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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском New Caledonia’s capital city, Noumea, has endured widespread violent rioting over the past 48 hours. This crisis intensified rapidly, taking local authorities by surprise. Peaceful protests had been occurring across the country in the preceding weeks as the French National Assembly in Paris deliberated on a constitutional amendment that would increase the territory’s electoral roll. As the date for the vote grew closer, however, protests became more obstructive and by Monday night had spiralled into uncontrolled violence. Since then, countless public buildings, business locations and private dwellings have been subjected to arson. Blockades erected by protesters prevent movement around greater Noumea. Four people have died. Security reinforcements have been deployed, the city is under nightly curfew, and a state of emergency has been declared. Citizens in many areas of Noumea are now also establishing their own neighbourhood protection militias. To understand how this situation has spiralled so quickly, it’s important to consider the complex currents of political and socioeconomic alienation at play. The political dispute At one level, the crisis is political, reflecting contention over a constitutional vote taken in Paris that will expand citizens’ voting rights. The change adds roughly 25,000 voters to the electoral role in New Caledonia by extending voting rights to French people who’ve lived on the island for ten years. This reform makes clear the political power that France continues to exercise over the territory. The current changes have proven divisive because they undo provisions in the 1998 Noumea Accord, particularly the restriction of voting rights. The accord was designed to “rebalance” political inequalities so the interests of Indigenous Kanaks and the descendants of French settlers would be equally recognised. This helped to consolidate peace between these groups after a long period of conflict in the 1980s, known locally as “the evenements”. A loyalist group of elected representatives in New Caledonia’s parliament reject the contemporary significance of “rebalancing” (in French “rééquilibrage”) with regard to the electoral status of Kanak people. They argue after three referendums on the question of New Caledonian independence, held between 2018 and 2021, all of which produced a majority no vote, the time for electoral reform is well overdue. This position is made clear by Nicolas Metzdorf. A key loyalist, he defined the constitutional amendment, which was passed by the National Assembly in Paris on Tuesday, as a vote for democracy and “universalism”. Yet this view is roundly rejected by Kanak pro-independence leaders who say these amendments undermine the political status of Indigenous Kanak people, who constitute a minority of the voting population. These leaders also refuse to accept that the decolonisation agenda has been concluded, as loyalists assert. Instead, they dispute the outcome of the final 2021 referendum which, they argue, was forced on the territory by French authorities too soon after the outbreak of the COVID pandemic. This disregarded the fact that Kanak communities bore disproportionate impacts of the pandemic and were unable able to fully mobilise before the vote. Demands that the referendum be delayed were rejected, and many Kanak people abstained as a result. In this context, the disputed electoral reforms decided in Paris this week are seen by pro-independence camps as yet another political prescription imposed on Kanak people. A leading figure of one Indigenous Kanak women’s organisation described the vote to me as a solution that pushes “Kanak people into the gutter”, one that would have “us living on our knees”. Beyond the politics Many political commentators are likening the violence observed in recent days to the political violence of les événements of the 1980s, which exacted a heavy toll on the country. Yet this is disputed by local women leaders with whom I am in conversation, who have encouraged me to look beyond the central political factors in analysing this crisis. Some female leaders reject the view this violence is simply an echo of past political grievances. They point to the highly visible wealth disparities in the country. These fuel resentment and the profound racial inequalities that deprive Kanak youths of opportunity and contribute to their alienation. Women have also told me they’re concerned about the unpredictability of the current situation. In the 1980s, violent campaigns were coordinated by Kanak leaders, they tell me. They were organised. They were controlled. In contrast, today it is the youth taking the lead and using violence because they feel they have no other choice. There is no coordination. They are acting through frustration and because they feel they have “no other means” to be recognised. There’s also frustration with political leaders on all sides. Late on Wednesday, Kanak pro-independence political leaders held a press conference. They echoed their loyalist political opponents in condemning the violence and issuing calls for dialogue. The leaders made specific calls to the “youths” engaged in the violence to respect the importance of a political process and warned against a logic of vengeance. The women civil society leaders I have been speaking to were frustrated by the weakness of this messaging. The women say political leaders on all sides have failed to address the realities faced by Kanak youths. They argue if dialogue remains simply focused on the political roots of the dispute, and only involves the same elites that have dominated the debate so far, little will be understood and little will be resolved. Likewise, they lament the heaviness of the current “command and control” state security response. It contradicts the calls for dialogue and makes little room for civil society participation of any sort. These approaches put a lid on grievances, but they do not resolve them. Women leaders observing the current situation are anguished and heartbroken for their country and its people. They say if the crisis is to be resolved sustainably, the solutions cannot be imposed and the words cannot be empty. Instead, they call for the space to be heard and to contribute to a resolution. Until that time they live with anxiety and uncertainty, waiting for the fires to subside, and the smoke currently hanging over a wounded Noumea to clear.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Rising tensions in the Middle East, with the risk of escalation in the confrontation between Israel and Iran against the backdrop of the Gaza conflict, represent a major change in the unwritten rules of this underground war between the two countries. From Iran’s perspective, the change in Israeli strategy violates the tacitly agreed rules of engagement. In particular, it removes the ambiguity that prevented attributing direct responsibility for attacks to either side, allowing the attacked party to limit the damage to its image and dissuading it from retaliatory actions that carry the risk of dangerous escalation. Iran’s response has also revealed a shift in its own strategy. For years, its position towards Israel and the US revolved around what was termed ‘strategic patience’, a long-term approach that involved strengthening the influence of its proxies in the region. In this sense, Hezbollah is its main export product, its most successful destabilisation model in that it is much more than a militia in Lebanon, even more than a state within the state: it is a state above the state, as it has the capacity to impose its own strategic objectives on the Lebanese state. This strategy of patience was based on the conviction that the networks Iran had been building allowed it to project its power without risking direct confrontation and its associated costs. However, the current dominance of conservative political figures in Tehran who see this strategic patience as a sign of weakness has led to the prevalence of more intense retaliation than usual, albeit below the critical threshold of outright conflict. This strategic shift has been evident in recent months. Thus, in January, Iran attacked targets in northern Iraq and Syria, claiming they were linked to Israel or the Islamic State, and a few days later launched strikes on Pakistani soil, demonstrating that the era of strategic patience is over. Broadening the focus, this episode reveals the dangers that prolonged tension between the two countries poses to an international security system suffering from prolonged US and EU inaction on the Palestinian issue and poisoning regional relations, as an open conflict between Iran and Israel would set the entire Middle East on fire and could degenerate into a nuclear crisis. With regard to Europe, this would pose a serious danger to its security and economy, as it could provoke large waves of migration to the EU, jeopardise the trade routes on which its economy depends and threaten energy supplies. The EU should therefore adopt a common policy to contain the risks associated with these dynamics. This means devoting more effort to resolving the Palestinian question and reactivating its conflict management capacity, keeping channels of communication open with all parties involved. Ultimately, it is urgent for the EU to intervene decisively and support inclusive dialogue in the Middle East to minimise the risk of full-scale war, before it is too late. These strategic shifts are taking place against a backdrop of growing internal contestation in Iran, where the Women, Life, Freedom movement has put an end to the idea that the regime was reformable and created a situation where both sides are at an impasse: on the one hand, a regime that disowns the majority of society and, on the other, a popular majority that disowns the regime. On the other hand, these tensions explain in large part why the regime continues to avoid a full-scale war, as it perceives that it is in a weak position with a population that has been in open revolt for almost two years. In addition, the destabilising role of ethnic minorities (Azeri, Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Baluchi) who represent more than half of the population, with their long history of grievances, such as systematic repression, poverty, poor access to public services, environmental degradation and the eradication of their languages and cultures has also increased. Iran’s multi-ethnic nature is thus also an important part of Iranian politics and a source of tensions that has usually been omitted from Western readings. Western pundits tend to look at Iran through the eyes of its Persian elite, just as they used to look at Russia from Moscow’s point of view, ignoring these different realities and their disruptive potential. However, the Iranian regime is well aware that if the majority of Persians who dominate the opposition hate the regime, they hate the prospect of losing control over the provinces even more, and Tehran is appealing to Persian nationalist sentiment to try to divide the opposition, claiming that only the current government can maintain control over the minority areas of the country. We will have to pay attention to the political, social and generational implications these movements have in a context where years of sanctions by Western powers have impoverished the main agents of change, namely the highly educated, open-minded and pro-Western middle class. These sanctions have been the main factor in strengthening economic ties between Russia and Iran, which share strategic objectives such as facilitating bilateral trade, accelerating the completion of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and strengthening the banking systems of both countries to facilitate financial transactions. In addition, what will be the impact of Iran’s entry into the BRICS+, along with its great regional rival, Saudi Arabia. In this regard, Iran has demonstrated its diplomatic flexibility by initiating since 2021 a process of normalisation of relations with the great powers of the Middle East, most of which had broken off diplomatic relations with Tehran, sometimes since the very founding of the Islamic Republic. Faced with the threat that the consolidation of the Abraham Accords and the normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab world could pose, Iran embarked on a new diplomatic strategy, where Egypt has become one of the main targets, after Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies. In this sense, a normalisation of relations between the two countries would constitute a second major diplomatic victory for Iran after its successful rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. Also relevant is that Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has recently visited Pakistan and Sri Lanka, two countries that have faced one of the worst economic crises in the region in recent years, and which hope to benefit from cooperation with Iran. Raisi’s trip demonstrates to the world that Iran remains diplomatically active despite instability in the Middle East, while reflecting a notable geopolitical trend: Iran is increasing its ties with South Asia with the intention of pushing an anti-Western and anti-Israel agenda through strengthening bilateral relations with certain countries in the region, most notably India and China, In parallel, Iran also seeks to diversify alliances in Latin America through a soft power strategy that allows it to position itself as a victim of Western harassment and to gain sympathy, political and strategic support in a region where, despite cultural and political differences, regimes such as Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela share the goal of establishing a new world order. In short, the Tehran regime is emerging from the isolation in which it has been immersed since the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, on the one hand by establishing alliances of circumstance such as the one it has been forging for some years now with Russia in the military and economic spheres and, on the other, by taking advantage of the loss of influence of the United States and the West in the region to normalise its relations with its great regional rival, Saudi Arabia, and other relevant actors such as Egypt and the Gulf monarchies, taking advantage of the loss of influence of the United States and the West in the region to normalise its relations with its great regional rival, Saudi Arabia, and other relevant actors such as Egypt and the Gulf monarchies, and betting on expanding its international influence through its membership of the BRICS+, thus taking the long road from isolation to strategic alliances.