Subscribe to our weekly newsletters for free

Subscribe to an email

If you want to subscribe to World & New World Newsletter, please enter
your e-mail

Defense & Security
K2 Black Panther during the 75th Republic of Korea Armed Forces parade, in Seoul, South Korea, on September 26, 2023

Major military weapons of South Korea defense industry

by World & New World Journal Policy Team

I. Introduction South Korea’s defense industry has rapidly emerged as a significant global arms exporter, driven by technological advancements, strategic government support, and increased geopolitical tensions such as the Ukraine war. South Korean arms exports have surged from $1.2 billion (2011–2015) to $38 billion (2021–2023), positioning South Korea as a key player in global arms market, challenging traditional arms exporters. This paper aims to introduce South Korean weapons to government officials and businessmen in European and Middle Eastern countries. This is the first paper in a series on South Korean defense industry. Focus is on South Korean weapons exported to Europe. The second paper will deal with South Korean weapons exported to Middle Eastern countries. This paper first provides an overview of South Korean defense industry and then introduces major Korean weapons exported to European countries. II. Overview of Korean Defense Industry It was 72 years ago that the bloody 1950-53 Korean War ended with an armistice. Today, South Korea, the once-war-ravaged nation, stands among global leading arms exporters, and its factories turn out advanced tanks, artillery systems and fighter jets destined for battlefields far beyond the Korean Peninsula. As Figure 1 shows, South Korea’s arms industry has been riding a wave of global demand. South Korea’ arms exports increased from 2.5 billion dollars in 2019 to 23 billion dollars (estimate)in 2025. South Korean weapons are in high demand for their advanced technology and fast delivery. As a result, in recent years, South Korea has often been listed among the world’s top 10 arms exporters, competing with the US, Russia and China. As Figure 2, South Korea ranked No. 10 in global arms exports, with a 2.2 % share of the world arms market in the 2020-2024 period, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The South Korean government is now setting its sights on breaking into the ranks of global top 4 arms exporters. Figure 1: South Korea arms export Figure 2: world’s biggest arms exporters 1. Major South Korean defense companies According to the Defense News Top 100 list for 2020, four of South Korea’s defense companies were ranked in the top 100 defense companies in the world. These four companies are Hanwha (32nd), Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI 55th), LIG Nex1 (68th), and Hyundai Rotem (95th). These South Korea’s top four defense companies are expected to surpass 100 trillion won ($72 billion) in total order backlog in 2025, driven by strong export growth. More European and other countries adopt self-reliant defense strategies as US President Donald Trump warn that the US will no longer protect them for free and as he calls for increasing military spending. Moreover, the Ukraine war and the Gaza conflict continue. Thus, there are higher expectations that South Korea’s leading defense firms will secure more orders. According to data compiled by the Chosun Ilbo, a top Korean newspaper, on May 6, 2025, the combined backlog of South Korea’s top four defense companies stands at around 94.5 trillion won. The figures for Hanwha Aerospace and KAI are based on the results of the first quarter in 2025, while those for LIG Nex1 and Hyundai Rotem reflect data from the end of 2024 (The Chosun Ilbo, May 6, 2025). All four companies secure more export deals, thereby enhancing both the scale and quality of their order books. Hanwha Aerospace, for example, holds 31.4 trillion won in ground defense orders, led by exports of K9 howitzers and Chunmoo multiple rocket systems. Exports account for 65% of that backlog. KAI’s backlog at the end of the first quarter in 2025 reached 24.3 trillion won, up 32% from 18.4 trillion won in 2020. The KAI aims to exceed 29 trillion won by year-end. Its export share has also risen from 50% in 2020 to 63% by the end of 2024. LIG Nex1 holds a backlog of around 20 trillion won as of the end of 2024, while Hyundai Rotem’s stands at 18.8 trillion won. More than half of the orders for both companies come from overseas. Hyundai Rotem is also expected to finalize a second contract with Poland to export around 820 K2 tanks, valued at over 8 trillion won. If finalized, the deal would significantly boost its backlog this year. According to updated data from the Chosun Ilbo, South Korea’s four major defense companies saw their combined order backlog surpass 100 trillion won ($72 billion) for the first time, driven by strong overseas demand. Data in second quarter of 2025 show that Hanwha Aerospace, LIG Nex1, Hyundai Rotem, and Korea Aerospace Industries held backlogs totaling 103.48 trillion won, more than double the 42.23 trillion won recorded at the end of 2021. Industry officials say these companies now have enough work secured for the next four to five years. (The Chosun Ilbo, August 19, 2025)  Figure 3: South Korea top 4 defense companies’ order backlog (source: the Chosun Ilbo, August 19, 2025)  This jump in exports of Korean-made conventional weapons has led to the Korean defense industry boom. Orders for Korean artillery weapons and armored vehicles from Eastern Europe and the Middle East have significantly increased since the outbreak of the Ukraine war. Sales of Hyundai Rotem Co., the supplier of the K-2 Black Panther tank, and Hanwha Aerospace Co., the supplier of the K-9 Thunder howitzer, have skyrocketed over the same period. Their parts suppliers have also seen their sales double over a year. The South Korean defense industry’s current heyday is expected to continue for a while as global demand for Korean-made weapons and combat systems has surged amid growing geopolitical conflicts around the world. According to defense industry sources, Hanwha Aerospace is expected to soon close a deal with Vietnam to export the K9 self-propelled howitzers, a contract expected to be worth 1 trillion won. Indeed, Hanwha Aerospace signed an agreement to export its K9 self-propelled howitzers worth US$250 million to Vietnam. Hyundai Rotem is also reportedly nearing the final stage of inking a second agreement with Poland for K2 battle tanks that could be worth over 7 trillion won. LIG Nex1 has supposedly been in talks with Malaysia to export its surface-to-air missile system Cheongung. KAI is looking to export its KF-21 fighter jet to the Middle East. As the Korean defense companies continue to rack up orders and look to expand their list of clients worldwide, JP Morgan released a report on the four major defense firms -- Hanwha Aerospace, Hyundai Rotem, LIG Nex1 and KAI – in March 2025, increasing their stock price targets by an average of 28 percent while pointing out that there is “plenty of room to go” for their values to rise (The Korea Herald, April 17, 2025). The report surprised investors, industry officials and analysts as it set the target prices of the four defense companies higher than the domestic market consensus. J.P. Morgan adjusted the target stock prices of Hanwha Aerospace, Hyundai Rotem, LIG Nex1 and KAI to 950,000 won, 90,000 won, 370,000 won and 120,000 won, respectively. JP Morgan noted that it estimates an annual new order market of 19 trillion won -- 14 trillion won from Europe and 5 trillion won from the Middle East -- for Korean land weapons systems companies. “Korean-made weapons remain one of the top choices for Eastern European countries facing national security issues,” said Lee Tae-hwan, an analyst at Daishin Securities. “Discussions about ordering conventional weapons will gain momentum. The K9 self-propelled howitzers and K2 tanks are excellent candidates with strong potential for scoring additional export deals in Eastern Europe.” (The Korea Herald, April 17, 2025). Yu Ji-hoon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, told The Korea Herald that “South Korea has rapidly matured into one of the world’s leading arms exporters, backed by a highly capable manufacturing base, a track record of delivering on time and at scale, and proven platforms.” (The Korea Herald, April 17, 2025). 2. Importers of South Korean weapons According to data from the Korea International Trade Association and the Korea Herald, last year’s biggest importer of Korean defense systems was Poland, which purchased Korea-made weapons worth about $2.51 billion, more than four times what it bought in 2023. The most-exported items were from Hanwha Aerospace, which shipped 212 units of its K9 self-propelled howitzers, and Hyundai Rotem, selling 134 units of the K2 battle tank. (The Korea Herald, April 17, 2025). Middle Eastern countries occupied most of the top five spots among importers of Korean weapons as regional tensions escalated due to the conflicts involving Israel, Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen. Saudi Arabia ranked second in the purchase of Korean weapons with $530 million in 2024, while the United Arab Emirates and Turkey placed fourth and fifth with $145 million and $113 million, respectively. The United States was the third-biggest importer of Korean weapons at $219 million. III. Major military weapons of South Korean Defense Industry 1. Overview In South Korea’s expanding arms export portfolio, the K2 tank, called “Black Panther” and built by Hyundai Rotem, has been a flagship item. The K2 is South Korea’s most advanced main battle tank, designed for speed, precision and adaptability on the mountainous Korean Peninsula. In recent years, the K2 has drawn major international orders, most notably from Poland, as Polish and other nations’ militaries seek modern armor to replace aging Cold War units. It is central to South Korea’s largest-ever defense export deals, including the one with Poland, signed in 2022, in which Poland ordered 180 K2 Black Panther tanks from Hyundai Rotem in a $3.37 billion agreement. Deliveries began within months, far faster than European or American suppliers could offer. (The Korea Herald, August 14, 2025) In 2025, Poland signed with a $6.5 billion contract for 180 upgraded K2PL tanks, to be produced in part in Poland. The two phases, part of a broader plan involving the manufacturing of up to 1,000 K2s, have made South Korea one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s most important new arms partners and cemented South Korea’s status as a major player in the global defense market. Other key weapons in the South Korean export portfolio are the K239 Chunmoo Multiple Rocket Launcher System, K9 self-propelled howitzer, FA-50 fighter jets and KP-SAM chirons. (The Korea Herald, August 14, 2025) Prominent deals made with global clients include K239 Chunmoo MLRS systems purchased by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in 2017 and 2022, respectively. South Korea also signed a $250 million agreement to supply Vietnam with 20 K9 self-propelled howitzers on August 14, 2025, marking the weapon’s first deployment to a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations bloc. The K9 howitzers are already in service in countries such as Turkey and Egypt. (The Korea Herald, August 14, 2025) In December 2013, Iraq signed a contract for 24 T-50IQ aircraft, a FA-50 variant, plus additional equipment and pilot training over the next 20 years. The first batch of aircraft was delivered in March 2017. On March 28, 2014, Department of Defense in the Philippines signed a contract for 12 FA-50 fighters worth P18.9 billion (US$421.12 million). Deliveries began in November 2015, all 12 aircraft were delivered by May 31, 2017. (The Korea Herald, August 14, 2025) Indonesian Air Force acquired and operated KP-Sam Chirons since 2014 which was integrated with Oerlikon Skyshield 35 mm anti-aircraft gun system. Additional 2 Chirons transferred according to a 2019 SIPRI small arms report. 54 KP-SAM chirons were delivered to Romania in June 2024. 2. Major South Korean weapons exported to Europe This is the first paper in a series on South Korean defense industry. Focus is on South Korean weapons exported to Europe. As Table 1 shows, South Korea exported the following weapons to European countries such as Poland, Romania, and Turkey in the period of 2022-2024: K 2 tanks, K 9 howitzer, Chunmoo multiple rocket systems, FA-50, and the KP-SAM Chiron. Table 1: Major defense export contracts, 2022-2024 (source: Issues & Insights on Economy, Technology, and Security, no. 011 (25-06) 4 June, 2025, p. 2) 1. K 2 Black Panther (K 2 tanks) Figure 4: K2 Black Panther (source: Wikipedia) K2 Black Panther (K-2 흑표 tank) is a South Korean fourth-generation main tank, manufactured by Hyundai Rotem. The K2 Black Panther has an advanced fire-control system, in-arm suspension, laser rangefinder, a radar, and crosswind sensor for lock-on targeting. The K2’s thermographic camera tracks target up to 9.8 km, and its millimeter-band radar acts as a Missile Approach Warning System, enhancing situational awareness. And its soft-kill active protection system deploys smoke grenades to counter incoming projectiles. The K2’s autoloader reduces crew size from 4 to 3, thereby providing a faster rate of fire, better fuel efficiency, and lower maintenance costs compared to other western main tanks requiring human loaders. In addition, the K2 can operate in indirect fire mode, offering key advantages over Western designs.[1] The K2’s production started in 2008 and its mass production began in 2013. The first K2 tanks were deployed to South Korean army in July 2014.[2] The K2 Black Panthers were exported to Turkey and Poland. The potential operators of K2 Black Panthers are Armenia, Egypt, Morocco, Peru, Romania, and Slovakia. a. Turkey In June 2007, South Korea and Turkey negotiated a deal worth $540 million that included South Korea’s support for the development of Turkey’s Altay battle tank. On July 29, 2008, Hyundai Rotem and Turkey’s Otokar (Turkish defense firm) signed a contract to provide design assistance and technology transfer for the Altay tank project. This collaboration included systems integration, critical design elements, and manufacturing expertise from South Korea, specifically tailored to develop Turkey’s domestic manufacturing capabilities. South Korea’s contributions to the Altay’s development included the transfer of manufacturing technologies for critical components. Hyundai Rotem played a central role in the system design and integration process, and Hyundai WIA provided the 120 mm 55-caliber smoothbore gun technology. Poongsan Corporation supported the development of ballistic protection systems, while Samyang Comtech shared expertise in advanced armor materials. These collective efforts laid the foundation for Turkey’s capabilities in producing the Altay tank.[3] This cooperation extended beyond technical support, encompassing assistance in establishing production lines for key subsystems. Hyundai Rotem guided Otokar in tank systems development, while MKEK (Turkish mechanical and chemical corporation) received tank gun production technologies. Roketsan (Turkish defense firm) was supported in the design and manufacturing of advanced armor packages. These collaborative efforts were instrumental in the development of prototypes PV1 and PV2, finalized in 2015, and the Altay project's official completion in 2016.[4] On 10 March 2021, BMC, the Turkish contractor responsible for the production of Altay tanks, made a decision to import engines and transmissions from South Korea to address production delays. Seven months later, on 22 October 2021, South Korea’s DAPA approved the export of Hyundai Doosan Infracore (now HD Hyundai Infracore) DV27K engines and SNT Dynamics EST15K transmissions to Turkey. In August 2022, durability testing of the powerpack, combining the DV27K engine and EST15K transmission from South Korea, was successfully completed. Following this success, the first batch of Altay tanks will be produced using this Korean powerpack including engines from HD Hyundai Infracore and transmissions by SNT Dynamics. The tank is in production according to the Turkish media.[5] In 2025, mass production of the Altay tank officially started on 5 September, 2025. b. Poland In January 2020, Poland announced negotiations with Hyundai Rotem for license production of the K2 Black Panther for the Polish Army. On 13 June 2022, the Polish Ministry of Defense announced that it had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to buy at least 180 K2 tanks for the Polish military. On 27 July 2022, the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) and Hyundai Rotem signed a framework agreement to provide 180 K2s and 820 K2PLs. The contract included rapid arms supply and extensive technology transfer from South Korea. According to the contract, 180 K2s will be produced in South Korea and delivered to Poland starting in 2022, and 820 K2PLs will be produced in Poland under license beginning in 2026.[6] On 26 August 2022, the first executive agreement worth $3.37 billion was signed to procure 180 K2s in Morąg in northern Poland. The contract included logistics packages, training programs, explosive reactive armor packages, 50,000 120 mm, 4.3 million 7.62 mm and 12.7 mm machine gun ammunition for the K2. Soldiers of the 16th Mechanized Division of the Polish Army were sent to South Korea in October 2022 to participate in the training program. The 180 K2 tanks will be delivered during the period of 2022-2025 and then be deployed to the 20th Mechanized Brigade, 15th Mechanized Brigade, and 9th Armored Cavalry Brigade in Poland.[7] On 7 September 2022, PGZ and Hyundai Rotem signed a partnership agreement to develop and produce tanks, armored vehicles and ground unmanned systems. The contract included joint cooperation in building manufacturing facilities in Poland for the production and maintenance of 1000 K2 tanks and the production of K3 next-generation battle tanks. The facilities to be built in Poland will be used as a hub in Europe for the sale and maintenance of Hyundai Rotem’s armed vehicles and tanks. On 5 December 2022, the first 10 K2 tanks arrived in Poland, just “six months” after the signing of the agreement. The tanks were delivered to the 20th Mechanized Brigade of the 16th Mechanized Division on 9 December 2022. On 31 March 2023, the Polish Ministry of Defense signed a foundational agreement with Hyundai Rotem for a consortium to produce K2PL in Poznań. 2. The K9 Thunder (K 9 howitzer) Figure 5: K9 Thunder (source: Wikipedia) The K9 Thunder is a South Korean 155 mm self-propelled howitzer designed and developed by the Agency for Defense Development and South Korean corporations including Samsung Aerospace Industries, Dongmyeong Heavy Industries, Kia Heavy Industry, and Poongsan Corporation for South Korean Armed Forces. It is now manufactured by Hanwha Aerospace. K9 howitzers operate in groups with the K10 ammunition resupply vehicle variant.[8] The entire K9 fleet operated by South Korean Armed Forces has undergone upgrades to K9A1, and a further upgrade variant K9A2 is now tested for production. As of 2022, the K9 series had a 52% share of global self-propelled howitzer market.[9] The K-9 Thunder is superior to the US self-propelled howitzer M109A6 Paladin or the British self-propelled howitzer AS90. The Chinese PLZ-05 has poor recoil and suspension functions as revealed in the released operating video. And the performance of the Russian 2S35 Kalitsa-SV has not been verified. Compared to the German PzH2000 (currently the world’s best self-propelled howitzer), the K-9 Thunder is a cost-effective alternative, offering a similar balance of performance, range, and mobility but at a lower price, making the K-9 a highly successful export system. The main differences between K-9 and PzH2000 lie in cost and performance. The PzH 2000 has been known for its superior automation and slightly higher firing rate, while the K9 Thunder boasts excellent mobility, a better cost-performance ratio, and seamless integration with its K10 ammunition resupply vehicle.[10] For these reasons, as Table 2 shows, the K9 Thunders were exported to a number of countries such as Turkey, India, Norway, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Australia, Egypt, and Romania.  Table 2: Countries to which K9 howitzers have been exported and the number of units under contract, 2001-2024 a. Turkey In May 1999, the Ministry of Defense in South Korea ordered its military attaché in Turkey to arrange a presentation for K9 Thunder. Although Turkey showed interest in K9 Thunder, there was no business deals made as Turkey was planning to produce German Panzerhaubitze 2000 at that time. As Turkey’s plan to build PzH2000 eventually became halted by Germany, South Korea and Turkey signed MOU to strengthen their military and defense cooperation on 18 November 1999.[11] On 12 December, Turkey sent a team of military general and engineers to Korea to inspect K9 Thunder. Satisfied with the K9’s performance, Turkey cancelled its plan to find replacement from Israel and decided to manufacture K9 Thunder. On 19 February 2000, a technology evaluation team from members of the Agency of Defense Development and Samsung was sent to Turkey and inspected various Turkish companies and facilities including Turkish 1010th Army Factory, MKEK, and Aselsan to optimize manufacturing process of K9 in Turkey. On 4 May 2000, the Ministry of Defense in South Korea and Turkish Land Forces Command signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to supply 350 K9 systems untill 2011.[12] The prototype was finally assembled on 30 December 2000, and earned the nickname Firtina (Fırtına; Storm). Winter test was held in January and February 2001 at Sarıkamış, and Firtina was able to operate in snowy mountain terrain without issue. A formal contract was signed by Samsung Techwin (formerly Samsung Aerospace Industries) and the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Seoul on 20 July 2001. South Korean government promised to transfer the technologies of the Agency for Defense Development to Turkey for free in exchange for Turkey’ purchase of 350 vehicles—280 for Turkish Land Forces and 70 for its future customer—by 2011, which the total is expected to be $1 billion. The first 24 T-155 Firtina consisted of Korean subsystems worth $65 million. The Turkish model was named T-155 Firtina.[13] Hanwha Defense has generated more than $600 million from Turkey since then, much lower than expected. This is because Turkey produced fewer units than planned and because Turkey increased its localization efforts gradually by indigenous research and from technology transfer. b. India On 25 March 2012, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to strengthen their economic and military ties. On 29 March 2012 at DEFEXPO, Samsung Techwin and Larsen & Toubro announced their partnership to produce the K9 Thunder in India. According to the agreement, Samsung Techwin will transfer key technologies, and the vehicle will be manufactured under license in India using 50 per cent of the domestic content such as FCS and communication system.[14] Two units of K9 were sent to Thar Desert, Rajasthan for firing and mobility test, and competed against Russian 2S19. Operated by Indian military personnel, the K9 fired 587 Indian ammunitions including Nub round and drove a total distance of 1,000 km. Maintenance test was conducted at Pune, EMI (electromagnetic interference) test at Chennai, and technical environment test was held in Bengaluru until March 2014. K9 Thunder achieved all ROC set by Indian military while the Russian counterpart failed to do so. Hanwha Techwin (previously Samsung Techwin) later told in an interview that the Russian engine performance dropped when the air density is low and in high temperature, the placement of the engine also resulted in the center of the mass located at the rear, making the vehicle difficult to climb high angles. On the other hand, K9 benefitted from automatic control system of the engine, providing the optimum performance based on given condition automatically—this was one of the decisive reason why India selected K9 over 2S19.[15] In September 2015, the Indian Ministry of Defense selected Hanwha Techwin and Larsen & Toubro as preferred bidder to supply 100 K9 Vajra-T to the Indian Army after K9 outperformed 2S19 Msta-S and passed two-year trial. On 6 July 2016, India agreed in purchasing 100 K9 Vajra-T for $750 million. On 29 March 2017, the Government of India approved budget of $646 million for purchasing 100 K9 Vajra-T. A formal contract of $310 million was signed between Hanwha Techwin and Larsen & Toubro in New Delhi on 21 April. According to the contract, Hanwha Techwin will supply first 10 K9 Vajra-T, and 90 K9 will be license produced in India by Larsen & Toubro.[16] In May 2021, it was reported that India’s Defense Research and Development Organisation was working with Larsen & Toubro on a light tank using the K9 chassis with 105 mm or 120 mm gun system to counter China’s Type 15 tank.[17] The Indian Army planned to order an additional 40 K-9 Vajra-T from Larsen & Toubro as of 2021 after completion of high altitude trials at Ladakh under cold climatic conditions. At that time, India was also looking to export the K9 Vajra-T variant to third countries in collaboration with South Korea and its industry partners. As per a report in 2022, the Indian MoD could place a repeat order of 200 K9 Vajra-T worth ₹9,600 crore (equivalent to ₹100 billion or US$1.2 billion in 2023) after satisfactory performance of the guns at high altitude terrain.[18] According to a report in May 2024, the clearance for next 100 units would be approved after the formation of a new government after Indian general election in 2024. The Cabinet Committee on Security cleared the purchase of 100 units on 12 December 2024.[19] The contract, worth ₹7,628.70 crore (US$900 million), was signed with Larsen & Toubro on 20 December 2024 in the South Block, New Delhi. The entire order is to be processed and delivered by the end of 2025. On 3 April 2025, Larsen &Toubro signed another contract with Hanwha Aerospace at $253 million to execute the order.[20] c. Norway In May 2015, Samsung Techwin joined the Norwegian artillery upgrade program to replace Norway’s M109Gs with 24 new systems, competing against the KMW Panzerhaubitze 2000, the Nexter CAESAR 6x6, and the RUAG M109 KAWEST. A single K9 was sent to Norway to join the competition. Operated by a sales team, the vehicle went through tests between November 2015 and January 2016. During the January winter test, the K9 was the only vehicle that managed to drive through meter-thick snow field and fire its weapon without any issue. Competing vehicles experienced engine troubles or broken parts.[21] The K9’s engine was able to maintain heat overnight by simply covering the area with tarpaulin, a simple trick learned from operating experience, allowing the engine to ignite without failure the next day at an extremely cold temperature. The hydropneumatic suspension became a huge advantage for mobility, as its mechanism melted snow on mobility parts much quicker. The test result had also significant impact on Finland and Estonia to acquire K9, because the two nations were invited to observe performances for their artillery replacement. In December 2017, a contract of $230 million was signed between Hanwha Land Systems and the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. According to the contract, Hanwha would supply 24 K9 Thunder and 6 K10 ARV by 2020. The K9 outperformed competitors in various weather and terrain conditions according to Norwegian military officials during trials.[22] The Norwegian variant was named K9 VIDAR based on the K9A1 configuration. In November 2022, Norway decided to purchase 4 K9s and 8 K10s, increasing its total vehicles to 28 K9s and 14 K10s (2:1 ratio). The delivery was expected to be completed in 2 years.[23] In April 2025, it was announced that Norway plans to almost double its K9s by ordering an additional 24 K9s for about $534 million USD.[24] d. Poland i) PK9 (AHS Krab with PK9 chassis) In 1999, Poland joined NATO and launched a military program named Regina Project to replace its 152mm Soviet-era SPGs with the NATO standard 155 mm artillery system. In December 2014, Samsung Techwin signed a cooperation agreement with Huta Stalowa Wola to supply modified K9 Thunder chassis for AHS Krab self-propelled howitzer. The deal is worth $310 million for 120 chassis, which includes related technology transfer and the power pack. From 2015 to 2022, 24 units were scheduled to be manufactured in South Korea, and 96 would be license produced in Poland. First chassis rolled out on 26 June 2015, and all 24 vehicles produced in South Korea were sent to Poland as of October 2016.[25] Late in May 2022, the Polish government sent 18 AHS Krab howitzers to Ukraine to assist the Ukrainian military to defend against Russia during the Ukraine war. On 29 May, Polish minister of defense visited South Korea for high level talks about the purchase of various Korean weapons to increase AHS Krab production. On June 7, Poland and Ukraine signed a contract for the purchase of an additional 54 units plus support vehicles, in a deal worth US$700 million. The agreement was the largest defense contract that Polish defense industry had made.[26] On 5 September 2022, Poland ordered 48 Krabs and other support vehicles for a value of PLN 3.8 billion zlotys (USD $797 million). On 23 December 2024, the contract worth PLN 9 billion for 96 Krabs, command vehicles, command and staff vehicles, ammunition vehicles, and repair workshops was signed. The delivery for this batch was scheduled by the end of 2029.[27] On 8 April 2025, Huta Stalowa Wola signed a ₩402.6 billion deal with Hanwha Aerospace to supply parts and power packs for 87 AHS Krabs between 2026 and 2028. ii) K9PL On 27 July 2022, Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) and Hanwha Defense signed a framework agreement to supply 672 K9PL. Hanwha Defense hoped to expand the deal by adding K10 ARV and K11 FDCV support vehicles. Poland was also expected to produce AHS Krab in parallel; however, due to the low production capability, the deliveries of the existing order will be completed by 2026. On 26 August 2022, an executive contract of $2.4 billion was signed to acquire 212 K9PL manufactured by Hanwha Defense as a Batch I order. Under the contract, Hanwha is responsible for delivery of all 212 vehicles by 30 September 2026. Poland plans to build K9PL locally afterward via technology transfer for the Batch II. On 7 September, Hanwha Defense and WB Electronics signed a $139.5 million deal for installation of Polish communication systems on the Batch I order.[28] The first 24 K9PL(GF) was rolled out on 19 October 2022. The delivery ceremony was held in Poland on 6 December. The first new K9PL began its construction in July 2023.[29] On 1 December 2023, Poland and Hanwha Aerospace signed a $2.6 billion agreement for 6 Batch I K9PLs by 2025, 146 Batch II K9PLs between 2026 and 2027, and integrated logistics support for the howitzers and 155 mm ammunitions.[30] On 4 April 2024, Hanwha Aerospace opened a European office in Warsaw and announced the integration of the K9 and Krab howitzer systems with cooperation from Huta Stalowa Wola to improve the operational and maintenance efficiency of the Polish military. e. Finland On 1 June 2016 at KDEC (Korea Defense Equipment & Component) industry fair, South Korea and Finland signed a MOU for defense cooperation including export of used K9. In July 2016, the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced that an undisclosed number of used K9s have been acquired from South Korea. In September 2016, K9 was field tested in Finland, and Seppo Toivonen, the commander of the Finnish Army, visited South Korea to inspect operating units during 2016 DX Korea. On 25 November 2016, two countries signed MOU to supply 48 used K9 for $200 million and match equal amount of free technology transfer related to vehicle maintenance.[31] On 17 February 2017, the South Korean Ministry of Defense announced that Finland will acquire 48 used K9s over a period of seven years starting in 2018, with conscript training on the equipment begining in 2019. On 2 March 2017, final contract of value of €145 million ($160 million) was signed by two governments in Seoul, South Korea.