strengthened by recent strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, Israeli leadership has framed Tehran as an imminent existential threat, pressuring Washington to intensify its military posture. As Froman (2024) observes, “Israel´s actions have fundamentally reshaped the security landscape of the Middle East.”  This situation highlights a concerning shift in how the United States is managing its foreign policy in the Middle East. Rather than settling the pace or leading diplomatically, Washington is now largely responding to events already set in motion by Israel. This reflects the long-standing nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship. America leaders now find themselves caught in a conflict they did not start but now must lead. With Iran already responding militarily and tensions rising across the region, the risk of a wider war is growing quickly. This mirrors past U.S experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where limited interventions turned into long, costly wars. As Israel continues to act from its position of strength, the U.S. faces danger of a new war.             With the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the sidelining of multilateral diplomacy, there is little room left for negotiation. Institutions such as the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been largely absent in terms of more action, also the intervention of the members of the security council of the United Nations, reflecting how hard power dynamics have overtaken diplomatic engagement. In this vacuum, the Israeli security narrative has become dominant. A War of Choice or a Path to Diplomacy The ongoing conflict has triggered a significant reconfiguration of the Middle East´s power structure. For now, Israel, strategically supported by the United States, has asserted its military and political dominance. Iran, weakened by the degradation of its proxy network and recent strikes on three nuclear facilities, finds itself momentarily contained. This alignment places the U.S.-Israel axis in a position of regional superiority.   However, this superiority could be temporary. If Iran succeeds in eventually acquiring a nuclear weapon, the balance may shift again, this time not through conventional power, but through nuclear deterrence. As seen during the cold war, deterrence is not about battlefield victory but about creating unacceptable costs for aggression.  A nuclear-armed Iran would no longer need to outmatch Israel or the U.S. militarily. This is precisely why diplomacy must be reviewed not as appeasement, but as a tool to prevent irreversible escalation. As Vaez (2025) states, “Washington and its partners should not give up on diplomacy with Iran not because it's not easy, but because it is the only sustainable way to prevent further escalation.” The current moments offer a fleeting opportunity: one where military success has bought time for diplomacy to reassert itself. Among the most urgent priorities               is re-engaging in serious negotiations surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), not simply to contain Iran´s nuclear ambitions, but to rebuild a broader framework of strategic dialogue. Failing to seize that opportunity could lock the region into a new war, one shaped not by diplomacy.             References:Beauchamp, Z. (2015, March 3). Why Netanyahu’s speech to Congress is one of the most controversial in history. Vox.  https://www.vox.com/2015/3/3/8142663/netanyahu-speech-congressMearsheimer, J. J., & Walt, S. M. (2007). The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.OpenSecrets. (2021). Pro-Israel PACs contributions to candidates, 2019–2020. Center for Responsive Politics.             https://www.opensecrets.org/political-action-committees-pacs/industry-detail/Q05/2020Pappé, I. (2017). Ten Myths About Israel. Verso Books.Vaez, A. (2025, June 16). Don’t Give Up on Diplomacy With Iran. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/dont-give-diplomacy-iran

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском After 12 days of war, US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran that would bring to an end the most dramatic, direct conflict between the two nations in decades. Israel and Iran both agreed to adhere to the ceasefire, though they said they would respond with force to any breach. If the ceasefire holds – a big if – the key question will be whether this signals the start of lasting peace, or merely a brief pause before renewed conflict. As contemporary war studies show, peace tends to endure under one of two conditions: either the total defeat of one side, or the establishment of mutual deterrence. This means both parties refrain from aggression because the expected costs of retaliation far outweigh any potential gains. What did each side gain? The war has marked a turning point for Israel in its decades-long confrontation with Iran. For the first time, Israel successfully brought a prolonged battle to Iranian soil, shifting the conflict from confrontations with Iranian-backed proxy militant groups to direct strikes on Iran itself. This was made possible largely due to Israel’s success over the past two years in weakening Iran’s regional proxy network, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite militias in Syria. Over the past two weeks, Israel has inflicted significant damage on Iran’s military and scientific elite, killing several high-ranking commanders and nuclear scientists. The civilian toll was also high. Additionally, Israel achieved a major strategic objective by pulling the United States directly into the conflict. In coordination with Israel, the US launched strikes on three of Iran’s primary nuclear facilities: Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. Despite these gains, Israel has not accomplished all of its stated goals. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had voiced support for regime change, urging Iranians to rise up against Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s government, but the senior leadership in Iran remains intact. Additionally, Israel has not fully eliminated Iran’s missile program. (Iran continued striking to the last minute before the ceasefire.) And Tehran did not acquiesce to Trump’s pre-war demand to end uranium enrichment. Although Iran was caught off-guard by Israel’s attacks — particularly as it was engaged in nuclear negotiations with the US — it responded by launching hundreds of missiles towards Israel. While many were intercepted, a significant number penetrated Israeli air defences, causing widespread destruction in major cities, dozens of fatalities and hundreds of injuries. Iran has demonstrated its capacity to strike back, though Israel has succeeded in destroying many of its air defence systems, some ballistic missile assets (including missile launchers) and multiple energy facilities. Since the beginning of the assault, Iranian officials have repeatedly called for a halt to resume