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском If it comes to pass, a second Donald Trump presidency will once again strain the bonds that have kept Australia and the United States close through so many decades. The self-interested nationalism of “America First” sits in fundamental opposition to the ideas that animate Australian foreign policy. We will have significant policy differences. Trump’s autocratic instincts, laid bare in attempts to steal the 2020 election, make talk of shared values a stretch. A Trump victory is far from assured. Still, the government needs a plan for one, and well before election day. Australia’s instinct will be to “manage through” pragmatically – to pick fights carefully, to be tough in private when needed while disagreeing politely in public, to build support for Australia in the administration, Congress and big business, and to work around Trump wherever possible. This was the model for Trump’s first presidency. There is nothing illegitimate in it, recognising as it does the enduring national interests that Australia has in its relationship with the United States – interests that are too important for governments to ignore, whatever they might think privately of Mr Trump. The alliance, on which Australia has staked so much as China’s power grows, is deeply institutionalised and will outlast Trump 2.0. The government is doing as much as it can to lock down AUKUS arrangements before the election. There is every chance economic ties will escape Trump’s obsession with “unfair” trade – Australia’s economy is open and the US enjoys a healthy trade surplus. Australia will hope that the institutions of the American state will temper excess: the US Constitution limits the ability of any one branch of government – legislative, executive, or judicial – from gaining too much power. Republicans in Congress, for example, won’t challenge Trump publicly, but nor will they give him free rein. And what shapes America happens in its states as much as in Washington. Tempering will happen in other ways. Trump doesn’t usually pay much attention to the interests of close partners, but others in a Trump administration will. The US needs dependable partners – that gives Australia access and at least some influence. Then there’s the noise-to-signal ratio: not everything Trump says will result in action. In short, Australia will be able to get things done, even if it is a wild ride. There is a good argument for protecting the alliance but not for normalising what Trump represents. Still, one doesn’t have to catastrophise about Trump to be alarmed at what might be in prospect. Constrained or not, the radical intent of Trump to remake America and its place in the world is clear. We have been here before, of course, but the stakes are higher, the context different, and the Trump movement better prepared. Today, China’s challenge is sharper and its global dimensions clearer. China’s military modernisation is quickening. The noose is tightening around Taiwan. The bloody, grinding conflict in Ukraine is a daily test of US resolve to stand against totalitarianism in Europe. Democracy and liberalism continue their world-wide retreat. Meanwhile, last year was the hottest on record globally. Unpredictable, inconsistent US leadership won’t support Australian national interests at such a critical moment. The rupture of transatlantic relations; a weaker NATO; the abandonment of Ukraine; emboldened leaders in China and Russia; disengagement from climate change processes; deeper global economic fragmentation; neglect of South-East Asia – if Trump were to win, not all of these outcomes are certain, but all are plausible. “Managing through” a second Trump term will therefore be necessary but not sufficient. For example, the government would need to consider a like-minded “coalitions of resistance” to shape or push back on some US decision-making – that will require loads of diplomatic finesse. Japan and South Korea would be key partners, and Europe more central to Australian thinking than it is today. Australia could choose to deepen the nation’s already evident hedge in Asia against both US inconsistency and Chinese aggression, diverting even more resources and political attention to its major Asian relationships. It may be necessary to spend more on defence and accelerate efforts to develop some sovereign military capabilities. Plurilateral co-operation without the United States, in groups small and large, could become more necessary. We would likely need to do more patching of the international system where our interests are strongly engaged, as the Morrison government did in supporting an interim appeal arbitration arrangement for trade disputes. Australia will need to think hard about how to influence a Trump administration on China. US and Australian approaches to China currently combine deterrence with reassurance through diplomacy. Under Mr Trump, misalignment could occur quickly. Trump has also flagged swingeing new tariffs on Chinese imports and greater self-reliance in “essential goods”. A new trade war and the ever-advancing boundaries of “de-risking” will pose complex policy challenges. Australia’s closest friends in America remind us that US democracy is often untidy and that for all its flaws, America is, well, the only America we have. This is a good argument for protecting the alliance but not for normalising what Trump represents. If Trump wins, that distinction will be as good a guide as any to policy-making in the national interest. This article originally appeared in Australian Financial Review.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском U.S. Marines joined Filipino counterparts on May 5, 2024, for a mock battle at a telling location: a small, remote territory just 100 miles off the southern tip of the contested island of Taiwan. The combat drill is part of the weekslong Exercise Balikatan that has brought together naval, air and ground forces of the Philippines and the United States, with Australia and France also joining some maneuvers. With a planned “maritime strike” on May 8 in which a decommissioned ship will be sunk and exercises at repelling an advancing foreign army, the aim is to display a united front against China, which Washington and Manila perceive as a threat to the region. Balikatan is Tagalog for “shoulder to shoulder.” Joint Philippines-U.S. naval drills have become an annual event. But as an expert in international relations, I believe this year’s drills mark an inflection point in the regional politics of the South China Sea. For the first time, warships taking part in the exercise ventured outside the 12-mile boundary that demarcates the territorial waters of the Philippines. This extends military operations into the gray area where the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone rubs up against the territory claimed by China and designated by its “nine-dash line.”    Also for the first time, the U.S. deployed an advanced mobile launcher for medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles of a type that had been banned under the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. In addition, the Philippine navy is showing off its newest acquisition, a South Korean-built missile frigate. The South China Sea has long been the source of maritime disputes between China, which claims the vast majority of its waters, and nations including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. In addition, heightened tensions over the status of Taiwan – a territory that the Biden administration has pledged to defend militarily in the event of a Chinese invasion – have made the South China Sea even more strategically important. Containment at sea The latest joint maneuvers come amid two developments that could go some way to influence the future trajectory of tensions in the South China Sea. First, the Philippines has grown increasingly assertive in countering China’s claims in the region; and second, the U.S. is increasingly intent on building up regional alliances as part of a strategy to contain China. The Philippines-U.S. alignment is more robust than ever. After a brief interval during the 2016-22 presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, U.S. warships and military aircraft once again operate out of bases in the Philippines. Joint naval patrols resumed in early 2023. At the same time, Manila granted U.S. troops unprecedented access to facilities on the northern Batanes islands, which have become the focus of current joint operations. Meanwhile, Washington has become more vocal in condemning challenges to the Philippines from China. U.S. officials had carefully avoided promising to protect the far-flung islands, atolls and reefs claimed by Manila for seven decades following the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines in 1951. Only in March 2019 did then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo assert that the treaty covers all of the geographical area over which the Philippines asserts sovereignty. In February 2023, Presidents Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Joe Biden doubled the number of bases in the Philippines open to the U.S. military. That May, the two leaders affirmed that the Mutual Defense Treaty applies to armed attacks that take place “anywhere in the South China Sea.” Causing waves, rocking the boat Firmer ties to the U.S. have been accompanied by more combative behavior on the part of the Philippines. In May 2023, the Philippines coast guard introduced demarcation buoys around Whitsun Reef – the site of an intense confrontation with China’s maritime militia a year earlier. Reports circulated three months later that Philippine marines planned to construct permanent outposts in the vicinity of the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal. And a Philippine coast guard ship, with the commander of the country’s armed forces aboard, approached Scarborough Shoal in November, before being forced to retreat by Chinese maritime militia vessels. Then in January 2024, the Philippines broke with its adherence to a prohibition on erecting structures on disputed territory, which was part of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, by installing electronic surveillance equipment on Thitu Island, which sits beyond Scarborough Shoal in the heart of a cluster of disputed formations. This was followed by announced plans to put water desalination plants on Thitu, Nanshan Island and Second Thomas Shoal, making it possible to maintain permanent garrisons on these isolated outposts. Manila has continued to assert its maritime rights by announcing that armed forces would escort exploration and mining activities in the exclusive economic zone. Further acts that could be seen as provocative in Beijing followed, including the stationing of a Philippine navy corvette at nearby Palawan Island and a joint flyover by Philippine warplanes and a U.S. Air Force B-52 heavy bomber. A raft of Chinese responses It is clear that the deepening of Philippines-U.S. ties has given Manila the confidence to undertake a variety of combative acts toward China. The question is, to what ends? A more assertive Philippines may end up contributing to the U.S. strategy to deter Beijing from extending its presence in the South China Sea and launching what many in Washington fear: an invasion of Taiwan. But it is possible that heightened truculence on the part of the Philippines will goad Beijing into being more aggressive, diminishing the prospects for regional stability. As the Philippines-U.S. alignment has strengthened, Beijing has boosted the number of warships it deploys in the South China Sea and escalated maritime operations around Thitu Island, Second Thomas Shoal and Iroquois Reef – all of which the Philippines considers its sovereign territory. In early March 2024, two Chinese research ships moved into Benham Rise, a resource-rich shelf situated on the eastern coast of the Philippines, outside the South China Sea. Weeks later, a Philippines coast guard cutter surveying a sandbar near Thitu was harassed not only by Chinese coast guard and maritime militia ships but also by a missile frigate of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, which for the first time launched a helicopter to shadow the cutter. Washington has taken no public steps to dampen tensions between Manila and Beijing. Rather, Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed full-throated support for “our ironclad defense commitments” during a mid-March 2024 stopover in Manila. Reassured of U.S. backing, Marcos has amped up the rhetoric, proclaiming that Manila would respond to any troublemaking on Beijing’s part by implementing a “countermeasure package that is proportionate, deliberate and reasonable.” “Filipinos,” he added, “do not yield.” Such an approach, according to Marcos, was now feasible due to the U.S. and its regional allies offering “to help us on what the Philippines requires to protect and secure our sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction.” The danger is that as the Philippines grows more assured by U.S. support, it may grow reckless in dealing with China. Rather than deterring China from further expansion, the deepening Philippines-U.S. alignment and associated Filipino assertiveness may only ramp up Beijing’s apprehensiveness over its continued access to the South China Sea – through which virtually all of its energy imports and most of its exports flow. And there is little reason to expect that Washington will be able to prevent an emboldened Manila from continuing down the path of confronting China in the South China Sea. To Beijing, the prospect of an emboldened Philippines forging active strategic partnerships with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and – most troublesome of all – Taiwan makes the situation all the more perilous.