[32] On 21 October 2021, Finnish Ministry of Defense authorized exercising option to purchase 10 new vehicles including spare parts and supplies—5 in 2021 and another 5 in 2022—for €30 million, increasing the fleet size to 58 vehicles.[33] On 18 November 2022 Finnish Minister of Defense Antti Kaikkonen authorized purchase of another 38 used vehicles for €134 million. The official Finnish designation of the K9 howitzer is 155 PSH K9 FIN, colloquially called Moukari (meaning Sledgehammer). On 4 March 2024, Millog, a Finnish company, signed a contract with the Finish Defense Force to upgrade 48 vehicles purchased in 2021 and 2022 at €8.1 million. The work is expected to be completed by 2030.[34] f. Estonia To reduce the cost for both nations, Finland invited Estonia to jointly procure the K9. In February 2017, Estonian military officials visited South Korea for price negotiations. In June 2018, Rauno Sirk, the director of the Estonian military procurement agency, announced that Estonia would buy K9 Thunder howitzers. Hanwha Land Systems was to supply 12 used K9s for €46 million, which would cover maintenance, parts and training, as in the contract with Finland. In October 2019, the Estonian Ministry of Defense announced that it would exercise the option to purchase 6 additional K9s under the terms of this contract, at an estimated cost of €20 million.[35] In August 2021, the Estonian Centre for Defense Investment (RKIK) signed a €4.6 million contract with Hanwha Defense and Go Craft to modernize 24 K9EST Kõu, hinting at purchasing 6 more for its inventory. The upgrade involves communication systems, a FCS, painting, fire suppression system, and electronics.[36] In September 2022, it was reported that Estonia had purchased 24 vehicles in total. In October, the Estonian defense minister stated that Estonia would procure 12 additional K9s, bringing the total number up to 36 units. In November 2022, Go Craft opened Estonia's first private military workshop, and will start upgrading K9s. In January 2023, Estonia ordered 12 vehicles for €36 million, which will be delivered before 2026. The first Estonian edition by Go Craft was rolled out in February 2023.[37] g. Australia In August 2009, it was reported that the consortium of Samsung Techwin and Raytheon Australia had the upper hand for Australia’s Land 17 artillery replacement program by becoming a sole bidder, as KMW, the manufacturer of the competing Panzerhaubitze 2000, had not provided the detailed offering proposal that Australia requested.[38] The K9 was sent to Australia and was evaluated by the Australian military starting in April 2010. The test included firing M982 Excalibur, a requirement which the K9 satisfied. In June 2010, the K9 became the preferred bidder for the LAND 17 program, but the program was delayed. In May 2019, in the lead-up to the 2019 Federal Election, the Prime Minister of Australia, Scott Morrison, announced that 30 K9 howitzers and associated support equipment, including ten K10 ammunition resupply vehicles, would be acquired for the Australian Defense Forces. No time frame was given for the purchase.[39] In September 2020, the Minister for Defense, Linda Reynolds, announced a request for tender to locally build 30 K9s under the Land 8116 Phase 1 Protected Mobility Fires requirement. The sole-source request for tender was released to the preferred supplier, Hanwha Defense Australia, to build and maintain 30 K9s and 15 K10s, as well as their supporting systems. These would be built at Hanwha Defense Australia's Geelong facility. Australian variant AS9 Huntsman was based on Norwegian K9 VIDAR.[40] In December 2021, the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) of Australia and Hanwha Defense Australia signed a formal contract of producing 30 AS9s and 15 AS10 AARVs under license at Hanwha Defense Australia facility in Geelong. The estimated value of the deal is $788 million, and manufacturing was expected to start in Q4 2024.[41] Production of AS9 and AS10 began in June 2023. In July, Australian army conducted tests on ammunition compatibility at the Agency for Defense Development test center in South Korea. In August, another Israeli company Epsilor was selected to supply NATO standard 6T Li-ion batteries for the howitzer.[42] On 28 March 2024, Hanwha Aerospace announced the beginning of assembly of two AS9s and one AS10 in Changwon. The remaining 28 AS9s and 14 AS10s will be built at H-ACE in Australia. On 23 August 2024, Hanwha Aerospace invited Korean and Australian government officials for an opening ceremony of H-ACE. The factory will start mass production of AS9 and AS10 in 2024 and deliver all vehicles to the Australian Army by 2027.[43] In December 2024, Hanwha Aerospace delivered two AS9 and one AS10 to Hanwha Defense Australia, and the Australian military received them in January 2025. h. Egypt In 2010, the K9 was evaluated by the Egyptian military to replace its aging artillery fleet. The regional instability resulting from the Arab Spring revolution caused the Egyptian government to postpone the replacing project indefinitely. In April 2017, it was reported that Hanwha Techwin was again in negotiations with Egypt to export the K9 Thunder. Hanwha Techwin sent a K9 howitzer to Egypt in July and K9 test-fired at a range located west of Cairo in August, competing with the French CAESAR, Russian 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, and Chinese PLZ-45. During the test, the K9 hit a target ship approaching to the shore, successfully performing an anti-access/area denial simulation against enemy ships for the Egyptian Navy.[44] In October 2021, South Korea and Egypt discussed the sale of the K9 Thunder. The estimated value of the deal was $2 billion, including training of technicians.[45] In February 2022, South Korea's Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced that Hanwha Defense had signed a $1.6 billion K9 Thunder export contract at Egypt's Artillery House, attended by Egypt's Ministry of National Defense and key officials from both countries. According to the DAPA, the deal provided for the production of 200 K9A1EGY and 100 K10EGY in Egypt, including technology transfer. An unknown number of the earliest vehicles in the series were to be produced in South Korea and delivered to the Egyptian Army and the Egyptian Navy.[46] The production of the first K9A1EGY was expected in Q4 2022. At a military parade on 25 October 2023, the Egyptian Army unveiled the K9A1EGY in service with the 4th Armored Division. On 1 July 2024, Egyptian media reported that the exact number of South Korean exports was 216 K9A1EGY, 39 K10, and 51 K11. Previously, Egypt received K9A1 and K10 vehicles with 1,000 horsepower Korean-made SMV1000 engines for testing purposes.[47] On 5 October 2024, Arab Defense reported that the Ministry of Military Production in Egypt announced local manufacturing of the SMV1000 engine by the state-owned Helwan Casting Company, also known as Military Factory 9. In addition, Egypt worked with Hanwha Aerospace in transferring manufacturing technology and installing production lines. The Military 200 became the main manufacturer, and the Military 100 would produce the CN98 cannon and armored steel. Moreover, Egypt plans to become the regional center to export the K9 Thunder system to African and Arab countries, and the Minister of Military Production confirmed negotiations with a number of countries.[48] i. Romania On 26 September, 2022, Romanian media reported that the Romanian military was interested in purchasing K9 Thunder and K2 Black Panther. Romania also expressed interest in the K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher and the K21 infantry fighting vehicle. In July 2023, it was reported that Romania planned to acquire 54 (3 systems of 18) K9 Thunders.[49] On 19 June 2024, Romanian Defense Minister Angel Tîlvăr finally decided to buy 54 K9s worth ₩1.3 trillion ($920 million) during an official meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik. The Romanian version is called K9 Tunet. The first 18 vehicles are expected to completely built at the Changwon factory in South Korea, while the rest will be assembled in Romania. On 9 July 2024, Hanwha Aerospace signed the ₩1.3 trillion contract with the Romanian Ministry to supply 54 K9s and 36 K10s, including ammunition and support equipment packages. Hanwha will deliver the vehicle from 2027 in cooperation with a local defense company in Romania. Meanwhile, Hanwha will deliver 18 K9s and 12 K10s from South Korea.[50] j. Vietnam The negotiation for K9 Thunder began when Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, the president of Vietnam, visited South Korea for the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties in 2022. In March 2023, Vietnam’s highest military figure Phan Văn Giang and other officials showed interests in the K9 by visiting South Korean Army’s K9 operator unit and discussion with Hanwha Aerospace on the potential K9 procurement for the Vietnam military.[51] In April 2024, it was reported that the Vietnam Ministry of National Defense has officially outlined the K9 procurement plan to its South Korean counterpart, with Korean officials supporting the deal. 108 units was mentioned as the potential purchase number. Vietnam confirmed the purchase on 11 August 2024 during Vietnam Prime Minister Tô Lâm's visit to South Korea. 3. The K239 Chunmoo (천무) Figure 6: K239 Chunmoo (source: Wikipedia) The K239 Chunmoo(천무) is a rocket artillery system developed in 2013 to replace the aging K136 Kooryong(구룡) of the South Korean military. The K239 Chunmoo is a self-propelled multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) capable of firing several different guided or unguided artillery rockets. The Cheonmu has a maximum range of 80km, capable of striking North Korean coastal artillery positions near the Military Demarcation Line and even the Wonsan area. It can fire 12 rounds continuously per minute, striking 12 different targets.[52] The Chunmoo is much better than US military’s HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) multiple rocket launcher in the ammunition capacity. The Chunmoo can fire up to 12 230mm guided missiles in single or burst bursts. Moreover, using 130mm pod-type ammunition (POD) of the same caliber as the Kooryong(구룡), the Chunmoo can fire 20 rounds per pod, for a total of 40 rounds simultaneously. It can also fire the US military’s 227mm MLRS ammunition. The wheeled Chunmoo launcher vehicle boasts excellent mobility, reaching a top speed of 80 km/h. It also has rapid response capabilities, capable of firing its first round within seven minutes of arriving at the firing point, and protection to ensure crew survivability. The Chunmoo boasts an excellent capability of carrying a wide variety of rocket types. The US Hymas, whose effectiveness was recently proven in the Ukraine war, can carry six rockets, while the ATACMS tactical ballistic missile can only carry a single rocket. However, the Chunmoo can fire 130mm rockets (36 rockets per pod), 227mm rockets (6 rockets per pod, two pods), and 230mm rockets (6 rockets per pod, two pods). Unguided 227mm rockets can travel up to 80km, while guided rockets can travel up to 160km, allowing them to strike all major North Korean military targets.[53] The K239 Chunmoo(천무) were exported to United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Poland. a. United Arab Emirates (UAE) In 2017, Hanwha Defense announced at ADEX (Aerospace & Defense Exhibition) in Seoul that it had signed a nondisclosure contract worth 700 billion won to export K239 Chunmoo to a certain country in the Middle East. Later it was revealed that the United Arab Emirates signed a supply contract with Hanwha Defense, including 12 K239 Chunmoos, 12 K239T Ammunition Support Vehicles, GPS-guided rockets, and munitions. In February 2021, 12 K239 Chunmoo systems and 12 K239T Ammunition Support Vehicles were delivered to the United Arab Emirates.[54] b. Saudi Arabia At the World Defense Show in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on March 9, 2022, Hanwha signed a defense export contract worth 1 trillion won ($800 million) with the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense, but details of the contract were not known. It was later confirmed on 31 March 2023 that an unknown number of Chunmoo was in service by the Royal Saudi Land Forces. As in the case of UAE, it is presumed that Saudi Arabia has signed a non-disclosure contract.[55] c. Poland On 27 August 2022, Polish defense minister, Mariusz Błaszczak, said that there were ongoing negotiations to acquire South Korea’s rocket artillery system. On 13 October 2022, Polish Armament Agency announced that the negotiations with South Korea to acquire nearly 300 K239 Chunmoo systems had been completed and the framework agreement was signed on October 17. Poland had originally intended to procure 500 American M142 HIMARS launchers, but such an order could not be fulfilled in a satisfactory timeline, so decision was made to split the HIMARS order into two stages, buying less of them and adding Chunmoo procurement. A supply contract for 288 Chunmoo MLRS mounted on Jelcz 8x8 chassis and equipped with Polish TOPAZ Integrated Combat Management System along with 23 thousand missiles with the range of 80 and 290 kilometers was signed in Poland on October 19, 2022.[56] On 20 August 2023, first Homar-K (Polish version of Chunmoo), which completed system integration and testing in South Korea, was deployed to the 18th Mechanized Division of the Polish Land Forces in Poland.[57] 4. FA- 50 Figure 7: FA-50 (source: Wikipedia) The FA-50 is a light combat aircraft manufactured by Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) for South Korean Air Force (ROKAF). It is a light combat version of the T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic advanced jet trainer and light attack aircraft. FA-50 aircraft can carry a weapons load of up to 4.5t. The aircraft can be armed with AIM-9 Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missiles, AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground tactical missiles (AGM), GBU-38/B Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), CBU-105 Sensor Fused Weapon (SFW), Mk-82 Low Drag General Purpose (LDGP) bombs and Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs).[58] The aircraft is also mounted with an internal, three-barrel 20mm Gatling gun and LAU-3/A 19-tube 2.75″ rocket launcher for firing Folding-Fin Aerial Rockets (FFAR). The wide range of weapon systems aboard the FA-50 jet allows it to counter multiple threats in today’s complex battlefield scenario.[59] The FA-50 platform will be integrated with Lockheed Martin’s Sniper advanced targeting pod (ATP), which is an electro-optical targeting system encased in a single, lightweight pod. It will expand the capabilities of FA-50 with two-color laser spot tracking (LST), high-definition, forward-looking infrared (FLIR), and the Global Scope™ sensor software suite for non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (NTISR) missions.[60] The FA-50 can be externally fitted with Rafael’s Sky Shield or LIG Nex1’s ALQ-200K ECM pods, Sniper or LITENING targeting pods, and Condor 2 reconnaissance pods to further improve its electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. Other armaments include SPICE multifunctional guidance kits, Textron CBU-97/105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon with WCMD tail kits, JDAM, JDAM-ER for more comprehensive air-to-ground operations, and AIM-120 missiles for BVR air-to-air operations. FA-50 has provisions for, but does not yet integrate, Python and Derby missiles, also produced by Rafael, and other anti-ship missiles, stand-off weapons, and sensors to be domestically developed by Korea. The South Korean military is reviewing whether to arm the FA-50 with a smaller version of the Taurus KEPD 350 missile to give it a stand-off engagement capability of 400 km (250 mi). European missile maker MBDA’s Meteor and ASRAAM medium and short-range air-to-air missiles are also reportedly available for integration on the FA-50.[61] Currently FA-50 is operational in South Korea, Indonesia, Iraq, Philippines, Thailand, Poland, and Malaysia. a. South Korea In 2011, the first squadron with the TA-50, the T-50’s light attack variant, became operational with the South Korean Air Forces. In 2014, the FA-50 was officially deployed by the South Korean Air Forces with President Park Geun-hye officially leading a ceremony during which a flight demonstration was held showing its capabilities. 20 FA-50s was assigned its own Air Force wing. 60 FA-50s were ordered by South Korean Air Forces. On October 9, 2014, an FA-50 successfully test fired an AGM-65 Maverick at a stationary target, a retired ship.[62] b. Indonesia Indonesia had been considering the T-50, along with four other aircraft, to replace its BAE Systems Hawk Mk 53 trainer and OV-10 Bronco attack aircraft. In August 2010, Indonesia announced that T-50, Yak-130 and L-159 were the remaining candidates for its requirement for 16 advanced jet trainers. In May 2011, Indonesia signed a US$400 million contract for 16 South Korean T-50s, designated T-50i. They feature weapons pylons and gun modules, enabling light attack capabilities. Deliveries began in September 2013 and the last aircraft were delivered in January 2014.[63] In July 2021, KAI confirmed that it has been awarded a US$240 million contract to supply another batch of six T-50s along with a support and logistics package. c. Iraq Iraq first publicly expressed interest in the T-50 trainers during the Korea–Iraq summit in Seoul on February 24, 2009. In December 2013, Iraq signed a contract for 24 T-50IQ aircraft, a FA-50 variant, plus additional equipment and pilot training over the next 20 years. The first batch of aircraft was delivered in March 2017, while the second batch arrived in May 2018. However, none were flown until June 2022, following the negotiation of a maintenance, logistics and training contract with KAI in November 2021.[64] d. Philippines The Philippine Air Force (PAF) chose 12 TA-50s to fulfill its requirement for a light attack and lead-in fighter trainer aircraft. In January 2013, state media reported that the FA-50 variant, not the TA-50 as previously reported, was selected for procurement. On March 28, 2014, the Department of National Defense in the Philippines signed a contract for 12 FA-50 fighters worth P18.9 billion (US$421.12 million).[65] Deliveries began in November 2015, all 12 aircraft were delivered by May 31, 2017. On January 26, 2017, two PAF FA-50PHs conducted a nighttime attack on terrorist hideouts in Butig, Lanao del Sur in Mindanao, the first combat sorties flown by these aircraft.[66] e. Thailand In September 2015, the Thai government chose Korean T-50TH for its air force over the Chinese Hongdu L-15 to replace its aging L-39 Albatros trainers. In July 2017, the Thai government approved the procurement of eight more aircrafts. Deliveries began in January 2018. The Royal Thai Air Force’s 2024 White Paper outlined a plan to acquire two more T-50TH aircraft in the fiscal year 2025. This acquisition will bring the total number of aircraft in squadron 401 to 16.[67] f. Poland On July 22, 2022, Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak announced in a press interview that Poland would purchase 48 FA-50 fighter jets. KAI officially signed a contract with the Polish government on July 28 for 12 FA-50GF (Gap Filler) Block 10 aircraft and 36 FA-50PL (Polish version) Block 20 aircraft.[68] Blaszczak stated that KAI’s ability to quickly deliver aircraft was a decisive factor in the selection. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 required the Polish Air Force to urgently replace its remaining MiG-29 fighters and Su-22 attack aircraft. However, the United States was unable to supply additional F-16s in such a short timeframe. The FA-50PL contract was awarded for an aircraft version still under development. The FA-50PL is an improved version of the basic FA-50 designed to meet Poland’s specific requirements. Many of these requirements, including the sniper targeting pod, GBU-12 bombs, KGGB guided bombs, and aerial refueling probes, had already been tested and integrated onto the FA-50 platform prior to the Polish order. Other integration plans for the FA-50PL, such as the Phantom Strike AESA radar and Link-16 datalink, were considered challenging, primarily in terms of timing, but not technically impossible.[69] The FA-50PL will be integrated with modern air-to-air missiles such as the AIM-9X Sidewinder and AIM-120 AMRAAM. The FA-50 is a light fighter aircraft similar in size to the F-16. While the FA-50 has limited combat capabilities, it is not without the capabilities and can carry and use certain weapons.[70] The FA-50’s training role has been compared to the Italian M-346 AJT. While the M-346 can simulate a wider range of virtual weapons, it is more expensive to operate than the FA-50. Unlike the M-346, the FA-50 can also be used for training against live targets and has unique combat capabilities. g. Malaysia On February 24, 2023, KAI announced the signing of a $920 million deal with the Malaysian Ministry of Defense for the purchase of 18 FA-50 Block 20 for the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s light combat aircraft (LCA) and fighter in-lead trainer (FLIT) tender, which is intended to replace the Aermacchi MB-339 and Hawk Mk 108/208 currently in service.[71] The FA-50 was in competition with the Indian HAL Tejas, Italian Alenia Aermacchi M-346 Master, Turkish TAI Hürjet, Chinese Hongdu L-15, Russian Mikoyan MiG-35, and Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder. On May 23, 2023, Malaysia signed a $920 million final contract with KAI to purchase 18 FA-50 Block 20s. KAI officials said Malaysia is willing to order 18 more FA-50s later.[72] 5. The KP-SAM Chiron (신궁) Figure 8: KP-SAM Chiron (source: Wikipedia) The KP-SAM Chiron (신궁) is a South Korean shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile manufactured by LIG Nex1. The KP-SAM Chiron was created to protect South Korean troops in the forward area, which started in 1995 under the direction of LIG Nex1. The KP-SAM began production in 2004 with extended trials in early 2005.[73] In late 2005, the KP-SAM entered service with the South Korean Army, after development for nearly 8 years. The KP-SAM was marketed in 2012 for India’s modernization of their VSHORAD system, competing with the RBS 70, the Starstreak, the Mistral-2 and the SA-24.[74] In 2014, Indonesia bought the KP-SAM for integration with the Skyshield 35 mm anti-aircraft system.[75] While the KP-SAM missile system externally resembles a French Mistral system, the entire missile systems including the seeker, control section, warhead and motor were developed and manufactured in South Korea. The missile features integrated IFF systems, night and adverse weather capabilities, a two-color (IR/UV) infrared seeker to aid in negating infrared countermeasures (IRCM) and a proximity-fuse warhead. During development tests, the missile scored a 90% hit ratio. According to Agency for Defense Development officials, the KP-SAM is superior to the American FIM-92 Stinger or the French Mistral in hit probability, price and portability. the KP-SAM had been involved in a missile test where its missile made impact on a low-flying target as high as 3.5 kilometers with a speed of 697.5 m/s (more than Mach 2.36) and a distance range of 7 km.[76] The KP-SAM Chirons are operational in South Korea, Indonesia, Romania. Indonesian Air Force acquired and operated Chirons since 2014 which was integrated with Oerlikon Skyshield 35 mm anti-aircraft gun system. Additional 2 Chirons were transferred to Indonesia according to a 2019 SIPRI small arms report.[77] First systems of 54 KP-SAMs were delivered to Romania in June 2024. The KP-SAM Chirons have been operational in South Korean army since 2005. IV. Conclusion This paper provided an overview of South Korean defense industry and its major military weapons that have been exported to European countries. The future for South Korean defense industry looks bright because of its advanced technology and fast delivery amid ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Middle East. References [1] For more information, see "Abrams i Czarna Pantera kontra rosyjskie T-14 i T-90M". Default (in Polish). 2023-01-23. [2] Kim Moon-kyung (27 September 2014). “K2 전차 실전배치 후 첫 공개 -- 백발백중.” YTN. [3] For more detailed information, see Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K2_Black_Panther [4] “Altay National Main Battle Tank of Turkey”. Globalsecurity.org. 5 February 2022. [5] Jung Seong-taek (6 February 2015). 파워팩 논란 K2전차 "전력화 이상무"... 1.2km 떨어진 표적지에 '쾅쾅'. The Dong-A Ilbo. [6] Kim Yeon-suk (27 July 2022). 폴란드 "한국에 K2 1천대·FA-50 3개편대·K-9 600문 주문"(종합2보). [7] Shin Jun-myeong (27 August 2022). 폴란드와 K2 전차·K9 자주포 7조6천억 규모 계약 체결. YTN. [8] Kim Minseok (6 March 2022). 8년전 우크라 때리자 꽂혔다...세계최강 K9자주포 진화 이유 [김민석 배틀그라운드]. JoongAng Ilbo. [9] 한화그룹, 대우조선해양 인수로 국내 유일 육·해·공 전문 방산기업으로 '우뚝'. 뉴스투데이, Retrieved 28 September 2022. [10] For information, see https://english.defensearabia.com/dominating-the-battlefield-the-worlds-most-advanced-self-propelled-artillery-systems-2025/ [11] 한-터키 국방장관 방산협력 협의. Yonhap News Agency. 18 November 1999. [12] 국산 K9자주포 첫 수출...터키에 1조3000억 규모. The Dong-A Ilbo. 20 July 2001. [13] "[K9 34회·끝] 터키형 자주포 화력시범 대성공". Kookbang Ilbo. Archived from the original on 8 December 2022. [14] "L&T, Samsung join hands for India's Howitzer artillery". The Economic Times. 29 March 2012. [15] "K9 자주포 & 해외수출 Q&A". Defense Today. 7 May 2020. [16] "K-9 자주포 100문 인도 수출 확정...3500억 규모". Newsis. 21 April 2017. [17] Philip, Snehesh Alex (14 June 2021). "India sets eyes on Russian Sprut light tanks to counter China, gets rare access to trials". The Print. [18] Unnithan, Sandeep (23 January 2022). "What's behind a massive order for Made-in-India howitzers". India Today. [19] "CCS clears Rs 20,000 crore Make in India projects for Su-30 fighter jets, 100 K-9 howitzers - The Economic Times". m.economictimes.com. Retrieved 12 December 2024. [20] "Indian Army accelerates artillery modernisation with indigenous systems". India Today. 13 January 2025. [21] Com, Segye (20 February 2018). 손재일 한화지상방산 대표 "K-9, 해외마케팅 강화. Segye Ilbo. [22] 김귀근 (21 December 2017). 한화, K-9 자주포 24문 노르웨이에 수출 계약...2천452억원 규모(종합). Yonhap News Agency. [23] 박희준 (9 November 2022). 노르웨이, K9 4문·K10 8대 추가 수입...K9 수입량 총 28문. 더팩트 (in Korean). [24] Ruitenberg, Rudy (4 April 2025). "Norway to nearly double its K9 howitzer fleet for around $534 million". Defense News. [25] 한화테크윈, 폴란드에 K9 자주포 96대 수출(종합). Yonhap News Agency. 15 December 2016. [26] "Poland to sell 60 AHS Krab self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine". Ukrinform. 2 June 2022. [27] "한화에어로스페이스, 폴란드에 4000억원대 자주포 부품 공급". Hanwha Aerospace. 8 April 2025. [28] [단독] 한화디펜스, 폴란드 방산업체와 '1920억원 규모' 통신 시스템 공급계약 체결. www.theguru.co.kr (in Korean). 8 September 2022. [29] 한화 김동관 폴란드行...한국선 K9 자주포 조립 개시. Money Today (in Korean). 14 July 2023. [30] MBC경남 NEWS (31 October 2024). [K-방산] K9자주포, K2전차 동시 폴란드 수출 선적 현장 포착..전차 180대 자주포 1차 212문, 2차 152문도 이렇게 납품됩니다. [31] "K-9 자주포, 핀란드 수출 양해각서 체결". Daily NTN. 23 November 2016. [32] "K-9 자주포 핀란드 수출계약 체결, 48문 1.45억 유로 규모". Republic of Korea. 2 March 2017. [33] 박원석 (9 September 2024). 서울대 '2024 한-핀란드 이노베이션 포럼: 떠오르는 민/군 겸용 기술' 개최. Veritas Alpha (in Korean). [34] "Millog sai lisätilauksen Puolustusvoimilta K9-panssarihaupitsien käyttökuntoon saattamisesta". Millog (in Finnish). 4 March 2024. [35] 한화디펜스, 에스토니아에 K9 자주포 6대 추가 수출. Global Economics (in Korean). 25 October 2019. [36] 한화디펜스, 에스토니아 'K9 자주포' 현대화 사업 수주. www.theguru.co.kr (in Korean). 5 August 2021. [37] [단독] 한화에어로, 에스토니아와 'K9 자주포' 12문 추가 계약 ... 3600만 유로. Global Economics [Newdaily] (in Korean). 17 January 2023 [38] "K-9 자주포 호주 수출 유력". Seoul Shinmun. 4 August 2009. [39] Bergmann, Kym (June 2019). "Australian Army to receive massive boost in firepower with 155mm SPH purchase". Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter. 45 (5): 12–16. [40] Kuper, Stephen (2 September 2020). "Government announces request for tender for Army Protected Mobile Fires". Defence Connect. [41] "S. Korea to export 30 units of K-9 howitzer to Australia under W930b deal". The Korea Herald. 13 December 2021. [42] 호주, K9 자주포에 이스라엘산 전력 시스템 장착. 한스경제 (in Korean). 22 August 2023. [43] 강지용 (23 August 2024). 한화에어로스페이스, 호주 방산 생산기지 완공…국내 첫 해외 생산. 파이낸셜포스트 (in Korean). [44] Helou, Agnes (1 February 2022). "Why did Egypt choose to buy South Korea's K9 howitzer?" Defense News. [45] 남수현 (12 October 2021). 박병석, 이집트 대통령 만나 세일즈 외교. JoongAng Ilbo (in Korean). [46] 한화디펜스, 이집트와 K9 자주포 2조원 규모 수출 계약...'역대 최대 규모'. 파이낸셜투데이 (in Korean). 3 February 2022. [47] MBC경남 NEWS (1 July 2024). 국산 파워팩 자주포 탑재 첫 수출. [48] "Egypt produces the advanced Korean K9 Thunder engine locally". Arab Defense. 5 October 2024. [49] “루마니아, 한국의 K9자주포와 K2흑표전차 구매 희망”. Global Economics (in Korean). 27 September 2022. [50] Seo Ji-eun; Lee Hay-june (10 July 2024). "Korea to export K9 howitzers to Romania in nearly $1 billion deal". Korea JoongAng Daily. [51] "Vietnam outlines intent to procure K9 howitzer". Janes.com. Janes Information Services. 24 April 2024. [52] Park Soo-chan (30 May 2021). "사거리 최대 80km ... 축구장 3개 면적 '초토화' [한국의 무기 이야기]". Segye Ilbo. [53] For more information, see Park Soo-chan (22 October 2022) “하이마스보다 낫다” 전면전 공포에 각국, 천무 다연장로켓 '주목' [박수찬의 軍] | 세계일보 https://www.segye.com/newsView/20221021509773 [54] "South-Korean Chunmoo K239 MLRS rockets/missile launcher to enter in service with UAE". Army Recognition. 8 April 2021 [55] "Saudi military unveils Chun-Moo MRLs". Janes Information Services. 4 April 2023 [56] "K239 Chunmoo launchers will increase the deterrence potential of the Polish Army". Defence Industry News. 19 October 2022. [57] Gil So-yeon (20 August 2023). "'K-239 천무' 폴란드 상륙…예정보다 12일 지연". The guru. [58] South Korea plans to arm its FA-50 light combat fighters with new variant of the Taurus missiles, December 8, 2015, at the Wayback Machine – Airrecognition.com, [59] FA-50 Expanded Weapons and Avionics Archived January 12, 2016, at the Wayback Machine. [60] For more information, see https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/fa-50-light-combat-aircraft-south-korea/ [61] "MBDA To Show New Munitions in Singapore". Archived from the original on February 7, 2018. [62] "The Chosun Ilbo (English Edition): Daily News from Korea – Korea Deploys Home-Grown FA-50 Fighter Jets". Archived from the original on February 8, 2015 [63] Waldron. "Indonesia receives first pair of T-50i advanced jet trainers." Archived December 3, 2013, at the Wayback Machine. [64] Iddon, Paul (June 27, 2022). "Korean T-50 Jets Could Enhance Iraq's Air Campaign Against ISIS". Forbes. [65] "KAI won a contract to export 12 FA-50s to the Phil" (Press release). Korea Aerospace Industries, LTD. (KAI). March 28, 2014. [66] "TV Patrol: DND, kinumpirma ang ugnayan ng ISIS at teroristang grupo sa Pilipinas". ABS-CBN News. January 26, 2017. [67] "Delivery of T-50TH trainer jets to Thailand begins". Seoul. Yonhap News Agency. January 8, 2018. [68] KAI signs US$3 bln deal with Poland to export 48 FA-50s". Yonhap News Agency. July 28, 2022. [69] "Świadoma tego wszystkiego polska strona wciąż parła do stworzenia lepszej wersji FA-50 PL, wpisując na listę życzeń trudne do zrealizowania wymogi.". The Furious Fafik. August 10, 2025. [70] "Korzystając z tego, że już utopiłem 9,90 zł w subskrypcję Onet Premium". The Furious Fafik. August 10, 2025. [71] Waldron, Greg (February 24, 2023). "FA-50 wins Malaysia's light combat aircraft competition". Flight Global. [72] Akhil Kadidal (May 23, 2023). "LIMA 2023: KAI says Malaysia keen to order 18 additional FA-50s". Janes Information Services. [73] Shin In-ho (5 November 2018). "[신궁 1회] 승리의 믿음 K-PSAM 신궁". Defense Media Agency. [74] "VSHORAD – India's Next Big Air Defense Program". April 2012. [75] "Indonesia might buy more Chiron MANPADS systems from South Korea | November 2018 Global Defense Security army news industry | Defense Security global news industry army 2018 | Archive News year". 13 November 2018. [76] "Chiron". www.deagel.com. Retrieved 2015-04-08. [77] For more information, see www.smallarmssurvey.org.

