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Energy & Economics
offshore oil platform and gas drillship with illumination

Undersea geopolitics and international law: Deepsea mining in the Indo-Pacific

by Abhishek Sharma , Udayvir Ahuja

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The pursuit of critical minerals does not come at the expense of the environment; a global moratorium on deep-sea mining should be the natural course of action The world is looking at a potential geopolitical and environmental point of conflict, which will affect every country in more ways than one. This dispute stems from a search for critical minerals in the deep sea. Critical minerals are considered the building blocks of contemporary technology. To say that they are crucial to the economic and national security of every country would be an understatement. Due to the inherited complexities of mining and attaining critical minerals from challenging geographies, the hunt for them has intensified. Beyond land, many countries are now looking at space as an alternative. Finding and commercially harnessing minerals from celestial bodies like the Moon and asteroids, however, is still a challenge. Therefore, the search for critical minerals in the deep sea has now entered a new phase of competition, where countries are no longer waiting but are actively engaged in the process of deep-sea mining. In this race, while some countries such as China, India, and South Korea (see Table 1) are preparing to grab the opportunity and are trying to build capacities and capabilities, others have raised the environmental and ecological impacts of deep-sea mining. Against this background, it is crucial to identify the key players in this race and understand the accompanying international legal nuances. Table 1: Exploration Contracts issued by the International Seabed Authority (ISA)   Source: ISA. What’s the rush? The urgency of the critical mineral problem is exacerbated by two factors: Fast-depleting reserves of critical minerals for human use and their rising demand. Behind this sudden rush are two important reasons: Firstly, the focus on clean and renewable energy, which is crucial in driving the green energy transition, and secondly, the increasing consumption of high-technology products, which depends on the heavy use of critical minerals. As an illustration, consider its application in high-tech items of various sizes, such as smartphones, electric car magnets, and intricate machinery like F35 stealth aircraft. A F35 aircraft, for example, needs 920 pounds of rare earth elements, demonstrating the significance of these minerals for any nation. Although deep-sea mining is not an exclusively Indo-Pacific phenomenon, competition is most felt in this region due to the high stakes involved. The major actors involved in this race are China, India, South Korea, and even non-state actors, such as private companies such as the Metals Company (TMC, a Canada-based company, which have considerable stakes in the space. International Seabed Authority: China and influence politics Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the International Seabed Authority (ISA) was constituted with the mandate to ‘organise and control all mineral resources-related activities’ and guarantee ‘effective protection of the marine environment’ on the seabed of international waters, which are a global commons. ISA is constituted by the Assembly, Council, and Secretariat. ISA’s key advisory body, the Legal and Technical Commission (LTC), should help the authority frame the rules, regulations and procedures (RRPs) to govern mining activities on the international seabed. While the conversation on setting a legal framework for undersea mining has been in process since 2016, ISA has garnered increasing international attention due to the triggering of the ‘two-year rule’ by the island nation of Nauru back in 2021. As per UNCLOS, if the Council of ISA fails to adopt the relevant RRPs within two years of receiving the application for approval of a plan of work for exploitation, the council will have to consider and approve such plan ‘based on the provisions of the Convention and any rules, regulations and procedures that the Council may have adopted provisionally, or based on the norms contained in the Convention and the terms and principles contained in this Annex as well as the principle of non-discrimination among contractors.’ Since this incident, negotiations have naturally picked up, with China playing the leading role in shaping the deep sea mining code, as it wants to influence and is eager to push forward the negotiations in its infancy phase. In the 2023 ISA Council’s July meeting, China blocked the motion introduced by France, Chile, and Costa Rica to discuss a moratorium on deep sea mining. The absence of the United States (US) from the ISA elevates Beijing's role to a prominent position. This discussion will likely have severe implications for the future of the high seas, which cover 60 percent of the world’s oceans. At the ISA’s Council meeting in July 2023, China and other states like Nauru, Japan, Australia, India, Norway, and Russia supported deep-sea mining against a group of 20 countries that opposed it due to lack of scientific evidence and are pushing to put a moratorium in place. France was the exception, calling for a total ban on deep-sea mining. Apart from nation states, many international Multinational Corporations (MNCs) like Google, Samsung, BMW, Volvo Group, and Tesla have also joined the call for a moratorium on deep-sea mining. This call includes 804 marine science and policy experts from 44 countries recommending a ‘pause until sufficient and robust scientific information’ is obtained. The call for a moratorium has increased since the discovery of “dark oxygen” on the seafloor. Even the European Union has adopted a resolution to support a moratorium in response to Norway’s decision to initiate deep-sea mining in the Arctic . Stuck in a limbo As commercial deep-sea mining comes closer than ever to being a reality, it is critical to analyse and take stock of the complex interplay of geopolitical, environmental, and legal challenges that will define the future of international relations and environmental stewardship. As nations such as China, Norway, South Korea, and even India accelerate their efforts to exploit these untapped resources, the world faces a crucial decision: To prioritise immediate economic and technological gains or the fragile ecosystems of the deep ocean. China's geopolitical and strategic goals and its growing influence on international organisations, including the ISA, must be kept in mind while taking a call when the stakes are undeniably high, not just for the Indo-Pacific but for the entire planet. The moratorium is also being proposed as per the established precautionary approach. This approach is a broad legal and philosophical principle that suggests a pause and reassessment in case of a human innovation/activity that could potentially result in harm given the lack of scientific knowledge. In light of the pressing concerns raised by scientists, environmentalists, and several nations, a global moratorium on deep-sea mining should be the natural course of action. While some have argued that such a precautionary pause would not be in accordance with UNCLOS, including the current Secretary General of ISA, it would be an obligation under the constitution of the oceans. In an advisory opinion, the International Tribunal on Law of Sea (ITLOS) has confirmed a trend of precautionary approach becoming a part of customary international law and stated that it is a ‘binding obligation’ on both states and the ISA. This approach is enshrined in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. An example of such a moratorium under international law is the International Whaling Convention, which was adopted based on the precautionary approach and has been largely followed for the past 35 years. As the global community navigates this uncharted territory, it must ensure that the pursuit of critical minerals does not come at the expense of the environment that sustains us all. The choices made today will have far-reaching consequences, shaping the geopolitical landscape and determining whether the international community can unite in the face of shared challenges or whether the race for resources will lead to further fragmentation and conflict.

Diplomacy
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Turkish flag background. + Portrait of Nicolas Maduro, 46th President of Venezuela.

Turkey could play a key role in finding a resolution to Venezuela's crisis

by Imdat Oner

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Erdogan’s Turkey could not only, once again , become a mediator in Venezuela and push for a solution. It could also become a safe haven for an exiled Maduro As Nicolás Maduro loses support domestically and among regional allies, he may be inclined to accept a deal or amnesty to secure a future away from the uncertainty in Venezuela. The opposition pledged not to seek “revenge” or to persecute members of Maduro’s administration. However, without his grip on power, Maduro may not feel safe in Venezuela – even with an amnesty. Recently, The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. had explored all options in secret negotiations, including offering Maduro an amnesty from drug-trafficking charges in exchange for him stepping down. The President of Panama, José Raúl Mulino, proposed facilitating Maduro’s safe transit through Panama to a third country so that he could leave office peacefully. But, at this point, Turkey could emerge as a potential refuge if he decides to leave power. Since 2016, Turkey has become a key strategic partner for the Maduro regime, joining countries like China, Russia, Iran, and India. This relationship has been bolstered by frequent visits from Maduro and public support from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Although Erdogan has not officially congratulated Maduro yet following the contested election, he was among the few leaders to speak with him afterward. During their call, Erdogan praised the Venezuelan people for a peaceful election and invited Maduro to Turkey soon to further advance bilateral projects. Pro-government Turkish media quickly picked up the news, highlighting that Maduro will soon be visiting Turkey. If he leaves power and moves abroad, Maduro is likely to prefer an autocratic destination like Turkey over a democratic one. His strong ties to Turkey and comfort with Erdoğan are quite evident. Maduro has officially visited Turkey more than any other country in the past seven years, frequently praising its culture and becoming a fan of Turkish TV shows. His connection to Turkey gained further attention when a viral video showed him and his family dining at an upscale Istanbul steakhouse during a 2018 visit, which sparked outrage in crisis-hit Venezuela at the time. Additionally, Maduro is quite popular among the Turkish public. During his legitimacy crisis in January 2019, Turkish citizens showed strong support on social media with hashtags like “#WeAreMaduro” and “#WeWontLetThemTakeMaduroDown.” His firm stance on the Palestine issue particularly resonated with the Turkish people, and some even prayed for his conversion to Islam. Financially, Turkey could be Maduro’s best option. There are several allegations that Maduro may have hidden wealth in Turkey. The Venezuelan government’s big volume of transfer of gold to Turkey in exchange for food supplies is well-documented. While Venezuelan officials claimed the gold would be returned once refined, it never came back and is suspected to be held in Turkish banks. The U.S. authorities have highlighted several corruption scandals involving shell companies in Turkey linked to the gold for food program. Turkey’s financial system has already faced scrutiny for money laundering, and in 2021, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) placed Turkey on its gray list due to concerns about money laundering and terrorist financing. Additionally, Turkey has a history of granting residency to individuals with international criminal warrants. Through its “golden passport” program, Turkey offers citizenship to those who can afford it, providing a haven for international criminals. Given these factors, Maduro and his associates might see Turkey as a viable option for securing both their financial freedom and safety. Legally, Maduro might worry that while Washington could drop its charges against him, it can’t prevent an investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) into his regime’s human rights abuses. Turkey’s non-membership in the ICC could offer Maduro a sense of security from such potential charges. While Turkey signed the Rome Statute, establishing the ICC, it has not ratified it and is thus not bound by the court’s rulings. For instance, Turkey ignored an ICC request to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who attended an Istanbul summit in 2017 despite facing genocide and war crimes charges. Under Erdoğan’s government, Turkey’s relatively lenient stance on legal issues could provide a safe haven for Maduro and his associates seeking to escape international scrutiny. As the Biden administration pushes Brazilian President Lula to persuade Maduro to step down and facilitate a transition, Turkey could emerge as an attractive asylum option for him. Ankara has previously attempted to mediate between Maduro and the Venezuelan opposition, but those efforts stalled due to the opposition’s internal conflicts. Recently, Maria Corina Machado asked Turkey to play a role in resolving Venezuela’s presidential crisis. The Venezuelan opposition might convince Turkey to support a transitional government by promising to safeguard Turkish investments in the post-Maduro era. Erdoğan’s Turkey, eager to enhance its international reputation as a mediator after its attempts in the Ukraine, Gaza and Ethiopia conflicts, would likely be interested in re-engaging and playing a role in Venezuela’s negotiations. This presents a unique chance to negotiate Maduro’s exit and prevent Venezuela from descending into a worse political conflict.

Diplomacy
HAVANA - MAR 20 2016 - An unknown enthusiastic local reacts to President Obama´s visit to Cuba hanging both Cuban and American flags on his balcony.

How much does the designation of Cuba as a terrorist state affect U.S. national interest?