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In mid-May Russia’s President Vladimir Putin will fly to China on an official state visit. A sceptic would say that this visit is not really a big deal: the Russian leader and his Chinese counterpart, Chairman Xi Jinping had bilateral meetings at least forty times since 2013, when Xi was first elected as Chairman of PRC. The Russian President was in Beijing last time no longer ago than in October of 2023, when he participated to the high level “One belt, one road” Forum. Still, there are a couple of reasons for him to come to China again at this particular moment; the trip is likely to be quite special and important. Let us outline some of the most important motivations behind the planned trip. First, courtesy. In March of 2023, after he had been reelected as 7th Chairman of the People's Republic of China, XI Jinping chose Moscow as his first foreign destination. This decision was duly appreciated by everyone in Russia, including even those who do not follow international affairs. Vladimir Putin was reelected as 3rd President of the Russian Federation in March of this year and it is only natural that he wants to pay back courtesy to his longtime partner and friend by going to China prior to exploring other travel itineraries. Symbolically, this decision underscores the importance of Beijing to the Kremlin. After having met Xi Jinping, the Russian leader may consider visiting a number of other non-Western capitals, including Ankara, Tehran and Pyongyang. Second, bilateral relations. It is essential for the two leaders to compare notes on the current state of the bilateral relations that evolved significantly since their last meeting in October. 2023 turned out to be a very successful year for the Russia-China economic cooperation with the bilateral trade reaching the all-time record of 240 billion US dollars. However, the West remains firmly committed to disrupt this trend and the Western pressure on Beijing is constantly growing. Not surprisingly, the Chinese private sector is getting increasingly concerned about the scope of the likely negative impact that secondary sanctions might have on their business prospects. After the European Union had introduced its 12th package of restrictive measures against Moscow, a number of the leading China’s banks became reluctant to accept dollar payments from Russia; as a result, in March the bilateral trade suffered a mild setback of 2%. With the Chinese export to Russia going down by 14% on the yearly basis (from USD 8,9 billion to USD 7,6 billion), while the Russian export to China continued to grow and reached USD 12 billion. The most recent trip of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to China in April confirmed once again that the Biden Administration will continue to complicate the Russia-China economic interaction to the extent possible. Apparently, Putin and Xi should focus on how to make sure that the United States will not succeed in its efforts and that the bilateral trade by the end of 2024 will indeed amount to USD 280–290 billion as planned. Summit meetings usually serve as powerful catalysts for bilateral trade and investments; let’s hope that this pattern will be confirmed once again by the forthcoming Putin-Xi summit. Third, global developments. Those who hoped that 2024 would become a turning point in global politics shifting it from conflicts and confrontation to peace and reconciliation were bitterly disappointed: we have entered yet another dramatic year with many tragic events taking place in various corners of the world. The Russian-Ukrainian and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts are not stopped, the Houthis continue to target military and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Sahel countries and Sudan are simmering and can explode at any moment, global defense spending and global arms trade in 2024 reached their historic highs. On the other hand, 2024 also offers a number of opportunities that should not be overlooked. It is the year for BRICS to properly digest and absorb its recent enlargement, and Russia will have to manage the process chairing the club and hosting the next BRICS summit in fall. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization might also start changing by accepting Belarus as a member and exploring new opportunities for multilateral cooperation. Clear enough, the Russian and Chinese leaders have a lot of issues to discuss on the volatile global situation and to coordinate their reactions to swift changes. Fourth, frictions with the West. The two leaders will definitely not omit an opportunity to talk about their nations’ respective uneasy relations with the West. By the time he meets President Putin, Chairman Xi will still be quite fresh from his trip to Paris, Belgrade and Budapest, which is scheduled for May 5–10 and is the first such tour in five years. He is likely to share his impressions with the colleague from Moscow. My feeling is that the two leaders have not quite opposite, but somewhat different views on Europe: while Putin remains highly skeptical of any ‘strategic autonomy’ of European nations from the United States, Xi apparently still hopes that Beijing’s cooperation with major European powers as well as with the European Union in general, can be preserved even if the China-US relations continue going sour. The jury is still in session on this critical question, but a candid exchange of views on Europe and on the political trends within the United States, the likely outcome of the November elections including, should constitute a significant item of the Putin-Xi agenda. Fifth, emerging world order. The two leaders are also likely to discuss more general matters of the emerging new world order, such as the preferred role of the UN system, the future of strategic stability along with various dimensions of global and regional governance. Many specific dimensions of the new world order remain very vague and ambiguous; for instance, it is not clear what might happen to the existing nonproliferation regime, how to coordinate efforts to defeat international terrorism and to contain the reckless arms race, what can be done to enhance the efficiency of international law and so on. However, it is crystal-clear that one of the key challenges for both Moscow and Beijing is about how to provide tangible global commons in a highly volatile and unpredictable world with no universally accepted hegemonic power in charge. The Russian and the Chinese visions on the desirable international transition are not identical, but they are very close to each other; it is therefore essential to discuss both converging and diverging views on major components of the emerging world order. Sixth, human dimensions. The trip might well produce some other positive results, which do not look really breathtaking, but nonetheless are very important not only for ordinary Russian and Chinese citizens, but for the two nations at large, because they are weaving the social fabric of the relationship. The approaching 75-years anniversary since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing is a nice opportunity not only to stage a standard chain of public fora, cultural events, business-to-business meetings and academic conferences, but also to promote grass-roots people-to-people contacts. In particular, the two leaders are likely to pay special attention to expanding bilateral links in higher education, in R&D projects and in transborder interactions. Personally, I would like Putin and Xi to make a breakthrough on moving to the non-visa regime between the two neighboring countries. It is hard to understand why, given the excellent state of the Russia-China relations, many of us on both sides of the border still have to stand in long lines waiting for single-entry visas to be stamped in our passports. A lot of Putin-Xi conversations will take place behind closed doors, which is only natural under the current challenging geopolitical circumstances. However, the two leaders can release a political statement or a joint declaration that would reflect the areas of consensus and the list of priorities that their nations share. When and if such a document becomes publicly available, it will definitely deserve a very careful and attentive reading by everyone interested in monitoring the Russia-China relations. These days, even foreigners know that in China the number 'six' is associated with the meaning of "smooth" as it shares the same pronunciation as the character 溜. This number promises a successful and productive conclusion of business. Let’s hope that all the above mentioned six items of the anticipated Putin’s agenda in China will be properly covered and considered. Yet, we should stay realistic and manage our expectations. A single meeting between two political leaders, even if the two leaders happen to be Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, cannot possibly reverse all the ongoing negative trends in the global developments. The meeting will not produce miracles or replace the need for a continuous and meticulous work of bureaucrats, diplomats, military, media, baseness and civil society leaders. Neither stable and productive Russian-Chinese relations can be considered a substitute to inclusive and efficient multilateral arrangements. Still, it cannot be denied that a strong personal bond between Putin and Xi serves as a significant factor contributing to the overall stability in our less than stable world.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском This analysis is part of the Geopolitical Conflict Overview 2023. Abstract The security crisis in Sahel is spreading to the northern regions of the Gulf of Guinea coastal countries: Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana. Until recently, counterterrorism experts were wary of the jihadists' ability to expand along the West African coastline because these states, unlike their Sahelian neighbors, are more politically stable and have greater control over their borders. However, while the coastal countries are not as fragile as those in the Sahel, they have structural vulnerabilities, perpetuated by a north-south division in terms of development and economic opportunities. There is a religious factor also: unlike the Sahel, the Gulf of Guinea countries have a large Christian population and elites that sometimes have tended to marginalize Muslims. Thus, jihadist groups are being effective in exploiting this resentment against the state among the communities of the northern border regions of these countries, and they are succeeding in recruiting young Muslims with socio-ethnic links to the Sahel. Introduction The security crisis affecting the central Sahel is spreading to the northern regions of the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea: Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, and Ghana. Thus, violent incidents and terrorist attacks are crossing the porous borders from Burkina Faso into the coastal states. Between January 2021 and July 2023, 459 incidents — 171 social disturbances and 288 episodes of violence — have been recorded in the northern regions of Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Ivory Coast (Reliefweb, 2023).    Source: https://reliefweb.int/report/benin/outil-de-veille-multirisques-pour-les-pays-cotiers-dafrique-de-louest-benin-cotedivoire-ghana-togo-granit-au-30-septembre-2023 The network of protected forest areas in the region facilitates jihadist expansion. Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin host approximately 588 forest reserves covering around 142,000 km2. 