Defense & Security
Hybrid warfare concept. Illustration with information and icons. Notepad and stationery on an office desk.

Hybrid Warfare and the Gray Zone: Russia’s Strategy of Ambiguity in Europe

by World & New World Journal

Introduction In the past few years, international tensions have intensified across the globe, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to rising frictions between China and Taiwan. These conflicts cannot be fully explained through traditional military or diplomatic frameworks. Instead, they reveal the emergence of a new strategic model: hybrid warfare, a method that blends military, economic, technological, and informational tools to achieve political goals without open war. Closely related is the concept of the gray zone, a sphere of competition that exists between peace and full-scale conflicts, where states use ambiguity to avoid direct confrontation. The ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates how hybrid warfare operates in practice. Russia’s combination of cyberattacks, disinformation, economic pressure, and drone warfare shows how modern conflicts blur the boundaries between combat and politics. Low-cost technologies such as drones have further revolutionized this form of warfare, enabling small actors to inflict significant damage and minimizing direct risk at the same time. What is a Hybrid warfare and gray zone Gray zone The concept of hybrid war is often covered in media as a synonym for the gray zone. However, within the academic field, the gray zone is considered more of a competing term2 It is suggested that the terms are not synonymous, and the gray zone is defined as a space of competition short of war. Hybrid warfare, in this context, is viewed as an operational solution to achieve political objectives in the gray zone, though it is not limited to it. Although both terms have a quite similar approach, the gray zone is considered more physical in comparison to hybrid war. A state’s operation in this area may clearly not cross the thresholds of war due to its ambiguity. For instance, an invasion of drones in the European Union might serve as an example of such a gray zone action. It is difficult to consider such actions as a threat of war, allowing the predatory state to operate near a border and keep itself safe through ambiguity. Simply put, the gray zone is a territory in politics where it is hard to clearly identify aggression, and the aggressor acts ambiguously, finding legal loopholes to gain advantages without necessarily provoking a military response. Historically, there are numerous examples of such gray zone tactics. Russia used these tactics multiple times before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This is one of the particular reasons why the world’s reaction to the Crimea annexation and Russian actions prior to 2022 was low-key and had little impact. A gray zone conflict demonstrates a fundamental change in the rules-based international order. By weaponizing ambiguity, one state seeks to undermine norms and erode democratic institutions from within. Interestingly, Philip Kapusta argues that the gray zone might be beneficial. The ambiguity that makes gray zones vexing also makes them useful to statesmen. It is crucial in international relations when one state tests the waters with gray zone activities to determine the potential strength of domestic or international commitments to an endeavor without resorting to the more lethal violence of war. Briefly saying, gray zone conflicts are an immensely better alternative to full-scale wars. [1] [2] What is a hybrid war? While gray zone competition describes the ambiguous environment between peace and war, hybrid warfare refers to the methods used within that environment to achieve political aims. In other words, the gray zone sets the stage, and hybrid warfare provides the playbook. The new concept of hybrid warfare and its correlating hybrid threats can be explained as a wide range of means, not necessarily violent, and a concept that is quite distant from traditional military power. Through non-violent means, a state can achieve a political effect without being embedded in an armed conflict. This term was introduced by Frank G. Hoffman, who described the warfare model as a collection of different strategies and models, including conventional capabilities, violence, coercion, terrorist acts, and criminal disorder. This definition stressed the importance of combining traditional military force with the use of new technologies. [5] However, several scholars question whether hybrid warfare truly represents a new paradigm. Analysts such as Michael Kofman and Lawrence Freedman argue that the term simply rebrands long-standing practices of covert and irregular warfare under a modern label. From this perspective, hybrid tactics—combining propaganda, subversion, and limited military action—were already evident in Soviet “active measures” and Cold War proxy conflicts. Still, the scale and technological sophistication of Russia’s recent operations suggest that hybrid warfare has evolved in scope and impact, even if its core logic is not entirely new. [13] Key characteristics and elements of hybrid warfare include: Fluidity and Ambiguity Debates on hybrid war in Ukraine in 2014 brought attention to the new term. The fluidity and ambiguity of hybrid threats and warfare helped Moscow to achieve a relatively non-violent political shift in Crimea. To escape a power balance, Russia used a creative underdog strategy. [4] Non-State Actors For some scholars, hybrid war and its actors are a new breed of non-state actors (likely sponsored by the state) who replaced the traditional concept of terrorists. They retain ties with the population and devote themselves to the propaganda of the deed. Diverse Definitions The definition of hybrid warfare differs between the West and Russia. For Russians, hybrid war is a new way of dealing with a conflict that avoids the traditional battlefield, utilizing economic, political, and socio-cultural methods. [6] Tactical Methods and Synchronization It is hard to clearly identify hybrid threats of warfare due to their ambiguous nature. However, most of the literature defines it by tactical methods. It is the synchronized use of several operation methods, and due to its unclear nature, the victim state may not be able to identify these multiple instruments. [5] Calculated Ambiguity Similarly to nuclear deterrence, hybrid warfare is full of calculated ambiguity. It is a key factor that makes it reasonable and effective; it is essential. [12] Thus, due to the gray zone's ambiguity, it is hard to indicate hybrid threats until they escalate into warfare. And even in such a case, one cannot necessarily say that hybrid warfare actually happened. Currently, there are high possibilities that Russia has used hybrid threats in several Baltic countries as well as Eastern Europe. So-called pro-Russian parties were critically close to winning presidential or parliamentary elections numerous times Comparison Hybrid war vs Gray zone Since gray zone conflict in its essence can incorporate traditional methods and unconventional tactics, and a complete reliance on unconventional techniques is likely to be less effective at fully and rapidly compelling a relatively strong opponent, states engaged in a gray zone conflict are likely to use hybrid techniques. To clearly illustrate the key notices from this comparison, the following table is provided. As Table illustrates, the primary difference lies in the level and ambition of each concept. The Gray Zone Conflict is a higher-level concept that operates at the strategic level and is directly tied to global and/or regional revisionist ambitions. Hybrid Warfare, conversely, generally pertains only to the operational and tactical levels. [3] Key distinctions between two concepts are Duration and Symmetry and Conventionality of Operations Duration and Symmetry Gray Zone Conflict is characterized by protracted engagement and is used under both symmetric and asymmetric conditions. Hybrid Warfare, however, may be protracted or short and is largely used under asymmetric conditions. Conventionality of Operations In Gray Zone Conflict, non-conventional military operations may be used standalone or alongside conventional operations8. In contrast, Hybrid Warfare treats non-conventional operations as auxiliary tactics used alongside conventional operations. This reinforces the idea that the Gray Zone is a large strategic territory of competition, while hybrid warfare is an operational solution frequently used within it. Drones as a tool of Hybrid warfare Drones' Impact on the Modern Battlefield Nowadays, conflict in Ukraine has proven the role of drones in modern battlefields. Drones now account for approximately 70% of total casualties from both sides. Moreover, it is hard to find actual troops in the war zones; most of the time, there are drone controllers rather than typical soldiers. Thus, in Ukraine, drones act as key actors in modern conflict. Throughout the war, it was clearly shown that drones are very useful against much more expensive and massive military equipment like tanks and planes. A drone that costs less than a thousand dollars can destroy a million-dollar tank, and what's even more terrifying, it is unmanned, meaning the fight will have fewer casualties. By using such drones, Ukraine was able to defend its borders without a further escalation of the conflict to the western part of the country. By using cheap and easy-to-use AI-powered technology, Kyiv was able to fight back against a state that is 28 times bigger. Drones in Ukraine and the Context of Russian Hybrid Warfare The role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) remains complex: in direct combat, Ukraine uses drones not strictly as a hybrid weapon but as a fully powered kamikaze to destroy local goals, functioning as a conventional weapon. However, the nature of these drones is inherently dual use. Some drones used in war can be purchased through commercial websites. For instance, the drone previously used by Ukraine, the «DJI MAVIC», can be purchased online, with a price range starting at $500. Such drones are modified on the field and used as small bombs. In comparison to Russians, some Ukrainians have even spent their own money on new ammunition or drones, creating an emerging civilian-led military supply market in Ukraine. The conflict in Ukraine is multi-dimensional with blurred lines between the kinetic use of military force and the non-kinetic use of strategic assets. Through the simultaneous use of political, technological, and military measures in achieving its policy objectives to design an ambiguity, Russia deliberately exploited its power to secure consensus for subsequent military actions. Russia has employed all three parameters of ambiguity in hybrid warfare, leaving Ukraine no other option except to fight. Hybrid war in EU? Russia's Strategy: Hybrid Warfare and Grey Zone Tactics Since the US established its dominance in the global stage, Russian involvement in the Baltics, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine since 2007 has been characterized as grey zone and hybrid warfare. Russia employs these tactics against EU and NATO participants, using several methods of cyber-warfare to challenge the military alliance. In Ukraine’s Crimea, for instance, Russia engaged in hybrid warfare by using non-state proxies to supplement a military deficit. In Eastern Europe, Russia relies on economic tools, cyberspace to harm infrastructure, as well as non-state actors. For example, Gazprom canceled a gas discount agreement with the Yanukovych administration. Subsequently, when Ukraine refused to accept Russian hegemony, the power grid was attacked and disabled a large portion of the country's infrastructure. Such incidents, includes alleged election interference in Romania, when in November 2024, Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled results of first-round presidential election. Romanian intellegence agencies presented that Russian-linked cyber operations (social media campaigns with AI-driven misinformation and alleged cyberattacks) distorted the electoral process in favour of the far right candidate. In March 2025, investigative reporting detailed pro-Russia groups using Telegram to recruit EU-based individuals for sabotage, vandalism, arson and influence operations across NATO countries. [14] As the Russian economy is strained, the frequency of similar incidents appears to increase. [7] Across the period, the lines between hacktivism, cybercrime and state-nexus activity continued to blur. Intrusion sets historically distinguished by TTPs’ level of advancement. conducted activities, or assessed objectives increasingly shared toolsets and modus operandi. This was notably exemplified by hacktivist-led DDoS waves by pro-Russia groups around electoral events, where increased activity was often observed as typical FIMI-aligned behavior to associate disruption with aspects of information operations. A prominent facet of this trend is faketivism, where state-aligned intrusion sets leverage hacktivist personas and activities. Notable examples include Cyber Army of Russia Reborn, associated to Russia-nexus Sandworm39, and the CyberAv3ngers group linked to Iran’s IRGC Hacktivists, seeking funding and visibility, embraced ransomware beyond DDoS and defacements. CyberVolk, operating in line with Russian interests, has used and promoted multiple strains—AzzaSec, HexaLocker, Parano, as well as LockBit and Chaos—since May 20244. KillSec, originally a pro-Russia hacktivist brand aligned with Anonymous, debuted its platform in June 2024. Drone Incursions: Testing Defenses and Undermining Support Russia has adapted new drone technologies and is now using them to test and threaten the European Union. For Europe, the usage of drones differs from the frontlines. Most incidents involve UAVs allegedly used for espionage or as a distraction mechanism. The possibility exists that drones sent into EU airspace are meant to frighten Europe and consequently pressure them to reduce military aid to Ukraine. Some argue that Russia uses this as a "carrot and stick" approach to force the EU to cut off military support. [8] Drones in the EU serve as one element of hybrid warfare: they are low-cost, deniable, and intentionally ambiguous. Russia's ambiguous attacks and hybrid threats, according to reports, might leave Europe's energy consumers vulnerable, especially during the winter. Economic Constraints and the Strategy of Exhaustion The financial strain on Russia does not diminish its ambitions. Such economic limitations directly shape Moscow’s strategic calculus. While the Central Bank attempts to manage the economy, the cumulative effect of sanctions and military expenditures is challenging the Kremlin's ability to cover its costs. Russian citizens and businesses are demonstrating creativity in navigating sanctions, but continued war and higher expenses are highly likely to destroy the economy. To maintain spending, the government is already seeking additional revenue sources by increasing taxes and fees on imports and making cuts to non-military budgets. [9] The consensus among experts is that a direct military conflict with NATO is highly unlikely, primarily due to Russian economic struggle. Russia simply cannot afford another large-scale war. [9] Even to sustain a major conflict with NATO, the state would first need to consolidate its forces by ending the war in Ukraine. Escalation Risk and European Resilience The latest drone attacks pose a severe threat to European energy and critical infrastructure. Even though recent drone incidents were relatively far away from key energy assets, they still represent a significant and deliberate risk. Reports suggest a potential disruption in energy supply, especially with winter approaching, could lead to price increases and higher heating costs, impacting not only the economy but also social stability. For instance, drone activity temporarily closed airports in Denmark, increasing the overall atmosphere of unease across EU countries. The Gray Zone attacks in Europe, including drone incursions, regular cyberattacks, and election interference, are part of a coherent hybrid warfare strategy aimed at testing Europe's resilience and preparedness. As international expert Christo Atanasov Kostov suggests, the Kremlin hopes to exhaust the West, not conquer it. This strategy aims to win in Ukraine by weakening the West—using hybrid tools to sow doubt over EU and NATO's ability to prevail and to cause domestic hardship that makes supporting Ukraine politically unattractive. [10] However, some scholars like Mark Galeotti argue that Russia’s hybrid campaigns have reached their limit: they can destabilize but not dominate resilient states. [15] It is very unlikely that Russia will cross the line of hybrid warfare and actually commit conventional forces against EU/NATO, as it is financially and politically untenable. The challenge for Europe is clear: to resist fatigue and demonstrate resilience, not fear. Moscow will likely continue its hybrid attacks, but Europe needs to be prepared through deterrence, technological and political autonomy, and collective defense. [11] Conclusion Hybrid warfare is a strategy that combines conventional military force and non-conventional forces to achieve a strategic political objective. Russia's campaign in Ukraine in 2014 successfully exploited the ambiguity of this hybrid warfare model to capture the initiative and secure political and military gains, particularly in Crimea and Donbas. Through drones, cyber operations, and economic pressure, Moscow continues to challenge European security while remaining below the traditional threshold of conflict. These actions show that hybrid warfare is not an alternative to war but a constant state of confrontation carried out through indirect means. For Europe, this reality creates serious strategic and financial challenges. Responding to low-cost and deniable attacks with expensive defense systems is unsustainable in the long term. Therefore, the main priority for the EU is to adapt its deterrence model, strengthen technological and informational resilience, and reduce dependence on external energy supplies. The evolution of hybrid warfare proves that modern conflicts no longer begin with formal declarations or visible invasions. They emerge through ambiguity, disinformation, and the silent use of technology. As Russia continues to exploit these gray areas, the stability of Europe will depend on its ability to recognize such operations early and respond collectively before the next stage of escalation begins. All we can conclude is that Putin himself is unlikely to stop the war until his maximalist ambitions are satisfied. He will continue to use any method, including the destruction of European stability through hybrid attacks, to exhaust the West. For the EU, the suggested course of action remains to diversify energy sources and demonstrate resilience against hybrid attacks to minimize security and economic challenges. References [1] Damien Van Puyvelde, ‘Hybrid Warfare – The Continuation of Ambiguity by Other Means’, European Journal of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 2019, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/hybrid-warfare-the-continuation-of-ambiguity-by-other-means/1B3336D8109D418F89D732EB98B774E5 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [2] U.S. Special Operations Command, Operating in the Gray Zone: A Strategy for Success, 2015, https://info.publicintelligence.net/USSOCOM-GrayZones.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025]. [3] David Carment and Dani Belo, War’s Future: The Risks and Rewards of Grey-Zone Conflict and Hybrid Warfare, Webster University, October 2018, https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.25994.98249 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [4] Nathan K. Finney, ‘A Full Spectrum of Conflict Design: How Doctrine Should Embrace Irregular Warfare’, Irregular Warfare Initiative, 2023, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/a-full-spectrum-of-conflict-design-how-doctrine-should-embrace-irregular-warfare/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [5] Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025]. [6] Steven Woehrel, Russia: Strategic Economic and Energy Interests, Congressional Research Service, 2011, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42006.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025]. [7] European Youth Portal, ‘How Romania’s Presidential Election Became the Plot of a Cyber Thriller’, 2024, https://youth.europa.eu/news/how-romanias-presidential-election-became-plot-of-cyber-thriller_en [accessed 17 October 2025]. [8] BBC Russian, ‘Как Россия готовится к выборам на фоне войны и цензуры’, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cm2zp2xl62mo [accessed 17 October 2025]. [9] Reuters, ‘Imported Cars Face Higher Fees as Russia Plans Domestic Production Boost’, 30 September 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/imported-cars-face-higher-fees-russia-plans-domestic-production-boost-2024-09-30/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [10] Stefan Wolff, ‘Russia’s Permanent Test Is Pushing Europe to the Brink of War – Here’s What Moscow Actually Wants’, The Conversation, 2024, https://theconversation.com/russias-permanent-test-is-pushing-europe-to-the-brink-of-war-heres-what-moscow-actually-wants-266826 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [11] Stefan Wolff, ‘Putin’s “Forever War” Against the West’, The Conversation, 2024, https://theconversation.com/putins-forever-war-against-the-west-267679 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [12] Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Countering Hybrid Warfare: So What for the Joint Force?’, PRISM – National Defense University Press, 2019, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1979787/countering-hybrid-warfare-so-what-for-the-joint-force/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [13] Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, ‘Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts’, War on the Rocks, 11 March 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [14] European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025, 2025, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2025 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [15] Mark Galeotti, Trouble at Home: Russia’s Looming Demobilization Challenge, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, June 2025, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Mark-Galeotti-Trouble-at-Home-Russias-looming-demobilization-challenge-GI-TOC-June-2025.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025].

