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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Brexit has had numerous consequences, many of which were scarcely discussed in the lead-up to the 2016 referendum. The British Overseas Territories (BOTs) were not exempt from the repercussions following the decision to leave the European Union (EU). All BOTs maintained a formal relationship with the EU through the 2013 Overseas Association Decision, which provided a range of benefits—including economic and environmental cooperation, development assistance, policy dialogue, and the free movement of goods, services, and people. For Gibraltar, the end of free movement raised concerns about the future of its open border with Spain. Interim measures were introduced to maintain a ‘fluid’ border when the UK formally exited the EU in 2020. However, without a comprehensive agreement, there remained a real risk that the border would become much harder—especially with the EU’s upcoming implementation of the new Entry/Exit System (EES). Indeed, there were signs that managing the border was becoming increasingly difficult. For instance, Spanish authorities began to intensify checks on people crossing the border, resulting in long delays and queues. Approximately 15,000 people commute daily from Spain to Gibraltar for work, comprising over half of Gibraltar’s workforce. Additionally, waste disposal in Gibraltar was becoming more problematic, as much of it is transported across the border. Many older Gibraltarians recall the border closure between 1969 and 1982, a decision made by General Franco. Although Gibraltarians demonstrated flexibility and resilience in adapting to the closure, it caused significant short- to medium-term economic hardship and separated families and friends. Spanish workers also suffered during this period. The desire to protect the economies of both Gibraltar and Spain was therefore a key factor in the push to secure a post-Brexit agreement. Negotiations that began under the UK Conservative Government were protracted, with key obstacles including the precise role of Spanish officials conducting Schengen checks in Gibraltar and the status of Gibraltar Airport, which also serves as an RAF base. However, on 11 June 2025, an agreement was reached on the core aspects of a future treaty. The overarching goal is to enhance prosperity across the Gibraltar–Spain region by removing physical barriers and checks on people and goods, while safeguarding the Schengen Area, the EU Single Market, and the Customs Union. The hope is that the deal will provide legal certainty, stimulate economic growth, and strengthen cooperation between Gibraltar and Spain. More specifically, the agreement includes the following commitments: First, joint border checks at Gibraltar’s port and airport will replace controls at the Gibraltar–La Línea crossing, easing daily travel. Spain will conduct Schengen checks, while Gibraltar will maintain UK checks. One outcome of this will be that UK nationals visiting Gibraltar will be counted as part of the time-limited allowance (90 days) for short stays in the Schengen area. Second, a customs union between Gibraltar and the EU will eliminate goods checks and ensure tax alignment—particularly on tobacco—to prevent market distortions and support regional development. Third, guarantees on fair competition in areas such as labour, the environment, anti-money laundering, transport, and social security. The agreement also establishes a financial mechanism to support training, employment, and regional cohesion. On announcing the agreement, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy said: “Alongside the Government of Gibraltar, we have a reached an agreement which protects British sovereignty, supports Gibraltar’s economy and allows businesses to plan for the long-term once again”. He also took a swipe at the previous Conservative government: “This government inherited a situation from the last government which put Gibraltar’s economy and way of life under threat. Today’s breakthrough delivers a practical solution after years of uncertainty”. Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, Fabio Picardo, who played a central role in the negotiations, also welcomed the deal. While José Manuel Albares, the Spanish foreign affairs minister, said it would bring down “the last wall” on the continent. To her credit, Conservative Shadow Home Secretary, Priti Patel, did not dismiss the deal, but reserved judgement until full details were available. However, others on the right went to their usual default position. Former Tory Home Secretary Suella Braverman said: “We are absolutely furious about this deal. It’s another unbelievable and unimaginable betrayal”. Reform UK described the agreement as a “total surrender”, while Conservative Armed Forces spokesperson Mark Francois declared: “First Chagos, now Gibraltar—and next, probably the Falklands. Labour used to sing The Red Flag—now they just wave a big white one instead”. Previously, I have argued that this narrative—linking decisions about one BOT to others—is misleading and overlooks the important differences between them. Many Brexiteers’ opposition to this deal is a classic case of wanting to ‘have their cake and eat it.’ They voted for Brexit (which Gibraltar strongly opposed), demanded a hard Brexit, yet seem either unable or unwilling to acknowledge and address the problems it has caused. Without a pragmatic border deal, Gibraltar’s political and economic position—which the right claims to staunchly defend—would almost certainly have been hurt longer term. Right-wing voices in Spain are also opposed to the agreement, but they feel it concedes too much to the UK and Gibraltar. Interestingly, this is not the first instance in which a complex border issue has been successfully addressed between the UK and an EU member state. The Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, located on the southern coast of Cyprus, form a single BOT. These areas were retained by the UK following Cyprus’ independence and are home to a non-permanent British population as well as a permanent Cypriot community. Prior to Brexit, the border between the SBAs and the Republic of Cyprus was entirely open. Given the unique characteristics of the territory, it was essential to maintain this openness. To preserve the status quo, a specific Protocol was included in the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated under Prime Minister Boris Johnson. This Protocol ensures the continued application of EU law in key areas such as taxation, goods, agriculture, and fisheries within the SBAs, with enforcement carried out by the Republic of Cyprus. Although Gibraltar has been described as “the last piece of the EU exit jigsaw,” several Brexit-related issues concerning the BOTs remain unresolved and, hopefully, will soon be addressed. Perhaps the most pressing of these involves the Falkland Islands and its fisheries exports to the EU. At the time of Brexit, none of the BOTs were included in the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement. While only a few BOTs engage in trade with the EU, the Falklands is a notable exception—particularly in its trade with Spain. Over the years, the Falklands has developed strong ties with Spanish fishing fleets and importers. As a result, more than 90% of the fish caught in its waters—primarily Loligo squid and various finfish—are exported to Spain. This industry is vital to the Falklands’ economy, contributing around 40% of the government’s annual revenue. It is also significant for Spain, which sources over 30% of its imported calamari from the Falklands. Before Brexit, Falklands fisheries exports entered the EU tariff-free. Now, they are subject to the EU’s common external tariff, which ranges from 6 to 18%, amounting to approximately €15 million annually—a substantial burden for a small economy. There is hope that, as part of a broader reset in UK-EU relations, the trade status of the BOTs can be improved. In a recent parliamentary response, David Lammy stated, “we are always seeking to reduce tariff burdens for our overseas territories, and we are in ongoing discussions with the European Union in particular”. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On 30 May 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore – Asia’s premier security summit – and his comments were unusually blunt. He warned that the West – Europe and the US – risk losing credibility over the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and unless these conflicts are resolved with integrity and consistency, the broader rules-based international order and Europe’s place in it will unravel. Macron’s concern wasn’t just about the tactical consequences of geopolitical instability, but something deeper: the symbolic and normative weight Europe claims to carry in global affairs. His comments mark a turning point, one that exposes the crisis of coherence at the heart of the European Union’s foreign policy – and the growing tension between the EU’s aspirational identity as a “normative power” and the harsh realities of a world governed by realpolitik. For over two decades, the EU has presented itself as a values-based actor, using diplomacy, development aid, legal harmonisation and multilateralism rather than coercion to wield influence. The concept of the EU as a “normative power” – famously coined by Ian Manners – is based on the idea that Europe seeks to shape global affairs by promoting norms such as human rights, democracy and international law. But the simultaneous occurrence of two deeply symbolic and contested wars – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s bombardment of Gaza – makes it increasingly hard for the EU to maintain this self-image without being accused of hypocrisy and selective morality. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the gap between Europe’s response to Ukraine and Gaza. In Ukraine, the EU has mounted one of the largest and most united responses in its history: military aid, sanctions, diplomatic isolation of Russia and open arms for Ukrainian refugees. In Gaza, the response has been fragmented, inconsistent and – by many accounts – morally ambiguous. Some European states like Ireland and Spain have called for recognition of Palestinian statehood and condemned Israeli actions, others have hesitated or doubled down on support for Israel in the name of counterterrorism and alliance politics. This has not gone unnoticed in the Global South, where Europe’s normative claims are increasingly seen as hollow, if not ridiculous. Macron’s talk of credibility reflects an elite awareness that Europe’s legitimacy is no longer taken for granted outside its borders. The credibility crisis he describes is not just about diplomacy – it’s about identity. If the EU says territorial integrity is sacred in Ukraine, how can it do nothing when the same principles are being flouted elsewhere? If the Union says human rights are universal, can it be silent – or ambiguous – on the civilian casualties in Gaza? These are not questions asked by foreign policy analysts; they are asked in international forums, in Asian capitals courted by Brussels and in the protests that fill European streets. The more the EU fails to match its words with its actions, the more its normative brand erodes. But there’s another layer to Macron’s intervention that needs to be looked at. His comments on “strategic autonomy” and not being caught in the crossfire of the US-China rivalry suggest Europe is dealing with more than just a credibility crisis. It’s facing a strategic choice that will redefine its global role: whether to double down on the postwar transatlantic compact or to chart a more independent course that allows it to mediate between blocs in a multipolar world. Macron’s consistent advocacy of strategic autonomy (however controversial) means he recognises the EU can’t outsource its geopolitical relevance to Washington indefinitely, especially with the return of Donald Trump to the White House. This dilemma is made worse by the structural weaknesses within the EU itself. The Union’s foreign policy is crippled by institutional fragmentation, national interests and a consensus-based decision-making process that often leads to lowest-common-denominator positions. While the EU was impressive in its initial unity on Ukraine, the Gaza crisis has shown the limits of that unity when values collide with political alliances or domestic political considerations. This is not just a crisis of perception but of capacity. Can the EU actually be a geopolitical player when its member states can’t even agree on what is legitimate force, occupation or humanitarian necessity? The illusion of normative power, then, is not just an external branding problem – it is an internal governance challenge. For Europe to maintain credibility abroad, it must first reconcile its internal contradictions. That means rethinking the balance between values and interests, between ideals and strategic imperatives. It may also require a degree of institutional boldness: deeper integration in foreign and security policy, a greater role for the High Representative, or a shift toward qualified majority voting in foreign affairs. At the same time, Europe must also acknowledge the changing global landscape in which it seeks to operate. In a world no longer dominated by Western hegemony, the EU’s normative influence depends not only on its coherence but on its ability to listen and engage with actors in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as equals rather than as recipients of European lectures. Macron’s call for a “positive new alliance” between Europe and Asia, one that resists domination by any superpower, hints at a potential path forward. But such an alliance will only be credible if Europe demonstrates that it is willing to apply its principles even when inconvenient—especially when those principles are tested not just by adversaries but by allies. In the end, Macron’s speech serves as a mirror held up to the European project itself. It reflects both its aspirations and its anxieties, its potential and its paradoxes. Whether Europe can move beyond this moment of crisis to forge a foreign policy that is both principled and strategic remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that credibility cannot be commanded—it must be earned. And in an era of increasing global scrutiny, that will require more than rhetoric. It will require resolve. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Arctic order historically, currently, and in the future reflects the world order. The idea of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ is not valid and is a poor guide for policy. During Cold War bipolarity, the Arctic was divided between the Soviet Arctic and the Nordic and North American Arctic. US victory and Soviet defeat in the Cold War led to US unipolarity and hegemony which was the basis for a circumpolar (including Russia) liberal (as opposed to realist) Arctic order with organizations, such as the Arctic Council, International Arctic Science Committee, University of the Arctic, Barents and Bering regional cooperation, all on liberal topics such as science, environment, Indigenous rights, people-to-people cooperation.Footnote1 US unipolarity and hegemony are slipping away to world order characteristics of continued US unipolarity and hegemony, Sino-American bipolarity in economics and S&T and multipolarity illustrated by BRICS+. Sino-US competition and US-Russia conflict to the extent of proxy-war in Ukraine reflect these changes. The Arctic, which is de facto divided between the US-led NATO-Arctic and the Russian Arctic, where Russia reaches out to the BRICS+ in diplomacy, economics, and S&T, reflects these changes to world order. There is wishful thinking in the West of returning to post-Cold War US unipolar and hegemonic ‘liberal world order’ or ‘rules-based order’ and the circumpolar liberal Arctic order with it. This wish is probably unrealistic for global trends in demography, economics, S&T, legitimacy, etc. Significant conflict can be expected between the US/West and China and Russia on developments in world order, with the Global South standing by. The Arctic is likely to remain divided between the US-led NATO Arctic and the Russian Arctic seeking engagement with the BRICS+ world for the future with extremely limited cooperation and risk of spill-over from the Ukraine War and other US-Russia-China conflicts. The Arctic in international order There are two common, but invalid, narratives about the Arctic, which are poor guides for policy: First, ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, that the Arctic was apart from international politics and allowed for West-Russia cooperation unlike elsewhere, especially between the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Second, a presentist discourse, where international interests in the Arctic are seen as rising in the last 15 years, driven by climate change, the Russian flag planting on the seafloor of the North Pole in 2007, and the United States Geological Survey’s assessment of oil and gas resources in 2008, north of the Arctic Circle. Rather, the Arctic has for centuries closely mirrored the international system, whether multipolar with Western colonial empires before the World Wars, bipolar Cold War between the US and the USSR, post-Cold War US unipolarity and hegemony, or the current emerging Sino-American bipolarity and multipolarity. During 2014–2022, cooperation in the Arctic was not exceptional compared to US-Russia non-proliferation cooperation, most notably with the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, or removing chemical weapons from Syria. There was extensive US-Europe-Russia and wider collaboration around the International Space Station. There was extensive energy trade and investment between Russia and Europe, most notably with the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines under the Baltic Sea. The bipolar Cold War Arctic in the bipolar Cold War order Bipolarity with two superpowers standing out from all other great powers due to their demographic, economic, science and technology, military, and ideological weight and global claims, the US and the USSR, shaped the the Cold War order. Bipolar logic shaped the international order. John Mearsheimer explains well the structural logic of a nuclear-armed bipolar superpower security competition, and he points out how each superpower formed ‘bounded orders’ of allies and clients to discipline them and mobilize their resources. These bounded orders were the West for the US with its institutions, and the East Bloc for the USSR.Footnote2 This bipolar logic was also clear in the Arctic, divided between the Nordic and North American Arctic of the West and the Soviet Arctic by the Iron Curtain in Europe and the Ice Curtain in the Bering Strait. Circumpolar Arctic cooperation was limited to the Polar Bear Treaty of 1973 between the USSR, Norway, Kingdom of Denmark, Canada, and the US, Norwegian Soviet joint fisheries management in the Barents Sea, and some Bering Strait cooperation. The Arctic was exceptionally militarized during the Cold War driven by the mutual nuclear deterrence between the US and the USSR, where the Arctic played a central role for geostrategic and technological reasons. The Arctic was the shortest flight path for bombers and missiles, and sea ice offered cover for nuclear ballistic submarines. This exceptional militarization of the Arctic harmed the human security of Arctic local and indigenous communities through forced displacement, security service surveillance, and pollution, including notable nuclear accidents, as the 1968 B52 bomber crash off Northwest Greenland with four H-bombs causing extensive radioactive contamination of much Soviet nuclear material