by Guillermo Suarez

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Let's imagine for a moment that any given day, in the evening hours, an upset (even unbalanced) person were to stop his car in front of the least protected and safest U.S. Embassy in the world, the one on Havana's Malecon, and open fire on the venue until his automatic rifle ran out of bullets. Let's continue imagining that the Cuban authorities, parsimonious and self-important, caught the offender and four years passed without a word on what had happened. Then one fine day, the Granma newspaper announces that the terrorist had been acquitted for alleged insanity at the time of the act and that it had taken them four long years to figure it out. Could anyone foresee what the reaction of the United States would be? Obviously, this story is fictional; it does not coincide with reality. What is contradictory - and even laughable- is that the United States lists Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism”, for a second time, as of January 2020. At this very minute that is the first and highest barrier that prevents our countries from considering a return to the path of a respectful relationship. Organizations and politicians linked to the most conservative sector in the United States have played an important role in the most persevering approaches to Cuba and have promoted for years a new relationship between the two countries, which contrasts with the usual aggressiveness and intransigent public stance of the Republican Party since 1959. The closest thing to lifting a ban on the sale of food and medicines to Cuba occurred back in the year 2000, implemented by the Republican George W. Bush, when at the same time, his administration was bringing back the Plattist ideology of intervention, at which time they even chose a pro-consul who would supervise “the Cuban transition”, once the revolutionary government had collapsed: Caleb McCarry A few years later we would get to see McCarry himself, a member of the staff of then US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Corker, promote dialogue with the Cuban government during a visit to the supposed main enemies of the United States in the region, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, meet with the Cuban foreign minister and president, and thus join those from the conservative sector who are betting on a more constructive relationship with Cuba. In a speech in 2011, the Cuban American senator for Florida, Marco Rubio emotionally pointed out Carlos Gutiérrez, at that time Secretary of Commerce of the United States, also of the Bush administration, as one of the references to which the so-called Cuban exile should look to in order to corroborate his undeniable success. A few months after the opening launched by Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro in December 2014, it would be Carlos Gutiérrez himself who would walk freely along the halls of Cuba's emblematic Hotel Nacional and join the conservatives who are betting on a transformation of ties with the island. In what he himself describes as a radical change of posture, this new attitude of Gutiérrez would take him to Cuba on numerous occasions until he headed the US-Cuba Business Council, an organization that, as part of the US Chamber of Commerce, promotes economic relations between the two countries. “I have lost many of my friends in Miami”, he would declare years later to the alternative media Belly of the Beast. Equally noteworthy was the activism of Sonny Perdue, Governor of Georgia (2003-2011), who in June 2010 would lead a delegation of 43 businessmen to Cuba, and who six years later would become Secretary of Agriculture in the Trump administration. “We would love to have Cuba as a customer” Perdue would declare at his confirmation, ratifying his support for allowing U.S. exports to Cuba. The absence of “merits” for the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, cynically coordinated with the then right-wing government in Colombia and energetically rejected by the current one, confirms its political and sanctioning content as the measure serves as an effective component of the package of sanctions that the United States calls “policy of maximum pressure towards Cuba”. The damage that such a designation does to the credibility and national interest of the United States and to the population of the island, which it claims to support, is profound and sustained. Its effects start in Washington but do not stop there; they are evident in the refusal of different entities to enter into economic and financial relations of any kind with Cuba, some of them even located in the territories of Havana's allies. The treacherous nickname of “terrorist”, as an integral part of the intensified sanctions policy, is partly responsible for the current wave of migration that is being carried out by a share of despairing Cubans. Together with the other nationalities present there, this complicates the operation of the southern border of the United States, an issue that has become a matter of life and death for the Republican leadership and, according to recent surveys, the main interest of the American electorate for the presidential elections of 2024. One of the Republican champions against disorderly migration has been the current governor of Texas Gregg Abbott, who with his policies has even challenged the founding principles of the U.S. federal union and has generated problems with neighboring Mexico. However, Abbott was another of those who showed up in Havana in 2016 to demonstrate his interest in a better relationship. Devoid of all political preconceptions, Abbott spoke in Havana of the inevitability of the end of the “embargo”, of the importance that a change of policy would have for Texas in general and for the southern port of Houston in particular. He did not mention migration because the Cuban migration was not a problem for Texas then. Other conservative politicians would stroll through Havana exhibiting a discourse of coexistence: Richard Lugar, Jeff Flake, Tom Emmer, John Boehner, and even the economic advisors of the Trump Organization, which, by the way, seems to keep alive one of its commercial firms in the Cuban property registry. The visits of the U.S. agribusiness lobby have also been constant over the years headed by numerous executives and businessmen of absolutely republican affinity. Right now it could be said that even defenders of the MAGA tendency are to be found among the latter, all interested in an improvement of the economic ties with Cuba. Few media outlets have objectively reported the impact of Cuba's inclusion on the criticized list and the human toll taken by the policy of maximum pressure on the Cuban population. One of them has been the popular conservative show “Full Measure” hosted by U.S. anchor Sharyll Atkisson. At a time when the United States is competing aggressively with other leading global powers, the anti-Cuban stance substantially affects the national interest of the United States, taking into account that the more belligerent the United States is, the greater the Cuban need to open itself financially and economically to other partners, not always to Washington's liking. The evidence of the damage caused to the Cuban economy by the disastrous combination of Trump's measures with the Covid-19 pandemic, has made President Joe Biden prefer, at least in his first four years in office, to maintain the Republican agenda of maximum pressure towards Cuba and wait to see if, by an act of providence, he could be the first American president of the modern era to set foot in Havana, without the presence of a revolutionary government in place. The expert on Cuban issues William LeoGrande does not give him much hope. In a recent article he describes the Cuban economy as famished, but the Cuban government as solid and far from an unexpected breakup or collapse, which contradicts the optimistic speech of Undersecretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Brian Nichols, in Madrid. LeoGrande clarifies that Cuba was not a failed state when Biden assured it was in 2021 and neither is it now, that despite all the economic difficulties and the unprecedented intensification of the “embargo,” the government remains united and unwavering. “With a cohesive ruling elite, a loyal military, and no organized and effective opposition, there is no plausible shift toward a sudden regime transition in Cuba in the foreseeable future,” he asserts. The eventual arrival in 2024 of a more conservative administration to the White House, headed by Trump himself, and the possible incorporation of Senator Marco Rubio to that administration, will surely make them bet on prolonging the economic losses that the U.S. tolerates as a result of its deep limits to the relationship with Cuba. It will continue to curtail the travel rights of Americans and interfere like a Big Brother with the business interests of its citizens, all to comply - once and for all- with the Mallory Memorandum of April 1960. The greatest pressure for regime change in Cuba comes precisely from the closest state, Florida, which, contradictorily, would benefit the most from a more functional treatment of Havana. With a roster of politicians led by Governor Ron DeSantis, Senators Rick Scott and Marco Rubio, who have acted out of electoral interests, without realizing that a pragmatic relationship with the island is in the best interest of the Union and also of its voters . As much as some blame the Cuban government for the current wave of migration to the United States, there is one real fact that cannot be ignored. In 2014, as President Barack Obama deployed his new policy of rapprochement with Cuba, the island was flourishing, Cubans were hopeful about the changes there, and migration levels to the United States could be considered optimal. Controlling illegal migration across the southern border of the U.S. and Mexico will continue to be a priority of the Republican Party. How much better would this situation be if conservatives were to promote a normalization of relations with Cuba, give back to its citizens the constitutional right to travel wherever they want and allow their businessmen to make money on the island, which it so badly needs? It has been concluded that in the case of the Central American countries, the solution to migration lies in greater U.S. investment there, which will open up greater employment opportunities and give people the hope of being able to progress without having to migrate. So, is it really expected that continuing to squeeze Cuba will control the exodus across the southern border? It would be smarter to give the green light to U.S. companies to take advantage of the opportunities in the investment portfolio and compete with European hotel chains in Cuba, to facilitate the new Cuban businessmen's financial procedures so that they can make their way in the face of the new opening of the Cuban government and, even, from the closed concept of U.S. national security, to prevent others from doing so. Undoubtedly, Cuba will have to be respected as an independent and sovereign country. Knowing fully that we are not talking about an associated free state, way beyond the historical strategic and hegemonic pretensions of the U.S. Empire over the years in relation to the island. Establishing a constructive relationship of coexistence with the island of Cuba, even with a government that does not please Washington, would be of great importance for the stability of the southern part of the United States. Law and Order, a precept equally upheld by U.S. conservatives over the years, would win hands down, as evidenced by the effective anti-drug collaboration between the two countries that the United States acknowledges in its latest annual report on the subject, despite a scenario that muddles all contact. I am inclined to believe that relationships are possible if the necessary quota of seriousness and pragmatism is applied to the process. A little known example is that of the frequent coordination between authorities on both sides of the territory occupied by the Guantanamo Naval Base, the military enclave resulting from the archaic Platt Amendment, which the Cuban government has for years denounced as illegal and inadmissible. The politicized and unwarranted inclusion of Cuba in the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, issued unilaterally by the State Department, is there to prevent anything from blossoming. Correcting that mistake would be the first of all steps.

Defense & Security
LA PAZ, BOLIVIA - JUNE 26, 2024: Bolivian National Police in Riot Gear Guarding Door of Presidential Palace after Failed Military Coup

The crisis that Bolivia faces

by Rosa Eugenia Sandoval Bustos , Verónica Castro Flores , Carolina Guadalupe Robles Dávila

