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Vladimir Putin held talks with President of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi. The agenda included the current state of multifaceted Russia-UAE cooperation and prospects for the further expansion of ties, as well as topical international issues with a focus on the situation in the Middle East. Before the consultations began, an official welcoming ceremony for the Russian President was hosted by the President of the UAE at the Qasr Al Watan Palace. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov, Deputy Prime Minister – Minister of Industry and Trade, Russian co-chair of the Russian-Emirati Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation Denis Manturov, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office – Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov, presidential aides Igor Levitin, Maxim Oreshkin and Yury Ushakov, Russia’s Ambassador to the UAE Timur Zabirov, as well as Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, Central Bank Governor, heads of the Roscosmos State Corporation, Russian Direct Investment Fund, Rosatom State Corporation, Rosoboronexport, VEB.RF State Development Corporation, and other officials took part in the talks on Russia’s side. * * * Beginning of Russia-UAE talks President of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (retranslated): Welcome, my dear friend Vladimir Putin, to the United Arab Emirates. I am glad to see you again. Let me begin by emphasising the historical nature of relations between the Russian Federation and the UAE. Over the past years, we have witnessed a substantial push to develop these relations in various spheres for the mutual benefit of our nations and people. I would like to express my great appreciation for your personal and effective contribution to strengthening our bilateral relations. In this context, I would like to say that the UAE is Russia’s biggest trade partner in the Middle East and in the Gulf Region. Let me note that the UAE is a major investor in the Russian economy. Investment in the non-oil sector increased by 103 percent over the past year. I would like to specifically mention that this is an unprecedented breakthrough which demonstrates the special nature of relations between our countries. I will be glad to continue working together on strengthening bilateral cooperation in various spheres. Of course, promoting development in energy, infrastructure, and high technologies, as well as elsewhere has special priority. In addition to this, I would like to mention that the United Arab Emirates and the Russian Federation have been working together and cooperating within various international frameworks. For example, we work together within BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where the Emirates were granted dialogue partner status in May 2023. We are also developing and promoting the strategic dialogue between the Russian Federation and the Gulf Cooperation Council. This helps us reinforce our relations and expand them in various spheres, promoting a proactive exchange of views on key international and regional matters, as well as on key items on our bilateral agenda. Once again, Mr President, welcome to the United Arab Emirates. I wish progress and prosperity to the Russian Federation and its people. President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Your Highness, friends, First of all, I would like to thank you for inviting us and for this colourful and friendly welcome. The other day, the United Arab Emirates celebrated the 52nd anniversary of its founding. I want to congratulate you on this and I want to recall that the Soviet Union was among the first to recognise this independent, self-reliant, and sovereign state. Today, our relations – thanks to the position you have taken – have reached unprecedented heights. You and I are in constant contact, and our colleagues work together on a permanent basis. In fact, the United Arab Emirates is Russia’s main trade partner in the Arab world. Last year, trade grew by 67.7 percent. This year, I think, the figures will be even higher. The same goes for investment activity. There is also progress in industrial cooperation, by which I mean cooperation to build certain industrial facilities in the United Arab Emirates and in the Russian Federation. A number of major oil and gas projects are being implemented. We also cooperate through OPEC Plus. We certainly attach due importance to humanitarian ties. Tourist exchanges are making headway: last year, almost one million tourists from Russia – a little over 900,000 – visited the UAE. A Russian school has been opened, and we are grateful to you for ordering land set aside to build a Russian Orthodox church. We also cooperate internationally. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, the United Arab Emirates makes a huge contribution to stabilising the situation in the world. We will certainly discuss with you the situation in the main hot spots, primarily, of course, the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I will certainly inform you of the developments in the context of the Ukraine crisis. I am quite pleased that the United Arab Emirates is beginning to work within the BRICS system. In 2024, Russia will chair this organisation. We will continue contacts on this. We look forward to meeting you at the [BRICS] summit in Kazan in October 2024. The UAE is currently hosting one of the world’s most important environmental forums. The first results of the effort to implement the Paris Agreement are being summed up. As expected, you are holding this event at the highest level, and very many people in the world, even those who do not identify themselves with environmental movements, are certainly grateful to you for this work. A Russian delegation is also involved in this work at the highest level. We wish you success. I have no doubt that it will be so. Shukran! <…>