in and around the Kola Peninsula, including sunken submarines with nuclear fuel or weapons on board.Footnote3 Circumpolar liberal Arctic order under US unipolarity The Cold War ended with US victory and Soviet defeat and dissolution, also caused by the US pressuring the USSR into a strategic nuclear arms race, that the Soviet economy could not support. US Navy operations near the Soviet Northern Fleet nuclear bastion around the Kola Peninsula were an important part of this pressure.Footnote4 The Arctic was also part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to save the USSR by reform and lowering external tension. Gorbachev called the Arctic as a zone of peace, environmental protection and scientific collaboration in his 1987 Murmansk speech, in contrast to being at the heart of a strategic nuclear arms race with the US, which the USSR could not sustain. Gorbachev’s reforms failed to avert the dissolution of the USSR and deep socio-economic, public health, and law and order crisis in Russian society during the 1990s. The Russian State withdrew to a significant extent from its Arctic, leaving military facilities and society behind. Sino-American bipolarity comes to the Arctic The relative distribution of comprehensive material and immaterial power of the strongest States shapes international order. States stay the predominant actors since the emergence of a state system, not denying powerful non-State actors historically and today. The US unipolarity after the Cold War was an exceptional time of international history and not the ‘End of History’ as believed by some quarters in the West (Fukuyama). History is returning to normal with the return of major centres of economic output and science and technology outside the West. Ironically, US unipolarity laid the foundation for the ‘Return of history’, rather than the ‘End of History’. Since the 1990s, the world experienced globalization with economic, science and technology, and cultural integration. The US as the sole superpower provided public goods and facilitated and coordinated many of these economic, scientific, and technological, and cultural flows. Globalization undermined US unipolarity, facilitating the faster relative growth of non-Western States. China’s export-oriented growth, returning it to its historical position as one of the world’s largest economies is the most important dimension for changes to world order. In parallel, other emerging markets have grown adding multipolar dimensions to international order. International Relations theory serves to think about how to respond to the return of China. About 20–25 years ago, Professor Joseph S. Nye (Harvard University) and Professor John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) articulated two major approaches with coherent theoretical and strategic visions for the Sino-American relationship. Nye, as a liberal institutionalist scholar and policymaker in the Bill Clinton Administration, presented a vision of ‘integrate, but hedge’. China integrated in the US-led world economy as member state of the World Trade Organization, while the US hedged against the rise of China by reinforcing its alliance with Japan.Footnote5 There were strong US and Western liberal expectations of Chinese economic growth and openness leading to political openness and reform. These expectations proved to be belied and ethnocentric. Mearsheimer, in line with his offensive realist theory, clearly outlined how the US had to keep China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia through a containment strategy.Footnote6 The US’ China strategy has shifted from the Nye perspective to the Mearsheimer perspective, while Mearsheimer himself is ostracized for his valid, but politically unacceptable, analysis of the Ukraine War. Mearsheimer explains how Sino-American bipolarity works with realist great power State security competition, and how competing great powers form their ‘bounded orders’ of allies and clients to discipline and mobilize these.Footnote7 The US is shaping a NATO+ order of the NATO member states and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. The US is increasingly engaging in trade and technology wars with China to slow down its growth rate, clearly denying its access to fundamental technologies of future knowledge-based economies. A realist focus on relative gains explains US policy to reduce China’s growth rate. China has a population more than three times that of the US with an absolute economy approaching the US economy. The US cannot allow China to catch up relatively with it, as that would imply a much larger Chinese economy than that of the US. Liberals (politically and theoretically) would ascribe the US policy to different domestic political systems, but the logic of anarchy points out how domestic political systems are of secondary concern, and empirically the US firmly bypassed and disciplined the previous Anglo-Saxon superpower, Britain. US-India relations can be expected to deteriorate with India’s socio-economic development, where India has a much younger population than China with great economic growth potential. China predicted the US abandoning its own open and globalized international economic policy out of concern for China’s relative rise to the US. China pursued a domestic and international economic policy much less dependent on US benevolence. In the domestic sphere, China pursued an economy based on domestic demand. Externally, China built up a parallel international economic and science and technology system with the Belt and Road Initiative with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Other bodies, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in security reflect parallel orders and institutions to the US-led Western institutions. Sino-American bipolarity also became clear in the Arctic about 10–15 years ago. China started to appear as a diplomatic, economic, science and technology actor in the Arctic. Western surprise and consternation to this development reflects the great difficulties many Westerners have in facing a world, where the Rest takes an interest in the West, and not only the West taking an interest in the Rest as during centuries of imperialism and colonialism. It should not be surprising that China as one of the world’s two largest national economies and science and technology systems (with the US) has interests in the Arctic, or anywhere else in the world. The US is globally present in politics, defence, diplomacy, economics, science and technology, culture, etc. The unfortunate Chinese term of ‘near-Arctic State’ to legitimize Chinese involvement in the Arctic drew much Western ridicule and opposition. In comparison, the US and the West seem to be ‘near-everywhere’ States. One place where the Sino-American bipolar logic appeared soon and clearly has been the Kingdom of Denmark with the North Atlantic and Arctic overseas autonomies of the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The US applies pressure on the Kingdom of Denmark to exclude Chinese investment, science and technology, in line with Mearsheimer’s argument of a superpower building bounded orders to mobilize and discipline allies and clients in security competition with a competing great or superpower. The Faroe Islands are located between Iceland, Norway, and Scotland. They are centrally placed in the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap controlling North-South access and blocking the Soviet-Russian Northern Fleet going south for NATO or the US and NATO navies going north for USSR/Russia. The Faroe Islands are becoming increasingly independent from Denmark. Huawei has long been a partner for the Faroese telecom company, which planned to continue with Huawei for 5G. This partnership came under increasing scrutiny from Danish and US sides. The Chinese ambassador to Copenhagen during a visit to the Faroe Islands linked the Faroe Islands choosing Huawei with prospects for a Sino-Faroese free trade agreement (the Faroe Islands are outside the EU and pursue an independent trade policy).Footnote8 The US ambassador to Copenhagen publicly spoke strongly against the Faroe Islands collaborating with Huawei for 5 G.Footnote9 Greenland is geographically North American (remember the Monroe Doctrine), crucial to US (North American) homeland defence, and pursuing independence from the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland and China have for some time eyed each other for investment and science and technology opportunities. Greenlandic independence primarily rests on economic independence from Denmark and human capital. The economic independence should be through, among other domains, mining, where China and Chinese companies were considered as very important likely investors. Copenhagen regarded Sino-Greenlandic mutual interest with great suspicion for a long time, which was evident from the report on Greenlandic mining from 2014.Footnote10 In 2014, the Royal Danish Navy abandoned Grønnedal, a small, remote old naval facility, established by the US during the Second World War, which was put up for sale. A Chinese mining company showed interest in the facility as a logistics hub for future operations in Greenland. The Danish government promptly took the facility off the market maintaining a token naval presence.Footnote11 Developing Greenlandic tourism requires upgrading the airport infrastructure, which is an enormous project for a nation of 57,000 on a 2 M km2 island. One of the finalists to an international tender was the China Construction Communication Company (4C), which might also have provided financing.Footnote12 The Danish government convinced the Greenlandic government to accept a Danish financing (with a Danish stake) of the renovated and new airports against choosing a Danish construction company.Footnote13 The Greenlandic government was reshaped over this intervention with a coalition party leaving in protest over accepting such Danish interference in Greenlandic affairs. In 2017, China publicly presented its interest in a research station in Greenland, including a satellite ground station, which the Government of Greenland might have been positive towards.Footnote14 This idea has never materialized, first probably delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, but Denmark and the US would never accept a Chinese research station and/or satellite station in Greenland. The US government has made its pressure on the Danish government public, through former Secretary of Defense, General Jim Mattis.Footnote15 China and Iceland spearheaded Sino-Nordic Arctic research cooperation from the official visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao to Iceland in 2012. In 2013, the China Nordic Arctic Research Center was founded, a virtual centre of Chinese and Nordic institutions hosted by the Polar Research Institute of China in Shanghai. CNARC has hosted an annual symposium between China and a Nordic country as well as researcher exchange. Today, Sweden has withdrawn from CNARC, and Denmark does not participate, as the participating Nordic Institute of Asian Studies at the University of Copenhagen has been closed. PRIC and RANNÍS (The Icelandic Center for Research, equivalent to Research Council) held the groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of the China-Iceland Aurora Observatory, now China Iceland Arctic Observatory, at Kárhóll, Northeast Iceland, in June 2014, which I attended. The Observatory opened formally—although unfinished—in October 2018. This collaboration had been hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic and negligence from central authorities and research institutions in the capital, Reykjavik. Today, Iceland is under pressure from the US, including a recent visit by US Congressional staffers, to close CIAO.Footnote16 US-Russia Eastern European security competition divides the Arctic US-Russia security competition, especially in Eastern Europe, became increasingly clear from around 2007–2008. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he unsurprisingly denounced US unipolarity. Russia had rejected US unipolarity and called for multipolarity since the Primakov Doctrine of the 1990s calling for Russia, China, and India to balance the US. In spring 2008, at the initiative of the US—and with French and German reservations—the NATO Bucharest summit invited Georgia and Ukraine to become member states. In the autumn, fighting broke out between Georgia and Russian forces in the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia leading to Georgia’s defeat. In autumn 2013, the EU proposed an agreement to Ukraine, which forced Ukraine to choose between Russia and the EU. The Ukrainian President rejected the EU’s proposal, leading to popular protests met with government violence and eventually the President fleeing the country. Russia intervened annexing Crimea and supporting an insurgency in the Donbas.Footnote17 In December 2021, Russia proposed a treaty to the US blocking former Soviet Republics from joining NATO and rolling back NATO troops and equipment in Central and Eastern Europe, which was rejected by the US and allies in January 2022. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which had led to a war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine. The West extends wide-ranging political, military, economic, and further support to Ukraine and tries to isolate Russia as much as possible. The Rest of the world follows Western policy of isolating Russia to a very limited extent. The Russian annexation of Crimea affected the Arctic in limited ways. The West stopped military dialogues with Russia in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum. The West imposed sanctions on Russian Arctic energy projects, as the US $27 billion Yamal LNG project, which initially had Russian Novatek (60 per cent), French Total (20 per cent), and China National Petroleum Cooperation (20 per cent) ownership. Sanctions forced Novatek to sell 9.9 per cent to the Chinese government’s Silk Road Fund and rely on Chinese bank funding. Russia responded to these sanctions with counter sanctions on Western food exports to Russia, which also affected some Arctic seafood export to Russia. Russia accepted Faroese salmon exports, which led to a boom in Faroese economy. In 2014, there was some protests in the Arctic Council from the Chair, Canada. Otherwise, Arctic Council and other scientific, people-to-people, cooperation continued between Russia and the seven other Arctic States. For Northern Norway, extensive regional cooperation in the Barents region continued. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine led to an almost complete Western cessation of Arctic collaboration with Russia. The other seven Arctic countries refused to collaborate with Russia in the Arctic Council, chaired by Russia 2021–2023. The Seven—now all NATO member states—Arctic Council member states have since backed down significantly. The Arctic Council was always more important to them than to Russia, suggesting that this Western brinkmanship was poorly thought through. There are extensive Western sanctions against the Russian economy, including against Russian Arctic energy projects, which were a key basis for developing the Russian Arctic. Russia had sought to develop a Europe-Russia-East Asia energy system with Russian Arctic oil and gas being exported both West to Europe and East to East Asia and with balanced Western and East Asian investments.Footnote18 The West has almost completely cut science and technology relations with Russia, also in the Arctic. The rare exceptions to continued Arctic science collaboration between West and Russia are for instance, the Norway-Russia Barents Sea Fisheries Commission because Norway also depends on this collaboration. The US continues more academic collaboration with Russia than European countries allow themselves; for instance, receiving Russian Fulbright professors. Norway pursued an extensive regional cooperation policy with Russia, Finland, and Sweden in the Barents Region since 1993 with much support for cross-border people-to-people exchange for youth, in education, academia, culture, environment, business development, and further. This collaboration built extensive insight, experience, networks, and access in Russia at North Norwegian institutions, as UiT The Arctic University of Norway, UNN The University Hospital of Northern Norway, the Norwegian Polar Institute, the Arctic Frontiers Conference, businesses such as Akvaplan-Niva marine environmental consultancy, and in academia, civil society, education, and government. The border town of Kirkenes depended for about a third of its economic turnover on trade with Russia. These connections are now almost completely cut by Norwegian government policy. Russian society and politics did become much more closed and authoritarian during this period, but that was for internal political reasons and not directed against Norway. Personally, I had successful high-level academic cooperation with some of the key Russian academic institutions funded by Norwegian public funds until they were forbidden by Norwegian government policy after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. My last personal visit to Moscow was in December 2019, and I was planning to visit with a sizeable group of Norwegian faculty and PhD candidates in April 2020, postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The rapid division of world order in a NATO+ and a BRICS++ world The world is separating into a NATO+ grouping of NATO countries and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, under clear US leadership, and the Rest. The Rest, I call BRICS++ for the BRICS+ grouping and many other countries. This separation is clear through demography, economy, and science and technology. Humanity is about 8 billion people, compared to the West, which is about 1 billion, making it a small minority. Humanity is expected to grow to 10 billion, where the West will remain at about 1 billion, a shrinking small minority. The dominance of the West has rested on economic development and science and technology, translated into military force, with a shrinking demographic share of the world economy, scientific and technological development and relative power shifts from the West to the Rest. Legitimacy and credibility divisions are also clearly visible between the NATO+ and the BRICS++ worlds concerning the war in Ukraine, where the West is astonished by its own isolation. To great surprise, the Rest of the world have not followed the West’s attempts to isolate Russia diplomatically and economically. This rejection of the West’s position was clear from the very first UN Security Council debate on the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Russian veto and Chinese and Indian abstentions were not surprising, but the abstention by the United Arab Emirates was remarkable considering the close security and other partnerships between the GCC countries and the US and historically the UK. The speech during the debate on 21 February 2022, a few days prior, by the Kenyan ambassador to the Security Council, condemning Russia’s recognition of breakaway regions but reminding that other UNSC permanent members had also violated international law, showed the lack of Western credibility and legitimacy on the issue.Footnote19 Western credibility and legitimacy have eroded further by supporting Israel’s genocide in Gaza since the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. The Division of the Arctic in a NATO Arctic and Russian BRICS++ Arctic. The effects of world order on the Arctic are clear, applying the analytical lenses of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar traits of world order to the Arctic. The world is increasingly becoming Sino-American bipolar, where the US seeks to maintain unipolarity