negotiations. Under such intense pressure, Iran has realised it would not benefit from a prolonged war of attrition with Israel — especially as both nations face mounting costs and the risk of depleting their military stockpiles if the war continues. As theories of victory suggest, success in war is defined not only by the damage inflicted, but by achieving core strategic goals and weakening the enemy’s will and capacity to resist. While Israel claims to have achieved the bulk of its objectives, the extent of the damage to Iran’s nuclear program is not fully known, nor is its capacity to continue enriching uranium. Both sides could remain locked in a volatile standoff over Iran’s nuclear program, with the conflict potentially reigniting whenever either side perceives a strategic opportunity. Sticking point over Iran’s nuclear program Iran faces even greater challenges when it emerges from the war. With a heavy toll on its leadership and nuclear infrastructure, Tehran will likely prioritise rebuilding its deterrence capability. That includes acquiring new advanced air defence systems — potentially from China — and restoring key components of its missile and nuclear programs. (Some experts say Iran has not used some of its most powerful missiles to maintain this deterrence.) Iranian officials have claimed they safeguarded more than 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium before the attacks. This stockpile could theoretically be converted into nine to ten nuclear warheads if further enriched to 90%. Trump declared Iran’s nuclear capacity had been “totally obliterated”, whereas Rafael Grossi, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog chief, said damage to Iran’s facilities was “very significant”. However, analysts have argued Iran will still have a depth of technical knowledge accumulated over decades. Depending on the extent of the damage to its underground facilities, Iran could be capable of restoring and even accelerating its program in a relatively short time frame. And the chances of reviving negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program appear slimmer than ever. What might future deterrence look like? The war has fundamentally reshaped how both Iran and Israel perceive deterrence — and how they plan to secure it going forward. For Iran, the conflict has reinforced the belief that its survival is at stake. With regime change openly discussed during the war, Iran’s leaders appear more convinced than ever that true deterrence requires two key pillars: nuclear weapons capability, and deeper strategic alignment with China and Russia. As a result, Iran is expected to move rapidly to restore and advance its nuclear program, potentially moving towards actual weaponisation — a step it had long avoided, officially. At the same time, Tehran is likely to accelerate military and economic cooperation with Beijing and Moscow to hedge against isolation. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasised this close engagement with Russia during a visit to Moscow this week, particularly on nuclear matters. Israel, meanwhile, sees deterrence as requiring constant vigilance and a credible threat of overwhelming retaliation. In the absence of diplomatic breakthroughs, Israel may adopt a policy of immediate preemptive strikes on Iranian facilities or leadership figures if it detects any new escalation — particularly related to Iran’s nuclear program. In this context, the current ceasefire already appears fragile. Without comprehensive negotiations that address the core issues — namely, Iran’s nuclear capabilities — the pause in hostilities may prove temporary. Mutual deterrence may prevent a more protracted war for now, but the balance remains precarious and could collapse with little warning.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel’s conflict with Iran represents far more than another Middle Eastern crisis – it marks the emergence of a dangerous new chapter in nuclear rivalries that has the potential to reshape global proliferation risks for decades to come. What began with Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and other targets on June 13, 2025 has now spiraled into the world’s first full-scale example of what I as an expert in nuclear security call a “threshold war” – a new and terrifying form of conflict where a nuclear weapons power seeks to use force to prevent an enemy on the verge of nuclearization from making that jump. As missiles continue to rain down on both Tehran and Tel Aviv – with hundreds dead in Iran and at least 24 killed in Israel – the international community is witnessing the collapse of traditional deterrence frameworks in real time. Unlike traditional nuclear rivalries where both sides possess declared arsenals – like India and Pakistan, who despite their tensions operate under mutual deterrence – this new threshold dynamic creates an inherently unstable escalation spiral. Iran increasingly believes it cannot deter Israeli aggression without nuclear weapons, yet every step toward acquiring them invites more aggressive Israeli strikes. Israel, for its part, cannot permanently eliminate Iran’s nuclear knowledge through military means – it can only delay it through means that would seemingly guarantee future Iranian determination to acquire the ultimate deterrent. Under this dynamic, neither side can step back without accepting an intolerable outcome: for Israel, an Iran more determined than even in becoming a nuclear weapons nation capable of deterring Israeli action and ending its regional military dominance; for Iran, the risk of regime change through devastating Israeli strikes. The consequences of this deadly logic extend far beyond the Middle East. The preventive strike precedent The stakes could not be higher, as Iranian officials have called the attack “a declaration of war” and vowed that destroyed nuclear facilities “would be rebuilt.” Israel, meanwhile has warned its campaign will continue “for as many days as it takes.” Most ominously, the scheduled nuclear talks between the U.S. and Iran were called off, with Tehran dismissing any such dialogue as “meaningless.” This may suggest diplomacy’s window – which opened for just a few months under Trump’s second administration, after being closed during his first – was deliberately slammed shut. More broadly, the Israeli strikes mark a dangerous evolution in international norms around preventive warfare. While Israeli officials called this a “preemptive strike,” the legal and strategic reality is different. Preemptive strikes respond to imminent threats – like Israel’s 1967 Six-Day War against Arab armies preparing to attack. Preventive strikes, by contrast, target distant future threats when conditions seem favorable – like Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Israel justified its action by claiming Iran could rapidly assemble up to 15 nuclear bombs. Yet, as the International Atomic Energy Agency director, Rafael Grossi, warned beforehand, an Israeli