Diplomacy
Aerial view Panama Canal, third set of locks, water shortages, maritime traffic, water reuse vats, summer drought.

What CK Hutchison told us in the Panama Case?

by Wallace Loo

The attempted sale of CK Hutchison’s Panama Canal operations to the US-based company BlackRock and Terminal Investment Limited was more than a commercial transaction. When Beijing publicly opposed the deal, branding it a betrayal of national interests, it transformed into a case study in how global business is being reshaped by strategic rivalry. The controversy illustrates a deeper question: Can Hong Kong’s leading conglomerates still operate on commercial logic alone, or are they inevitably drawn into the geopolitical contest between the United States and China? For Hutchison, the Panama case shows that the room for neutrality is shrinking. Why does it matter? Beijing’s intervention signals to Hong Kong businesses and foreign investors alike that commercial neutrality is no longer assured. Loyalty, alignment, and political sacrifice are emerging as expectations alongside profit and efficiency. For global decision-makers, this raises two critical issues: Why did Hutchison seek to exit its Panama Canal holdings in the first place? Why did Beijing judge it necessary to intervene in a transaction that, on the surface, was driven by corporate strategy? Why Hutchison sold its Panama Canal operations? 1. Strategic Realignment Toward Core Businesses CK Hutchison has steadily repositioned itself around two “twin engines”, i.e. real estate in Asia and infrastructure in Europe. While ports in Latin America once fit into its global footprint, they were never central to this model. By selling its Panama Canal operations, Hutchison freed resources to consolidate strengths where it sees long-term stability and growth. This is part of a deliberate shift visible over the past decade: acquiring the German infrastructure firm ISTA in 2017 and securing UK regulatory approval in 2024 for the £11 billion merger of Vodafone UK and Hutchison’s subsidiary Three. These moves point to a concentration of capital in Europe’s regulated infrastructure and Asia’s high-demand property markets, underscoring a deliberate pivot toward strengthening European operations and ensuring cash flow visibility. This implies that Hutchison is reducing its exposure and a systematic exit to regions marked by political uncertainty and doubling down on reinvesting into higher-yielding and strategically aligned assets, particularly in European infrastructure platform while deepening its Asian real estate footprint. For governments and investors, this suggests that Hong Kong conglomerates are not retreating from globalization but are planning to recalibrate toward safer, higher-visibility assets. 2. Capitalizing on Market Timing and Asset Valuation The divestment also reflected classic Hutchison discipline: Buying early and exiting when valuations reach the peak. With global demand for strategic infrastructure rising, the Panama Canal assets commanded a premium. The resulting HK$19 billion in proceeds and a sharp rise in share price underlined investor confidence. Such timing underscores Hutchison’s longstanding strategy of opportunistic repositioning. This divestment was both value-accretive and strategically well-timed. By crystallizing gains now, the group strengthens its balance sheet and cash-reserve, maintaining its flexibility to reinvest or return capital to shareholders. For policymakers, this implies that global infrastructure assets are increasingly financialized. Strategic nodes like the Panama Canal are no longer just trade arteries but high-value commodities in global capital markets. Governments must therefore view divestments not only as corporate decisions but as moves that can shift control of strategic assets between geopolitical actors. 3. Geopolitical Considerations and Risk Mitigation The Panama Canal is a corridor of strategic significance and what US-President Donald Trump calls Chinese ownership on the potential dual-use nature of port terminals there inevitably drew scrutiny in Washington. U.S. allies have already tightened the screening of Chinese-linked infrastructure deals and the EU’s 2019 FDI framework explicitly flagged ports as areas requiring “special oversight”. Against this backdrop, Hutchison sought to avoid being cast as a “Chinese state-backed actor”, an extension of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Hutchison has taken deliberate steps to present itself as a neutral and commercially driven multinational investor, rather than an extension of Chinese state policy. The company restructured in 2015 to a Cayman Islands base carefully positioning itself apart from state-linked Chinese enterprises, which creates an international legal identity rather than retaining a mainland Chinese or Hong Kong corporate domicile. By exiting Panama, Hutchison not only monetized assets but also reduced exposure to the intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry in one of the world’s most contested trade chokepoints. For European and U.S. decision-makers, this implies that Hutchison’s move signals how Hong Kong firms navigate geopolitical pressure. It shows that even Chinese-origin conglomerates may prefer retreat to avoid being entangled in state rivalries. Hutchison pre-emptively mitigated the risk of being labelled a “Chinese state proxy” in a critical geopolitical theatre. This move not only alleviated Western concerns about Hutchison’s control of Panama’s ports but also demonstrated the group’s ability to act with commercial neutrality and flexibility, preserving its ability to operate, finance, and expand in Western markets without being constrained by the “Chinese capital” label. For Beijing, however, this retreat risks weakening China’s global port footprint. This highlights a potential divergence between the commercial logic of Hong Kong firms and China’s strategic ambitions. Why did Beijing intervened? 1. Loss of Chinese Strategic Assets and Diplomatic Advantage The Panama Canal is among the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints and control of its ports carries weight far beyond commerce. For China, investment in Latin American terminals has been part of a wider strategy to shape global shipping routes and enhance strategic reach. From Beijing’s perspective, CK Hutchison’s divestment was more than a business transaction. This was a strategic setback. The transfer of control to U.S.-linked interests was seen as a symbolic “recapture” of the terminals, which weakens China’s presence at a vital corridor. Within the Chinese leadership, the ports had been regarded as potential bargaining leverage in trade negotiations with Washington. But this loss reduced Beijing’s diplomatic toolkit at a time of rising frictions. The episode illustrates how Chinese policymakers increasingly view overseas ports as instruments of geopolitical positioning, not just commercial assets. Hutchison’s decision to sell underscored a broader reality: not all Chinese-affiliated enterprises act in alignment with state objectives. For Beijing, this implies that the Panama case highlighted the limits of relying on Hong Kong conglomerates to advance strategic interests abroad. For foreign governments and firms, it signalled both China’s heightened sensitivity to divestments in contested regions and the growing tension between corporate autonomy and state geopolitical expectations. 2. Absence of Beijing’s Prior Approval Sparked Political Backlash In the Panama Canal divestment, Beijing’s leadership reacted strongly against CK Hutchison’s “transaction first, then approval” approach. Beijing expressed dissatisfaction and even instructed state-owned enterprises to suspend new collaborations with the Li family, who serve as the controlling shareholders and principal decision-makers of Hutchison. Hutchison defended this sale as a “purely commercial and competitive process” by emphasizing Mediterranean Shipping Company as the principal buyer. Yet, in the context of intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry, this stance was no longer acceptable. Regulatory pressure and political intervention from Beijing slowed negotiations, preventing the transaction from proceeding as planned. The broader precedent is clear: in strategically sensitive areas, Beijing now expects Hong Kong firms to align commercial decisions with state priorities. Neutrality is no longer an option. This marks a fundamental shift in the operating environment, binding the leading Hong Kong conglomerates more closely to state interests and constraining their room for independent strategic choices. For policymakers and investors, this implies that the Panama case shows how Beijing is extending political oversight into commercial domains once seen as autonomous. Hong Kong enterprises face increasing limits on their ability to separate business logic from state loyalty, particularly where Sino-U.S. rivalry is at stake. 3. Public Opinion as Strategic Pressure: Shaping a New Regional Order Beijing’s response to Hutchison’s Panama sale was not confined to official channels. Pro-Beijing media denounced the deal as disloyal and profit-driven, framing it as a matter of national honour. When the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, which is the Beijing central body responsible for overseeing Hong Kong and Macao affairs, amplified these narratives, they gained quasi-official status and exerted pressure on both Hutchison and other Hong Kong firms. This discourse resonated beyond China. The Panama Canal Authority warned that excessive concentration of terminal assets could undermine neutrality and competitiveness. This wording strikingly complies with Beijing’s “anti-hegemony” rhetoric. By shaping the terms of debate, Beijing positioned itself to argue for greater balance and competition in Panama’s port operations. Looking ahead, China advocates to leverage new concession tenders to advance its tactical objectives: strengthening the role of China Ocean Shipping Company, counterbalancing U.S. and European dominance and embedding Chinese capital in Latin America’s maritime infrastructure. More broadly, the case illustrates how Beijing integrates public opinion, regulatory narratives, and commercial strategy to shape a regional order more favourable to its interests. For policymakers, this implies that Panama demonstrates how Beijing transforms domestic media pressure into a tool of international influence. What begins as reputational discipline at home can translate into bargaining leverage abroad, particularly in contested regions where infrastructure and influence are intertwined. Points of Special Relevance: Beijing’s Strategic Signal Beijing’s intervention in the Panama Canal case should be read not as a single act but as a strategic signal. Its aims to prevent U.S. and European firms from consolidating control at a vital chokepoint and to avoid the appearance of “losing” strategic assets. At the same time, Beijing used this episode to remind Hong Kong conglomerates that in sensitive geopolitical contexts, commercial logic alone is no longer sufficient. The Panama case demonstrates how Beijing leverages commercial disputes as instruments of statecraft. The more plausible outcome is a conditional arrangement to encourage Panama to introduce mechanisms that limit Western influence in Latin America. China seeks structural adjustments that preserve its influence and reshape the regional order to its advantage. From Neutrality to National Loyalty As U.S. China tensions intensify, many multinational firms pursue de-risking strategies: not full decoupling as it is economically unviable, but carefully calibrated ambiguity that allows them to operate in both markets without explicit political commitments. This balancing act is becoming harder in Hong Kong. Since 1997, the influx of mainland state-linked enterprises has blurred the line between state and market. Benefiting from the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, these firms embedded political expectations into business norms. Ties to the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference are increasingly relevant in Hong Kong. By 2019, Beijing moved further, promoting patriotism in the business sector such as the Greater Bay Area Business Support Scheme, which channels funding toward firms demonstrating “patriotic entrepreneurship” or contributions to “national rejuvenation”. The result is a growing convergence of economic and political expectations. Commercial autonomy is increasingly contingent on political alignment, eroding the distinction between business logic and ideological loyalty. For investors and firms, this raises strategic concerns: - Will political loyalty requirements constrain the free flow of capital? - Could companies risk state intervention or even nationalization if perceived as acting against China’s interests? These questions remain unresolved, but Hutchison’s Panama case shows how quickly a commercial decision can be redefined as a matter of national loyalty. The broader uncertainty surrounding Hong Kong’s business environment will shape the city’s role as a financial hub in the decade ahead. This is my view on things: An Outlook on Hong Kong Looking ahead, the space for Hong Kong conglomerates to maintain commercial neutrality is narrowing. The rise of a nationalist business paradigm means companies must increasingly balance political conformity with economic self-interest. Two scenarios are emerging: 1. “Hong Kong, then China”: firms retain some operational autonomy and global credibility by prioritizing commercial logic, while carefully managing political sensitivities. 2. “China, then Hong Kong”: political loyalty takes precedence, with business priorities subordinated to national strategic goals of the Chinese Communist Party. Which path prevails will determine Hong Kong’s role as a financial hub. The tension between economic liberalism and political loyalty is no longer abstract. It is becoming the defining fault line for Hong Kong’s business landscape in the decade ahead.

Defense & Security
Letter tiles, Chinese Yuan bank notes and national flags on a word map. A Belt And Road Initiative concept.

Blocking the Belt and Road: Activation and deactivation of conflicts to contain China

by Alonso Ronald Ortiz García

Introduction Contemporary geopolitical competition has moved away from traditional paradigms of direct military conflict, giving way to more sophisticated forms of strategic rivalry. In this new landscape — where the lines between peace and war are increasingly blurred — the control of critical infrastructure and trade routes has emerged as a fundamental element of national power. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — conceived by Beijing as the most ambitious geoeconomic project since the Marshall Plan — seeks to reshape the Eurasian trade architecture, positioning China as the central node of an integrated connectivity system. However, the events of 2025 reveal that this project does not operate in a strategic vacuum; rather, it faces a coordinated response from rival powers that have developed sophisticated strategies to limit, fragment, or condition its expansion. This article examines the indirect containment strategies directed against the BRI, focusing on one particular dimension: the deliberate activation and deactivation of conflicts as a tool of geoeconomic blockade. Through the analysis of two paradigmatic cases, it illustrates how rival powers can employ geoeconomic methods to block, fragment, or constrain large infrastructure projects by strategically manipulating regional conflicts. Two seemingly disconnected but strategically linked events will be examined — both of which have redefined the struggle for control over Eurasian trade routes. On one hand, the military escalation between India and Pakistan in the southern sector, specifically in the Rajasthan–Sindh–Southern Punjab Corridor; on the other, the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which revived the Zangezur Corridor Project, now under U.S. control. Both events represent concrete manifestations of a new form of great power rivalry centered on the instrumental use of conflicts to systematically obstruct the BRI. Geoeconomics as a Theater of War Geoeconomics, understood as an analytical discipline, examines how geographic, economic, and political factors intertwine to determine the relative power of states within the international system. Within this framework, connectivity infrastructures transcend their technical or commercial nature to become strategic assets capable of altering the regional balance of power. At its core, the BRI represents China’s attempt to create a network of economic dependencies that enables it to project political influence across Eurasia. This network includes both land and maritime corridors connecting East Asia with Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, establishing China as the central node of an integrated commercial system. However, the interconnected nature of this system also generates specific vulnerabilities: the disruption of critical segments can produce cascading effects that compromise the functionality of the entire network. Containment strategies, therefore, do not need to dismantle the BRI entirely to be effective. It is enough to introduce points of friction, uncertainty, or external control in key segments to alter participants’ cost-benefit calculations and reduce the overall attractiveness of the Chinese system. This logic of “selective blockade” allows rival powers to exert disproportionate influence with limited resources. In this context, the strategic activation and deactivation of conflicts emerge as a particularly refined tool. Unlike direct blockades — which require a permanent military presence and entail significant political costs — the manipulation of conflicts enables the introduction of instability indirectly, leveraging preexisting tensions to generate disruptions along critical BRI corridors. Thus, the temporal simultaneity of the India–Pakistan crisis and the resolution of the Caucasus conflict does not constitute a geopolitical coincidence but rather the manifestation of a deliberate geoeconomic containment strategy that employs the selective activation and deactivation of conflicts to block the fundamental pillars of the BRI. Case 1: Activation of the Indo-Pakistani Conflict The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) stands as the flagship project of the BRI in South Asia. With an estimated investment exceeding $60 billion, the CPEC aims to connect China’s Xinjiang region with the Port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, providing China with an alternative trade route that bypasses strategic straits controlled by rival maritime powers. The fundamental vulnerability of the CPEC lies in its dependence on Pakistan’s territorial stability—particularly in the southern provinces, where both critical infrastructure and the energy resources that sustain the project are concentrated. This is precisely where the strategy of conflict activation reaches its fullest expression. Following the escalation recorded in May 2025, intelligence analysts suggest that the timing and intensity of the Indo-Pakistani crisis indicate a deliberate activation of preexisting tensions with specific geoeconomic objectives. The impact of a hypothetical Indian incursion into the Rajasthan–Sindh–Southern Punjab belt would not necessarily aim for the permanent occupation of Pakistani territory, but rather for a demonstration of capability to disrupt the territorial continuity of the corridor. This interdiction strategy through conflict activation operates across multiple dimensions simultaneously. On the physical level, temporary control over this belt would effectively sever the connection between southern Pakistan and the routes leading to China, forcing costly detours or temporary suspensions of operations. On the economic level, the mere threat of disruption would significantly increase security and insurance costs for Chinese investments, thereby reducing the projected profitability of the corridor. More importantly, on the psychological level, a successful demonstration of interdiction capability through controlled escalation would create lasting uncertainty about the security of Chinese investments in the region. This uncertainty would not be limited to the CPEC, but would extend to other BRI projects that depend on the stability of strategic partners. The implicit message is clear: China cannot guarantee the security of its trade corridors against the strategic activation of conflicts by rival powers. The temporal dimension of this strategy is particularly sophisticated. The activation of conflicts makes it possible to generate immediate disruptions in the functioning of the corridors, while their eventual deactivation — once the strategic objectives have been achieved — avoids the long-term costs of a prolonged confrontation. This modulation of conflict intensity transforms regional tensions into precise instruments of geoeconomic policy. Access to the hydrocarbon reserves in southeastern Sindh adds an additional layer to this activation strategy. By temporarily controlling these resources during periods of escalation, India would not only obtain direct economic benefits but would also deny Pakistan and China the revenues that could otherwise be used to finance and expand the CPEC. This logic of “resource denial through conflict” is particularly effective in infrastructure projects that rely on sustained revenue flows to justify their initial investments. Case 2: Deactivation of the Armenian–Azerbaijani Conflict The second case illustrates the complementary side of this strategy: the use of conflict deactivation as a mechanism to gain control over critical infrastructure. The Zangezur Corridor, renamed the “Trump Corridor for Peace and International Prosperity” (TRIPP), represents a paradigmatic example of how a major power can insert control points into connectivity networks through the instrumental resolution of conflicts. In August 2025, U.S. mediation in the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict allowed Washington to obtain exclusive development rights over this corridor for 99 years, effectively transforming what could have been a component of the BRI into an asset under Western control. This maneuver is particularly ingenious because it uses conflict resolution — seemingly a global public good — as a tool for broader geoeconomic objectives. The conflict deactivation strategy operates under a logic that is different but complementary to activation. While activation seeks to generate immediate disruptions in existing corridors, deactivation enables lasting control over critical segments of the connectivity network through the establishment of new contractual and regulatory frameworks that emerge from the peace process. The TRIPP occupies a crucial strategic position within the Eurasian connectivity network. As part of the Trans-Caspian Corridor (the so-called “Middle Corridor”), it provides a direct land route between Central Asia and Europe that bypasses both Russia and Iran. For China, this corridor represented a vital alternative to reduce its dependence on routes controlled by rival powers. However, by securing contractual control over the TRIPP segment through the instrumental deactivation of the conflict, the United States effectively introduced a strategic bottleneck in the middle of this network. The effectiveness of this strategy lies in its ability to condition the use of the corridor without explicitly prohibiting it. Washington can employ a variety of regulatory, tariff, and security instruments to make the transit of Chinese goods more expensive or cumbersome, rendering the route less attractive to traders and investors. This form of “administrative friction” can be as effective as a physical blockade, but with far lower political costs and reduced risks of escalation. Moreover, control over the TRIPP allows the United States to modulate its policy toward the BRI according to its broader strategic needs. During periods of bilateral tension, it can tighten restrictions on the corridor as a form of pressure; during periods of détente, it can ease such measures as a gesture of goodwill. This flexibility transforms the corridor into a permanent bargaining instrument in Sino–American relations. Integrated Logic: Activation and Deactivation of Conflicts as a Containment System The true sophistication of the analyzed cases becomes evident when one understands that the activation and deactivation of conflicts are not isolated tactics, but rather components of an integrated system of geoeconomic containment. The effectiveness of each element is amplified when they operate in coordination, creating a dynamic that maximizes pressure on the BRI while minimizing costs for the implementers. The activation of conflicts generates immediate disruptions and heightens the perception of risk associated with Chinese projects. Simultaneously, the selective deactivation of other conflicts allows rival powers to establish alternative control frameworks that channel trade flows toward systems under their own influence. This combination produces a “push-and-pull” effect: pushing trade away from routes controlled by China through the creation of instability, while pulling it toward alternatives managed by rival powers through the creation of selective stability. The temporal dimension of this integrated strategy is crucial to its effectiveness. Cycles of activation and deactivation can be calibrated to maximize the impact on long-term investment decisions, generating sufficient uncertainty to discourage future commitments — without creating levels of instability that would undermine the broader interests of the implementing powers. Systemic Dynamics The strategies of conflict activation and deactivation go beyond their immediate tactical objectives to generate broader systemic effects on the BRI and on global geopolitical competition. These effects operate across multiple levels and time scales, creating dynamics that can fundamentally alter the strategic calculations of all actors involved. First, these strategies introduce an element of structural uncertainty deeper than that produced by conventional forms of interference. While direct blockades or sanctions are predictable in their application, the manipulation of conflicts introduces elements of volatility that are far more difficult to anticipate and mitigate. International connectivity depends on the predictability and reliability of trade routes, but when those routes become subject to the unpredictable dynamics of strategically activated conflicts, investor and trader confidence in the system as a whole is eroded. Second, the alternation between activation and deactivation creates a pattern of cyclical instability that complicates long-term planning. Investors must consider not only the current state of stability in a region but also the likelihood that latent conflicts may be activated in the future for geoeconomic purposes. This additional consideration translates into demands for higher returns to compensate for perceived risk, thereby increasing the cost of capital for future BRI projects. Third, the strategy of activation and deactivation can generate demonstration effects that shape third countries’ perceptions of the BRI’s viability. When these countries observe that middle powers can effectively disrupt segments of China’s system by manipulating local conflicts, they may feel empowered to adopt more assertive positions in their own negotiations with Beijing. This dynamic can gradually erode China’s position as a preferred partner for infrastructure projects. Finally, these strategies create dangerous precedents for the stability of the international system. If the activation and deactivation of conflicts become normalized as tools of geoeconomic competition, other actors may adopt similar tactics, fostering a more volatile and unpredictable global environment. China’s Counterstrategies The strategies of conflict activation and deactivation do not operate in a strategic vacuum; rather, they generate adaptive responses from China that can alter their long-term effectiveness. Beijing has developed a variety of counterstrategies specifically designed to reduce the vulnerability of the BRI to this kind of indirect interference. One of the most important responses has been the development of mediation and conflict-prevention capabilities. Recognizing that many of the conflicts which can be strategically activated have roots in genuine, unresolved disputes, China has significantly expanded its involvement in international mediation. This approach seeks to address the underlying causes of instability that could otherwise be exploited by rival powers. At the same time, Beijing has intensified efforts to build early warning systems that enable it to anticipate the imminent activation of conflicts in regions critical to the BRI. These systems combine traditional intelligence with big data analysis and predictive modeling to identify patterns suggesting the external manipulation of local tensions. China has also pursued a more systematic geographic diversification of routes and corridors, developing multiple pathways to the same destinations to reduce dependence on any single segment of the network. This strategy of “planned redundancy” increases system costs but also enhances resilience against selective blockades caused by activated conflicts. A third line of response has been the development of specialized financial and insurance instruments for projects in high-risk regions. These tools allow China to maintain the economic viability of BRI projects even in unstable environments, thereby reducing the impact of conflict activation strategies. Future Projections The analysis of conflict activation and deactivation strategies directed against the BRI reveals the growing sophistication of contemporary geopolitical competition. The examined cases demonstrate that rival powers have developed effective methods to condition, fragment, or disrupt large-scale infrastructure projects without resorting to direct military confrontation, instead employing the strategic manipulation of conflicts as a tool of containment. These strategies represent an evolution of traditional forms of containment operating within the geoeconomic domain, using the interdependence of connectivity systems and their vulnerability to regional instability as vectors of strategic influence. Their effectiveness lies not necessarily in their ability to dismantle the BRI entirely, but in their capacity to introduce cyclical frictions and structural uncertainties that diminish the overall attractiveness of the Chinese system. However, the adaptive nature of geopolitical competition suggests that these activation and deactivation strategies will generate countermeasures and counter-countermeasures that continuously reshape the balance of advantages. China’s capacity to develop alternatives and redundancies, combined with its growing mediation and conflict-prevention capabilities, may eventually limit the effectiveness of these containment tactics. In the long term, competition surrounding the BRI will likely evolve into even more sophisticated forms of geoeconomic rivalry, where the ability to create, control, and protect connectivity networks — as well as to manipulate or resolve the conflicts that affect them — will become a fundamental measure of national power. This dynamic will have far-reaching implications not only for the main actors involved but also for the international system, which will need to adapt to an era in which the strategic activation and deactivation of conflicts has emerged as a central tool in great-power competition. The growing sophistication of these strategies suggests that the future of geopolitical competition will be marked by an increasing instrumentalization of regional conflicts for global geoeconomic objectives, creating new challenges for international stability and requiring the development of normative and institutional frameworks adapted to this new reality. References Chatham House. (2025). India-Pakistan ceasefire remains shaky; relations unlikely to return to status quo. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/india-pakistan-ceasefire-remains-shaky-relations-unlikely-return-status-quo Consejo Previsional Mundial (WPC). (2025). Informe sobre la brecha de infraestructura en Asia y el impacto de la BRI. La división de los BRICS y la guerra que estamos ignorando entre India y Pakistán. (2025, 8 de mayo). Navarra Confidencial. https://www.navarraconfidencial.com/espana/la-division-de-los-brics-y-la-guerra-que-estamos-ignorando-entre-india-y-pakistan/ La iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta es un proyecto de cooperación internacional presentado por China en 2013, con enfoque en infraestructura, comercio y conectividad. (2025, 1 de septiembre). Lisanews. https://www.lisanews.org/internacional/iniciativa-franja-ruta-que-es-objetivos/ Le Grand Continent. (2025, 10 de agosto). Al firmar un acuerdo de paz entre Armenia y Azerbaiyán, EE.UU. desplaza a Rusia en el Cáucaso Meridional. https://legrandcontinent.eu/es/2025/08/10/al-firmar-un-acuerdo-de-paz-entre-armenia-y-azerbaiyan-ha-desplazado-trump-a-putin-del-caucaso-meridional/ Ministerio de Defensa de España. (2025). La visión estratégica de la República Popular China en la nueva era: Análisis del Libro Blanco sobre Seguridad Nacional. https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/la_vision_estrategica_de_la_republica_popular_china_en_la_nueva_era_analisis_del_libro_blanco_sobre_seguridad_nacional_2025 Nedopil, C. (2025). Países de la Iniciativa del Cinturón y la Ruta (BRI). Green Finance & Development Center. https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/ Reuters. (2025, 7 de agosto). EE. UU. asegura un corredor de tránsito estratégico en el acuerdo de paz Armenia-Azerbaiyán. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-secures-strategic-transit-corridor-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-deal-2025-08-07/