188 of these reserves, including four of the five largest ones, are located within ten kilometers of an international border. In Ivory Coast alone, there are 249 reserves. None of them are separated by more than twenty-six kilometers from a border, and over a quarter of them border another reserve. These protected areas are crucial for preserving the remaining wildlife in the region but are at the center of an unprecedented security problem. As hideouts and routes for acting unnoticed, the reserves are a resource that favors the expansion plans of terrorist groups (Brottem, 2022a). The jihadist[1] group linked to both the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the regional franchise of Al Qaeda, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), has been operating with impunity in these forest reserves for years. This movement was first observed along the transhumance corridors extending from southern Algeria to these forests on the borders of the coastal states shortly after France began its anti-terrorism operations in Mali in 2013. The local jihadists, familiar with these corridors, moved south in search of safe resting spaces in the forests during the French operations in the Sahel. These forest reserves hinder aerial surveillance, provide access to food and fuel supplies, and facilitate discreet recruitment of young people to join the jihadist cause among marginalized communities (Bernard, 2021). So, groups like JNIM and ISGS have demonstrated their effectiveness in transforming a range of armed actors — bandits, rebels, militants, smugglers, local militias, and poachers — into allied and auxiliary groups, establishing a unity of purpose to undermine state control and facilitate illicit activities (Nsaibia, 2020). The maritime outlets of these four countries and their strategic position favor the establishment of organized crime in their territories, operating in their ports and coasts as logistical and distribution centers. Thus, the Gulf of Guinea and specifically Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria constitute entry and transit points in the routes of arms trafficking and cocaine and other narcotics. Other significant criminal activities include tobacco smuggling, motorcycles, and motor vehicle trafficking. This illicit trafficking directly fosters terrorist activity since, apart from the link between terrorist groups and criminal networks for the acquisition of weapons, a relationship can be established between the illegal flow of certain products and the ‘modus operandi’ of jihadist organizations. The illicit trafficking of fertilizers is an example, as they are introduced as contraband products from Ghana to Burkina Faso and used for the creation of improvised explosive devices (Collado, 2021). Thus, in the northern regions of the coastal countries, there has been a growing presence of jihadist groups that, before committing attacks, undergo a process of local approach and establishment. The arrival of this type of violence in the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea is a source of particular concern for the governments of these four countries, as well as for the international community, which fears that the destabilization in the region may lead to new humanitarian crises or exacerbate pre-existing problems. Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, and Ghana are economically stronger than their northern Sahel neighbors, but they also have weaknesses: factors such as the lack of economic and educational opportunities among youth, ethnic disputes, differences in living conditions between northern and southern populations, or conflicts over land ownership facilitate the potential establishment of terrorist groups (Summers, 2022). Until recently, counterterrorism experts were skeptical of the jihadists' ability to expand along the West African coast because these states, unlike their Sahelian neighbors, are more politically stable and have greater control over their borders. According to this logic, stronger security forces and government structures made jihadism unwelcome. However, while coastal countries are not as fragile as those in the Sahel, they have structural vulnerabilities perpetuated by a north-south division in terms of development and economic opportunities. Underdevelopment prevails in the north due to the distance from economically booming cities near the ports. The north-south gap is exacerbated by poor infrastructure and lack of roads. Northern populations are often deprived of resources — such as access to employment and education — which are available in the more industrialized southern regions (Bernard, 2021). In addition to these socioeconomic and intercommunity differences, a religious factor comes into play: unlike the Sahel, countries in the Gulf of Guinea have a significant Christian population and elites that sometimes tend to marginalize Muslims (Guiffard, 2023). Benin The activity of jihadist groups in Benin has significantly increased since 2019. The most affected areas are in the northern regions, where the population shares many geographic and ethnic similarities with the neighboring states. In recent years, several jihadist groups have taken advantage of Benin's forests to seek refuge and escape the pressure of regional counterterrorism efforts. A key area is the complex formed by the W-Arly-Pendjari National Parks (WAP), a UNESCO World Heritage site region divided between Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The national parks have often allowed these non-state armed groups to operate undetected, turning the region into a launching pad for their expansion into the West African savanna.    Source: United Nations Environment Programme Until recently, jihadist groups had used the area of the W National Park in Benin mainly as a rear base for operations in Burkina Faso and Niger. However, between 2019 and 2023, attacks by terrorist groups were repeated, most of the time against state security forces. The main jihadist groups operating in northern Benin are JNIM, its Burkinabe allied group Ansaroul Islam, as well as ISGS (Cristiani, 2023). The presence of these armed groups in the W National Park is disrupting conservation efforts and local livelihoods, fueling conflicts between farmers and nomadic herders over land and water. These jihadist groups are being effective in recruiting young Muslim herders from Benin, mostly Fulani, with socio-ethnic ties to the Sahel (Brottem, 2022b). This is a peripheral region where its inhabitants have been routinely overlooked by central governments and they lack social services, making these populations particularly vulnerable to infiltration and recruitment by Islamist groups. Over the past three years, there has been a growing influx of radical Islamic preachers facilitating the integration of jihadists into local communities through their preaching and infiltration into local Islamic schools (Lepidi, 2023). The next step is to impose the Sharia law, especially on women, and in some cases, they have already forced underage girls into marriage. Additionally, jihadists are engaging in smuggling activities of various goods such as gold, weapons, or money, and they trade with herds (International Crisis Group, 2023a). As has occurred in neighboring countries, jihadist groups exploit resentment against the state among communities in the border regions of northern Benin, where there is widespread discontent with central authorities. Authorities and official institutions in Benin are often seen as incapable of providing solutions to local problems and are criticized as opaque, discriminatory, and corrupt (Lepidi, 2023). For jihadists, Benin's geographical position is crucial. Its location as an intermediate stop for travelers moving from Mali or Burkina Faso to Nigeria makes it an important stronghold for facilitating the expansion of terrorist groups between Nigeria and the Sahel. Additionally, the fact that Hausa is the common language in northern Nigeria and is widely used in some areas of northern Benin contributes to facilitating cross-border operations of Nigerian bandits and jihadists (Zenn, 2023). The jihadists in northern Benin are taking control during the night. They move in motorcycle caravans with only one headlight on and descend upon villages to attack or engage in illicit activities. Locals note that these unpredictable nocturnal movements allow members of these groups to be intermittently present in many areas, making it difficult for state security forces to respond. The vast dimensions of the national parks on the border between Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger make monitoring them and providing security in adjacent communities a challenging task. The jihadists operating in this area have displaced civilian authorities and eliminated security agents through threats and attacks. This vacuum leaves local communities even more exposed to kidnappings and extortions (Brottem, 2022a). Government authorities in Benin assure they are taking terrorist threats seriously and claim to have detained seven hundred suspects, most of them from Benin, Nigeria, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The first alarm signal, confirming Benin was in the jihadists' sights, occurred in May 2019 when two French tourists were kidnapped near Pendjari National Park, in Benin territory, by a jihadist group from Burkina Faso. The two were released after the French army intervened, but their Beninese guide was killed (Vidjingninou, 2022). Less than two years later, in February 2021, JNIM carried out its first attack also in the northern part of the country. Among other actions, in September 2022, the jihadists killed two customs officers and kidnapped three government-affiliated individuals, signaling an alarming resurgence of jihadist violence in northern Benin. Meanwhile, in June 2022, JNIM carried out an attack in neighboring Togo, highlighting that the expansion of jihadism towards the West African coast had gained momentum (Zenn, 2023). Togo On April 7, 2023, the Togolese National Assembly voted to extend the state of emergency in the Savanes region, in the north of the country, by twelve months. The measure was first approved in June 2022 and has been extended since then. The state of emergency reflects the Togolese government's concern about the growing threat of non-state armed groups along the Togo-Burkina Faso border (Agence France Presse, 2023). This extension followed the jihadist attack in February 2023 that claimed the lives of thirty-one civilians in the town of Kpendjal, in the Savanes region (Crisis24, 2023). It is the deadliest attack by terrorist groups in the country's history. Although the attack remains unclaimed, reports by local media suggest that JNIM militants are behind it. Togo recorded its first attack in early November 2021 when jihadists from Burkina Faso clashed with Togolese military forces at a security post in Sanloaga, in the Savanes region (Zenn, 20212). In May 2022, another attack resulted in the deaths of eight soldiers in Kpendjal, on the border with Burkina Faso (Reuters, 2022). Most of the militants' activity in Togo has targeted security forces at rural outposts, although civilians in villages in the region have also been subject to attacks. The northern region of Savanes, with a population of 860,000 inhabitants in an area of 8,600 km2, harbors significant economic, social, and political issues that have facilitated the penetration of jihadist groups from the Sahel: massive unemployment, lack of infrastructure, distance from the central power, a sense of marginalization of rural and northern populations compared to urban elites in the south, and stigmatization and underrepresentation of minority Fulani nomadic communities in local governments. Additionally, it should be noted that the smuggling of light weapons and drugs has become an outlet to alleviate unemployment among the population in the border region with Burkina Faso. In fact, control of the underground economy in this area has become one of the driving forces behind the expansion of jihadist groups into northern Togo (Merz, 2022). Ivory Coast In June 2020, on the border with Burkina Faso, JNIM terrorists carried out the first jihadist attack to hit Ivory Coast since the 2016 shootings at the Grand-Bassam tourist resort by Al Qaeda in the Maghreb. Although the 2020 attack was a rare occurrence in Ivory Coast, it was not surprising, as jihadist militants operating between Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast had been able to grow and develop their capabilities largely due to the limited coordination, up to that point, between the two governments. JNIM militants established their presence in the border region between Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, and Mali in 2015. Even though organized political violence was sporadic and the network was presumably dismantled by security forces, remnants of these groups maintained their presence in the area (Nsaibia, 2020). In May 2020, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso decided to join forces to confront the common threat and launched a large-scale joint operation on both sides of the border against JNIM fighters, dubbed as Operation Comoé. The result of the operation was the dismantling of a base of jihadist militants near the village of Alidougou, the death of eight fighters, and the arrest of twenty-four suspects in Burkina Faso and fourteen in Ivory Coast. Weapons, ammunition, USB drives, and mobile phones were also seized in the operation (Jeune Afrique, 2020) A short time after the end of Operation Comoé, on June 11, 2020, JNIM fighters attacked a military post in the border village of Kafolo, killing fourteen Ivorian soldiers. This event demonstrated that, even after a large-scale joint operation, the jihadists were able to regroup and launch, in a matter of days, a devastating attack with a significant number of casualties, in a process much faster compared to the lengthy coordination process between Ivorian and Burkinabe authorities (Nsaibia, 2020). The attack served as a wake-up call for the Ivorian government, which retaliated with airstrikes and soon announced that it had located and arrested the alleged mastermind behind the Kafolo attack. In response to the attack and the persistent insecurity along the northern borders of the country, the government also authorized the creation of an operational military zone in the north to enhance border surveillance and prevent the infiltration of jihadist militants. Ivorian authorities have also established a community police force that works in collaboration with local citizens to relay information to security forces and have undertaken awareness campaigns in the northern regions (Le Figaro, 2020). However, in response to the terrorism problem, Ivory Coast has combined military action with a socio-economic approach by investing in programs aimed at providing social welfare and livelihood opportunities, especially to youth and women living in villages directly threatened by jihadism. Additionally, the government is aware that the country is the largest economy in the Francophone West Africa