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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Arctic order historically, currently, and in the future reflects the world order. The idea of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ is not valid and is a poor guide for policy. During Cold War bipolarity, the Arctic was divided between the Soviet Arctic and the Nordic and North American Arctic. US victory and Soviet defeat in the Cold War led to US unipolarity and hegemony which was the basis for a circumpolar (including Russia) liberal (as opposed to realist) Arctic order with organizations, such as the Arctic Council, International Arctic Science Committee, University of the Arctic, Barents and Bering regional cooperation, all on liberal topics such as science, environment, Indigenous rights, people-to-people cooperation.Footnote1 US unipolarity and hegemony are slipping away to world order characteristics of continued US unipolarity and hegemony, Sino-American bipolarity in economics and S&T and multipolarity illustrated by BRICS+. Sino-US competition and US-Russia conflict to the extent of proxy-war in Ukraine reflect these changes. The Arctic, which is de facto divided between the US-led NATO-Arctic and the Russian Arctic, where Russia reaches out to the BRICS+ in diplomacy, economics, and S&T, reflects these changes to world order. There is wishful thinking in the West of returning to post-Cold War US unipolar and hegemonic ‘liberal world order’ or ‘rules-based order’ and the circumpolar liberal Arctic order with it. This wish is probably unrealistic for global trends in demography, economics, S&T, legitimacy, etc. Significant conflict can be expected between the US/West and China and Russia on developments in world order, with the Global South standing by. The Arctic is likely to remain divided between the US-led NATO Arctic and the Russian Arctic seeking engagement with the BRICS+ world for the future with extremely limited cooperation and risk of spill-over from the Ukraine War and other US-Russia-China conflicts. The Arctic in international order There are two common, but invalid, narratives about the Arctic, which are poor guides for policy: First, ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, that the Arctic was apart from international politics and allowed for West-Russia cooperation unlike elsewhere, especially between the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Second, a presentist discourse, where international interests in the Arctic are seen as rising in the last 15 years, driven by climate change, the Russian flag planting on the seafloor of the North Pole in 2007, and the United States Geological Survey’s assessment of oil and gas resources in 2008, north of the Arctic Circle. Rather, the Arctic has for centuries closely mirrored the international system, whether multipolar with Western colonial empires before the World Wars, bipolar Cold War between the US and the USSR, post-Cold War US unipolarity and hegemony, or the current emerging Sino-American bipolarity and multipolarity. During 2014–2022, cooperation in the Arctic was not exceptional compared to US-Russia non-proliferation cooperation, most notably with the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, or removing chemical weapons from Syria. There was extensive US-Europe-Russia and wider collaboration around the International Space Station. There was extensive energy trade and investment between Russia and Europe, most notably with the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines under the Baltic Sea. The bipolar Cold War Arctic in the bipolar Cold War order Bipolarity with two superpowers standing out from all other great powers due to their demographic, economic, science and technology, military, and ideological weight and global claims, the US and the USSR, shaped the the Cold War order. Bipolar logic shaped the international order. John Mearsheimer explains well the structural logic of a nuclear-armed bipolar superpower security competition, and he points out how each superpower formed ‘bounded orders’ of allies and clients to discipline them and mobilize their resources. These bounded orders were the West for the US with its institutions, and the East Bloc for the USSR.Footnote2 This bipolar logic was also clear in the Arctic, divided between the Nordic and North American Arctic of the West and the Soviet Arctic by the Iron Curtain in Europe and the Ice Curtain in the Bering Strait. Circumpolar Arctic cooperation was limited to the Polar Bear Treaty of 1973 between the USSR, Norway, Kingdom of Denmark, Canada, and the US, Norwegian Soviet joint fisheries management in the Barents Sea, and some Bering Strait cooperation. The Arctic was exceptionally militarized during the Cold War driven by the mutual nuclear deterrence between the US and the USSR, where the Arctic played a central role for geostrategic and technological reasons. The Arctic was the shortest flight path for bombers and missiles, and sea ice offered cover for nuclear ballistic submarines. This exceptional militarization of the Arctic harmed the human security of Arctic local and indigenous communities through forced displacement, security service surveillance, and pollution, including notable nuclear accidents, as the 1968 B52 bomber crash off Northwest Greenland with four H-bombs causing extensive radioactive contamination of much Soviet nuclear material in and around the Kola Peninsula, including sunken submarines with nuclear fuel or weapons on board.Footnote3 Circumpolar liberal Arctic order under US unipolarity The Cold War ended with US victory and Soviet defeat and dissolution, also caused by the US pressuring the USSR into a strategic nuclear arms race, that the Soviet economy could not support. US Navy operations near the Soviet Northern Fleet nuclear bastion around the Kola Peninsula were an important part of this pressure.Footnote4 The Arctic was also part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to save the USSR by reform and lowering external tension. Gorbachev called the Arctic as a zone of peace, environmental protection and scientific collaboration in his 1987 Murmansk speech, in contrast to being at the heart of a strategic nuclear arms race with the US, which the USSR could not sustain. Gorbachev’s reforms failed to avert the dissolution of the USSR and deep socio-economic, public health, and law and order crisis in Russian society during the 1990s. The Russian State withdrew to a significant extent from its Arctic, leaving military facilities and society behind. Sino-American bipolarity comes to the Arctic The relative distribution of comprehensive material and immaterial power of the strongest States shapes international order. States stay the predominant actors since the emergence of a state system, not denying powerful non-State actors historically and today. The US unipolarity after the Cold War was an exceptional time of international history and not the ‘End of History’ as believed by some quarters in the West (Fukuyama). History is returning to normal with the return of major centres of economic output and science and technology outside the West. Ironically, US unipolarity laid the foundation for the ‘Return of history’, rather than the ‘End of History’. Since the 1990s, the world experienced globalization with economic, science and technology, and cultural integration. The US as the sole superpower provided public goods and facilitated and coordinated many of these economic, scientific, and technological, and cultural flows. Globalization undermined US unipolarity, facilitating the faster relative growth of non-Western States. China’s export-oriented growth, returning it to its historical position as one of the world’s largest economies is the most important dimension for changes to world order. In parallel, other emerging markets have grown adding multipolar dimensions to international order. International Relations theory serves to think about how to respond to the return of China. About 20–25 years ago, Professor Joseph S. Nye (Harvard University) and Professor John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) articulated two major approaches with coherent theoretical and strategic visions for the Sino-American relationship. Nye, as a liberal institutionalist scholar and policymaker in the Bill Clinton Administration, presented a vision of ‘integrate, but hedge’. China integrated in the US-led world economy as member state of the World Trade Organization, while the US hedged against the rise of China by reinforcing its alliance with Japan.Footnote5 There were strong US and Western liberal expectations of Chinese economic growth and openness leading to political openness and reform. These expectations proved to be belied and ethnocentric. Mearsheimer, in line with his offensive realist theory, clearly outlined how the US had to keep China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia through a containment strategy.Footnote6 The US’ China strategy has shifted from the Nye perspective to the Mearsheimer perspective, while Mearsheimer himself is ostracized for his valid, but politically unacceptable, analysis of the Ukraine War. Mearsheimer explains how Sino-American bipolarity works with realist great power State security competition, and how competing great powers form their ‘bounded orders’ of allies and clients to discipline and mobilize these.Footnote7 The US is shaping a NATO+ order of the NATO member states and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. The US is increasingly engaging in trade and technology wars with China to slow down its growth rate, clearly denying its access to fundamental technologies of future knowledge-based economies. A realist focus on relative gains explains US policy to reduce China’s growth rate. China has a population more than three times that of the US with an absolute economy approaching the US economy. The US cannot allow China to catch up relatively with it, as that would imply a much larger Chinese economy than that of the US. Liberals (politically and theoretically) would ascribe the US policy to different domestic political systems, but the logic of anarchy points out how domestic political systems are of secondary concern, and empirically the US firmly bypassed and disciplined the previous Anglo-Saxon superpower, Britain. US-India relations can be expected to deteriorate with India’s socio-economic development, where India has a much younger population than China with great economic growth potential. China predicted the US abandoning its own open and globalized international economic policy out of concern for China’s relative rise to the US. China pursued a domestic and international economic policy much less dependent on US benevolence. In the domestic sphere, China pursued an economy based on domestic demand. Externally, China built up a parallel international economic and science and technology system with the Belt and Road Initiative with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Other bodies, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in security reflect parallel orders and institutions to the US-led Western institutions. Sino-American bipolarity also became clear in the Arctic about 10–15 years ago. China started to appear as a diplomatic, economic, science and technology actor in the Arctic. Western surprise and consternation to this development reflects the great difficulties many Westerners have in facing a world, where the Rest takes an interest in the West, and not only the West taking an interest in the Rest as during centuries of imperialism and colonialism. It should not be surprising that China as one of the world’s two largest national economies and science and technology systems (with the US) has interests in the Arctic, or anywhere else in the world. The US is globally present in politics, defence, diplomacy, economics, science and technology, culture, etc. The unfortunate Chinese term of ‘near-Arctic State’ to legitimize Chinese involvement in the Arctic drew much Western ridicule and opposition. In comparison, the US and the West seem to be ‘near-everywhere’ States. One place where the Sino-American bipolar logic appeared soon and clearly has been the Kingdom of Denmark with the North Atlantic and Arctic overseas autonomies of the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The US applies pressure on the Kingdom of Denmark to exclude Chinese investment, science and technology, in line with Mearsheimer’s argument of a superpower building bounded orders to mobilize and discipline allies and clients in security competition with a competing great or superpower. The Faroe Islands are located between Iceland, Norway, and Scotland. They are centrally placed in the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap controlling North-South access and blocking the Soviet-Russian Northern Fleet going south for NATO or the US and NATO navies going north for USSR/Russia. The Faroe Islands are becoming increasingly independent from Denmark. Huawei has long been a partner for the Faroese telecom company, which planned to continue with Huawei for 5G. This partnership came under increasing scrutiny from Danish and US sides. The Chinese ambassador to Copenhagen during a visit to the Faroe Islands linked the Faroe Islands choosing Huawei with prospects for a Sino-Faroese free trade agreement (the Faroe Islands are outside the EU and pursue an independent trade policy).Footnote8 The US ambassador to Copenhagen publicly spoke strongly against the Faroe Islands collaborating with Huawei for 5 G.Footnote9 Greenland is geographically North American (remember the Monroe Doctrine), crucial to US (North American) homeland defence, and pursuing independence from the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland and China have for some time eyed each other for investment and science and technology opportunities. Greenlandic independence primarily rests on economic independence from Denmark and human capital. The economic independence should be through, among other domains, mining, where China and Chinese companies were considered as very important likely investors. Copenhagen regarded Sino-Greenlandic mutual interest with great suspicion for a long time, which was evident from the report on Greenlandic mining from 2014.Footnote10 In 2014, the Royal Danish Navy abandoned Grønnedal, a small, remote old naval facility, established by the US during the Second World War, which was put up for sale. A Chinese mining company showed interest in the facility as a logistics hub for future operations in Greenland. The Danish government promptly took the facility off the market maintaining a token naval presence.Footnote11 Developing Greenlandic tourism requires upgrading the airport infrastructure, which is an enormous project for a nation of 57,000 on a 2 M km2 island. One of the finalists to an international tender was the China Construction Communication Company (4C), which might also have provided financing.Footnote12 The Danish government convinced the Greenlandic government to accept a Danish financing (with a Danish stake) of the renovated and new airports against choosing a Danish construction company.Footnote13 The Greenlandic government was reshaped over this intervention with a coalition party leaving in protest over accepting such Danish interference in Greenlandic affairs. In 2017, China publicly presented its interest in a research station in Greenland, including a satellite ground station, which the Government of Greenland might have been positive towards.Footnote14 This idea has never materialized, first probably delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, but Denmark and the US would never accept a Chinese research station and/or satellite station in Greenland. The US government has made its pressure on the Danish government public, through former Secretary of Defense, General Jim Mattis.Footnote15 China and Iceland spearheaded Sino-Nordic Arctic research cooperation from the official visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao to Iceland in 2012. In 2013, the China Nordic Arctic Research Center was founded, a virtual centre of Chinese and Nordic institutions hosted by the Polar Research Institute of China in Shanghai. CNARC has hosted an annual symposium between China and a Nordic country as well as researcher exchange. Today, Sweden has withdrawn from CNARC, and Denmark does not participate, as the participating Nordic Institute of Asian Studies at the University of Copenhagen has been closed. PRIC and RANNÍS (The Icelandic Center for Research, equivalent to Research Council) held the groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of the China-Iceland Aurora Observatory, now China Iceland Arctic Observatory, at Kárhóll, Northeast Iceland, in June 2014, which I attended. The Observatory opened formally—although unfinished—in October 2018. This collaboration had been hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic and negligence from central authorities and research institutions in the capital, Reykjavik. Today, Iceland is under pressure from the US, including a recent visit by US Congressional staffers, to close CIAO.Footnote16 US-Russia Eastern European security competition divides the Arctic US-Russia security competition, especially in Eastern Europe, became increasingly clear from around 2007–2008. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he unsurprisingly denounced US unipolarity. Russia had rejected US unipolarity and called for multipolarity since the Primakov Doctrine of the 1990s calling for Russia, China, and India to balance the US. In spring 2008, at the initiative of the US—and with French and German reservations—the NATO Bucharest summit invited Georgia and Ukraine to become member states. In the autumn, fighting broke out between Georgia and Russian forces in the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia leading to Georgia’s defeat. In autumn 2013, the EU proposed an agreement to Ukraine, which forced Ukraine to choose between Russia and the EU. The Ukrainian President rejected the EU’s proposal, leading to popular protests met with government violence and eventually the President fleeing the country. Russia intervened annexing Crimea and supporting an insurgency in the Donbas.Footnote17 In December 2021, Russia proposed a treaty to the US blocking former Soviet Republics from joining NATO and rolling back NATO troops and equipment in Central and Eastern Europe, which was rejected by the US and allies in January 2022. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which had led to a war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine. The West extends wide-ranging political, military, economic, and further support to Ukraine and tries to isolate Russia as much as possible. The Rest of the world follows Western policy of isolating Russia to a very limited extent. The Russian annexation of Crimea affected the Arctic in limited ways. The West stopped military dialogues with Russia in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum. The West imposed sanctions on Russian Arctic energy projects, as the US $27 billion Yamal LNG project, which initially had Russian Novatek (60 per cent), French Total (20 per cent), and China National Petroleum Cooperation (20 per cent) ownership. Sanctions forced Novatek to sell 9.9 per cent to the Chinese government’s Silk Road Fund and rely on Chinese bank funding. Russia responded to these sanctions with counter sanctions on Western food exports to Russia, which also affected some Arctic seafood export to Russia. Russia accepted Faroese salmon exports, which led to a boom in Faroese economy. In 2014, there was some protests in the Arctic Council from the Chair, Canada. Otherwise, Arctic Council and other scientific, people-to-people, cooperation continued between Russia and the seven other Arctic States. For Northern Norway, extensive regional cooperation in the Barents region continued. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine led to an almost complete Western cessation of Arctic collaboration with Russia. The other seven Arctic countries refused to collaborate with Russia in the Arctic Council, chaired by Russia 2021–2023. The Seven—now all NATO member states—Arctic Council member states have since backed down significantly. The Arctic Council was always more important to them than to Russia, suggesting that this Western brinkmanship was poorly thought through. There are extensive Western sanctions against the Russian economy, including against Russian Arctic energy projects, which were a key basis for developing the Russian Arctic. Russia had sought to develop a Europe-Russia-East Asia energy system with Russian Arctic oil and gas being exported both West to Europe and East to East Asia and with balanced Western and East Asian investments.Footnote18 The West has almost completely cut science and technology relations with Russia, also in the Arctic. The rare exceptions to continued Arctic science collaboration between West and Russia are for instance, the Norway-Russia Barents Sea Fisheries Commission because Norway also depends on this collaboration. The US continues more academic collaboration with Russia than European countries allow themselves; for instance, receiving Russian Fulbright professors. Norway pursued an extensive regional cooperation policy with Russia, Finland, and Sweden in the Barents Region since 1993 with much support for cross-border people-to-people exchange for youth, in education, academia, culture, environment, business development, and further. This collaboration built extensive insight, experience, networks, and access in Russia at North Norwegian institutions, as UiT The Arctic University of Norway, UNN The University Hospital of Northern Norway, the Norwegian Polar Institute, the Arctic Frontiers Conference, businesses such as Akvaplan-Niva marine environmental consultancy, and in academia, civil society, education, and government. The border town of Kirkenes depended for about a third of its economic turnover on trade with Russia. These connections are now almost completely cut by Norwegian government policy. Russian society and politics did become much more closed and authoritarian during this period, but that was for internal political reasons and not directed against Norway. Personally, I had successful high-level academic cooperation with some of the key Russian academic institutions funded by Norwegian public funds until they were forbidden by Norwegian government policy after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. My last personal visit to Moscow was in December 2019, and I was planning to visit with a sizeable group of Norwegian faculty and PhD candidates in April 2020, postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The rapid division of world order in a NATO+ and a BRICS++ world The world is separating into a NATO+ grouping of NATO countries and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, under clear US leadership, and the Rest. The Rest, I call BRICS++ for the BRICS+ grouping and many other countries. This separation is clear through demography, economy, and science and technology. Humanity is about 8 billion people, compared to the West, which is about 1 billion, making it a small minority. Humanity is expected to grow to 10 billion, where the West will remain at about 1 billion, a shrinking small minority. The dominance of the West has rested on economic development and science and technology, translated into military force, with a shrinking demographic share of the world economy, scientific and technological development and relative power shifts from the West to the Rest. Legitimacy and credibility divisions are also clearly visible between the NATO+ and the BRICS++ worlds concerning the war in Ukraine, where the West is astonished by its own isolation. To great surprise, the Rest of the world have not followed the West’s attempts to isolate Russia diplomatically and economically. This rejection of the West’s position was clear from the very first UN Security Council debate on the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Russian veto and Chinese and Indian abstentions were not surprising, but the abstention by the United Arab