strike could solidify rather than deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions, potentially prompting withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. True to that warning, on June 16, Iran announced it was preparing a parliamentary bill that would see the country leave the 1968 treaty. Israel’s calculations in opting to strike build on the same erosion of international legal frameworks that has legitimized preemptive warfare since the United States’ military action in Afghanistan and Iraq after the Sept. 11, 2001 attack. America’s “war on terror” fundamentally challenged sovereignty norms through practices like drone strikes and preemptive attacks. More recently, operations in Gaza and elsewhere have demonstrated that violations of international humanitarian law carry limited consequences in practice. For Israel, this permissive environment has seemingly created both opportunity and justification regarding striking Iran – something that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been pursuing for decades. Already, Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant demonstrated nuclear facilities’ vulnerability in modern warfare. I believe Israel’s actions further risk normalizing attacks on nuclear infrastructure, potentially legitimizing similar preventive actions by India, China or the U.S. against emerging nuclear programs elsewhere. From strikes to regional conflagration Israel’s initial strike quickly triggered inevitable escalation. Iran’s retaliation came in waves: first hundreds of drones and missiles on June 13, then sustained barrages throughout the following days. By the morning of June 15, both countries were trading strikes on energy infrastructure, military bases and civilian areas, with no immediate end in sight. The Houthis in Yemen have since joined the fight, by launching ballistic missiles at Tel Aviv. Notably absent are Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran’s Iraqi militias – all significantly damaged by recent action by Israel. This degradation of Iran’s “axis of resistance” – its traditional forward deterrent – fundamentally alters Tehran’s strategic calculations. Without strong proxies to threaten retaliation, Iran is more exposed to Israeli strikes, making nuclear weapons seem like the only reliable deterrent against future attacks. The escalation pattern illustrates what can happen when when a government casts aggression as prevention. Having initiated the recent escalation of hostilities, Israel now faces the consequences. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s vow that destroyed facilities “would be rebuilt” underscores that Israeli action designed to prevent nuclearization may instead result in Iran pursuing it with renewed determination. The commitment trap This creates what strategists call the “commitment trap” – a dynamic where both sides face escalating costs but cannot back down. Israel faces its own strategic dilemma. The strikes may ultimately accelerate rather than prevent Iranian nuclearization, yet backing down would mean accepting a nuclear Iran. Netanyahu’s promise that current strikes are “nothing compared to what they will feel in coming days” shows how quickly strikes sold as preventative escalate toward total war. Unlike established nuclear powers that can negotiate from positions of strength, threshold states, such as Iran, face a stark choice: remain vulnerable to preventive strikes and regime change or race toward the protection that nuclear deterrence provides. North Korea offers the clearest example of this dynamic. Despite decades of sanctions and military threats, Pyongyang’s nuclear program has made it essentially immune to preventive strikes. Iranian leaders understand this lesson well – the question is whether they can reach the same protected status before suffering decisive preventive action. Traditional nuclear deterrence theory assumes rational actors operating under mutual vulnerability. But threshold wars break these assumptions in fundamental ways. Iran cannot fully deter Israeli action because it lacks confirmed weapons, while Israel cannot rely on deterrence to prevent Iranian weaponization because Iran’s nuclear program continues advancing. This creates “use it or lose it” dynamics: Israel faces shrinking windows to act preventively as Iran approaches weaponization; Iran faces incentives to accelerate its program before suffering additional strikes. The absence of effective external mediation compounds these risks. U.S. President Donald Trump’s response to the strikes reveals this dynamic starkly. Initially opposing military action and preferring diplomacy to “bombing the hell out of” Iran, Trump pivoted dramatically after the strikes began, and warned that “there’s more to come. A lot more.” His post on Truth Social – “Two months ago I gave Iran a 60-day ultimatum to ‘make a deal.’ They should have done it!” – demonstrates how quickly diplomatic efforts can collapse once threshold wars begin. Global implication The international response reveals how thoroughly Israel’s Operation Rising Lion has normalized aggression against nuclear facilities. While European leaders called for “maximum restraint,” none condemned Israel’s initial attacks. Russia and China condemned the attacks but took no concrete action. The U.N. Security Council produced only statements of “concern” about “escalation.” This normalization sets what I believe to be a catastrophic precedent. The threshold war model threatens to unravel decades of nuclear governance based on deterrence rather than preemption. Indeed, the Iran-Israel threshold war sets dangerous precedents for other regional nuclear competitions. Successful preventive strikes could incentivize similar actions elsewhere, eroding diplomatic nonproliferation efforts. Conversely, rapid nuclearization by Iran could encourage other threshold states, like Saudi Arabia, to pursue nuclear capabilities swiftly and secretly. When preventive strikes become the enforcement mechanism for nonproliferation norms, the entire architecture of nuclear governance begins to crumble. Without these frameworks, the world faces an unstable future defined by cycles of preventive strikes and accelerated nuclear proliferation – far more dangerous than the Cold War-era standoffs that shaped nuclear governance.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As Israel’s devastating war in Gaza has ground on, the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was thought to be “dead”. Now, it is showing signs of life again. French President Emmanuel Macron is reportedly pressing other European nations to jointly recognise a Palestinian state at a UN conference in mid-June, focused on achieving a two-state solution. Macron called such recognition a “political necessity”. Countries outside Europe are feeling the pressure, too. Australia has reaffirmed its view that recognition of Palestine should be a “way of building momentum towards a two-state solution”. During Macron’s visit to Indonesia in late May, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto made a surprising pledge to recognise Israel if it allowed for a Palestinian state. Indonesia is one of about 28 nations that don’t currently recognise Israel. France, Australia, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea are among the approximately 46 nations that don’t recognise a Palestinian state.   