According to reports from Chinese media in late November, Beijing has refused to invest in the construction of the Power of Siberia-2 natural gas pipeline, proposing instead that Moscow fully cover the multibillion-dollar project. China also insists on substantial discounts for Russian gas, demonstrating strong “bargaining power” in negotiations with the Kremlin (South China Morning Post, November 24). Power of Siberia-2 is pivotal for Russia in mitigating the losses incurred after Gazprom’s withdrawal from the European market. As Western sanctions have weakened Moscow’s geopolitical leverage with its energy resources, Beijing has capitalized on the situation to increase energy flows to China at cheaper prices. Most economists argue that Moscow cannot fully compensate for the losses resulting from limited access to European markets. They also point out that the gas supplies currently flowing through the Power of Siberia-1 pipeline are already being sold to China at almost half the price of rates for the European Union and Turkey. Russian oil and gas analyst Mikhail Krutikhin emphasizes that Beijing has little interest in the construction of the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline, as China does not require large quantities of natural gas. He notes that the planned capacity of the new pipeline is 50 billion cubic meters (bcm), while Gazprom, on average, has exported 155 bcm to the West. According to Krutikhin, with the discounts, Russian gas exports to China do not even cover the operational costs of their extraction and transportation. The Kremlin, nevertheless, is forced to construct a second gas pipeline because it cannot guarantee the promised gas supplies of existing agreements without it due to the limited gas deposits supporting Power of Siberia-1 (VOA Russian Service, November 28). China’s exploitation of Russian vulnerabilities should not come as a surprise. Experts observed last spring that Beijing only supports Moscow to serve Chinese interests, for example, leveraging Russian anti-Western narratives in its own propaganda and treating the Russian Far East as a “resource colony” (see EDM, February 6). China will not assist Russia to its own detriment. Marina Rudyak, a professor of Sinology at Heidelberg University, believes that the Chinese government may genuinely fear that a Russian victory in Ukraine could strengthen Moscow’s influence in Central Asia and beyond (Svoboda, May 21, 2022). At the same time, Beijing has provided practical assistance to Moscow for projects personally important to Russian President Vladimir Putin. For example, China has actively shared its experience with censorship and digital control over the Internet since 2015, offering insights on the functions and capabilities of China’s “Great Firewall” (Kremlin.ru, June 5, 2019; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 5). This cooperation, however, does not prevent China from competing with Russia for influence in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and other regions (Gazeta.ru, September 20, 2019; see EDM, October 5, 2022, November 15, 2022, May 24, August 10). Moscow’s predicament lies in unrealistic expectations for cooperation with its “Eastern partners,” including China and other “non-Western” countries. Putin has repeatedly stated that the expansion of the BRICS countries (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) will become a movement “against the hegemony and neo-colonialism policy of the West” (Izvestiya, August 23). In contrast, the organization’s members are not planning to sever relations with Western countries and are attempting to extract maximum benefits in finding a balance between the East and West. Another of the Kremlin’s unrealistic hopes was the dream of creating a single currency for BRICS members to strengthen Moscow’s ability to circumvent sanctions. Such talks began emerging in the Russian press at the end of last year (Sibnovosti.ru, December 3, 2022). By mid-summer, central Russian media predicted that the currency would be created in August, noting that the realization of this idea was “closer than ever before” (Moskovskij komsomolets, July 9). Pro-Kremlin experts discussed how the new currency would replace the “toxic and inconvenient” US dollar and be used for intergovernmental payments and settlements (Vechernyaya Moskva, July 3). The most optimistic among them speculated that the dollar might not withstand this challenge (Iarex.ru, May 17). Following the August BRICS summit, Russian officials were compelled to acknowledge that their partners had no intention of creating a single currency in the near future. On August 24, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov officially relented on Moscow’s hopes for a unified currency at the summit in Johannesburg (Rossiyskaya gazeta, August 24). That same day, South African Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana announced that the creation of a single currency had never been discussed within the BRICS format, even informally (Forbes.ru, August 24). A parallel situation of unrealistic expectations for allies is unfolding for Russia with Iran. In early 2022, Russia extended a credit line of $1.4 billion for the construction of the Sirik thermal power station in Iran, a debt that Tehran has yet to settle. In July 2022, Gazprom and the National Iranian Oil Company signed a memorandum of understanding and cooperation, leading to agreements on projects valued at $40 billion. These projects encompass the development of the Kish and North Pars gas fields and Russia’s involvement in the operations of the South Pars field (Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 7, 2022). Even with the agreements in hand, little tangible progress has been made. The lack of progress in joint Russian-Iranian projects closely mirrors the breakdown in Russian-Chinese cooperation with Power of Siberia-2. Independent analysts noted last year that Moscow should not anticipate Iran’s assistance in modernizing underdeveloped infrastructure along the “North-South” corridor. Russia has sought to develop this route to connect with the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean via the Caspian Sea and Iran. Even if the new corridor is further developed, it will not be able to wholly replace the traditional transit routes Russia utilized before its war against Ukraine (Carnegie Politika, October 28, 2022). Russia is being increasingly forced to supply strategic resources to partners on highly unfavorable terms in exchange for minor displays of political support and assistance. In the long run, such a policy will likely result in significant losses for Moscow. While cooperation with China and Iran has improved in some areas, the current circumstances underline that, in the end, both Beijing and Tehran will pursue their own interests, even at Moscow’s expense.