through a global containment strategy of China. This struggle is also evident in the Arctic; for instance, US pressure on the Kingdom of Denmark to exclude Chinese investment, science and technology in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The US keeps up an ever-stronger anti-Chinese Arctic discourse from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s 2019 speech in Rovaniemi, Finland, to US Senator Lisa Murkowski at the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik in 2024. Russia has opposed US unipolarity since the 1990s, seeking multipolarity. The conflict between US and Russian multipolarity ultimately escalated via the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the proxy war in Ukraine. This conflict has led to an almost complete division of the Arctic into NATO-Arctic (collaborating with the wider NATO+ world and further) and the Russian Arctic. Russia reaches out all it can diplomatically, economically, and in science and technology to the BRICS++ world, especially China and India. The Rest of the World seems restrained from pursuing Russian Arctic opportunities by the risk of US and Western secondary sanctions and other NATO Arctic pushbacks. Conclusion: looking forward for world and Arctic order The world is—as usual for international history—marked by the struggle over the world order among the strongest State actors. This struggle was forgotten especially by European observers during the post-Cold War era, with the illusion of End of History and confounding globalization and modernization with Westernization. Instead, we have had the Return of History and the return of historically very large non-Western economic, science and technology actors as China, followed by others. The current struggle over the world order also shapes the Arctic, as was historically clear, especially during the Second World War and the Cold War. The US is determined to prolong post-Cold War unipolar dominance expressed as ‘rules-based order’, where the US defines the rules, to whom, and when they apply. Europe has found an apparently comfortable and completely dependent position in this US-led order. The Rest of the World less so, with China and Russia explicitly rejecting this US-led order. The conflict over world order between the US and its bounded order in the NATO+ world in Europe, Oceania, and East Asia and the Rest of the World, can only be expected to escalate. The US must either stop Chinese economic, science and technology development (and later other peer competitors), or demographics, economy, science and technology will lead to a more bipolar and multipolar world. Europe by its dependence on the US is forced to follow this US strategy. The war in Ukraine can lead to a frozen conflict, where the overall Russia-West relationship remains highly conflictual, including in the Arctic. Ukrainian defeat or a negotiated settlement with a neutralized Ukraine and cessation of territory to Russia will also probably lead to a decadal severance of economic, science and technology, people-to-people ties between Russia and the West, including in the Arctic. A Russian defeat is unlikely because of difference in Russian and Ukrainian manpower and resources. China is unlikely to allow Russia to succumb to the US, which would put defeated Russia on China’s Northern frontier in China’s own conflict with the US. All in all, world order seems highly conflictual and with increased separation between the NATO+ and the BRICS++ world, which will only bring humanity more conflict and less economic development and growth, unlike the age of post-Cold War globalization. This division will be replicated in the Arctic. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsRasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen is Professor at UiT The Arctic University of Norway. Views expressed are personal. Notes 1. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, ‘Unipolarity and Order in the Arctic’. Nina Græger, Bertel Heurlin, Ole Wæver, Anders Wivel, (Eds.), Polarity in International Relations. Governance, Security and Development, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05505-8_16. 2. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 43 (4), 2019, pp. 7–50 at https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342 3. George Lindsey, ‘Strategic Stability in the Arctic’, Adelphi Papers 241, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989. 4. Steven E. Miller, ‘The Return of the Strategic Arctic’, in The Arctic Yearbook, 2023 at https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/6C_AY2022_Miller.pdf. 5. Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Challenge of China’, in Stephen Van Evera (Ed.) How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security, The Tobin Project, Cambridge, MA 2006 at https://tobinproject.org/sites/default/files/assets/Make_America_Safe_The_Challenge_Of_China.pdf. 6. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All’, The Australian, 18 November 2005 at https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The-Australian-November-18-2005.pdf. 7. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 43 (4), pp. 7–50, 2019 athttps://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342. 8. Thomas Foght, ‘Hemmelig lydoptagelse: Kina pressede Færøerne til at vælge Huawei’ [Secret Sound Recording: China Pressured the Faroe Islands to Choose Huawei]. Danmarks Radio, 2019 at https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/hemmelig-lydoptagelse-kina-pressede-faeroeerne-til-vaelge-huawei. 9. Adam Satariano, ‘At the Edge of the World, a New Battleground for the US and China’, New York Times, 2019 at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/technology/faroe-islands-huawei-china-us.html. 10. The Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society, ‘To the Benefit of Greenland’. Ilisimatusarfik-University of Greenland; University of Copenhagen, 2014 at https://vbn.aau.dk/ws/files/208241864/To_the_benefit_of_Greenland.pdf. 11. Martin Breum, ‘Analyse: Stoppede Danmarks statsminister kinesisk opkøb i Grønland?’ [Analysis: Did the Danish Prime Minister Stop Chinese Acquisition in Greenland?]. High North News, 2018 at https://www.highnorthnews.com/nb/analyse-stoppede-danmarks-statsminister-kinesisk-opkob-i-gronland. 12. Teis Jensen, ‘Greenland shortlists Chinese company for airport construction despite Denmark’s concerns’, Reuters, 2018 at https://www.reuters.com/article/world/greenland-shortlists-chinese-company-for-airport-construction-despite-denmarks-idUSKBN1H32XG/. 13. Statsministeriet, ‘Aftale mellem regeringen og Naalakkersuisut om dansk engagement i lufthavnsprojektet i Grønland og styrket erhvervssamarbejde mellem Danmark og Grønland’ [Agreement Between the [Danish] Government and Naalakkersuisut [Government of Greenland] on Danish Involvement in the Airport Project in Greenland and Enhanced Business Collaboration Between Denmark and Greenland] Statsministeriet. Formandens Departement, 2018 at https://www.stm.dk/media/8148/10-09-2018_aftale_mellem_regeringen_og_naalakkersuisut.pdf. 14. Martin Breum, ‘Kina vil bygge kontroversiel forskningsstation i Grønland’. [China Wants to Build Controversial Research Station in Greenland], 2017 at https://www.information.dk/udland/2017/10/kina-bygge-kontroversiel-forskningsstation-groenland. 15. Damian Paletta and Itkowitz Colby, ‘Trump Aides Look into US Purchasing Greenland after Directives from President’. The Washington Post, 2019 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/16/america-first-greenland-second-is-trumps-latest-white-house-directive/. 16. ‘Letter to Anthony Blinking and Lloyd Austin’, Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, United States Congress, 2017 at https://democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/10.16.24_PRC%20dual%20use%20research%20in%20the%20Arctic__.pdf. 17. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2014 at https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf. 18. Mariia Kobzeva and Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, ‘European-Russian-Chinese Arctic Energy System’,in Xing Li (Ed) China-EU Relations in a New Era of Global Transformation, London: Routledge, London, 2021, 22p. 19. Martin Kimani, ‘Statement by Amb. Martin Kimani, during the Security Council Urgent Meeting on the Situation in Ukraine’, The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya, United Nations Security Council, February 2022 at https://www.un.int/kenya/sites/www.un.int/files/Kenya/kenya_statement_during_urgent_meeting_on_on_ukraine_21_february_2022_at_2100.pdf.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction  On 7 April 2025, the Italian Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Dutch Clingendael Institute co-hosted the fourth edition of the Van Wittel/Vanvitelli Roundtable, which is becoming a major recurring event in the policy dialogue between Italy and the Netherlands. The meeting, co-organized by the two policy institutes, took place at the Italian School of Public Administration in Caserta (NA, Italy), bringing together a broad array of stakeholders including experts from academia, think tanks, ministries and civil society.1 This year’s roundtable focused on the critical intersections between industrial innovation, technological sovereignty and (open) strategic autonomy, underlining the urgent need to strengthen linkages between these domains within the broader European framework. Held under the Chatham House Rule and by invitation only, the event created a space for frank and forwardlooking exchanges on how both Italy and the Netherlands can safeguard their national interests while contributing constructively to the collective resilience and strategic capacity of the European Union. One of the most relevant outcomes of this edition was the joint endorsement of a proposal to develop a bilateral policy paper aimed at strengthening collaboration between the two countries, while also feeding into ongoing EU-level initiatives.  1. Increasing security and reducing dependencies The dialogue began with a reflection on the pressing geopolitical challenges facing the European Union. Participants broadly acknowledged that escalating tensions between the United States and China, including an increasingly protectionist American posture – as seen during and potentially following the Trump administration – pose risks for Europe’s role in the international order. The possibility of a global trade war, alongside the gradual withdrawal of the US from traditional multilateralism, is both a threat and a wake-up call for Europe. In the last months, the challenge has become particularly serious, as the US administration threatened multiple times to impose high tariffs on EU products. Rather than becoming collateral damage in this global rivalry, Europe should take active steps to strengthen its strategic positioning and develop a strategy to counter and deter coercion from third countries. This goal, the participants argued, requires avoiding marginalisation through enhanced internal cohesion, greater autonomy from external suppliers, and the ability to act collectively on the world stage. In this light, there was widespread agreement that bilateral relationships such as the one between Italy and the Netherlands can serve as essential building blocks in shaping Europe’s capacity to act with strategic clarity and operational effectiveness.  In the event of a global trade war, another source of instability could come from China. If the US markets shut its doors, China would be faced with an overproduction capacity, due to the misplacement of all the goods destined to the US economy. In this scenario, the only option for Beijing would be to flow the same commodities to Europe, thereby saturating the market and curbing EU competitiveness. This scenario must be avoided. The solution can be only a tough but necessary negotiation with the US to avoid a dramatic fragmentation of global trade. The EU should act reasonably and try to persuade Washington of the existing nexus between global trade, wealth and political stability. The negotiation should start from the assumption that the transatlantic trade with the United States is much smaller than trade within the European Union. As a consequence, all the EU member states have a practical convenience in standing together and speaking with Washington with one voice. The formal and exclusive competence that the Commission holds in the commercial field, granted by the EU Treaties, should be therefore supported politically at the highest levels. At the same time, the Commission and the member states should focus on: 1) developing bilateral agreements with like-minded countries worldwide which believe in open and fair trade; 2) removing non-tariff barriers inside the internal market to boost competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The second point is particularly important, as the Commission needs to make the bloc more resilient to external shocks through a set of instruments aimed at enhancing strategic autonomy in a framework of necessary global interdependence.  Indeed, the recipe to achieve this goal has been already identified in the Letta and Draghi reports, which offer sound analyses and strategic directions for European industrial and economic policy. Despite these clear guidelines, the participants’ consensus was that implementation today remains inconsistent due to poor coordination among member states and institutional inertia. It was argued that meaningful progress depends on increased financial support, forward-looking strategic planning and, crucially, the formation of coalitions among like-minded EU member states – especially when the broader EU framework falls short. A recurring theme throughout the discussion was Europe’s evolving role as a global actor; if the ambitions of the bloc go beyond playing the role of an excellent regulatory power, the EU must position itself as a mediator and real broker in a multipolar world. Italy and the Netherlands, with their strong institutional, industrial and diplomatic assets, are natural complimentary partners in this effort, and can help the EU agenda in many respects. One dimension obviously pivotal for both the Union and its member states is the future of our economies. In this regard, participants insisted on the need to place industrial policy at the very heart of Europe’s strategic agenda. The capacity to maintain economic leadership, social cohesion and democratic vitality depends in no small part rests on the continent’s ability to manufacture, innovate and compete. A number of shared structural challenges – most prominently energy affordability, demographic change and the digital transition – must be tackled through integrated strategies that involve both public and private actors. The traditional rigid separation between public sector policy and private investment is therefore outdated and counterproductive. Today’s complex challenges require unified action driven by shared objectives. The Italy–Netherlands partnership, in this context, was identified as a potential nucleus for a new wave of EU-wide strategic thinking. These two countries already hold considerable influence in different sectors and can use their complementary strengths to demonstrate the added value of bilateral cooperation for the entire EU. By jointly addressing pressing infrastructure needs, advancing cooperation on research and innovation, and fostering deeper market integration, Italy and the Netherlands could set a precedent for other mid-sized EU member states. The panel was concluded by a call to action: to jointly draft a detailed position paper, developed in direct dialogue with the European Commission, to define shared priorities and propose concrete initiatives. This policy paper would focus on key areas such as advanced technologies, green innovation, the energy transition and the pursuit of strategic autonomy – laying the foundations for a resilient and forward-looking Europe. Italy and the Netherlands, as major industrial powerhouses, can give a significant contribution, as they already did in the past. 2. Innovation and strategic sectors: Agriculture, defence and semiconductors The second part of the discussion focused on innovation as a cornerstone of European competitiveness. While there was strong recognition of the EU’s ambition in this domain, participants pointed to significant structural weaknesses, particularly underinvestment in research and development and fragmented policy implementation. The Chips Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act were cited as important legislative efforts, but whose success will depend on coherent action across all member states and the mobilisation of private capital and expertise. Among the strategic sectors identified for both countries, agriculture stood out as a particularly relevant case. Agriculture in fact embodies both industrial potential and the need for open strategic autonomy – especially in the context of international trade developments, such as those stemming from EU-Mercosur negotiations and US demands to open European agricultural markets. Italy and the Netherlands are major players in this field. According to Eurostat data, the Netherlands is one of the top three agricultural exporters in the EU, while Italy ranks among the leaders in high-quality agricultural production and is a world leader in agri-food machinery. These comparative advantages create space for deep, complementary cooperation. Participants stressed the need to build a joint framework focused on food quality, innovation testing and the harmonisation of production systems. The Netherlands was recognised for its leadership in digitalisation and agri-tech innovation, while Italy’s sophisticated machinery sector was seen as critical for enabling largescale adoption of new technologies. Importantly, agricultural innovation was also viewed as essential for climate adaptation. With the increasing scarcity of water and the shrinking availability of arable land, Europe’s food systems must evolve to remain viable and resilient. The digital transformation of agriculture, through the adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) and data-driven solutions, presents opportunities to increase productivity and sustainability. However, it also raises challenges, including the need to ensure equitable access to vital semiconductors in order to build digital infrastructure and to address skills gaps in digital literacy. Semiconductors in particular, the hardware backbone of all digital systems, were identified as a cross-cutting capability essential not only to agriculture but to broader industrial policy. For Italy and the Netherlands, enhancing national capacity in this field aligns with the strategic goal of technological sovereignty. Another core issue raised was the generational transition in agriculture. As rural populations age, the sector should be made more appealing to younger, highly educated individuals. This requires a cultural shift: reframing agriculture as a highvalue and socially meaningful profession. The traditional image of the isolated farmer must give way to a narrative that resonates with environmentally conscious youth who see value in returning to the land. However, this shift requires careful policy design to reconcile environmental goals with economic sustainability. Specific strategies were discussed for supporting small farms, which often lack access to advanced technology, and for incentivising large-scale producers to integrate sustainable practices. Italy’s prominence in agricultural machinery offers a further avenue for international engagement. Expanding innovation to developing countries through machinery exports and technical cooperation could support global food security while reinforcing Europe’s leadership. In