Energy & Economics
Ex KGB FSB secret police agent using mass propaganda technology tools on laptop to influence population minds. Russian spy silencing online opposition voices using notebook device

Life of youth in sanctioned Russia: VPN, rebranding and copycats

by World & New World Journal

Will sanctions create a more inward-looking generation, or will VPNs and parallel imports keep Russia’s youth plugged into global culture anyway? 2010s in Russia – The “Peak of Freedom” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia underwent severe economic, political, and cultural changes. Previously blocked by the iron curtain, Russians suddenly found themselves exposed to Western influence. In the early 2000s’, Russia was culturally and economically thriving. Nowadays, it is hard to imagine controversial artists such as drag artists, t.A.T.u. and others performing on the national stage, when back then all of this was broadcast across the country. For citizens of border cities such as Saint Petersburg and Kaliningrad, this was a period of frequent travelling abroad. Trips to neighboring countries to buy products or visit relatives have become part of normal life. Russia seemed more democratic, integrated, and culturally alive. The 2010s’ marked the beginning of sanctions. Yet for most Russians, daily life hardly changed. Even after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, people continued to travel, buy “sanctioned” goods, and enjoy global events. Russia even hosted the FIFA World Cup in 2018, which was a moment of international recognition that contrasted with the West’s growing political distance. Сергей Ильницкий / EPA This changed drastically in 2022, when Moscow launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This time, the sanctions were sweeping and deeply felt in everyday life. Major international companies announced their departure from the Russian market. According to Russian claims, U.S. companies lost more than $300 billion as a result, while the Financial Times reported that European firms lost over $100 billion in just 18 months. It has now been more than three years since major international brands officially “left” Russia. McDonald’s, Adidas, Zara, IKEA, and many others appeared to vanish from Russian market. On paper, they exited what many call a rogue state. In reality, most of them never truly left. Adaptation Under Sanctions By early 2023, Russia’s consumer market was full of “new-old” brands. While some companies left outright, the majority transferred stocks to local managers, often at discounts of up to 70%. As a result, there was a strange marketplace with familiar stores but unfamiliar names. At the same time, Ukrainian observers note a different reality. Forbes reported that many foreign revenue leaders in Russia, including Philip Morris, Pepsi, Mars, Nestlé, Leroy Merlin, and Raiffeisen Bank never left Russia at all. According to B4Ukraine, these companies together paid over $41.6 billion in taxes, equivalent to roughly one-third of Russia’s annual military budget. Back in 2023 Philip Morris International confirmed that it would “rather keep” its Russian holdings than sell them at a discount to local investors. For example, L’Occitane simply transliterated its name into Cyrillic, while Spanish corporation Inditex sold its stocks to Daher, and brands like ZARA, Pull&Bear, Bershka were replaced by alternative brands like Maag, Ecru, Dub. Thus, authentic ZARA’s clothing still can be easily found on internet marketplaces, such as Lamoda. Food and beverage: Starbucks transformed into Stars Coffee, McDonald’s into Vkusno i Tochka. Coca-Cola was sold to a Russian businessman and rebranded as Dobryi Cola. Yet, many shops still sell original Coca-Cola imported from neighboring countries such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Poland. Finnish company Fazer Group sold Khlebniy Dom (major bread and pastry company) to “Kolomenskyi” holding, keeping the same legal structure, representatives, and recipes. Consumer goods and toys: Lego returned as Mir Kubikov (“Cubic World”), offering identical products under a new name. German holding Henkel became Lab Industries, selling the same products under Cyrillic labels. Earlier this year Daher Group claimed that Adidas would reopen stores by November 2025, though details remain unclear. Nike, meanwhile, continues to operate in Russia under the abbreviation NSP — Nike Sport Point. For Russian youth, these “copycat” and alternative have a mixed reaction. On social media platforms like Telegram, Instagram and TikTok memes mocking the awkward logos and uninspired renamings were circulating. Young consumers still crave original products, especially iPhones, brand clothes and cosmetics, which are often purchased through parallel imports, friends, albeit at inflated prices. Polls confirm such trend. According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (RPORC), 94% of Russians believe that Western brands will eventually return, and 68% think it is only a matter of time. About 60% of the population continues to buy sanctioned goods; for 28%, it has become a habit. Two-thirds of respondents say they would prefer national brands only if the price were equal. This dual reality for young Russians means living in a consumer world that is both familiar and fractured. Economic Challenges Despite adaptation, Russia’s economic outlook remains mixed. Polling by RPORC suggests that while many Russians believe the economy is worsening, a growing number also describe it as “stabilizing.” As RPORC explained: “Businesses and people were able to adapt to new conditions. Not everyone succeeded, but economic catastrophe did not happen.” © Тимур Ханов/ПГ The Levada Center found similar resilience. Half of respondents said their lives had not changed in recent years, or that they had even found new opportunities. One in five, however, admitted to abandoning their old lifestyle or struggling to adapt. Two-thirds reported feeling confident about the future, most of them relying on wages and pensions, with fewer depending on savings or secondary income. Economic indicators, however, tell a more fragile story. The Consumer Sentiment Index fell to 110 points in August 2025, down from 117 in June. Assessments of current living conditions dropped sharply, while expectations for the future also declined. Businesses face ongoing challenges. According to the Bank of Russia’s September monitoring, companies reported weaker demand, especially in manufacturing, alongside persistent cost pressures from labor shortages and rising expenses. Inflation has moderated to 8.2% year-on-year, but expectations of higher prices remain. In response, the central bank cautiously lowered its interest rate from 18% to 17%. While this move was intended to encourage funding and investment, it came with warnings. High rates had already limited capital investment and strained both households and firms. For younger Russians, this translates into expensive loans, delayed purchases of homes or cars, and fewer stable jobs. Small firms are especially vulnerable, and larger companies hesitate to commit to long-term investment in Russia. The October 24 monetary policy meeting is expected to clarify whether further rate cuts will follow, but for now, the message remains one of “cautious easing amid a fragile economy.” For Russian youth entering the workforce, the environment is uncertain. Jobs in international firms are disappearing, wages struggle to keep pace with inflation, and credit is harder to access. Their career paths are increasingly shaped by state-owned companies or sanctioned industries rather than by global opportunities. Government Restrictions Sanctions are only half the story. Alongside them, the Russian government has tightened internal restrictions, from healthcare to social media, touching nearly every aspect of citizens’ lives. On September 1, 2025, a wave of new restrictions and laws came into force. In healthcare, paramedics and obstetric nurses were legally authorized to provide emergency care in the absence of doctors, while health and dietary supplements (“БАДы”) became subject to stricter regulation. Additionally, a new federal list of Strategically Significant Medicinal Products was introduced to encourage full domestic production of essential drugs. This move aims to reduce Russia’s dependence on imported medicine and support local firms. Beyond healthcare, other laws targeted digital life and education. Advertising VPNs was banned, along with advertising in prohibited apps. While internet users faced growing difficulties with messaging platforms, the government launched a new app called Max, a Russian equivalent of China’s WeChat, while simultaneously restricting access to competitors such as Telegram, WhatsApp, and Viber. Although text communication remains possible, audio and video calls are increasingly blocked. According to the Levada Center, 71% of Russians recently reported problems accessing the internet on mobile phones, and 63% experienced issues with messaging apps. Public opinion is split: 49% support Roskomnadzor’s decision to block voice calls on WhatsApp and Telegram, while 41% oppose it. Support varies by age and education level: younger people and the highly educated are far more likely to oppose restrictions, disapprove of Putin’s presidency, and favor a ceasefire in Ukraine. Education has also come under tighter state control. New quotas for universities, stricter graduation requirements, and the exit from the Bologna education system are expected to make it harder to pursue higher education abroad. For Russian youth, this means growing up in a system where schools and universities serve not only as centers of learning but also as instruments of political loyalty. Closing Reflection Older generations of Russians remember both the Iron Curtain and the sudden openness of the 2000s. Today’s youth, Gen Z and Gen Alpha, are growing up in a very different environment. Born into a Russia that once promised travel, global brands, and open media, they now face a country of copycat stores, patriotic lessons, and state-controlled apps. Their world is paradoxical: connected through VPNs, Telegram, and imported iPhones, yet isolated by censorship, propaganda, and restricted travel. They can mock “Vkusno i Tochka” on Telegram but cannot easily study abroad or see global TikTok trends without additional tools. This contradiction defines Russian youth today. They adapt quickly to new changes and even mock fake brands, find ways around bans, and stay tuned to global culture. But they are also growing up in a system that narrows horizons, imposes loyalty, and tries to shape them into a generation of compliance. Thus, the question remains. Will sanctions and state policies succeed in creating a more conservative, obedient generation? Or will Russian youth continue to find creative ways to remain connected to the wider world? Their choices will shape not only the future of Russian consumer culture, but the political and cultural direction of the country itself. References https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2025/02/18/1092830-amerikanskii-biznes-poteryal https://b4ukraine.org/what-we-do/corporate-enablers-of-russias-war-report https://www.ft.com/content/656714b0-2e93-467b-92d6-a2d834bc0e2b

Defense & Security
This paper explores how Russians’ fears have evolved from 2014 to 2025—shifting from war and repression to economic hardship and social control. It reveals how political pressure, sanctions, and digital isolation have reshaped everyday anxiety and public

Fears and concerns of russians

by World & New World Journal

If you ask the average person in any country about their concerns, their answers would likely be very similar. Across the globe, people are generally most worried about the uncertainty of the future, particularly regarding their finances. This holds true whether you're in the United States, China, or elsewhere. However, does this trend remain the same for a country in a state of war?2014: The Sochi Olympics & The Annexation of CrimeaThe year 2014 was significant for Russia, both economically and politically. It was marked by two major events: the Sochi Winter Olympics and the annexation of Crimea.The 2014 Winter Olympics were held in Sochi, a Russian resort city. To host the games, the government spent an enormous amount of money, over $50 billion, on transportation infrastructure and new sports complexes. In recent decades, the Olympics have been seen as a way for nations to exert "soft power," and there were even speculations in 2010 that Russia may have paid its way to host the games. Despite the celebration of the event's successful conclusion, this period was immediately followed by a major political decision.During late 2013 and early 2014, Ukraine's internal political situation was highly unstable. Many Ukrainians were unhappy with their pro-Russian government's policies, believing that President Yanukovych was a "Russian puppet" who had denied the country a chance to join the European Union. Yanukovych's suspension of a key pact with the EU sparked mass protests and eventually a revolution.While the world's attention was focused on the Olympics and the political turmoil in Ukraine, Russia swiftly moved its troops into the Crimean Peninsula. With military and political pressure, the Crimean government held a referendum, after which the majority of citizens voted to join Russia. This move led to massive international sanctions against Russia, which put its rapidly rising economy under immense pressure.Russian Concerns in 2014This period of political and economic pressure was reflected in the concerns of ordinary Russians. According to a Levada Center survey from May 2014, the top concerns for Russians were:Illness or death of relativesPoverty or job lossWorld warCrimePolitical repressionPublic humiliationHealth threatsHowever, the trends in these fears showed some notable changes compared to the previous decade (1999–2014). Excluding health concerns, these trends indicate that Russians became increasingly worried about the country's political and economic situation. The fear of war also increased due to the instability in Ukraine and the repercussions of their president's actions on the lives of ordinary citizens.2018-2019: The World Cup, Pension Reform, and Shifting Public ConcernsThe period of 2018 to 2019 was a abundant in all the aspects time for Russia, marked by a contrast between a successful international event and a significant domestic political turmoil. The main events of this year were the presidential election, the FIFA World Cup, and a highly questionable reform.Political Discontent and Public ProtestsIn the run up to the 2018 presidential election, Vladimir Putin, in order to secure his presidential spot banned all possible candidates from joining the race. One of the prominent opponents of Putin was Alexey Navalny, who was massively supported by younger generation. Along with allegations of widespread election fraud and a controversial pension reform, it acted as a major catalyst for public protests. Critics argued that with a low average life expectancy (66 years for men), many Russians would not live long enough to collect their state pensions.These events, combined with a documentary by Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation exposing government corruption, fueled significant public demonstrations and damaged government’s image. Tens of thousands of people across Russia joined in these protests, leading to a major surge in political anxiety. Authorities responded with a lockdown, arresting many participants and detaining even more people. Educational institutions reportedly pressured students to not participate, threatening them with dismissal. Navalny himself was repeatedly arrested.Despite the size of protest, there were no results, nothing has changed.The Impact of the FIFA World CupIn stark contrast to the domestic political turmoil, the 2018 World Cup provided the government with a platform for soft power and a temporary boost in national image. While not considered an economic success, and costing over $14 billion with a minor economic benefit, the tournament significantly increased global attention on Russia. This international spotlight, along with a more stable economic situation, created a sense of national pride and momentarily overshadowed the public's grievances.Changing Public Fears (2014 vs. 2019) Data from the Levada Center highlights how Russians' concerns shifted between 2014 - 2019. The two periods show a marked increase in fears related to political instability and government repression. The most significant changes were in political concerns. The fear of "abuse of power" saw the largest jump, increasing by 18 percentage points to 33%. Along with the fear of a "return to repression" and a "tightening of the political regime", which increased by 15 pp and 13 pp, respectively. These statistics underscore a growing public distrust and disbelief in the government, fueled by the 2018 pension reform, “rigged” election and protests. As an expert, Denis Volkov, explained, "People decided that the authorities violated their obligations, deceived them," which directly links the pension reform to the surge in political anxiety.Despite these growing fears, a different Levada poll from late 2019 showed a slight increase in confidence in the government. This could be attributed to the successful staging of the World Cup and a powerful state propaganda campaign aimed at "reconciling people with reality." However, the long-term trends clearly indicate a population increasingly concerned with their political rights, personal freedom and security.2025: Economic Struggles and New Public RestrictionsFollowing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has faced harsh sanctions and economic challenges. While the government has responded with tight control over public discourse, these policies and their consequences have significantly altered the concerns of ordinary citizens.Russian public opinion has evolved throughout the conflict. Initially, there was a surge of patriotic sentiment, but as the war continued, public anxieties have shifted. While the fear of war remains a concern, the focus has increasingly moved toward domestic issues, such as the economy and social tensions. 2025 polls indicated that a majority of Russians supported peace negotiations to end the war, rather than continuing military action. This change is likely correlated with a growing economic impact of the war, as well as drone attacks and their damage on Russian territory, which brought the conflict’s sclale closer to home for many of Russians.  Economic and Social ConcernsEconomic stability has long been a top concern for Russians, and the current situation has only amplified these fears. Since the invasion, government spending on the military has skyrocketed, leading to a massive budget deficit. In an effort to stabilize the economy and combat rapid inflation, the Central Bank, under the leadership of Elvira Nabiullina, implemented a policy of extremely high interest rates, at one point reaching 21%. While this was a logical, albeit painful, economic maneuver to slow down inflation, it had a harsh effect on ordinary citizens, making things like mortgages and loans prohibitively expensive. This has led to a major rise in public concern over the country's economic future, with a significant portion of the population now worried about the state of the "cold" or stagnant economy.Another major concern is the issue of immigrant labor. Russia's aging population and the war have created a severe labor shortage, which is being filled by migrant workers, primarily men from Central Asian countries. These migrants often take low-paying, difficult jobs that Russians are unwilling to do. Despite their essential role in the economy, particularly in industries like construction, their presence has led to social tensions. Public fear, often fueled by nationalist sentiment and concerns over crime, remains a major issue. While some younger Russians may be more tolerant, the general atmosphere is a complex mix of necessity and xenophobia.Public Restrictions and Digital IsolationThe government has also tightened its control over public life and information. Laws restricting dissent and free speech have escalated, with hundreds of people being jailed under new repressive measures. Many journalists and activists have fled the country, and critical discussion is now largely impossible.A major part of this ban has been on internet and digital communication. Following the 2022 invasion, many social media platforms left Russia, forcing users to rely on VPNs to access sites like Instagram and Facebook. Further restrictions have been implemented, including limitations on popular messaging apps like WhatsApp and Telegram. These measures were officially justified as a way to minimize fraud, but they have also been seen as a way to promote state-sponsored apps and control communication. For many Russians, especially the youth, this digital isolation has become a significant source of frustration, with reports of internet slowdowns and service outages becoming more common.How these concerns differ within age groups?While many fears are shared across generations, their intensity and focus vary significantly by age.  For all age groups, the fear of illness of loved ones remains the strongest emotional anchor, symbolizing the dominance of private, family-centered values in contemporary Russian life. Additionally, the fear of war unites all age brackets, suggesting a collective awareness of geopolitical instability and the lasting psychological effects of military conflict.Generational PatternsRecent data [1] reveals distinct generational patterns of fear and anxiety. While most citizens share concerns about security, stability, and well-being, the intensity and content of these fears vary sharply across age groups.Younger Russians (18–30) display the highest levels of anxiety about political instability and future uncertainty. Nearly one-third fear a civil war (32%), and about the same proportion express concern about migration (29%) and environmental threats (27%). These fears reflect their heightened sensitivity to social unrest and global crises, likely influenced by online political discourse.Middle-aged groups (31–60) tend to focus more on economic and social pressures. Concerns about rising prices and impoverishment (up to 29%), interethnic conflicts (29%), and terrorist threats (30%) dominate their worldview. This generation, responsible for families and careers, appears most affected by inflation, inequality, and the broader sense of insecurity in everyday life.In contrast, older respondents (60 and above) prioritize personal health and family safety over political or economic fears. For this group, the focus shifts inward, from collective or national threats to the vulnerabilities of aging and declining health.This progression from systemic to personal anxieties suggests that as individuals age, their fears become less ideological and more existential, mirroring the broader transformation of Russian society.ConclusionOver the past decade, Russian fears have evolved with political shocks, economic turbulence, and social change, yet in many ways, they remain strikingly universal. Like people in most countries, Russians fear illness, poverty, and war above all else. What distinguishes Russia is not the content of its fears, but the context that amplifies them: authoritarian governance, prolonged sanctions, and ongoing conflict.The 2014 annexation of Crimea, the 2018 protests, and the 2022-25 wartime restrictions each reshaped the emotional landscape of Russian society. Political repression and economic instability deepened existing anxieties, turning collective uncertainty into a defining feature of everyday life. Still, beneath these structural pressures, the same human concerns remain love for family, fear of loss, and hope for security.Ultimately, Russia is not an exception, but a reflection of the modern world: a nation where political fear overlays universal human vulnerability, and where personal and national uncertainty continues to define what it means to live in the 2020s.Note[1] It is important to acknowledge that the FOM is a state-funded organization, and the accuracy of its results may be subject to scrutiny.