The UN conference on June 17–20, co-sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia, wants to go “beyond reaffirming principles” and “achieve concrete results” towards a two-state solution. Most countries, including the US, have supported the two-state solution in principle for decades. However, the political will from all parties has faded in recent years. So, why is the policy gaining traction again now? And does it have a greater chance of success? What is the two-state solution? Put simply, the two-state solution is a proposed peace plan that would create a sovereign Palestinian state alongside the Israeli state. There have been several failed attempts to enact the policy over recent decades, the most famous of which was the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s. In recent years, the two-state solution was looking less likely by the day. The Trump administration’s decision in 2017 to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the US embassy there signalled the US was moving away from its role as mediator. Then, several Arab states agreed to normalise relations with Israel in the the Abraham Accords, without Israeli promises to move towards a two-state solution. The Hamas attacks on Israel – and subsequent Israeli war on Gaza – have had a somewhat contradictory effect on the overarching debate. On the one hand, the brutality of Hamas’ actions substantially set back the legitimacy of the Palestinian self-determination movement in some quarters on the world stage. On the other, it’s also become clear the status quo – the continued Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank following the end of a brutal war – is not tenable for either Israeli security or Palestinian human rights. And the breakdown of the most recent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the return of heavy Israeli ground operations in May and reports of mass Palestinian starvation have only served to further isolate the Israeli government in the eyes of its peers. Once-steadfast supporters of Israel’s actions have become increasingly frustrated by a lack of clear strategic goals in Gaza. And many now seem prepared to ignore Israeli wishes and pursue Palestinian recognition. For these governments, the hope is recognition of a Palestinian state would rebuild political will – both globally and in the Middle East – towards a two-state solution. Huge obstacles remain But how likely is this in reality? There is certainly more political will than there was before, but also several important roadblocks. First and foremost is the war in Gaza. It’s obvious this will need to end, with both sides agreeing to an enduring ceasefire. Beyond that, the political authority in both Gaza and Israel remains an issue. The countries now considering Palestinian recognition, such France and Australia, have expressly said Hamas cannot play any role in governing a future Palestinian state. Though anti-Hamas sentiment is becoming more vocal among residents in Gaza, Hamas has been violently cracking down on this dissent and is attempting to consolidate its power. However, polling shows the popularity of Fatah – the party leading the Palestinian National Authority – is even lower than Hamas at an average of 21%. Less than half of Gazans support the enclave returning to Palestinian Authority control. This means a future Palestinian state would likely require new leadership. There is almost no political will in Israel for a two-state solution, either. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not been shy about his opposition to a Palestinian state. His cabinet members have mostly been on the same page. This has also been reflected in policy action. In early May, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved a plan for Israel to indefinitely occupy parts of Gaza. The government also just approved its largest expansion of settlements in the West Bank in decades. These settlements remain a major problem for a two-state solution. The total population of Israeli settlers is more than 700,000 in both East Jerusalem and the West Bank. And it’s been increasing at a faster rate since the election of the right-wing, pro-settler Netanyahu government in 2022. Settlement is enshrined in Israeli Basic Law, with the state defining it as “national value” and actively encouraging its “establishment and consolidation”. The more settlement that occurs, the more complicated the boundaries of a future Palestinian state become. Then there’s the problem of public support. Recent polling shows neither Israelis nor Palestinians view the two-state solution favourably. Just 40% of Palestinians support it, while only 26% of Israelis believe a Palestinian state can “coexist peacefully” alongside Israel. However, none of these challenges makes the policy impossible. The unpopularity of the two-state solution locally is more a reflection of previous failures than it is of future negotiations. A power-sharing agreement in Northern Ireland was similarly unpopular in the 1990s, but peace was achieved through bold political leadership involving the US and European Union. In other words, we won’t know what’s possible until negotiations begin. Red lines will need to be drawn and compromises made. It’s not clear what effect growing external pressure will have, but the international community does appear to be reaching a political tipping point on the two-state solution. Momentum could start building again.

I. Introduction Since October 7, 2023, when the Hamas attacked Israel, the Gaza war has entered its third year. Palestinians continue to endure an unprecedented level of violence, trauma, economic hardship, and uncertainty. The war has resulted in a staggering number of casualties and widespread displacement, in addition to massive destruction of physical assets in Gaza, significant reduction of economic output, increased violence in the West Bank, and widespread collapse of basic service provision across the entire Palestinian territories.  As of May 7, 2025, according to Wikipedia and Gaza’s Ministry of Health, 55000 fatalities (53,253 Palestinians and 1,706 Israelis) and more than 110,00 injuries have been reported in Gaza. More than half of the casualties are women, children, and the elderly. An estimated 1.9 million people, approximately 90 percent of Gaza’s population, are currently internally displaced. Seventy percent of Gaza’s Road network, more than 80 per cent of commercial facilities, and close to 90 percent of housing units in Gaza have either severely damaged or have been destroyed.  