A meeting between Vladimir Putin and Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud took place in the Saudi King’s al-Yamamah Palace. At the Conclusion of the Visit of Vladimir Putin to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a Joint Statement has been adopted. Beginning of Russian-Saudi talks Crown Prince, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (retranslated):We can find many topics and subjects of common interest, on which we are working together to promote stability and development around the world, including in the Middle East. Over the past seven years, we have achieved a lot in our bilateral relations, for example, in the energy sector, investment and agriculture. In addition, our political cooperation and interactions have had a positive influence on several Middle Eastern issues and helped enhance security. Moreover, our future political ties and cooperation will, no doubt, have a positive bearing on the international environment. We have broad and far-reaching opportunities ahead of us, and by seizing them we can work together for the benefit of our nations and the entire world. I would like to reiterate, Mr President, that you are a cherished guest here in Saudi Arabia. We welcome you on behalf of its government and its people. Welcome! President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Thank you. Your Highness, first, I would like to thank you for the invitation. We expected to see you in Moscow. I know that the circumstances have affected these plans. But, as I said, nothing can prevent the development of our friendly relations. Indeed, being in this region on a scheduled visit to the United Arab Emirates, I used your invitation to come and see you and all our friends that we have been vigorously developing our interaction with over the past seven years. That said, the next meeting will hopefully take place in Moscow. Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (retranslated): Of course, we are ready. Vladimir Putin: Agreed. Indeed, the Soviet Union was among the first to recognise the independent state of Saudi Arabia. This was almost a hundred years ago. Our relations have developed in different ways during this time. Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud: I would like to note that it was the development of independence rather than the independence of a state that was recognised at that time. Vladimir Putin: In any event, we respected the will of the subjects of Saudi Arabia to build their future independently. Much has happened in our relations during this time, but over the past seven years, they have certainly reached a truly unprecedented level. This was achieved owing to the wise policy of your father, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King of Saudi Arabia with your direct participation. We have stable, very good ties in political interaction, the economy and in humanitarian area. And, of course, it is now very important for all of us to exchange information and views on what is taking place in the region. No doubt, our meeting is timely. Thank you very much for your invitation, once again. Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud: Welcome! <…>

Although the visit to Saudi Arabia was brief, President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. said that it was a successful and productive one with various engagements accomplished to reaffirm the Philippines’ commitment to the partnership between the GCC and ASEAN countries, as well as to promote the country to prospect investors. In his arrival speech on Saturday following his visit to Riyadh, the President ticked off his accomplishments, mentioning the business-to-business agreements that would guarantee additional employment for Filipino workers. President Marcos described the ASEAN-GCC Summit held in Riyadh as a landmark event, adding that it was the first time that ASEAN and GCC Member States gathered together to discuss regional and international issues and on future cooperation. The six GCC member countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates while Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam compose the ASEAN. “The Summit provided an opportunity to project the Philippines’ long-standing promotion of a rules-based international order, which is essential to the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in our regions which sit astride two of the most vibrant sea-lanes of trade and communications in the world,” President Marcos said. The President said that the Summit also provided an opportunity for the Philippines to secure a US$120-million Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that would establish a 500-person capacity training facility in the country to upskill Filipino workers in the construction industry. “The facility aims to train at least 3,000 Filipinos a year and more than 15,000 in the next 5 years, ready for deployment at any time,” President Marcos said. Another three business-to-business agreements were also discussed among Saudi and Philippine human resource companies “for the training and employment of Filipinos across a wide range of industries including healthcare; hotel, restaurant, and catering; and maintenance and operations, amongst other operations.” “These agreements are expected to generate more than USD 4.2 billion and additional 220,000 jobs for Filipinos over the next few years,” he said. President Marcos also reported resolving the outstanding bilateral issue with Kuwait at the sidelines of the Summit, including working out the lifting of the deployment ban of Filipino workers. “Now, that will end and we will now return to the normal state of affairs with the Kuwaiti government,” he said. The President said he also had the opportunity to meet with the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, and he referred to their discussion as “very encouraging,” with anticipated capital investments pledged by the government of Saudi Arabia to the Philippines. “We exchanged views on issues of common concern to our two countries, and I expressed hope that we can sustain the momentum of high-level exchanges as we expand cooperation in key areas of mutual benefit to our peoples,” President Marcos said. In his arrival speech, President Marcos reiterated his commitment to continue to advance the country’s interest and at the same time, expand the Philippines’ partnership with ally nations. “Let me assure you that we will continue to advance our national interests as we further expand our partnerships abroad,” Marcos said. In his speech during the Summit, President Marcos emphasized further cooperation in key areas including energy and food security and enhancement of logistic chains. He also called for safeguarding of rights and welfare of Filipino workers. President Marcos arrived at the Villamor Air Base in Pasay City at 2:50 p.m. Saturday. PND

Vladimir Putin took part in an extraordinary BRICS summit on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, held via videoconference. The extraordinary BRICS summit on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (held via videoconference) was attended by President of Russia Vladimir Putin, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil Luiz Lula da Silva, President of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping, President of the Republic of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa, and Minister of External Affairs of the Republic of India Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. The states invited to join the association were represented at the summit by President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Ebrahim Raisi, Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, President of the United Arab Emirates Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of the Argentine Republic Santiago Andres Cafiero. * * * Speech by the President of Russia President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Ramaphosa, colleagues, friends, We think the initiative of the President of South Africa, as the current chair of BRICS, to convene an extraordinary summit to discuss the escalation in the Gaza Strip, has come at the right time. The thousands of deaths and mass expulsion of civilians, the humanitarian disaster unfolding in the area are causing deep concern. Just now, one of our colleagues spoke of the deaths of a large number of children. It is terrible, but when you watch children being operated on without anaesthesia, it certainly evokes intense feelings. And all of that is, in fact, happening as a consequence of the United States’ aspiration to monopolise the mediation role in the Palestinian-Israeli settlement process and block the activities of the Middle East Quartet of international mediators. This is history’s way of demonstrating that attempts to single-handedly cut the “Palestinian knot” are unviable and counterproductive. Because of the sabotage of UN decisions, which clearly called for the establishment and peaceful coexistence of two independent and sovereign states – Israel and Palestine – more than one generation of Palestinians has grown up in an atmosphere of injustice, and Israelis cannot fully guarantee the security of their state either. Russia's stance is consistent and independent of momentary conditions. We urge the international community to join efforts aimed at de-escalating the situation, negotiating a ceasefire, and achieving a political solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The BRICS states and the countries in the region could play a key role in this work. For this reason, it is particularly significant that our colleagues from Middle Eastern countries, which received invitations to become full members of the BRICS this year, are joining our meeting today. I would like to take this opportunity to respectfully acknowledge their efforts to normalise the situation. In particular, I am referring to the Peace Summit hosted by Egypt and the joint Arab-Islamic extraordinary summit in Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting that all BRICS countries have similar positions on the need to collectively reach long-term and durable settlement of the long-standing Palestinian-Israeli problem. This was reflected during voting on the draft resolution on a humanitarian truce in the UN General Assembly and in discussing a UN Security Council resolution on the Middle East settlement process, which was adopted for the first time in the past seven years. Although this resolution contains merely an appeal for humanitarian pauses rather than a full ceasefire, we consider the very fact of its approval a step in the right direction. I would like to emphasise that such humanitarian pauses and, better still, a full ceasefire is essential to continue the efforts to free hostages and evacuate civilians and foreigners from the Gaza Strip. I must express again my deep gratitude to President [of Egypt Abdel Fattah] el-Sisi, and all our Egyptian colleagues for their help in resolving many challenging issues linked with receiving and sending home the Russian citizens that had left the conflict area. Of course, by all accounts, the most urgent goal is to reach a truly long-term and sustainable truce. I agree with my Brazilian colleague that it is important that other states not get drawn into a war in the Middle East and that the conflict not spread in any way, as is preserving the fragile peace between religions. In this context, we consider it extremely useful to continue discussing subsequent developments in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in BRICS. If there are no objections, colleagues, we will initiate possible contacts, including via videoconference, concerning these issues during Russia’s upcoming BRICS presidency next year. In general, the new format of emergency online summit meetings suggested by President [of South Africa Cyril] Ramaphosa appears to be quite promising. Importantly, this applies not only to the Middle East settlement but to other urgent global and regional issues. Thank you for your attention. The views and opinions expressed in this article solely belong to the author and do not represent the perspectives or stance of World and New World Journal, nor do they reflect the opinions of any of our employees. World and New World Journal does not endorse or take responsibility for the content, opinions, or information presented in this article. Readers are encouraged to consider multiple sources and viewpoints for a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. Thank you for your understanding. 