Diplomacy
Sharm El Sheikh Summit for Peace: Agreement to End the War in Gaza, 13 October 2025. Photo by Roman Ismayilov. President.az, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Gaza Peace Plan: End of war, or A beginning of occupation?

by Muhammad Abdullah

On 29 September 2025, President Trump held a press conference along with his counterpart, Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, and issued 20 Points detailed peace plan for the war-torn Gaza, though he claims that the plan was backed by prominent Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan and some other’s. By and large these Muslim states also welcomed the Plan, most importantly Palestinian political body which is Palestinian Liberation Organization also called the plan an opportunity to end the war on Gaza. Some significant points of the peace plan. Gaza will be a deradicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned. (Gjevori, 2025)Role of ArabsSince the start of Trump’s tenure  and the new American administration Arabs were making efforts to stop the long running Gaza War, they propose alternatives to Trump’s Gaza Rivera plan and so on. (Jazeera, 2025) Now, when eventually Gaza Peace Plan announced by Trump, they (Arabs ) not only endorsed the Plan but also Nations like Qatar, Egypt and Türkiye take part in negotiations with Hamas and Israel, along with envoy to Middle East Steve Witkoff, and finally brought some relief for Gazans like (ceasefire and immediate supplies of aid) which is very crucial for the starving people Gaza. (Irish, 2025)Proposed Governance ModelGaza would be governed by technocrats, apolitical Palestinian committee responsible for day-to-day public services and municipal functions in Palestine. The committee would be composed of qualified Palestinian and International experts. They will be overseen by a body called the Board of Peace. There would be a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF). To oversee security in Gaza during transition. (Walsh, 2025)Parties response to the plan.Hamas, which is the military body of Gaza has also issued a response to Trump’s Plan, in which they accepted the demands like hostage release, and to hand over the administration of Gaza to independent Technocrats, but they clearly stated that they want to negotiate over some points through mediators.PLO which is Political body of Palestine, welcomed the ceasefire but they are opposed to hand over Gaza’s governance to foreign actors, as Nasser al- Qudwa, a prominent Palestinian and Nephew of Yasser Arafat, has warned against foreign governance of Gaza post-Hamas, (Newspaper, 2025) stressing that leadership must be rooted locally rather than imposed from abroad. The statement highlights the potential opposition and undermines the credibility of the plan.The Israeli Prime Minister called the plan as their victory and fulfillment of their objectives, as they want to decommission Hamas, they will achieve this once the plan is implemented. The tunnels which were in Gaza and which caused Israel unbearable damage, especially in early days of war. (Bronner l., 2025) They are also going to get rid of them by Hamas exclusion and their deradicalization and development of infrastructure by independent actors. The most favorable point for Israel is Trump's statement that “if Hamas does not accept the plan then you [Netanyahu] are allowed to finish the job in Gaza and destroy Hamas completely”. (Griner, 2025) Which I think is a very provocative statement and can cause more bloodshed of innocent civilians. which may end up in complete occupation of the Strip.  Since the day Trump’s plan for Gaza was announced, the Israeli military did not slow down their advancement in the strip, instead they continued with their actions against civilians which reflect their intentions clearly.But for the implementation of the so-called peace plan and to further discuss over its terms both parties take part in negotiations in Egypt. With the mediation of Qatar and Egypt, these negotiations continued for days and then concluded with the statement made by Donald Trump that Israel and Hamas have agreed to his peace plan for Gaza. The Israeli military says that a ceasefire in Palestinian territory took effect on Friday 10th. And that it has begun to withdraw from parts of the Strip as per plan. The first phase of Trump's plan is expected to see the release of all 20 living Israeli hostages in exchange for around 250 Palestinian prisoners and 1,700 detainees from Gaza. Increased amounts of aid will also enter the Strip. (BBC, 2025). On October 13th, Hamas released the 20 living hostages and Israel began to release the Palestinian prisoners. (BBC, 2025) The same day, in Sharm El Shaikh, Egypt, an international peace summit was held, attended by representatives from various nations, - including Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, UK, among others – but notably excluding Hamas and Israel representatives. The summit focused on humanitarian access to Gaza and mechanisms to monitor the proposed ceasefire, aiming to end the two-year war. The outcome was the signing of a joint declaration by Egypt, US, Qatar and Türkiye. Despite these recent developments, the Plan gave the UN only a minimal role, limited to the supply of aid. Although the UN was created to maintain world peace and to resolve conflicts peacefully, when we see the plan, Trump did not assign any role to the peace keeping body, instead he appointed Tony Blair [former British PM, who invaded Iraq in 2003] as head of the Board of peace, which is an international Transitional body whose responsibility is to supervise the apolitical Palestinian committee (responsible for day to day running activities in Gaza). AnalysesThe future of the 20 Points Plan is quite uncertain because it neither has a security guarantee for Palestinian nor any durable provisions about the existence of Palestinian state. The plan calls for an ISF (International stabilization Force) which will be deployed in Gaza immediately for ensuring peace, but the fact is the world does not have a pool of experienced peacekeeping force for this purpose that can handle the situation.  Furthermore, the Israeli PM made it clear that there is no meaningful withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza anytime soon.Moreover, the Plan prohibits Israeli annexation of Gaza, but it does not address the issue of the West Bank. Annexation there is opposed by present and potential Abraham Accord States. But I think soft annexation there would be continued through expansion and establishment of settlement. (weller, 2025)ConclusionWhile the world is admiring Trump’s 20 Points Peace Plan, how can we think of peace anywhere, without an army, and most importantly without recognizing the place as a sovereign State with demarcated borders? Although the Plan has some appealing aspects like immediate ceasefire, entry of aid, development of infrastructure in Gaza and exchange of prisoners, it lacks in terms of security from future Israeli aggression, and it also has no provision about the Palestinian state with borders of before 1967 with East Jerusalem as its Capital. Furthermore, if the plan is implemented Palestinians will be governed by the people of other countries, who will govern them as per the policy devised by the committee, (whose members probably belong to West and other States) not according to the needs and opinion of Palestinians. Which may add more to their misery. So, for a short span of time the Plan may seem like the end of war, but in the long run if more reforms like the recognition of Palestinian statehood and its existence will not be made, then this is just a start of a new occupation. References BBC. (2025, october 9).  BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgqx7ygq41o.ampBBC. (2025, october 14). BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c740jx07vz0oBronner, L. (2025, september 30). Le Monde.  https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/09/30/netanyahu-accepts-trump-s-gaza-peace-plan-under-pressure-but-sets-conditions_6745930_4.html?utmGjevori, E. (2025, sep 29). al jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2025/9/29/heres-the-full-text-of-trumps-20-point-plan-to-end-israels-war-on-gazaGriner, A. (2025, oct 3). AL Jazeera. from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/3/trump-issues-sunday-deadline-for-hamas-to-accept-gaza-peace-proposal?utm_sourceIrish, J. (2025, october 8). Reuters. from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/europeans-arabs-meet-flesh-out-next-phase-trump-gaza-plan-2025-10-09/?utm_sourceJazeera, A. (2025, feb 21). Al Jazeera. Arab leaders hold a meeting and discuss alternatives to GazaNewspaper, T. T. (2025, october). the times.  https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/nasser-al-qudwa-gaza-hamas-palestine-israel-news-vl7xmgct9?utm_sourceWeller, M. (2025, oct 2). Cathom house. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/10/can-trump-peace-plan-gaza-succeed?utm

Defense & Security
Warsaw, Poland - 14 January 2025 - Flags of NATO, the EU and Poland waving in the wind next to each other

The tongue of the Balance and the Tip of the Spear. The role of Poland in European Geopolitics

by Krzysztof Sliwinski

Abstract This paper examines Poland's pivotal role in European geopolitics amid escalating tensions following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Highlighting the September 2025 Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace—marking NATO's first engagement with Russian assets within allied territory—it analyses Poland's military, diplomatic, and strategic responses, including border closures with Belarus and the NATO-led Iron Defender-25 exercise.The study contextualises Poland's historical significance from its 1918 independence through Cold War dynamics to its contemporary position as a key NATO and EU member. Poland's substantial support to Ukraine, encompassing military aid, humanitarian assistance, and political advocacy, underscores its role as both a regional security actor and a logistic hub.The paper also addresses challenges stemming from refugee influxes and bilateral tensions, while discussing broader implications for EU security and autonomy, particularly regarding Ukraine's potential membership in the EU. Through this lens, Poland emerges as both a bulwark against Russian aggression and a spearhead of European defence initiatives, navigating complex geopolitical pressures with strategic resolve. Key Words: Poland, Ukraine, Geopolitics, Security, Europe Introduction Between September 9 and 10, 2025, a contingent of 19 to 23 drones, alleged to be Russian, breached Polish airspace. This incident marked the first occasion since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine that NATO forces engaged and neutralised Russian assets within allied airspace.[i] Allegedly, the drones were part of a massive Russian assault on Ukraine, involving over 400 drones and missiles. At least four drones were shot down, primarily by Dutch F-35 jets, with support from Polish F-16s, Italian airborne early warning aircraft, and a Belgian aerial tanker. German Patriot systems in Poland were also on high alert.[ii] The drones caused minor damage, and no casualties were reported. Four Polish airports, including Warsaw's Chopin Airport, were temporarily closed due to the incursion. Poland's Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, described the event as a "large-scale provocation" and the closest the country had come to open conflict since World War II. Poland invoked NATO's Article 4, prompting consultations among allies, and an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council was requested. Polish officials, including Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, assert the incursion was deliberate, citing the number of drones and their flight paths, some of which reached deep into Poland, including near Gdańsk. The drones, identified as Gerbera models (simplified versions of Iran-designed Geran drones), were unarmed, suggesting they might have been decoys to test NATO's air defences. Russia denied targeting Poland, claiming the drones veered off course due to Ukrainian jamming, a claim supported by Belarus but dismissed by Polish and European leaders. Intelligence officials are divided on whether the incursion was intentional or accidental, with some suggesting Russia aimed to probe NATO's response without escalating to direct conflict.[iii] NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte condemned Russia's "reckless behaviour," and leaders from the US, UK, France, Germany, and others expressed solidarity with Poland, calling the incident a serious escalation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy labelled it a "dangerous precedent" and offered Poland anti-drone training, leading to a Poland-Ukraine agreement on joint drone defence initiatives. The EU's foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, proposed a "drone wall" to protect Europe's eastern flank.[iv] The incident occurred amid heightened Russian attacks on Ukraine and joint Russia-Belarus military exercises (Zapad 2025), raising concerns about regional stability. Some analysts believe Russia was testing NATO's resolve, especially after failed US-brokered peace talks. NATO has since bolstered its eastern defences, and Poland has closed its border with Belarus, citing security threats. The Zapad (meaning "West" in the Russian language) series began in 2009 as part of the Union State agreement between Russia and Belarus, alternating with other drills, such as Union Shield. Previous exercises often raised alarms among NATO members due to their scale and proximity to alliance borders. For instance, Zapad 2017 involved scenarios with fictional states resembling the Baltic nations.[v] At the same time, Zapad 2021 reportedly included up to 200,000 troops and integrated Belarusian forces more deeply into Russian command structures, with elements simulating operations involving Ukraine. The 2023 Zapad exercise was cancelled, attributed to Russia's resource strain from the Ukraine conflict. Notably, similar drills like Union Resolve in early 2022 were used to mask troop buildups for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, fuelling suspicions around Zapad events. Zapad 2025 took place from September 12 to 16 across 41 land and maritime training areas in both Russia and Belarus. Around 100,000 military personnel participated in the exercise, which also involved up to 7,000 Belarusian soldiers and 10,000 pieces of military hardware.[vi] The operation explicitly framed itself as a defensive measure to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union State. Still, it also incorporated high-intensity combat simulations, including the theoretical deployment of tactical nuclear capabilities and advanced missile systems. Despite the presence of military observers from NATO nations and other allied countries at the Zapad 2025 military exercises, the event has raised concerns about regional security, particularly among Poland and the easternmost members of NATO. According to the world's oldest and one of the most cited think tanks specialising in international security, the RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), "Zapad 2025 appears as a meticulously calibrated, scaled-down, and geographically-constrained exercise. This is a deliberate and rational adaptation to the immense human and material costs of the ongoing large-scale war in Ukraine and the persistent strain of international sanctions. The exercise worked as a multi-layered instrument of a state in wartime, even though not fully mobilised. Politically, it fostered a perception of resolve continuity to both domestic and international audiences, strengthening the Russian-Belarusian closeness and deploying calibrated, low-resource deterrent messaging. Militarily, it worked as a field laboratory where Russia stress-tested and refined its Initial Period of War (IPW) playbook, incorporating direct lessons from the Ukrainian battlefield. The focus this time was on high-leverage capabilities, such as long-range precision fires, integrated air and missile defence (IAMD), and electronic warfare (EW), while conserving mass and materiel that are critically needed in Ukraine."[vii]Polish reaction to ZAPAD 2025Poland responded resolutely to the joint Russia-Belarus Zapad 2025 military exercises, viewing them as a provocative threat due to their proximity to the Polish border, aggressive scenarios (including nuclear elements and targeting the strategic Suwałki Gap), and the broader context of Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine and recent incidents like Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace. The reactions encompassed military, border security, diplomatic, and intelligence measures, reflecting heightened tensions and a focus on deterrence.[viii] Poland closed all border crossings with Belarus, including railway lines, effective midnight on September 11-12, 2025 (local Polish time), for an indefinite period until the perceived threat subsided.[1] This decision, announced by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, was justified by the exercises' aggressive nature, their location near the border, and ongoing hybrid threats from Russia and Belarus, such as arson attacks, sabotage, propaganda, disinformation, and espionage. The closure impacted the transit of Chinese and Russian goods. Additional measures included heightened vigilance at the frontier, with Poland coordinating with allies like Lithuania, which also ramped up security at its borders with Belarus and Russia.[ix] Additionally, Poland deployed up to 40,000 soldiers to its eastern border with Belarus as a direct counter to the drills, emphasising preparedness amid the perceived escalation. In a pre-emptive move, Poland led the NATO-backed Iron Defender-25 exercise, starting on September 2, 2025, as its primary military response.[x] This was described as the largest NATO-led drill of the year, involving approximately 30,000 troops (including Polish Armed Forces, NATO battlegroups, Air Force, Navy, Territorial Defence Forces, and Special Forces) and over 600 pieces of heavy equipment, such as U.S.-made Abrams tanks, K9 howitzers, and Gladius drone systems. The multi-domain exercise (land, sea, air, cyberspace) incorporated lessons from the Ukraine war, testing combat effectiveness in realistic scenarios to enhance interoperability and demonstrate alliance unity. Poland's Defence Ministry framed it as non-targeted training but a clear signal of readiness against potential threats, including large-scale drone attacks and Russia's Iskander-M missile deployments in Kaliningrad. Concurrent NATO drills were also conducted along the border.[xi] Historical Context For a non-specialist, especially one from outside Europe, Poland may seem a big unknown. Let us then very briefly examine the role of Poland in European Politics from a historical perspective over the last one hundred years. Poland's role in European history since 1918 has been transformative, serving as both a symbol of national resilience and a catalyst for broader continental change. From regaining independence after 123 years of partition to becoming a cornerstone of modern European integration, Poland's journey reflects the complex dynamics of 20th and 21st century European politics. Poland re-emerged as an independent state in 1918 following the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. The newly reconstituted Second Polish Republic faced immediate challenges, including border conflicts with neighbouring states from 1918 to 1921 and internal struggles with multiethnic tensions and economic dislocation.[xii] The interwar period was characterised by political instability, debates over competing leadership visions, and the legacy of partitions that shaped Poland's regional ambitions and democratic consolidation efforts.[xiii] Poland became the epicentre of World War II, suffering devastating military occupation under both Nazi and Soviet policies. The country experienced unprecedented civilian trauma, displacement, and the systematic extermination of its population.[xiv] Historians still debate the numbers, but recent analyses suggest that the nation might have lost much more than initially was suggested. Instead of six million, some historians suggest that nine million would be a more realistic number, which would constitute almost 24% of the Polish population.[xv] This wartime destruction fundamentally reshaped Poland's demographics, political landscape, and postwar boundaries, leaving an indelible mark on European memory of the war. After 1945, Poland fell under the Soviet sphere, adopting a communist system that profoundly shaped its institutions, economy, and foreign policy throughout the Cold War. The Soviet-backed regime implemented state socialism, which combined industrialisation with political repression, resulting in periodic episodes of mass dissent.[xvi] Notably, as a member of the Warsaw Pact,[xvii] Poland occupied a central strategic position within the Central and Eastern European architecture, serving as both a critical forward staging area and a substantial contributor to the alliance's conventional forces throughout the Cold War period (1955 - 1989). As part of the "Northern Tier" alongside East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Poland's territory formed the primary staging ground for Soviet operational plans targeting Western Europe, providing essential buffer protection for Soviet rear areas while controlling crucial East-West transit routes across Central Europe.[xviii] The Polish People's Army constituted one of the largest non-Soviet contingents within the Warsaw Pact, with substantial ground forces integrated into Soviet-designed offensive operations that emphasised rapid cross-border campaigns and coalition warfare capabilities. Polish military doctrine was heavily subordinated to Soviet operational art, with force structures, equipment procurement, and training programs synchronised to complement Soviet General Staff concepts rather than independent national defence requirements.[xix] Poland's armed forces regularly participated in major Warsaw Pact exercises that rehearsed theatre-level offensive operations, serving as integral combat elements whose contributions were deemed necessary for the alliance's conventional surprise-attack options. However, this integration came at the cost of operational autonomy, as Soviet personnel and advisers maintained significant influence over Polish military leadership and strategic planning throughout much of the Cold War period. The relationship revealed inherent tensions between Polish national interests and Soviet strategic imperatives, particularly during political crises such as the 1980 - 1981 Solidarity period, when Moscow considered military intervention but ultimately relied on Polish authorities to maintain internal order. By the 1980s, while Poland remained formally committed to Warsaw Pact structures, domestic political changes increasingly undermined the reliability and willingness of Polish forces to serve Soviet strategic objectives, contributing to the gradual erosion of the alliance's military cohesion.[xx] The independent trade union Solidarity, born from mass strikes in 1980, became the primary catalyst for Poland's transition from communism. Despite the imposition of martial law in December 1981, the movement persisted and eventually led to the Round Table negotiations and the pivotal 1989 elections, which produced rapid systemic change.[xxi] Poland's peaceful transition initiated processes that reverberated across Eastern Europe, contributing to the end of the Cold War order. Poland's post-1989 trajectory transformed it from a transition exemplar to an active Euro-Atlantic partner. The country joined NATO in 1999 and acceded to the European Union in 2004, completing its integration into Western institutions.[xxii] Today, Poland serves as the largest economy in Central Europe. It plays multiple roles as a security actor countering Russian influence, a close US partner, and a significant voice in EU decision-making.[xxiii] Below, the reader will find a comprehensive table that contains key political and economic developments in Poland since 1918. Source: Grok – prompt: Create a table with the most important political and economic developments in Poland since 1918. Visualisation by gamma.app. The Role of Poland in the Ukrainian War As allegedly a Chinese saying goes, "one picture is worth a thousand words", one needs to look no further than at a map of contemporary Europe to understand the central and therefore strategically important location of Poland. Source: https://www.escape2poland.co.uk/poland-guide/poland-map From the very beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Poland has emerged as one of Kyiv's staunchest allies, providing multifaceted support amid escalating geopolitical tensions. This assistance has spanned military, humanitarian, political, and economic domains, reflecting Warsaw's strategic interest in countering Russian aggression while bolstering regional stability. By mid-2025, Poland's total aid to Ukraine has approached $9 billion, equivalent to about 4.91% of its GDP.[xxiv] In the military sphere, Poland has delivered 47 aid packages, positioning itself as Europe's primary logistics hub for defence supplies, with 80% of allied donations transiting through its borders. Cumulative military support has reached €4.5 billion by May 2025, including over 300 T-72 and PT-91 Twardy tanks, BWP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, air defence systems, reconnaissance drones, and 100 million rounds of ammunition. Poland also trained Ukrainian troops on NATO equipment and, in April 2024, offered to repatriate draft-eligible Ukrainian men residing in Poland to bolster Kyiv's forces. A July 2024 bilateral security agreement further commits Warsaw to ongoing defence cooperation.[xxv] Humanitarian efforts have been equally robust, with Poland hosting over 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees by 2025, after more than 7.57 million crossed its borders since the invasion's onset.[xxvi] Warsaw established nine reception points on day one and spent €40 billion (1.9% of GDP) on refugee and humanitarian aid from 2022 to 2024, including welfare, medical supplies, and integration programs.[xxvii] By 2024, Ukrainian refugees reportedly contributed a net 2.7% boost to Poland's GDP through employment, with rates rising from 61% to 69%. However, public support has waned, dropping to 45% for long-term stays by 2025, amid political debates over extending benefits.[xxviii] Politically, Poland condemned the invasion through a unanimous Sejm resolution on February 24, 2022, and has advocated for Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO within forums like the Lublin Triangle. Leaders like President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Donald Tusk have emphasised "non-negotiable" solidarity, pushing for sanctions and intelligence sharing. Tensions flared in 2023 over grain imports, leading to temporary bans and border protests, but dialogue resumed with high-level meetings in 2024.[xxix] Economically, Poland's aid encompasses reconstruction involvement, energy interconnections, and trade facilitation, with refugees contributing to growth. As of September 2025, Warsaw has joined the "Coalition of the Willing" for sustained defence pledges, although domestic fatigue and the 2025 elections pose challenges to its long-term commitment. Overall, Poland's role has solidified its regional leadership, balancing altruism with security imperatives.[xxx] The overall picture regarding the actual situation in Poland regarding the costs and benefits of Ukrainian immigration is not all roses. The influx has triggered notable social, economic, and infrastructural strains. Public support for long-term refugee stays has declined amid growing fatigue and political debates. Key challenges include social tensions, housing pressures, welfare strains, and integration barriers. Rarely, but especially painful from a Polish perspective, are anti-Polish sentiments manifested by some Ukrainians, mostly on social media, which often refer to support for Stepan Bandera, seen as a founder of the modern Ukrainian State. Stephan Bandera, was a Ukrainian nationalist leader associated with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) — and a prominent instigator of Volhynia Massacre of 1943 - 1944. During the massacre, UPA forces killed up to 200,000 ethnic Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (civilians – mostly women and children) as part of ethnic cleansing efforts. Consequently, Bandera, viewed as a hero in Ukraine for resisting Soviet and Nazi occupations, is often equated in Poland with perpetrators of genocide. SAFE and European Autonomy As analysed here, the EU is in favour of Ukraine's integration into European defence cooperation through the SAFE fund, which highlights Ukraine's unique status as a semi-integrated security partner (SISP) despite not being an EU member. With its vast resources, Ukraine can potentially strengthen the EU and contribute to its economic and political growth, thereby enhancing European geopolitical influence. On the downside, Ukrainian semi- or full membership in the EU, which is likely to include membership in the postulated European Defence Union (EDU), will further stretch the EU dangerously to the East, shrinking the geographical distance between the EU and Russia. Consequently, Europe is likely to face an elevated strategic challenge posed by Russia, given its military potential and, most importantly, the historical and current context of political and economic adversary relations. Simply speaking, once Ukraine becomes an EU member, the EU will be exposed to constant security challenges to a degree much higher than before. The theory of escalation by Herman Kahn should therefore be studied in detail by European policymakers and military leaders to make sure that Europe does not find itself again drawn into a military conflict that may damage its societies for generations to come.[xxxi] Curiously, political leaders of Poland (such as Prime Minister Donald Tusk or Minister of Foreign Affairs Radek Sikorski), supported by Estonian, German, French and British leaders, strike somewhat risky poses and flex muscles verbally challenging the delicate status quo. For example, a recent Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace (8-9 September 2025) produced a lot of chaos and uncertainty. As a consequence, some damage was done to civilian infrastructure. Polish authorities were quick to declare that Russian drones had caused the damage. Only later did it transpire through media reports that the damage had, in fact, been caused by friendly fire. A Polish missile mistakenly hit the civilian infrastructure instead of a hostile drone.[xxxii] Similarly, on November 15, 2022, during a massive Russian missile barrage targeting Ukrainian infrastructure, a missile struck a grain drying facility in the Polish village of Przewodów (near the Ukraine border), killing two Polish civilians and causing an explosion.[xxxiii] Initial reactions from the Ukrainian and the Polish governments hinted at Russian agency. Later on, it turned out that it was, in fact, a Ukrainian missile that mistakenly hit the Polish territory.[2] Interestingly, in a recent interview, the former President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, admitted that the Ukrainian side clearly used the event as an attempt to force the Polish hand to join the war against Russia.[xxxiv]Poland, once again, finds itself at the forefront of the geopolitical border between the collective West and Russia, and once again, it serves as both a bulwark and a spearhead. A role that never really paid any dividends in the 20th century. A role that cost millions of lives, destruction and decades of servitude. Broader Geopolitical Context In a broader geopolitical context, the Polish government has recently taken a significant step by blocking the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. The closure of the border with Belarus halted all road and rail traffic, including a critical rail route that handles about 90% of EU-China freight train shipments — part of China's Belt and Road Initiative — valued at around €25 - 30 billion annually. The disruption affected perishable goods, forced rerouting to less efficient paths, such as the Middle Corridor (via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey), and led to potential losses for Chinese investors. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski emphasised to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on September 16 that security took precedence over trade, rejecting the initial request to reopen. The border reopened on September 25, allowing rail trade to resume gradually, though short-term congestion and instability persisted.[xxxv]Initially, Poland was positive about OBOR, which was formally launched back in 2013. Poland's participation positioned it as a key European gateway, leveraging its central location for rail, port, and trade links. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Poland in June 2016 and held a meeting with then-President Andrzej Duda and then-Prime Minister Beata Szydło. They signed a declaration elevating ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership, emphasising OBOR cooperation in trade, investment, and infrastructure. The next several years saw a focus on rail and port projects where Poland positions itself as a "hub" for the Silk Road Economic Belt, with investments in logistics and connectivity.[xxxvi] In June 2024, President Xi met Duda in Beijing to mark 75 years of diplomatic relations. They issued an Action Plan (2024–2027) for strengthening the partnership, including high-quality OBOR cooperation.Recent events show that the Polish leadership has reevaluated its role in global and European geopolitics. By doing so, it appears that the Polish political leadership is playing a high-stakes game in the current geopolitical arena — a picture all too familiar to anyone who has studied the history of World War II. We can only hope that this time the future will not bring an all-European war.  [1] The border was reopened at midnight 25 of September.[2] The Ukrainian side has issued no official acknowledgement nor any compensation.   [i] Easton, A., & Lukiv, J. (2025, September 11). Poland says it shot down Russian drones after airspace violation. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c147065pzdzo[ii] Charlish, A., Kelly, L., & Erling, B. (2025, September 11). Poland downs drones in its airspace, becoming first NATO member to fire during war in Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/poland-downs-drones-its-airspace-becoming-first-nato-member-fire-during-war-2025-09-10/[iii] Walker, S. (2025, September 15). Russian drone incursion into Poland ‘was Kremlin test on Nato.’ The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/14/russian-drone-incursion-poland-nato-ukraine-europe[iv] Emergency Briefing on Drone Incursion into Poland. (2025, September 12). Security Council Report. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/emergency-briefing-on-drone-incursion-into-poland.php[v] Yeryoma, M. (2025, August 26). As Russia-Belarus Zapad military exercises begin, here’s everything you need to know. The Kyiv Independent. https://kyivindependent.com/everything-you-need-to-know-about-russia-belarus-zapad-2025-military-drills-set-for-september/[vi] Bifolchi, G. (2025, September 17). Russia-Belarus Joint Military Exercise “Zapad-2025”: Intel Briefing. The Kyiv Independent. https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/09/17/russia-belarus-zapad-2025/[vii] Minniti, F. (2025, September 22). Wartime Zapad 2025 Exercise: Russia’s Strategic Adaptation and NATO. RUSI. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/wartime-zapad-2025-exercise-russias-strategic-adaptation-and-nato[viii] Query, A. (2025, September 20). Iron Defender-25: Is NATO Finally Ready to Shield Its Eastern Flank? UNITED24 MEDIA. https://united24media.com/world/iron-defender-25-is-nato-finally-ready-to-shield-its-eastern-flank-11795[ix] Poland to close Belarus border due to Russia-led military exercises, PM says. (2025, September 10). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-close-belarus-border-due-russia-led-military-exercises-pm-says-2025-09-09/[x] Polska odpowiedź na “Zapad-2025”. “Unikamy eskalacji, nie boimy się.” (2025, August 9). Polskie Radio24.Pl. https://polskieradio24.pl/artykul/3562822,polska-odpowiedz-na-zapad-2025-unikamy-eskalacji-nie-boimy-sie[xi] Federation of Exercises codenamed IRON DEFENDER-25 - One Goal, Many Forces, Shared Readiness. (2025, August 26). Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Poland. https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/federation-of-exercises-codenamed-iron-defender-25--one-goal-many-forces-shared-readiness[xii] J. Lukowski and H. Zawadzki, "Independence regained and lost, 1914–1945," in A Concise History of Poland, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Also J. Böhler, Civil War in Central Europe, 1918-1921: The Reconstruction of Poland, 2018.[xiii] Górny, M. (2019). A Century of Selective Ignorance: Poland 1918–2018. Slavic Review, 78(3), 654–662. doi:10.1017/slr.2019.227  [xiv] A. J. Prazmowska, Poland: A Modern History, 2010. Also P. D. Stachura, Poland in the Twentieth Century, 1999.[xv] Davies, N. (n.d.). Europa walczy 1939-1945. Nie takie proste zwycięstwo. ZNAK.[xvi] A. Kemp‑Welch, Poland under Communism: A Cold War History, Cambridge University Press, 2008.[xvii] See more at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Warsaw-Pact[xviii] M. Sadykiewicz, "Organizing for Coalition Warfare The Role of East European Warsaw Pact Forces in Soviet Military Planning," RAND, 1988.[xix] Jones, C. D. (2003). Soviet military doctrine as strategic deception: An offensive military strategy for defense of the socialist fatherland. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 16(3), 24–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040308430567[xx] Mastny, V. (1999). The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of the Cold War. Europe-Asia Studies, 51(2), 189–211. http://www.jstor.org/stable/153609[xxi] A. Paczkowski and C. Manetti, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Poland, 1980–1989, 2015.[xxii] A. F. Tatham, "The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and European Law," in European Law and the Eastern Enlargement, Brill, 2013.[xxiii] R. Zięba, "The Evolution of Poland's International Roles," in Central Europe and the Changing International Order, 2020. Or A. Szczerbiak, "A model for democratic transition and European integration? Why Poland matters?" Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, 2016.[xxiv] Prochwicz Jazowska, M. (2025, September 8). Home and away: Why Poland is fighting a war on two fronts. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/home-and-away-why-poland-is-fighting-a-war-on-two-fronts/[xxv] Palowski, J. (2025, April 8). Poland delivered 100 million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine. Details on Germany and USA. Defence 24.Com. https://defence24.com/defence-policy/poland-delivered-100-million-rounds-of-ammunition-to-ukraine-details-on-germany-and-usa Also Słowański, M. T. (2025, January 13). Poland and Ukraine: A Partnership Forged in Resilience. Fair Observer. https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/poland-and-ukraine-a-partnership-forged-in-resilience/[xxvi] Fusiek, D. A. (2022, November 28). The needs of refugees. European Investment Bank. https://www.eib.org/en/stories/ukrainian-poland-infrastructure-refugees[xxvii] See more at: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine/location/10781[xxviii] See more at: UKRAINE EMERGENCY. (2025, September 25). UNHCR. https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/[xxix] Prochwicz Jazowska, M. (2025, September 8). Home and away: Why Poland is fighting a war on two fronts. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/home-and-away-why-poland-is-fighting-a-war-on-two-fronts/[xxx] Ukrainian refugees give Poland big economic boost, report says. (2025, June 10). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-refugees-give-poland-big-economic-boost-report-says-2025-06-10/[xxxi]https://www.amazon.com/Escalation-Metaphors-Scenarios-Herman-Kahn/dp/1412811627#:~:text=In%20this%20widely%20discussed%20and,closer%20to%20all%2Dout%20war.[xxxii] Kacprzak, I., & Zawadka, G. (2025, September 16). Polska rakieta uderzyła w dom na Lubelszczyźnie. Rzeczpospolita. https://www.rp.pl/wojsko/art43015001-polska-rakieta-uderzyla-w-dom-na-lubelszczyznie[xxxiii] Henley, J. (2022, November 16). Missile that hit Poland likely came from Ukraine defences, say Warsaw and NATO. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/16/poland-president-missile-strike-probably-ukrainian-stray[xxxiv] Scheffer, J. (2025, September 5). Poland’s Ex-President Duda Exposes How Ukraine Tries to Pull Allies into War. Hungarian Conservative. https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/ukraine-war-andrzej-duda-allies-false-flag-drone-strike/[xxxv] Dean, J. D. (2025, September 23). Poland to China: So, You Want to Play Hybrid War? Hungarian Conservative. https://cepa.org/article/poland-to-china-so-you-want-to-play-hybrid-war/[xxxvi] Jakubowski, A., Komornicki, T., Kowalczyk, K., & Miszczuk, A. (2020). Poland as a hub of the Silk Road Economic Belt: is the narrative of opportunity supported by developments on the ground? Asia Europe Journal, 18, 367–396. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-020-00571-6