Since October 7, 2023, the UN has documented over 1,500 clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank, resulting in property damage, casualties, and displacement. Over 1,600 Palestinians, half of whom are children, have been displaced due to increased settlers’ violence and access restrictions. Additionally, existing fiscal constraints and growing security concerns have disrupted service provision in the West Bank.  On the macroeconomic front, the Gaza and West Bank face a collapse, which is unmatched in recent memory. The Palestine economy has faced significant contraction, evidenced by a reduced production, sharp decline in gross domestic product (GDP), and soaring unemployment rates. On the other hand, the Gaza war has had significant negative impacts on Israel. The economic and financial costs of war consist of the direct cost of military operations as well as the indirect losses that extend over the medium and long term. One of the most direct costs of the Gaza war was the recall of about 300,000 reservists in the early days, which meant that the Israeli government would bear the cost of conscription, and the Israeli economy would bear loss of output due to their absence from the workforce.Given these situations, this paper analyzes the economic effects of the Gaza war on Palestine and Israel. II. Literature on the Effects of Wars Wars have the potential to alter the parties and “transform the future” of belligerents (Ikle 1991) and they also bring about fundamental changes to the international system (Gilpin 1981).  Scholars in Economics have provided considerable analysis of the macroeconomic effects of a conflict across spatial levels: locally, nationally, regionally, and internationally. Some studies have examined the effects of specific wars such as the Syrian civil war (Kešeljević and Spruk, 2023) or the Iraq war (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). For example, an analysis estimated that the Russian invasion of Ukraine had an economic cost of 1% of global GDP in 2022 (Liadze et al. 2023) Others have examined the effects of war in general. For instance, Reuven Glick and Alan Taylor (2010) examine bilateral trade relations from 1870 to 1997 and find large and persistent negative impacts of wars on trade and hence on national and global economic welfare. Similarly, Vally Koubi (2005) investigates the effects of inter- and intrastate wars on a sample of countries and finds that the combined prewar, contemporaneous, and postwar effects on economic growth are negative.  A “war ruin” school emphasized that the destruction caused by wars is accompanied by higher inflation, unproductive resource spending on the military, and war debt (Chan 1985; Russett 1970). By contrast, a “war renewal” school argued that there can be longer-term positive economic effects from war because war can lead to increased efficiency in the economy by reducing the power of rent-seeking special interests, triggering technological innovation, and advancing human capital (Organski and Kugler 1980).  III. Economic Effects of the Gaza War1. Casualties  As Table 1 shows, since the Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, 55,000 people (as of May 7, 2025, 53,253 Palestinians and 1,706 Israelis) have been killed in the Gaza war according to the Gaza Health Ministry. Scholars have estimated that 80% of Palestinians killed are civilians. A study by OHCHR (The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) found that 70% of the Palestinians killed in residential buildings or similar housing were children and women.  The majority of casualties have been found in the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Health Ministry’s total casualty count is the number of deaths directly caused by the war.  The 7 October attacks of the Hamas on Israel killed 1,195 people, including 815 civilians. A further 806 Palestinians have been killed in the occupied West Bank (including East Jerusalem).  2. Economic Effects of the Gaza War on Palestine  As Figure 1-1 shows, since October 7, 2023, Palestine’s economy has significantly contracted as a result of continued warfare. As Figure 1-2 shows, economic downturn started from the fourth quarter of 2023. In 2024, Palestine's GDP contracted by 27% compared to the previous year. The decline was driven by a 27% drop in industrial output in the Gaza Strip due to the ongoing Israeli occupation and attack. Especially, economic contractions were recorded in construction (-14.5%), services (-11.0%), financial and insurance activities (-5.3%), information and communication (-3.2%). However, Palestine’s economy began to recover in the fourth quarter of 2024, although it still marked a negative growth.   Figure 1-1: Palestine economic growth rate  Figure 1-2: Palestine economic growth (quarterly) As Figure 2 shows, industrial production in Palestine significantly decreased in 2024 as war has continued between Israel and Hamas. Industrial production in Palestine has been low, averaging -7.62 percent from 2012 until 2025. However, it reached a record low of -29.77 percent in June of 2024. Then industrial production in Palestine increased to 2.1 percent in March of 2025 over the same month in the previous year.   Figure 2: Industrial production in Palestine As Figure 3 shows, inflation rate in Palestine has significantly increased in 2023 and 2024, reaching all time high of 88.93 percent in November of 2024. High inflation resulted from resource shortages as a result of continued warfare and significant production decline. And then inflation rate in Palestine dropped to 1.88 percent in March and -2.51 percent in February of 2025. Inflation rate in Palestine averaged 4.95 percent from 1998 until 2025.   Figure 3: Inflation rate in Palestine As Figure 4-1 shows, unemployment rate in Palestine significantly increased after October 7, 2023, as economy continued to shrink and industrial production fell. Unemployment rate in Palestine increased to 35.20 percent in the first quarter of 2024 from 24.1 percent in the third quarter of 2023. It then dropped to 31.1 percent in the second quarter of 2024 and 28.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024. Unemployment Rate in Palestine has been remarkably high, averaging 24.07 percent from 1995 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 35.60 percent in the third quarter of 2002 and a record low of 8.80 percent in the second quarter of 2000.    Figure 4-1: Unemployment rate in Palestine As Figure 4-2 shows, youth unemployment rate in Palestine increased from 38.40 percent in the first quarter of 2023 to 45.70 percent in the first quarter of 2024 and then slightly dropped to 42.60 percent in the third quarter of 2024 and 38.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024. Youth unemployment rate in Palestine has been remarkably high, averaging 41.85 percent from 2009 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 49.90 percent in the second quarter of 2018 and a record low of 32.90 percent in the first quarter of 2011.   