There were smiles for the camera, handshakes, warm words and the unveiling of a couple of agreements. But beyond the optics of the first meeting in over a year between the leaders of the world’s two biggest economies, not an awful lot had changed: There was nothing to suggest a “reset” in U.S. and China relations that in recent years have been rooted in suspicion and competition. President Joe Biden hinted as much just hours after the face-to-face talks, confirming that he still considered his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, a “dictator.” Beijing hit back, with foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning telling reporters Biden’s remark was “extremely wrong and irresponsible political manipulation.” As a scholar of U.S.-China relations, I believe the relationship between the two countries can be best described as an “enduring rivalry” – a term used by political scientists to denote two powers that have singled each other out for intense security competition. Examples from history include India and Pakistan, France and England, and the West and the Soviet Union. Over the past two centuries, such rivals have accounted for only 1% of the world’s international relationships but 80% of its wars. History suggest these rivalries last around 40 years and end only when one side loses the ability to compete – or when the two sides ally against a common enemy. Neither scenario looks likely any time soon in regards to China and the U.S. How enduring rivalries end China “is a communist country … based on a form of government totally different than ours,” Biden said after his meeting with Xi. That comment gets to the heart of why diplomacy alone cannot reset the U.S.-China relationship. Washington and Beijing are not rivals due to any misunderstanding that can be sorted out through talks alone. Rather, they are rivals because of the opposite reason: They understand each other only too well and have come to the conclusion that their respective world outlooks cannot be reconciled. The same is true for many of the issues that divide the two countries – they are framed as binary win-lose scenarios. Taiwan can be governed from Taipei or Beijing, but not both. Similarly, the East China and South China seas can be international waters or Chinese territory; Russia can be crippled or supported. For the United States, its Asian alliances are a force for stability; for China, they’re hostile encirclement. And both countries are right in their respective assessments. Diplomacy alone is insufficient to resolve a rivalry. At best, it can help manage it. When the US calls, who picks up? Part of this management of the U.S-China rivalry involves finding areas of agreement that can be committed to. And on Nov. 15, Biden and Xi announced deals over curbing China’s production of the deadly drug fentanyl and the restoring of high-level, military-to-military dialogue between the two countries. But the fentanyl announcement is very similar to the one Xi gave to then-President Donald Trump in 2019. The U.S. administration later accused China of reneging on the agreement. Similarly, committing to restarting high-level dialogue is one thing; following up on it is another. History is dotted with occasions when having an open line between Beijing and Washington hasn’t meant a whole lot in times of crisis. In 2001, when a U.S. surveillance aircraft collided with a Chinese jet over Hainan Island, Beijing didn’t pick up the phone. Likewise, during the Tiananmen Square massacre, then-President George H.W. Bush urgently tried to call his counterpart Deng Xiaoping but was unable to get through. Moreover, focusing on what was agreed to in talks also highlights what wasn’t – and is unlikely to ever be – agreed to without a substantial shift in power that forces one side to concede to the other. For example, China wants the U.S. to stop selling arms to Taiwan. But Washington has no intention of doing this, as it knows that this will make the disputed island more vulnerable to Beijing. Washington would like China to end its military displays of strength over the Taiwan Strait; Beijing knows doing so risks seeing Taiwan drift toward independence. American policymakers have long said what they want is China to “change” – by which it means to liberalize its system of governance. But the Chinese Communist Party knows that doing so means self-liquidation – every communist regime that has allowed space for alternative political parties has unraveled. Which is why American attempts to engage China are often met with suspicion in China. As former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin commented, engagement and containment policies have the same aim: to end China’s socialist system. For similar reasons, Xi has shunned attempts by the U.S. to bring China further into the rules-based international order. The Chinese leader saw what happened when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev tried to integrate the Soviet Union into the Western order in the late 1980s – it only hastened the demise of the socialist entity. Instead, Xi calls for a massive military buildup, the reassertion of Chinese Communist Party control and an economic policy based on self-reliance. Actions speak louder … The encouraging words and limited agreements hammered out in the latest meeting between Xi and Biden should also not distract from the actions that continue to push the U.S. and China further apart. China’s show of force in the Taiwan Strait has been sustained for three years now and shows no sign of abating. Meanwhile, Beijing’s navy continues to harass other nations in the South China Sea. Similarly, Biden has continued the U.S. path toward military alliances aimed at countering China’s threat. It recently entered a trilateral agreement between the U.S., Japan and South Korea. And that came two years after the establishment of AUKUS, a security partnership between the the U.S., Australia and the U.K. that has similar aims. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration will continue to tighten the screws on China’s economy through investment restrictions. Biden is well aware that easy flowing money from Wall Street is helping China weather choppier economic waters of late and is keen to turn off the tap. The point of diplomacy This isn’t to say that diplomacy and face-to-face talks are pointless. They do, in fact, serve a number of interests. For both men involved, there is a domestic upside. For Biden, playing nice with China projects the image of a statesman – especially at a time when, due to U.S. positions on Ukraine and the Middle East, he is facing accusations from the political left of being a “warmonger.” And encouraging Beijing to tread softly during the U.S. election year may blunt a potential line of attack from Republicans that the administration’s China policy is not working. Meanwhile, Xi is able to showcase his own diplomatic skills and present China as an alternative superpower to the U.S. and to potentially cleave the Western business community – and perhaps even major European nations – from what he would see as the U.S. anti-China coalition. Moreover, summits like the one in San Francisco signal that both the U.S. and China are jointly committed to at least keep talking, helping ensure that a rocky relationship doesn’t descend into anything more belligerent – even it that doesn’t make them any friendlier.