Defense & Security
Flags of Ukraine and the European Union on flagpoles near the office of the President of Ukraine. Kyiv

Assessment of the Limitations of the EU's guarantees regarding Ukraine's security and territorial integrity

by Krzysztof Sliwinski

Abstract This analysis critically examines the European Union's security guarantees for Ukraine as of 2025, amid ongoing conflict and geopolitical tensions. Despite ambitious diplomatic efforts and increased defence spending, the EU faces significant economic and military challenges that undermine its capacity to ensure Ukraine's security and territorial integrity.Economically, the EU struggles with sluggish growth, structural inefficiencies, high public debt, and trade deficits, particularly with China, limiting resources for sustained military investment. Militarily, the EU's fragmented forces and reliance on NATO contrast sharply with Russia's extensive, war-driven military production and strategic nuclear capabilities.The war in Ukraine demonstrates the increasing prominence of drones and missiles, areas where the EU lags behind both Ukraine and Russia in production scale and innovation. Furthermore, the shifting global order towards multipolarity and the strategic alignment of Russia and China further constrain the EU's role as a formidable security actor beyond its borders. Key Words: EU, Ukraine, Security, Guarantees Introduction Russian President Vladimir Putin made a statement on September 5, 2025, warning that any foreign troops deployed to Ukraine — particularly in the context of the "coalition of the willing" led by France and the UK — would be considered legitimate targets for Russian forces. This was in direct response to a summit in Paris on September 4, where 26 countries pledged to contribute to a potential postwar security force for Ukraine, which could involve deploying troops on the ground, at sea, or in the air to deter future aggression after a ceasefire. Putin's exact words, as reported from his appearance at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, included: "Therefore, if some troops appear there, especially now, during military operations, we proceed from the fact that these will be legitimate targets for destruction."[i] He further emphasised that even post-ceasefire, he saw no need for such forces if a long-term peace is achieved, adding, "If decisions are reached that lead to peace, to long-term peace, then I simply do not see any sense in their presence on the territory of Ukraine, full stop."[ii] The "coalition of the willing" refers to a group of primarily European and Commonwealth nations, co-chaired by France and Britain, formed in early 2025 to provide security guarantees for Ukraine amid ongoing peace efforts led by US President Donald Trump. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov echoed Putin's stance, calling the presence of any foreign or NATO forces near Russia's border a threat and unacceptable.[iii] While Putin did not explicitly name the "coalition of the willing" in his quoted remarks, the timing and context—immediately following the Paris summit announcements—make it clear his warning targets their proposed deployments.[iv] As bold as President Putin's statement is, the EU has been making lots of noise in recent months regarding European guarantees for the future of Ukrainian security and its territorial integrity. This analysis aims to provide a "hard-eyed" assessment of the formidability of these claims, following a previous piece that analysed European diplomatic efforts to support Ukraine's territorial integrity, published here: An analysis of European Diplomatic Efforts to Support Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity. Challenges and Opportunities. EU Economic Stance and Prospects As of 2025, the European Union's economy remains sluggish, troubled by structural inefficiencies and mounting external pressures. Arguably, the EU bloc is increasingly uncompetitive on the global stage. Despite some stabilisation in inflation and resilient labour markets, the overall trajectory suggests a region struggling to keep pace with the United States and China, with GDP growth forecasts hovering around a dismal 1% — well below the global average of 3.2%. This underperformance is not a temporary hiccup but a symptom of deep-rooted issues, including overregulation, demographic decline, and dependency on volatile external factors.[v] Critics argue that the EU's adherence to rigid "globalist" policies, such as burdensome environmental regulations and fragmented fiscal strategies, has stifled innovation and exacerbated trade imbalances, leading to a €305.8 billion deficit with China in 2024 alone. It is pretty probable that without radical reforms, the EU risks sliding into prolonged stagnation or even collapse, as high energy costs erode competitiveness in export markets. State of the Union (2025,10 September ) openly admits that "In the trade of goods, the EU has long had a trade deficit with China. The deficit amounted to €305.8 billion in 2024, surpassing the €297 billion deficit of 2023, but lower than the record trade deficit of €397.3 billion reached in 2022. In terms of volume, the deficit increased from 34.8 million tons in 2023 to 44.5 million tons in 2024. In the period 2015-2024, the deficit quadrupled in volume, while it doubled in value.China is the EU's third-largest partner for exports and its biggest for imports. EU exports to China amounted to €213.3 billion, whereas EU imports from China amounted to €519 billion, indicating year-on-year decreases of 0.3% and 4.6% respectively. In 2024, EU imports of manufactured goods accounted for 96.7% of total imports from China, with primary goods comprising just 3%. The most important manufactured goods were machinery and vehicles (55%), followed by other manufactured goods (34%), and chemicals (8%). In 2024, EU exports of manufactured goods constituted 86.9% of total exports to China, with primary goods making up 11.5%. The most exported manufactured goods were machinery and vehicles (51%), followed by other manufactured goods (20%), and chemicals (17%).[vi] The EU's core metrics reveal an economy that is stable but uninspiring, to put it mildly, with persistent disparities across member states that undermine cohesion.   *Created by Grok – prompt: critical evaluation of the EU economic situation as of 2025. These figures highlight internal fractures: Southern Europe (e.g., Spain at 2.6%) outperforms the core (Germany at 0%), but overall, the bloc's growth is "stuck in first gear," with services stagnant and manufacturing barely registering. Household savings are rebuilding, but consumer confidence remains low amid trade disruptions and geopolitical noise. At its core, the EU suffers from endemic structural flaws that no amount of monetary tinkering can fix. An ageing population—projected to strain fiscal sustainability—exacerbates labour shortages and boosts welfare costs, while policies to increase participation among older workers and women remain inadequate.[vii] Productivity has lagged behind that of the US and Asia for over 15 years, hindered by fragmented regulations that impede innovation in AI and biotech.[viii] The much-touted Green Deal, while environmentally ambitious, imposes extreme costs on industries, with 44% of firms reporting trade disruptions from China (mostly dumping). Energy dependency, exposed by the Ukraine war, has led to sky-high costs that "erode competitiveness," pushing the EU toward deindustrialisation. Critics decry the EU as a "technocratic regime" where national sovereignty is eroded by Brussel’s alleged blackmail tactics, rendering parliaments mere puppets and stifling bold reforms. The EU's economy is dangerously exposed to global headwinds, with risks tilted firmly downward.[ix] Escalating US-China trade tensions, including potential Trump-era tariffs, threaten exports (over 50% of GDP), particularly in the automotive and machinery sectors.[x] Geopolitical conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East disrupt supply chains and energy prices, while climate events add further volatility.[xi] The loss of the "peace dividend" forces a diversion of resources to defence, inflating costs and deterring investment. Capital outflows to a faster-growing US, driven by tax cuts, compound the issue, leaving Europe starved of investment. Politically, instability, such as France's government collapse over budget cuts (€44 billion), signals deeper fractures, risking social unrest and further eroding confidence.[xii] The analysis above only scratches the surface. To have a better picture, one should also look at current and projected budget deficits and public debts. For example, according to the EU-27, the total public debt was approximately €14.2 trillion in Q1 2025.[xiii] As for budget deficits, the aggregate EU-27 deficit stood at -2.9% of GDP in Q1 2025, according to Eurostat. [xiv] Looking forward, the situation does not seem to look much better. The prospects for public debt and budget deficits in the EU-27 over the next 5 to 10 years are characterised by gradual upward pressure on debt-to-GDP ratios due to persistent deficits, ageing populations, increased defence spending, and potential shocks like higher interest rates or geopolitical tensions. Based on the latest forecasts from the European Commission (Spring 2025), IMF (April 2025 World Economic Outlook and Fiscal Monitor), and other analyses as of September 2025, debt levels are expected to stabilise or edge higher in the short term (2025–2026), with longer-term sustainability risks emerging from megatrends like climate adaptation and demographic shifts. No comprehensive projections extend fully to 2035, but medium-term analyses (up to 2030) suggest debt could rise to 85–90% of GDP for the EU aggregate if fiscal consolidation is uneven. Deficits are projected to hover around -3% of GDP, testing the Maastricht 3% limit, with calls for prudent policies to avoid unsustainable paths.[xv] It is against this backdrop that the SAFE investments, of which I have written here, here, here and here will have to be somehow balanced against other public policies, including immigration, education, public healthcare or housing. The picture does not look good for the EU, to put it mildly. Current European Military Capabilities as Compared to Russia The EU The European Union's military and defence capabilities remain fragmented, relying on the collective forces of its 27 member states rather than a unified army. As of 2025, the EU and the UK boast approximately 1.4 million[xvi] active personnel, over 7,000 tanks, 1,300 combat aircraft, and a naval fleet including 18 submarines and multiple aircraft carriers, primarily from France and Italy. Combined defence spending has risen to approximately 2% of GDP, totalling €343 billion as of 2024, but gaps persist in strategic enablers, such as air defence, munitions, and cyber capabilities.[xvii] The EU's strengths include industrial bases in countries such as Germany and France, which support exports and innovation in areas like drones and AI. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) facilitate missions, while PESCO fosters joint projects. Recent initiatives, such as the White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 and the ReArm Europe Plan, aim to mobilise €800 billion for investments, including €150 billion via the SAFE loan instrument, targeting two million artillery rounds in 2025, enhanced drone systems, and military mobility.[xviii] The EU's major weaknesses include a heavy reliance on NATO, particularly on US troops, with estimates suggesting that Europe needs an additional 300,000 soldiers and €250 billion annually to achieve independence. This includes addressing shortfalls in tanks (1,400 needed), artillery, and shells (one million for sustained combat). Challenges include political divisions, with Hungary blocking aid, and supply chain vulnerabilities amid climate threats.[xix] Overall, while progress toward a "European pillar" in NATO accelerates, achieving full strategic autonomy by 2030 hinges on member states' commitment to joint procurement and increased spending. The Russian Federation Russia's military capabilities in 2025 are formidable yet strained by the ongoing Ukraine war, with approximately 1.1 million active personnel, including 600,000 deployed near Ukraine.[xx] According to the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Russia's Defence spending reached 15.5 trillion roubles ($150 billion), or 7.2% of GDP, up 3.4% in real terms from 2024, funding war efforts and modernisation. Inventory includes roughly 5,000 tanks (after refurbishing Soviet stocks amid 3,000+ losses), 1,000 combat aircraft (down from pre-war due to 250 losses), and a navy with one aircraft carrier, 60 submarines, and 800 vessels total, emphasising submarine advancements.[xxi] Russia's strengths seem to lie in strategic nuclear forces (1,550 deployed warheads, up to 2,000 non-strategic), electronic warfare, drone production (over 100 daily), and global power projection via naval deployments. Adaptations include glide bombs and unmanned systems, enabling incremental gains in Ukraine despite 750,000 - 790,000 casualties.[xxii] According to experts, Russia's weaknesses include degraded conventional forces against NATO, stagnation in innovation, sanctions-driven dependencies on China/Iran/North Korea, labour shortages, and rising costs that hamper the development of advanced technology.[xxiii] Reforms prioritise nuclear deterrence, robotics, and force enlargement, but demographic/economic constraints may limit rebuilding over a decade. Overall, Russia sustains attrition warfare but faces sustainability challenges for broader threats.[xxiv] The Realities of the Current Wars – the case of the war in Ukraine The war in Ukraine is surprisingly static in a sense in which the First World War was static. We can observe numerous troops fighting a 21st-century version of a trench war, at least to an extent where the front lines seem pretty much fixed. Technological aspects of the Ukrainian war are, however, decidedly different from a hundred years ago. The war in Ukraine is marked by an extensive use of drones. The analysis of available data from the military, UN reports, and media, up to mid-2025, indicates that the weapons causing the highest number of casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war are primarily drones and artillery systems. These two account for most of both military and civilian losses, with a notable shift toward drones in recent years. Total casualties exceed 1.2 million (primarily military, including killed and wounded), though exact figures are estimates due to underreporting and classification issues.   *Generated by Grok. Prompt: What weapons cause the most significant number of casualties in the Ukrainian war? Multiple Sources. Please see below.[xxv] According to publicly available data, military casualties dominate, with around 1.2 million total for Russia and Ukraine combined.[xxvi] As for civilians, the estimates indicate around 50 thousand casualties, mostly from wide-area explosives.[xxvii] Can the EU be a Formidable Military Power of Tomorrow? The existing intel indicates that the drones are responsible for 70 to 80% of battlefield casualties. Exact numbers are naturally difficult to come by, but experts estimate that the total usage of drones likely exceeds production slightly due to imports/donations. Having said that, the production is probably the best indicator. Consequently, the cumulative totals since 2022 exceed 10 million, with 2025 projected to add 7-9 million drones to the battlefield.[xxviii] If this trajectory continues, it means that the future wars will increasingly be fought with drones and missiles, probably operated by AI systems. So how about the EU? The EU production is small-scale and high-value, with countries like France (Parrot SA, Thales) and Germany (Flyability) among the global top 10 manufacturers. No specific unit numbers, but the EU lags in mass production, urging scaling to millions annually for defence. The current output is likely in the tens to hundreds of thousands, primarily focused on (ISR) – Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.[xxix] Tellingly, "Defence Data 2024-2025" from the European Defence Agency (EDA) does not even explicitly mention drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). At best, the document alludes to the substantial increase in defence investment, procurement, and R&D in the EU Member States in the future, strongly suggesting that unmanned systems, including drones, are part of ongoing and future defence capability developments.[xxx] Interestingly, it is Ukraine that outpaces the EU in its own domestic production of drones. According to the Global Drone Industry 2025 Market Report, Ukraine produced over 2 million drones domestically in 2024 and, per President Zelensky in early 2025, has the capacity to build 4 million drones annually.[xxxi] Among other interesting information, one finds: 1. The global drone market was valued at about $73 billion in 2024 and is forecast to reach $163+ billion by 2030, with a 14%+ CAGR in the latter 2020s2. Military and defence end-use accounted for about 60% of the total drone market value in 2024.3. DJI (Chinese producer) held an estimated 70%+ share of the global drone market by 2024. One of the most promising developments in this respect appears to be the Eurodrone, officially known as the European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (MALE RPAS), a twin-turboprop unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions. It is being developed collaboratively by Airbus (leading the project), Dassault Aviation, and Leonardo, under the management of the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), to meet the needs of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The program aims to provide a sovereign European capability that's affordable, operationally relevant, and certified for flight in non-segregated airspace, thereby reducing reliance on non-European systems, such as the U.S.-made Reaper drone.[xxxii] As of 2025, it's in the development phase, with the prototype assembly underway and a maiden flight targeted for mid-2027, followed by initial deliveries around 2029-2030. As such, it is still more of a project rather than any real formidable capability.   Source: https://www.statista.com/chart/20005/total-forecast-purchases-of-weaponized-military-drones/   Source: https://quasa.io/media/top-10-drone-manufacturing-countries-in-2025-global-leaders-trends-and-analysis Apart from drones and UAVs, it is missiles that feature prominently in the modern battlefield. Here, the EU's production capabilities seem equally modest. EU production has indeed tripled overall since 2022, driven by the war. Still, it remains defensive-oriented, with slower scale-up due to component shortages (e.g., rocket motors) and a reliance on U.S. partners. Offensive long-range strike capabilities are limited, with focus on air-defence interceptors under initiatives like the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI).[xxxiii] Key systems include U.S.-made Patriot (PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE) and European Aster 30 (via MBDA's Eurosam). Global Patriot production is 850 – 880 annually, but Europe receives only 400 – 500. Aster output is 190 – 225 in 2025, nearly all for Europe. Combined, EU availability is 600 – 700 interceptors per year. Under a 2:1 targeting ratio (multiple interceptors per incoming missile), this equates to defending against 235 – 299 ballistic missiles annually. Projections aim for 1,130 by 2027 and 1,470 by 2029, with licensed production in Germany (e.g., Rheinmetall).[xxxiv] Recent analyses indicate Russia has significantly boosted its missile manufacturing since 2022, shifting to a wartime economy with 24/7 operations and foreign inputs (e.g., from North Korea and Iran). Estimates for 2025 suggest an annual output in the thousands, far outpacing pre-war levels, though exact figures are classified and reliant on external intelligence.[xxxv] As for ballistic missiles, Russia's Production of short- and medium-range systems such as the 9M723 (Iskander-M) and Kh-47M2 (Kinzhal) has surged. Pre-war estimates pegged 9M723 at around 72 units per year, but by June 2025, this had risen to at least 720 annually, with monthly output at 60 – 70 units. Kinzhal production stands at 10 – 15 per month (120 – 180 annually). Combined, these yield 840 – 1,020 ballistic missiles per year, marking a 66% increase over the past year and a 15–40% jump in Iskander output alone during the first half of 2025. Regarding cruise missiles, Russia's output has similarly expanded, with the Kh-101 rising from 56 pre-war to over 700 annually. Total land-attack cruise missiles (including 3M-14 Kalibr, Kh-59, and P-800 Oniks adaptations) could reach up to 2,000 per year. Stocks are estimated at 300 – 600 units currently, with projections for 5,000 by 2035. All in all, most experts point to a significant "missile gap" favouring Russia, where its 840 – 1,020 annual ballistic missiles alone exceed the EU's defensive capacity (e.g., intercepting only 300 ballistic threats per year). Russia's total missile/drone output dwarfs EU efforts. However, that is not all; one should also examine the usage and development of AI and AI-driven and operated military systems. This limited analysis does not allow an in-depth look into the matter. I have written about it here, claiming that the current war in Ukraine is also a huge lab for testing AI and AI-driven military systems. Apparently, the "AI arms race" gives Russia's wartime AI applications (e.g., drone swarms) a practical edge, potentially outpacing the EU's ethical focus by 2–3 times in deployment speed. Russia's budget allocations (5–15%) exceed the EU's EDF share (4–8%), but EU venture surges (500% growth) and NATO ties provide qualitative advantages in reliable, regulated AI. Gaps include Russia's hands-on war experience versus the EU's potential lag, with calls for international law bans and more substantial EU investments to counter the risks of escalation. Optimistically, Europe's rearmament ($865 billion) could close the divide by 2030, but analysts warn of vulnerabilities without faster AI scaling.[xxxvi] Last but not least, similar arguments can be made about the munition production capabilities. To cut a long story short, the answer to the question presented in the title of this section has to be rather negative. For example, even NATO officials, including Secretary General Mark Rutte, claimed Russia produces three times as much ammunition in three months as the whole of NATO in a year," implying 9 – 12 million annually, or even 20.5 million for a 12 times advantage. However, analysts critique these as exaggerated, noting Russia's industrial limits make figures above 4 – 6 million unfeasible without full mobilisation. External supplies bolster output: North Korea delivered ~7 million rounds by mid-2025. Russia's $1.1 trillion rearmament plan through 2036 supports long-term growth, but 2025 estimates hover at 3 – 4 million new/refurbished shells.