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Since 1825, Bolivia has averaged a new government every 26 and a half months. A study by Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, Political Science professors at the University of Kentucky, indicates that from 1950 to 2010, there were 23 coup d'état cases in the country. These include 11 successful actions, defined as those that allowed the insurgents to control power for at least a week. The decade in which Bolivia recorded the most coups was the 1970s, with some years experiencing two consecutive cases. Another study by The Washington Post reports that during the country's independent history, there have been over 190 attempts at coups and revolutionary processes. Bolivian historian Manuel Contreras attributes this situation to elements of internal politics, such as the absence of strong institutions and "an unprofessional military prone to this type of adventures". [1] Bolivia is currently facing multiple crises. The most prominent is in the political sphere, stemming from the division between President Luis Arce and former President Evo Morales, who lead different factions of the Movement for Socialism–Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP) and are vying for the party’s nomination for the 2025 presidential elections. This fragmentation is also reflected in a conflict with the judiciary, due to rulings made by judges regarding Morales' potential presidential candidacy, among other decisions. Additionally, the country is experiencing significant economic deterioration due to a decrease in foreign currency reserves and fuel shortages, which are heightening social discontent. In this context, it was reported that there was an attempted coup on June 26. The rift between the MAS leaders weakens the institutional framework needed to respond to these various crises. This article briefly reviews all these elements. Background: resignation of former President Evo Morales Evo Morales governed for three terms, from 2006 to 2019. In 2016, a referendum was held to consult citizens about modifying Article 168 of the country's Constitution, which stipulates that the presidency is for five years, with the possibility of re-election only once consecutively. At that time, the "no" vote won, and the constitutional reform project was narrowly rejected. [2] In 2017, Evo Morales filed a challenge of unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court. The Court determined that Morales could run for a fourth consecutive presidential term in the 2019 elections, arguing that unlimited re-election is a right protected by the American Convention on Human Rights, which, it was claimed, takes precedence over the Bolivian Constitution. [3] On October 20, 2019, Bolivia held general elections. [4] Initially, the results pointed to a runoff between President Evo Morales and former President Carlos Mesa. During the vote count, the Preliminary Results Transmission System (TREP) was abruptly halted and resumed almost 24 hours later with a shift in the trend. [5] Subsequently, Morales was declared the winner in the first round by a narrow margin. [6] Almost simultaneously with the announcement of the new results by the president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of Bolivia (TSE), María Eugenia Choque, dozens of police officers positioned themselves near the headquarters where the electoral authorities were receiving the tallies. Accusations of fraud and massive protests were followed, [7] demanding either a runoff or the annulment of the elections. [8] As mentioned, before Evo Morales' presidency, the military in Bolivia attempted several times to overthrow the government in power. During the MAS leader’s mandate, institutional relations were strengthened. Several measures were taken to transform the military mentality and bring it closer to the Bolivian people. In 2009, the Armed Forces adopted the wiphala, the indigenous flag. In 2016, a mandatory “anti-imperialist" school was established for military personnel aspiring to be promoted. Morales referred to himself as the "first private soldier president," increased the military budget from $114 million in 2001 to $483 million in 2018, and was the only democratic president to purchase large quantities of weapons and equipment. At the same time, Morales provoked resentment among the military by removing "neoliberal" commanders and prosecuting the chiefs who handed over missiles to the United States in 2005. Additionally, he imprisoned the officers responsible for the 2003 repression in El Alto, which resulted in the death of 67 protesters. These measures failed to change the "conservative spirit of the armed forces." [9] Over time, a rift was developed between the military and Morales. In late 2019, under the leadership of Williams Kalimán, members of the Army appeared on television asking for Morales' resignation, which led to his ousting. The former president initially rejected accusations of fraud from opposition groups and organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) and denounced an attempted coup orchestrated by his political adversaries and sectors of the armed forces. [10] However, he agreed to call for new elections, but this was not enough to ease the tensions. [11] On November 10, 2019, Evo Morales resigned from his position. [12] He then left Bolivia, first for Mexico and later for Argentina, where he was granted political asylum. [13] As a result, the presidential line of succession was disrupted, with several key government figures resigning. In this context, Jeanine Áñez, who was the second vice president of the Senate, assumed the interim presidency on November 12, 2019. Her proclamation took place in a parliamentary session without a quorum, which sparked controversy and accusations of illegitimacy from Morales' party, MAS, and other sectors. In his view, Morales stated from Mexico that "the most insidious and nefarious coup in the history" of his country had been carried out. [14] Struggle among the leaders of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) In the 2020 elections, Luis Arce, former Minister of Finance under Morales, was elected, running as the MAS candidate. [15] Former President Evo Morales returned to Bolivia a year after leaving the country, a day after Arce assumed the leadership of the Andean state. Analysts say that the dispute between the two politicians began on the day of Arce's inauguration in November 2020. In his inaugural speech, Arce did not mention Morales. Political scientist Susana Bejarano says that the president "made a textbook mistake by not giving Morales a place [...]. Without having a role, Morales exerted pressure through his influence, and Arce responded" [16] In recent months, Morales has referred to Arce as "the worst president of the democratic era" and has also accused him of leading the country’s economy to deterioration. For Arce, Morales is his "main opponent," and his supporters accuse Morales of wanting to control the country. [17] In October 2023, Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca were expelled from MAS by the leadership aligned with Evo Morales due to their refusal to attend a congress held in Cochabamba. This clearly defined the two factions: the “Evista” faction, which supports Morales' leadership, and the "Arcista" (or renewal bloc) that did not recognize the expulsion of the president and Choquehuanca. [18] The Minister of Government, Eduardo del Castillo, a prominent figure in the Arcista sector, believes that Morales “conceives of MAS from the person rather than from social organizations.” On the other hand, Morales’ faction accuses the Arcistas of being close to the political right, trying to take over a social base that does not belong to them, and forgetting the revolutionary principles of the movement. [19] Recently, in May, the Arcistas organized a congress in the city of El Alto, where they elected Grover García as the new president of MAS in place of Morales, but the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) did not approve this conclave. Meanwhile, the Evistas attempted to hold their congress in Villa Tunari, in the Cochabamba region, Morales' political and union stronghold, but the TSE also did not recognize that meeting. This has temporarily left the MAS candidacy for the 2025 presidential elections in suspense. [20] Both groups have tried several times to hold national congresses to appoint a new leadership (and thus comply with the Electoral Law) and to select a presidential candidate. [21] However, the TSE has disqualified all the sessions and insists that both factions hold "a joint congress" to comply with the party's statutes. In September 2023, Morales announced his candidacy for the presidency, challenging Arce, who is expected to seek re-election. The former president has accused the government of trying to block his candidacy and has also threatened that there will be "upheaval" in Bolivia if he is disqualified. [22] The Bolivian Congress is bicameral; the Chamber of Deputies consists of 130 representatives, of which MAS holds 75 seats [23], and 24 of them are Arcistas. Meanwhile, the Senate is made up of 36 members [24], with 21 belonging to the MAS caucus, of which 7 are Arcistas. [25] The party also celebrated its 29th anniversary, albeit in a divided manner, with the Arcistas in La Paz and the Evistas in Santa Cruz. This struggle has extended to the Congress, where Arce lost the majority due to the MAS split. Political scientist Fernando Mayorga says that the fracture caused legislators close to Morales to move forward with agreements with the opposition to pass various laws, such as the suspension of the mandates of the Judicial branch magistrates, or to block others, such as the approval of external loans for public finances. [26] This situation has led the government to accuse Morales of provoking a "structural crisis scenario" to "shorten" Arce's mandate. The president has even stated that he is the target of a "soft coup" by Morales' followers. On the other hand, the former president accuses the government of incompetence and corruption [27] and has said that he has "ideological, programmatic, organizational, and even ethical differences" with Arce. He has also pointed out that there are no opportunities for reconciliation with the government because it has shifted to the right. [28] Confrontation with the Judiciary Part of the struggle between the former president and the current president involves the Judiciary, which Evo Morales considers aligned with Luis Arce. Bolivia is the only country in Latin America that elects its high judicial courts [29] by popular vote since 2009. That is how two elections have been held, in 2011 and 2017. [30] At the end of 2023, the term of the magistrates concluded; however, the lack of agreements within MAS (and with the opposition) to define the candidates has delayed the judicial election process. [31] The Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) also contributed to this delay by declaring some laws approved by Parliament to convene the judicial elections unconstitutional. For these reasons, the TCP decided to extend its mandate and that of the other judicial bodies to "avoid a power vacuum." In early June, during a joint session of the Senate and the Lower House, Evistas and opposition legislators approved a bill that suspends the magistrates of the high judicial courts, without the presence of Arcistas legislators. This meeting was convened by the president of the Senate, Andrónico Rodríguez, an ally of Morales. The TCP deemed this process illegal, as the senator did not have the backing to assume the role of president of the Assembly. [32] The Tribunal pointed out that the presidency of Congress is the responsibility of the country's vice president, David Choquehuanca, who, according to Rodríguez, was acting as interim president due to a trip by the country's president, Luis Arce. [33] The law also nullifies all the rulings that the magistrates approved in the last year. A source close to Vice President Choquehuanca stated that overturning these rulings would be "chaotic" and argued that it aims to provoke a political and social crisis. Meanwhile, other experts, such as the constitutionalist Israel Quino, believe that nullifying these legal acts is necessary for the country to "return to the rule of law." [34] At the end of 2023, the TCP issued a ruling nullifying indefinite re-election in the country, which disqualifies Morales from running in the 2025 elections. This decision overturns the 2017 ruling that allowed the former president to be re-elected that year. If the TCP is not renewed, this ruling cannot be reviewed. Supporters of the former president are demanding the resignation of the magistrates from the highest courts, alleging that the Judiciary "follows orders from the government." Meanwhile, Evo Morales accuses the government of sabotaging the judicial elections. After a series of road blockades by Morales' followers, President Arce issued a law in February aimed at holding the elections in September. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal announced that it expects the Congress to issue the call for the elections. [35] The economic situation and social discontent in Bolivia Bolivia's economy grew at an annual rate of 4.7% from 2005 to 2019. The government channeled the profits from natural gas exports into social programs and salary increases, which helped reduce poverty from 60% in 2006 to 37.2% in 2019. [36] A new indigenous middle class also emerged. Gas production increased after Evo Morales' 2006 decree to nationalize hydrocarbons. Additionally, Bolivia has the world's largest lithium reserves, with 23 million metric tons (MT). Along with Chile and Argentina, these countries form the "Lithium Triangle," holding more than two-thirds of the world's reserves. However, Bolivia's production of this element is still very low (600 tons per year), presenting significant growth opportunities for the future. [37] Since the end of the raw materials boom in 2014, Bolivia relied on high public spending and domestic credit to sustain economic growth. Over time, these measures increased debt and reduced international reserves and accumulated fiscal savings. The COVID-19 pandemic worsened the situation. After it ended, the Bolivian economy recovered. However, the level of indebtedness, the decline in natural gas production, and modest international reserves have put pressure on the foreign exchange market, where a parallel exchange rate has emerged. [38] Natural gas production decreased from 56.6 million cubic meters per day (Mm³/d) in 2016, with oil revenue of $1.755 billion, to 31.9 Mm³/d in 2023, with an income of $2.048 billion, according to official information. Bolivia has seen low production in its oil and gas fields, requiring the import of gasoline and diesel, which are then sold at subsidized prices in the domestic market — a cost that is increasingly difficult to sustain. [39] “As a result of the decline in natural gas production, the amount of dollars coming into the country has decreased," says economist Jaime Dunn. According to the Central Bank reports, international reserves dropped from $15.122 billion in 2014 to $1.796 billion in April 2024 [40], attributed to the decline in revenue from gas sales to Brazil and Argentina and the lack of approval for new loans in the Congress. [41] The prices of basic goods have also increased. For months, long lines of people trying to obtain dollars have been observed, as well as the expansion of a parallel market for this currency. The shortage of dollars has impacted both importers and exporters. The most affected product has been fuel purchased from abroad. Bolivia imposed a subsidy on gasoline and diesel more than 15 years ago. Now, specialists warn the country doesn't have the dollars to buy them. This is a problem because Bolivia imports 56% of the gasoline and 86% of the diesel it consumes. Bolivian President Luis Arce has acknowledged that the situation is "pathetic." According to him, it is due to the "lack of a clear hydrocarbon policy in the country" in recent years. [42] To mitigate the situation, he ordered the militarization of the fuel supply system to prevent the smuggling of subsidized diesel to neighboring countries. [43] This combination of fuel and currency shortages has sparked protests from merchants and transporters in various cities across the country. Several sectors have taken to the streets to demand a solution to the rising costs of essential goods. [44] In 2023, there were almost 200 days of blockades. To address the situation, in February, Economy Minister Marcelo Montenegro announced a series of economic reforms, such as easing export restrictions and creating a diesel auction for large producers. However, these measures still seem insufficient. The tension generated by the situation has also affected Arce's popularity, which has dropped to 18% [46] according to polls. [45] Some social protest calls are attributed to supporters of Evo Morales, although these groups deny it. [47] To exacerbate these problems, the country has experienced droughts and high temperatures, which have damaged agricultural production and caused wildfires in the Bolivian Amazon. Lake Titicaca, among other bodies of water, has dropped to historically low levels. Residents of the El Alto neighborhood, in the heights of La Paz, only receive water sporadically during the day. [48] Reactions after the attempted coup In this context of political strife and economic deterioration, it was reported on June 26th that there was an attempted coup led by General Juan José Zúñiga, who has been dismissed and is now in prison. [49] The Minister of Government, Eduardo Del Castillo, stated that the insurrection had been planned for three weeks. The official indicated that the action resulted in 12 gunshot injuries and led to the arrest of about 20 military personnel and civilians. A new high command has also been appointed. Del Castillo emphasized that although the government had received information about previous attempts at destabilization and "soft coups," none had reached the scale of the reported events. [50] Analysts believe that Zúñiga appears to be an unhappy general with little support. [51] According to various journalistic reports, he was perceived as the "general of the people." [52] He was appointed as the General Commander of the Army in November 2022 and reaffirmed in January of this year by the president. Before that, he held the position of Chief of the General Staff. According to the Bolivian newspaper ‘El Deber’, Zúñiga was the closest military officer to Arce and was at odds with former President Evo Morales. [53] According to Army records, in 2020, Zúñiga