Emirates was remarkable considering the close security and other partnerships between the GCC countries and the US and historically the UK. The speech during the debate on 21 February 2022, a few days prior, by the Kenyan ambassador to the Security Council, condemning Russia’s recognition of breakaway regions but reminding that other UNSC permanent members had also violated international law, showed the lack of Western credibility and legitimacy on the issue.Footnote19 Western credibility and legitimacy have eroded further by supporting Israel’s genocide in Gaza since the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. The Division of the Arctic in a NATO Arctic and Russian BRICS++ Arctic. The effects of world order on the Arctic are clear, applying the analytical lenses of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar traits of world order to the Arctic. The world is increasingly becoming Sino-American bipolar, where the US seeks to maintain unipolarity through a global containment strategy of China. This struggle is also evident in the Arctic; for instance, US pressure on the Kingdom of Denmark to exclude Chinese investment, science and technology in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The US keeps up an ever-stronger anti-Chinese Arctic discourse from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s 2019 speech in Rovaniemi, Finland, to US Senator Lisa Murkowski at the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik in 2024. Russia has opposed US unipolarity since the 1990s, seeking multipolarity. The conflict between US and Russian multipolarity ultimately escalated via the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the proxy war in Ukraine. This conflict has led to an almost complete division of the Arctic into NATO-Arctic (collaborating with the wider NATO+ world and further) and the Russian Arctic. Russia reaches out all it can diplomatically, economically, and in science and technology to the BRICS++ world, especially China and India. The Rest of the World seems restrained from pursuing Russian Arctic opportunities by the risk of US and Western secondary sanctions and other NATO Arctic pushbacks. Conclusion: looking forward for world and Arctic order The world is—as usual for international history—marked by the struggle over the world order among the strongest State actors. This struggle was forgotten especially by European observers during the post-Cold War era, with the illusion of End of History and confounding globalization and modernization with Westernization. Instead, we have had the Return of History and the return of historically very large non-Western economic, science and technology actors as China, followed by others. The current struggle over the world order also shapes the Arctic, as was historically clear, especially during the Second World War and the Cold War. The US is determined to prolong post-Cold War unipolar dominance expressed as ‘rules-based order’, where the US defines the rules, to whom, and when they apply. Europe has found an apparently comfortable and completely dependent position in this US-led order. The Rest of the World less so, with China and Russia explicitly rejecting this US-led order. The conflict over world order between the US and its bounded order in the NATO+ world in Europe, Oceania, and East Asia and the Rest of the World, can only be expected to escalate. The US must either stop Chinese economic, science and technology development (and later other peer competitors), or demographics, economy, science and technology will lead to a more bipolar and multipolar world. Europe by its dependence on the US is forced to follow this US strategy. The war in Ukraine can lead to a frozen conflict, where the overall Russia-West relationship remains highly conflictual, including in the Arctic. Ukrainian defeat or a negotiated settlement with a neutralized Ukraine and cessation of territory to Russia will also probably lead to a decadal severance of economic, science and technology, people-to-people ties between Russia and the West, including in the Arctic. A Russian defeat is unlikely because of difference in Russian and Ukrainian manpower and resources. China is unlikely to allow Russia to succumb to the US, which would put defeated Russia on China’s Northern frontier in China’s own conflict with the US. All in all, world order seems highly conflictual and with increased separation between the NATO+ and the BRICS++ world, which will only bring humanity more conflict and less economic development and growth, unlike the age of post-Cold War globalization. This division will be replicated in the Arctic. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsRasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen is Professor at UiT The Arctic University of Norway. Views expressed are personal. Notes 1. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, ‘Unipolarity and Order in the Arctic’. Nina Græger, Bertel Heurlin, Ole Wæver, Anders Wivel, (Eds.), Polarity in International Relations. Governance, Security and Development, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05505-8_16. 2. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 43 (4), 2019, pp. 7–50 at https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342 3. George Lindsey, ‘Strategic Stability in the Arctic’, Adelphi Papers 241, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989. 4. Steven E. Miller, ‘The Return of the Strategic Arctic’, in The Arctic Yearbook, 2023 at https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/6C_AY2022_Miller.pdf. 5. Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Challenge of China’, in Stephen Van Evera (Ed.) How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security, The Tobin Project, Cambridge, MA 2006 at https://tobinproject.org/sites/default/files/assets/Make_America_Safe_The_Challenge_Of_China.pdf. 6. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All’, The Australian, 18 November 2005 at https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The-Australian-November-18-2005.pdf. 7. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 43 (4), pp. 7–50, 2019 athttps://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342. 8. Thomas Foght, ‘Hemmelig lydoptagelse: Kina pressede Færøerne til at vælge Huawei’ [Secret Sound Recording: China Pressured the Faroe Islands to Choose Huawei]. Danmarks Radio, 2019 at https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/hemmelig-lydoptagelse-kina-pressede-faeroeerne-til-vaelge-huawei. 9. Adam Satariano, ‘At the Edge of the World, a New Battleground for the US and China’, New York Times, 2019 at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/technology/faroe-islands-huawei-china-us.html. 10. The Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society, ‘To the Benefit of Greenland’. Ilisimatusarfik-University of Greenland; University of Copenhagen, 2014 at https://vbn.aau.dk/ws/files/208241864/To_the_benefit_of_Greenland.pdf. 11. Martin Breum, ‘Analyse: Stoppede Danmarks statsminister kinesisk opkøb i Grønland?’ [Analysis: Did the Danish Prime Minister Stop Chinese Acquisition in Greenland?]. High North News, 2018 at https://www.highnorthnews.com/nb/analyse-stoppede-danmarks-statsminister-kinesisk-opkob-i-gronland. 12. Teis Jensen, ‘Greenland shortlists Chinese company for airport construction despite Denmark’s concerns’, Reuters, 2018 at https://www.reuters.com/article/world/greenland-shortlists-chinese-company-for-airport-construction-despite-denmarks-idUSKBN1H32XG/. 13. Statsministeriet, ‘Aftale mellem regeringen og Naalakkersuisut om dansk engagement i lufthavnsprojektet i Grønland og styrket erhvervssamarbejde mellem Danmark og Grønland’ [Agreement Between the [Danish] Government and Naalakkersuisut [Government of Greenland] on Danish Involvement in the Airport Project in Greenland and Enhanced Business Collaboration Between Denmark and Greenland] Statsministeriet. Formandens Departement, 2018 at https://www.stm.dk/media/8148/10-09-2018_aftale_mellem_regeringen_og_naalakkersuisut.pdf. 14. Martin Breum, ‘Kina vil bygge kontroversiel forskningsstation i Grønland’. [China Wants to Build Controversial Research Station in Greenland], 2017 at https://www.information.dk/udland/2017/10/kina-bygge-kontroversiel-forskningsstation-groenland. 15. Damian Paletta and Itkowitz Colby, ‘Trump Aides Look into US Purchasing Greenland after Directives from President’. The Washington Post, 2019 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/16/america-first-greenland-second-is-trumps-latest-white-house-directive/. 16. ‘Letter to Anthony Blinking and Lloyd Austin’, Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, United States Congress, 2017 at https://democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/10.16.24_PRC%20dual%20use%20research%20in%20the%20Arctic__.pdf. 17. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2014 at https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf. 18. Mariia Kobzeva and Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, ‘European-Russian-Chinese Arctic Energy System’,in Xing Li (Ed) China-EU Relations in a New Era of Global Transformation, London: Routledge, London, 2021, 22p. 19. Martin Kimani, ‘Statement by Amb. Martin Kimani, during the Security Council Urgent Meeting on the Situation in Ukraine’, The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya, United Nations Security Council, February 2022 at https://www.un.int/kenya/sites/www.un.int/files/Kenya/kenya_statement_during_urgent_meeting_on_on_ukraine_21_february_2022_at_2100.pdf.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On September 24, 2024, speaking from the gargantuan Kazan International Exhibition Centre during the BRICS Summit in Russia, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphatically extolled the “collective rise of the Global South [as] a distinctive feature of the great transformation across the world.” While celebrating “Global South countries marching together toward modernization [as] monumental in world history and unprecedented in human civilization,” the Chinese leader hastened to add that China was not quite a part of but at the Global South’s “forefront”; that “will always keep the Global South in [their] heart, and maintain [their]roots in the Global South. As emerging powers in the BRICS+ grouping thronged Kazan in a clear sign to the West that they would not unwittingly entrench Vladimir Putin’s full-scale diplomatic isolation, China’s message was clear: as a great power, they would not ignore or undermine the interests of the Global South.  The rise of the Global South as a central voice in world politics concurs with the emergence of cyber diplomacy as a diplomatic field. This is not a coincidence, as they are both intimately related to broader changes in the international order, away from a US-led liberal international order, toward a post-liberal one, whose contours are still being defined, but where informal groupings, such as the BRICS+ play a key role. One could even argue that it is this transition to a new order that has pushed states to engage diplomatically on issues around cyberspace. What was once the purview of the Global North, and particularly the US, is now a contested domain of international activity. In this text we explore how the Global South has entered this contestation, and how it articulates its ever-growing presence in shaping the agenda of this domain. However, as cyber diplomacy is mainstreamed across the Global South, it is unclear whether it will continue to be a relevant collective force in forging the rules and norms that govern cyberspace, or whether the tendency will be for each country to trace their own path in service of their independent national interests. The evolution of cyber diplomacy in a post-liberal world Cyber diplomacy is very recent. One could argue that its practice only really started in the late 1990s, with Russia’s proposal of an international treaty to ban electronic and information weapons. Cyber diplomacy, as “the use of diplomatic resources and the performance of diplomatic functions to secure national interests with regard to the cyberspace” (or more simply, to the “the application of diplomacy to cyberspace”  is even more recent, with the first few writings on the topic emerging only in the last 15 years.   To be sure, the internet was born at the zenith of the US-led liberal international order and was viewed as an ideal tool to promote based on liberalism, free trade and information exchange with limited government intervention and democratic ideals. Cyber libertarians extolled the virtues of an independent cyberspace, free from state control and western governments, particularly the US, did not disagree. They viewed the internet as the perfect tool for promoting US global power and maintaining liberal hegemony -“ruling the airwaves as Great Britain once ruled the seas.” The internet was ensconced in the relatively uncontested unipolar geopolitical moment. As the pipe dreams of a liberal cyberspace began to unravel with China and Russia pushing for an alternate state-centric vision of cyberspace, cyber diplomacy began to emerge both as a “response to and continuing factor in the continuing battle in and over cyberspace.” Explicitly, we can pin down its origin to two factors. First, is the perception that cyberspace was becoming an increasingly intertwined with geopolitics and geo-economics, with states starting to better understand its threats, but also its opportunities. Moonlight Maze, the 2007 attacks against Estonia or even Stuxnet were all cases that helped focus the mind of policymakers around the world. Second, the broader context of underlying changes in the international order necessitated cyber diplomacy as a bridge-building activity both to mitigate great power rivalry and to preserve the stability of cyberspace and the digital economy. Private companies, till then the beneficiaries of an open and de-regulated internet, also had to step in to ensure that their own interests and profit motives were safeguarded. These two intertwined factors dominated the discussions around cyber diplomacy for most of the 2000s. Initially, the predominant focus was arms control, reflected in the composition of the first few Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) iterations, the forum created by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to discuss the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in international security. And although experts appointed by countries from the Global South were present since the first meeting in July 2004 the debate was very much framed as a discussion among great powers. As discussions progressed, and the GGE became a process in itself, some states outside the permanent members’ group started to engage more actively. This also coincided with the progressive creation of cyber diplomacy posts and offices in foreign ministries around the world. The field was becoming more professional, as more states started to realise that these were discussions that mattered beyond the restrictive group of power politics. Countries such as South Africa, Brazil, or Kenya started to push for the discussion of issues that affected a larger group of states, with a particular focus on cyber capacity building not just at the UN-GGE but also at other multilateral and multi-stakeholder processes and conferences including the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The creation of a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) at the UN First Committee (after an acrimonious diplomatic process) had an important effect in the diversification and democratisation of the discussions, as these were now open to the whole UN membership, and non-state actors were given the opportunity to observe and participate in these sessions. Further, in 2022, the UN set up an Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) to negotiate a cybercrime convention (adopted by consensus by UNGA members in December 2024) that also enabled all UN members to participate in the negotiations. The opening up of these processes exposed many states, particularly in the Global South, to the field, and it forced them to actively engage in discussions that until recently were seen as the dominion of great powers. The African Group and the G77 were now able to actively participate in the discussions, with frequent statements and contributions. Conceptualising the Global South in cyber diplomacy As cyber diplomacy progressed, policy-maker and academics alike understood global cyber governance to be divided along three main blocs of states. The status quo defenders were led by the US and (mostly Western) like-minded states, focused on the promotion of liberal values and non-binding norms shaped by a multi-stakeholder approach and adherence to existing tenets of international law but resisted significant changes in the governance of cyberspace. A revisionist group, led by Russia and China, advocated for a new binding international treaty and multilateral governance with the objective of guaranteeing security and order rather than necessarily promoting liberal values. Given this impasse, the role and influence of a group of states termed ‘swing states’ or ‘digital deciders’ has been recognized as critical to determining the future of cyberspace, most prominently in a detailed 2018 report by the Washington DC-based think-tank New America . This grouping that largely includes emerging powers from the Global South including India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, are understood as countries that are yet to “gravitate towards either end of the spectrum, some undecided and others seeking a third path.” Given these groupings, it is worth considering how the Global South fits in with present conceptualisations of cyber diplomacy, or whether it is a grouping at all. The term ‘Global South’ has come in for some criticism given the heterogeneity of countries it describes and its geographical inaccuracy (many Global South countries are not quite in the geographical South.) To be fair, the term never aspired for terminological accuracy and was instead coined to conceptually represent a group of countries during the Vietnam dissatisfied with the political and economic exploitation from the Global North. In that regard, Global South is a “mood,” a metaphor for developing countries aiming to find their way in an increasingly contested world. The war in Ukraine only augmented these fissures as the West were confounded by the Global South’s refusal to take a stand against brazen Russian aggression in Europe. The developing world saw it differently though: in an international order long-built on racism and inequality, expecting these countries to take a stand in their “petty squabbles” while they had also carried out “similarly violent, unjust, and undemocratic interventions—from Vietnam to Iraq” was a bridge too far. The Ukraine war helped clarify the combination of behaviours that countries within the Global South exhibit to attain this strategic goal: ideological agnosticism or neutrality; selective engagement with norms and rules; and finally, multi-pronged bilateral and minilateral groupings, with equidistance from the major powers. These three approaches helped illuminate the multiple different forms of agency that each developing country exercises vis-à-vis the international order based on their own interests and quest for strategic autonomy. However, what became evident as Russians bombs started to fall on the street of Kyiv, was already visible in these states’ interactions in cyber diplomacy. First, much of the Global South has refused to take an explicit stand on the controversial fissures that the leading powers have spent much of their time debating, including whether cyberspace governance should be state-centric or driven by new rules or existing international law.  Throughout the negotiating processes at the UN OEWG and AHC, as Russia and China clashed with the United States and its allies on the text of several controversial proposals, most developing countries took an agnostic approach, neither explicitly endorsing or opposing any of these potential treaty provisions. (There are naturally some exceptions: an analysis of voting patterns suggests that Iran and North Korea have firmly pegged themselves to the Russian and Chinese side of the aisle whereas some smaller developing countries have gravitated towards the US side of the aisle.) Second, there has been selective engagement when security or developmental interests are directly impacted. For example, in its joint submission to the UN’s Global Digital Compact (GDC), the G77+China asserted the need for equitable cross-border data flows that maximize development gains. The GDC is the UN’s first comprehensive framework for global digital cooperation. Long concerned about the misuse of the multi-stakeholder model by private actors for profit at the expense of developmental interests, the G77 also highlighted the need for “multilateral and transparent approaches to digital governance to facilitate a more just, equitable and effective governance system.” Finally, countries in  the Global South have entered into multiple technology partnerships across political and ideological divides. US efforts at restricting the encroachment of Chinese hardware providers like Huawei and ZTE into the core technological periphery of several Global South countries using allegations of surveillance were sometimes rebuked, given the Five Eyes’ proclivity and reputation for also conducting similar surveillance, including on top officials. By being agnostic on controversial ideological issues, countries in the Global South have been able to maintain ties with great powers on all sides of the political spectrum and foster pragmatic technological partnerships. Will the Global South rise? The Global South’s rise as a potent force in cyber diplomacy will, however, depend on three factors. Can it maintain ideological consistency on developmental and rights concerns, including on how the internet is governed at home? Can they continue to work with multiple partners without succumbing to pressure either from Washington or Beijing? Will emerging powers in the Global South (like India, Brazil and Indonesia) bat for the interests of the larger developing world, rather than simply orchestrating global governance to service their own interests or that of the regime in power? Given that cyber diplomacy emerged and developed as the playground of great powers, analysing it through the perspective of the Global South enables us to focus on cyber governance as an issue that goes beyond (cyber)security concerns – including economic development and identity (cutting across issues of race, gender, and colonialism) – and to see the world from a perspective that goes beyond the dynamics of great power competition. Analytically, it is useful to understand how these states position themselves and justify their actions on behalf of the whole. When looking inside the box, we see some collective movement but also a desire on part of the great powers, including China to incentivise the developing world to see the world as they do. The Global South remains relevant as a construct that captures the mood of the developing world on the geopolitics of technology of cyber issues. Its “great strength” will emerge not from swinging between Washington and Beijing or being orchestrated through New Delhi or Brasilia. It will instead come through standing their ground, in service of their own security and developmental interests in cyberspace. And as they progress, it remains to be seen whether the “Global South” retains its relevance as an analytical construct or whether it will give way to other denominations that better capture the developing world’s nuances and differences vis-à-vis the international cyber order. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском AbstractPurpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the international political economy of Korea and its effects due to geopolitical tension between China and the USA. Design/methodology/approach Economic war between China and the USA has prolonged longer than expected. Aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, reforming the supply chain has been the centre of economic tension between China and the USA. Quite recently, with the rapid expansion of Chinese e-commerce platforms, distribution channels come upon a new economic tension between the two. And now is the time to pivot its pattern of conflict from competition into cooperation. In this end, economic diplomacy could be a useful means to give a signal of cooperation. From the view of economic diplomacy, this paper tries to analyse the projected transition of economic war between China and the USA with its implication on the trade policy of Korea. Findings As an implementation of economic diplomacy, China suggested the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), enhancing trade logistics among related countries to gain competitiveness. In 2023, the Biden administration suggested the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor as a counter to BRI, which will be a threshold for changing trade policy from economic war into economic diplomacy. As a result, it is expected China and the USA will expand their economic diplomacy in a way to promote economic cooperation among allied states, while the distribution channel war would continue to accelerate the economic tension between China and the USA. Korea has to prepare for and provide measures handling this geopolitical location in its trade policy or economic diplomacy. Originality/value This research contributes to the awareness and understanding of trade environments from the perspective of economic diplomacy. 1. Introduction The advent of globalisation has led to widespread economic integration, creating global production networks and markets. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has acted as a significant setback to this trend. In the wake of COVID-19, an economic war has arisen between China and the USA, centred on the restructuring of global supply chains following widespread disruptions. International political economy (IPE) examines the power dynamics between states and the structures of influence within regional economies. Consequently, economic diplomacy has gained unprecedented attention. Economic diplomacy focuses on government actions regarding international economic issues, distinct from political diplomacy through its market-oriented approach in foreign policy. Putnam (1988) categorises economic diplomacy into two levels: unilateralism and bilateralism. Unilateral economic diplomacy (or unilateralism) often relies on hard power, involving decisions on trade liberalisation or market protection without negotiation. Bilateral economic diplomacy (or bilateralism) or multilateral economic diplomacy (or multilateralism), by contrast, involves negotiation among trade partners, resulting in agreements such as regional or global free trade agreements (FTAs). A vast range of state or non-state actors engage in economic diplomacy, navigating the complex interplay between international and domestic factors. Defining economic diplomacy is extremely challenging, but one useful definition is “the broad concept of economic statecraft, where economic measures are taken in the pursuit of political goals, including punitive actions such as sanctions” (Blanchard and Ripsman, 2008).  Figure 1 Recent trend of economic diplomacy To exert influence internationally, ministers and heads of government strive to demonstrate their capacity for national security through two primary approaches, as shown in Figure 1 (above): economic war (or competition) and economic diplomacy (or international cooperation). In the context of global supply chain restructuring, the economic conflict between China and the USA has intensified, marked by threats of supply chain disruptions. This has led to emerging strategies aimed at “crowding out” the USA from global supply chains (去美戰略) or excluding China through alliances such as the Allied Supply Chain and Chip 4. While economic war is inherently “temporary” due to its painstaking nature, economic diplomacy or international cooperation offer a more “long-term” approach because it is gains-taking. This paper analyses the factors contributing to the prolonged nature of this economic war and explores potential outcomes of the supply chain tensions between China and the USA from the perspectives of IPE or geo-economics. In conclusion, it highlights the importance of preparing for trade policy adjustments and strategic economic diplomacy. 2. International trade war and strategic items2.1 Supply chain The supply chain encompasses a network of interconnected suppliers involved in each stage of production, from raw materials and components to the finished goods or services. This network can include vendors, warehouses, retailers, freight stations and distribution centres. Effective supply chain management is a “crucial process because an optimised supply chain results in lower costs and a more efficient production cycle” [1]. Within the supply chain, a leading company typically holds governance power, enabling it to coordinate scheduling and exercise control across the interconnected suppliers, resulting in reduced costs and shorter production times (Gereffi et al., 2005) [2]. Since the 2000s, forward and backward integration have been key strategies for managing time, cost and uncertainty in supply chains. For example, Toyota’s Just-In-Time (JIT) system demonstrated the efficiency of locally concentrated supply chains until disruptions from the 2011 East Japan Earthquake and the Thailand flood. Following supply chain shutdowns in 2020, many businesses shifted from local to global supply chains, utilising advancements of the information technology (IT) and transportation technologies to geographically diversify operations. As the need for a systematically functioning global supply chain has grown, a leading nation, much like a leading company, often assumes governance power in international trade and investment, as illustrated in Figure 2 (below), by aligning with the leadership of a dominant market competitiveness, which makes this leadership valuable.  Figure 2 Supply chain The COVID-19 pandemic dealt a severe blow to the global supply chain, causing sudden lockdowns that led to widespread supply chain disruptions. To mitigate the risks of future global disruptions, supply chains have begun restructuring to operate on a more regionally segmented basis. In this shift toward regional supply chains, China and the USA are at the centre, drawing allied countries within their spheres of influence. This alignment helps explain why the economic war between China and the USA has lasted longer than anticipated. 2.2 Strategic items China has restricted exports of two rare metals, gallium and germanium, which are critical to semiconductor production. Kraljic (1983) highlighted the importance of managing “strategic items” within the framework of supply chain management, as shown in Figure 3. Kraljic emphasises the need to strengthen and diversify critical items. The Kraljic matrix provides a valuable tool for identifying essential items that require focused management within the supply chain.  Figure 3 Kraljic matrix Kraljic identified the importance of managing “bottleneck items” in strategic supply chain management – items that present high supply risk but have relatively low business value. Due to the potential costs associated with non-delivery or compromised quality of strategic items, these must be closely monitored and controlled. From a risk management perspective, establishing medium-term business relationships and collaboration with suppliers is essential. For example, South Korea imports over 90% of its urea for agricultural and industrial purposes from China [3]. Heavily dependent on China for urea supplies due to pricing factors, Korea faced challenges when China imposed export controls on urea, underscoring Korea’s vulnerability within China’s sphere of influence. The European Union (EU) also faces challenges with critical raw materials (CRMs). China remains the EU’s sole supplier of processed rare earth elements, while Chile supplies 79% of its lithium. In response, the EU introduced the CRM Act (CRMA) to support projects aimed at increasing “the EU’s capacity to extract, process, and recycle strategic raw materials and diversify supplies from the third countries” [4]. 2.3 Resilient supply chain alliance In contrast to China’s approach of leveraging supply disruptions to strengthen its influence, the Biden administration in the USA has adopted a cooperative approach focused on building resilient supply chains (Pillar 2) through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which includes 14 member countries [5]. The need for resilient supply chains has been further underscored by the Russia–Ukraine crisis. The IPEF aims to address supply chain vulnerabilities by fostering global efforts to reduce risks associated with concentrated, fragile supply chains [6].  Figure 4 Resilient supply chain alliance In Figure 4, the EU Commission presented the Single Market Emergency Instrument (SMEI) in September 2022, a crisis governance framework designed to ensure the availability of essential goods and services during future emergencies. The SMEI operates on three levels: contingency planning, vigilance and emergency. The contingency planning phase focuses on collaboration among member states to mitigate supply chain disruption and monitor incidents. The vigilance phase can be activated when a significant disruption is anticipated, enabling specific measures such as mapping and monitoring supply chains and production capacities. Finally, the emergency phase is activated in cases of severe disruption to the functioning of the single market [7]. Establishing a resilient supply chain through international cooperation may be appealing, yet the reality often falls short of the ambition. In South Korea, the IPEF took effect on 17 April 2024, after an extended negotiation process, marking the first multilateral agreement on supply chains. As a result, during non-crisis periods, the 14 member countries will collaborate to strengthen international trade, investment and trade logistics. In times of crisis, member countries will activate a “crisis response network”. Conversely, opportunities for negotiation with China, South Korea’s largest trading partner, are essential for building supply chain resilience [8]. China has pursued an industrial policy focused on enhancing its supply chain management capabilities. In the semiconductor sector, the decoupling between China and the USA has become increasingly evident. Contrary to expectations, China has adopted a policy of internalising its supply chains, returning to the integration strategies of the 2000s rather than furthering globalisation. A promising opportunity for transformation between the two countries has emerged recently. Since 2015, China and South Korea have maintained bilateral FTA, and with the second phase of FTA negotiations currently underway, there is an opportunity to strengthen trade and investment ties, fostering positive progress through international cooperation. 2.4 China manufacturing exodus During the COVID-19 pandemic, China imposed sudden lockdowns without prior notice or preparation, halting production and logistics cycles. This “zero COVID” policy may have triggered a shift towards “de-risking” China from supply chain disruptions. Although China still offers significant advantages as “the factory of the world,” with vast market potential, prolonged trade tensions with the USA, intensified during the Trump administration, have prompted global manufacturers with substantial USA market bases to relocate operations amid rising geopolitical uncertainties. For example, Nike and Adidas have shifted much of their footwear manufacturing to Vietnam, Apple has begun iPhone production at a Foxconn in Chennai, India, and AstraZeneca has contracted production with India’s Serum Institute. In the pre-globalised era, defining the Rule of Origin (ROO) was straightforward, as a product’s components were usually manufactured and assembled within a single country. However, with the complexity of global supply chains, particularly since 2012, determining ROO has become a time-consuming and subjective process. ROO are classified as either non-preferential or preferential. The USA applies non-preferential ROO to restrict imports from countries like Cuba, Iran and North Korea, while offering trade preference programmes for others. Preferential ROO are used to determine duty-free eligibility for imports from approved countries [9], whereas non-preferential ROO play a crucial role in “country of origin labelling, government procurement, enforcement of trade remedy actions, compilation of trade statistics, supply chain security issues.” [10] China manufacturing exodus may negatively impact capital inflows into Hong Kong, traditionally seen as the Gateway to China. In 2023, Hong Kong’s initial public offering volume fell to a 20-year low of $5.9bn [11]. While China-oriented business remains in Hong Kong, which returns fully to Chinese control in 2047, non-China-oriented businesses have migrated to Singapore. As the certainty of contract and ownership rights forms the foundation of capitalism, this capital flight from Hong Kong is likely to persist. 3. Trade logistics and economic corridors Globalisation has allowed supply chains to leverage interdependence and interconnectedness, maximising efficiency. However, while these efficiencies have been beneficial, they have also created a fertile ground for friction between trade partners due to a “survival of the fittest” mindset and the principle of “winner takes all.” This interdependence has also highlighted vulnerabilities; the global supply chain struggled to manage the disruptions caused by COVID-19, prompting a shift towards regional integration initiatives, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. As the global economy seeks stability, collaboration over competition has become increasingly essential, with economic diplomacy emerging as a priority. The prolonged economic war between China and the USA arguably needs to shift towards economic diplomacy. The global supply chain is restructuring into regional supply chains, building resilience by operating in regional segments that can withstand crises. Michael Porter introduced the concept of value chain as “a set of activities that a firm performs to deliver a valuable product or service to the market.” [12] Complex finished goods often depend on global value chains, traversing multiple countries. As shown in Figure 5, the value chain consists of supply chain and trade channel components. While the focus has traditionally been on which country holds lead status within a regional supply chain, the emphasis is now shifting to how these regional segments can be interconnected and relayed. In this context, the supply chain competition may evolve into a “channel war” in international trade, where trade logistics will centre on the internal flow of goods, standardising channel processes and establishing authority over these channels.  Figure 5 Supply chain v. trade channel 3.1 Trade logistics It is natural for governments to seek environments that enhance competitiveness within in their countries. In terms of trade, effective trade logistics are essential for maintaining competitive advantage. As a prerequisite, a strong IT management infrastructure is indispensable. As shown in Figure 6, trade logistics encompass the internal flow of goods to market, integrating physical infrastructure with operating software – such as transport hubs, warehouses, highways, ports, terminals, trains and shipping vessels. Key areas of conflict in trade logistics involve the standardisation of channel processes and determining who holds governance over operation of these logistics systems. This is equally relevant within the digital economy. Recently, Chinese e-commerce – often referred to as C-commerce – has aggressively sought to gain control over digital distribution channels, interconnected delivery networks and trade logistics via digital platforms. Chinese platforms such as Taobao, Temu and AliExpress are actively working to increase their monthly active users (MAUs), positing themselves as counterweights to USA-based platforms such as Amazon and eBay in digital trade [13].  Figure 6 Trade logistics When the agenda of establishing international trade logistics is introduced to relevant trade members across various countries, initial progress and effective responses are often achieved. However, efforts soon encounter obstacles related to standardising logistics processes and establishing operational governance. Greater reliance on international institutions could help resolve these issues (Bayne, 2017). Yet governments frequently prioritise domestic interests, and after prolonged negotiations, the risk of international agreements failing increases. Amid the economic war between China and the USA, China launched a trade logistics initiative known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or One Belt One Road, in 2013. Often referred to as the New Silk Road, the BRI aims to establish economic corridors for trade logistics. The World Bank estimates that the BRI could boost trade flows by 4.1% and reduce trade costs by 1.1% [14]. In response, the Biden administration proposed the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in September 2023 to strengthen transport and communication links between Europe and Asia as a countermeasure to China’s BRI. IMEC has been well received by participating countries, with expectations of fostering economic growth, enhancing connectivity and potentially rebalancing trade and economic relations between the EU and China [15]. Both BRI and IMEC are ambitious projects aimed at boosting international trade through substantial investments in trade logistics infrastructure. Each seeks to assert governance over international trade channels, signalling that the supply chain war may soon evolve into a trade channel war between China and the USA. 3.2 Economic corridors Economic corridors are transport networks designed to support and facilitate the movement of goods, services, people and information. These corridors often include integrated infrastructure, such as highways, railways and ports, linking cities or even countries (Octaviano and Trishia, 2014). They are typically established to connect manufacturing hubs, high-supply and high-demand areas, and producers of value-added goods. Economic corridors comprise both hard infrastructure – such as trade facilities – and soft infrastructure, including trade facilitation and capacity-building measures. The Asian Development Bank introduced the term “economic corridor” in 1998 to describe networks connecting various economic agents within a region [16]. Economic corridors are integrated trade logistics networks, providing essential infrastructure for connecting regional segments of supply chains. As supply chains increasingly operate in regional “chunks,” linking these segments becomes ever more important. Economic corridors typically include a network of transport infrastructure, such as highways, railways, terminals and ports. Initiatives like the BRI and IMEC use economic corridors as instruments of economic diplomacy, shifting strategies from hard power to soft power, as shown in Figure 7. Because less-developed or developing countries often lack sufficient funding to invest in trade logistics, they tend to welcome these initiatives from developed countries, which offer international collaboration and support. However, these initiatives usually come with the condition that participating countries must accept standardised trade processes and governance led by the sponsoring developed country.  Figure 7 Economic corridor initiatives as economic diplomacy To succeed, economic corridors must meet three key conditions [17]. First, government intervention is essential, as economic corridor initiatives primarily involve public infrastructure investments beyond the scope of the private sector. In realising these projects, governments must reconcile three tensions to ensure their policies are mutually supportive: tensions between politics and economics, between international and domestic pressures and between governments and other stakeholders. Second, intermediate outcomes should be measured and demonstrated as results of economic corridors, allowing participants to experience tangible benefits throughout these longer-term projects. Finally, economic corridors should deliver broader benefits. Participants need incentives to utilise the infrastructure sustainably. These benefits may extend beyond economic welfare, such as wages and income, to include social inclusion, equity and environmental gains, which support the long-term viability of the infrastructure. 4. BRI vs IMEC4.1 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - Silk Road The BRI can be a modern-day realisation of the Silk Road concept, connecting Europe as a market base with China as a production base. Unlike the ancient Silk Road, which connected trade routes across Eurasia, the BRI poses potential challenges due to its extensive connectivity. Firstly, there are social and environmental externalities, such as increased congestion and accidents from concentrating traffic flows through limited links and nodes within trade networks. Secondly, while the connectivity may benefit the production and market bases at either end, regions situated between these hubs, through which highways and railways pass, may gain minimal advantage. Thirdly, there is often a mismatch between where costs and benefits are realised. Transit regions that facilitate network traffic often see fewer direct benefits compared to high-density nodes within the network. 4.2 India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) - The Spice Road The ancient Spice Roads once connected the Middle East and Northeast Africa with Europe, facilitating the exchange of goods such as cinnamon, ginger, pepper and cassia, which, like silk, served as a form of currency. The IMEC proposes a modern route from India to Europe through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Israel and Greece. Since its announcement in September 2023, some regional experts have expressed reservations about its feasibility, particularly regarding the connection between the Middle East and Israel. The project has faced delays due to the Israel–Hamas war. Despite these challenges, IMEC holds potential to drive economic growth and strengthen connectivity, especially as countries like Vietnam and India emerge as alternative manufacturing bases for companies relocating from China. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, IMEC is not viewed as a challenge to China but rather as an opportunity to diversify their economies and solidify their roles within the Middle East region [18]. 5. Conclusion A new trade war between China and the USA has begun, with the Biden Administration’s introduction of IMEC as a counter to China’s BRI. This shift could soon transform the nature of economic war from a focus on supply chains to one on trade channels. The China manufacturing exodus was further accelerated by supply disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Amidst the economic tensions between China and the USA, the restructuring of global supply chains into regional networks has made significant progress. With China maintaining its stance on export controls for strategic items, South Korea must prepare for resilient supply chain management. In relation to China–Korea FTA, which is currently undergoing its second phase of negotiation, South Korea should seek clarity on the transparency of China’s strategic item controls. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) plays a key role in monitoring the quality of inbound investments; similarly, South Korea is experiencing increased inbound investment due to the manufacturing shift from China and should apply similar standards to evaluate investment quality. This emerging economic war between China and the USA is now marked by the competing initiatives of the BRI and IMEC. The BRI can be viewed as a modern Silk Road, linking China with Europe, while the IMEC seeks to establish a trade logistics corridor connecting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and Greece. The South Korean Government should take proactive steps to prepare for the evolving dynamics of the trade war between China and the USA. CitationOh, J.S. (2025), "International trade war - Spice Road against Silk Road", International Trade, Politics and Development, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 2-11. https://doi.org/10.1108/ITPD-06-2024-0031  Notes 1. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/supplychain.asp2. According to Gary Gereffi et al, 5 governance types of a lead company could be categorised as market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchy.3. Korea imports urea from 12 countries including Qatar, Vietnam, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, in addition to China.4. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/strategic-projects-under-crma_en5. IPEF was launched on May 23,2022 at Tokyo. 14 member countries are Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and the USA. 4 Pillar of IPEF are Trade (Pillar 1), Supply Chain (Pillar 2),Clean Economy (Pillar 3) and Fair Economy (Pillar 4).6. Critics say “lack of substantive actions and binding commitments, instead focusing on process-driven framework building.” https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/its-time-ipef-countries-take-action-supply-chain-resilience7. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_54438. As of 2023, the first-largest trade partner of Korea is China (Trade volume of $267.66bn), the second is the US ($186.96bn) and the third is Vietnam ($79.43bn)9. As preferential ROO contain the labour value content requirement in the USMCA, it could increase compliance costs for importers. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL3452410. USITC(1996), Country of Origin Marking: Review of Laws, Regulations and Practices, USITC Publication 2975, July, pp. 2–411. https://www.barrons.com/articles/hong-kong-financial-center-china-46ba5d3612. Porter identifies a value chain broken in five primary activities: inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and post-sale services. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/concepts_approaches_in_gvc_research_final_april_18.pdf13. MAU is a metric commonly used to identify the number of unique users who engage with apps and website. MAU is an important measurement to the level of platform competitiveness in the digital trade logistics or e-commerce industry.14. https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2019/12/china-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-global-chemical-industry.html15. https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2023/10/the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-prospects-and-challenges-for-us-businesses16. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), which first used the term in 1998, defines economic corridors as important networks or connections between economic agents along a defined geography, which link the supply and demand sides of markets. http://research.bworldonline.com/popular-economics/story.php?id=350&title=Economic-corridors-boost-markets,-living-conditions17. Legovini et al. (2020) comments traditional cross border agreements of transport investment focuses only on a narrow set of direct benefits and cost. However, economic corridors can entail much wider economic benefits and costs such as trade and economic activity, structural change, poverty reduction, pollution and deforestation.18. Arab Centre Washington D.C. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-geopolitics-of-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/ References Bayne, N. (2017), Challenge and Response in the New Economic Diplomacy, 4th ed., The New Economic Diplomacy, Routledge, London, p. 19.Blanchard, J.M.F. and Ripsman, N.M. (2008), “A political theory of economic statecraft”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 4, pp. 371-398, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00076.x.Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005), “The governance of value chain”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 78-104, doi: 10.1080/09692290500049805.Kraljic, P. (1983), “Purchasing must be supply management”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 61 No. 5, September.Legovini, A., Duhaut, A. and Bougna, T. (2020), “Economic corridors-transforming the growth potential of transport investments”, p. 10.Octaviano, B.Y. and Trishia, P. (2014), Economic Corridors Boost Markets, Living Conditions, Business World Research, Islamabad, October.United States International Trade Commission (USITC) (1996), “Country of origin marking: Review of Laws, Regulations, and Practices”, USITC Publication, Vol. 2975, July, pp. 2-4.Further readingPorter, M. (1985), Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, Free Press.Putman, R.D. (1988), “Diplomacy and domestic politics; the logic of two-level games”, International Organization, Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 427-600.USITC (2019), “Global value chain analysis: concepts and approaches”, Journal of International Commerce and Economics, April, pp. 1-29.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Last week, the Trump administration signed a deal with Ukraine that gives it privileged access to Ukraine’s natural resources. Some news outlets described the deal as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “caving” to US President Donald Trump’s demands. But we see the agreement as the result of clever bargaining on the part of Ukraine’s war-time president. So, what does the deal mean for Ukraine? And will this help strengthen America’s mineral supply chains? Ukraine’s natural resource wealth Ukraine is home to 5% of the world’s critical mineral wealth, including 22 of the 34 minerals identified by the European Union as vital for defence, construction and high-tech manufacturing. However, there’s a big difference between resources (what’s in the ground) and reserves (what can be commercially exploited). Ukraine’s proven mineral reserves are limited. Further, Ukraine has an estimated mineral wealth of around US$14.8 trillion (A$23 trillion), but more than half of this is in territories currently occupied by Russia. What does the new deal mean for Ukraine? American support for overseas conflict is usually about securing US economic interests — often in the form of resource exploitation. From the Middle East to Asia, US interventions abroad have enabled access for American firms to other countries’ oil, gas and minerals. But the first iteration of the Ukraine mineral deal, which Zelensky rejected in February, had been an especially brazen resource grab by Trump’s government. It required Ukraine to cede sovereignty over its land and resources to one country (the US), in order to defend itself from attacks by another (Russia). These terms were highly exploitative of a country fighting against a years-long military occupation. In addition, they violated Ukraine’s constitution, which puts the ownership of Ukraine’s natural resources in the hands of the Ukrainian people. Were Zelensky to accept this, he would have faced a tremendous backlash from the public. In comparison, the new deal sounds like a strategic and (potentially) commercial win for Ukraine. First, this agreement is more just, and it’s aligned with Ukraine’s short- and medium-term interests. Zelenksy describes it as an “equal partnership” that will modernise Ukraine. Under the terms, Ukraine will set up a United States–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund for foreign investments into the country’s economy, which will be jointly governed by both countries. Ukraine will contribute 50% of the income from royalties and licenses to develop critical minerals, oil and gas reserves, while the US can make its contributions in-kind, such as through military assistance or technology transfers. Ukraine maintains ownership over its natural resources and state enterprises. And the licensing agreements will not require substantial changes to the country’s laws, or disrupt its future integration with Europe. Importantly, there is no mention of retroactive debts for the US military assistance already received by Ukraine. This would have created a dangerous precedent, allowing other nations to seek to claim similar debts from Ukraine. Finally, the deal also signals the Trump administration’s commitment to “a free, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine” – albeit, still without any security guarantees. Profits may be a long time coming Unsurprisingly, the Trump administration and conservative media in the US are framing the deal as a win. For too long, Trump argues, Ukraine has enjoyed US taxpayer-funded military assistance, and such assistance now has a price tag. The administration has described the deal to Americans as a profit-making endeavour that can recoup monies spent defending Ukrainian interests. But in reality, profits are a long way off. The terms of the agreement clearly state the fund’s investment will be directed at new resource projects. Existing operations and state-owned projects will fall outside the terms of the agreement. Mining projects typically work within long time frames. The move from exploration to production is a slow, high-risk and enormously expensive process. It can often take over a decade. Add to this complexity the fact that some experts are sceptical Ukraine even has enormously valuable reserves. And to bring any promising deposits to market will require major investments. What’s perhaps more important It’s possible, however, that profits are a secondary calculation for the US. Boxing out China is likely to be as – if not more – important. Like other Western nations, the US is desperate to diversify its critical mineral supply chains. China controls not just a large proportion of the world’s known rare earths deposits, it also has a monopoly on the processing of most critical minerals used in green energy and defence technologies. The US fears China will weaponise its market dominance against strategic rivals. This is why Western governments increasingly make mineral supply chain resilience central to their foreign policy and defence strategies. Given Beijing’s closeness to Moscow and their deepening cooperation on natural resources, the US-Ukraine deal may prevent Russia — and, by extension, China — from accessing Ukrainian minerals. The terms of the agreement are explicit: “states and persons who have acted adversely towards Ukraine must not benefit from its reconstruction”. Finally, the performance of “the deal” matters just as much to Trump. Getting Zelensky to sign on the dotted line is progress in itself, plays well to Trump’s base at home, and puts pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to come to the table. So, the deal is a win for Zelensky because it gives the US a stake in an independent Ukraine. But even if Ukraine’s critical mineral reserves turn out to be less valuable than expected, it may not matter to Trump.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This study examines the short-term, medium-term, and long-term implications of recent "tariff wars" on the European Union (EU). The imposition of tariffs by the United States, particularly the "Liberation Day" tariffs announced by President Trump on April 2, 2025, led to significant disruptions in global supply chains, negatively impacted GDP growth, increased financial market volatility, and exacerbated geopolitical tensions. The EU faces challenges in navigating this shifting geopolitical landscape while maintaining its economic interests and influence. However, the EU has opportunities to leverage these conflicts to strengthen its internal market, foster international cooperation, and emerge as a more resilient global actor. The paper concludes by discussing the potential end of transatlanticism, the future of the EU, and the implications for globalisation in light of the current "tariff chaos." Keywords: Tariffs, Geopolitics, European Union, Trade Wars Introduction Before we examine the topic of tariffs, let us recall that the terms "tariff war" or "trade war" are not strictly academic. International Security scholars generally believe that the notion of war is reserved for military conflicts (both domestic and international) that involve at least a thousand casualties in any given year.[1] One of the most prominent sources in this regard is the Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, published by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, and the International Peace Research Institute at Uppsala University in Uppsala.[2] Therefore, "tariff war" or "tariff wars" are more journalistic and hyperbolic. Hence, they are used in this study with quotation marks. Journalists and commentators from various backgrounds often use inflated language to impress their readers. On the other hand, wars are cataclysmic events that have game-changing consequences. In this sense, some tools that state leaders use to achieve political and economic goals, such as tariffs, may have short- and long-term outcomes. Nonetheless, scholars who tend to be precise in their explanations will mainly discuss economic competition rather than "economic war" or "wars." This study investigates the short-, medium-, and possible long-term implications of "tariff wars" on the European Union. These implications appear multifaceted and encompass stability, political relationships, and a broader international order."Liberation Day" On April 2, US President Trump announced new tariffs under the banner of "Liberation Day" – a minimum baseline of 10 per cent tariffs on goods imported from all foreign countries and higher, reciprocal tariffs on nations that impose tariffs on US exports.[3]  Crucially, the White House claims that the new tariffs are reciprocal: "It is the policy of the United States to rebalance global trade flows by imposing an additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners except as otherwise provided herein. The additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners shall start at 10 per cent, and shortly thereafter, the additional ad valorem duty shall increase for trading partners enumerated in Annex I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to this order. These additional ad valorem duties shall apply until such time as I determine that the underlying conditions described above are satisfied, resolved, or mitigated".[4] We did not have to wait for strong reactions to occur worldwide. China vowed to retaliate against the 34 per cent tariffs imposed by the US on Wednesday (April 2 2025) and protect its national interests while condemning the move as "an act of bullying".[5] Doubling down, a few days later, Trump threatened a 50 per cent tariff on China on top of previous reciprocal duties,[6] to which Chinese President Xi Jinping already replied hawkishly.[7] In an equally hawkish response, the Trump administration declared that Chinese goods would be subject to a 145 per cent tariff.[8] In a twist of events, on April 9, the US  declared a 90-day-long pause for previously declared tariffs covering the whole world (keeping a minimum of 10 per cent, though) except against China.[9] The next couple of weeks will show whether the world will enter the "tariff arms race" or we will enter some "tariff détente". Importantly, as one can surmise, "Xi has sold himself domestically and internationally as the guy standing up to America, and people that want to stand up to America should get in line behind Chairman Xi".[10] For the EU, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described US universal tariffs as a significant blow to the world economy and claimed that the European Union was prepared to respond with countermeasures if talks with Washington failed. Accordingly, the EU was already finalising a first package of tariffs on up to 26 billion Euro ($28.4 billion) of US goods for mid-April in response to US steel and aluminium tariffs that took effect on March 12.[11] Consequently, on April 7, 2025, a meeting was organised in Luxembourg[12] regarding the EU's response to US tariffs on steel and aluminium and the preparation of countermeasures, which included a proposal to impose 25 per cent tariffs on US goods. Interestingly, the "Liberation Day" tariffs do not include Russia. According to numerous commentators, this indicates Moscow's importance as a future trade partner once the Ukrainian war is over. However, the official explanation issued by the White House suggests that the existing sanctions against Russia "preclude any meaningful trade."[13] Tariff imposition: short, medium and long-term consequences Several observable phenomena can be identified regarding their economic ramifications: First, the imposition of tariffs can lead to significant disruptions in global supply chains, thereby affecting industries that rely heavily on international trade. This disruption can lead to increased costs and reduced competitiveness for EU businesses, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing.[14] While national measures may yield political and economic benefits in the short term, it is essential to note that global prosperity cannot be sustained without cooperative and stable international trade policies. Second, the Gross Domestic Product is likely to be impacted. The imposition of tariffs has been shown to negatively affect GDP growth. For instance, the US-China "trade war" decreased the GDP of both countries, which could similarly affect the EU if it becomes embroiled in similar conflicts.[15] Third, we examine volatility in the financial markets. "Tariff wars" contribute to financial market volatility, which can cause a ripple effect on EU economic stability. This volatility can deter investment and slow economic growth.[16] Fourth, political targeting and retaliation. "Tariff wars" often involve politically targeted retaliations, as seen in the US-China trade conflict. The EU has been adept at minimising economic damage while maximising political targeting, which could influence its future trade strategies and political alliances.[17] Fifth, global alliances are shifting. The EU may need to reconsider its trade alliances and partnerships in response to these shifting dynamics. This could involve forming new trade agreements or strengthening existing ones to mitigate the impact of "tariff wars."[18] Next, increased geopolitical competition and economic nationalism can exacerbate tensions between major powers, potentially leading to a crisis in globalization. As an aspiring global player, the EU must navigate these tensions carefully to maintain its influence and economic interests.[19] Social impacts should also be considered. "Trade wars" can lead to changes in employment and consumer prices, thus affecting the EU's social equity and economic stability. These changes necessitate policies that enhance social resilience and protect vulnerable populations.[20] Does Team Trump have a plan? The tariffs imposed by the Trump administration appear to be part of a broader strategy that Trump describes as a declaration of economic independence for the US, notably heralding them as part of the national emergency. The long-term effects of this strategy depend on how effectively the US can transition to domestic production without facing significant retaliation or trade barriers from other nations. Notably, the US dollar's status as the world's primary reserve currency has been supported by military power since the introduction of the Bretton Woods system. The US military, especially the US Navy, has helped secure trade routes, enforce economic policies, and establish a framework for international trade, favouring the US. dollar. The countries that subscribed to the system also gained access to the US consumer market. Importantly, what is explained by the Triffin Dilemma, back in the 1960s, the US had a choice: to either increase the supply of the US Dollar,  sought after by the whole world as a reserve currency and international trade currency and that way to upkeep global economic growth, which was pivotal for the US economy or to end the gold standard. In 1971, the US finished its Bretton Woods system. What followed was a new system primarily dictated by neoliberalism based on low tariffs, free capital movement, flexible exchange rates and US security guarantees.[21] Under that neoliberal system, reserve demand for American assets has pushed up the dollar, leading it to levels far in excess of what would balance international trade over the long run.[22] This made manufacturing in the US very expensive, and consequently, the deindustrialisation of the US followed. Therefore, it appears that Trump wants to keep the US dollar as the world's reserve currency and reindustrialise the US. According to Stephen Miran, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers (a United States agency within the Executive Office of the President), two key elements to achieve this goal are tariffs and addressing currency undervaluation of other nations.[23] The second element in that duo is also known as the Mar-a-Lago Accord.[24] Scott Bessent, 79th US Secretary of the Treasury, picked up this argument.[25] In a nutshell, the current "tariff chaos" is arguably only temporary, and in the long term, it is designed to provide an advantage for the US economy.A readjustment of sorts fundamentally reshapes the existing international political economy. Whether or not this plan works and achieves its goals is entirely different. As market analysts observe, "For the past two decades, the US has focused on high-tech services like Amazon and Google services, which have added to a service surplus. However, the real sustainable wealth comes from the manufacturing of goods, which, for the US, went from 17 per cent in 1988 to 10 per cent in 2023 of GDP. The entire process of building goods creates many mini ecosystems of production/capital value that stay in a country for many decades. […] Initially, the Chinese started in low-tech and low-cost labour manufacturing before 2001, but shifted towards becoming major manufacturers of high-tech products like robotics and EV automobiles. […] For President Trump to levy high tariffs on the Chinese in the current moment, he is doing everything that he can to resuscitate US manufacturing".[26] EU's options The EU and the US share the world's largest bilateral trade and investment relationship, with 2024 data showing EU exports to the US at 531.6 billion euros and imports at 333.4 billion euros, resulting in a 198.2 billion Euro trade surplus for the EU.[27] While the EU faces significant challenges due to "tariff wars," there are potential opportunities for positive outcomes. The EU can leverage these conflicts to strengthen its internal market and enhance its role in global trade. By adopting proactive trade policies and fostering international cooperation, the EU can mitigate the negative impacts of "tariff wars" and potentially emerge as a more resilient and influential global actor. However, this requires careful navigation of the complex geopolitical landscape and a commitment to maintaining open and cooperative trade relations. It seems likely that the EU can leverage recent US tariffs to strengthen ties with China and India, potentially reducing its dependency on US trade. China is the EU's second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade at 739 billion euros in 2023, though a large deficit favouring China (292 billion euros in 2023).[28] The EU's strategy is to de-risk, not decouple, focusing on reciprocity and reducing dependencies; however, competition and systemic rivalry complicate deeper ties. Meanwhile, India's trade with the EU was 124 billion euros in goods in 2023, and ongoing free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations, expected to conclude by 2025, could yield short-term economic gains of 4.4 billion euros for both.[29] India's fast-growing economy and shared interest in technology make it a potentially promising partner. EU and China: Opportunities and Challenges Economically, there are more opportunities than challenges. China remains the EU's second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade reaching 739 billion euros in 2023, down 14 per cent from 2022 due to global economic shifts.