closing, participants linked these reflections back to the broader topic of European security and defence. The defence industry and the cybersecurity domain face similar issues of dependency and vulnerability. Strategic autonomy in these sectors is not only about accessing raw materials but about entire supply chains – from design and production to deployment. Both Italy and the Netherlands are well-positioned to lead within a broader European effort to secure these strategic infrastructures. Conclusions The roundtable concluded by reaffirming the centrality of the economic dimension to the future of Europe. A clear and robust industrial strategy must return to the forefront of EU policymaking. In the absence of an effective industrial policy framework, too much responsibility remains at the national level, creating disparities and inefficiencies. Europe must shift from aspirational rhetoric to operational pragmatism, investing decisively in sectors that underpin its long-term resilience. The cooperation between the public and private sectors is essential. Both Italy and the Netherlands are undergoing parallel transitions – digital, environmental and demographic. These must be tackled simultaneously, as none can be deprioritised. Change will require acknowledgment of systemic constraints. Among the most urgent priorities is the cost of energy, which undermines industrial competitiveness across Europe. Italy is particularly affected due to its structural vulnerabilities, but this is a shared European challenge. Energy prices must be drastically reduced, and a fully functioning internal (energy) market must be established. Demographic decline poses a new challenge. Unlike previous decades, the EU must now envision growth in a context of population shrinkage. The only answer to this unprecedented challenge lays in innovation, accessible energy and a revitalised industrial base. Hence, the call for new models and economic frameworks capable of adapting to shrinking labour markets while maintaining living standards. Ultimately, the Van Wittell/Vanvitelli Roundtable highlighted that the EU should engage proactively the US to avoid a global trade crisis and forge alliances with like-minded and complementary world players. With the contribution of two important actors such as Italy and the Netherlands, the EU can find new pathways to open strategic autonomy and long-term prosperity. *Updated 23 May 2025 Report of the fourth edition of the Van Wittel/Vanvitelli Roundtable organised at the Italian School of Public Administration in Caserta on 7 April 2025 by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Clingendael Institute. Paper produced in the framework of the project “Van Wittel/Vanvitelli Roundtable”. The project has benefited from the financial support of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Policy Planning Unit of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI) pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967, and the Compagnia di San Paolo Foundation. The views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. References 1 - A video of the closing remarks by Antonio Tajani, Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and Caspar Veldkamp, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, is available here: https://www.youtube.com/live/mqhfJfW-4s8.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract The defining political shift of our era is the revolt of the lower middle class. Much more exposed than the better-off to the succession of crises in recent years—from the financial crisis to uncontrolled migration, from Covid-19 to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—the lower middle class is turning to the populist right and its promise of protection by closure. Unlike the US first-past-the-post system, the EU’s institutional framework emphasises compromise and cross-party cooperation and thus offers a critical buffer against this wave of disruption. But this is not enough to protect our post-1945 political order, which is based on parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and European integration, from both internal and external threats. The EU needs a bold agenda that focuses on competitiveness, growth, migration and defence, all of which are crucial to strengthening our continent. Introduction1 Once is an accident, twice the new normal. With his electoral success, Donald Trump is the new reality in the US, not just an aberration. Trump obviously understands his time better than anybody else, which ensured him his comeback as president of the US, elected by the people against seemingly overwhelming legal and political resistance. He is the new rule of the game, like it or not. The revolt of the lower middle classWhat is the new reality? The party political system in the US and Europe has been fundamentally transformed by the revolt of the lower middle class. Voter analyses in several European countries give a clear picture: in France, Marine Le Pen and the National Rally (Rassemblement National) represent the ‘défavorisés’ like no other party and have replaced in that function the traditional left. Le Pen is successful in the former Communist heartland and mining territory of northern France, where she also assured her own seat in parliament (Ipsos 2024). Similarly, Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) is electorally over-represented among workers and the unemployed and those with below average incomes and education (Moreau 2024a). And the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) rallies the workers too (Moreau 2024b). This should not come as a big surprise. Right-wing populist parties have been recognised in political science as unconventional workers’ parties for more than a decade (Rydgren 2013). And the transformation of the political space in Europe has been ongoing for more than a decade as well. European Parliament elections are an excellent monitor of the overall situation in Europe and the member states. The outcome of the 2024 European Parliament elections shows us a political space that is basically divided into three parts. One-third of the members now sit on the left, organised in the Green, Socialist and Left groups; a good third are in the centre, encompassing the Liberals and the Christian Democrat European People’s Party (EPP); and close to a third now belong to the populist and radical right (European Parliament 2024). In the US, Trump’s success was assured in 2016 through gains in the ‘rustbelt states’, formerly the Democrat Party’s heartland. In 2020 Joe Biden was able to narrowly turn the tide. With his credibility among workers—acquired over decades through close cooperation with the trade unions—he was able to achieve what presidential candidates from liberal New York and California, Hillary Clinton and Kamala Harris, could not. The Republican Party today is the Make America Great Again Party. It is the party of Donald Trump. The Republican Party of Ronald Reagan and George Bush does not exist anymore. The party that used to represent the highly skilled today represents and owes its electoral success to the lower-skilled working class. ‘National security Republicans’ have lost their political home. Why is the lower middle class revolting? The lower middle class can be identified as those whose economic situation is tense. In other words, they have no financial buffer and anything unexpected happening can push them over the edge. In the US, this group, known as those living ‘from paycheque to paycheque’, is considered to comprise 25% to 30% of the population. A single paycheque not arriving might force people belonging to this group to sell their car; several paycheques not arriving might oblige them to sell their house (Bank of America Institute 2024). Ever since the financial crisis that started in 2008, we have gone in Europe from crisis to crisis. The drawn-out financial crisis was followed by uncontrolled migration as a consequence of Russia’s bombardment of big cities in Syria, and this was followed by Covid-19 and then Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which caused major spikes in energy and food prices and another massive wave of migration. What we call a ‘crisis’ might equally be considered a lack in performance of the system overall and an indication of increasing loss of control. Russia is being aggressive militarily and in other ways because it believes it can do so and get away with it. External borders prove time and time again to be porous. After the Second World War, the German economy grew by an average of about 5% per year; but in the last five years, this has dropped to 0% and even into the negative. What can be weathered by the better-off is an existential challenge for the lower middle class. If you are not already on the housing ladder by luck of birth, it is increasingly difficult to get onto. The social elevator is stuttering. And while migration is perceived by the upper middle class as the promise of affordable personal services today and care in old age later, for the lower middle class it means competition for affordable housing and state services, and the risk of decreasing educational standards for children in their lower-income living areas. German sociologist Andreas Reckwitz (2020) describes the experience of the lower middle class as one of a double devaluation: economic and cultural. It is economic because formerly well-paid industrial workers are falling increasingly behind the new university-educated service class. And it is cultural because their system of traditional values is regarded as outdated and destined to be superseded. From a horizontal to a vertical understanding of the party political system The traditional horizontal classification of parties on a left to right axis is very misleading now. To understand what is happening, we need to replace the traditional horizontal classification with a vertical one based on social status, income and education. On the basis of the 2021 German federal election and data provided by the Bundestag (data no longer available online) and others (Focus online 2021), we can construct such a vertical system for Germany: 1. Greens and liberals represent younger voters, with a very good income in the case of the liberals and an average income, but outstanding level of education, when it comes to the greens, the new party of the Bildungsbürgertum (the very well-educated). These voters can together be considered the upper middle class and the most dynamic part of society.2. The traditional people’s parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, become more popular the older the cohort, with their popularity rocketing among those above 70 years old. The income levels of the voters of these parties are average, as is their education, and this voter base is shrinking. These parties represent the middle class.3. The Left (Die Linke) is over-represented among academics and the unemployed; its electorate has a below-average income. The extreme-right AfD is over-represented among workers, the unemployed and people of working age. The educational levels of these voters are low, and their household incomes are below average. The Left and the AfD both represent the lower middle class. The part of the lower middle class that is represented by the populist right is being promised protection by closure. Right-wing populism is therefore ‘social nationalism’. But it is not just about the programme. Bringing that new coalition of various social groups together is facilitated by charismatic leadership: Trump is a charismatic leader in the sense of Max Weber (1921); and he finds his European equivalents in the likes of Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, Marine Le Pen and Viktor Orbán. Moreover, the dominance of social media over the traditional media has dramatically decreased the cost of political organisation and provided a chance for newcomers to establish themselves. Social media have also normalised hate, which was banned from the traditional media for very good reasons after the dramatic experiences of racism, National Socialism and Communism in the twentieth century. Political parties based on portraying political adversaries as enemies in the tradition of Carl Schmitt (2007) are profiting more than any other from these new tools. What differentiates Europe from the US? Party political competition in the US If we are observing a revolt of the lower middle class in both the US and Europe, why has the impact been so different up to now? In the US the first-past-the-post system forces everybody to integrate into one of the two major political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans. Both parties therefore represent very large coalitions, which essentially serve an electoral purpose only and cannot be considered programme parties. The fight for content takes place mainly within, among the different caucuses organised in Congress. What you would find in the European Parliament in the EPP, the European Conservatives and Reformists, the Patriots and the Sovereigntists is, in the US, all assembled in one political family, the Republicans. Equally, what you would find in the liberal Renew group, the Socialists and Democrats, the Greens and the Left in Europe has to cohabit within the Democrat Party in the US. The Republican Party can be understood as a broad political coalition which has effectively fallen under the control and leadership of what in Europe might rather be considered the line of Viktor Orbán and the Patriots. The other tendencies are still there but marginalised. They can no longer determine the overall direction but might still be sufficiently strong in Congress to block decision-making or align with the other side when they regard policies as being against their core convictions, such as creating unsustainable debt levels, or on matters related to national security and defence.Europe and its national electoral systemsEuropean states are not immune either. The British, the French and the Hungarian electoral systems provide an oversized seat result for the relatively strongest party, and this increases the opportunities of the extremes. Brexit can be considered one outcome of this. The current political stalemate in France, where the extreme right and the extreme left are holding the system hostage, is another. In systems of pure proportional representation, by contrast, you need more than 50% of the votes for one party or a coalition of several parties to take effective political control. In a first-past-the-post system, as in the US, 20%–30% of the electorate is more than sufficient to take over one of the major political parties and, with that, to potentially run the country. Pure proportional systems therefore provide better protection against a right-wing or left-wing populist takeover. The EU political system On the federal level of the EU on the other hand, the incentives are there for cooperation across the political centre. Decisions in the Council need an oversized qualified majority; the election of a European Commission president by the European Parliament requires an absolute majority of the members elected to the house. These majorities can regularly be found only through cooperation across the aisle and by transcending the traditional left–right schism. The desire to hold important political offices in the EU, therefore, requires a willingness to compromise and forces political parties that are more on the right or on the left to look towards the centre. The final vote on the von der Leyen Commission was carried by a large cross-cutting alliance of the Christian Democrat EPP, the liberal Renew and the Socialists, complemented by the constructive right, centred on Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and the constructive left, led by the German Greens. The more radical elements of both the European Conservatives and Reformists and Green groups voted against. The institutional system has a strong impact on the political culture in the EU, which is a culture of cooperation. The political system favours the creation of unity—as the condition for stability on a historically, geographically and culturally divided continent—and therefore the centre. The absence of permanent coalitions and the lack of fixed roles of majority and minority in the division of power in the EU create the opportunity to integrate those on the very right and the very left who are not opposed to the system as such and whose primary aim is not to destroy it: the constructive right and the constructive left. Contrary to the US, where the destructive and anti-system elements can dominate the rest of their respective coalitions, inside the EU that destructive right and left find themselves isolated unless they stop being the system opposition. That is why Ursula von der Leyen was well advised to integrate Raffaele Fitto from Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) as vice-president of the European Commission and, at the same time, to continue a constructive dialogue with the co-leader of the Green group Terry Reincke on the importance of climate change policies and actions to preserve the rule of law. Brothers of Italy had not only supported the new asylum pact, in contrast to Viktor Orbán, but had also supported Ukraine in a steadfast fashion, including in the vote to ensure Ukraine profits from the interest on Russian assets. Brothers of Italy is part of the constructive right, stabilising the political system of the EU. Is the EU therefore safe? The EU is a federal union of citizens and states and therefore dependent on support in each and every member state. It is only as strong as its weakest link. Even though, on average, support for EU institutions is close to historical highs and well above the support levels for national institutions, that is not enough (EU 2024). Before Brexit the EU’s weakest link in terms of overall support was the UK. Nowadays its weakest link is France, which is paralysed by the combination of a destructive right, on the one hand, and on the other, a destructive left which, in the form of France Unbowed (La France Insoumise), is holding the socialists and greens hostage. And both extremes are cooperating in the destabilisation of the state. That smells like Weimar. What needs to be done? An agenda for the next phase of European integration An agenda for strength In the worlds of Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, strength is the only thing that counts. Internationally and geopolitically, we are back in the world of nineteenth-century power politics. The rules of the game have changed, and the quicker we understand this the better. We are threatened at the same time from the inside and from the outside. From the inside, by the destructive nationalist populist right and left that are trying to hollow out the political order, established after 1945, based on parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and European integration. From the outside, by aggressive nationalist power politics. And more often than not, these two are connected. The seatbelts need to be fastened. Defending ourselves from threats both inside and outside has to start with the recognition that we are confronted with real issues, not just imagined ones. Hyper-inflation was real and is still stored in today’s price levels. The accumulated inflation during Joe Biden’s four-year term was above 20% (US Bureau of Labour Statistics n.d., author’s calculations), and it will not have been very different in Europe. Growth rates are very low, while debt is rising, and with it the difficulty of states to intervene in times of absolute need. Uncontrolled mass immigration happened. Our capacity to defend our continent is seriously compromised. International respect comes from strength, not from weakness. This is not a case for mass psychotherapy, but political action: the political agenda has to change. The European Parliament nowadays plays a key role in setting the agenda for the upcoming legislative term. Ursula von der Leyen had to negotiate with all the political forces of good will about the programme for the next five years to have any chance of being elected by an absolute majority of the members of the house. The need for the Commission president to negotiate the programme also changes the role of the European political foundations. The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies has contributed hundreds of precise policy proposals to the process of reflection in a document entitled The 7Ds for Sustainability. This text centres on defence, debt, digitalisation, demography, democracy, decarbonisation and de-risking globalisation in order to enrich the debate and help set a new agenda (Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies n.d.). The outcomes of the European elections matter, as they should. With the Greens and the Liberals having together lost more than 50 seats and the so-called progressive majority between the Liberals, Greens, Socialists and the far left having disappeared, European Commission priorities for this legislature have markedly changed. Competitiveness and security, comprising both defence and migration, including border protection, have become the top two priorities. This is underpinned by the different composition of the European Commission and the European Council. With half of the members of both institutions coming from the EPP and the EPP occupying the centre space in the European Parliament as well, concerns about competitiveness, migration and defence, critical to strengthening our continent, which is being challenged from both within and without, now have a stronger voice. An agenda for growth: implementing the Draghi report Like every other policy paper, the Letta and Draghi reports can and are being discussed in detail. But no one can dispute the competence of Mario Draghi in matters monetary and economic. The Draghi report will therefore provide a most important reference point. His report comprises six basic truths that will inspire the legislative proposals of the European Commission in this term, even more so as it was requested by the European Commission president herself. Draghi brings everybody face to face with his or her responsibilities. From my personal reading, his report can be summarised as follows: • Investment is the precondition for future growth. Europe is lagging behind in high-tech investment and has largely lost the new digital economy race. This can be identified as the key reason for the difference in per capita growth between the US and the EU. Mid-tech–based industry, such as the car industry, which provides our current economic backbone, is coming under increasing competitive pressure from China.