[xxxvii] The New World Order - Incoming!!! Importantly, if the EU were to offer security and territorial integrity guarantees to Ukraine outside NATO, it would not face Russia alone. It would, or should I instead say will, face Russia and China cooperating and supporting each other, with other members of BRICS, remaining negatively neutral, that is, informally supporting Russia. I suggest that, especially a European reader, carry out a little experiment. I propose that they take any map of the world that is printed in China and locate Europe. When looking at the map, the reader is advised to compare the sizes of the territories of the EU countries with those of Russia (and China combined). Apart from that the reader is advised to compare the GDP output of the EU as Against that of Russia and China, their GDP structures, the international trade vectors, structures and volumes, the number of people, natural resources (rare earths as well as gas and coal, the number and strength of TNCs (Trans-National Companies) with headquarters in Asia and Europe. In other words, carry out a simple geopolitical comparison. To say that the EU does not look impressive as compared to Russia and China is to say nothing. When carrying out such a comparison, the observer should swiftly realise that the EU is a small region in the upper left-hand corner of the map and that its relevance and importance regarding most, if not all, of the indicators mentioned above is diminishing. The fact of the matter is that we are witnessing an absolute overhaul of the international system towards a multipolar model with the centre of gravity away from the collective west. There does not seem to be much room for Berlin, Paris or Brussels for that matter to operate as a formidable security agent outside Europe perimeter not only by the virtue of the lack of capabilities and military tools but perhaps most importantly by the lack of international recognition by the three Great powers (USA., China and Russia) and global actors such as BRICS. References[i] Soldatkin, V. (2025, September 5). Putin says any Western troops in Ukraine would be fair targets. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/putin-says-any-western-troops-ukraine-would-be-fair-targets-2025-09-05/[ii] Walker, S. (2025, September 5). Western troops in Ukraine would be ‘legitimate targets’, Putin says. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/05/western-troops-ukraine-legitimate-targets-vladimir-putin-says[iii] Western troops in Ukraine would be ‘targets’ for Russian forces: Putin. (2025, September 5). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/5/western-troops-in-ukraine-would-be-targets-for-russian-forces-putin[iv] Putin says Russia would consider foreign troops deployed in Ukraine “legitimate targets.” (2025, September 5). CBS NEWS. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-putin-says-foreign-troops-legitimate-targets/[v] The Conference Board Economic Forecast for the Euro Area Economy. (2025, September 5). The Conference Board. https://www.conference-board.org/publications/eur-forecast[vi] China. EU trade relations with China. Facts, figures and latest developments. (2025, September 9). European Cmmission. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en#:~:text=Trade%20picture,%2C%20and%20chemicals%20(17%25).[vii] A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts. (2025, April). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/04/22/world-economic-outlook-april-2025[viii] 3 priorities to boost Europe’s competitiveness in a changing world. (2025, February 20). World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/02/europe-growth-competitiveness/[ix] A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts. (2025, April). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/04/22/world-economic-outlook-april-2025[x] Barkin, N. (2025, September 2). Watching China in Europe—September 2025. German Marshall Fund. https://www.gmfus.org/news/watching-china-europe-september-2025[xi] Petersen, T. (2024, December 12). European Economic Outlook 2025: Multiple Crises Dampen the Upswing. Bertelsmann Stiftung. https://bst-europe.eu/economy-security-trade/european-economic-outlook-2025-multiple-crises-dampen-the-upswing/[xii] Experts react: The French government has collapsed again. What does this mean for France, the EU, and Macron? (2025, September 8). Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-the-french-government-has-collapsed-again-what-does-this-mean-for-france-the-eu-and-macron/[xiii] Public debt at 88% of GDP in the euro area. (2025, July 21). Eurostat. https://formatresearch.com/en/2025/07/21/debito-pubblico-all88-del-pil-nellarea-euro-eurostat/[xiv] Government finance statistics. (2025, October 21). Eurostat. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Government_finance_statistics[xv] International Monetary Fund. (2025). World economic outlook: A critical juncture amid policy shifts. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO, Europe’s debt set to surge again in new era of uncertainty, IMF warns. (2025, April 24). POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-debt-surge-uncertainty-international-monetary-fund/, Global Economy Faces Trade-Related Headwinds. (n.d.). World Bank Group. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects , Euro Area: IMF Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Mission on Common Policies for Member Countries. (2025, June 19). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/mcs-06182025-euro-area-imf-cs-of-2025-mission-on-common-policies-for-member-countries or Stráský, J., & Giovannelli, F. (2025, July 3). OECD Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025. OECD. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/07/oecd-economic-surveys-european-union-and-euro-area-2025_af6b738a/full-report/repurposing-the-eu-budget-for-new-challenges_b90b1f1d.html[xvi] European Commission (2025, February 21). Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed. Brugel. https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed[xvii] European Commission, EU defence in numbers. European Council, Council of the European Union. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-numbers/[xviii] European Commission, Acting on defence to protect Europeans. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en[xix] Mejino-Lopez, J., & Wolff, G. B. (2025). Boosting the European Defence Industry in a Hostile World. Interconomics, 60(1), 34–39. https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2025/number/1/article/boosting-the-european-defence-industry-in-a-hostile-world.html[xx] Carlough, M., & Harris, B. (n.d.). Comparing the Size and Capabilities of the Russian and Ukrainian Militaries. Retrieved June 3, 2025, from https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/comparing-size-and-capabilities-russian-and-ukrainian-militaries[xxi] Defense Intelligence Agency. (2025). 2025 worldwide threat assessment: Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations, United States House of Representatives. U.S. Department of Defense. https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/2025%20Worldwide%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf[xxii] U.S. Naval Institute Staff. (2025, May 29). Report to Congress on Russian Military Performance. USNI News. https://news.usni.org/2025/05/29/report-to-congress-on-russian-military-performance[xxiii] Boulègue, M. (2025, July 21). Russia’s struggle to modernize its military industry. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-people/mathieu-boulegue[xxiv] Foreman, J. (2025, July 9). Military lessons identified by Russia, priorities for reform, and challenges to implementation. New Eurasian Strategies Centre. https://nestcentre.org/military-lessons/[xxv] Adams, P. (2025, July 18). Kill Russian soldiers, win points: Is Ukraine’s new drone scheme gamifying war? BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c80p9k1r1dlo, Drones become most common cause of death for civilians in Ukraine war, UN says. (2025, February 11). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/drones-become-most-common-cause-death-civilians-ukraine-war-un-says-2025-02-11/, Grey, S., Shiffman, J., & Martell, A. (2024, July 19). Years of miscalculations by U.S., NATO led to dire shell shortage in Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-artillery/, Ukraine: AOAV explosive violence data on harm to civilians. (2025, August 1). Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). https://aoav.org.uk/2025/ukraine-casualty-monitor/, Court, E. (2025, February 13). What is the death toll of Russia’s war in Ukraine? Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). https://kyivindependent.com/a-very-bloody-war-what-is-the-death-toll-of-russias-war-in-ukraine/[xxvi] The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, July 16, 2025. (n.d.). Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs. Retrieved September 11, 2025, from https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-july-16-2025[xxvii] Number of civilian casualties in Ukraine during Russia’s invasion verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to July 31, 2025. (2022, February 24). STATISTA. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/[xxviii] A Perspective on Russia, Facon, S. (n.d.). A Perspective on Russia. Centre for New American Security. Retrieved September 11, 2025, from https://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-russia/ See also: The Russia-Ukraine Drone War: Innovation on the Frontlines and Beyond. (2025, May 28). Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-drone-war-innovation-frontlines-and-beyond and Reeves, T. (2025, May 28). JUST IN: Russia Expands Drone Capabilities as Ukraine Conflict Continues. National Defence. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/5/28/as-russia-ukraine-war-continues-so-does-drone-innovation[xxix] Top 10 Drone Manufacturing Countries in 2025: Global Leaders, Trends, and Analysis. (2025, July 19). QUASA. https://quasa.io/media/top-10-drone-manufacturing-countries-in-2025-global-leaders-trends-and-analysis[xxx] European Defence Agency. (2025). Defence Data 2024-2025. European Defence Agency. https://www.eda.europa.eu[xxxi] Global Drone Industry: 2025 Market Report. (2025, July 16). Tech Space 2.0. https://ts2.tech/en/global-drone-industry-2025-market-report/[xxxii] Global Drone Industry: 2025 Market Report. (n.d.). EUROPEAN MEDIUM ALTITUDE LONG ENDURANCE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS – MALE RPAS (EURODRONE). Retrieved September 15, 2025, from https://www.pesco.europa.eu/project/european-medium-altitude-long-endurance-remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-male-rpas-eurodrone/[xxxiii] Casimiro, C. (2025, August 14). European Defense Production Triples Since Russia-Ukraine War: Report. WAR ON THE ROCKS. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/08/14/european-defense-production-tripled/[xxxiv] Hoffmann, F. (2025, July 6). Europe’s Missile Gap: How Russia Outcompetes Europe in the Conventional Missile Domain. MIssile Matters - with Fabian Hoffmann. https://missilematters.substack.com/p/europes-missile-gap-how-russia-outcompetes[xxxv] Hoffmann, F. (2025, September 8). Denial Won’t Do: Europe Needs a Punishment-Based Conventional Counterstrike Strategy. WAR ON THE ROCKS. https://warontherocks.com/2025/09/denial-wont-do-europe-needs-a-punishment-based-conventional-counterstrike-strategy/[xxxvi] Zysk, K. (2023, November 20). Struggling, Not Crumbling: Russian Defence AI in a Time of War. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/struggling-not-crumbling-russian-defence-ai-time-war and Cohen, J. (2025, June 30). The Future of European Defense. Goldman Sachs. https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/the-future-of-european-defense[xxxvii] Lehalau, Y. (2025, July 25). Is Russia Outpacing NATO In Weapons Production? Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-nato-weapons-production-us-germany/33482927.html

Defense & Security
Mersin Turkey - 23.06.2021: Yavuz Drillship on the mediterranean sea. Drillships of Turkey which is search and drill for natural gas and oils.

Mavi Vatan: The turkish strategy for Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea

by Jessica Martínez Pluma

In February 2019, the Turkish Naval Force carried out a large-scale military exercise in the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to test the operation of the new weapons and naval systems acquired by the country over the last decade. At first, this event did not generate adverse reactions from the international community, but six months later alarm bells rang when, during a speech by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at Turkey’s National Defense University, a map was publicly displayed showing what the Republic of Turkey considered to be its sovereign maritime domains. This later became associated with a concept known as Mavi Vatan. Proposed by Admiral Cihat Yaycı and developed by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Mavi Vatan or the Blue Homeland Doctrine is a project and geostrategic representation of Turkey with the intention of claiming the state’s supposed jurisdiction over parts of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. It demonstrates Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the limits established by international law—the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)—and upholds its right to the legitimate defense of sovereignty over what it asserts are its maritime domains: 462,000 km² comprising its territorial waters, its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and its continental shelf (Denizeau, A., 2021).  Figure 1: Map of ‘Mavi Vatan’ or the Blue Homeland Doctrine publicly displayed during President Erdoğan’s speech at Turkey’s National Defense University (August 2019). Source: Wikimedia Commons ‘Mavi Vatan’ not only represents a historical claim regarding the events of 2004, when the Republic of Cyprus became an official member of the European Union and established its own maritime borders as a state, which, under the framework of international law, pushed the Republic of Turkey into a narrow strip of sea in which to operate. At the same time, Mavi Vatan emerged as a solution to the growing security challenges that have arisen in the last decade of the 21st century, challenges that have threatened not only the integrity of the state itself but also all those elements that guarantee its survival in the international arena; in this case, Turkey’s access to energy resources. With projections that the Republic of Turkey will reach 90 million inhabitants by 2030 (Martín, L; n.d.), the Turkish state is aware of the increasing energy demands needed to adequately meet the needs of a rapidly growing population. To satisfy that demand, it is compelled to seek optimal sources of income to achieve this purpose. In response—and knowing of the large hydrocarbon reserves discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea in recent years (Zeballos Rivero, M., 2024)—Turkey has turned to Mavi Vatan as a solution. If successfully implemented, it would allow Turkey to establish an area for the exploration and exploitation of resources lying beneath these waters to cover its urgent energy needs. The problem? Turkey is not the only interested party. Countries such as Israel, Lebanon, and Egypt, sharing coastlines with the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, are also engaged in heated disputes over legitimate access to these energy resources. However, the most pressing rivalry remains between Turkey and Cyprus, who, having relatively greater capacities to extract energy resources, have been at the forefront of an active dispute to claim sovereignty over these hydrocarbons.  Figure 2: Map of the EEZs of the Eastern Mediterranean countries and also of Mavi Vatan. Source: Emmanouilidis, C. (2020, August 31). Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. European Data Journalist Network. https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/es/cp_data_news/tensiones-en-el-mediterraneo-oriental/ On the one hand, there is the Cyprus–Egypt–European Union alliance, which has agreed upon and mutually recognized the maritime boundaries corresponding to each of them in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, while clearly omitting the possible sovereignty claims of other countries in the disputed area (s.autor, 2024). On the other hand, there are Turkey’s individual efforts, which, in its quest to gain access to hydrocarbon resources in the sea in question, signed a Memorandum of Understanding in November 2019 with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to establish an EEZ stretching from Turkey’s southern coast to the northwestern area of the North African country. This agreement granted the Turks rights to hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in the zone (s.autor, 2024). Although the agreement was suspended in 2021, Turkey has continued to promote ongoing exploration expeditions in the region, which have even extended to Somali waters, with whom it already has agreements in this field. The firm actions taken by states in the region demonstrate that, beyond being an ambition for access to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, the dispute actually represents an active risk to stability and security in the region. Firstly, from the energy dimension: given the importance of energy resources for human development, the continuation of hostilities among the involved states prevents the establishment of cooperative mechanisms that would allow all parties to benefit from the issue. Instead, it risks generating a zero-sum game in which only the strongest state would emerge victorious while the others remain vulnerable to an imminent energy crisis, thereby putting thousands of human lives at risk. Secondly, from the military dimension, there is the latent possibility that an armed conflict could erupt at any moment in the Eastern Mediterranean over immediate access to the contested resources. Without underestimating the military capabilities of the other countries involved, it is important to highlight the case of Turkey, which in recent years has significantly expanded its military capacities as part of the reformulation of its Foreign Policy. This has allowed Turkey to position itself as the ninth-strongest military power in the world (Global Fire Power, 2025) and the second-largest army within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the opposite side lies Cyprus, which, although it does not possess the same military capabilities as the Republic of Turkey, does benefit from the direct support of the European Union, which, if necessary, could easily respond to potential acts of aggression in a military conflict in the region. Both sides of the dispute—Turkey and the European Union along with Cyprus—truly have sufficient resources to escalate the conflict if they so desire, but they have not done so for reasons that remain unclear. For now, the situation remains uncertain. Beyond warnings or complaints from some states and/or international organizations, there has been no decisive action to put an immediate end to the conflict, since, in reality, no large-scale crisis has yet warranted such a response. However, it is important not to underestimate the phenomenon: the fact that it has not yet generated a major impact does not mean it could not do so one day, especially considering the great capacities the involved states have both to act and to respond to possible aggression. Historically, disputes over energy resources have generated unprecedented wars that have cost thousands of lives—for example, the Gulf War in 1991. It is therefore necessary to continue monitoring such situations to prevent them from escalating into conflicts as violent as those of the past. Thus, diplomatic channels between all parties to the conflict must be pursued, with the aim of generating cooperative solutions that foster peace and prosperity among nations, rather than new problems. ReferencesDenizeau, A. (abril, 2021) “Mavi Vatan, the ‘Blue Homeland’: The Origins, Influences and Limits of an Ambitious Doctrine for Turkey”, Études de l’Ifri, Ifri.E. (2019, 30 diciembre) La lucha por los recursos en el Mediterráneo Oriental. Anadolu Ajansi. https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/la-lucha-por-los-recursos-en-el-mediterr%C3%A1neo-oriental-/1685950Global Fire Power (2025). 2025 Military Strength Ranking. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.phpJager, J.; Norris, A. (2021, 27 septiembre). The Mavi Vatan Doctrine and Blue Homeland Anthem: A Look At Turkey’s Maritime Worldview. Center for International Maritime Security. https://cimsec.org/the-mavi-vatan-doctrine-and-blue-homeland-anthem-a-look-at-turkeys-maritime-worldview/Kaya Ulger, I. (2020, 14 octubre) Turquía continúa defendiendo su “patria azul”. Anadolu Ajansi. https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/turqu%C3%ADa-contin%C3%BAa-defendiendo-su-patria-azul-/2005458Mason, S. (2020, 20 septiembre). Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy - War on the Rocks. War On The Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/blue-homeland-the-heated-politics-behind-turkeys-new-maritime-strategy/Martín, L. (s. f.).   ‘Mavi Vatam’: la doctrina turca de la ‘patria azul‘. Global Affairs and Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/-mavi-vatam-la-doctrina-turca-de-la-patria-azul-3Menjón, D. M. (2021, 7 octubre). Dossier Geopolítico Especial: Teoría de la “Patria Azul”. Turquía se proyecta sobre el mar (de la energía). Hermes Kalamos. https://www.hermes-kalamos.eu/dossier-geopolitico-especial-teoria-de-la-patria-azul-turquia-se-proyecta-sobre-el-mar-de-la-energia/S. a. (2024, 10 abril) Cihat Yayci: Libia es un socio estratégico y un aliado para proteger y promover la seguridad de Turquía. OtraLecturA https://otralectura.com/2024/03/15/cihat-yayci-libia-es-un-socio-estrategico-y-un-aliado-para-proteger-y-promover-la-seguridad-de-turquia/S.a. (s. f.). Mavi Vatan-2019 Tatbikatının Ardından Enerji-Politik Ağırlıklı Bir Değerlendirme. Euronewsport İş dünyasından haberler. https://euronewsport.com/mavi-vatan-2019-tatbikatinin-ardindan-enerji-politik-agirlikli-bir-degerlendirme/Zeballos Rivero, M. (2023, 22 marzo). Creciente tensión entre Turquía y Grecia por reservas de gas en el Mediterráneo. Global Affairs And Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/creciente-tension-entre-turquia-y-grecia-por-reservas-de-gas-en-el-mediterraneo