[30] The trade balance shows a significant deficit of 292 billion euros in 2023, driven by imports of telecommunications equipment and machinery, whereas EU exports include motor cars and medicaments. The EU's strategy, outlined in its 2019 strategic outlook and reaffirmed in 2023, positions China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival, focusing on de-risking rather than decoupling. Recent actions, such as anti-dumping duties on Chinese glass fibre yarns in March 2025, highlight tensions over unfair trade practices. Despite these challenges, China's market size offers opportunities, especially if the EU can negotiate for better access. However, geopolitical rivalry complicates deeper ties, including EU probes, in Chinese subsidies. Politically, the EU and China differ significantly in this regard. Regarding human rights policies, the EU consistently raises concerns about human rights issues in China.[31] These concerns often lead to friction, with the European Parliament blocking trade agreements and imposing sanctions on them. Moreover, China's stance on the war in Ukraine has created tension, with the EU viewing Russia as a major threat, and China's support of Russia is a significant concern.[32] China is often perceived in Western European capitals as not making concessions on issues vital to European interests.[33] The understanding of the war's root causes, the assessment of implications, risks or potential solutions - in all these areas, the Chinese leadership on the one hand and the European governments and the EU Commission in Brussels on the other hand have expressed very different, at times even contrary, positions.[34] Finally, China's political model demonstrates that democracy is not a prerequisite for prosperity, challenging Western emphasis on democracy and human rights.[35] EU and India: Growing Partnership and FTA Prospects and Political Challenges Economically, it seems that there are more opportunities than challenges. India, ranked as the EU's ninth-largest trading partner, accounted for 124 billion euros in goods trade in 2023, representing 2.2 per cent of the EU's total trade, with growth of around 90 per cent over the past decade.[36] Services trade reached nearly 60 billion euros in 2023, almost doubling since 2020, with a third being digital services.[37] The EU is India's largest trading partner, and ongoing negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA), investment protection, and geographical indications, initiated in 2007 and resuming in 2022, aim for conclusion by 2025.[38] A 2008 trade impact assessment suggests positive real income effects, with short-term gains of 3–4.4 billion euros for both parties. The EU seeks to lower Indian tariffs on cars, wine, and whiskey. Simultaneously, India has pushed for market access to pharmaceuticals and easier work visas for IT professionals. However, concerns remain regarding the impact of EU border carbon taxes and farm subsidies on Indian farmers. Politically, challenges to EU-India relations stem from several sources. Trade has been a persistent friction point, with negotiations for a free trade agreement facing roadblocks (Malaponti, 2024). Despite the EU being a significant trading partner for India,[39] differing approaches to trade liberalization have hindered progress. India's historical emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance can sometimes clash with the EU's multilateral approach.[40] Further, India's complex relationship with Russia, particularly its continued reliance on Russian defence technology, presents a challenge for closer EU-India security cooperation.[41] Finally, while the EU and India share concerns about China's growing influence, their strategies for managing this challenge may differ. These issues, if left unaddressed, could limit the potential for a deeper, more strategic partnership between the EU and India.[42] Conclusions "What does Trump want? This question is on the minds of policymakers and experts worldwide. Perhaps we are witnessing the opening salvo of a decisive phase of the US-China economic conflict - the most serious conflict since 1989. It is likely the beginning of the end of the ideology of Globalism and the processes of globalisation. It is arguably aggressive "decoupling" at its worst and the fragmentation of the world economy. For the EU, this is a new situation which dictates new challenges. Someday, probably sooner than later, European political elites will have to make a choice. To loosen or perhaps even end the transatlantic community and go against the US. Perhaps in tandem with some of the BRICS countries, such as India and China, or swallow the bitter pill, redefine its current economic model, and once again gamble with Washington, this time against the BRICS. It seems that the EU and its member states are at a crossroads, and their next choice of action will have to be very careful. In a likely new "Cold War" between the US and this time, China, the EU might not be allowed to play the third party, neutral status. One should also remember that Trump, like Putin or Xi, likes to talk to EU member states' representatives directly, bypassing Brussels and unelected "Eureaucrats' like Ursula Von der Leyen. In other words, he tends to leverage his position against the unity of the EU, which should not be surprising given the internal EU conflicts. More often than not, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, or Nordic members of the EU clash on numerous Issues with Berlin, Paris and most importantly, Brussels. (I write more about it here: Will the EU even survive? Vital external and internal challenges ahead of the EU in the newly emerging world order. https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=4577).   References [1] See more at:  For detailed information, consult one of the most comprehensive databases on conflicts run by Uppsala Conflict Data Programme at: https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia[2] Pettersson, Therese. 2019. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 19.1. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-191.pdf[3] Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and-persistent-annual-united-states-goods-trade-deficits/[4] Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify… op. cit.[5] Hanin Bochen, and Ziwen Zhao. "China vows to retaliate after 'bullying' US imposes 34% reciprocal tariffs". South China Morning Post. April 3 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/us/diplomacy/article/3304971/trump-announced-34-reciprocal-tariffs-chinese-goods-part-liberation-day-package[6] Megerian, Chris and Boak, Josh. "Trump threatens new 50% tariff on China on top of 'reciprocal' duties". Global News. April 7, 2025. https://globalnews.ca/news/11119347/trump-added-50-percent-tariff-china/[7] Tan Yvette, Liang Annabelle and Ng Kelly. "China is not backing down from Trump's tariff war. What next?". BBC, April 8 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg51yw700lo[8] Wong, Olga. “Trump further raises tariffs to 120% on small parcels from mainland, Hong Kong”. South China Morning Post, 11 April 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3306069/trump-further-raises-tariffs-120-small-parcels-mainland-hong-kong?utm_source=feedly_feed[9] Chu, Ben. “ What does Trump's tariff pause mean for global trade?”, BBC, 10 April, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz95589ey9yo[10] Wu, Terri. "Why US Has Upper Hand Over Beijing in Tariff Standoff". The Epoch Times April 7, 2025. https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/why-us-has-upper-hand-over-beijing-in-tariff-standoff-5838158?utm_source=epochHG&utm_campaign=jj  [11] Blenkinsop, Philip, and Van Overstraeten, Benoit. "EU plans countermeasures to new US tariffs, says EU chief." April 3, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/eu-prepare-countermeasures-us-reciprocal-tariffs-says-eu-chief-2025-04-03/[12] Payne, Julia. The EU Commission proposes 25% counter-tariffs on some US imports, document shows". Reuters, April 8, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/eu-commission-proposes-25-counter-tariffs-some-us-imports-document-shows-2025-04-07/  [13] Bennett, Ivor. "US seems content to cosy up to Russia instead of imposing tariffs." Sky News, April 4, 2025. https://news.sky.com/story/us-seems-content-to-cosy-up-to-russia-instead-of-coerce-it-with-tariffs-13341300[14] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship." Business and Economic Research, 14, no. 4 (October 27, 2024): 62. https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v14i4.22185[15] Ilhomjonov, Ibrohim, and Akbarali Yakubov. "THE IMPACT OF THE TRADE WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USA ON THE WORLD ECONOMY," June 16, 2024. https://interoncof.com/index.php/USA/article/view/2112[16] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship." Business and Economic Research 14, no. 4 (October 27, 2024): 62. https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v14i4.22185[17] Fetzer, Thiemo, and Schwarz Carlo. "Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars." Economic Journal 131: no. 636 (May 2021): 1717–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa122[18] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship …op. cit.[19] Mihaylov, Valentin Todorov, and Sławomir Sitek. 2021. "Trade Wars and the Changing International Order: A Crisis of Globalisation?" Miscellanea Geographica 25: 99–109. https://doi.org/10.2478/mgrsd-2020-0051[20] Wheatley, Mary Christine. "Global Trade Wars: Economic and Social Impacts." PREMIER JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT, November 5, 2024. https://premierscience.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/pjbm-24-368.pdf[21] Money & Macro, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ts5wJ6OfzA&t=572s[22] Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System." November 2024. Hudson Bay Capital. https://www.hudsonbaycapital.com/documents/FG/hudsonbay/research/638199_A_Users_Guide_to_Restructuring_the_Global_Trading_System.pdf[23] Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System"... op.cit.[24] Zongyuan Zoe Liu, "Why the Proposed Mar-a-Lago Accord May Not be the Magic Wand That Trump Is Hoping For", 9  April 2025. https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-proposed-mar-lago-accord-may-not-be-magic-wand-trump-hoping  [25] Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent Breaks Down Trump's Tariff Plan and Its Impact on the Middle Class. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zLnX1SQfgJI[26] Park, Thomas. https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7316122202846765056/[27] See more at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/fr/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20250311-1[28] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en[29] Kar, Jeet. "The EU and India are close to finalising a free trade agreement. Here's what to know." World Economic Forum. 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"Europe and China at a Crossroads." 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/europe-and-china-at-a-crossroads.[35] Sharshenova, A. and Crawford. 2017. "Undermining Western Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: China's Countervailing Influences, Powers and Impact." Central Asian Survey 36 (4): 453. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2017.1372364.[36] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en[37] See more at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/key-outcomes-second-eu-india-trade-and-technology-council[38] Kar, Jeet. "The EU and India are close to finalising a free trade agreement. Here's what to know"… op. cit.[39] Malaponti, Chiara. 2024. “Rebooting EU-India Relations: How to Unlock Post-Election Potential.” https://ecfr.eu/article/rebooting-eu-india-relations-how-to-unlock-post-election-potential/.[40] Sinha, Aseema, and Jon P. Dorschner. 2009. “India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations?” Polity 42 (1): 74. https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2009.19.[41] Chandrasekar, Anunita. 2025. “It’s Time to Upgrade the EU-India Relationship.” https://www.cer.eu/insights/its-time-upgrade-eu-india-relationship.[42] Gare, Frédéric and Reuter Manisha. “Here be dragons: India-China relations and their consequences for Europe”. 25 May 2023. https://ecfr.eu/article/here-be-dragons-india-china-relations-and-their-consequences-for-europe/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском China is simultaneously the world's biggest polluter and the global leader in renewables This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice Fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Kazakhstan’s transition to renewable energy (RE) has seen a significant surge in recent years. This rapidly growing green transition has allowed the country to meet its interim RE targets. By 2030, the country aims to generate 15 percent of its total energy output through renewables and increase this share to 50 percent by 2050. Moreover, Kazakhstan has committed to reaching carbon neutrality by 2060.  The biggest partner in this endeavor has been China, whose role in the RE transition has grown and diversified over the years. For Kazakhstan, the benefits of this partnership are clear: industrialization of its economy and, more importantly, decreasing carbon emissions and improving air quality and public health. For China, the benefits go beyond mere lucrative investments and exporting its RE technology and include gaining soft power and offsetting its environmentally destructive footprint in Kazakhstan.  Harnessing renewable energy to combat air pollution In addition to rich oil and gas resources, Kazakhstan has vast renewable energy potential, thanks to its large territory and abundance of wind and sunny days. It is the ninth largest country by area and holds 77 percent of Central Asia’s solar potential and 90 percent of the regional wind potential.   The presence of wind corridors in vast Kazakh steppes with wind speeds of more than five miles per second, which is present in all regions, makes Kazakhstan ideal for the operation of wind turbines. Additionally, at least 50 percent of Kazakhstan's territory is suitable for installing solar panels.  Most of the RE potential remains untapped, with Kazakhstan still relying on Soviet-era energy infrastructure built to utilize fossil fuels. In 2024, 66 percent of the country’s electricity was generated through coal, 21 percent via natural gas, 6.6 percent from hydroelectricity, and only 6.4 percent from renewables.  Air pollution is a nationwide problem in Kazakhstan. In 2025, 35 cities spread across the country faced significant air pollution, according to the National Hydrometeorological Service of Kazakhstan. A major source of this pollution pandemic is coal burned by thermal power plants, industrial complexes, and households.  The list of adverse effects of air pollution is long. According to Kazakhstani doctor Denis Vinnikov, who has researched air pollution’s effects on health, long-term exposure to polluted air increases the risk of developing cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, such as Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). In addition, air pollution increases the likelihood of almost all types of cancer and tumors. One of the most polluted cities in Kazakhstan, Almaty, is one of the national leaders with the highest cases of COPD.  Kazakhstan’s recognition of the adverse effects of its coal-intensive energy sector on the environment and public health has pushed the government to ramp up renewable energy production in the last decade. China’s multiple roles in renewables The Kazakh-Chinese green energy endeavors are part of China's wider bilateral cooperation, covering energy, agriculture, machinery, and mining, among other areas. China is one of Kazakhstan’s largest trade and investment partners. In 2022, the countries signed a permanent comprehensive strategic partnership. Between 2005 and 2023, China invested over USD 25 billion in Kazakhstan.  The two sides also work closely within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s global connectivity project focusing on energy, trade, and transport infrastructure in global majority states. Between 2013 and 2020, China invested USD 18.5 billion in Kazakhstan within the BRI framework. China has participated in Kazakhstan’s green transition from the very beginning. In an interview with Global Voices, Yunis Sharifli, a non-resident fellow at the China Global South Project, described China as the “first-comer” to Kazakhstan’s RE sector. Yana Zabanova, a research associate at the Research Institute for Sustainability, said in an interview with Global Voices: China has been the main technology supplier to Kazakhstan's renewable energy sector, both in the solar PV and increasingly in the wind sector, and Chinese companies have also served as important investors and EPC [engineering, procurement, and constuction] contractors for renewable energy projects in the country. China’s role grew exponentially starting in 2018 when the government launched renewable energy auctions, which gifted government contracts to the lowest bidder. Since 2018, a single private Chinese company, Universal Energy, has built 10 RE plants, three solar and seven wind, with a total capacity of 630 Megawatts by winning government tenders.   Additionally, state-owned Chinese companies have secured contracts via intergovernmental negotiations. There are several examples of this, such as the Zhanatas and Shelek wind power plants (WPP), which are already operational, and five more RE plants in the development stage with a total capacity of 2.6 GW.   In an interview with Global Voices, Ainur Sospanova, the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Qazaq Green RES Association, provided her expert assessment of China’s share in Kazakhstan’s RE sector: In the solar energy sector, it is almost 100 percent because it is impossible to compete against Chinese solar panels. In the wind energy sector, it is at least 70 percent and continues to grow. Thus, since 2018, China has expanded its role to project developer and financier through loans issued by Chinese banks and equity financing.  China's share in Kazakhstan’s renewable projects is set to grow even more upon the completion of two Chinese plants that will localize the production of energy storage systems and components for WPP. Gaining soft power and improving its image Paradoxically, China is simultaneously the biggest polluter in the world and the global leader in renewables. While China is constructing two-thirds of the world's wind and solar projects, 93 percent of global construction from coal power took place in China in 2024. This paradox is also present in BRI projects, including those in Kazakhstan.  China frequently touts its solar and wind energy projects as part of the BRI. At the same time, one-fourth of coal-fired power generation in the world is financed through the BRI. Though China Power International Holding and Kazakhstani Samruk Energy have agreed on solar and wind projects to develop renewables, deals are also inked to develop oil, gas, coal, cement, and steel industries in Kazakhstan, which adversely affect the environment and the well-being of local communities. Sharifli explained: When we look at the global discontent with China’s presence, we see two worries: debt trap and environmental pollution. So renewable energy is very important in this context. China’s investments in renewables are aimed at tackling these worries by gaining soft power and improving its reputation. This benefits not only China but also the BRI. Chinese companies that have invested in RE in Kazakhstan, such as Risen Energy, Universal Energy, and Power China, put the BRI at the heart of how they frame their companies. Chinese think tanks also suggest that the Chinese government welcome RE development overseas despite concerns.   In contrast to the Chinese-built oil processing, steel, and cement plants in Kazakhstan, RE projects have thus caused no controversy and helped China improve its reputation in Central Asia. Sharifli noted that since 2021, public attitudes towards China in Kazakhstan have started becoming more positive, partially due to Chinese investments in RE, according to a survey conducted by the Central Asia Barometer.  “Renewable energy plants are usually located in the steppe, far away from the settlements, they don’t interfere with the daily lives of people and look idyllic. There is no trash, there is no pollution, there is no dirty water or soil,” said Zabanova, who has visited multiple RE plants in Kazakhstan as part of her research.  China’s investments in renewables in Kazakhstan serve as an example of how solar and wind energy projects are used in diplomacy. They not only allow Chinese companies to export their excess capacities to profitable foreign markets but also help China mask its environmental damage and create a favorable perception abroad.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском I. Introduction  We are only two and a half months into the new Trump administration. However, President Donald Trump's long-threatened tariffs have plunged the country into a trade war abroad. On-again, off-again, new tariffs continue to escalate uncertainty around the world. Trump already launched a trade war during his first term in office, but he has more sweeping tariff plans right now. The second Trump administration has embarked on a new and more aggressive tariff policy, citing various economic and national security concerns. His administration has proposed, imposed, suspended, revoked, and then reimposed various new tariffs. It could be difficult for average citizens to keep up with all the proposals. As of March 19, 2025, there are ten proposed or active tariff initiatives. They range from broad-based tariffs that cover all goods from a certain country (China, Mexico, Canada) to tariffs that cover certain types of goods (aluminum & steel), promises of future tariffs (copper, lumber, automotive, semiconductor, and pharmaceutical), and promised retaliatory tariffs (European wine and other alcoholic beverages). Moreover, although we have seen more tariff announcements in the first two months of the second Trump administration than in the entire first Trump administration, "fair and reciprocal" tariff rollout will overpower the tariffs imposed until today. The ten tariff initiatives that are proposed or in play are as follows in Table 1.   This paper aims to evaluate economic impacts of tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. It first explains the effects of tariffs imposed by the first Trump administration and then forecasts the impacts of the second Trump administration's tariffs.  II. Literature on Tariff Effects A tariff is a type of tax that a government adds to imported goods. Companies importing goods pay the tariff to the government. If any part of a product arrives with a tariff, whether it is an imported avocado or a car built locally with imported steel, its cost is part of the price everyday consumers pay before sales tax.  Economists reject tariffs as an effective tool to improve the welfare of U.S. citizens or strengthen key industries. In a survey conducted during the first Trump administration, 93 % of economic experts did not agree that targeted tariffs on aluminium and steel would improve Americans' welfare. Recent research has strengthened economists' opposition to this policy instrument. Numerous studies demonstrate that American consumers entirely bear the burden of tariffs imposed during the first Trump administration, with disproportionately large impacts on lower-income U.S. households. A framework for analysing the impact of higher import tariffs on the economy is provided by Mundell and Fleming. Mundell (1961) claimed that the country that raised tariffs on imported products may benefit because more people choose domestically produced products over imported ones. Protection from foreign competition could also benefit domestic industries. Large countries can also benefit from improved terms of trade. However, increased tariffs on imported products are assumed to lead to an increase in the current account balance by increasing savings relative to investment. Higher savings dampen aggregate demand. The situation of households deteriorates because of rising consumer prices. Domestic industries are also negatively affected by lower household demand and the need to pay more for imported input products.  