and maintains close ties with the former colonial power. Thus, Ivory Coast is a showcase of the West, and for jihadists, destabilizing the country would have significant propagandistic value (International Crisis Group, 2023b). Ghana Although in Ghana the jihadist threat may not be as perceptible as among its coastal neighbors, the penetration of jihadists from Burkina Faso into the northern provinces is also a concern. Thus, in the northern part of the country, favorable conditions for recruitment exist: a significant Muslim population and economic difficulties within the community. Ghana is exposed to jihadist activity within its territory due to its proximity to the Cascades region in Burkina Faso and northern region of Ivory Coast. In fact, the growing presence of jihadist fighting groups in the Cascades region, as well as the intensification of a strategy of attacks against neighboring Ivory Coast, make northern Ghana an ideal cross-border region for retreat and control for armed groups, especially because these areas offer access to highly attractive illegal activities such as clandestine gold mining or cattle theft (Merz, 2022). The fact that jihadist activity in Ghana is apparently lower could be related to several factors. The first is that it is the only Anglophone country in the region, which may be hindering (though not preventing) cross-border recruitment by the Francophone jihadists of JNIM (Moody, 2022). Another factor is that the government has taken the threat very seriously and has made significant efforts to improve security. Thus, military presence has been significantly strengthened in the north, where the army strives to involve the local population and encourage citizens to report suspicious incidents near their homes. This was demonstrated especially with the campaign 'If you see something, say something,' which encouraged the local population to call an anti-terrorism hotline if they saw anything suspicious (Africa Defense Forum, 2022a). Despite the anti-terrorism prevention measures, there is evidence that jihadist groups are established in the northern part of the country. Thus, after the military operation Otapuanu in southeastern Burkina Faso in March 2019, in which Burkinabe military forces attempted to dismantle JNIM and ISGS groups, authorities in that country reported that extremist elements had been discovered in northern Ghana. There is also evidence that in the Sahel, there is a considerable number of Ghanaian jihadist fighters. It is estimated that up to two hundred Ghanaian youths have left the country to join jihadist groups in Burkina Faso or Mali and that, in the future, they may return to their home villages to engage in religious proselytism activities. Additionally, everything indicates that JNIM uses Ghana as a resource stockpile area, particularly motorcycles, which suggests that jihadists are likely already familiar with the terrain of the country (Moody, 2022). In November 2019, military forces from Ghana and Togo detained one hundred and seventy suspected jihadist militants on Ghanaian territory near the border between both countries. This was part of a joint security operation, called Koudanlgou III, which objective was to thwart terrorist plans and other criminal activities that the detainees were allegedly involved in (Ghana Web, 2019). In October 2022, Ghanaian security forces detained an Islamic cleric and twelve of his followers for alleged terrorist activities in the town of Nangun, in the Karaga district. Apparently, the individuals had ties to a jihadist group in Burkina Faso (Geopolitical Report, 2022). In April 2023, one thousand special forces troops from the Ghanaian army were deployed to Bawku in the Upper East region after three immigration officials were shot, one of whom was killed (My Info Gh, 2023). Response to the terrorist threat Following the kidnapping of two French citizens and their guide in Benin in May 2019, the country's authorities questioned whether they had done everything in their power to confront the terrorist threat. Despite warnings, the Beninese government had not strengthened security in the border area. Regarding Pendjari National Park, it was only monitored by forest guards from African Parks, a South African NGO. State security forces were not present, even though this forest reserve borders the Arly Forest and the Pama department in Burkina Faso, known to be hotspots for criminal groups and jihadists (Barry, 2019). In response to the increasing threat, the coastal states of West Africa have been adopting a military approach in the fight against terrorism by enhancing cross-border security. Thus, over the past two years, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin have expanded troop deployments in their northern regions. These coastal states have relatively small armies ranging from ten thousand to sixteen thousand personnel and are generally not sufficiently trained and equipped. The governments of these countries have shown particular interest in acquiring drones for border surveillance and conducting targeted attacks. Additionally, they are seeking to strengthen regional bilateral relations to carry out joint operations and share information (Stratfor, 2022). In the realm of international organizations in West Africa, multilateral institutions and initiatives face two problems: insufficient funding and disputes and rivalries among their members, which limit effective cooperation and coordination in the fight against terrorism. The main initiatives comprising the regional security architecture are the G5 Sahel Joint Force (which is expected to disappear following the new security pact signed in September 2023 by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, consolidating the shift towards Russia and the expulsion of France) (Al Jazeera, 2023); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force; the Multinational Joint Task Force combating Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP) and Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin; and the Accra Initiative, a multilateral security cooperation mechanism established by Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Togo in 2017, which also includes Mali and Niger as observer members. Five years after its creation, the Accra Initiative has agreed to assemble a multinational military force to help curb the spread of jihadism. This operational force will consist of ten thousand soldiers, the majority of whom will be stationed in Tamale (Ghana), with an intelligence component in the Burkinabe capital, Ouagadougou. Despite the recent withdrawal of European forces from the Sahel, the Accra Initiative has received €135 million from the European Union. It is estimated that the joint multinational force requires $550 million to operate effectively, and member states hope that, in addition to the European Union, funding can be provided by the African Union, ECOWAS, and Britain. Nigeria has agreed to join this initiative as an observer and provide air and logistical support (Africa Defense Forum, 2022b). Additionally, according to a German newspaper published last August, EU foreign ministers have already reached an agreement to launch a civilian-military mission in the coming months in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin. The number of police officers and soldiers to be deployed in the Gulf of Guinea has not yet been defined, as the mission is pending official approval by the community institutions. According to the source cited by the German newspaper, there is concern among European countries that jihadist groups will expand their activities in the region and destabilize the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea. The governments of Benin and Ghana have already issued the necessary invitation for the European mission to establish itself in their territory (Schiltz, 2023). Future perspectives of the conflict The political instability and coups d'état in the Sahel countries, which have led to the withdrawal of French military presence from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, offer new opportunities for jihadist groups to expand their positions, spread across the territory, and thereby increase their ability to threaten the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea. On the other hand, the trajectory of the Wagner Group mercenaries’ presence in the Sahel is uncertain following Prigozhin's death, but in any case, Russian paramilitaries do not appear to be the solution to the region's security crisis. The political fragility of the coup governments in the Sahel and regional insecurity will mutually reinforce each other, and it is to be expected that the jihadist threat to Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, and Ghana will continue to grow. However, several factors could hinder the progression of jihadist groups further south, starting with the need to forge local alliances. Jihadist groups are numerically small, which makes it difficult for them to hold territory. One of their main strengths lies in the alliances they can establish locally, through persuasion or threat, with local leaders and marginalized communities. However, as jihadist groups move southward, they will find it difficult to establish lasting bases and gain support from inhabitants of predominantly Christian regions. Additionally, they will lose much of their ability to move undetected among the local population. Nevertheless, the recent wave of coups d'état in the Sahel has demonstrated that it is not necessary for jihadists to spread throughout the entire territory of a country to create a crisis that leads to a failed state and chaos (Walther, 2023). From what is highlighted in this chapter, it is evident that preventing the terrorist threat depends on military decisions and actions, but also on better political and social integration of the populations living in the peripheral regions of the north. Although there may not be a deliberate policy of discrimination, the sense of marginalization seems to be one of the reasons why young people from these regions decide to collaborate with or join the cause of jihadist groups. The counterterrorism response should involve strengthening the social and investment presence of the state in the northern regions of these countries with the aim of improving access to basic services or employment opportunities, and also by enhancing dialogue between security forces and the population. In this conflict, nothing is yet decided, and it will be crucial, to prevent jihadist expansion in the region, for the cooperation of West African countries in regional organizations such as the Accra Initiative and ECOWAS. Likewise, military collaboration with the European Union will be of great assistance, as many of its countries are currently concerned (and would be affected tomorrow) by the expansion of the jihadist threat in the Gulf of Guinea. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] Jihadism is a type of ideology characterized by the frequent use of terrorism with the aim of restoring the original greatness of Islam both spiritually and politically. This restoration involves the re-Islamization of Muslim societies from the strictest orthodoxy and the aspiration to create political structures that uphold and promote the realization of these principles. The scope of action may be solely regional, but all lines coincide in the desire to achieve the unity of all Muslims, and the willingness to spread Islam throughout the world. (https://www.wikiwand.com/es/Yihadismo).  References · Africa Defense Forum (2022a). 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Jihadist Attack on Togo Highlights Threats to Neighboring Ghana. The Jamestown Foundation. Disponible en: https://jamestown.org/program/jihadist-attack-on-togo-highlights-threats-toneighboring-ghana/ · My info Gh (2023). Government deploys 1,000 Special Forces to Bawku following deadly attack on immigration officers. My Info Gh. Disponible en: https://myinfo.com.gh/2023/04/government-deploys-1000-special-forces-tobawku-following-deadly-attack-on-immigration-officers/ · Nsaibia, Héni (2020). In Light of the Kafolo Attack: The Jihadi Militant Threat in the Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. Disponible en: https://acleddata.com/2020/08/24/in-light-of-the-kafolo-attack-thejihadi-militant-threat-in-the-burkina-faso-and-ivory-coast-borderlands/ · Reliefweb (2023). Outil de veille multirisques pour les pays côtiers d’Afrique de l’Ouest. Reliefweb. 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Disponible en: https://observatorioterrorismo.com/eedyckaz/2023/07/ESPANOL-ANUARIO2022_final.pdf · Vidjingninou, Fiacre (2022). Bénin: l’étau terroriste se resserre au Nord. Jeune Afrique. Disponible en: https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1292906/politique/beninletau-terroriste-se-resserre-au-nord/ · Walther, Olivier (2023). Sahelian jihadists go? Mapping Territorial Transformations in Africa. Disponible en: https://mapping-africa-transformations.org/how-far-southwill-the-sahelian-jihadists-go/#MAPTA · Zenn, Jacob (2021). Togo Suffers First Al-Qaeda Affiliated Jihadist Attack». The Jamestown Foundation. Disponible en: https://jamestown.