Figure 4-2: Youth unemployment rate in Palestine As Figure 4-3 shows, full-time employment in Palestine plunged to 628000 persons in the first quarter of 2024 from 1143800 persons in the third quarter of 2023. Then it increased to 705700 persons in the fourth quarter of 2024. Full-time employment in Palestine averaged 888133 persons from 2010 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 1143800 persons in the third quarter of 2023 and a record low of 67900 persons in the first quarter of 2010.   Figure 4-3: Full-time employment in Palestine Despite the continued warfare in Gaza, as Figure 5 shows, exports in Palestine did not significantly decrease. On the contrary, exports in Palestine increased from 148.3 USD Million in August 2023 to 164.20 USD Million in December of 2024. Exports in Palestine averaged 68.15 USD Million from 2001 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 164.20 USD Million in December of 2024 and a record low of 15.92 USD Million in April of 2002. Exports in Palestine maintained pre-war level in 2025, recording 140.70 USD Million in January of 2025. Top exports of Palestine in 2023 were scrap iron ($68.6M), tropical fruits ($53.8M), pure olive oil ($10.9M), and building stone ($7.56M).  Figure 5: Exports in Palestine Figure 6 shows, imports in Palestine significantly dropped in 2024 as warfare continued in Gaza. Imports in Palestine decreased to 420.30 USD Million in April 2024 from 747.20 USD Million in August 2023. Imports in Palestine averaged 370.00 USD Million from 2001 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 750.60 USD Million in November of 2022 and a record low of 82.71 USD Million in April of 2002. According to media reports, there are severe food shortages in Gaza, but there is no information about the imports of food after 2023.   Figure 6: Imports in Palestine As Figure 7 shows, since October 7, 2023, government spending in Palestine has significantly declined in 2023 and early 2024, hitting a record low of 461.20 USD million in the first quarter of 2024. And then government spending in Palestine increased to 666.70 USD million in the fourth quarter of 2024 from 616.50 USD million in the third quarter of 2024. Government spending in Palestine averaged 797.95 USD million from 2011 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 974.90 USD million in the fourth quarter of 2016 and a record low of 461.20 USD million in the first quarter of 2024.   Figure 7: Government spending in Palestine 3. Economic Effects of the Gaza War on Israel  As Figure 8 shows, since October 7, 2023, when the Hamas attacked Israel, government spending in Israel significantly increased as Israel government conducted massive military operations against the Hamas. Government spending in Israel increased from 84100 ILS (Israel new shekel) Million in the third quarter of 2023 to 97973 ILS Million in the fourth quarter of 2023 and 97018 ILS Million in the fourth quarter of 2024. Government Spending in Israel averaged 58676 ILS Million from 1995 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 97973 ILS Million in the fourth quarter of 2023 and a record low of 39524 ILS Million in the third quarter of 1995.   Figure 8: Government spending in Israel As Figure 9 shows, as Israel government conducted massive military operations against the Hamas, military expenditure in Israel increased to 46505.30 USD Million in 2024 from 27498.50 USD Million in 2023. Military expenditure in Israel averaged 7742.87 USD Million from 1951 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 46505.30 USD Million in 2024 and a record low of 57.60 USD Million in 1954.   Figure 9: Military expenditure in Israel As Figure 10 shows, Israel recorded a government budget deficit of -33793.00 ILS Million in December of 2023 from 14100 ILS Million in January 2023 because government spending, in particular military expenditure significantly increased. Government budget value in Israel averaged -3405.71 ILS Million from 2005 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 22839.00 ILS Million in January of 2025 and a record low of -33793.00 ILS Million in December of 2023.   Figure 10: Budget Balance in Israel As Figure 11-1 & 11-2 show, Israel's economic growth plunged to -4.32 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 from 3.44% in the third quarter of 2023. Israel experienced consecutive negative growth until the third quarter of 2024 as the ongoing conflict with the Hamas had taken a significant toll on economic activity. This marked the weakest growth since 2020, when the covid-19 pandemic severely impacted the economy. However, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Israel expanded 5.46 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024 over the same quarter of the previous year. GDP annual growth rate in Israel averaged 3.73 percent from 1996 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 16.27 percent in the second quarter of 2021 and a record low of -8.37 percent in the second quarter of 2020.  Figure 11-1: Israel's economic growth rate  Figure 11-2: Israel's GDP growth (quarterly) As Figure 12 shows, industrial production in Israel decreased 7.4 percent in December of 2023 and 9.8 percent in March 2024 and then increased 15.9 percent in December 2024. Industrial production in Israel averaged 5.66 percent from 1960 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 62.70 percent in June of 1968 and a record low of -29.20 percent in June of 1967.   Figure 12: Industrial production in Israel As Figure 13 shows, unemployment rate in Israel decreased from 4.30 percent in January 2023 to 2.80 percent in November 2023 and 2.60 percent in December 2024. This decline seems to result from the fact that Israeli government called up tens of thousands of reservists to replace conscripts and active-duty soldiers. And then unemployment rate in Israel slightly increased to 2.9% in March 2025. Unemployment rate in Israel averaged 5.89 percent from 1992 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 11.40 percent in March of 1992 and a record low of 2.60 percent in August & December of 2024.  Figure 13: Unemployment Rate in Israel As Figure 14 shows, the number of unemployed persons in Israel decreased to 119200 in December of 2024 from 184000 in January 2023. Unemployed persons in Israel averaged 192800 from 1991 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 305400 in September of 2003 and a record low of 119200 in December of 2024.  Figure 14: The number of unemployed persons in Israel As Figure 15 shows, after October 2023, exports in Israel fluctuated between 4470 USD Million in October 2023, 5330 USD Million in March 2024, 4320 USD Million June 2024 and 5250 USD million in December 2024. Exports in Israel averaged 1836.30 USD Million from 1959 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 6276.70 USD Million in March of 2022 and a record low of 10.80 USD Million in July of 1959.   