ranked 48th out of 65 officers in the 1990 class. ‘El Deber’ notes that Zúñiga has close ties with mining and union sectors. However, throughout his career, he has faced accusations of misappropriation of public funds, for which he was sanctioned. In 2022, Zúñiga was mentioned by Evo Morales as the leader of an Army group that engaged in "permanent persecution" against political leaders like him. This elite faction, known as the ‘Pachajchos’, carried out military intelligence operations, [54] they had influence in the assignment of officers' posts, and played an important role in combating smuggling. [55] Following the brief insurrection, it is expected that the fracture between former President Evo Morales and President Luis Arce will deepen. On one hand, the government's version claims to have successfully quelled an attempted military coup in less than four hours. Retired Army Colonel Jorge Santistevan described Zúñiga as an amateur, leading an uprising without military consent, with improvised tactics and an empty speech. "This was an adventure, not a coup," stated analyst Omar Durán. [56] On the other hand, Evo Morales and opposition sectors describe the events as "a self-coup," "a political show," "an adventure," or "a parody" by Luis Arce Catacora, allegedly orchestrated with General Zúñiga and his supporters to victimize the president and boost his popularity. [57] This version aligns with what Zúñiga declared when he was arrested. In several posts on the social network "X", Morales has commented on the situation. He criticized the president's actions, called for a thorough investigation of the events, and even apologized to the international community for seeking their support in the face of the apparent coup (a narrative later adopted by Argentina). [58] Additionally, Evista Senator Luis Adolfo Flores argued that there was no police action to prevent the seizure of the plaza, for example, and he highlighted the "inaction" of the Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo. Another member of the Upper House, William Torrez, agreed that it was not a genuine coup. [59] Senate President Rodríguez posted on social media that "between the self-extended magistrates, a supposed coup or self-coup, the Bolivian people are sinking into uncertainty. This institutional disorder is leading the country to a situation of chaos and distrust." [60]. Luis Arce says that foreign interests are involved in the attempted coup, aiming to benefit from Bolivia's natural resources. He also claims that former President Evo Morales is willing to go to any lengths, even questioning the government's actions, in order to be a candidate for the 2025 elections. [61] On the other hand, the failed coup in Bolivia could worsen the current dollar shortage in the Andean country, said the global investment bank BancTrust & Co., based in London. "Although the coup apparently failed, the crisis will leave its mark. Political instability and the government's weakness will likely make it difficult for authorities and the private sector to access alternative sources of hard currency financing in the future, exacerbating the current crisis," BancTrust & Co. said in a commentary on the situation in Bolivia. [62] On the other hand, the rift between Arce and his mentor, Evo Morales, weakens Bolivian democracy, blocks any strategy against the economic crisis, keeps Congress paralyzed, and opens the door to ventures like that of General Zúñiga. Researcher Armando Ortuño warns that "the military coup was a symptom of political disorder. There is a weak government facing multiple crises." [63] Ortuño points out that in the short term, to address the political crisis, there must be some sort of agreement between Arce and Morales. [64] Jean Pierre Lavaud, a French sociologist, believes that the current major problem stems from "the internal struggle within MAS." [65] Another possible effect of this rift is that the opposition could win the next elections. [66] Additionally, Evo Morales' vice president, Álvaro García Linera, fears that this power struggle between the two leaders could strengthen the military. It will be problematic if Morales' supporters use the military to weaken the president, while the Evistas use them to contain the former president. García Linera argues that the military structure always has its own agenda and could pose a risk to national stability. Legal notice The article was created and published by the Gilberto Bosques Center for International Studies of the Senate of the Republic of Mexico (webpage https://centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/). The analysis and research do not represent the position of the Senate or its members. References [1] Gerardo Lissardy, “La tumultuosa historia de Bolivia como "el país con más intentos de golpe de Estado" desde 1950 (y por qué su crisis actual sorprende a los expertos)”, BBC, 28 de junio de 2204. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cne4787lpnzo [2] Jaime Cárdenas Gracia, “Informe sobre el referéndum boliviano de 2016”, Boletín mexicano de derecho comparado, 50(148), 81-112, abril de 2017. consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-86332017000100081 [3] Jorge Sánchez Morales, “Elecciones generales en Bolivia, 2019. Una reflexión de derecho comparado”, Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación, 2020. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.te.gob.mx/editorial_service/media/pdf/250320241450414990.pdf [4] Boris Miranda, “Elecciones en Bolivia: Carlos Mesa acusa a Evo Morales de ser el "protagonista de un golpe de Estado" y llama a continuar las protestas”, BBC News Mundo, 23 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50161520 [5] BBC News Mundo, Elecciones en Bolivia: suspenden el recuento provisional de votos cuando todo apuntaba a una segunda vuelta entre Evo Morales y Carlos Mesa, 21 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50119933 [6] BBC News Mundo, “Elecciones en Bolivia: el conteo preliminar sitúa a Evo Morales como virtual ganador sin necesidad de segunda vuelta y en medio de denuncias de fraude”, 21 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50134370 [7] Swiss Info, “Claves sobre el polémico proceso por fraude electoral de 2019 en Bolivia”, 28 de julio de 2021. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024, en: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/claves-sobre-el-pol%C3%A9mico-proceso-por-fraude-electoral-de-2019-en-bolivia/46822282 [8] Boris Miranda, “Elecciones en Bolivia: por qué hay cuestionamientos y denuncias de fraude sobre los resultados preliminares que sitúan a Evo Morales como ganador en primera vuelta”, BBC News Mundo, 22 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50146649 [9] Fernando Molina, “De Evo Morales a Luis Arce: las conspiraciones de los militares bolivianos contra el Movimiento al Socialismo”, El País, 28 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-29/de-evo-morales-a-luis-arce-las-conspiraciones-de-losmilitares-bolivianos-contra-el-movimiento-al-socialismo.html [10] Norberto Paredes, “Evo Morales: ¿hubo un golpe de Estado en Bolivia? BBC Mundo consultó a 6 expertos”, BBC, 13 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50375002 [11] Fernando Molina, “Bolivia: ¿golpe o (contra)revolución?”, Nueva Sociedad, noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en:https://www.nuso.org/articulo/bolivia-golpe-ocontrarevolucion/?fbclid=IwAR0dIgxoErXdbi2oKUw8JGkYxTFfRlKZaJFGm9DlTN7b0zJ3VwNGXPWYli0 [12] Abraham Zamorano y Boris Miranda, “Evo Morales renuncia a la presidencia de Bolivia: 5 claves que explican por qué tuvo que dimitir el mandatario indígena”, BBC. News Mundo, 10 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50369434#:~:text=Evo%20Morales%20pas%C3%B3%20en%20menos,el%20que%20anunci%C3%B3%20su%20dimisi%C3%B3n. [13] BBC News Mundo, “Asilo a Evo Morales en México: las consecuencias para AMLO del paso del expresidente boliviano”, 14 de diciembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50790682 [14] Deutsche Welle, “Jeanine Áñez asume presidencia interina de Bolivia”, 13 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/jeanine-%C3%A1%C3%B1ez-asume-presidencia-interina-de-bolivia/a-51219169 [15] BBC News Mundo, “Luis Arce, ganador de las elecciones en Bolivia, a la BBC: "Si Evo Morales quiere ayudarnos será muy bienvenido pero eso no quiere decir que él estará en el gobierno"”, 20 de octubre de 2020. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticiasamerica-latina-54610692 [16] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales ensombrece el futuro de Bolivia”, El País, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-07-01/la-fractura-entre-luis-arce-y-evo-morales-ensombrece-el-futuro-de-bolivia.html [17] EFE, “Momentos clave que llevaron a Bolivia a su actual crisis política y social”, El Universal, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/mundo/momentos-clave-que-llevaron-a-bolivia-a-su-actual-crisis-politica-y-social/ [18] Fernando Molina, “El partido de Evo Morales expulsa al presidente Luis Arce y agrava la guerra política en Bolivia”, El País, 5 de octubre de 2023. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-10-05/el-partido-de-evo-morales-expulsa-al-presidente-luis-arce-y-agravala-guerra-politica-en-bolivia.html [19] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales…”, op. cit. [20] EFE, “Momentos clave…”, op. cit. [21] Fernando Molina, “Evo Morales anuncia que será candidato a la presidencia de Bolivia en medio de la guerra con Luis Arce”, El País, 24 de septiembre de 2023. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-09-24/evo-morales-anuncia-que-sera-candidato-a-lapresidencia-de-bolivia-en-medio-de-la-guerra-con-luis-arce.html [22] Fernanda Paúl, “3 claves para entender la crisis política y económica detrás del intento de golpe de Estado denunciado por el presidente de Bolivia”, BBC, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c6p2r06lenjo [23] Cámara de Diputados de Bolivia, ”Composición de la Cámara de Diputados”. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://diputados.gob.bo/diputados-home/ [24] Cámara de Senadores de Bolivia, ”Bancadas”. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://web.senado.gob.bo/legislativa/bancadas [25] Marco Antonio Chuquimia, ”El 'evismo' es mayoría en el Senado: tiene la presidencia y la jefatura de bancada”, El Deber, 18 de octubre de 2023, consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/el-evismo-es-mayoria-en-el-senado-tiene-la-presidencia-y-la-jefatura-debancada_343939 [26] Fernando Molina, “Luis Arce reconoce que la falta de diésel en Bolivia es “patética””, El País, 12 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-13/luis-arce-reconoce-que-la-falta-de-diesel-en-bolivia-es-patetica.html [27] Fernanda Paúl, op cit. [28] Sputnik, ”Evo Morales descarta reconciliación dentro del MAS”, Elpais.cr, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.elpais.cr/2024/03/12/evo-morales-descarta-reconciliacion-dentro-del-mas/ [29] Se eligen por voto popular los cargos del Consejo de la Magistratura, el Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, el Tribunal Supremo de Justicia y el Tribunal Agroambiental. Fernando Molina, “La elección popular de jueces en Bolivia se atasca en el Congreso”, El País, 30 de agosto de 2023. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-08-31/la-eleccion-popular-de-jueces-en-bolivia-se-atasca-en-elcongreso.html [30] Idem. [31] Idem. [32] Fernando Molina, “El Parlamento boliviano suspende a los magistrados de las altas cortes en una sesión declarada ilegal por el Constitucional”, El País, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-08/el-parlamento-boliviano-suspende-a-losmagistrados-de-las-altas-cortes-en-una-sesion-declarada-ilegal-por-el-constitucional.html [33] Infobae, “El Congreso de Bolivia aprobó el cese del mandato de altos magistrados en una polémica sesión que comenzó a oscuras”, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/07/el-congreso-de-bolivia-aprobo-el-cesedel-mandato-de-altos-magistrados-en-una-polemica-sesion-que-comenzo-a-oscuras/ [34] Fernando Molina, “El Parlamento boliviano…”, op. cit. suspende a los magistrados de las altas cortes en una sesión declarada ilegal por el Constitucional”, El País, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-08/el-parlamento-bolivianosuspende-a-los-magistrados-de-las-altas-cortes-en-una-sesion-declarada-ilegal-por-el-constitucional.html [35] Fernanda Hernández Orozco, “¿Cómo le ha ido a Bolivia con la elección directa de jueces?”, Expansión, 18 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://expansion.mx/mundo/2024/06/18/como-le-ha-ido-a-bolivia-con-la-eleccion-directa-de-jueces [36] Congressional Research Service, “Bolivia: An Overview, 16 de mayo de 2022”. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2022 en: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11325 [37] Ivan Castano, “Bolivia has the World's Largest Lithium Reserves. Is it Worth Investing In?”, 31 de julio de 2023. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/bolivia-has-the-worlds-largest-lithium-reserves-is-it-worth-investing-in [38] Banco Mundial, “El Banco Mundial en Bolivia”, 14 de abril de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bolivia/overview [39] Redacción Movant, “Bolivia: baja en la producción de gas y su impacto económico”, infobae, 12 de mayo de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/movant/2024/05/12/bolivia-baja-en-la-produccion-de-gas-y-su-impacto-economico/ [40] Paúl, “3 claves…”, op .cit. [41] France 24, “Bolivia cierra 2023 con las reservas internacionales más bajas en 17 años”, 5 de enero de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20240105-bolivia-cierra-2023-con-las-reservas-internacionales-m%C3%A1s-bajas-en-17- a%C3%B1os [42] Paúl, “3 claves…”, op. cit. o [43] Pablo Stefanoni, “Bolivia: claves de la asonada militar y sus coletazos”, Nueva Sociedad, junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.nuso.org/articulo/bolivia-claves-de-la-asonada-militar-y-sus-coletazos/ [44] Deutsche Welle, “Militares controlan estaciones de combustible en Bolivia”, 13 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/militares-controlan-estaciones-de-combustible-en-bolivia/a-69348165 [45] Fernanda Paúl, “3 claves…”, op. cit. [46] Fernando Molina, “Luis Arce reconoce…”, op. cit. l [47] Fernando Molina, “Fracasa el intento de golpe de Estado en Bolivia: detenido el general rebelde”, El País, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-26/el-presidente-de-bolivia-denuncia-movilizaciones-irregulares-del-ejercito.html [48] Ivan Ellis, “La caída de Bolivia en un profundo caos y sus implicaciones para la región”, Infobae, 25 de noviembre de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/11/25/la-caida-de-bolivia-en-un-profundo-caos-y-sus-implicaciones-para-laregion/ [49] Centro de Estudios Internacionales Gilberto Bosques, “Intento fallido de golpe de Estado en Bolivia”, Senado de México, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/analisisinvestigacion/contexto/fallido-golpe-bolivia/viewdocument [50] Infobae, “El Gobierno de Bolivia reveló que los militares planearon el golpe durante tres semanas”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/27/el-gobierno-de-bolivia-dijo-que-los-militares-planearon-el-golpe-durantetres-semanas-y-que-su-lider-ya-habia-sido-cesado/ [51] The Editors, “Daily Review: Bolivia’s Failed Coup Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg”, World Politics Review, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/daily-review-bolivia-coup-arce/ [52] Pablo Stefanoni, “Arcistas’ vs ‘evistas’: los riesgos de despertar monstruos en Bolivia”, El País, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-30/arcistas-vs-evistas-los-riesgos-de-despertar-monstruos-en-bolivia.html [53] El Deber, “Toma del Palacio Quemado: Zúñiga, el militar más cercano al Presidente, sacó a la tropa militar, fue aprehendido y dijo que actuó por orden de Arce”, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/toma-del-palacio-quemado-zuniga-el-militarmas-cercano-al-presidente-saco-a-la-tropa-militar-fue-apr_374314 [54] BBC News Mundo, “Quién es Juan José Zúñiga, el general que lideró lo que el presidente de Bolivia calificó de "intento de golpe de Estado" y luego fue arrestado”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c035jg3j13ro [55] El Deber, “Los ‘Pachajchos’ son vistos como un grupo de poder en las Fuerzas Armadas”, 6 de noviembre de 2022. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/los-pachajchos-son-vistos-como-un-grupo-de-poder-en-las-fuerzas-armadas_302903 [56] Tuffí Aré Vásquez, “Golpe fallido, autogolpe, montaje o qué: los datos y las dudas en Bolivia al día siguiente del levantamiento militar”, Infobae, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/27/golpe-fallido-autogolpemontaje-o-que-los-datos-y-las-dudas-en-bolivia-al-dia-siguiente-del-levantamiento-militar/ [57] Idem. [58] Cuenta en “X” de Evo Morales, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://x.com/evoespueblo/status/1807496134119571492?s=48&t=RUbtGPN92qpBD2NHDoDKUg [59] El Día, “Federaciones del Trópico tildan de "show", "novela" y "autogolpe" lo ocurrido en plaza Murillo”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.eldia.com.bo/2024-06-27/pais/federaciones-del-tropico-tildan-de-show-novela-y-autogolpe-lo-ocurrido-en-plazamurillo.html [60] Pablo Stefanoni, op. cit. [61] Federico Rivas Molina, “Luis Arce: “Evo Morales pone en duda el golpe militar fallido por sus aspiraciones políticas personales””, El País, 29 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-30/luis-arce-evo-morales-pone-en-duda-el-golpe-militar-fallidopor-sus-aspiraciones-politicas-personales.html [62] Daniel Salazar Castellanos, “Intento de golpe de Estado en Bolivia podría agravar escasez de dólares, según banco de inversión”, Bloomberg en Línea, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bloomberglinea.com/2024/06/27/intento-de-fallido-golpe-de-estadoen-bolivia-podria-agravar-escasez-de-dolares-segun-banco-de-inversion/ [63] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales…”, op. cit. [64] Idem. [65] Gerardo Lissardy, “La tumultuosa historia de Bolivia como "el país con más intentos de golpe de Estado" desde 1950 (y por qué su crisis actual sorprende a los expertos)”, BBC, 28 de junio de 2204. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cne4787lpnzo 66Pablo Biderbost y Guillermo Boscán, “La historia turbulenta de Bolivia: más de 190 intentos de golpes y revoluciones”, The Conversation, 2 de julio de 2024. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://theconversation.com/la-historia-turbulenta-de-bolivia-mas-de-190-intentos-de-golpes-yrevoluciones-233495