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/11/TM-pdf-Draft-1.pdf (2023). Benin Becomes Bulwark Against Terrorism in West Africa. The Jamestown Foundation. Disponible en: https://jamestown.org/program/brief-benin-becomesbulwark-against-terrorism-in-west-africa/ Appendix  Table: Demographic, Economic, and Social Indicators. Source: https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Political loyalty to PT-led governments has garnered support among the poorest. However, the Brazilian center-left has lost its hegemony over its social base. Can Bolsonaro return to power in 2026? Yes, he could. We must consider the existence of powerful objective and subjective factors to explain the resilience of the far right, even after the defeat of the semi-insurrection in January 2023. But, first of all, it is wise to recognize the international context of the phenomenon, in which the far right plays an instrumental role: (a) the turbulence in the system of states with the strengthening of China and the strategy of U.S. imperialism to preserve the supremacy of the Troika, for which a tougher protectionist orientation is useful; (b) the disputes caused by the emergence of the environmental crisis and the energy transition, which temporarily disadvantage those who decarbonize more quickly; (c) the shift of bourgeois factions towards the defense of authoritarian regimes that face popular protest and embrace a national-imperialist line; (d) the trend towards economic stagnation and the impoverishment and rightward shift of the middle classes; (e) the faltering crisis of the left, among others. But there are Brazilian peculiarities in the political fragmentation of the country. These are essentially five: (i) the hegemony among the military and the police; (ii) the gravitation of the vast majority of Pentecostal evangelicals towards the far right; (iii) the weight of the Bolsonarism in the most developed regions, the Southeast and South of the country, especially among the new middle-class property owners, or those with very high levels of education who hold executive positions in the private and public sectors; (iv) the leadership of the neo-fascist current within the far right; (v) the support base of the far right among the salaried middle classes with wages between three and five or even up to seven minimum wages. The first four peculiarities have been widely researched, but the last one less so. Studying it is strategic because it may be the only one possible to reverse in the context of a very unfavorable situation of still reactionary social power relations. There are objective factors that explain the distancing, division, or political separation between parts of the working class and the poorest, such as the inflation of private education and health plans, and the increase in income tax, which are threats to a model of consumption and living standard, and subjective factors, such as social resentment and moral-ideological rancor. Both are intertwined and may even be indivisible. But that was not the case when the final phase of the struggle against the dictatorship began, forty-five years ago. The PT was born, supported by metalworkers, public school teachers, oil workers, bankers, and other categories who, compared to the reality of the masses, had more education and better salaries. Lulism, or political loyalty to the experience of PT-led governments, allowed for support among the poorest. However, the left, although it maintains its positions, has lost hegemony over its original mass social base. This tragic reality, due to the fracture of the working class, requires that we analyze it from a historical perspective. The post-war period (1945-1981) of intense growth, during which GDP doubled every decade, and which favored absolute social mobility in Brazil, accompanying accelerated urbanization, seems to have irretrievably passed. Full employment and increased schooling, in a country where half of the active population was illiterate, were the two key factors in improving the lives of this layer of workers. But they no longer exert the same pressure as in the past. It is clear that in the last decade, Brazilian capitalism has lost momentum. It lost 7% of its GDP between 2015/17 and, after the Covid pandemic in 2020/21, it took three years to return to the 2019 levels. Despite all the anti-social counter-reforms - labor, social security - aimed at reducing production costs, the investment rate did not exceed 18% of GDP in 2023, despite the authorization of the Transitional Proposed Constitutional Amendment (PEC) to breach the Public Spending Ceiling. Brazil, the largest industrial park, and consumer market for durable goods in the periphery, has become a nation of slow growth. The increase in schooling has ceased to be such a powerful driving factor. Improving life has become much more difficult. The Brazil of 2024 is a less poor country than in the 20th century, but not less unjust. Of course, there is still a lot of poverty: tens of millions or even more continue suffering from food insecurity, despite the ‘Bolsa Familia’, depending on the economic cycle. But there has been a reduction in extreme poverty without a qualitative reduction in social inequality. The functional distribution of income between capital and labor has experienced variations in the margin. The personal income distribution improved between 2003 and 2014, but it has increased again since 2015/16, following the institutional coup against Dilma Rousseff's government. Extreme poverty has decreased, but half of the economically active population earns no more than two minimum wages. A third of wage earners earn between three and five minimum wages. Inequality has remained almost intact because, among other reasons, the position of middle-income wage earners with higher levels of education has stagnated with a downward bias. Numerous studies confirm that the increase in average schooling is not related to employability, and IBGE surveys paradoxically confirm that unemployment is higher as schooling increases. Most of the millions of jobs created since the end of the pandemic have been for people earning up to two minimum wages, with very low educational requirements. To assess the greater or lesser social cohesion of a country, two mobility rates are considered: absolute and relative. The absolute rate compares the occupation of the parent and the child, or the first activity of each one with their last job. The relative mobility rate checks to what extent the obstacles to accessing jobs - or opportunities for study - that favor social advancement could or could not be overcome by those in a lower social position. In Brazil, both the absolute and relative mobility rates were positive until the 1980s, but the former was more intense than the latter. In other words, we experienced intense social mobility in the post-war period due to the pressure of urbanization and internal migration, from the Northeast to the Southeast, and from the South to the Midwest. But this is no longer the case. This historical stage ended in the 1990s when the flow from the agrarian world was exhausted. Since then, poverty has decreased, but middle-class workers have experienced a more hostile reality. What explains this process is that the social mobility trajectories of the last twenty years have benefited millions of people who lived in extreme poverty, but very few have ascended significantly. Many have improved their lives, but they have only ascended to the step immediately above to the one occupied by their parents. Relative social mobility has remained very low because the material incentives to increase schooling have been lower in the last forty years than they were for the generation that reached adulthood in the fifties or sixties. The rewards that families receive for keeping their children out of work for at least twelve years until they finish high school have decreased compared to the previous generation, despite the greater ease of access. A country may start from a situation of great social inequality, but if social mobility is intense, social inequality should decrease, increasing social cohesion, as happened in post-war Italy. Conversely, a country that had low social inequality compared to its neighbors occupying a similar position in the world may see its situation deteriorate if social mobility becomes regressive, as is evident in present-day France. In Brazil, contrary to what is commonly thought, most of the new jobs in the last ten years have not benefited the most educated sector of the population. Studying more has not reduced the risk of unemployment. In the forty-five years since 1979, average schooling has increased from three to over eight years. But two transformations have occurred that have had a lasting impact on the consciousness of the working youth. The first is that Brazilian capitalism is no longer a society of full employment, as it had been for half a century. The second is that, even with the sacrifices made by families to keep their children studying and delaying their entry into the labor market, employability has concentrated in activities that require little schooling and offer low wages. For the first time in history, children have lost hope of living better than their parents. Unemployment among those with higher education is proportionally higher than among those with lower education, and if the inequality of personal incomes has decreased in the last fifteen years, it is because the average salary of those with middle and higher education has been decreasing. The dizzying expansion of uberization is not surprising. The monthly employment surveys by IBGE in the São Paulo metropolitan region indicate a very slow evolution that, at best, only approximates the recovery of inflation. Nearly forty years after the end of the military dictatorship, the economic and social balance of the liberal democracy regime is discouraging. The reforms carried out by the regime, such as expanding access to public education, implementing the SUS (Unified Health System), the ‘Bolsa Familia’ for the extremely poor, among others, were progressive but insufficient to reduce social inequality. The hypothesis that a more educated population would gradually change the political reality of the country, driving a sustainable cycle of economic growth and income distribution, has not been confirmed. One form of gradualist illusion in the perspective of social justice within the limits of capitalism was the hope that a more educated population would gradually change the social reality of the country. This brings us to the limits of the coalition governments led by the PT, which bet on conciliation with the ruling class to regulate “wild" capitalism. Although there are long-term correlations between schooling and economic growth, no direct effects that are incontrovertible have been identified, even less so if we include the variable of reducing social inequality, as confirmed by South Korea What is incontrovertible is that the Brazilian bourgeoisie was united in 2016 to overthrow the government of Dilma Rousseff, despite the moderation of the reforms carried out. It should not surprise us that the ruling class had no qualms about going to the extreme of manipulating the impeachment, subverting the rules of the regime to take power for their direct representatives, such as Michel Temer. The challenge is to explain why the working class was not willing to fight to defend it. At the beginning of the 1990s, wages represented more than half of the national wealth, and in the last thirty years, they fell to just over 40% in 1999. Despite the recovery between 2004 and 2010, they still remain below the 50% level of 2014. This variable is significant for an assessment of the evolution of social inequality because Brazil in 2024 is a society that has already completed the historical transition from rural to urban (86% of the population lives in cities), and the majority of those under contract, 38 million with labor contracts and 13 million civil servants, receive salaries. Another ten million have an employer but no contract. It is true that there are still 25 million Brazilians who live off self-employment, but they proportionally fewer than in the past [ii]. In summary, the functional distribution of income between capital and labor has not improved. The bourgeoisie has no reason to complain about the liberal regime. Nevertheless, a fraction of the bourgeoisie, such as agroindustry and others, supports neo-fascism and its authoritarian strategy. The data indicating that social inequality has decreased among wage earners is convincing. But not because injustice has decreased, although misery has. This process has occurred because there have been two opposing trends in the labor market. One is relatively new, and the other is older. The first was the rise in wage floors for less skilled and less organized sectors. The minimum wage has been increasing above devaluation slowly but steadily since 1994 with the introduction of the real, accelerating during the years of the Lula and Dilma Rousseff governments. This is a new phenomenon, as the opposite had occurred in the previous fifteen years. The minimum wage is a key economic variable because it is the floor for INSS pensions, which is why the bourgeoisie demands it to be delinked. The economic recovery favored by the global cycle of increased demand for commodities allowed unemployment to fall from the second half of 2005, culminating in 2014 in a situation of almost full employment. The widespread distribution of the ‘Bolsa Familia’ also appears to have exerted pressure on the remuneration of manual labor, especially in less industrialized regions. The second trend was the continued decline in the remuneration of jobs that require middle and higher education, a process that had been occurring since the 1980s. In conclusion, the available data suggest that increasing schooling is no longer a significant factor in social upward mobility, as it was in the past. The political loyalty of the popular masses to Lulism is an expression of the first phenomenon. The lives of the poorest improved during the years of PT governments. The division among wage earners earning more than two minimum wages expresses a social resentment that has been manipulated by Bolsonarism. If the left does not regain confidence in this sector of the workforce, the danger for 2026 is significant. Jacobinlat The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском French and German credibility has reached new lows on the Ukraine issue, risking European security as each seeks to sure up political and geopolitical influence. Solidarity is weak, and arms corporations have proven influential in national decisions for EU integration on security matters. In the numerous crises that hit the European Union (EU) in the 21st century – the role of the so-called “integration engine,” as the French-German duopoly is called – was crucial. However, after Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022, both integration leaders from Western Europe receded into the background. The leaders of aid for fighting Ukraine were mainly the countries of NATO’s eastern flank, led by Poland and the Baltic states. Germany and France defended themselves against too radical sanctions imposed on Moscow, did not support Kiev, and did not want, among other things, either Ukraine’s accession to the EU nor to NATO. Why did Paris and Berlin distance themselves from Russian aggression in 2022, which violated European values and human rights and also threatened the EU itself? In short, the war hit various economic interests that France and Germany conducted with Vladimir Putin’s regime. An example of this was the expansion of Nord Stream, a gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea, after Putin’s first military aggression against eastern Ukraine in 2014. It is worth recalling that the entire climate transformation in the EU in its initial phase was based on cheap Russian gas. Economic ties were not the only reason for the strange behavior of Berlin and Paris in the face of Moscow’s aggression. Geopolitical considerations were even more important. The elites of Western Europe have traditionally, with minor interruptions, cooperated with Russia and considered it an important economic and political partner. The geopolitical goal of both Western European countries was to seek strategic autonomy from Washington and rapprochement with Moscow and Beijing. Historically, Central Eastern Europe has been treated as an area of influence of Berlin and Moscow, which they share or (less frequently) compete for. Before 2022, for Berlin, this sphere of influence included the Central European countries and the Baltic states; for Moscow, this included Belarus and Ukraine. This is why, among other things, Western Europe distanced itself from Moscow’s aggression in 2022. It did not want to spoil relations with Moscow. It also did not want to provoke even greater Russian aggression, fearing a full-scale war with NATO. Western Europe wanted to reach an agreement with Putin as quickly as possible and return to the previous economic and geopolitical arrangement. However, in 2024, there was a clear change in Western Europe’s position towards the war in Ukraine. First, Germany increased its financial and military assistance, although it continued to block the delivery to Kiev of the most modern weapons requested by President Volodymyr Zelensky. France and Germany increased the scope of sanctions imposed on Moscow, although they were still full of loopholes that allowed the Kremlin to avoid them. Meanwhile, Berlin and Paris unblocked their veto on Ukraine’s accession to the EU, nevertheless they continued to maintain their opposition to Kiev’s membership in NATO. Under the influence of both Western European countries, the EU’s financial and military assistance to Kiev increased. It was still too small in relation to Ukraine’s needs, and Brussels faced great problems and delays in fulfilling aid declarations. The most radicalized person was President Emmanuel Macron who announced in 2024 that he would send troops to Ukraine. In the same year, German politicians proposed that NATO troops should protect the sky over western Ukraine from the territory of Romania and Poland. What caused this radical turn in Berlin and Paris? First of all, it turned out that both countries were losing credibility in NATO and the EU, and thus political influence in Central Europe and Ukraine. What was no less dangerous – especially for German politicians – was the growing dissatisfaction with their attitude in the US. The Germans feared that Washington would lose trust in Berlin and focus on NATO’s eastern flank, mainly Warsaw. Furthermore, Germany and France believed less and less in renewing good relations with Moscow. They also had little hope that their “neutral attitude” could protect Europe from further aggression by Putin, including his attack on NATO and EU countries. At this point, both Western European countries launched a diplomatic offensive to introduce changes in the European Union. It was primarily about revising EU treaties to strengthen the political influence of the two largest countries in Western Europe. Therefore, it was proposed, among others, the abolition of voting based on unanimity in foreign and defense policy, which gave a decision-making advantage to the countries with the greatest voting power (Germany and France). In addition, efforts were made to strengthen the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The main goal was to increase the production of ammunition and weapons from EU funds. Typically, such actions were aimed at strengthening the potential of arms corporations in Western Europe, as well as limiting arms exports from outside the EU, including from the US and South Korea. It goes without saying that in the event of a real threat from the East, the EU should not limit the transportation of weapons from non-European allies, because Europe itself produces too little ammunition and weapons. Nevertheless, subsequent actions of the European Commission after 2022 clearly rewarded aid for German and French corporations, as well as restricting access to arms imports from outside the EU. These attempts to strengthen the strategic autonomy of the EU against Washington are short-sighted in the face of a real threat on the EU and NATO. Moreover, instead of primarily supporting coordination within NATO, France and Germany have sought to duplicate the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance, focusing on the expansion of EU’s rapid reaction forces (rather than NATO’s rapid reaction forces), which were much more modest in terms of numbers and equipment. In other words, their goals were political, not real defense. The idea was to strengthen Franco-German leadership in Europe, and this was to be achieved by supporting the development of EU structures in the area of security. All these aspirations to expand the CSDP could encounter serious obstacles in implementation. First, Germany and France often disagree on EU security considerations, particularly when it comes to their own national interests. For example, the French were disappointed with Germany’s decision to purchase the American F-35 multi-role fighter capable of carrying nuclear warheads. This affected plans to build a sixth-generation aircraft in cooperation between German, French, and Spanish corporations. Moreover, Berlin was developing its own anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense project in the EU (European Sky Shield Initiative), to which it did not invite the French, and even competed with their own European defense program (La défense aérienne du continent). Therefore, Macron criticized the German shield initiative, which he considered hasty and incomplete. Instead, he promoted a truly “European initiative,” where the French arms industry is the dominant force. Secondly, the actions of France and Germany in the field of defense have been delayed and ineffective. More than two years after the announcement of the famous Zeitenwende, the modernisation of the Bundeswehr, the federal government in Berlin managed to order only eighteen Leopard 2 tanks and twelve Panzerhaubitz 2000. Thirdly, it became increasingly clear early on that Germany and France were not ready to defend NATO’s eastern flank in solidarity, wanting rather to show initiative and leadership in order to maintain geopolitical influence in Europe. In terms of real security, their subsequent ideas were controversial. They were certainly beneficial to their arms corporations. For all these reasons, the credibility of Germany and France has been trending downwards on eastern EU security considerations. For the time being, it is difficult to predict whether the plans of Paris and Berlin will ultimately be implemented and whether cooperation within the CSDP will be strengthened. However, if this does not happen, it will paradoxically be a good solution for the security of the eastern flank. Efforts to defend it will be focused within NATO and, above all, located in the countries most at risk from Moscow’s aggression. This analysis is based on a recent article published by the Journal of International Affairs.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Narendra Modi, India’s two-time prime minister, was elected on June 5, 2024, as the leader of the National Democratic Alliance, a coalition of political parties that won with a slim majority in the recently concluded parliamentary election. Modi is expected to be sworn in for his third term as prime minister on June 8. The BJP had hoped for a landslide victory in the country’s six-week general election – the largest display of democracy, by far, in a year of voting around the world. But the party scored only 240 parliamentary seats in the final tally and needs coalition partners to secure a majority of 272. The Conversation U.S. spoke with Sumit Ganguly, distinguished professor of political science and the Tagore chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, to understand more about the election results and what they mean for Indian democracy. The BJP had talked about an overwhelming victory, but it seems it will not get a majority. How do you explain these results? Part of the answer lies in the Modi government’s failure to realize that while economic benefits had been substantial, their distribution has been uneven. India has seen a growth in inequality and persistent unemployment both in rural and urban areas. Unemployment of those aged 20 to 24 years is at a high of 44.49%. And that is the overall national number; that data does not tell us that it may be much worse in certain regions. The other explanation is that Modi’s exploitation of historic Hindu-Muslim tensions seems to have run its natural course. You can beat the religious drum – and Modi did with rhetoric including calling Muslims “infiltrators” – but then the day-to-day issues of jobs, housing and other such necessities take over, and these are the things people care about the most. BJP made a miscalculation, in my analysis. It failed to realize that in a country where only 11.3% of children get adequate nutrition, Hindu pride cannot be eaten – ultimately, it’s the price of potatoes and other essentials that matter. Let’s talk about Uttar Pradesh, the northern Indian state with 80 parliamentary seats. It plays a crucial role in any national election, and Modi and his alliance are set to lose the state. What happened? It’s another example of the same miscalculation we are seeing nationally by the BJP. The chief minister of the state,Yogi Adityanath, saw himself as a firebrand Hindu nationalist leader and likely a successor of Modi. But he, too, failed to take into account how his policies were playing out in the poorer segments of the state’s population, who are mainly Muslims and those at the bottom of India’s caste hierarchy. He pursued grand infrastructure projects such as new highways and airports, and those might well have appealed to the middle class – but not to the poor. Additionally, years of presiding over a state government that has used police power to suppress dissent, often those of the poor and marginalized, have taken their toll on Adityanath’s support. What explains BJP’s inroads into the southern state of Kerala, where it is on course to make history by winning a parliamentary seat for the first time? The gains in the south are perplexing and will require more data on voting patterns for a more accurate analysis. Historically, the BJP has not been able to make inroads into the southern states for a number of reasons. These include linguistic subnationalism owing to the hostility toward Hindi. The other issue in the south is that the practice of Hinduism is quite different, including festivals and other regional traditions. The BJP’s vision of Hinduism is based on the “great tradition” of northern India, which believes in the trinity of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva as the creator, the sustainer and the destroyer gods. The southern states are also engines of economic growth and end up subsidizing the poorer states of the north. As a consequence, there is resentment against the BJP, which has long had its political base in northern India. In July 2023, 26 opposition parties formed a coalition called INDIA – the Indian National Developmental and Inclusive Alliance – to challenge the BJP in the election. Were they given a fair chance? No, the playing field was far from level. The mass media has been mostly co-opted by the ruling BJP to advance its agenda. Apart from one or two regional newspapers, all the national dailies scrupulously avoid any criticism of the BJP, and the major television channels mostly act as cheerleaders of the government’s policies. A number of intelligence agencies are alleged to have been used for blatantly partisan purposes against the opposition parties. Political leaders have been jailed on charges that may prove to be dubious. For example, Arvind Kejriwal, the highly popular chief minister of New Delhi, was charged with alleged improprieties in the allocation of liquor licenses and jailed just days after election dates were announced. Despite the electoral losses, Modi is expected to return as prime minister for a third