• Without investment, annual productivity growth falls behind. Europe could maintain and improve its living standard by considerably increasing female and older-age participation in the workplace. Worsening demographics make that quantitative input increase more difficult.• The EU has to return to the strategy of scaling through the development of its own internal market, especially in the less-integrated areas of the service sector.• The Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union are critical to assisting high-tech investors in their efforts to scale beyond national boundaries. Given that high-tech means not only high return but also high risk, venture capital is necessary to accompany that growth.• We have regulated for risk and not for opportunity, as is typical for ageing societies. The regulatory burden has to be reduced.• Common public debt has to come in as a residual answer, dependent in volume on the progress in the above-mentioned areas. Consensus on common European debt could be achieved in the area of defence, which could be considered a European public good. Common European financing would also contribute to more equal burden sharing. An agenda for migration Migration is at the core of right-wing populist parties’ growth. It brings together social and cultural challenges: social challenges in the form of competition for scarce public services and support, and cultural ones in the form of a challenge to traditional constructions of national and cultural identity. Here society is falling apart. What is a promise of improved personal services for the upper middle class and the liberal and green parties representing them is, for the lower middle class, a threat of lower salaries and increased competition for state services, including education. Experiences during the negotiations to form the current Swedish and Finnish governments showed that a tough policy on migration was the one area where populist parties were not ready to adapt or compromise. Preliminary voting analysis from the European Parliament demonstrates that while right-wing populist parties show some diverging views on economics, they clearly differentiate themselves from other political forces on the cultural axis of the political divide (Welle and Frantescu 2025). We have experienced a radicalisation of our political space following the events of mass migration, both in the Mediterranean and following Russia’s aggression in Syria and Ukraine. Russia even actively tries to destabilise its neighbours by transporting refugees to their common borders or via Belarus. Denmark is the only country in the EU that has managed to reduce established right-wing populist parties back to single digits. It has done so by establishing a consensus in society on a tough migration policy that is being continued by its current Social Democrat–led government. At the same time, Denmark represents a country with one of the highest standards of societal development. ‘Going to Denmark’ is even a reference in international development policy. Danish migration policy will therefore need to be studied in more detail so as to understand how far it can provide guidance for the EU as a whole or not. Speedier implementation of the migration pact voted on in the European Parliament in April 2024 therefore has to be a prime priority. But it cannot be the last step. Integration capacity has to become critical to migration policy. An agenda for defence Those who cannot defend themselves are inviting their stronger neighbours to aggress them. A look at maps of Russia over the last 500 years shows us that Russia has expanded continuously at the expense of its weaker neighbours—from basically the city territory of Moscow to becoming the largest state on earth. The military submission of its neighbours is the Russian business model. The peaceful and voluntary integration of the European space, based on the rule of law, is the business model of the EU. These concepts are now geographically colliding. And the grey zone in between, at the very least, is now in danger of Russian aggression and occupation, as demonstrated in Ukraine, where Russia is trying to reintroduce the logic of nineteenth-century empire to the European continent. The US will focus its own efforts increasingly on Asia and the attempt to contain China. Europe will therefore have to provide the lion’s share of its own conventional defence. This can only be effectively organised by making use of the possibilities provided by the EU. The Martens Centre has provided a plan in 10 steps—the European Defence Pyramid—on how to achieve a viable European defence under changed geopolitical circumstances. Starting with more basic ideas at the beginning, it has now been outlined in considerable detail with the help of external experts in The 7Ds for Sustainability – Defence Extended (Ciolan and Welle 2024). Progress is already visible. The Martens Centre suggested the creation of the office of a European defence commissioner and a standing defence committee in the European Parliament. Both are now reality. The proposed increase in financial support for military mobility has now been achieved through the decision of the European Commission to allow the use of regional funds for this purpose. And the new defence commissioner has suggested the creation of an ‘EU DARPA’2 for military research, as developed in the concept papers. Living in dangerous times Europe is being simultaneously challenged internally and externally: internally by right-wing populist parties, which have now conquered nearly 30% of the political space; externally by Russia, which is trying to reintroduce the nineteenth-century rules of empire through military aggression with at least the benevolent acceptance of China. These challenges are not unrelated. Some of the populist parties on the right and left openly make the case for China and Russia. Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has even been rewarded by China with massive investments and the status of an ‘all-weather partner’. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, we have been living in a world of cooperation. System competition between East and West was replaced by globalisation. System seemingly did not matter anymore. Production went wherever it was the cheapest. Communist China became the capitalists’ best friend in exchange for the transfer of superior technology. In analogy to Lenin, China sold the capitalists the rope with which to hang themselves. The price paradigm replaced the security paradigm. With China now so strong that it can and does challenge the US economically and politically for number-one status globally, and strongly on the rise militarily, this phase has ended. China is preparing for the military strangulation, if not occupation of Taiwan, as demonstrated by its ever more menacing sea exercises around the island every year. Russia waged a war against Ukraine only days after establishing a ‘no limits partnership’ with China, testing the global order established after 1945 when conquering and annexing the territory of a weaker neighbour was outlawed. The West is being challenged both in Asia and in Europe. To defend our European way of life we need to be strong economically and militarily. We need to close the rifts in our societies and constructively end the revolt of the lower middle class. System competition is back, and the security paradigm has replaced the price paradigm. Cite:  Welle, K. (2025). Donald Trump, the revolt of the lower middle class and the next phase of European integration. European View, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/17816858251345566 Footnotes 1. This article is a revised version of an article that originally appeared on the website of the research centre Groupe d’études géopolitiques on 19 March 2025 with the title ‘Trump and the next phase of European integration’. See https://geopolitique.eu/en/2025/03/19/after-trump-the-next-phase-of-european-integration/. Used by permission.2. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is a US Department of Defense agency focused on developing breakthrough technologies for national security. References Bank of America Institute. (2024). Paycheck to paycheck: What, who, where, why? 22 October. https://institute.bankofamerica.Com/content/dam/economic-insights/paycheck-to-paycheck-lower-income-households.pdf. Accessed 24 April 2025.Ciolan I. M., Welle K., eds. (2024). The 7Ds for sustainability – Defence extended. https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/the-7ds-defence-extended/. Accessed 24 April 2025.EU. (2024). Standard Eurobarometer 102 – Autumn 2024. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3215. Accessed 24 April 2025.European Parliament. (2024). European Parliament 2024–2029. Constitutive session. https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/european-results/2024-2029/. Accessed 24 April 2025.Focus online. (2021). Wer wählte wie? Die Analyse. 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Accessed 24 April 2025.Reckwitz A. (2020). Society of singularities. Cambridge: Polity.Rydgren J., ed. (2013). Class politics and the radical right. London: Routledge.Schmitt C. (2007). The concept of the political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossrefUS Bureau of Labour Statistics. (n.d.). CPI inflation calculator. https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm. Accessed 24 April 2025.Weber M. (2010). Politik als Beruf [Politics as a vocation], 11th edn. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.Welle K., Frantescu D. (2025). (Forthcoming study on voting behaviour in the European Parliament in the 2019–24 legislature).Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (n.d.). Publications: The 7Ds. https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/#the-7ds. Accessed 24 April 2025.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, following the military actions that began with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The conflict is having devastating consequences, including widespread death and displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and a global energy crisis, also heightening geopolitical tensions (Kurapov et al., Citation2023). Pertiwi (Citation2024) contended that since the crisis in Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the European Union (EU) has adopted sanctions as the key policy response targeting Russia’s aggressive behaviour. These restrictive measures were applied by the EU in multiple rounds and packages and gradually became the cornerstone of the EU’s policy towards Russia. (p. 61) There is extant literature studying the direct consequences of the war, such as humanitarian crises, economic impacts and geopolitical instability. Numerous countries have experienced food shortages and rising prices due to disruptions in supply chains, worsened by the crisis in Ukraine and the closure of airspace (Hellegers, Citation2022). Concurrently, the war has caused an unprecedentedly volatile energy market, as many European countries were obliged to seek alternative energy sources to Russian imports, demanding more oil and natural gas from alternative suppliers (Liadze et al., Citation2022). The invasion has also fuelled inflation across the EU, not only affecting energy, which is essential in all the sectors of the economy but also other sectors like food, for example, as Ukraine is a major global grain producer (Ozili, Citation2024). The added value and main contribution of this paper is based on the use of grounded social scientific methods like the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS and the Ordered Probit, to analyse the EU citizens’ support of the sanctions against Russia, providing more nuanced insights on what factors are the most important to be in favour and against the sanctions. Thus, in particular, our study contributes to filling one of the important gaps mentioned by Pertiwi (Citation2024) in the analysis of the literature on the EU’s approach to sanctions on Russia. Concretely, our study fills in part the fifth gap in the analysis of causal mechanisms that examine the sanctions, including relevant actors like the EU citizens. Thus, we first provide an in-depth analysis of European citizens’ views on EU sanctions to weaken Russia and support Ukraine. And then, we analyse the main factors that affect the EU citizens’ support of the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia and in favour of Ukraine. The study includes data from 26,461 respondents across the 27 EU Member States, collected through the 98th Eurobarometer survey (Winter 2022–2023), which examined the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature review. Section 3 presents the dataset used, and the methodological approach. In Section 5, the results are presented, followed by Section 5, which offers a thorough discussion of the findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper by summarising the main conclusions drawn from the study, identifying implications, limitations of the study, and potential directions for future research. Literature reviewAttitudes towards EU’s sanctions against Russia war in Ukraine Public sentiment for the EU is a complex phenomenon to study and needs to be approached from different angles, including identity, governance, security and the economy. How the public perceives the EU as a guardian of democratic values and good governance directly influences support for its policies, including sanctions on Russia. Boomgaarden et al. (Citation2011) argue that if the people believe that the EU is going to safeguard democratic principles, then they will identify sanctions as a proper means of safeguarding such principles. However, if there is a lack of trust in the EU to defend such values, there will be little support for such sanctions. The purpose of European identity is primarily to determine people’s views on the EU’s actions. Kende et al. (Citation2018) believe that European identity can have a profound impact on solidarity with common EU policies, such as sanctions. This would imply that the framing of a common European identity can become the most important factor in eliciting public consent for EU programmes, especially in the midst of geopolitical crises. Thus, public opinion on sanctions is also based on perceptions of the EU’s ability to act in the interests of citizens. According to McLean and Roblyer (Citation2016), if citizens perceive the EU as doing the best it can for its citizens, particularly in terms of economic stability and governance, they are more likely to support sanctions against Russia. However, if the EU is perceived as wasteful, or its policies are perceived as economically harmful, then the potential for support for sanctions will be low. This explains the need to ensure that EU action is consistent with shared perceptions of political effectiveness and economic benefit. The imposition of economic sanctions is one of the highest prioritised tools in the modern world, especially against threats to stability and security. The EU sanctions on Russia, especially after the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine, have stimulated an immensely wide public discussion (Karlović et al., Citation2021). An important question is: What is the role of perceived security threats in shaping public opinion about these sanctions? It has been made known through investigation that subjective security risk strongly predicts public opinion regarding EU sanctions against Russia. Frye (Citation2019) argues that sanctions are not always supported but vary depending on how people view security threats. Public support is higher when sanctions are framed as protection against an external threat. When sanctions are perceived as a threat to national or economic security, they can generate opposition. The EU’s collective response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict also shows that public opinion on sanctions is shaped by both security interests and normative expectations of justice and self-determination (Bosse, Citation2024). This mutual influence can lead to mixed public responses, with some seeing sanctions as an ethical necessity, while others withdraw their support due to perceived economic and national security risks. The way EU sanctions are proposed and implemented also influences public opinion. According to Sjursen (Citation2015), citizens will be more supportive of sanctions if they see EU institutions as representative and transparent. Conversely, an image of bureaucratic distance or lack of public participation in decision-making can undermine trust and lead to opposition. Thus, in line with this background, we pose our first research question as follows: (1) How do European values and security threats influence the intensity of public support for EU sanctions against Russia?Socioeconomic factors in shaping attitudes towards EU sanctions Support for economic sanctions against Russia is