Figure 15: Exports in Israel As Figure 16 shows, imports in Israel fluctuated between 8090 USD Million in August 2023, 7590 USD Million in December 2023, 7010 USD Million in August 2024, and 8318.70 USD Million in March 2025. Imports in Israel averaged 2500.72 USD Million from 1959 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 10372.30 USD Million in May of 2022 and a record low of 33.10 USD Million in November of 1959.   Figure 16: Imports in Israel As Figure 17 shows, inflation rate in Israel decreased from 5.40 percent in January 2023 to 3.70 percent in October 2023 and 2.50 percent in February 2024. It then increased to 3.60 percent in August 2024 and 3.80 percent in January 2025. Inflation rate in Israel averaged 26.75 percent from 1952 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 486.20 percent in November of 1984 and a record low of -2.70 percent in March of 2004.   Figure 17: Inflation rate in Israel As Figure 18 shows, despite on-going warfare in Gaza, gasoline price in Israel did not rise significantly. It increased from 1.82 USD/Liter in September 2023 to 1.98 and 2.14 USD/Liter in January and May 2024, respectively and then dropped to 2.06 and 2.04 USD/Liter in August 2024 and February 2025, respectively. Gasoline prices in Israel averaged 1.78 USD/Liter from 1995 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 2.30 USD/Liter in June of 2022 and a record low of 0.73 USD/Liter in December of 1995.   Figure 18: Gasoline price in Israel IV. Conclusion The Gaza war has had negative impacts on both Palestine and Israel, but the negative effects were much bigger in Palestine than in Israel. The number of casualties was much higher in Palestine. Especially the war brought down Palestine economy, lowering economic growth, reducing industrial productions, and increasing inflation & unemployment in Palestine. The Israeli economy has also slowed down, and budget deficit increased. However, unemployment went down, and inflation has been stable between 2 and 5 percent. Trade has maintained a pre-war level, although there have been some difficulties. References Bilmes, Linda, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2006. The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Chan, Steve. 1985. “The Impact of Defense Spending on Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and Problems.” Orbis 29 (2): 403–434.CIA Factbook. 2024. “Ukraine.”Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.  Glick, Rouven and Alan Taylor. 2010. “Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 92(1): 102-127.Iklé, Fred C. 1991. Every War Must End. New York: Columbia University Press.Kešeljević, Aleksandar, and Rok Spruk. 2023. Estimating the Effects of Syrian Civil War. Empirical Economics.  Koumi, Valley. 2005. “War and Economic Performance.” Journal of Peace Research 42 (1): 67-82. Liadze, Iana, Corrado Macchiarelli, Paul Mortimer-Lee, and Patricia Sanchez Juanino. 2023. “Economic Costs of the Russia-Ukraine War.” The World Economy 46: 874–886.Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Russett, Bruce. 1970. What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense. New Haven: Yale University Press.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском While Trump declared the truce agreement a US victory, Ansar Allah said that Washington contacted them in order to “avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen”. Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement reached a ceasefire deal with the United States on Wednesday, May 7, according to Oman, which mediated the negotiations. The deal stipulates the halt of Ansar Allah’s attacks on US ships in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, and an end to US aggression on Yemen. However, it does not prevent the Yemeni movement from launching attacks on Israel.  “Following recent discussions and contacts conducted by the Sultanate of Oman with the United States and the relevant authorities in Sana’a, in the Republic of Yemen, with the aim of de-escalation, efforts have resulted in a ceasefire agreement between the two sides,” Omani Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, wrote on X. “In the future, neither side will target the other, including American vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and the smooth flow of international commercial shipping,” the minister added. Peoples Dispatch spoke to a member of the Communist Party of Jordan, Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh, to discuss the ceasefire, which he described as a “sudden development in the war in the Red Sea.” Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh indicated that “both the US and Oman didn’t comment on Ansar Allah’s missiles targeting Israel, especially that this agreement was reached shortly after a Yemeni missile reached Ben Gurion airport, near the occupied city of Lydda (also known as Lod).” As per Al-Hatabeh’s analysis, “important questions about this agreement are left without answers. Taking into consideration the Omani role in the American – Iranian negotiations, is the ceasefire in the Red Sea part of the deal? Another question will arise from this assumption, did America give up some of Israel’s interests in order to reach an agreement with Iran? Where does this agreement leave Netanyahu’s government, especially after Ansar Allah’s spokesman told Reuters that the agreement doesn’t include Israel.” Ansar Allah says the US contacted them seeking a truce One day before Oman announced that the deal was sealed, US President Donald Trump alluded that a ceasefire agreement was about to be reached, claiming that Ansar Allah agreed to stop the fight with the US because they “capitulated”.  “They just don’t want to fight, and we will honor that and we will stop the bombings, and they have capitulated,” Trump said from the White House on Tuesday, May 6. “They will not be blowing up ships anymore, and that’s what the purpose of what we were doing. So that’s just news. We just found out about that. So I think that’s very, very positive,” he added. Although Trump bragged about the deal, presenting it as a US victory, analysts suggest that it was Ansar Allah that forced the world’s greatest military superpower to the negotiating table, after paralyzing US naval traffic off the Yemeni coast.  