Defense & Security
Several people during the demonstration against the results of the Venezuelan elections at sunset on July 29, 2024 in Madrid, Spain

Venezuela: What Next after its Election Uproar?

by Phil Gunson

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group” Venezuelan election authorities proclaimed incumbent Nicolás Maduro victor in the 28 July presidential poll despite evidence brandished by the opposition showing its candidate won by a landslide. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Phil Gunson explains what the ensuing outcry means for Venezuela’s protracted crisis. What happened? Under enormous international attention, Venezuela held presidential elections on 28 July. The polls pitted unpopular incumbent Nicolás Maduro, in power since 2013 after being anointed by late President Hugo Chávez as his successor, against a relatively unheralded opposition candidate, Edmundo González. González had established a commanding lead in pre-election opinion polls, in large part thanks to the endorsement of banned opposition leader María Corina Machado. Six hours after most polling stations closed, the National Electoral Council (CNE) declared Maduro victorious, but neither then nor in the days since has it provided any breakdown of the results by polling station or evidence to substantiate its announcement. Convinced that the election had been stolen, opposition supporters, many from working class communities, took to the streets the following day. They have been met with a violent response from state security services, which have made clear they will stand with the Maduro administration and unfurled a wave of targeted arrests. With Maduro digging in, the past few days’ turbulence could leave in its wake a weakened government, a galvanised but frustrated opposition, and a broad front of foreign governments all struggling to determine their next moves. How did we get here? Much of the controversy that swirled around the 2024 presidential campaign and election is a legacy of the domestic and international rancour that followed the previous, disputed presidential vote six years ago. In 2018, the prohibition of certain opposition candidates and parties – who mostly boycotted the poll – as well as a heavily tilted electoral playing field helped President Maduro secure a second term. But his victory was dismissed as illegitimate by the U.S., the European Union and many of Venezuela’s neighbours. The next year, over fifty countries opted instead to recognise Juan Guaidó, chair of the opposition-led parliament, as interim president. Washington imposed sweeping economic sanctions as successive opposition efforts sought to topple Maduro, only for the government to hold its ground through a wave of political repression, with the help of almost seamless backing from the military and support from Russia, Iran, Cuba and other states. At the same time, the Norwegian government facilitated sporadic rounds of talks between the government and opposition. Despite prolonged deadlock, these talks ultimately led to a breakthrough: the Barbados Agreement of October 2023 saw the Maduro government promise improved conditions for the 2024 election, while receiving in return (via parallel talks with President Joe Biden’s administration) conditional sanctions relief. The government’s concessions nevertheless came with strings attached. Although the authorities allowed the main opposition coalition, the Unitary Platform, to hold a primary election, they reaffirmed a ban on the runaway winner, Machado, holding elected office and blocked the candidacy of her chosen substitute, Corina Yoris. González, a 74-year-old retired diplomat, was the opposition’s third choice, but despite being an unknown with no previous political experience, he soon garnered massive support, touring the country with the hugely popular Machado. Ten candidates, backed by 38 political parties, eventually appeared on the official electronic ballot, many of them thinly veiled plants by the government, which intended them as a ploy to divide and confuse opposition voters and create the appearance of a diverse and competitive election. But the campaign rapidly took a shape that was not to the government’s liking – a two-horse race, in which reputable polling companies all gave González a massive lead, of up to 30 points and more, over Maduro. Most striking was the rapturous reception given to opposition campaign rallies in urban slums and agricultural states in the interior, which had until recently been the strongholds of chavismo – the political movement created by late president Chávez. “María Corina was here last week and filled the main street”, said an opposition supporter in the Andean state of Mérida. “Maduro came the next day and only filled half of it, despite all the buses from out of town”. The government did its best to impede the opposition’s rallies, banning Machado from traveling by air, cancelling public transport in the vicinity, digging up highways and setting up roadblocks ahead of them. It closed down radio stations, blocked websites and kept the opposition message largely out of the mass media. Millions of voters were disenfranchised. For the Venezuelan diaspora – estimated to number eight million migrants and refugees who have left the country over a decade of economic contraction and political tumult – arbitrary rules prevented them from registering to vote; at home, enrolment was marred by lack of information, as well as of time and opportunities to register. The National Electoral Council, dominated by a pro-government majority, failed even to adhere to its own election timetable, and overlooked or omitted a number of key steps. As in previous campaigns, the government abused its power by using state resources to bolster the Maduro campaign, while extorting contributions from private businesses and closing down those that gave any assistance to their adversary. With all signs nevertheless pointing to an opposition victory, many observers, including Crisis Group, foresaw that the Maduro administration would resort to even more extreme tactics to avoid losing power. But in the event, at least in the run-up to the election, it proved more restrained than expected. The government refrained from banning González’s candidacy or using its control of the Supreme Court to have the party ticket on which it was registered declared invalid. Ongoing talks between Washington and Caracas, as well as pressure from neighbouring and relatively friendly left-leaning governments in Brazil and Colombia, may possibly have dissuaded Maduro from adopting such draconian measures. Hopes that a low turnout among opposition voters alongside chavismo’s tried and tested methods of electoral mobilisation would again lead to victory may also have persuaded authorities not to act earlier. But none of this meant that the administration was prepared, when push came to shove, to give up power. What happened on election day? Election day itself was largely peaceful and voting took place normally, with only a minority of polling stations reporting irregularities. Exit polls and quick counts organised by the opposition indicated that Maduro was headed for defeat. But there were soon signs that the government might not be prepared to concede. As polls closed, opposition witnesses and election workers in voting precincts across the country reported that electoral authorities (at times supported by chavista operatives and members of the security forces), were trying to deny them copies of the vote tallies, called “actas”. These actas are printed out by each voting machine once polls close and constitute the physical corroboration of the electronic result that is sent to CNE headquarters and amalgamated into a final nationwide vote count. All participating political parties are entitled to them by law. Concerned about the implications, at 11pm, Unitary Platform coordinator Omar Barboza publicly called on the government not to “take a wrong step”. The hours after the polls closed (technically at 6pm, although many remained open later, even without people in line to vote) were tense, with both sides claiming to have won but with no official results from the electoral authorities. Shortly after midnight, CNE president Elvis Amoroso – a close ally of President Maduro – announced that, with 80 per cent of returns tallied, Maduro had obtained 51.2 per cent of the vote and that his lead of around 700,000 votes indicated an “irreversible” tendency. Machado and González then appeared before the cameras, with Machado saying, “We won, and everyone knows it”. The commission pronounced Maduro the election winner in a Monday morning event in Caracas. What evidence is there to suggest that the results may have been falsified? Both opposition and international suspicions of foul play have been heightened by the failure of guardrail systems to function as intended. In principle, the integrity of the vote should be protected by the actas, the paper tallies that each of the 30,026 voting machines produces once the polling station has closed. This safeguard was introduced under late president Chávez, and makes the Venezuelan system, according to electoral experts, one of the best in the world. Yet the CNE has so far failed to publish or distribute electronically the breakdown of voting by polling station and voting machine, despite Amoroso’s promises to do so. It also did not complete the post-voting audit of over half the machines, which the rules required it to. Its website, until the time of writing, was offline. Presidential candidate Enrique Márquez, a former member of the CNE board, said on 30 July that an electoral observer representing his campaign could attest that the results bulletin CNE head Amoroso read out on election night was not the one generated by the electronic voting system. Caracas has offered little by way of explanation for the apparent irregularities. The government has accused the opposition of hacking the system, saying that a cyberattack initiated in North Macedonia accounts for the delay in transmitting the results from voting machines (the North Macedonian government has said it has no evidence such an attack took place). But, regardless, the CNE has been unable to explain why problems with the electronic system would affect the tally sheets, which are printed before transmission, or why it cannot provide the actas it says it received on the evening after polls closed. Machado and the Unitary Platform, meanwhile, say they have managed to obtain over 80 per cent of the physical tallies through a network of observers, covering around 90 per cent of voting precincts. A day after the election they posted the breakdown of the vote, together with images of each acta, on a website that permits members of the public to consult them. The government immediately moved to block access to the site, which has not stopped thousands of Venezuelans reaching it through the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). Against this backdrop, the Carter Center, the only professional international observer mission for the polls allowed to produce a public assessment, stated on 31 July that the election “did not meet international standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic”. The Center cited the lopsided playing field during the campaign and said that, given the lack of access to the full tally, it could not “verify or corroborate the results of the election” declared by the CNE. How much post-election unrest has there been and what is the risk of further violence? The government’s announcement sparked unrest on 29 July, the day after the election, which saw spontaneous demonstrations against the Maduro government. Protesters burned tires, blocked highways and toppled several statues of Hugo Chávez. The demonstrations, which mainly drew inhabitants of poorer communities that used to be pro-government strongholds, were met with force by security forces and chavista para-police groups known as colectivos. At least twenty deaths have so far been reported along with over 1,000 arrests, according to the government and human rights organisations. Machado and González expressed solidarity with the demonstrators and called for restraint by government forces, but have not convened marches themselves. The opposition is no doubt conscious that since the first major anti-Maduro protest wave in 2014, the government has brutally quashed such demonstrations on numerous occasions, leading to over 250 people killed and thousands of arrests as unarmed protesters have clashed with riot squads from the police and National Guard. The government’s ferocious response to protests in 2017 provoked international outrage and paved the way for the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor to open an investigation into possible commission of crimes against humanity. There is little to suggest that things would be easier for demonstrators this time. The armed forces high command has made clear that it will stand by Maduro. Military leaders were present at his investiture by the CNE as president-elect on Monday morning, and on the following day gave a press conference in combat fatigues to reiterate their “unconditional” backing for his government. On Tuesday, Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino published a statement accusing international “fascist structures” of trying to discredit the exemplary demonstration of civic duty by Venezuelans and reaffirming the military’s “loyalty” to Maduro. In an apparent effort to avoid violence, Machado and González opted to organise brief rallies (what they called “popular assemblies”) on 30 July; another nationwide gathering has been called for Saturday. Sources close to the opposition affirm they have also made efforts to talk directly to the government, but these have so far been rebuffed. This has left them struggling with the question of how simultaneously to sustain pressure on the authorities to revisit the results without eliciting an even more severe response, while holding together an opposition coalition that has traditionally squabbled over tactics and strategy. Meanwhile, arrests of leading opposition figures – including Freddy Superlano, the national coordinator of opposition party Voluntad Popular and a close ally of Machado – signal that Maduro is ready to crack down hard on the opposition. Jorge Rodríguez, Maduro’s right-hand man and head of the National Assembly, has called for Machado and González to be arrested and tried. Six members of Machado’s election team, who have spent months in the residence of the Argentine ambassador to avoid arrest, risked capture after the government ordered Argentine diplomats expelled. (Brazil then offered to represent Argentine interests in Venezuela as long as the embassy remained closed.) For now, Maduro seems to be abstaining from taking this step, although the government’s rhetoric and the actions of its security services indicate that it is ready to tighten its authoritarian grip across the country, even at the cost of becoming a regional pariah. What should the outside world do? Countries in the region and further afield that have commented on the election have generally pressed for full transparency concerning the 28 July poll results, including publication of a complete breakdown of voting by polling station. The exception is countries with strong links to Maduro, including Russia, China, Cuba, Bolivia and Honduras, among others. Caracas has brooked no criticism. On the day after the election, after six Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay) bluntly declined to recognise Maduro’s victory without a detailed breakdown of the figures, Caracas ordered their diplomatic representatives expelled. (Panama had already ordered its diplomats out.) The government followed up by banning flights to and from Panama, the Dominican Republic and Peru, leaving Venezuelans feeling more isolated from the world once again. On Thursday, the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a statement that “it is clear to the United States … that Edmundo González Urrutia won the most votes”. Top Venezuelan officials and government propagandists insist that the refusal of many countries to accept Maduro’s re-election is simply a rerun of the aftermath of the 2018 election, and that a right-wing conspiracy, led by the U.S., is using González’s supposed victory as a pretext for another bid to overthrow the Venezuelan government. Some key countries – in particular Brazil and Colombia (both neighbours of Venezuela), and with certain reservations, Mexico – have sought to cling precariously to what little hope remains for compromise, refraining from declaring outright that the result is a fraud while insisting on the need for transparency. But with the Maduro government seemingly bent on intensifying polarisation and dismissing all challenges to its version of events, the chances of reaching any kind of consensus on how to resolve the electoral dispute currently look remote. A session on 31 July of the Organization of American States failed to pass a resolution on the issue, with half the member states abstaining or declining to attend. (Venezuela, while formally a member, does not participate in the organisation.) Diplomatic efforts by Brazil as well as Colombia and the U.S. are reportedly ongoing, but face a key obstacle. If any moves to greater transparency in the vote count will put Maduro’s hold on power at risk (as increasingly seems to be the case), then he is highly unlikely to move in that direction. For now, he has put the matter of settling the dispute in the hands of the Supreme Court, which like the CNE is loyal to him and will simply endorse the result. Despite Maduro’s extreme prickliness, the risks that an unresolved election dispute will extend Venezuela’s political and economic crisis – at the expense of its people and the region – make it essential that Bogotá, Brasilia and Mexico City continue to press the Venezuelan government to prove the result in an independent and impartial forum, or be ready to agree an alternative route to some form of negotiated transition. What happens now? For now, Maduro’s plan appears to be to batten down the hatches and try to ride out the storm. In the past, he has been able to take advantage of outside pressure to rally his supporters and quell dissent within chavismo, claiming Caracas is resisting imperialist interventionism abetted by the forces of domestic “fascism”. This may well work again, at least over the short term. The ruling Socialist Party, or PSUV, and the armed forces have stood by him despite what appears to have been a brazen refusal to accept the verdict from the ballot box. Still, Maduro is likely to emerge from the process weakened, both at home and abroad. His candidacy was not universally popular among chavistas, and his failure to deliver a credible triumph at the polls or lay the basis for economic growth and social peace will have further eroded his standing. His reputation abroad, notably among more sympathetic governments in Latin America, is likely to suffer, and at some stage the country and senior officials might face additional U.S. and EU sanctions. It remains to be seen whether a president who has been unable so far to disprove opposition claims of election victory and who can apparently only promise deeper international isolation and a stagnant economy, will still command respect among the factions that make up the movement. As for the opposition, indignation as to the outcome is leavened by what they believe their candidate achieved, reportedly gaining four million votes more than Maduro – representing not only their first ever apparent victory over chavismo at this level, but the biggest margin of victory ever in a Venezuelan presidential election. They are, for now, much more united than they have been for several years. But that does not solve the bind they are in. Assuming Maduro clings to power, further dilemmas await them. Parliamentary and local elections are due to take place next year, but the government might be tempted to bring them forward. If it does, the opposition will face a quandary that has tormented it for much of chavismo’s 25 years in power: do they stick to the method of contesting elections, despite the government’s apparent disregard for the most basic rules of democracy, or do they boycott the polls, a tactic they have used in the past but which simply allowed the government to win by default? If they do spurn elections, it is unclear what other options the opposition might embrace beyond the campaigns of street protest and foreign sanctions that have thus far failed to dislodge the government, and in the case of sanctions, deepened the country’s humanitarian misery. Despite the opposition’s frustration at yet another election dispute following years of patient negotiations, it remains the case that a solution to Venezuela’s long-running political crisis – and a peaceful, gradual return to democratic governance – will require full-scale talks between the two sides. If the current crisis has any upside, it is the opportunity it could present to convince a majority on both sides that the moment for talks has now arrived. Opposition leaders, governments in the region, and multilateral bodies – above all the UN – should continue to press for a full accounting of the election results. But they should also use all the channels at their disposal to urge Maduro and senior officials to understand the electoral crisis as the latest episode of a debilitating dispute that, without a course correction, will simmer endlessly to the detriment of the Venezuelan people. They should insist that the government’s efforts over the last five years to restore its political legitimacy will come to naught without a comprehensive negotiation process aimed at defusing tensions, reestablishing representative politics and rekindling economic growth. As efforts by third countries to restart negotiations continue, the opposition and its allies should prepare themselves to discuss difficult issues if they do. These include inevitable demands from senior chavistas for robust guarantees to protect them from legal peril in the event that they leave high office. At the same time, they should avoid the temptation, always present when options seem limited or non-existent, to threaten coercive force or slap on more sanctions so as not to be seen to be “doing nothing”. The solution to Venezuela’s ills does not lie in piling more punishment on a population that is already suffering a humanitarian emergency, but instead using existing sanctions and the prospect of their lifting as an incentive for the government to compromise. Whether there will be an opening for meaningful talks any time soon is anyone’s guess. Right now, chavismo seems more girded for intransigence than negotiation and compromise. Hopes for a better outcome remain slender. Some voices in the opposition are advocating a face-saving deal for Maduro, in which he would step down in favor of a consensus candidate agreed to by both the government and opposition ahead of a fresh election. It is not a proposal that appears to have great prospects for success at this point in time. But at a deeply troubling moment for Venezuela, options for a way out of the hardening deadlock should be nurtured and sustained.