Over the years, Mundell and Fleming's model has been developed further by other scholars such as Eichengreen (1981), Krugman (1982), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Eichengreen (2018). Overall, the theoretical literature demonstrates that higher import tariffs could affect the economy through various channels. The impacts of tariffs on the economy differ between a nation imposing the tariffs and nations exporting to the nation raising the tariffs. However, nations that are not subject to the increased import duties are also affected. Main effects of higher tariffs are as follows: Higher inflation: Higher import tariffs lead to higher prices for imported products. Depending on which tariffs are increased, this could lead to higher prices for both consumers and companies. Domestic firms may also raise their prices because of reduced competition from foreign companies (Cavallo et al. (2021)).  Higher consumer prices lead to a decline in real disposable household income, which hampers private consumption. Higher business costs have impacts on companies' profits, which in turn dampen employment and companies' willingness to invest. Companies are also more likely to pass on some of their higher costs to consumers in the form of higher prices. The rise in imported prices might be smaller in large countries, as they are more able to influence the world price of products. Increased consumption of other products: Higher imported prices can lead companies and consumers to increasingly buy cheaper domestic products. But it can also lead to increased imports of products from countries not subject to higher import tariffs.  Domestic industries are protected: Higher import tariffs improve the competitive position of domestic companies. These benefits can lead to increased investment, production, and employment in protected industries. However, the longer-term effect of protecting some domestic industries from foreign competition can be negative, as it might reduce incentives to improve production efficiency, thereby dampening productivity and GDP.  Decreased trade: Increased tariffs usually lead to reduced trade. This can lead to reduced knowledge transfer between nations in the form of less direct investment, reduced technology transfer, and reduced access to skilled labour. These factors in turn can lead to companies moving further away from the technological frontier, thereby hampering productivity (Dornbusch (1992) and Frankel and Romer (1999)).  Stronger exchange rate: When demand changes from foreign to domestic production, the exchange rate tends to rise to balance it out. One reason is that higher inflation often leads to higher interest rates relative to other nations. The nominal exchange rate might appreciate if imports decline significantly and demand for foreign currency drops. An appreciation of the exchange rate hampers exports but keeps imports cheaper.  Global value chains: Higher tariffs can lead to disruptions in global value chains by making imported inputs from abroad pricier. If firms are part of global value chains, higher costs for firms facing higher import costs may also lead to higher costs for domestic firms further down the production chain.  Uncertainty and confidence: Higher import tariffs may increase uncertainty about future trade policy and lead to increased pessimism among households and companies. Such uncertainty may hamper household consumption and business investment (Boer and Rieth (2024)).  III. Tariffs under the first Trump administration The first Trump administration's tariffs involved protectionist trade initiatives against other nations, notably China.  In January 2018, the Trump administration-imposed tariffs on solar panels and washing machines of 30–50%. In March 2018, the administration-imposed tariffs on aluminium (10%) and steel (25%), which are imported from most countries. In June 2018, the Administration expanded these tariffs to include the EU, Mexico, and Canada. The Trump administration separately set and escalated tariffs on products imported from China, leading to a trade war between the U.S. and China.  In their responses, U.S. trading partners imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products. Canada imposed matching retaliatory tariffs on July 1, 2018. China implemented retaliatory tariffs equivalent to the $34 billion tariff imposed on it by the U.S. In June 2019, India imposed retaliatory tariffs on $240 million worth of U.S. products.  However, tariff negotiations in North America were under way and successful, with the U.S. lifting steel and aluminium tariffs on Mexico and Canada on May 20, 2019. Mexico and Canada joined Argentina and Australia, which were the only countries exempted from the tariffs. But on May 30, Trump announced on his own that he would put a 5% tariff on all imports from Mexico starting on June 10, 2019. The tariffs would go up to 10% on July 1, and then by another 5% every month for three months, until illegal immigrants stopped coming through Mexico and into the U.S. Then the tariffs were averted on June 7 after negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico. U.S. tariffs on Chinese products had been applied as follows: On March 22, 2018, Trump signed a memorandum under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to apply tariffs of $50 billion on Chinese products. In response, China announced plans to implement its tariffs on 128 U.S. products. 120 of those products, such as fruit and wine, will be taxed at a 15% duty, while the remaining eight products, including pork, will receive a 25% tariff. China implemented their tariffs on April 2, 2018.  On April 3, 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative's office (the USTR) published an initial list of 1,300+ Chinese products to impose levies upon products like flat-screen televisions, medical devices, aircraft parts and batteries. On April 4, 2018, China's Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council decided to announce a plan to put 25% more tariffs on 106 U.S. goods, such as soybeans and cars.  In the response, On April 5, 2018, President Trump directed the USTR to consider $100 billion in additional tariffs. On May 9, 2018, China cancelled soybean orders exported from the United States to China. On June 15, 2018, President Trump released a list of Chinese products worth $34 billion that would face a 25% tariff, starting on July 6. Another list with $16 billion of Chinese products was released, with an implementation date of August 23.  On July 10, 2018, in reaction to China's retaliatory tariffs that took effect July 6, the USTR issued a proposed list of Chinese products amounting to an annual trade value of about $200 billion that would be subjected to an additional 10% in duties. During the G20 summit in Japan in June 2019, the U.S. and China agreed to resume stalled trade talks, with Trump announcing he would suspend an additional $300 billion in tariffs that had been under consideration. IV. Economic Effects of the Tariffs from the First Trump Administration Changes in tariffs affect economic activity directly by influencing the price of imported products and indirectly through changes in exchange rates and real incomes. The extent of the price change and its impact on trade flows, employment, and production in the United States and abroad depend on resource constraints and how various economic actors (producers of domestic substitutes, foreign producers of the goods subject to the tariffs, producers in downstream industries, and consumers) respond as the effects of the increased tariffs reverberate throughout the economy. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), the following six outcomes came out at the level of individual firms and consumers as well as at the level of the national economy. 1. Increased costs for U.S. consumers Higher tariff rates lead to price increases for consumers of products subject to the tariffs and for consumers of downstream products as input costs rise. Higher prices in turn lead to decreased consumption, depending on consumers' price sensitivity for a particular product. For example, consider the monthly price of U.S. laundry equipment, which includes washing machines subject to tariff increases as high as 50% since February 2018. The monthly price of this equipment increased by as much as 14% in 2018 compared to the average price level in 2017, before the tariffs took effect (see Figure 1).   Figure 1: U.S. laundry equipment prices According to Jin (2023), many companies passed the costs of the Trump tariffs on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Following impositions of the tariffs on Chinese products, the prices of U.S. intermediate goods rose by 10% to 30%, an amount equivalent to the size of the tariffs. An April 2019 working paper by Flaaen, Hortaçsu, and Tintel not found that the tariffs on washing machines caused the prices of washers to rise by approximately 12% in the United States. A Goldman Sachs analysis by Fitzgerald in May 2019 found that the consumer price index (CPI) for tariffed products had increased dramatically, compared to a declining CPI for all other core goods. According to the Guardian, the Budget Lab at Yale University found that American consumer prices could rise by 1.4% to 5.1% if Trump implemented his comprehensive tariff plan, which would amount to an additional $1,900 to $7,600 per household. 2. Decreased domestic demand for imported goods subject to the tariffs and less competition for U.S. producers of substitute goods: U.S. producers competing with the imported products subject to the tariffs (e.g., domestic aluminium and steel producers) may benefit to the degree they are able to charge higher prices for their domestic products and may expand production because of increased profitability. Since March 2018, U.S. imports of steel and aluminium have faced additional tariff charges of 25% and 10%, making foreign supplies of these products more expensive relative to domestic products. Because of these tariffs, U.S. imports of these goods went down in 2018 and 2019 compared to what they were usually like in 2017 before the tariffs, while U.S. production went up (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). By the first quarter of 2020, real U.S. imports of steel and aluminium (adjusted for price fluctuations) had decreased by more than 30% and 16%, respectively, from their average 2017 levels. The quarterly production of steel and aluminium in the U.S. during this period, however, increased by as much as 13.5% and 9.0%, respectively, above average 2017 levels.   Figure 2: Domestic production and imports: Steel  Figure 3: Domestic production and imports: Aluminium 3. Increased costs for U.S. producers in downstream industries, resulting in a decline in employment U.S. producers that use imported products subject to the additional tariffs as inputs ("downstream" industries, such as auto manufacturers in the case of the aluminium and steel tariffs) might be harmed as their costs of production increase. Higher input costs are more likely to lead to some combination of lower profits for producers, which in turn might dampen demand for these downstream products, leading to some contraction in these sectors.  A study (2019) by Federal Reserve Board economists Flaaen and Pierce, which examined effects on the manufacturing sector from all U.S. tariff actions in 2018, found that higher input costs from the tariffs were associated with higher prices, employment declines, and reductions in output for affected firms. Another study (2020) by Handley, Kamal, and Monarch found that the higher input costs associated with the tariffs might have led to a decrease in U.S. exports for firms reliant on imported intermediate inputs. Handley, Kamal, and Monarch suggested that export growth was approximately 2% lower for products made with products subject to higher U.S. tariffs, relative to unaffected products. Another study (2019) by Federal Reserve Board economists Flaaen and Pierce found that the steel tariffs led to 0.6% fewer jobs in the manufacturing sector than would have happened in the absence of the tariffs; this cut amounted to approximately 75,000 jobs. A study (2024) by Ma and David concluded that the United States lost 245,000 jobs because of the Trump tariffs.  4. Decreased demand for U.S. exports subject to retaliatory tariffs  Retaliatory tariffs place U.S. exporters at a price disadvantage in export markets relative to competitors from other countries, potentially decreasing demand for U.S. exports to those markets. Since Q3 2018, after Section 232 retaliatory tariffs took effect in China, the EU, Russia, and Türkiye, U.S. exports to these trading partners subject to the tariffs declined by as much as 44% below their 2017 average values (Figure 4). U.S. exports to China subject to retaliation during the same period declined even further from their 2017 levels, falling as much as 68% on a quarterly basis. By contrast, during this same period, overall U.S. exports were as much as 10% higher each quarter relative to 2017, suggesting the retaliatory tariffs played a role in the product-specific export declines.  Figure 4: Declines in U.S. exports subject to retaliation A study by Fajgelbaum, Goldberg, Kennedy, and Khandelwal published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in October 2019 estimated that consumers and firms in the U.S. who buy imports lost $51 billion (0.27% of GDP) because of the 2018 tariffs. This study also found that retaliatory tariffs resulted in a 9.9% decline in U.S. exports. This study also found that workers in counties with a lot of Republicans were hurt the most by the trade war because agricultural products were hit the hardest by retaliatory tariffs.  5. U.S. National Economy In addition to industry- or consumer-level effects, tariffs also have the potential to affect the broader U.S. national economy. Quantitative estimates of the effects vary based on modelling assumptions and techniques, but most studies suggest a negative overall impact on U.S. GDP because of the tariffs.  The Congressional Budget Office (2020) estimated that the increased tariffs in effect as of December 2019 would reduce U.S. GDP by 0.5% in 2020, below a baseline without the tariffs, while raising consumer prices by 0.5%, thereby reducing average real household income by $1,277. From a global perspective, the International Monetary Fund estimated that the tariffs would reduce global GDP in 2020 by 0.8%. Dario Caldara et al. (2020) also found that in 2018, investment dropped by 1.5% because of the uncertainty caused by U.S. trade policy. Moreover, a study (2019) by Amiti, Redding, and David published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives found that by December 2018, Trump's tariffs resulted in a reduction in aggregate U.S. real income of $1.4 billion per month in deadweight losses and cost U.S. consumers an additional $3.2 billion per month in added tax. Furthermore, Russ (2019) found that tariffs, which Trump imposed through mid-2019, combined with the policy uncertainty they created, would reduce the 2020 real GDP growth rate by one percentage point.  6. Trade balance  The Trump administration repeatedly raised concerns over the size of the U.S. trade deficit, thereby making trade deficit reduction a stated objective in negotiations for new U.S. trade agreements. Broad-based tariff increases affecting a large share of imports may reduce imports initially, but they are unlikely to reduce the overall trade deficit over the longer period due to at least two indirect impacts that counteract the initial reduction in imports. One indirect effect is a potential change in the value of the U.S. dollar relative to foreign currencies. Another potential effect of U.S. import tariffs is retaliatory tariffs. Economists argue that while tariffs placed on imports from a limited number of trading partners may reduce the bilateral U.S. trade deficit with those specific nations, this is likely to be offset by an increase in the trade deficit or reduction in the trade surplus with other nations, leaving the total U.S. trade deficit largely unchanged.  Figure 5 shows the relative change in the U.S. goods trade deficit with the world as well as the bilateral U.S. deficits with three major partners, China, Mexico, and Vietnam, from 2017 to 2019. Since the U.S. tariffs took effect, the overall U.S. trade deficit has increased, rising 8% from 2017 to 2019. However, the U.S. trade deficit in goods with China declined by 8% from 2017 to 2019, while the U.S. trade deficit in goods with Vietnam and Mexico significantly increased by more than 40% during the same period.  Figure 5: Changes in the U.S. goods trade deficits with China, Mexico, and Vietnam According to Zarroli (2019), between the time Trump took office in 2017 and March 2019, the U.S. trade deficit increased by $119 billion, reaching $621 billion, the highest it had been since 2008. American Farm Bureau Federation data showed that agriculture exports from the U.S. to China decreased from $19.5 billion in 2017 to $9.1 billion in 2018, a 53% reduction.  V. What are the Potential Consequences of Trump's Tariff Plan? Last year, the Peterson Institute for International Economics examined the impact of President Trump's proposed tariffs based on his campaign promises, which would impose 10 % additional tariffs on US imports from all sources and 60 % additional tariffs on imports from China. The major outcomes were lower national income, lower employment, and higher inflation. McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland (2024) at the Peterson Institute for International Economics found that both of Trump's tariff plans—imposing 10% additional tariffs on U.S. imports from all sources and 60% additional tariffs on imports from China—would reduce both U.S. real GDP and employment by 2028. But the former proposal damages the U.S. economy more than the latter. If other nations retaliate with higher tariffs on their imports from the U.S., the damage intensifies.  Assuming other governments respond in kind, Trump's 10 % increase results in U.S. real GDP that is 0.9 % lower than otherwise by 2026, and U.S. inflation rises 1.3 % above the baseline in 2025.  The 10 % added tariffs hurt the economies of Canada, Mexico, China, Germany, and Japan—all major US trading partners that see a lower GDP relative to their baselines through 2040. Mexico and Canada take much larger GDP hits than the U.S. The 60 % added tariffs on imports from China reduce its GDP relative to its baseline, much more than that of other U.S. trading partners. Mexico, however, sees a higher GDP than otherwise as some production shifts to Mexico from China. This paper focuses on Trump's universal 10 % tariffs rather than 60 % tariffs on imports from China because extreme 60 % tariffs on Chinese imports are not expected. McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland (2024) assume the 10 % tariff increase is implemented in 2025 and remains in place through the forecast period. They also consider a second scenario in which U.S. trading partners retaliate with equivalent tariff increases on products they import from the U.S.  Figures 6–11 show the results for the uniform additional 10 % increase in the tariff on imports of goods and services from all trading partners.   Figure 6: Projected change in real GDP of selected economies from an additional 10 % increase in US tariffs on imports of goods and services from all trading partners, 2025-40 (Source: McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland, 2024) When tariffs go up by 10%, the U.S. real GDP goes down by 0.36 % by 2026, and it goes down even more in Mexico and Canada by 2027 (see Figure 6). Chinese GDP drops by 0.25 % below the baseline in 2025. After the initial demand-induced slowdown, U.S. GDP recovers as production shifts from foreign suppliers to U.S. suppliers, leading to a slightly lower long-term GDP of 0.1 % below baseline by 2030 in the U.S.   Figure 7: Projected change in employment (hours worked) in selected economies from an additional 10 % increase in US tariffs on imports of goods and services from all trading partners, 2025-40 (Source: McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland, 2024) The results for aggregate employment are like the GDP outcomes (see figure 7). Employment drops in the United States by 0.6 % by 2026 but recovers due to a supply relocation towards U.S. suppliers. U.S. employment returns to baseline eventually because real wages decline permanently to bring employment back to baseline by assumption.  Figure 8: Projected change in inflation in selected economies from an additional 10% increase in US tariffs on imports of goods and services from all trading partners, 2025-40 (Source: McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland, 2024) The imposition of higher tariffs increases prices of both consumer and intermediate goods, contributing to a rise in inflation of 0.6 % above baseline in 2025 (see figure 8).  The higher tariff is inflationary everywhere except in China due to the tightening of Chinese monetary policy to resist change in the exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar.   Figure 9: Projected change in the trade balance in selected economies from an additional 10 % increase in US tariffs on imports of goods and services from all trading partners, 2025-40 (Source: McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland (2024)) Figure 9 shows the change in the trade balance as a share of GDP. In theory, the trade balance can worsen or improve due to changes in exports and imports. From 2025 to 2028, the U.S. trade deficit narrows slightly but then widens as capital flows into the U.S. economy, appreciating the U.S. real effective exchange rate. By 2030, the U.S. trade deficit will worsen by 0.1 % of GDP due to capital moving from Mexico and Canada into the U.S. Government savings rise due to additional tariff revenues.  VI. Conclusion  This paper showed that tariffs imposed by the first Trump administration had negative impacts on the U.S. economy, particularly inflation, incomes, and employment. It also demonstrated that tariffs which will be imposed by the second Trump administration are expected to have negative effects on the U.S. economy. Then a question arises: "Why does Trump attempt to impose tariffs on products from abroad?" Today, more people mention tariffs as tools to protect U.S. companies and farmers. They are discussed as a tool for bringing back manufacturing businesses into the U.S. as well as a bargaining tactic in negotiations over the flow of fentanyl and immigration. Trump has used and promised to increase tariffs for three purposes: to raise revenue, to bring trade into balance, and to bring rival countries to heel. It is unclear whether Trump will achieve his goals. However, President Donald Trump believes that tariffs are a panacea. Trump believes that his tariffs would bring hundreds of billions—trillions— into the US Treasury. Moreover, Trump is confident that he can force countries to give up something he believes is in America's best interest. For example, his tariffs on Canada and Mexico have led Mexico and Canada to agree to expand their border patrols. Reference  Amiti Mary, Redding Stephen, David E, “The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare,” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 33 (Fall 2019): 187–210. Boer, L. and M. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In response to its recent retaliatory tariffs on US energy imports, a delegation of major Chinese energy firms visited Kazakhstan in February 2025 to explore new trade opportunities. It was led by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), which focused on diversifying supply chains and reducing dependence on western markets. The visit highlights Beijing’s commitment to deepening economic ties in Central Asia through trade, infrastructure investment, and energy cooperation amidst the escalating tensions between China and the West. Traditionally, Russia exerted a dominant influence in Central Asian countries due to its Soviet-era legacy and security ties. However, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and expanding economic partnerships with Central Asian nations have established Beijing as a key player in the region. As US presence has diminished, and Russia remains preoccupied with its conflict in Ukraine, China has leveraged economic partnerships, infrastructure projects, and strategic diplomacy. China has emerged as Central Asia’s primary trade partner, even surpassing Russia in economic influence. In 2023, trade between China and Central Asia reached $89.4 billion, reflecting a 27% increase from the previous year. This surge highlights China’s efforts to solidify its economic presence through investments, trade agreements, and infrastructure projects. Kazakhstan remains Beijing’s most significant economic ally in the region, with trade reaching $43.8 billion by the end of 2024, a 9% rise from 2023. Likewise, Uzbekistan has upgraded its ties with China to an “all-weather” comprehensive strategic partnership, aiming to boost trade from $14 billion to $20 billion. Chinese investments in Uzbekistan’s renewable energy sector have grown fivefold, underscoring Beijing’s focus on sustainable development. Infrastructure development is a cornerstone of China’s engagement in Central Asia. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway is a flagship project designed to provide China with a direct access route into the region, reducing dependence on Russian transit networks. China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a trilateral agreement that will carry out the project in June 2024. This aligns with Beijing’s broader goal of diversifying trade routes, particularly amid global disruptions such as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. China has expanded its influence and investments in the energy industry, extending its reach beyond transportation infrastructure. The China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline, spanning Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and China, is crucial to Beijing’s energy security strategy. This infrastructure ensures a steady supply of natural gas while providing Central Asian states with an alternative to Russian-controlled routes. In October 2023, KazMunayGas (KMG) and China National Chemical Engineering Group Corporation (CNCEC) agreed to construct a gas turbine power plant at the Atyrau oil refinery. This facility aims to enhance power supply reliability and support the energy needs of the Atyrau region.Similarly QazaqGaz and Geo-Jade Petroleum Corporation are set to develop the Pridorozhnoye gas field in Turkistan Region. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is implementing four oil and gas projects in collaboration with Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Kazyna. On a regional scale, PetroChina plans to resume construction of Line D of the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline in 2025, pending the finalization of a gas supply contract with Turkmenistan, further strengthening China’s energy ties with the region. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Beijing plays a dominant role in the extraction of essential minerals, while its economic ties with Kazakhstan continue to strengthen. China’s molybdenum imports from Kazakhstan increased to around $19.6 million in 2022, demonstrating the country’s reliance on Kazakh resources. Meanwhile, 1.5% of Tajikistan’s total exports to China were zinc, and 17.5% were copper, demonstrating China’s rising influence over Central Asia’s minerals and the potential for raw material exploitation in Central Asian countries. Despite China’s growing economic footprint, Central Asian states remain cautious about excessive dependence and actively seek to diversify their partnerships, including engagement with the United States. Beijing has heavily invested in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, financing essential infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, hospitals, and government buildings. These investments reflect China’s broader strategy of fostering economic development as a means to ensure regional stability. By funding key projects, Beijing not only stimulates economic growth but also deepens its political influence by cultivating relationships with local elites. Chinese direct investments in Kyrgyzstan reached $220.8 million in 2023. Specifically, China has been involved in the construction of roads and infrastructure, and Bishkek, China provides grants for the construction of interchanges to solve traffic jams. China and Kyrgyzstan have extended their Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation until 2026, aligning the infrastructure project with Kyrgyzstan’s national development strategy. China has been the largest national contributor to Tajikistan’s expanding transport infrastructure, accounting for 26 percent of the total value, or $570.2 million. Of this, $37 million has been provided in grants, while the remaining $533.2 million were loans. China has committed $230 million in funding to Tajikistan for the construction of a new parliament  building. The 2023 China-Central Asia summit in Xi’an marked a turning point in Beijing’s regional strategy. Historically, China engaged with Central Asian states through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where Russia played a significant role. However, the establishment of an independent China-Central Asia summit signals Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the region and a strategic shift toward reducing Russia’s traditional influence. In May 2023, President Xi Jinping hosted leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan for the inaugural  China Central Asia summit, which took place in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province. China announced during the summit that it would upgrade bilateral investment agreements, introduce more trade facilitation initiatives, speed up the construction of the D-line of the China-Central Asia gas pipeline, and give Central Asian countries 26 billion in financing support and non-reimbursable assistance. Kazakhstan will host the next summit in 2025–2026. At the summit, China pledged substantial development aid, expanded energy partnerships, and strengthened security cooperation, reflecting its broader commitment to regional stability and economic integration. Although China’s engagement in Central Asia remains primarily economic, it is increasingly asserting itself on political matters as well. Beijing has taken diplomatic stances that occasionally diverge from Moscow’s interests. For instance, China has openly supported Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity in response to Russian nationalist rhetoric, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared during his September 14, 2022 visit to Kazakhstan that his country backs Kazakhstan’s independence and territorial integrity and is against any meddling in its domestic affairs. However, despite these political maneuvers, China remains cautious about direct security involvement in the region. While Beijing maintains a military presence in Tajikistan and deploys private security firms to protect its investments, it continues to operate within Russia’s established security framework rather than attempting to supplant it. This cautious approach was particularly evident in China’s limited response to border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, signalling its reluctance to assume a direct security guarantor role in the region. Meanwhile, Russia’s traditional dominance in Central Asia has weakened due to its ongoing war in Ukraine. Central Asian governments are distancing themselves from Moscow, with Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev openly rejecting Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine. Moreover , the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Moscow’s regional economic bloc, has struggled to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which provides more substantial investments and infrastructure development. As a result, China’s influence in Central Asia continues to expand, filling the gaps left by Russia’s declining geopolitical leverage. While China’s engagement in Central Asia has traditionally focused on economic investments, its security presence is steadily expanding. Beijing has increased arms sales, military cooperation, and counterterrorism efforts. Chinese military exports accounted for only 1.5% of Central Asia’s total arms imports, between 2010 and 2014,  but by 2019, this figure had surged to 18%. In a significant development, in 2021, Tajikistan approved the construction of a new base after an agreement between the country’s Interior Ministry and China’s Public Security Ministry or police force. The fact that the Public Security Ministry, not the Chinese military, signed the agreement indicates that counterterrorism is a priority in the face of growing concerns about instability in neighbouring Afghanistan. This facility enhances Beijing’s security footprint near Afghanistan, a region of strategic concern due to potential instability affecting Xinjiang. Unlike Russia, which maintains a direct military presence, China takes a different approach to security cooperation. Rather than deploying conventional troops, Beijing relies on Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs) to safeguard its economic interests and infrastructure projects. These contractors, often led by former Chinese military personnel, protect Chinese investments across Central Asia. While negotiating its non-interference policy’s limitations, these PMSCs handle security concerns ranging from terrorism to local unrest impacting Chinese workers and projects by offering a variety of services such as armed protection, intelligence collection, and military training. In line with its security diplomacy and larger Global Security Initiative, China uses PMSCs to strengthen security cooperation and increase its influence in the region. Companies such as Zhongjun Junhong Group and China Security and Protection Group have established branches in nations like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China launched the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in 2022, reinforcing its commitment to regional security. The GSI prioritizes sovereignty, noninterference, and counterterrorism collaboration, aligning with the security priorities of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which face domestic stability challenges. Beyond military engagement, China has intensified law enforcement cooperation with Central Asian states. Beijing has established intelligence-sharing agreements, police training programs, and cybersecurity initiatives aimed at combating organized crime and terrorism. These efforts serve China’s broader goal of maintaining regional stability while protecting its economic interests. Despite China’s growing economic and security ties with Central Asia, local resistance poses a significant challenge. Public opposition to Chinese investments has been fuelled by concerns over debt dependency, land acquisitions, job displacement, and environmental impact. In 2016, proposed land reforms in Kazakhstan sparked widespread protests across the country, as many citizens feared that the changes would allow Chinese investors to buy large tracts of Kazakh land. The government had introduced amendments to the Land Code, which included provisions for leasing agricultural land to foreign investors for up to 25 years. This led to public concerns about the potential for Chinese ownership of Kazakh land, given China’s increasing economic influence in the region. Demonstrations took place in major cities like Almaty, Atyrau, and Aktobe, drawing thousands of people. The scale of the protests forced the Kazakh government to suspend the reforms and impose a moratorium on land sales to foreigners, highlighting the deep-seated anxieties over national sovereignty and economic dependency on China. Protests occurred in several cities in 2019 including Astana, Almaty, and Zhanaozen in Kazakhstan. Demonstrators opposed Chinese industrial projects, fearing environmental harm and long-term economic dependence on China. There was also widespread suspicion that Chinese investments would lead to land leases or permanent settlements by Chinese workers, further fueling public discontent. In Naryn, Kyrgyzstan, violent protests erupted against a planned $280 million Chinese logistics and industrial project. Protesters were concerned about potential environmental damage, the loss of land to foreign companies, and a perceived lack of economic benefits for local communities. The unrest led to the cancellation of some Chinese-backed projects. China’s treatment of ethnic minorities of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz in Xinjiang has further complicated its relations with Central Asian populations. Protests against the mass detentions have mainly occurred in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. From 2018 to 2019, the activist group Atajurt Eriktileri organized frequent demonstrations in Almaty and Nur-Sultan (Astana), demanding the release of detained ethnic Kazakhs. Since January 2021, relatives of detainees have held weekly protests outside the Chinese Consulate in Almaty. In Kyrgyzstan, smaller protests took place in Bishkek in February and December 2019, where activists urged the government to act against China’s repression. China’s growing trade, security, and political influence in Central Asia is a key testing ground for its broader geopolitical ambitions. The future of this engagement will depend on China’s ability to balance its economic interests with local concerns, ensuring that its expanding role contributes to stability rather than fostering tensions. Beijing’s influence in Central Asia is steadily increasing, making it a dominant economic and security partner. Through initiatives like the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the China-Central Asia (C+C5) mechanism, China has deepened its presence by offering financial investments, security cooperation, and diplomatic engagement. This approach has been well-received by Central Asian governments, which seek economic growth and stability. Although Russia remains a major geopolitical actor in the region, its influence is diminishing as China’s economic power continues to rise. Beijing’s emphasis on respecting sovereignty and promoting development has helped solidify its relationships with Central Asian states. However, challenges such as local resistance to Chinese investments and potential geopolitical tensions with Russia persist. The long-term success of China’s regional strategy will depend on its ability to manage these complexities while maintaining its strategic foothold. The text of this work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The social dimension of the Alliance The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the organization created by the signatory states of the Washington Treaty to achieve the goals set by the Alliance, is an institution characteristic of the democratic realm, where governments depend on their respective public opinions when trying to establish a security policy. The people matter – and this is something we must keep in mind – when reflecting on their future. The simplest and most logical answer to the question posed in the title of this conference, the one that responds to common sense, is wherever its member states want. And this is the core of the problem. Do the allies have a common vision? Do they share interests as they did in 1949? Do they still believe they are a community united by their commitment to democracy? Is it reasonable to consider that they form a “collective defense system”? Without clearly answering these questions, it becomes very difficult to move forward with this analysis. We would be venturing into speculative territory. On the other hand, we cannot ignore reality, and this leads us to acknowledge that it is unlikely we will receive clear answers due to a set of considerations characteristic of the present time. The first refers to the lack of reliability of the State because of the high fragmentation of public opinion. Globalization and the Digital Revolution are causing social and economic changes that have led the population to distrust their political elites. Traditional parties are disappearing or losing seats, while new political forces emerge, questioning many of the paradigms we have been working with for years. The societies of the member states no longer have as clear a sense of the purpose of the Alliance as they did a decade ago, because there is confusion about what the actual risks, challenges, and threats they face are. The second is the absence of prominent figures with the authority to exercise leadership at the heads of the allied governments. We cannot ignore that in times of uncertainty, leadership is more necessary than ever, because in its absence, it becomes extremely difficult to shape a sufficiently common position among the citizens. The third is the empirical realization that the Alliance has not been able to manage the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine in a competent and professional manner. In the first case, the European allies decided to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty even though it wasn’t necessary, but wanting to show their solidarity with the state that had guaranteed their security for decades. However, on the battlefield, the vast majority shield themselves behind their ‘rules of engagement’ to avoid complicated situations. The goal was to comply with the United States more than to commit to victory. For its part, the United States was unable to maintain consistent objectives and strategy over time, which led to a humiliating defeat. What was the point of the waste of lives and money if, in the end, the same people returned to power? What was the point of the Alliance's technological superiority if it was defeated by poorly armed militias? In the second case, we have observed that despite the obvious incompetence of its armed forces, its limited capabilities, and its dire economic situation, Russia has managed to consolidate its control over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and continues to advance. For the average citizen, it is incomprehensible that, having committed ourselves to reclaim all Ukrainian sovereign territory and being much wealthier, our strategy has led Ukraine to the unfortunate situation it finds itself in. Why didn’t we offer them the weapons they needed from the very beginning? Why have we deprived them of the victory we formally committed to? The fourth is a derivative of the previous one. In this context, does it make sense for the citizen to trust the Alliance? Isn’t it understandable that they try to seek refuge within the national framework and fear that the Alliance, in the hands of unqualified people, will drag them into scenarios that are not critical to their lives? Whether we like it or not, the citizen's distrust in NATO is as justified as their intuition that only NATO can guarantee their security, which includes both their freedom and their well-being. What is the Alliance today? In circumstances as complex as those we are currently experiencing, it is virtually impossible for an organization composed of thirty-two member states to be a community committed to the defense and promotion of democracy. The mere reference to Turkey, Hungary, or Spain is proof of how far there are nations within it that are heading in a different direction. The evolution of European political systems points to a worsening of the situation rather than the exceptional nature of the mentioned cases. The community, as well as the idea that it constitutes a "collective defense system," falls within the realm of aspirations. The Alliance has been a “collective defense system,” and I have no doubt that there are allies who continue to act consistently with this idea. However, putting aside formalities, I believe that when assessing the transatlantic relationship, we must focus on its strict condition as an alliance. NATO is an asset that no one wants to lose, even though in its current state, it leaves much to be desired. Its strength does not lie in the common perception of the threat, the solidarity of its members, the available capabilities, or in sharing a strategy, which is clearly nonexistent. What makes its members want to keep it alive is the accumulated legacy after 75 years of shared experiences and the deep sense of insecurity in the face of the dual realization of a world undergoing profound change and poorly prepared national defenses from any point of view. Outside the Alliance, it’s even colder. NATO provides us with a starting point to try to react collectively, knowing that, in reality, except for the United States, no member state has the critical size to act as a "strategic actor." We have a history, an institutional framework, civilian and military bodies, doctrines, resources... that allow us to try to adapt without having to start from scratch. The European Perspective In recent years, the European states that are members of the Alliance have experienced the contrast between the claim that the European Union should assume the role of a "strategic actor" and the harsh, relentless reality of its impotence to effectively and competently address the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. In parallel, they have shifted from contempt for the United States, due to its erratic foreign policy and its inability to successfully complete its foreign initiatives, to seeking shelter once again under its military strength, considering the evidence of their own inability to understand international politics and act accordingly. It seems beyond doubt that the dynamics of the European integration process are heading towards the establishment of a federation. The transfer of sovereignty represented by the single currency was a milestone, marking the creation of "political Europe" through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, we are moving toward a single fiscal policy, with banking union, European monetary fund... ultimately towards the consolidation of an economic and monetary policy. Such significant common economic interests demand both a shared legal framework and a unified foreign policy. However, the factor of time plays a fundamental role. The passing of generations has allowed us to make progress, overcoming nationalist prejudices. Despite the formidable progress made, which is easily reflected in the recognition by young people that we live in a common cultural environment, the reality is that we are still far from forming what Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón referred to decades ago as a "European people." One thing is to delegate certain public policies to European institutions, and another, undoubtedly very different, is the exercise of actions that are characteristically sovereign. History and geography matter, and we must acknowledge that we have not yet formed that continental identity that would allow us to credibly face the formidable challenge of establishing a common foreign policy. The advantages of planning together and having the same capabilities are obvious, but above all, what matters is its viability. The Union is still not in a position to replace American leadership. This humbling realization transforms into a flow of energy in favor of the Alliance, assuming as inevitable the implementation of changes that allow it to adapt to a new international environment. For years, we have been aware that the Washington Treaty, and especially its Article 5, are anachronistic. The emergence of new domains – space, cyber, and cognitive – and the development of hybrid strategies challenge some of its foundations. Even so, we try to adapt without facing a reform of the treaty, in an exercise of understandable but risky