widespread among the EU, varying according to socioeconomic status, demographic characteristics and political engagement. As Frye (Citation2017) has noted, economic prosperity is a key predictor of support for sanctions. Those who are financially ‘safe’ are more likely to support EU-imposed sanctions, as they are less directly affected by the economic burden. Previous studies have shown that those in more affluent income groups or with stable household finances are more likely to support foreign policy actions, such as sanctions, that represent broader European values, even if they are economically costly (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). This is consistent with the findings of Lepeu (Citation2025), which recognises that citizens who rate their own economic situation as ‘very good’ are far more likely to support sanctions than those facing financial hardship. On the other hand, citizens facing economic hardship are less likely to be sanction-supportive if they believe that sanctions will negatively impact inflation, increase unemployment or suppress national economic stability. Onderco (Citation2017) found that economic hardship is associated with higher scepticism towards foreign policy decisions that lack tangible personal benefits. This means that the economic price of sanctions is likely to disproportionately affect support among lower-income individuals. Generational differences also play a role in shaping public opinion on sanctions. Older individuals (over 55 years) are more supportive of EU sanctions, as they have a historical perspective on European security and are more politically engaged (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). On the other hand, younger people (15–34 years) have weaker support, possibly because they have different priorities, such as financial stability and employment, which could be considered more pressing than geopolitical concerns (Onderco, Citation2017). Alexandrescu (Citation2024) also suggests a new generational divide in attitudes towards coercive diplomacy, suggesting that efforts to build popular support for sanctions must consider young Europeans’ concerns and values about economic consequences and political transparency. Political interest is a second important predictor of support for EU sanctions. Politically knowledgeable and engaged citizens tend to be more supportive of EU foreign policy decisions, including sanctions (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). Thus, there is political ideology duality: left and centre-left voters support sanctions if they are anchored in a broader vision of upholding international law and human rights, while centre-right and populist voters are likely to be more sceptical if sanctions are perceived as infringing on national sovereignty (Onderco, Citation2017). As in the literature, the likelihood of being a strong supporter of EU sanctions depends on several socioeconomic and demographic factors, our second research question builds on the following: (2) Do socioeconomic characteristics influence the likelihood of being a strong supporter of EU sanctions against Russia?Dataset and methodology The dataset of the study is based on the Standard Eurobarometer 98.2 (EB98) survey Winter 2022–2023 which was conducted from 12 January to 6 February 2023 in 39 countries or territories. In the study, we only use the dataset from the 27 Member States of the EU, without considering the data from the other twelve additional countries included. The dataset was collected about a year after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, covering the following five topic areas identified by the European Commission (Citation2024): (1) The EU’s response to the invasion of Ukraine; (2) the actions taken as a unified EU response to the invasion; (3) the consequences of the war in Ukraine; (4) the European security threat; and (5) the future EU actions in the wake of the war., and aims to analyse the solidarity of European citizens with the Ukrainian people. The sample size for each country was around 1000 respondents except for Malta with 503, making a total of 26,461 respondents. The endogenous variable of the study is obtained by applying the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS approach to the items of the survey included to measure the degree of support of the respondents towards the measures taken by the EU in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The following five items were included in the analysis: (1) financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine; (2) imposing economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals; (3) providing financial support to Ukraine; (4) providing humanitarian support to the people affected by the war; and (5) welcoming into the EU people fleeing the war. The question introduction was the same for all the items: The EU has taken a series of actions as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of these actions taken? The responses to the question for each item were given using a complete 5-point Likert scale, where: 1 = totally agree; 2 = tend to agree; 3 = do not know; 4 = tend to disagree; and 5 = totally disagree. The scale was reversed to enhance interpretability, ensuring that higher values are aligned with those citizens who expressed higher support for the measures taken by the EU. The analysis of the variables affecting the citizens’ support was based on the selection of 14 exogenous variables, including age, gender, political interest, perception of the situation in the country, employment personal perception, financial household perception, the labour market perception of the country, the provision of public services perception, the overall image of the EU, the perception of the threat posed by the Russian war in Ukraine to security in the EU and the country itself, the personal perception that standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is defending European values, and the political orientation. More information about the exogenous variables can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. The Ordered Probit model will provide interesting and nuanced results of whether some exogenous variables affect the support of the EU sanctions taken by the EU in response to the Russian invasion. For example, for each of the variables included in the analysis, it will be possible to analyse to what extent some of the categories support more or less the sanctions. Similarly, it will be possible to determine if some of the variables have a significant effect on the level of support. Methodology Opinion surveys are affected by the subjective judgments of respondents, leading to potential inaccuracy in interpreting response categories (Disegna et al., Citation2018). For instance, ‘totally agree’ for one respondent could be equivalent to simply ‘tend to agree’ for another. For this reason, Fuzzy Set Logic methods are becoming very popular in social sciences to manage the uncertainty associated with survey responses effectively (Cantillo et al., Citation2021; Indelicato & Martín, Citation2024). The study uses the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS Approach to calculate the endogenous variable that measures the support (sup) of the respondents towards the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia. The method is grounded in the fuzzy set theory proposed by Zadeh (Citation1965), which was introduced for handling the inherent uncertainty and vagueness of information provided by answers to social surveys (Carlsson & Fullér, Citation2001; Disegna et al., Citation2018; Mamdani & Assilian, Citation1999). There are multiple fuzzy set representations that can be used to associate the categories of the answers given in the survey (Nguyen et al., Citation2005). In the study, we use the Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFNs), which are the most used fuzzy sets (Anand & Bharatraj, Citation2017; Wang, Citation2017). The final representation of the answers from the dataset is as follows: (1) totally disagree is represented by (0, 0, 30); (2) tend to disagree by (20, 30, 40); (3) do not know by (30, 50, 70); (4) tend to agree by (60, 70, 80); and (5) totally agree by (70, 100, 100). The hybrid nature of the method is based on the application of the Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), which calculates the synthetic indicator (Hwang & Yoon, Citation1981). We omit the mathematical formulation of the method for simplicity and ease of exposition. Interested readers can consult many existing papers, such as (Cantillo et al., Citation2023; Indelicato et al., Citation2023; Martín et al., Citation2020; Martín & Indelicato, Citation2023). We will use sup which provides relative support for the sanctions on Russia taken by the EU after invading Ukraine, as the dependent variable for the econometric model. The variable will be categorised into five quintiles according to the ranking of the indicator in order to use an ordered probit model. The marginal effects of the results will be used to analyse the main determinants that explain the highest support of EU citizens. In the study, we use the Daly normalisation for all the categories that act as exogenous variables in the model. Thus, it is possible to determine the marginal effects of each category with respect to the sample-weighted average. We omit the discussion of the technicalities of the model and exogenous variables normalisation. Interested readers can consult Daly et al. (Citation2016), Greene and Hensher (Citation2010), Hensher et al. (Citation2015) and Martin and Roman (Citation2021). Results Figure 1 shows the kernel density of the exogenous variable that measures the support of EU individuals for the sanctions against Russia taken by the EU for the whole sample (panel a) and for those who totally agree and totally disagree with the EU imposing the sanctions to defend European values (panel b). The results indicate that a small number of respondents do not support the sanctions imposed by the EU at all, with 170 citizens giving a score of 1 to all survey items included in the scale. Conversely, a significant portion of the population holds a more neutral position, as shown by responses falling in the range of 0.3–0.6. Additionally, a substantial number of citizens – specifically, 6430 – express their strong support for the sanctions by responding with a score of 5 to all items.  Figure 1. Support kernel density. Panel (b) of the figure clearly distinguishes between the two categories of respondents. It shows that those who strongly support the defence of European values are more in favour of the sanctions compared to those who strongly oppose them. Similar figure patterns are obtained for the categories of those who have a positive or negative image of the EU, and for those who think that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is seen as an important threat to the security of the EU. Nevertheless, this will be further discussed with the results of the ordered probit model. Table 1 shows the main drivers to support or not the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia. The table is obtained from the marginal effects obtained from the ordered probit model, which is in the fifth quintile of the support distribution, and refers to the citizen group of the strong supporters (Table A3, in the appendix). It can be seen that the main drivers to support the sanctions are totally agreeing that by standing against the Russian invasion, the EU is defending European values, having a very good or rather good image of the EU, totally agreeing that the EU security is under threat with the Russian invasion, and to have a very good financial situation in the household. All the coefficients are significant at 999 per thousand. The results of the ordered probit model, as well as the complete table of the marginal effects, can be consulted in the appendix. Table A2 shows that all the exogenous variables affect the support level except the area in which the respondent resides, so the support is transversal to whether the European lives in a rural, middle town or large town. It is also interesting to observe that all the threshold parameters of the ordered probit model result significant, i.e. the five different quintiles of the distribution can be allocated without the need to collapse some of the categories used in the estimation.  Table 1. Main drivers to be or not a strong supporter of the EU sanctions. Interestingly, the main drivers to be in the population segment of those who do not strongly support the EU sanctions are the opposite categories of supporting the sanctions: totally disagreeing or tending to disagree with the defence of European values, totally disagreeing or tending to disagree with the fact that the invasion of Ukraine is a security threat to the EU and having a very bad image of the EU. The coefficients of Table 1 have been extracted from Table A3, and need to be interpreted as follows: the coefficients are the marginal effects of the category to be or not a strong supporter of the EU sanctions. For example, the coefficient of 0.105 for individuals who totally agree that the EU is defending European values by standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine indicates that this group has a 10.5 per cent higher likelihood of being strong supporters of EU sanctions compared to the average citizen in the overall sample. In a similar manner, the coefficient of −0.225 for the category of total disagreement indicates a 22.5 per cent lower probability of being a strong supporter. Other interesting results that can be seen in the complete marginal effects table (Table A3, in the appendix) are that the type of urbanisation where the respondent lives, namely rural village, small and mid-size town or large town, is the only variable of the twelve under analysis which does not have any significant effect on being a strong supporter of the sanctions. For the rest of the variables, there is always a category with more odds of being or not in the category of strong supporters. It is interesting to note that the younger generations (between 15 and 24 and between 25 and 34) are less likely to be in the category of strong supporters than those over 55, who are significantly more likely to be in this category. Similarly, those who have a strong political interest, have a good personal job situation, think that the economic situation of their country is rather good, are leftist or left-centre, think that the employment situation of the country is rather good, are males, or have a rather good financial situation have a higher probability of being in the category of strong supporters. Conclusions In a recent speech by Jens Stoltenberg, former Secretary General of NATO, the following assessment was made: In just a few weeks, NATO leaders will meet in Madrid. We will make important decisions. To continue to strengthen and adapt our Alliance to a new security reality and protect our people and our values. I look forward to the day when we can welcome both Finland and Sweden into our Alliance. This will make Finland and Sweden safer. NATO stronger. And the whole Euro-Atlantic area more secure. (NATO, Citation2022) Although NATO’s strategic decision affects the entire geopolitical landscape, public perceptions of EU sanctions need to be addressed through a more nuanced, evidence-based approach. Public opinion on sanctions is driven not only by security concerns but also by economic and political factors that underpin individual belief systems. To measure the determinants of support for such policies, this study applies both the fuzzy hybrid approach and the ordered probit model. The first method calculates the endogenous variable that measures the level of support of each respondent. The second method is used to find the main factors of a set of 14 exogenous variables or covariates that affect the support. Our results reveal that there are four important drivers to be a strong supporter of the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in early 2022: (1) totally agreeing that by standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is defending European values, (2) having a very good overall EU image, (3) totally agreeing that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a threat to the security of the EU, and (4) having a very good household financial situation. Other factors, such as age, gender, or political orientation, among others, are less determinant in explaining the strong support category. The dataset for the study was obtained from the 98th Eurobarometer, covering winter 2022–2023, providing a solid foundation for the objectives pursued in the study. Our results imply that, at least in the salient category of being a strong supporter of the EU sanctions, European Parliamentarians and the political parties involved should promote a triad: the defence of European values (Anghel & Jones, Citation2023), a more integrated security defence system that will permit the EU to be more independent from NATO and US (Del Sarto Citation2016; Howorth Citation2018), and a solid campaign of improving the EU image, highlighting the benefits of being in the union (Elmatzoglou, Citation2020). The European values of human rights and dignity, as well as the principles of living in liberal democracies, should not be undermined by misinformation campaigns from autocratic regimes. The invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest security threat in Europe since the end of the Cold War, fostering a wave of fear and real politics about the necessity of increasing the military budget. Europeans have seen more closely how the lives of human beings are worth almost nothing when their homes are bombed, and they have to leave with just the bare minimum, stopping their daily lives and becoming refugees in countries that may not welcome them with open arms. There is a need for effective communication campaigns that change the focus from generic issues such as ‘Europeanness’ fostering a common national identity or sense of belonging to a pragmatic branding strategy that achieves a power actor in the new turbulent geopolitical battlefield. Recent developments, in the light of newly elected President Donald Trump’s views on NATO and US foreign aid, have added uncertainty to the EU’s strategic calculus on sanctions. Trump’s concerns about NATO’s burden-sharing and his ambivalent stance on continued US military aid to Ukraine have set off alarm bells among EU policymakers and underscored the need for a European security policy that is less dependent on US leadership (Sorgi, Citation2025). Thus, it is the time for a more than-less European Union mentality that decreases Euroscepticism, a time to strengthen public support for the EU. This shift requires an emphasis on the tangible benefits that EU membership brings to member states, including economic stability, enhanced security, and the promotion of shared values like democracy and human rights. By fostering greater awareness and understanding of the EU’s role in addressing cross-border challenges, citizens can better appreciate the advantages of unity over division. Engaging with local communities, encouraging open dialogues, and actively involving citizens in EU decision-making processes can further bridge the gap between the EU and its citizens, reinforcing a sense of belonging and shared purpose. This study has some limitations that can be addressed in future studies. First, the dataset is a point-in-time measure of public opinion, surveyed in the winter of 2022–2023. Due to the dynamic nature of the geopolitical environment, longitudinal studies are needed to examine how public support for EU sanctions may change over time in response to political, economic and military events. Second, other external factors can also be examined to gain a better picture of how other factors could shape people’s opinions. These range from cultural equivalence with Ukraine to geographical proximity to the war zone, exposure to social media narratives, and interaction with Ukrainian refugees. The role of media frames and disinformation campaigns in determining views on EU sanctions is another area that would require more work. Third, latent variables such as societal resilience, institutional trust, geopolitical affinity, and adherence to European values could provide a better understanding of the reasons for support or opposition to EU sanctions. Such variables could also explain the differences in public opinion between EU member states and between different demographic groups. Furthermore, as previous studies on public support (Onderco et al., Citation2023) have also shown, a comparative analysis with previous surveys, for example, in 2008 (Russia-Georgia war), 2014 (annexation of Crimea and Donbas war) with the full invasion of Ukraine in 2022–2023, could also be very useful. Although not directly compared in the current study, future research would benefit from a historical analysis component to explore the continuities and shifts in public opinion during these major geopolitical events and how they change in different EU countries. This would provide a better insight into how threat perceptions, economic concerns and EU identity evolve in response to Russian aggression and EU foreign policy initiatives. Supplemental Material Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2025.2476484. Additional informationFunding Dr Alessandro Indelicato research is funded by the research fellowship “Catalina Ruiz,” provided by the Consejo de Economía, Conocimiento y Empleo of the Gobierno de Canarias, the Agencia Canaria De Investigación Innovación Y Sociedad De La Información (ACIISI), and Fondo Social Europeo of the EU, through the Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain). Martín, J. C., & Indelicato, A. (2025). 