term. Given that the BJP got just two seats in the 1984 elections, what factors led to the party’s meteoric rise? The BJP has built a solid organizational base across the country, unlike the Indian National Congress, the principal opposition party. And the Congress party has done little to revitalize its political foundations, which had eroded in the 1970s after then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed a state of emergency and a non-Congress government came into power for the first time. The BJP has also appealed to the sentiments of the majority Hindu population through slogans that paint India’s principal minority, Muslims, as the source of myriad societal problems. Hate crimes against Muslims and other minorities surged across India over the past few years. Finally, the BJP also benefited from economic reforms that the earlier Congress government had set in motion from the 1990s, including a national goods and services tax and the privatization of the loss-making, state-owned airline, Air India, thereby contributing to substantial economic growth in India. In December 1992, Hindu nationalists destroyed the 16th-century Babri Mosque. How crucial was that to BJP’s rise to power? And what should we read into BJP losing its seat in Ayodhya? The destruction of the Babri Mosque certainly galvanized an important segment of the Hindu electorate and led to a growth in support for the BJP. In 1999 – just seven years after the event – the BJP first came to power in a coalition government in which it had 182 out of 543 seats in the Indian Parliament. Two national elections later, in 2014, Modi assumed office as the prime minister with a clear-cut majority of 282 seats. In January 2024, just a few months before the election, Modi inaugurated a newly constructed temple in Ayodhya, the site of the Babri Mosque. It was a carefully stage-managed event with an eye on votes. However, BJP lost its seat in Ayodhya. It’s possible that all the fanfare around the new temple appealed to people outside of Ayodhya – but not to the city’s residents who continued to deal with waste mismanagement and other issues. What’s next for Modi? And what do the results tell us about Indian democracy? It’s certainly possible that Modi will form the government with coalition partners. I believe that Modi, as an astute politician, will most likely learn from this setback and adapt his tactics to new realities. The results might also be a useful corrective – the Indian voter has once again demonstrated that he or she might be willing to put up with some things but not others. Indian voters have demonstrated in the past that when they see democracy being threatened, they tend to punish leaders with autocratic tendencies. We saw this when the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi suffered a crushing defeat in the elections in 1977. The elections followed a state of emergency that Gandhi had imposed on the country, suspending all civil liberties. Back then, it was India’s poor who voted her out of power. This time around, we might need to wait on additional electoral data about how particular caste and income groups voted. This article was updated on June 5, 2024, with the final election results and other developments.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In the last 48 hours, a series of events and situations have significantly contributed to redefining the military and diplomatic scenario in Gaza. It all began on the night of May 5, when Hamas launched several rockets that hit Israel, causing some civilian casualties. At the same time, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) responded to the act with massive artillery bombardments against several Hamas positions in the al-Zahraa, al-Mughraqa, and Nuseirat camps (in the central-northern areas of the Gaza Strip) and took control of the Kerem Shalom crossing, which separates the enclave from Israeli territory. However, the IDF's actions went further with the announcement on May 6 of the expansion of the humanitarian area of al-Mawasi (in the coastal south of the Strip). This choice seems to be driven by the political will to regain control of the southern strip of Palestinian territory through the forced evacuation of Palestinian refugees from Rafah and Khan Younis towards al-Mawasi (where it is estimated that over 100,000 people will arrive shortly), also guaranteed by the Israeli resumption of the Gaza side of the Rafah crossing. All these actions seem to suggest a green light from the war cabinet for the launch of the repeatedly announced Israeli ground operation in the area. Simultaneously with the war preparations, just a few hours later, came the unexpected announcement from Hamas that it had accepted a proposal for a ceasefire in Gaza. The terms of the ceasefire – admittedly still very unclear given the often-unreliable media reports – were reportedly mediated by Egypt and Qatar, with U.S. approval, which reportedly infuriated representatives of Tel Aviv. Based on the details announced by Hamas officials, the proposal is expected to outline a three-phase plan. The first phase involves a 42-day ceasefire period during which Hamas would release 33 hostages in exchange for the release of some Palestinian militants detained in Israeli prisons. In the second phase, Tel Aviv would partially withdraw its troops from Gaza and allow the free movement of Palestinians from the south to the north of the Strip. After this preliminary phase, another 42-day period would be activated only if it clearly emerged that both parties were willing to restore a climate of "sustainable calm" in Gaza, which would also favor the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the area and the final release of the reservists and IDF soldiers held by Hamas. To crown this prolonged "silence of arms," the final step would be reached: the establishment of a true ceasefire and the start, among other things, of a reconstruction phase, including the end of the total Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, according to a plan supervised and shared by Qatar, Egypt, the USA, and the United Nations. Based on leaks and fragmented information, it is very difficult to make precise assessments, but it is plausible to imagine that if the terms of the agreement were as presented here, it would be very difficult – almost impossible – for Israel to accept the Egyptian-Qatari proposal. It would be much more satisfying for their expectations to continue with a military operation in Rafah. In the preceding days, the Israeli war cabinet had also explained the necessity of maintaining its action in Gaza unchanged, with or without an agreement with Hamas, as it was fundamental and strategic to achieve its primary objective: the destruction and eradication of the Islamist organization from the Palestinian enclave. Given this evidence, both the nature and complete terms of the diplomatic proposal accepted by Hamas, as well as the Israeli willingness to follow through on the agreement, are fundamental to creating a positive development in the current dynamics. However, no actor (regional or international) involved in the negotiations is under the illusion that a turning point has been reached, given both the opposing positions of the contenders and the operation in Rafah, which is now about to enter the heart of the action. This latter element is crucial to understanding the behavior and calculated risk taken by Hamas. In fact, at least until late afternoon on May 6, the organization had shown no interest in the Egyptian-Qatari proposal. The change of pace would suggest that the Islamist organization may have wanted to take advantage of the situation to put the ball back in the opponent's court, shifting all responsibility to Israel in the event of its refusal to follow through with the ceasefire, preferring instead military action in Rafah. In this regard, it could be argued that Hamas's twist of events was as clever as it was politically significant in contributing to weakening Tel Aviv's position. Not surprisingly, the movement led by Ismail Haniyeh understands that Israeli mediators cannot accept any negotiation that involves the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza, the end of the total blockade of the enclave's borders, but above all, the continuation in power of the organization towards, which Benjamin Netanyahu himself has declared, their destruction as an undeniable objective. A position that, regardless of whether Israel accepts the agreement already approved by Hamas in whole or in part, as well as its rejection, would expose Israel to a difficult condition of internal contention and to some strategic considerations that the Islamist movement knows well and has already exploited precisely to launch that tremendous attack on the heart of the country on October 7, 2023. In the perspective of Tel Aviv, the acceptance or rejection of the proposal by Egypt and Qatar, as well as the start of the operation in Rafah, raise a series of questions on multiple fronts, in which Netanyahu plays his usual game of political survival. If his government were to follow through with the agreement and stop/postpone the operation in Rafah, it would undoubtedly benefit diplomatically, enjoying a resurgence of credit after the storms of recent months. However, this would also mean opening an internal front, especially within his government, with extremist ministers threatening the fall of the executive. Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich have clearly stated that without the destruction of Hamas and the conquest of Rafah (and the entire Strip), the government would have no reason to exist. At the same time, even more moderate figures in the war cabinet, such as Defense Minister Yoav Gallant or Ministers Benny Gantz and Gady Eisenkot, have not taken a clear position, wavering between the possibility of a more contained humanitarian ceasefire and the wavering political opportunism on the military operation in Rafah in a challenge that seems more oriented towards the country's future and the conquest of the conservative electorate and the national right, the current Prime Minister's target audience. However, it is equally true that even in the face of a rejection of the international proposal, some clear repercussions would emerge: Israel would worsen its position and reputation, although it could keep that government in place that is now pushing relentlessly on Rafah. Such a situation would not avoid, either, domestic social protests by the families of the hostages, who demand guarantees from the government not to endanger the lives of their loved ones. In both cases, Tel Aviv would be called into question and would risk losing internal and external credibility, along with the political and security dilemma (mainly supported by the military establishment) linked to the failure to eradicate Hamas. Such a fluid and unpredictable scenario with potential repercussions even on different levels of the regional and international context. In fact, a resumption of hostilities in Rafah would have the opportunity to activate the Lebanese scenario in a different way than what has happened so far (where violent exchanges of fire have been occurring along the Blue Line border areas for days) and lead to a worsening of security conditions in the West Bank (especially in the triangle between Tulkarem-Nablus-Jenin, where IDF raids have become more pressing). A similar situation could open the door to external actions by other actors interested in instability, such as Iran, which would benefit from the role played by its proxies in Syria and Iraq, as well as the potential and renewed threat from the Yemeni Houthi militias to exert pressure on Israel, but also on other regional players involved in the ongoing dynamics - the thought in these cases essentially revolves around Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, which for different reasons have so much, and perhaps even too much, to lose from an escalation of the Gaza scenario. No less decisive must be considered the international impact of Tel Aviv's rejection of the Egyptian-Qatari proposal, especially considering how the United States has been engaged in recent weeks in trying to convince its ally to reconsider its positions on Iran and advocate for particular attention to the humanitarian situation in Gaza. In this sense, Washington has clearly expressed its warning to its ally about the risks associated with a possible miscalculation that could open up various considerations. Not surprisingly, the White House can always leverage the issue of military supplies as a tool of pressure. Just last week, the United States suspended a shipment of ammunition to Israel without providing details on the reasons. It could have been a simple bureaucratic error or a signal, but it's evident that considering such a scenario would provide new space and considerations for both internal and external detractors of the Biden Administration. Conversely, such a development could give new impetus to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has never hidden his strained relationship with almost all US administrations he has collaborated with during his 15 years in office. With the sole exception of the Trump Administration, which in the post-election American context could see the New York tycoon returning as the new occupant of the White House and Israel's key partner in the Middle East. Therefore, the assessments remain complex and highly susceptible to changes due to the volatility of the local scenario. However, it is undeniable that from this initiative, Israel has much to lose, and the concrete risk is that Hamas has carefully assessed this "trap" with the intention of further weakening Tel Aviv. License under Creative Commons Attribution – ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-SA 3.0).