The meeting at San Francisco between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping offers a short respite in the broader strategic conflict that both states have been waging since at least 2017. The friends and trade partners of both nations now have an opportunity to employ middle power diplomacy to advocate for their interests and also the moderation of competition. In his book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, Graham Allison provided historical examples of when a status quo power met a rising power and whether and why it resulted in war. Unlike his peer John Mearsheimer, author of the Tragedy of Great Power Politics, who concludes that competition and conflict between the US and China are inevitable due to the structure of the international system, Allison’s book provides a warning to both the US and China that the decisions they make could be positively or negatively consequential, leaving room for agency to be the final arbiter of the fate of bilateral relations. The pre-APEC meeting between President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping was an invitro international relations experiment testing the premises of Allison and Mearsheimer as to whether US-China strategic competition will be shaped by the agency of leaders or the structure of the system. Superficially, the 15 November 2023 meeting allowed for an agreement limiting the precursors of fentanyl coming into the United States and, importantly, reviving regular talks under what is known as the military maritime consultation agreement. These modest but important agreements followed a throng of high-level cabinet visits to Beijing and reciprocal visits by Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, that were meant to stabilise US-China relations. These agreements suggest that leaders in both countries can find diplomatic crosswalks to stabilise the relationship in functional areas. It also intimates that other window of cooperation such as climate change, anti-terrorism, transnational disease prevention, and poverty alleviation may be fertile ground for collaboration if leaders choose to move forward. While the modest takeaways from the meeting in San Francisco underscores that agency does have a role in bilateral relations, we should be realistic that they also reflect the deep structural challenges that exist between the United States and China. Moreover, they also represent the intractable nature of the structural challenges in the relationship, placing friends and allies of the United States and major trading partners of China, such as Australia, Japan, Canada, and Southeast Asian nations, with a difficult quandary: How to balance their economic prosperity and stability through a vibrant and beneficial trade relationship with China while maintaining a strong, comprehensive relationship with the United States as it deepens its strategic competition with China? In the US, there is bipartisan consensus that China represents a challenge to US leadership that needs to be dealt with comprehensively. Under the Biden administration, we have seen a systemic, sequential, and allied-first approach to competing with China. It has brought accolades from friends and allies and, predictably, criticism from China that Biden has not only adopted a continuation of policies towards China from the Trump administration, but that his policies are even more severe. The Biden administration has reinforced and reified its alliance partnerships with South Korea and Japan. It then enhanced its commitment to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and demonstrated substantial leadership in terms of pushing back against Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine. More recently, the Biden administration forged a new trilateral partnership between South Korea, Japan, and the United States, under the so-called Camp David Principles. It also strengthened the quadrilateral security dialogue and its efforts to provide public goods to the Indo Pacific region. And we’ve gradually seen a more coherent AUKUS strategy that aims to create synergy between the UK, Australia, and the United States in the areas of AI research, quantum computing, hypersonic missiles, cyber, and importantly nuclear power submarines. Last, but not least, the adoption of the Chips Act, limiting the sale of sophisticated semiconductor chips to China and the associated technologies, suggests that the United States is not stepping down from its competition with China, but stepping up in the same way that the United States transformed every aspect of its governance following the 911 attacks. Similarly, there seems to be consensus in the Chinese political elite that the US and its allies are intent on containing China and attenuating its development. Xi Jinping’s 20th Workers Party Report at the 20th Party Congress highlighted the concerns China has about its external environment and advocated for strengthening the PLA to deal with separatist forces and external threats, while consolidating it political, social, economic, and ideological systems. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the expansion of the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the advocacy of the Global Development/ Security and Civilization Initiatives, China under the leadership of Xi Jinping is aiming to transform itself, its periphery, and the international system such that all are more conducive to China’s core interests, including preserving its political system. These realities suggest that rather than fostering a reset in bilateral relations, what we are seeing is both China and the United States taking a tactical pause in their strategic competition to amass the resources they need to compete successfully in the Mearsheimer world of great power politics and the maximisation of power. In closed-door discussions on China with Japanese, South Koreans, Australians, Canadians, Southeast and South Asians, as well as Europeans, we hear similar refrains: while China represents a “systemic challenge” in the case of the Europeans and NATO, or is a “disruptive power” in the case of Canada, or as Japan writes in its 2022 National Security Strategy, “the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community,” China is also an important and largely irreplaceable economic partner and essential player in dealing with global challenges such as climate change. The question for friends and allies of the United States is how to balance the increasingly difficult and competitive relationship between China and the United States in a way that ensures that they can continue to have strong economic relationships with China while building resilience into their economies and into their economic relationship, such that the economic weaponization of supply chains and the monopolisation of resources cannot negatively affect trading partners of China. Part of these states’ responses to protect their national interests from the structural realities of Sino-U.S. strategic competition will be a middle power diplomacy that aims to shape the competitive nature of the relationship between the US and China. This will be implemented through coordinating their diplomacy and proactively lobbying, insulating, and investing in rulemaking in the realms of security, trade, and international law alongside their like-minded ally the US, but at times also in opposition to the US. This will require investing in diplomatic resources in both the US and China, in the broader Indo-Pacific region, and at the subnational level to forge strong state to state relations to effectively lobby US policy makers to inculcate the interests of allies and friends of the US in their strategic rivalry with China. Similarly, through forging stronger relations with Chinese provincial leaders though trade and investment, middle powers and stakeholders in the US-China strategic competition may be able to have their interests reflected in a moderation of China’s approach to competition with the US.