caution. We are aware that the European theater is no longer the same as it was in 1949, that globalization and the "competition among great powers" in the race to win the "Digital Revolution" have shaped a considerably different scenario that we must integrate into, but we feel dizzy at the thought of leaving our own geographic zone, when we are not even in a position to effectively address our own problems. The American Perspective Since the creation of the United States, American society has lived with the contradiction between its isolationist vocation and its dependence on foreign trade. It fears becoming involved in the affairs of others at a high cost. However, the commercial dimension of its economy demands freedom of navigation, legal security, access to raw materials, and the ability to penetrate other markets, conditions that lead to an international role. From the First and Second World Wars, they learned that it was impossible to turn their back on what was happening in other countries, that they had to commit to international security, trying to establish an order that would guarantee their national interests. After years of involvement in international conflicts that seemed to have no end, isolationist and nationalist sentiment has grown, as a classic pendulum effect. In this context, it is understandable that the public debate openly questions its presence in the Atlantic Alliance. Is NATO a guarantee of the security of the United States? In the years immediately preceding the Madrid Summit, it was evident that the Alliance lacked a threat to unite it, a strategy to guide its steps, and capabilities that would allow it to carry out combined activities. It should therefore come as no surprise that since the second term of the Bush Administration, statements from senior officials have been warning of the dangerous drift of the Organization or threatening its withdrawal. There has been much talk about the low defense spending by many of the European allies. It is evident that without investment, there is no modernization, and without it, there is a technological disconnect that prevents the joint action of the armed forces of the different member states. However, what is truly concerning is what this implies in terms of abuse and disregard towards the United States. Hence, the heated reactions we receive from the other side. It is indecent that we spend on welfare, reaching levels that are unattainable for the average American, while we let them bear the cost of our security, both in economic terms and in human lives. As grave as, or even more than, the lack of investment is the absence of a shared vision and strategy, but it is understandable that the debate has focused on investment, an instrumental element. For European allies, increasing defense spending under the current economic circumstances will be as difficult as it is painful, but it will not be any less difficult or painful to reach an agreement that gives meaning to NATO's existence in the coming years. One of the few consensuses in the Capitol is to consider China as its main rival, around which all its economic, foreign, and defense policies revolve. In the Strategic Concept approved in Madrid, we can read that China is a “systemic challenge” for all of us. What policy have we derived from this categorical statement? Is there an Atlantic vision on this? It is hard to imagine that the Alliance can have a future if the states on both sides of the Atlantic do not reach a common position on how to engage with the great Asian power. In the same document, we find the statement that Russia is a “threat,” which does not align with statements from American leaders of both parties, though more from the Republican side than the Democratic one. It is neither acceptable nor responsible that, after the approval of such an important document, just two and a half years later, the United States acts as if the problem is not theirs. Putting formal aspects aside, is Russia a threat to the United States? To what extent does the behavior of the Moscow government in Eastern Europe affect U.S. national interests? Does it make sense for the United States to get involved in the war in Ukraine? Was Biden's behavior a reflection of a Cold War veteran, detached from the international circumstances of today? The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance was not the result of U.S. leaders in the early postwar years being convinced that the Soviet Union posed a threat to their national interests. On the contrary, they were fully aware that it did not. What concerned them was the extreme weakness of the European states, ravaged by a brutal war, the absence of a democratic culture, the high risk of totalitarian currents feeding off misery and uncertainty, and leading the Old Continent to a Third World War. European governments felt Soviet pressure. The area occupied by the Red Army was experiencing the extermination of representative institutions, Germany was torn between neutrality and partition, communist parties were gaining parliamentary positions in significant countries like France and Italy, supported by the prestige earned in the Resistance. For U.S. analysts, the European perception of the Soviet threat was exaggerated, but its effects could be concerning. The United States chose to engage in European reconstruction to prevent its drift towards fragmentation and totalitarianism, as the consequences of this drift could directly affect their national interests. They established a comprehensive strategy based on two pillars, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance. NATO has been and continues to be an instrument to guarantee cohesion and democracy on the Old Continent. The second Trump administration must resolve the tension between the isolationist demand of the citizenry, the need to create jobs on domestic soil through the erection of tariff barriers, the necessity of securing supply and distribution chains, and the consolidation of alliances or understandings between different regional blocs in response to Chinese initiatives. It is a set of contradictory actions wrapped in the populist demagoguery characteristic of our time, but which will require decisions in times marked by a succession of crises. Time for decisions An organization inhabited by officials does not need meaning to continue functioning. From 9 AM to 5 PM, qualified staff will move papers from one office to another, showcasing their professionalism and operational efficiency. However, it is important not to confuse NATO with the Alliance. The latter does need meaning, which is now in question. Whether we like it or not, the coming years will be crucial for its future. We will witness how the decisions made regarding a set of circumstances and debates will ultimately determine it, as well as the link between the two shores of the Atlantic. As happened at its origin, that link will go far beyond security, which is instrumental in consolidating that community which was the original aspiration and is now marked by its absence. The war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the central issue in the transatlantic relationship, as it brings to the negotiation table many of the fundamental issues that question its very existence. We are facing a continental conflict that arises after a Russian diplomatic attempt to reach an agreement on a new balance of power. Moscow's proposal demanded the withdrawal of U.S. units from areas bordering its territory and the removal of its nuclear weapons stationed in the Old Continent. Putin’s government felt threatened by NATO and the European Union's eastward expansion and demanded compensation. When it was not granted, it launched its third campaign on Ukraine and its fifth on territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. This is not a campaign that can be understood in a bilateral Russia-Ukraine logic, but rather as part of an effort by a revived Russian imperialism to reconstitute its historical sphere of influence. This invasion is not the first, and unless the Alliance acts wisely, it will not be the last. The role played by the Europeans has been disappointing. Their response to previous aggressions – Moldova, Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas – was the perfect example of how supposedly educated elites learn nothing from history. The French, Germans, and Italians collectively made the same mistakes as Chamberlain in Munich, thinking that the aggressor would be satisfied by acknowledging their right to aggression, when, in reality, they were encouraging them to proceed and prepare for new expansionist ventures. This attitude provoked the logical irritation and distrust in the Slavic-Scandinavian space, which was never deceived by the ongoing process under the Russian government. These powers refused to believe U.S. intelligence warnings about Russia's willingness to invade and reacted too late and poorly. All this, combined with the old problem of lack of investment in defense, made European armed forces ineffective and their industry powerless in responding to a demand for military capabilities in a short period of time. If the Europeans do not take their defense seriously, if they have become accustomed to parasitizing U.S. leadership, the frustration of their elites with their European allies is understandable. The Biden administration tried to use the Ukraine War to reconstitute the Alliance, but the strategy of attrition applied, renouncing victory out of fear of its political and military consequences, has led to a very high number of Ukrainian casualties and to public fatigue, which, following the Russian plan, is pushing through new political formations from both the right and the left to reach an unfeasible understanding with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. In the new international scenario, characterized by competition among great powers to achieve technological hegemony within the framework of the Digital Revolution, the United States needs Europe as much as Europe needs the United States. Russia does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, but it has become a vassal of China and an instrument of Beijing to weaken the cohesion of the Western bloc. The Trump administration must not fall into the temptation of turning its back on its allies, no matter how irresponsible and incompetent they may be, as this would cede ground to the rival. An even more protectionist policy could push European states, if not the Union itself, to seek alternative markets in China. A policy of greater withdrawal would encourage both division among continental powers and the pursuit of a middle ground between the two superpowers. What is at stake is much more than tariffs or investment in defense. What we will decide soon is whether we are a community or not, whether we face the challenges of a new era together, or if we choose separation. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States has valuable allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the Slavic and Scandinavian blocs. Attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine War could mean a victory for Russia by recognizing its right to alter Europe's borders by force, and the loss of trust from these allies, who are aware that even Trump would have fallen into the Munich trap, and despite his brash rhetoric, he would have ended up playing Chamberlain’s role. This would be a grave mistake for the United States, which, on the contrary, should rely on these countries to contain Russian expansionism and send a very clear message to Beijing about its commitment to updating and maintaining the cohesion of the Western community. Such an update would require allies, this time for real, to commit to defense investment and be prepared to use their capabilities when necessary. The Alliance needs a strategy. The concept approved in Madrid was merely the political framework to develop it. It is up to the Trump administration to lead its development in order to ultimately agree on what to do about the "Russian threat" and the "systemic challenge" posed by China. The Middle East crisis is unfolding in a scenario defined by two fronts established after years of diplomatic work: the "Abraham Accords" and the Axis of Resistance. Hamas’ aggression towards Israel has materialized in a harsh military campaign in the Gaza Strip, which has severely damaged the political and military capabilities of the Islamist group, and has extended to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is also suffering a heavy blow. In addition, Iran has seen its defense industry, anti-aircraft artillery systems, and, more limitedly, its nuclear network has suffered significant damage, while its intelligence system has been humiliated and degraded. In this context, despite the damage suffered by the Gazan population, the block formed by the Abraham Accords has remained cohesive, aware of Hamas' blackmail and the cost of yielding to it. On the other hand, Europe has presented itself as divided, lacking a strategic vision, not understanding that this was not a problem between Israelis and Palestinians, but an instrumental conflict aimed at undermining the regimes of Arab countries not aligned with the Axis of Resistance. Its criticism of Israel for the effects of its military campaign on the Gazan population consciously ignored both Hamas’ responsibility in turning them into human shields and the cost that accepting Hamas' blackmail would have had for all of us — Arabs, Israelis, and Europeans — if the campaign had not continued. How is it possible that we have so easily forgotten how the Axis powers were defeated? What would have happened in Europe during WWII if we had followed the European Union's demands during the Gaza War? The Middle East is a critical space for the Atlantic Alliance. It is understandable that the United States is frustrated with many of its European allies who, once again, have acted in a frivolous and irresponsible manner, unable to think in strategic terms. Israel has long chosen to turn its back on Europe, in response to a behavior it associates with a new form of anti-Semitism. The Arab bloc appreciates the European sensitivity to the suffering of the Gazan or Lebanese people, but it seeks security under the umbrella of the United States and Israel in the face of the Axis of Resistance, which poses a challenge of internal subversion, asymmetric warfare, and nuclear threat. A renewed Alliance needs to establish a strategy for the MENA region focused on containing Islamism and consolidating moderate regimes. China and Russia are taking advantage of the instability to infiltrate and hinder our missions. For them, instability on our southern front is a strategic objective, one that would fuel migration and insecurity, and with them, division within the Alliance and the Union. The Arab-Israeli bloc distrusts the United States due to its inability to maintain a strategy over time and does not rely on the Europeans. Only a firm stance from the Alliance in favor of this group of countries and against the Axis of Resistance could overcome this situation and guarantee both the cohesion of the Alliance and its authority in the region. The circumstances that led to the creation of the Alliance are behind us. They are history. However, today the Alliance is more necessary than ever. The circumstances have changed, but the community of values and interests remains the same, even though not everyone may understand this. Dissolving this community would be a grave mistake that would only benefit those powers whose goal is nothing more than to "revise" our legacy. Reviving it will not be easy. It will require political awareness and high-level diplomacy. Challenges that are impossible to achieve without leadership that matches the times. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump has sparked diplomatic controversy by suggesting the U.S. needs to acquire Greenland for reasons of “national security” and refusing to definitively rule out using military force to do so. Greenland, a self-governing Danish territory, “is not for sale,” said Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen. Trump’s interest in Greenland is not new. He first expressed interest in the territory in 2019, but it never developed into any action. Whether or not Trump has actual plans this time around to advance any attempt in Washington to own Greenland is far from clear. But given the incoming president’s repeated statements and invocation of national security, it’s worth considering what strategic value Greenland might actually have from the perspective of the U.S.’s geopolitical priorities. As a scholar of geopolitical conflicts involving natural resources and the Arctic, I believe Greenland’s value from an international political perspective can be viewed in terms of four fundamental areas: minerals, military presence, Arctic geopolitics and the territory’s potential independence. A matter of minerals Greenland’s most valuable natural resources lie with its vast mineral wealth, which holds real potential to advance its economy. Identified deposits include precious metals such as gold and platinum, a number of base metals – zinc, iron, copper, nickel, cobalt and uranium – and rare earth elements, including neodymium, dysprosium and praseodymium. A detailed 2023 summary published by the Geologic Survey of Denmark and Greenland suggests new deposits will be found with the continued retreat of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Greenland’s rare earth resources are particularly significant. These elements are essential not only to battery, solar and wind technology but also to military applications. If fully developed, the Kvanefjeld – or Kuannersuit in Greenlandic – uranium and rare earth deposit would place Greenland among the top producers worldwide. During the 2010s, Greenland’s leaders encouraged interest from outside mining firms, including leading Chinese companies, before finally granting a lease to the Australian company Energy Transition Minerals (formerly Greenland Minerals Ltd). When China’s Shenghe Resources took a major share in Energy Transition Minerals, it raised red flags for Denmark, the European Union and the U.S., which felt China was seeking to expand its global dominance of the rare earth market while reducing Europe’s own potential supply. The issue was put to rest in 2021 when Greenland’s parliament banned all uranium mining, killing further development of Kvanefjeld for the time being. That same year saw the government also prohibit any further oil and gas activity. Predictably, a majority of mining companies have subsequently steered clear of Greenland due to perceived concern of any investment being jeopardized by future political decisions. Fears of China abroad China’s interest in Greenland stretches back at least a decade. In 2015, Greenland Minister of Finance and Interior Vittus Qujaukitsoq visited China to discuss possible investment in mining, hydropower, port and other infrastructure projects. One firm, China Communications Construction Company, bid to build two airports, one in the capital, Nuuk, the other in Ilulissat. Another Chinese firm, General Nice Group, offered to purchase an abandoned Danish naval base in northeastern Greenland, while the Chinese Academy of Sciences asked to build a permanent research center and a satellite ground station near Nuuk. None of this sat well with the first Trump administration, which put pressure on Denmark to convince Greenland’s government that a significant, official Chinese presence on the island was unwanted. The Danes and Greenlanders complied, rebuffing Chinese attempts to invest in Greenland-based projects. The Trump administration, in particular, viewed China’s interest in Greenland as having hidden commercial and military motives, concerns that continued under the Biden administration in its recent lobbying of another Australian mining firm not to sell any of its Greenland assets to Chinese companies. Long-standing US interest The U.S. has had a long-standing security interest in Greenland dating from 1946, when it offered Denmark US$100 million in gold bullion for it. The Danes politely but firmly declined, with their foreign minister saying he didn’t feel “we owe them the whole island.” In the early 1950s, the U.S built Thule Air Force Base 750 miles (about 1,200 kilometers) north of the Arctic Circle. Originally a missile early warning and radio communications site, it was transferred to the newly formed U.S. Space Force in 2020 and renamed Pituffik Space Base in 2023.   The northernmost military facility of the U.S., Pituffik has updated radar and tracking capabilities to provide missile warning, defense and space surveillance, and satellite command missions. While it also supports scientific research focused on the Arctic, the base is intended to increase military capabilities in the Arctic region for both the U.S. and its allies. The base has the ability to track shipping as well as air and satellite positions, giving it both real and symbolic importance to American strategic interests in the Arctic. As a result, much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, not just those in Trump’s orbit, view any notable Chinese presence in Greenland, whether temporary or permanent, with concern. Geopolitics of the Arctic Greenland is geographically situated between the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, two Arctic shipping routes whose importance is growing as sea ice shrinks. By around 2050, a Transpolar Sea Route is likely to open through the central Arctic Ocean, passing Greenland’s eastern shores. Furthermore, the island is the basis of Denmark’s sovereignty claim to the North Pole – rivaled by claims by Russia and Canada. While international law recognizes no national sovereignty in international waters, that has done little to end the diplomatic tug-of-war over the pole. The matter is far from trivial: Sovereignty would give a country access to potentially significant oil, gas and rare earth resources, as well as superior scientific and military access to the future Transpolar Sea Route. Yet, this dispute over ownership of the North Pole is only one part of the geopolitical struggle for offshore territory in the region. Russia’s growing militarization of its enormous coastal area has been countered by NATO military exercises in northern Scandinavia, while China’s own moves into the Arctic, aided by Moscow, has seen the launch of several research stations supported by icebreakers and agreements for research and commercial projects. China’s government has also asserted it has rights in the region, for navigation, fishing, overflight, investment in oil and gas projects, and more. Greenland for Greenlanders? All of these factors help decipher the realities involved in the U.S.-Denmark-Greenland relationship. Despite Trump’s words, I believe it is extremely unlikely he would actually use U.S. military force to take Greenland, and it’s an open question whether he would use coercive economic policies in the form of tariffs against Denmark to give him leverage in negotiating a purchase of Greenland. Yet while Trump and other foreign policy outsiders view Greenland through an external strategic and economic lens, the island is home to nearly 60,000 people – 90% of them indigenous Inuit – many of whom treat the designs of foreign nations on their territory with skepticism. Indeed, in 2008, Greenland voted to pursue nationhood. The island receives an annual subsidy of 500 million euros ($513 million) from Denmark, and to further economic independence, it has sought foreign investment. Interest from China has accompanied Greenland’s moves toward independence, backed by Beijing’s strategy to be an Arctic player. The thinking in Beijing may be that an independent Greenland will be less shackled to NATO and the European Union, and as such, more open to investment from further afield. Ironically, Trump’s recent comments have the potential of achieving something very different than their aim by encouraging Greenland’s prime minister, Mute Egede, to propose a referendum in 2025 on full independence. “It is now time for our country to take the next step,” he said. “We must work to remove … the shackles of colonialism.”