Diplomacy
Mexico City, Mexico. July 18, 2024: Claudia Sheinbaum, new Mexican president, announces new cabinet members. Marath Bolaños, Josefina Rodríguez Zamora and Claudia Curiel de Icaza.

Sheinbaum and the internacional

by Rodrigo Vázquez Ortega

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Elections, in simplified terms, usually involve deciding between continuity or change. That decision was clearly expressed by Mexican voters. The results of the electoral day on June 2nd in Mexico reflect that approximately two-thirds of the votes cast favor continuity and, to some extent, a deepening of the outgoing administration's policies. Starting from the theory, this deepening will apply to foreign policy. Following the electoral day, expectations, proposals, questions, and prospects arise. These lines aim to address those that fall within the international sphere. It is advisable to begin with a brief diagnosis of the context and Mexico's recent international actions. It can be confidently stated that the constitutional principles of Mexican foreign policy, particularly non-intervention, were invoked with a particular emphasis. This emphasis was maintained throughout López Obrador's six-year term, in line with a nationalist-oriented foreign policy. The reference to these principles was made in regional matters as well as in the global thematic agenda. Regionally, in North America, the path was guided by the principle of respect for sovereignty and recognition of shared responsibility in matters that foster understanding, a spirit of cooperation, and a strategic partnership. However, it became evident that in some sensitive issues, antagonistic views do exist. To the south of our border, the overall assessment indicates a strengthening of ties, with a greater emphasis on Central American countries, through the strengthening of political dialogue and Mexico's cooperation agenda with specific social development programs. However, with some South American countries, Mexico experienced and continues to experience disagreements, which have led to a pause and even a setback in Latin American and Caribbean integration. Across the Atlantic, Mexico's relationship with its European counterparts continued on its path toward intensifying friendship and deepening political dialogue as strategic allies, despite brief disagreements. However, on balance, there is also a pause in the formalization of our modernized Global Agreement with the European Union. With the rest of the world's regions, Mexico sought greater diversification. However, it is still an unfinished endeavor. Despite efforts to promote dialogue and greater cooperation on regional and global agendas, bilateral relations with many countries remained on the sidelines of the priorities. In international forums, Mexico has stood out by advocating for the revitalization of multilateralism to create a more favorable global environment capable of addressing and resolving the multitude of global crises that concern the entire international community. For Mexico, the multilateral arena served as a mechanism to balance and counteract asymmetries with other countries and to enhance Mexico's prestige in favor of a world grounded in International Law, a system of clear rules. There have been achievements in Mexico's multilateral policy during this government. It is important to highlight the greater prominence gained in United Nations (UN) bodies, including the decision to occupy a non-permanent seat on the Security Council during the 2021-2022 biennium, those years were extremely challenging for international stability, peace, and security. This is a characteristic element of a State's foreign policy. Thus, Mexico consolidated a continuous, relevant, and stable relationship with the UN's principal body. Despite the complex scenario in which international security was constantly challenged, our diplomacy in the Council adopted a constructive attitude. Mexico played a successful role in bridging distant positions. Mexico's stances and decisions were supported, as has historically been the case, by legal rigor and in favor of peace and human rights, which has earned it recognition. Thus, our multilateral policy succeeded in capitalizing on credibility and trust among the international community. Another achievement of Mexico in the multilateral sphere has been the call to the international community and the effort to persuade major powers and emerging countries of the urgent need to reform the UN considering global reconfigurations. For Mexico, it is clear that the measures required for a comprehensive reform must be guided by the principles of representativeness, democratization, transparency, and effectiveness. With this foundational assessment, what can be anticipated in terms of foreign policy for the upcoming administration led by Claudia Sheinbaum? What recommendations could be made for Mexico's international efforts in the coming years? The answers to these questions revolve around finding consensus on the need to build a State foreign policy, rather than a government policy. A foreign policy with long-term objectives and vision that allows for the accommodation of the nuances and emphases each head of the Executive may bring. To outline some recommendations, we must emphasize that Mexico is a globally strategic country. The voice of our country and the diplomatic prestige accumulated over the years exert tangible influence on the international stage. Our country plays a key role in the trends and dynamics of international trade and global production chains, being among the top ten exporting countries in the world. In addition to this, Mexico will continue to benefit from the relocation of companies and investments. Thanks to this global phenomenon, known as “nearshoring,” our country could solidify its position as an increasingly attractive destination for foreign investment, including the one from Asia, and will have the potential to develop clusters of technological innovations, among other sectors. Therefore, broad opportunities for global engagement are emerging for Mexico. However, the conflict dynamics that prevail on the international scene present complex challenges for Claudia Sheinbaum's management of foreign policy. Commercial, military, or geopolitical tensions, such as the situation in the South China Sea, the war between Russia and Ukraine, or the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, pose challenges that require reaching agreements on a wide range of issues, particularly in security, migration, climate change, and sustainable development. Identifying and deepening convergences with key countries will be essential to easing the many international tensions that Mexico will face at the beginning of Sheinbaum's term. Our bilateral relationship with the United States is, without a doubt, the clear priority in Mexico's foreign agenda. Mexico's outlook toward the world begins there, at our northern border. The ties of interdependence are broad and deep. Our country and the United States need each other. Therefore, among the issues that could constitute the first successes of Sheinbaum's international agenda could be taking important steps in advancing and deepening a strategic partnership from which cooperative benefits can be derived, setting aside rhetoric. In our relationship with the United States, the main thematic axes from which opportunities arise are bilateral trade, investments, production chains and competitiveness through innovation; migration; security; and border management. Challenges are also apparent in these areas. The vitality of the bilateral relationship demands, first and foremost, building an effective, institutionalized, and frequent dialogue through periodic summits and high-level meetings, in addition to achieving mutual recognition of shared responsibilities in the most significant issues. This is a critical condition, regardless of who occupies the White House in the coming years. Deepening and further institutionalizing this bilateral dialogue is urgent given the likelihood of a remastered “Trumpism” version reaching the Oval Office. These variables will be conclusive and decisive in paving the way toward 2026, the year of the first USMCA review. The goal is to ensure that the review focuses on the formalities of the process, meaning it should be free from deep renegotiations or political setbacks. We now know that Marcelo Ebrard will have the important mission of leading this difficult task for Mexico. One of Ebrard's assets, in addition to his experience during the negotiation of the USMCA, is that he is a familiar figure to our North American counterparts. Our relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is also of utmost importance. It has become clear that this bilateral relationship is essential for Mexico's present and future. The Asian country plays a crucial role in the network of political relations that the Mexican government must continue to weave and deepen, especially considering and recognizing the predominant, superpower role that China exerts in global politics, technological development, investments, and trade. The geopolitical tensions and trends in which the PRC government has played a leading role grant and validate a stronger position for China in the region and, by extension, on the global chessboard. While few doubted years ago, and no one doubts today, that the dynamism of the Chinese economy is of growing importance in terms of the behavior and current state of the world economy. Furthermore, China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Given the positioning that the Asian country has achieved, strengthening the bilateral relationship is vital to achieving the global and regional power balances that are in Mexico's best interest. Therefore, Mexico must approach China both politically and economically. It is essential that the government and the business sector jointly adopt medium and long-term measures to achieve a strategic rapprochement, with an updated agenda and innovative dialogue mechanisms that bring both countries closer together. Achieving this also involves the need to foster mutual understanding through cultural exchanges. Consequently, it will be imperative for the new Mexican President to work towards continuing to intensify and expand our relationship with China, primarily in economic and technological matters, as well as in identifying common ground and affinities on global issues. With Europe as a whole, it will be a priority to achieve the signing of the new Global Agreement with the European Union to deepen our alliance. This includes countries with which our bilateral relations are historic, such as Spain; leading EU countries, such as Germany — our main trading partner in Europe — and France; and the group of Eastern European countries where threats to the established international order are clearly perceived at their borders. Additionally, it will be essential to reaffirm Mexico's interest in working alongside all European countries to formulate joint strategies to restore peace and ensure international security. Our ties with Latin America and the Caribbean deserve special mention. The equation of Mexico's foreign policy toward this region, which is undoubtedly a priority, must reaffirm its commitment to strengthening mechanisms for political coordination, advancing regional integration, and agreeing on common policies and principles to achieve shared economic and social development, well-being for the population, and a migration management approach based on human rights, with an emphasis on the comprehensive protection of migrants. Considering that globally there are now 281 million migrants, Mexico will need to assert its regional convening power by stressing the urgency of addressing the structural causes of this phenomenon, condemning hate speech against migrants, and advocating for the need to develop political and legal frameworks that contribute to the sustainable development and the well-being of populations. In this region, the relationship with Brazil will become increasingly strategic, based on the leadership roles that each country plays and the shared values. In the current context, there is an evident political and ideological affinity between both governments, which translates into an additional advantage that will allow us to further strengthen our bilateral ties. This conclusion also considers Brazil's importance within the BRICS framework. Therefore, Tlatelolco should capitalize on the opportunities for alignment with Itamaraty on regional political issues and contributions to resolving crises in certain countries, such as Haiti. Of course, the comprehensive regional partnership that Mexico promotes and seeks within the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the fertile ground that political and diplomatic coordination initiatives could experience within its framework, may spark interest for Brazil and clearly outline synergies leading to closer relations. Perhaps the upcoming visit to Mexico by Brazilian President Lula da Silva will provide the ideal opportunity to illustrate the potential harmony between the two countries in advancing the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean and in articulating global initiatives. Undoubtedly, the bilateral issues with some governments in the region, the aired tensions, and the challenges to Latin American integration are imperative topics for the next president and her cabinet to address. Solutions to these pending matters will not be simple or quick. Common ground is limited, and the ideological distances between different leaderships in the region are evident. The relevance of the region to Mexico cannot be denied, given the shared cultural and historical heritage with these countries. However, the divergence of political directions taken by governing groups and the alternations in power across the region have led to a series of ideological and political transitions toward radical centralization of power, evident in regimes characterized by strong presidential figures. Pragmatic approaches in their most extreme forms loom, and given the structural fragility and vulnerability of their economies, they provoke sociopolitical unrest, instability, and emigration, among other outcomes. Therefore, the challenges are complex, and the priorities emerging from the region are clear. Other areas of opportunity for Claudia Sheinbaum's foreign policy will include diversifying our political and commercial relations with emerging and influential countries in regions of growing global importance, such as Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Opening new diplomatic and consular missions in these areas will be ideal and will yield benefits in the medium term. Reactivating political dialogue and cooperation with all international and regional actors is also imperative. The drive to expand our diplomatic footprint in traditionally neglected regions will increasingly take on a sense of urgency. In addition to this diversification, it will be necessary to strengthen the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID, in spanish). Its institutional strengthening should begin with building an international cooperation agenda based on both the results and needs of supply and demand. It seems necessary to increase the capacity of resources allocated to the international cooperation that Mexico offers. It also seems viable to adopt a more proactive and forward-looking approach to cooperation, with a high value on innovation, where Mexico can position itself as a recipient of cooperation in areas such as technological innovation and energy transition. Equally important is to continue betting on trilateral or triangular cooperation schemes, as this decision is based on recognizing shared visions and priorities with other countries, which contributes to strengthening collaborative ties with countries in the region and in various parts of the world. In addition to all of this, there are several other issues that will need to be addressed. To briefly mention a few, it will be crucial to emphasize the urgency of developing international actions aimed at expanding spaces for multilateral engagement and building common positions on issues such as food security, climate change, and the transition to clean and green energy — topics of personal interest to Claudia Sheinbaum given her background, knowledge, and experience. Other topics, also of a global nature and requiring priority attention, include those related to health; contributions to the refinement and progress of International Law codification; the promotion of innovative instruments such as our Feminist Foreign Policy; and, of course, the formulation of initiatives and leadership in multilateral efforts to restore peace. It is important to pause and emphasize that the issue of international peace is one in which Mexico enjoys a reputation as a builder of bridges for understanding. Our advantages lie not only in our traditional pacifist and conciliatory policy but also in the credibility provided by our multiple memberships, which facilitate Mexico's voice and vote in many international organizations. This will undoubtedly contribute to identifying potential consensus and common positions in favor of sustainable peace. These same multiple memberships and Mexico's prestige can be translated into contributions to the urgent need to reform the UN to ensure an updated international system. Individually or collectively, the issues described constitute crucial topics for defining the international profile and image that will be built around the elected president and what her foreign policy will be during her 6-year term. However, it is worth pausing for a reflection that is undoubtedly relevant. The personal decisions that Claudia Sheinbaum makes regarding her trips abroad will carry significant weight. The future international trips of the Head of the Executive, in case they occur frequently, will be an important element to consider in terms of the international presence that Mexico wishes to adopt. In this regard, the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro next November presents itself as a valuable first opportunity for Sheinbaum to appear alongside the leaders of the world's most important economies. The advantages of this trip are obvious, as it goes without saying that Mexico's foreign policy fully aligns with the three general priorities of Brazil's G20 presidency. As in this group, global forums are also expecting Mexico's voice to be represented at the highest level. Likewise, the profile of the future Mexican president necessitates highlighting the enormous environmental challenges and adaptability issues imposed by the evidence of climate change. In this context, it is worth noting that Sheinbaum inspires hope. The odds suggest that she could capitalize on international leadership grounded in her political commitment and academic background in this particular area. She seems to understand clearly that it is essential to advance in energy transition and will need to work towards and persuade others to increase public and private sector investments in the proportion of renewable energy within the country's energy matrix. The environmental policies and the focus on energy efficiency, due to their characteristics and implications of global shared responsibility, will occupy a significant portion of the time and space on both the domestic and international agendas during the next Mexican administration. Sheinbaum has the credentials and interest to make progress in the direction demanded by the global climate emergency and to take on a leading role. The work of Alicia Bárcena, the current Foreign Minister and future Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources, will be crucial in supporting and advancing global agreements on this issue. Bárcena's technical and practical knowledge of this agenda is a guarantee, and her appointment underscores the importance of the environmental agenda. As with the start of any new administration, it may be worthwhile to revisit the interpretation of the constitutional principles of Mexican foreign policy. This exercise will need to be carried out considering the limited flexibility that the tumultuous global landscape allows. Despite these contextual limitations, adherence to the principled foundation of our international actions should first and foremost offer a range of resources that can be translated into practical solutions for the successful conduct of Mexico's affairs beyond its borders. The principles are, in essence, fundamental elements for the conduct of foreign policy, and at the same time, they are subsidiary to the definition of strategies for Mexico's international actions. They are not, by definition, meant to be declarative priorities. Instead, they constitute the legal framework for acceptable, possible, and desirable actions and decisions, including their role in safeguarding and upholding the national interest. But they will be useful to the extent that they provide predictability, guide our international actions, signal the positions and definitions that should be valid in line with Mexico's international stature, contribute to our diplomatic tradition, and enhance Mexico's prestige and image. In other words, as our history has shown, their value does not lie in declarations but in their contribution to building global agreements with our international partners and allies, both bilaterally and within the framework of multilateral and regional organizations. For these principles to translate into practical advantages, it is desirable to accompany them with the exercise of soft power and the promotion of Mexico through our valuable cultural, natural, artistic, and historical heritage. To achieve all of the above and meet these objectives, it will be necessary to overcome the obstacle of resource scarcity. To be consistent with the goal of exercising a global presence that corresponds to Mexico's position on the international stage, it is imperative to strengthen action capacities and allocate resources. Additionally, organizational schemes must be developed to skillfully direct actions in both bilateral and multilateral arenas to fully achieve the aforementioned foreign policy objectives. The answer will largely lie in relying on and supporting the professionals of Mexican diplomacy and diplomatically skilled personnel who can act within the framework of our constitutional foreign policy principles and prioritize cooperation over conflict. Therefore, it is essential to recognize the need to affirm that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is strengthened by the capabilities of the Mexican Foreign Service (SEM, in spanish). It is the oldest service in the country, which has gradually taken on more responsibilities. A service characterized by its committed and professional work in pursuit of Mexican interests and the best causes of humanity. The implementation of this foreign policy, based on the diplomatic tradition embodied by the SEM, should also promote the creation of cooperative synergies through the virtuous tripod of collaboration among universities and research centers, businesses and organized civil society, and the government. Despite its apparent abstraction, foreign policy is as important as domestic policy; this underscores the importance of investing effort and political will in consolidating Mexico's international actions as a State policy. It is clear that global challenges require cooperative actions and common solutions characterized by shared responsibility. Mexican diplomacy possesses sufficient experience, political sensitivity, skill, historical awareness, global perspective, a commitment to serving national interests, and intellectual capital to take the initiative in addressing the solutions that both the world and Mexico demand. The world is increasingly interdependent, interconnected, and globalized. It is also alarmingly radicalized, navigating through axiological debates, as demonstrated by election results in various parts of the world. Mexico needs to contribute to a more stable, orderly, and peaceful world. Finally, these reflections on the international agenda of Mexico's future president would be incomplete without mentioning the person who will lead the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has been confirmed by Claudia Sheinbaum herself that Juan Ramón de la Fuente will take on this responsibility. In addition to his personality, which will open doors and contribute to a positive atmosphere for negotiations with his counterparts, his professional experience and shared scientific profile, together with Sheinbaum and Bárcena, combined with a global outlook, are among his strengths. His tenure in the SEM as Mexico's permanent representative to the UN in New York, along with his accumulated international experience working closely with this universal organization's family, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), bolster his credentials in guiding and advancing Mexico's interests in global forums. His appointment is seen as a positive development, and it raises expectations.