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A new chapter in the EU-UK partnership Almost ten years ago, Prime Minister David Cameron called the Brexit referendum. In June 2016, a narrow majority (51.9%) of the British population voted to leave the EU. Cameron's resignation was followed by five prime ministers who had to deal with the consequences of this historic vote. On Monday, May 19, 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer, together with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Council President Antonio Costa, finally hosted the first official EU-UK summit after Brexit to announce a new strategic partnership between the UK and the EU. A "win-win" Starmer had already declared rapprochement with the EU to be a foreign policy priority when he took office. Now he has presented concrete results: After months of preparation, the EU and the UK signed a "Joint Declaration", a "Security and Defense Partnership" and a "Declaration of Intent on a Renewed Agenda for the UK and the EU". The scope of the agreement is indeed considerable. The depth of the agreements reached is currently the subject of debate in political and economic circles. For some, the cooperation goes too far, for others the results are too superficial. For Prime Minister Starmer, the result is clear: a "win-win" that puts the UK back on the world stage. In addition to defense policy cooperation, agreements were reached in the areas of veterinary standards, fishing rights, youth mobility and energy cooperation. The fact that a breakthrough was possible at all was not a matter of course: a number of points of contention that had strained relations between London and Brussels for years had to be resolved in advance. Despite ongoing differences - for example on fishing rights, the dynamic harmonization of standards and the free movement of young people - there was consensus on both sides on the need for close cooperation on defence policy. The core of the deal: defense cooperation At the heart of the new cooperation is the UK's participation in the EU's rearmament programs and initiatives. In the face of Russian aggression and growing transatlantic insecurity, the integration of the UK's military capabilities into European security and defense structures is a strategic necessity. The agreements enshrined in the new security and defense partnership include biannual foreign and security policy dialogues between the EU High Representative and UK Foreign and Defense Ministers. In addition, the High Representative will be able to invite the UK to high-level EU meetings, including the Council. An annual security and defense dialogue will accompany and further develop the implementation of the agreement. An important motivation on the part of London is undoubtedly its participation in the 159-billion-euro SAFE initiative, with which the EU aims to promote investment in the European Defense, Technology, and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Defense companies from third countries may cover a maximum of 35 percent of the contract value - unless their home country concludes a bilateral defense agreement with the EU as well as a separate technical agreement. The UK therefore needed the deal to take the first step towards overcoming these restrictions. Negotiations on the additional technical agreement are still ongoing, but according to Commission President von der Leyen, they should be concluded in just a few weeks. In return, London will accept a "pay-to-play" regulation. In addition to participation in SAFE, the signed security partnership also includes agreements on closer cooperation to improve military mobility, as well as the possibility of British troops participating in EU missions - particularly relevant should the USA withdraw from NATO initiatives. In view of the existential challenges facing the UK and the EU internationally, the defense agreement was indeed a clear "win-win". However, its conclusion was complicated by a number of unrelated issues in which conflicts of interest between EU member states and the UK at times even appeared to put the defense agreement at risk. Agricultural and food trade: obstacle and growth opportunity Prime Minister Starmer is under internal economic pressure. The consumer confidence index is at an all-time low, while inflation rose to 3.6% in April according to ONS forecasts - the highest level for two and a half years. The government expects a trade agreement with the EU in the area of agricultural and food products to lead to a noticeable reduction in food prices in British supermarkets and an increase in exports to the continent. However, PM Starmer ruled out a return to the single market or the customs union from the outset. He also wanted to avoid the impression that his "Brexit reset" could undermine the Brexit referendum vote. A sectoral deal in the area of veterinary standards, which relates to food safety, animal health and plant health regulations, was therefore a key objective for London. Specifically, the agreement aims to reduce bureaucratic hurdles for British agricultural and fisheries exports. Experts expect an increase in exports of up to 20 %. In return, the UK agreed to dynamic alignment with relevant EU regulations and promised contribution payments to co-finance work on the corresponding standardization. However, in order to make this veterinary deal possible, agreement had to be reached on the issue of fishing rights for European fishermen in British waters. Fishing rights: a risky compromise Some EU states, led by France, had made an extension of the current regulation, which grants European fishing boats access to British waters and would have expired next year, a condition for the unhindered access of British agricultural products to the European market. The EU wanted to prevent London from permanently benefiting from market facilitation without at the same time securing access for European fishermen. In the end, a compromise was reached: in return for an indefinite easing of British food exports, the UK would extend the existing fisheries regulation by twelve years. Although there is no temporal symmetry between the market facilitation for the British and the fishing rights of the Europeans, the current fishing regulation has been extended for significantly longer than the four years originally sought by London. Youth Mobility: postponed movement One particularly controversial point was the European desire for a comprehensive "Youth Mobility Scheme". Germany in particular pushed for a regulation that would make it easier for young people to live and work in the EU or the UK. A reduction in tuition fees for EU students at British universities was also under discussion. However, given the domestic political pressure from Reform UK, it would have been extremely risky for Prime Minister Keir Starmer to initiate even a partial return to European freedom of movement. In addition, the Prime Minister had only recently made an abrupt U-turn towards a more restrictive migration policy. It can be assumed that the negotiators did not include the term "youth mobility" in the final document, partly out of consideration for the Prime Minister's sensitive domestic political situation. Instead, the vaguely formulated will to work together towards a "balanced Youth Experience Scheme" with upper limits and a time limit was recorded. The domestic debate: the spirit of Brexit lives on While the powerful representatives of the British industry welcomed the agreements and arrangements between the UK and the EU in principle and refrained from making either euphoric or critical statements, the British fishing industry came out with particularly harsh criticism. Although the fishing industry's annual turnover is comparatively small - equivalent to that of the London department store Harrods - the issue of fishing rights in the UK has taken on totemic significance since the Brexit referendum and is intricately linked to the issue of national sovereignty. The Scottish Fishermen's Federation described the deal as "a horror show" and Scotland's First Minister, John Swinney, claimed that the UK government had abandoned the fishing industry with the deal. Nevertheless, even though these stakeholders are aware that the new agreement extends the current status quo, the UK government is providing additional funding to coastal towns and fishery products will now have easier access to the European market. For the opposition, the rapprochement with the EU is still a red rag. Kemi Badenoch, leader of the Conservatives, the architects of Brexit, railed that Keir Starmer saw nothing historic about the deal. "We want to talk about the future - but this agreement takes us back to the past. That's why we call it a capitulation." The United Kingdom was in danger of becoming a mere "rule recipient". The criticism from Brexit fanatic Nigel Farage was even harsher. The Reform UK leader described the compromise as a "betrayal" and a "sell-out of British interests". Both the Tories and Reform UK announced their intention to reverse the deal, which is not binding under international law if they win the next general election. After all, Nigel Farage had made a name for himself as a Brexit campaigner and the Tories had implemented a "hard" Brexit. Under Starmer's Conservative predecessors, the UK had broken away from the EU and laid claim to forging new partnerships worldwide. The slogan "Global Britain" was coined as a deliberate contrast to the old integration into the EU but fell short of the announcements and expectations in terms of implementation. Between Brexit reset and Global Britain Instead, it is Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer who is approaching this ambition and vision with concrete results. Since taking office, the PM has quickly finalized trade agreements that his predecessors were denied - with India, with the Trump administration and now with the EU. What others promised, he implemented. The latest agreement with the EU is his greatest foreign policy success to date. Europe and the UK share common values and security interests, and the EU remains the UK's most important trading partner. Whether the "win-win" deal will contribute to economic recovery in the short term remains to be seen. However, the domestic political urgency of tangible successes is undisputed. The door for a further deepening of cooperation has only just been opened with the agreements sealed in Lancaster House: the far-reaching "renewed agenda" will have to be filled with life in the coming months and years through further negotiations. Differences remain on key issues such as the internal market and the role of the Strasbourg Court of Justice. Although the successes of this summit mark the beginning of a new chapter, its text will not be written in itself. With the Brexit reset, Starmer is taking a calculated risk - he is betting that the path to Global Britain will lead via a "Brexit reset" of relations with the EU. Whether this approach will lead him to re-election as the first prime minister since David Cameron will depend on whether the reset also takes effect domestically.

Abstract The EU-India–Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, relaunched in 2022 after a nine-year hiatus, represent a significant step towards deepening economic and geopolitical ties between the European Union (EU) and India. The agreement, with its potential to eliminate tariffs, reduce non-tariff barriers, and enhance market access, particularly in services such as telecommunications, could substantially increase trade volume between the two entities, offering promising economic prospects. By creating a combined market of over 1.5 billion people, the FTA offers significant economic opportunities in sectors such as chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment. More importantly, it serves as a geopolitical tool aligned with the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, aiming to strengthen partnerships with like-minded democracies and potentially counterbalance China’s increasing influence, reassuring them about its geopolitical implications. Therefore, this study examines the potential economic and geopolitical opportunities and challenges associated with the EU-India FTA. It concludes that, perhaps unsurprisingly, much depends on the foreign and security policies of great powers such as the US, China, and Russia. Key Words: EU, India, Free Trade Area, Geopolitics Introduction Negotiations regarding the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) were initially launched in 2007. The talks were suspended in 2013 due to a gap in ambition and resumed after a nine-year pause with a formal relaunch on June 17, 2022, announced by Union Minister Piyush Goyal and European Commission Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis in Brussels.[i] This relaunch also included separate negotiations for an Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) and an Agreement on Geographical Indications (GIs), reflecting a broader agenda to enhance bilateral economic relations. The EU is India's largest trading partner, accounting for €124 billion in goods trade by 2023 (12.2% of the total Indian trade). India is the EU’s ninth-largest trading partner, representing 2.2% of the total trade in goods. Trade in services reached €59.7 billion in 2023, nearly double the 2020 level, with a significant portion being digital services, highlighting the growing economic interdependence.[ii]       *Data acquired from the European Commission at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en Negotiation Rounds and Progress Since the relaunch, ten rounds of negotiations have been conducted, with the following timeline detailing key developments:   ·         Acquired through Grok. Prompt: What is the latest on the EU – India FTA Negotiations? At: https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=1922705918707265888 (14 May 2025) What is so important regarding FTAs? Free Trade Areas (FTAs) have become the cornerstone of international trade policy by reshaping global economic landscapes and geopolitical dynamics. These agreements aim to reduce trade barriers and foster economic cooperation among member states; however, their implications extend far beyond mere economic exchanges. Economic Consequences of Free Trade Areas One of the primary economic consequences of FTAs is the creation of new trade opportunities among the member states. By reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, FTAs encourage specialisation and efficiency and increase trade volumes. For instance, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is expected to boost intra-African trade by creating a single market for goods and services that can unlock regional value chains and enhance economic integration.[i]  Similarly, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has expanded trade between Indonesia and China, although the benefits may be asymmetric, with Indonesia's imports growing faster than exports.[ii] However, FTAs can also lead to trade diversion, in which member states import goods at the expense of non-member countries. This phenomenon can harm non-members by reducing market access and undermining global trade liberalisation efforts.[iii] For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which never entered into force,[iv] and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which shared the same fate, were criticised for potentially marginalising non-member states and creating a fragmented global trade system.[v] FTAs often attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by creating more integrated markets. For instance, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has stimulated FDI inflows into member states such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, contributing to GDP growth.[vi] Similarly, establishing Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in China has promoted financial employment and industrial upgrading, particularly in the middle and western regions, balancing regional development.[vii] However, the benefits of FTAs are not always distributed evenly. Some studies suggest that while FTAs may boost economic growth for member states, non-members may experience adverse impacts such as reduced trade volumes and deteriorating terms of trade.[viii] Geopolitical Consequences of Free Trade Areas FTAs often serve as tools for geopolitical influence, allowing powerful states to shape their global economic order. For example, the TTIP and TPP were partly designed to counterbalance China's rising economic influence and establish new trade standards.[ix] Similarly, the RCEP has reinforced China's economic leadership in Asia, while the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) has allowed the United States to maintain its influence in North America.[x] For smaller countries like Vietnam, FTAs can enhance international recognition and strategic balancing between major powers, contribute to regional integration and stability, influence internal political legitimacy and power dynamics, and provide tools to manage geopolitical risks and external shocks. FTAs, especially New Generation Free Trade Agreements (NGFTAs) such as the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), act as economic instruments and geopolitical tools that shape Vietnam's global and regional order position.[xi] The geopolitical implications of FTAs are evident in their impact on international trade governance. The proliferation of mega-regional trade agreements has challenged the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO), creating a fragmented trade landscape.[xii] This shift has raised concerns about the marginalisation of developing countries and the erosion of global trade rules. FTAs can also mitigate interstate conflict by increasing war costs. For instance, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) catalyses regional peace, fostering economic interdependence and reducing the likelihood of conflict.