Dear Madam President Ladies and gentlemen of the House, Dear visitors in the gallery! I just want to say that I am grateful. Grateful for this unanimous decision in this House. This is a really important signal that also strengthens my position. We must never forget: October 7 really was a breach of civilization. In terms of its cruelty, it was a day that actually eclipsed everything. In a region that is not short of atrocities as it is. I will never forget when I received a phone call on that Saturday with the question: Mr. Federal Minister, how good are your stomach nerves? And I said yes, they are good. And then I was sent videos and photos that I knew were authentic. These pictures will never leave me again. The last time I saw something similar was in connection with the Daesh videos. The cruelty, the bloodlust, the dehumanization. And I am therefore very grateful that we have such a clear position here in Austria. I believe that each and every one of us is called upon to take a clear stance on terrorism - no matter where, no matter how. Murder is murder! You must not put something into context, because that means relativizing it. Never in the history of mankind has a conflict come out of the blue. There is always a prehistory for everything. Also for the Russian attack on Ukraine, which we have not put into context either. And of course international humanitarian law applies. But that is precisely the difference - and several MEPs have emphasized this - that Israel is a constitutional state, a pluralistic democracy. It is struggling, it is trying to find the right path. And MP Matznetter also said that we don't want to be in the IDF's shoes. Because it's almost an inhuman task to keep a cool head in such an emotionally charged situation. Yes, they drop leaflets. Yes, they warn. They call for evacuation. They try to keep civilian casualties to a minimum. And yes, we see what we have actually always known, that Hamas deliberately uses civilian facilities such as schools, refugee camps, hospitals and others for their command centers, tunnel entrances, to hide their weapons there. In other words, as a democracy, as a constitutional state in the fight against terrorism, one hand is always tied behind its back. But that is the right thing to do, it has to be that way. You can see from Israel that they are trying. Three points now have priority: The first point is to prevent a wildfire. This is still not averted. It could end up being a three-front war. We are of course keeping a very close eye on developments in northern Israel and in southern Lebanon with Hezbollah. But, and I would like to emphasize this in particular: Austria is not blind with one eye, we see with both eyes. This applies to the West Bank. And I have to say quite frankly: I consider the settler violence that we see in the West Bank to be intolerable. It is also a lack of solidarity. We are currently dealing with a situation in which the Israeli army is stretched to the limit. And then I think it's a lack of solidarity within Israeli society if some people think they can vent their anger, their emotions and set fire to the West Bank. That could lead to a third front. We have to be very clear about this. The second point is of course - as has already been mentioned several times - the unconditional release of the hostages. I had the opportunity to meet some of the survivors of October 7 here in Vienna last week. It really got under your skin. When you meet a father who tells you that he is actually almost relieved because his child is among the dead and not among the hostages, it's hard to imagine what that must mean for these people. We have to stay on it. This is a terrorist organization, there can be no ifs and buts. There can be no negotiations. They must release the hostages unconditionally. The third point - this is also important to me: I myself was one of the first ministers to put development cooperation with Palestine on hold and ordered an evaluation. We do not want to support Hamas. At the same time, however, we do not want the civilian population to suffer. That would again be fertile ground for the next extremism. We have therefore made EUR 2 million available for humanitarian aid via the Austrian Development Agency. A further EUR 6 million for the region - for Syria, Lebanon and Jordan - which of course run the risk of being destabilized. I think it is good that the European Union has quadrupled humanitarian aid. But, and we saw the European Commission's report on development cooperation a few days ago, I believe we must not be naive. In future, we in Austria will take a very close look at which partner organizations - whether in Gaza or Israel, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mozambique - we work with. What does it say on their websites? What does the umbrella organization in which they are affiliated say? Is there racism, is there anti-Semitism? Are there lines that we cannot support because of our values? This is also a lesson for me from the horrific incident on October 7. In future, we need to take a much closer look at exactly who we are helping and how. Thank you very much!