Diplomacy
Casa Rosada (Pink House), Argentine Presidential Palace - Buenos Aires, Argentina

Remarks by the President of the Nation, Javier Milei, at the Global Peace Summit for Ukraine

by Javier Milei

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Good afternoon, everyone. It is an honor for me and for Argentina to participate in this Peace Summit organized by President Zelenski, with whom we have established a close relationship. We Argentinians are fully aware of the value of peace and democratic coexistence as guiding principles of life in society, and that is why I want to especially thank you for the invitation to this event. I want to express, on behalf of the Argentinian people, our utmost support for the people of Ukraine and our friend, President Zelenski, as defenders of the idea of freedom, we condemn any form of violence, whether between individuals, but particularly, we repudiate war as an illegitimate mean of resolving conflicts between nations. War, tragic by nature, can never be the answer to problems that should be resolved in the political sphere. War is not a legitimate tool for resolving conflicts; it is the last resort of a people who must defend themselves, nothing more, nothing less. We are defenders of the idea of freedom. Liberalism, as we understand it, is the respect and protection of the life projects of others, based on the principle of non-aggression, in defense of the right to life, freedom, and private property. As defenders of freedom, we can advocate for nothing other than peace among free peoples and nations. When we say that the guiding principle of our doctrine is the defense of individuals' lives, liberty, and property, we are expressing that there is a direct relationship between peace, commerce, and prosperity. There is no economic prosperity without free trade, and there is no free trade without peace. Free trade naturally promotes peace, because as Bastiat said, "where trade enters, bullets do not," or as Milton Friedman said, "I may hate my neighbor, but if he doesn't buy my product, I go bankrupt." As a fervent believer in the philosophical consciousness found in liberalism and peace, I make this brief defense of these principles today, as they seem to have gone out of fashion. I believe it is an important step for Argentina to be present first at the G7 Summit and now here at this Peace Summit. It is part of the great shift we are undertaking as a country after decades of turning our back on the world. There is a new Argentina that is once again embracing the ideas that, 150 years ago, made it one of the most prosperous countries in the world. There is a new Argentina that also seeks to reclaim the prominent role in the concert of nations that it once held and never should have abandoned. Know that Argentina will always be committed to defending the ideas that made great the West, and that for us, peace among free nations is not only a moral duty but also a necessary condition for prosperity. Thank you all very much.

Energy & Economics
Skyline of La Habana, Havanna, Cuba, Carribean, Central Amerika

Thirsty in paradise: Water crises are a growing problem across the Caribbean islands

by Farah Nibbs

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In the popular imagination, the Caribbean is paradise, an exotic place to escape to. But behind the images of balmy beaches and lush hotel grounds lies a crisis, the likes of which its residents have never experienced. Caribbean islands are in a water crisis, and their governments have warned that water scarcity may become the new norm. Within the past five years, every island in the region has experienced some sort of water scarcity. For example, Trinidad is experiencing its worst drought in recent memory, and residents are under water restrictions through at least the end of June 2024, with fines for anyone who violates the rules. Dominica, considered the nature island of the Caribbean for its mountain rain forests, is seeing a significant decrease in freshwater resources and increasingly frequent water shortages. In Grenada, known as the spice isle, drought has affected water systems throughout the island. Jamaica is also facing water restrictions and has had to resort to water shutoffs in recent years, limiting water availability to a few hours per day in some areas. St. Vincent and St. Kitts have had to ration water. Barbados has experienced several water bans in recent years. In fact, recent data shows that the Caribbean is one of the most water-stressed regions in the world. I study the intersection of critical infrastructure and disasters, particularly in the Caribbean. Safe water is essential for all human activity and public health. That’s why it is important to understand the root causes of the water crises and to find effective, affordable ways to improve water supply systems. 3 reasons water demand is outstripping supply Changing precipitation patterns and droughts are straining Caribbean water supplies, but water demand has also been outstripping supply for a number of reasons. 1. Rapid urbanization and industrialization The Caribbean is one of the most rapidly urbanizing regions in the world. About three-quarters of its population lives in cities, and that percentage is rising, adding pressure on public water systems. At the same time, increased industrialization and commercialization of agriculture have degraded water quality and in some cases encroached on sensitive water catchment areas, affecting the soil’s capacity to retain water. This competing demand for limited fresh water has reduced stream flows and led to water being drawn down from sensitive sources. In Dennery North, a major farming community in St. Lucia, water shortages have left residents collecting water from rivers and other sources for their homes and farms. Unregulated extraction of groundwater can also worsen the problem. Many islands depend on groundwater. For example, 90% of water supply in Barbados comes from groundwater, while in Jamaica it is 84%. However, increasing demand and changes in annual rainfall patterns are affecting the ability of aquifers or groundwater to recharge. As a result, supply isn’t keeping up with demand. This is a huge problem for the island of Utila, located off the coast of Honduras, where the current rate of aquifer recharge is only 2.5% annually. For comparison, Barbados has a recharge rate of 15% to 30% of annual rainfall. 2. Water-intensive tourism industry It’s no secret that the Caribbean is a popular tourist destination, and tourist economies depend on vast quantities of water. Even during water rationing, water is diverted to hotels and other tourist-dependent sites first. That can leave local residents without water for hours or days at a time and facing fines if they violate use restrictions. Tourism not only increases the consumption of water but also the pollution of water resources. Building golf courses to attract more tourists further increases tourism’s water demand and runoff. 3. Weak water infrastructure governance Another problem water systems face is weak governance that leads to excessive loss of treated water before it even reaches the customer. A well-performing water utility will usually have water losses – known as nonrevenue water – below 30%. In the Caribbean, the average nonrevenue water is 46%, with some as high as 75%.   The reasons range from lack of appropriate management practices to metering inaccuracies, leaks and theft. Climate change and extreme weather worsen water insecurity These troubled water systems can struggle on good days. Worsening extreme weather, such as hurricanes and flooding, can damage infrastructure, leading to long outages and expensive repairs. The Caribbean is the second-most disaster-prone region in the world. The islands face frequent earthquakes, landslides, devastating hurricanes and other destructive storms. As global temperatures and sea levels rise, the risk of extreme weather and storm surge causing erosion, flooding and saltwater contamination increases.   Three months after Hurricane Maria hit in 2017, well over 14% of the Caribbean population was still without potable water. Hurricane Dorian in 2019 left Grand Bahama Utility Co. and the country’s Water and Sewerage Corp. with U$54 million in damages. A year after Dorian, WSC was “still working on restoring operations to pre-Hurricane Dorian levels.” How hybrid rainwater harvesting can help Improving water access in the Caribbean means working on all of those challenges. Better governance and investment can help reduce water loss from theft and leaks. Government and social pressure and educating tourists can help reduce waste at hotels and resorts. There are also ways to increase water supply. One involves being more strategic about how the islands use a practice the region has relied on for centuries: rainwater harvesting. Rainwater harvesting involves capturing rainwater, often from where it runs off rooftops, and storing it for future use. It can replace irrigation, or the water can be treated for household uses. Right now, rainwater harvesting is not managed as part of the islands’ centralized water management system. Instead, households bear the cost to finance, build and maintain their own systems. Finding technical support can be difficult, leaving households to contend with seasonal variations in water quantity and quality. That makes risks to drinking water safety difficult to identify. If rainwater harvesting were instead combined with central water systems in a managed hybrid water model, I believe that could help expand safe rainwater harvesting and address water issues in the region. It’s a relatively new concept, and integrating decentralized sources can be complex, including requiring separate pipes, but it has potential to reduce water stress. Decentralized sources, such as rainwater harvesting, groundwater or recycled gray water, could serve as backup water sources during shortages or provide water for nonpotable purposes, such as flushing toilets or irrigation, to reduce demand for treated water. Engineers in Australia are weighing the potential of hybrid water systems to help face the challenges of delivering secure, safe and sustainable water in the future. Fulfilling a human right in the islands The World Health Organization has declared that access to a sufficient, safe and reliable water supply is a fundamental human right, and that to accomplish this, water suppliers have a responsibility to provide adequate quantities of potable water. Hybrid water systems could help ensure water safety and security for island communities and improve the water systems’ resilience amid the human and environmental pressures facing the Caribbean.