Ansar Allah’s chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, confirmed during an interview with Almasirah TV channel, that the movement “did not make any request to the Americans to hold ceasefire talks”. Abdulsalam asserted that, on the contrary, the movement recently received US requests and messages seeking a truce, via the Sultanate of Oman. The Yemeni official pointed out that US endeavors to reach a ceasefire with Ansar Allah were a great disappointment to Israel. “The Israelis have endured great disappointment after the stance of the US, which tried to walk away and avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen,” he said. However, Abdulsalam clarified that Ansar Allah is still “assessing this US position so that the facts on the ground do not contradict its statements”. He further warned that in the event that the US “would not abide by the agreement in any way”, the movement “will respond”. Abdulsalam considered the deal “a success to be added to Yemen’s credit, as it enhances a situation that would leave the “usurper entity” [Israel] in a situation of loneliness, in confrontation with the great popular and military stance led by Yemen on behalf of the Arab and Islamic nation.” The ceasefire was announced two months after Trump ordered a large-scale aerial campaign against Yemen on the pretext of protecting US shipping, air, and naval assets and to restore “navigation freedom” from Ansar Allah’s attacks. Trump’s order followed Ansar Allah’s decision to resume a ban on Israeli ships due to Israel’s continuous blockade of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Yemen threatens Israel with a devastating and painful response for attacking Sana’a airport  While Ansar Allah agreed to a truce with the US, it vowed to escalate its operations against Israel as long as its blockade on humanitarian aid to Gaza is not lifted.  In response to Israel’s aggression on Sana’a International Airport on Tuesday, that destroyed terminal buildings and caused USD 500 million in damage, Yemen’s Supreme Political Council Chairman, Mahdi al-Mashat, threatened that “Sanaa’s response will be devastating, painful, and beyond what the Israeli enemy can endure.” “From this moment onward, stay in your shelters or leave for your homelands immediately. Your failed government will no longer be able to protect you,” Al-Mashat warned Israeli people.  Moreover, the Yemeni senior official reaffirmed that no aggression will deter Yemen from its “rightful decision” to support the people of Palestine “until the genocide ends and the siege on Gaza is lifted.” The Yemeni Armed Forces’ spokesman, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, also confirmed in a televised statement late Wednesday, that the movement will continue its ban on Israeli ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, alongside the comprehensive aerial blockade on Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport. Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Israeli army seeks to mobilize 30,000 reservists for a new expansion of its offensive on Gaza. UN-affiliated organizations warn of famine and disease in an enclave where clean drinking water is scarce. The Israeli security cabinet has approved a plan to intensify the operation in Gaza, which includes capturing or seizing additional areas across the Palestinian coastal territory and expanding the area controlled by the IDF. Government members, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, are already using the term “occupation” to clarify the plans for Gaza. Although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not specified which parts of the territory are involved in the new escalation, anonymous military sources have claimed that the goal is to occupy the entire Gaza Strip. The idea put forth by the Zionist regime, in any case, is to seize the territory and not return it in the future. Hamas has rejected this plan and continues to pursue “a comprehensive agreement that guarantees the safety and protection of our people,” according to one of its senior officials. The announcement includes the destruction of “all infrastructure above and underground,” according to Israeli Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir. The meeting followed IDF orders to mobilize 30,000 reservists last Saturday. Israel is thereby increasing pressure on Gaza during the same month that U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to visit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, where he will present his colonization plans aligned with the wishes of the Tel Aviv regime. The plan also entails a new forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to the south of Gaza, expected to last for months. The government of Netanyahu — who is considered a suspected war criminal by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) — faces internal resistance from the Hostage and Missing Families Forum, which has protested what they see as prioritizing territorial conquest over the return of prisoners captured by Hamas on October 7. Fifty-nine people remain held by the Gaza government after Israel unilaterally broke the ceasefire on March 18. The Forum mentioned before, criticized the Gaza occupation plans, referring to them as the “Smotrich-Netanyahu Plan for the Sacrifice of Hostages,” according to a public statement. The main debate within the security cabinet focused on whether to open routes for humanitarian aid — routes that have been closed since early March, two weeks before the ceasefire collapsed. According to Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Itamar Ben Gvir — also subject to ICJ arrest warrants — argued for keeping all aid routes closed: “I don’t understand why we have to give them anything; they have enough food there. We should bomb Hamas’s food reserves,” the outlet quoted. The Chief of Staff called the idea “dangerous.” According to the same leaks, Ben Gvir also proposed “bombing food warehouses and generators.” The International Criminal Court has reminded that blocking humanitarian aid may constitute a war crime. The Israeli government has leaked to the press that under the new escalation, humanitarian aid would be allowed in only through “international organizations and private security contractors.” On Sunday, May 4, the Country Humanitarian Team (CHT), under the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), reported that for nine weeks Israeli authorities had blocked all supplies from entering Gaza: “Bakeries and community kitchens have shut down. The warehouses are empty. Children are starving.” Two days earlier, UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell expanded on the critical situation in Gaza: “In the past month, more than 75% of households have reported increased difficulty accessing water. Families don’t have enough to drink, cannot wash their hands when needed, and often must choose between showering, cleaning, or cooking,” Russell said in a statement. UNICEF also warned of the prevalence of acute watery diarrhea, especially dangerous for children: “Over 9,000 boys and girls have received treatment for acute malnutrition,” the organization added. At the end of April, during ICJ hearings related to South Africa’s case against Israel, Claire Nicolet, Head of Emergencies at Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), stated that “Israeli authorities are not only using aid as a bargaining chip but also as a weapon of war.” Since October 7, 2023, 52,567 Palestinians have been killed and 118,610 injured as a result of Israeli attacks, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. Of those fatalities, 2,459 occurred after the March ceasefire was broken.