Long-standing unresolved colonial history and territorial issues between China and Japan, as well as the two countries’ opposing world views, have increasingly manifested in the escalation of tensions. With high-level political/diplomatic communication at a standstill, the relationship has become adrift. In August 2023, the latest spate erupted when Japan decided to release treated radioactive wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear power plant into the Pacific Ocean. Although approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and considered safe by scientists, the discharge sparked vehement criticism from China which rejected the IAEA assessment. Yet it is common knowledge that China, South Korea, and Taiwan as well as many countries with nuclear facilities release radioactive tritium into the sea. Nevertheless, in China’s words, the Pacific Ocean is being used as “Japan’s private sewer.” Stating concerns with “food safety,” the Chinese government has suspended all Japanese seafood imports with an immediate economic impact and price falls in Japanese domestic seafood markets. Beyond the diplomatic row, trolling on Chinese social media and nuisance calls in their thousands have hit Japanese government agencies and businesses. China’s Global Times has characterised Japan as a “rogue state.” With the further planned releases of water, this issue will continue to simmer. Violent attacks in words and actions through Chinese social media and street demonstrations against Japan are not new. Attacks on Japanese establishments in China and anti-Japanese demonstrations have happened before. In 2005, when a new set of history textbooks was released in Japan, many Japanese establishments including the Japanese Embassy in Beijing became targets of attacks from protestors opposing what they called Japan’s attempt to whitewash history. Attacks on Japanese-brand cars and smashing windows of Japanese-owned businesses occurred again in the 2010s following Japan’s decision to nationalise the Senkaku islands which Japan administers but China claims and calls the Diaoyu islands. Tensions had begun to build in 2010 when a Chinese fishing boat rammed two Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the waters near disputed Islands and Japan detained the captain. It was not always like this. Japan and China enjoyed a long honeymoon period and close economic and diplomatic relations after they “normalised” ties and signed a peace treaty in the 1970s. Private investment and government aid poured enormous capital, technology, and human resources into the country, setting China on the path of modernisation. Exchanges at all levels intensified, shelving historical and territorial issues, ushering in an apparent golden era of bilateral ties. The cracks began to open as China started to overtake Japan when the latter was only slowly emerging from years of economic malaise. China overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010, a status Japan had enjoyed for four decades. With China’s prosperity came its economic dominance and military muscle flexing. Since the 2010s, old wounds once papered over, have reopened. China maintains and often claims that Japan has not properly apologised for its colonial and wartime atrocities and that their territorial disputes must be settled (in its favour). Tokyo though, believes it has done all it can and that Japan’s ownership of the Senkaku islands is indisputable. Given China’s now highly confrontational views, the once-strong pro-China constituency in Japan is thinning fast. Public opinion on both sides is now overwhelmingly negative towards the other. Japan considers its neighbourhood strategically far more challenging and dangerous today than at any time in the recent past. Besides North Korea’s sabre rattling and its deteriorating ties with Russia, China’s designs on Taiwan are of special concern as any forceful change in the status quo will have major implications for Japan’s security. Partially reflecting this belief, high-ranking Japanese politicians’ visits to Taiwan in recent months, including that of the Vice President of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and former Prime Minister Taro Aso’s in August, are very significant. Aso’s call to deter China sends strong signals that Japan takes the China threat very seriously. As a result, Japan is substantially increasing its defence budget and has committed to a significant military build-up. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has often referred to the war in Ukraine as akin to what possibly might happen in East Asia, that is, a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan. These developments have enraged China, causing further deterioration in the relationship. China even cancelled a planned August visit by Natsuo Yamaguchi, the leader of the ruling party’s coalition ally, Komeito. This leaves no room for summitry at the leader level in the near future. Notably, Komeito, the political arm of the Buddhist Soka Gakkai, has been a key interlocutor between Tokyo and Beijing, since the 1970s. Japan-China tensions are not just limited to bilateral matters. Irreconcilable differences stem from their broader perspectives on world politics. Japan is deeply embedded in Western systems and advances the free-and-open Indo-Pacific, and has strengthenied military ties with the United States and its allies and partners. Japan offers alternative models of development to the Global South, such as quality infrastructure initiatives as opposed to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Japan’s Quad initiatives, leadership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership and its support for AUKUS stand in contrast to China’s leadership in the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, its “no limits” ties with Russia, and support for North Korea. Japan long separated politics and economics (seikei bunri) in its ties with China, but the boundaries which once kept economic ties strong despite political differences have weakened with what Japan calls China’s increasing economic coercion. The earlier narrative of “hot economics and cold politics” has given way to a new reality with all matters including an increasingly securitised economic relationship. With China’s “coercive and intimidating” behaviour such as its 2010 export ban on rare earth elements and the latest ban on seafood, Japan is cautiously but constantly trying to de-couple and de-risk as well as carry out onshoring and “friendshoring.” China remains Japan’s number one trading partner and a major destination for private capital, but this may well change, albeit gradually as Japanese businesses consider other options. Signs of some improvement through then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Beijing in 2018, and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President Xi Jinping’s meeting on the sidelines of a multilateral forum in 2022, may give a false impression of thawing, because the relationship has become so fractious and adversarial that progress remains elusive. As long as China continues flexing its military muscle and deploys economic coercion while building spheres of influence countering Japan; and Japan in turn strengthens its military ties with the US and establishes strategic partnerships to balance China, the relationship is unlikely to improve.