Diplomacy
Election word Venezuela or Venezuela with election sign showing the parliamentary election of Venezuela

Explainer: Venezuela's 2024 Presidential Elections

by Chase Harrison

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Publication credits to AS/COA and Chase Harrison.Nicólas Maduro keeps stacking the deck to win come July 28, but polls favor opposition candidate Edmundo González. The big question for Venezuela’s July 28 elections may not be who voters prefer but whether their preference will be respected. The previous presidential election, which took place in 2018, was marked by irregularities. The reelection of Nicólas Maduro was considered illegitimate by the EU and countries around the world. Now, Maduro is seeking to extend his already decade-long reign with another six-year term. But will this race be free and fair? The fact that Venezuelans will even have the chance to go to the polls was not a given just a few months ago. The framework for this election was established in through the Barbados Accords, signed in October 2023 by the Maduro government and an alliance of opposition parties known as the Unitary Platform. The agreement set out conditions for the election, including that it must take place in the second half of this year, electoral reforms must be made, and international observation must be allowed. It also covered guarantees for the opposition’s participation and primary election process. The United States, which was not party to the accords, agreed to drop some sanctions to get Maduro to stick to his Barbados pledges. A few conditions have been met. The opposition did have its primary in October 2023. And, Maduro set the date for July 28—his deceased predecessor Hugo Chávez’s birthday, marking a date that is early but within the promised range. But other promises have been violated, with one key example being the January disqualification of presidential candidate Maria Corina Machado, who won the opposition primary with 93 percent of the vote. This prompted international outcry and the resumption of some sanctions. Now, the Unitary Platform has a new candidate, former diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia, and polls suggest he has a commanding lead of as much as 50 points over Maduro. What is González proposing? And how might Maduro undercut his rivals? AS/COA Online covers the electoral context and the candidates. Electoral context Venezuela’s election is being overseen by the country’s Electoral Council (CNE). While the body once included members seen as part of the opposition, in June 2023, the government-controlled constituent assembly replaced all 15 members to create an unanimously pro-Maduro council. So far, the CNE has undertaken several moves that watchdogs and foreign observers view as anti-democratic, such as the disqualification of opposition parties and candidates. Under the Barbados Accords, the CNE was tasked with updating the electoral registry. Currently, the roll includes about 21.6 million of Venezuela’s 28.8 million citizens. Of the about 8 million Venezuelans who live outside the country, only about 228,000 are registered abroad. That’s because the rules for absentee voting in Venezuela are onerous, requiring voters to be registered at a foreign address for at least three years and living in that place legally. Those seeking refugee or asylum status are banned from participating. Moreover, registered voters must go to a consulate to cast their ballots. But in many countries, such as the United States, Venezuelan government buildings have been shuttered, leaving no available voting sites. Meanwhile, the October 2023 opposition primary, which was independently organized and had more relaxed registration rules, attracted 2.4 million voters from abroad. Even for those living in the country, registration remains difficult, as it must be performed at official buildings in state capitals. In 2023, it was estimated that there are 3.5 million potential new voters who remain unregistered in the country. The CNE is also in charge of facilitating the participation of international electoral observers. Under the Barbados Accords, the Maduro regime promised that missions from bodies like the EU, the UN, the African Union, and the Carter Center would be able to observe the election. However, the regime revoked the EU’s invitation in May. Other groups, like the Carter Center and the African Union, are still slated to observe with small missions. Aside from the CNE, the Venezuelan military plays a role in overseeing the elections. Historically, the military has been loyal to Maduro, helping him stay in power. However, the military might be key to guaranteeing that the will of the voters is respected. “They will see and they will know if a major fraud is committed,” explained AS/COA Senior Director Guillermo Zubillaga. “The military will be the deciding factor.” Machado has already called for the military to guarantee a democratic transition. Nicólas Maduro, United Social Party of Venezuela Maduro took over the reins of the country after the death of his mentor, Chávez, in 2013 and he has overseen the acceleration of the country’s democratic and economic collapse ever since. From 2014 to 2021, Venezuela’s GDP shrank nearly three-quarters. The country has seen a small amount of growth since then, but it remains bogged down by hyperinflation, a debt load of $154 billion, mass emigration, and a crippled oil sector. His career grew in Chávez’s shadow. After working as a bus driver and trade unionist, he was elected to the National Assembly in 2000. From there, he served as minister of foreign affairs (2006-2012), vice president (2012-2013), and acting president once Chávez passed. He declared himself victorious in a 2013 presidential special election with 1.6 percent more of the vote than his closest rival. The opposition protested against vote-rigging and Maduro’s unfair use of state resources to campaign. As president, Maduro’s ideological commitment to Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution has seen him stack institutions with allies, advance economic policies that maximize state control, and pursue a foreign policy agenda in opposition to the United States. In turn, Venezuela has sunk to the bottom of global indexes focused on freedom and democracy amid shrinking checks and balances; chavistas control the country’s judiciary and electoral courts. The opposition did control the National Assembly after 2015 elections but, in 2017, the country’s top court dissolved the legislature. That same year, Maduro called for the election of a constituent assembly in a contest boycotted by the opposition. The constituent assembly has now usurped the National Assembly to become the de facto legislating body. Maduro has used his control of the courts and the legislature to tilt the playing field in his favor in this year’s elections. He’s jailed more than 270 dissenting voices, stacked the members of the electoral court, and disqualified presidential candidates. Despite these maneuvers, Maduro polls with as little as 8 percent of the vote in the July elections. How might he still win? He’s hoping the strong chavista party structure can aid his campaign. He also might leverage clientelist networks. Already, Maduro has increased public spending by 80 percent from January to May and raised the monthly income for public workers. But waning enthusiasm and state resources might hamper the chavistas’ electoral abilities. “In the past, they’ve been able to mobilize the party members and loyalists, before and on the day of the election. This year, that ability is in question,” said Zubillaga. Maduro maintains a prolific media presence in the country, appearing across television and radio. Opposition figures, meanwhile, are barred from appearing on most radio and TV stations. And, Maduro is tapping into Tik Tok, expanding his use of social media to portray himself as charismatic, to appeal to youth voters. Polling shows that this group continues to be the most supportive of the opposition. Edmundo González, Unitary Platform The 73-year-old former diplomat and academic did not intend to become the presidential hopeful for the Venezuelan opposition. Originally a placeholder, González was affirmed as the official nominee after substitutes for Machado, like academic Corina Yoris, were disqualified. But even if he was not so well known a few months ago, González now leads polls and, alongside Machado, headlines large rallies across the country. Pitching himself as a reconciliation candidate, his platform articulates a transition back to a pluralistic democracy, touching on themes of amnesty for the Maduro regime and rebuilding institutions. Outside of a focus on facilitating a democratic transition, González defers to the political program of Machado, noting that she, not him, was the primary voters’ choice. She has championed stabilizing the country’s macroeconomics by developing its energy reserves, as well as promoting nearshoring, and investment in infrastructure. González also references his long tenure in Venezuela’s foreign service to divorce himself from any particular political ideology. He highlights that he served successive administrations during posts in Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, El Salvador, and the United States. In an interview with El Pais, he described himself “as a democrat, a moderate person, far from extreme positions.” Still, even if González is voters’ top choice, worries persist that he will be disqualified before or, should he win, after the election. Four members of his team have already been detained on charges of instigating hate and conspiracy. Other candidates Eight other candidates will appear on the ballot for president. While there was potential for some of these candidates to split opposition votes, so far none of them poll above 2 percent in the May 2024 Meganalisis poll. Still, they are muddling an already confusing ballot. Candidates appear under each party they represent, meaning there are 38 headshots even though there are ten candidates. Maduro appears in 13* places; Gónzalez just three times. Many of the other candidates—such as evangelical pastor Javier Bertucci, lawyer Antonio Ecarri, and comedian Benjamin Rauseo—are trying to present themselves as a third way, rebuking chavismo but criticizing the Unitary Platform for either its strategy or its policies. *Editor's note: The original version of this article stated that Maduro appears 14 times on the electoral ballot.

Diplomacy
Kenyan President William Ruto

Kenyan president will receive White House praise over troops-to-Haiti move − but lack of action across Americas should prompt regional soul-searching

by Jorge Heine

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Kenyan President William Ruto will attend a rare U.S. state reception for an African leader on May 23, 2024 – but much of the chat will be about a third country: Haiti. Kenyan troops are preparing to deploy to the Caribbean nation as part of a U.N.-backed mission aimed at bringing stability to a country ravaged by gang violence. The White House event is in part a recognition by Washington of Kenya’s decision to step up to a task that the Biden administration – and much of the West – would rather outsource. Indeed, Haiti has seemingly become a crisis that most international bodies and foreign governments would rather not touch. The U.S., like other major governments in the Americas, has repeatedly ruled out putting its own troops on the ground in Haiti. As someone who has written a book, “Fixing Haiti,” on the last concerted outside intervention – the United Nations’ stabilizing mission known as MINUSTAH – I fear the lack of action by countries in the Americas could increase the risk of Haiti transitioning from a fragile state to a failed one. MINUSTAH was the first U.N. mission formed by a majority of Latin American troops, with Chile and Brazil taking the lead. The outsourcing of that role now to Kenya has sparked concerns from human rights groups. It should also lead to soul-searching questions in capitals from Washington to Brasília, as well as at United Nations headquarters in New York. At the mercy of gangs Haiti’s descent into chaos began almost three years ago with the murder of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021. Lawlessness in the nation has seen gangs take control of an estimated 80% of the capital Port-au-Prince and thousands killed in the spiraling violence. Today, the country is not only the poorest in the Americas but is also among the most destitute in the world. About 87.6% of the population is estimated to be living in poverty, with 30% in extreme poverty. Life expectancy is just 63 years, compared with 76 in the United States and 72 in Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole. Recipe for disaster International intervention in Haiti has been long overdue. Yet, until now, the attitude of the international community has, from my perspective, been largely to look away. From a humanitarian perspective and in terms of regional security, to allow a country in the Americas to drift into the condition of a failed state controlled by a fluid network of criminal gangs is a recipe for disaster. Yet governments and international organizations in the region are unwilling to step up to confront the crisis directly despite pleas from Haiti and the U.N. The Organization of American States, which in the past played an important role in Haiti and for which I served as an observer to the country’s 1990 presidential elections, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States have been criticized over their slow response to the Haitian crisis. The Caribbean Community, or CARICOM, has made a significant effort, holding a number of meetings on the Haitian crisis; several member states, such as the Bahamas, Barbados and Jamaica, have committed to sending police forces to Haiti, albeit in small numbers. The United States, in turn, having left Afghanistan in 2021 after a tumultuous 20-year occupation, appears reluctant to send troops anywhere. Rather, Washington would prefer that others take up the role of peacekeeper this time. In response to the offer from Kenya, the State Department said it “commends” the African nation for “responding to Haiti’s call.” Part of this reluctance in the Americas could also be related to the perception – in my view, a misperception – of how past interventions have played out. The United Nations mission from 2004 initially managed to stabilize Haiti after another rocky period. In fact, the country made significant strides before it was hit by a devastating earthquake in 2010. There were bad missteps, for sure, after 2010. A cholera outbreak brought to Haiti by infected troops from Nepal resulted in more than 800,000 infections and 10,000 deaths. Sexual misconduct by some of the U.N.’s blue helmets further tarnished the mission. But the notion that MINUSTAH was a failure is, in my view, quite wrong. And the end of the mission in 2017 certainly didn’t see improved conditions in Haiti. Indeed, after the mission ended, criminal gangs had the run of the country once again and proceeded accordingly. Yet the perceived failure of the U.N. mission has become the basis of a view held by some Haiti watchers that international interventions are not only unsuccessful or misconceived but also counterproductive. Such a view forms the backbone of the notion of Haiti as an “aid state” – as opposed to a “failed state.” In this view, international interventions and the inflow of foreign funds have created a condition of dependency in which the country gets used to having foreigners make key decisions. This, the argument goes, fosters a cycle of corruption and mismanagement. There is no doubt that some previous interventions left much to be desired, and that any new initiative would have to be conducted in close cooperation with Haitian civil society to avoid such pitfalls. But I believe the notion that Haiti, in its current state, would be able to lift itself up without the help of the international community is wishful thinking. The nation has moved too far down the direction of gang control, and what remains of the Haitian state lacks the capacity to change that trajectory. A duty to intervene? Moreover, there is an argument to be made that the international community bears responsibility for the Haitian tragedy and is duty bound to try to fix it. To use one example from the relatively recent past: Haiti, until the early 1980s, was self-sufficient in the production of rice – a key staple there. Yet, pressured by the United States in the 1990s, the country lowered its agricultural tariffs to the bare minimum and, in so doing, destroyed local rice production. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton later apologized for the policy, but its legacy still lasts. Haiti today has to import most of the rice it consumes, largely from the United States. And there isn’t enough of it to go around for all Haitians – the U.N. estimates that nearly half of Haiti’s population of 11.5 million is food insecure. Indeed, from its very beginning as an independent nation in 1804, Haiti has suffered the consequences of its unique place in history: It was simply too much for white colonial powers to see Haiti thrive as the first Black republic resulting from a successful slave rebellion. France retaliated over the loss of what was once considered the world’s wealthiest colony by exacting reparations for a century and a half. Payments from Haiti flowed until 1947 – to the tune of US$21 billion in today’s dollars. The United States took 60 years to recognize Haiti and invaded and occupied the nation from 1915 to 1934. Any thoughts of atoning for past actions, however, seem far from the minds of those looking on as the chaos in Haiti spirals. Rather, many appear to have the kind of mindset expressed in 1994 by current U.S. President Joe Biden when, as a senator discussing the rationale for various interventions, he noted: “If Haiti just quietly sunk into the Caribbean, or rose 300 feet, it wouldn’t matter a whole lot for our interests.”