On Oct. 30, 2023, reports began to circulate that Israel was missing from the mapping services provided by Chinese tech companies Baidu and Alibaba, effectively signalling – or so some believed – that Beijing was siding with Hamas over Israel in the ongoing war. Within hours, Chinese officials began to push back on that narrative, pointing out that the names do appear on the country’s official maps and that the maps offered by China’s tech companies had not changed at all since the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas. Indeed, the Chinese Foreign Ministry took the opportunity to go further, emphasizing that China was not taking sides in the conflict. Rather, Beijing said it respected both Israel’s right to self defense and the rights of the Palestinian people under international humanitarian law. This assertion of balance and even-handedness should have come as a surprise to no one. It has been the bedrock of China’s strategic approach to the Middle East for more than a decade, during which time Beijing has sought to portray itself as a friend to all in the region and the enemy of none. But the map episode underscores a problem Beijing faces over the current crisis. The polarization that has set in over this conflict – in both the Middle East itself and around the world – is making Beijing’s strategic approach to the Middle East increasingly difficult to sustain. As a scholar who teaches classes on China’s foreign policy, I believe that the Israel-Hamas war is posing the sternest test yet of President Xi Jinping’s Middle East strategy – that to date has been centred around the concept of “balanced diplomacy.” Growing pro-Palestinian sentiment in China – and the country’s historic sympathies in the region – suggest that if Xi is forced off the impartiality road, he will side with the Palestinians over the Israelis. But it is a choice Beijing would rather not make – and for wise economic and foreign policy reasons. Making such a choice would, I believe, effectively mark the end of China’s decade-long effort to positioning itself as an influential “helpful fixer” in the region – an outside power that seeks to broker peace deals and create a truly inclusive regional economic and security order. Beijing’s objectives and strategies Whereas in decades past the conventional wisdom in diplomatic circles was that China was not that invested in the Middle East, this has not been true since about 2012. From that time onward, China has invested considerable diplomatic energy building its influence in the region. Beijing’s overall strategic vision for the Middle East is one in which U.S. influence is significantly reduced while China’s is significantly enhanced. On the one hand, this is merely a regional manifestation of a global vision – as set out in a series of Chinese foreign policy initiatives such as the Community of Common Destiny, Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative – all of which are designed, in part at least, to appeal to countries in the Global South that feel increasingly alienated from the U.S.-led rules-based international order. It is a vision grounded in fears that a continuation of United States dominance in the Middle East would threaten China’s access to the region’s oil and gas exports. That isn’t to say that Beijing is seeking to displace the United States as the dominant power in the region. That is infeasible given the power of the dollar and the U.S. longstanding relations with some of the region’s biggest economies. Rather, China’s stated plan is to promote multi-alignment among countries in the region – that is to encourage individual nations to engage with China in areas such as infrastructure and trade. Doing so not only creates relationships between China and players in the region, but it also weakens any incentives to join exclusive U.S.-led blocs. Beijing seeks to promote multi-alignment through what is described in Chinese government documents as “balanced diplomacy” and “positive balancing.” Balanced diplomacy entails not taking sides in various conflicts – including the Israeli-Palestinian one – and not making any enemies. Positive balancing centers on pursuing closer cooperation with one regional power, say Iran in the belief that this will incentivize others – for example, Arab Gulf countries – to follow suit. China’s Middle East success Prior to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, Beijing’s strategy was beginning to pay considerable dividends. In 2016, China entered a comprehensive strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and in 2020 signed a 25-year cooperation agreement with Iran. Over that same timespan, Beijing has expanded economic ties with a host of other Gulf countries including Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Oman. Beyond the Gulf, China has also deepened its economic ties with Egypt, to the point where it is now the largest investor in the Suez Canal Area Development Project. It has also invested in reconstruction projects in Iraq and Syria. Earlier this year, China brokered a deal to re-establish diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran – a major breakthrough and one that set China up as a major mediator in the region. In fact, following that success, Beijing began to position itself as a potential broker of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The impact of the Israel-Hamas War The Israel-Hamas war, however, has complicated China’s approach to the Middle East. Beijing’s initial response to the conflict was to continue with its balanced diplomacy. In the aftermath of the Oct. 7 attack, China’s leaders did not condemn Hamas, instead they urged both sides to “exercise restraint” and to embrace a “two-state solution.” This is consistent with Beijing’s long-standing policy of “non-interference” in other countries’ internal affairs and its fundamental strategic approach to the region. But the neutral stance jarred with the approach adopted by the United States and some European nations – which pushed China for a firmer line. Under pressure from U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, among others, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China’s view that every country has the right to self-defence. But he qualified this by stating that Israel “should abide by international humanitarian law and protect the safety of civilians.” And that qualification reflects a shift in the tone from Beijing, which has moved progressively toward making statements that are sympathetic to the Palestinians and critical of Israel. On Oct. 25, China used it veto power at the United Nations to block a U.S. resolution calling for a humanitarian pause on the grounds that it failed to call on Israel to lift is siege on Gaza. China’s U.N. ambassador, Zhang Jun, explained the decision was based on the “strong appeals of the entire world, in particular the Arab countries.” Championing the Global South Such a shift is unsurprising given Beijing’s economic concerns and its geopolitical ambitions. China is much more heavily dependent on trade with the numerous states across the Middle East and North Africa it has established economic ties than it is with Israel. Should geopolitical pressures push China to the point where it must decide between Israel and the Arab world, Beijing has powerful economic incentives to side with the latter. But China has another powerful incentive to side with the Palestinians. Beijing harbours a desire to be seen as a champion of the Global South. And siding with Israel risks alienating that increasingly important constituency. In countries across Africa, Latin America and beyond, the Palestinians’ struggle against Israel is seen as akin to fighting colonization or resisting “apartheid.” Siding with Israel would, under that lens, put China on the side of the colonial oppressor. And that, in turn, risks undermining the diplomatic and economic work China has undertaken through its infrastructure development program, the Belt and Road Initiative, and effort to encourage more Global South countries to join what is now the BRICS economic bloc. And while China may not have altered its maps of the Middle East, its diplomats may well be looking at them and wondering if there is still room for balanced diplomacy.