[xiii] Similarly, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has strengthened economic ties between Indonesia and China, reducing potential geopolitical tensions in the region.[xiv] FTAs are not always effective in preventing conflict. In some cases, they may exacerbate tensions by creating unequal benefits or excluding certain states. For example, the TPP and TTIP have been criticised for their exclusionary nature, which may have contributed to trade tensions between member and non-member states.[xv] FTAs often serve as building blocks for broader regional integrations. For instance, the EU began a series of FTAs and customs unions before evolving into a deeply integrated economic and political bloc. Similarly, AfCFTA is part of a broader vision for African economic integration, aiming to create a single market and customs union. The proliferation of FTAs has also raised concerns regarding the future of multilateralism. The Doha Round of WTO negotiations has stalled, and the rise of mega-regional trade agreements has further fragmented the global trade system.[xvi] This has led to calls for a more inclusive and equitable approach to trade governance that ensures that developing countries are not left behind.Free trade has profound economic and geopolitical consequences. It shapes global trade patterns, influences regional stability, and affects the distribution of wealth and power. Although FTAs offer significant economic growth and integration opportunities, they also pose inequality, exclusion, and sustainability challenges. EU – India FTA Opportunities Economic The potential Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and India presents significant economic opportunities for the EU driven by eliminating trade barriers, increased market access, and deeper economic integration. First, the services sector is a critical area where the EU can benefit significantly from an FTA with India. The EU's services exports to India could more than double, while India's services exports to the EU would increase by approximately 50%.[xvii] This growth is attributed to reduced trade barriers and the liberalisation of sectors such as telecommunications, which has been identified as a key area for reform. Arguably, half of the predicted export expansion is driven by reforms to domestic regulations, particularly in the telecommunications sector, which could further enhance the EU's competitive position in the Indian market. The FTA is expected to eliminate tariffs and reduce non-tariff barriers, creating a more level-playing field for the EU businesses in India. The FTA of EU-Indian trade could approximately double, particularly in business services.[xviii] This liberalisation would increase trade volumes and lead to structural changes in both economies, with the EU potentially gaining a competitive advantage in high-value-added sectors. The FTA would create a combined market of over 1.5 billion people, enabling the EU and India to reap the benefits of economies of scale. This integration would be particularly beneficial for manufactured goods, such as chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment, where intra-industry trade could lead to efficiency gains and cost reductions. These economies of scale could also give the EU a competitive edge in global markets, helping to stimulate economic growth and job creation.[xix] Geopolitics and security The EU–India FTA is an economic arrangement and a geopolitical tool that aligns with the EU's broader objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU's geopolitical position and security interests are central to understanding the opportunities and challenges presented by the FTA. The EU's engagement with India through the FTA is deeply rooted in its Indo-Pacific strategy, formally launched in 2021. This reflects the EU's ambition to strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, an area increasingly characterised by multipolar competition, particularly between the United States and China. The EU's strategy is driven by recognising that the Indo-Pacific is the "pivotal region" of the 21st century, and its economic and security dynamics will shape global governance.[xx] While the EU's new strategy does not take a confrontational stance towards China, it reflects increased concerns about Beijing’s growing assertiveness and the implications of the US-China rivalry for Europe. The strategy advocates for a multifaceted engagement with China, encouraging cooperation and protecting EU interests and values. An FTA with India is a key component of the EU’s strategy. India's growing economic and political influence in the Indo-Pacific region makes it a critical partner for the EU. The EU views India as a like-minded democracy that shares concerns about China's assertiveness and the need for a rule-based international order. This alignment creates a unique opportunity for the EU to deepen its strategic partnership with India by leveraging economic cooperation to strengthen geopolitics.[xxi] The EU's engagement with India is part of its broader effort to strengthen security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU and India share concerns regarding maritime security, cybersecurity, and the challenges posed by China's growing influence in the region. The FTA can serve as a foundation for deeper collaboration on security issues such as counterterrorism, non-proliferation, and disaster management.[xxii] The EU's security strategy in the Indo-Pacific also emphasises the importance of upholding a rule-based international order. An FTA with India can help promote this objective by reinforcing shared norms and standards in trade, investment, and intellectual property rights. This alignment is critical in China's increasing assertiveness and need for like-minded partners to counterbalance its influence.[xxiii] The EU's approach to an FTA is also shaped by its identity as a normative power. The EU has historically sought to promote its values, such as human rights, environmental sustainability, and social justice, through trade agreements. The FTA with India allows for advancing these values by incorporating labour rights, environmental protection, and sustainable development clauses.[xxiv] However, its geopolitical and economic realities constrain the EU’s ability to promote its normative agenda. The EU must be pragmatic and balance its value-based approach with the need to secure concessions on market access and other economic interests. This tension is evident in EU trade policy, where strategic and economic interests often precede normative objectives.[xxv] EU – India FTA Challenges Existing literature on the challenges the EU–India FTA poses is sparse. Generally, scholars admit that FTA, especially those negotiated by the EU, can face varying degrees of politicisation and contestation from civil society, as seen with TTIP and CETA.[xxvi] This finding suggests the potential for public opposition to new FTAs. In addition, the EU often pursues ambitious agreements beyond tariff reductions, including behind-the-border measures and regulatory cooperation.[xxvii] While FTAs aim to boost trade, their impact can be uneven. Some agreements have failed to entirely realise the expected benefits of trade and investment flows.[xxviii] There are also concerns that FTAs may reduce policy space for developing country partners to pursue alternative development strategies.[xxix] Economic However, several economic challenges regarding the EU-India negotiated FTA can be easily identified. To begin, the talks were stuck for nearly two decades, mainly because the EU and India had different goals. The EU wants deeper integration, including investment and competition policies, whereas India prefers a more limited agreement. This has led to repeated delays, and little progress has been made. Specifically, market access has been a point of contention, especially in sensitive sectors such as agriculture and automobiles. India imposes high tariffs on EU cars (60-100%) compared to the EU's 6.5% on Indian cars, and it protects its agricultural sector, making it difficult for EU farmers to enter the market. The EU also wanted India to open up services such as accountancy and legal work, but India resisted due to fears of competition.[xxx] The EU has strict rules, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and sustainability directives, which India sees as overregulatory and burdensome. This creates friction, as India worries these rules could act as trade barriers. There are also issues with intellectual property rights, where the EU wants stronger protection, but India resists keeping generic drugs affordable.[xxxi] Finally, the EU has invested heavily in India, around €100 billion by 2020, but India's decision to end bilateral investment treaties in 2016 and stalled talks on investment protection since 2023 creates uncertainty. There is also a trust deficit, with India fearing EU regulatory overreach and the EU worrying about compliance.[xxxii] Geopolitics and security As mentioned above, the EU's engagement with India is part of its broader strategy to deepen ties with the Indo-Pacific region. This strategy is driven by the need to counterbalance rising powers like China and enhance its global influence. The EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Global Gateway Initiative reflect this ambition, emphasising the importance of strategic partnerships with like-minded actors such as India.[xxxiii] China's growing economic and military presence in the Indo-Pacific region poses a significant challenge for the EU and India. The EU has expressed concerns about China's assertive behaviour in the South China Sea and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is seen as a tool for expanding Chinese influence.[xxxiv] The EU and India share a common interest in promoting rules-based international order and countering China's increasing dominance. This alignment has been a key driver of their strategic partnership, with both sides seeking to enhance trade, technology, and security cooperation.[xxxv] The Russia-Ukraine war has further complicated the geopolitical landscape, with significant implications for EU-India relations. While the EU has strongly supported Ukraine, India has maintained a more neutral stance by prioritising its strategic partnership with Russia.[xxxvi] This divergence in approach has created tensions, particularly in terms of energy security and sanctions, which could impact FTA negotiations. The EU and India face various traditional security challenges that affect their strategic partnerships and FTA negotiations. China's military modernisation and assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region have heightened security concerns for the EU and India. The EU has expressed support for India's role in maintaining regional stability, particularly in China's actions in the South China Sea and along the India-China border.[xxxvii] The EU and India are also concerned about regional instability, including Myanmar and the Korean Peninsula. These issues underscore the need for enhanced security cooperation between the two partners.[xxxviii] As for non-traditional security challenges, climate change and energy security are key areas of cooperation between the EU and India. The EU has emphasised the importance of transitioning to renewable energy sources, while India has sought to balance its energy needs with environmental concerns.[xxxix] In addition, the increasing importance of digital technologies has highlighted the need for cooperation in cybersecurity and data protection areas. The EU and India are interested in collaborating with digital infrastructure and innovation.[xl] Conclusion According to the European Parliament, “India was among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community in 1962. With the formal establishment of the EU in 1993, India signed a Cooperation Agreement in 1994, which opened the door to broader political interaction between the two. […] The relationship was upgraded to a 'Strategic Partnership' during The Hague's 5th India-EU Summit in 2004. From 1980 to 2005, EU-India trade grew from €4.4 billion to €40 billion. The EU was India's largest trading partner at the time, accounting for 22.4% of Indian exports and 20.8% of imports”.[xli] Despite these incentives, India's historical emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance can sometimes clash with the EU's multilateral approach.[xlii] Further, India's complex relationship with Russia, particularly its continued reliance on Russian defence technology, presents a challenge for closer EU-India security cooperation.[xliii] Finally, although the EU and India share concerns about China's growing influence, their strategies for managing this challenge may differ. 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Dr. Gabriele Abbondanza is Lecturer and Marie Curie Fellow at the University of Madrid (UCM), Associate Researcher at the University of Sydney (USYD), and Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).As the Indo-Pacific gradually becomes the world’s geopolitical and geoeconomic epicentre, states and regional organisations are progressively pivoting to it. Due to a combination of drivers – chiefly US pressure, economic opportunities, strategic interests and politico-normative priorities – European and Indo-Pacific actors have increased cooperation with Washington and NATO in the region. However, the second Trump administration looks considerably less aligned with the conventional pillars of US foreign policy. In light of the unfolding fracture between the US and its European allies over Ukraine, what lies ahead for NATO-Europe-US cooperation in the Indo-Pacific? [1] The priorities of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners The so-called Indo-Pacific Four (Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand – IP4) are NATO’s regional partners as well as formal US allies, each of them with specific priorities and concerns. Australia is possibly the US’s most unwavering ally in the Indo-Pacific. Canberra has second-tier yet noticeable military capabilities, a large military expenditure and moderate expeditionary experience.[2] The country has cooperated with NATO in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, and is a NATO “Enhanced Opportunities Partner”.[3] Consequently, greater Australia-NATO cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is foreseeable, although this would require US approval and would be subject to President Trump’s transactional approach. Japan is another steadfast Indo-Pacific player, being the country in which the modern iteration of the “Indo-Pacific” as a strategic concept originated. Tokyo is acutely threat-aware – its exclusive economic zones border both China’s and Russia’s – and is entirely aligned with Washington. Despite the country’s constitutional and budgetary limitations, its military capabilities are very significant, although their deployments are traditionally minimal. Japan has mostly supported NATO via financial means, yet the latest tailored partnership shows much scope for future cooperation. As with Australia, any major NATO-oriented development is subordinated to US approval. South Korea is a more recent component of the Indo-Pacific equation, chiefly due to its vast security-trade divide visà-vis the US (a treaty ally with around 30,000 troops stationed in the country) and China (whose bilateral trade is worth over 300 billion dollars). Even so, the country is now more explicitly aligned with the US, and although its contribution to NATO activities is less prominent than Australia’s, Seoul’s position as a major defence player could stimulate stronger cooperation with the Alliance in the region. Once again, a continuing US commitment would be a prerequisite in this case too. Lastly, New Zealand, arguably the “odd man out” among the IP4 due to its low threat perception, its focus on non-traditional security, the nuclear-free policy in its waters, a consequently “milder” relationship with the US, and its lower material capabilities. Still, Wellington has recently performed passing exercises (PASSEXs),[4] it has previously supported NATO in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean, and currently focuses on technology and military capacitybuilding. Hence, more cooperation in these specific areas could be envisioned, given their “low-security” perimeter. In short, the IP4 displays varying degrees of Indo-Pacific cooperation with NATO. While there is a general convergence on greater involvement, stronger cooperation traditionally requires US consent, which is a less straightforward condition compared to the past. Europe at a crossroads Europe’s interaction with the IndoPacific is gaining momentum, despite being relatively recent. The spillover effects of Indo-Pacific security issues have prompted a widespread recognition of the region’s significance, including the “big four” (France, the UK, Germany and Italy) with their broad alignment to the US, large material capabilities (and blue-water navies) and expeditionary experience.[5] This development holds much promise for Europe-NATO convergence in the region, also considering their substantial cooperation in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. France spearheaded the European approach to the Indo-Pacific, on account of its status of “resident power” (with overseas territories, population and military bases in the region), through an effective combination of hard and soft power. The UK, the only other resident power, has systematically engaged with the region in more recent times, following a more traditional (USled) balancing strategy. Germany and the Netherlands, two major trading nations, tend to interact with the IndoPacific in a more “neutral” way, with Germany trying to limit its excessive reliance on China. Italy represents a particular case, as its economic, normative and security engagement (including major deployments and naval diplomacy) in the region is both rooted and substantial (the country’s “Enlarged Mediterranean” sphere of interest overlaps with the western Indo-Pacific), although it does not have a formal regional strategy (yet).[6] The EU, too, has openly recognised the necessity of an Indo-Pacific pivot and is pursuing it with its own policy tools.[7] Lastly, other European countries – virtually all NATO members – are gradually refocusing on this region. However, the widening fracture with Europe’s greatest ally – the US – marks a major shift in transatlantic relations. While this may not be a permanent turn in US foreign policy, Washington’s instability is prompting Europe to do more, to do better and to do it rapidly. On the one hand, the current US posture is already spurring a greater European role in its immediate neighbourhood, which undoubtedly remains the main priority area. On the other, given that Europe’s interests are now inextricably intertwined with the Indo-Pacific, a stronger European activism in this region is altogether possible, mainly due to economic, strategic and political interests, in addition to renewed US burden-sharing pressures. As more intense rivalry with China is unlikely due to well-known issues concerning political and material resources, greater cooperation with Europe’s many IndoPacific partners – including the NATO IP4[8] – may well represent a realistic step forward towards further developing European countries’ role in the region. To achieve this, Europe needs a more realistic (that is, higher) threat awareness, greater defence spending, more integrated defence systems[9] and, arguably, a European security-oriented minilateral which gathers a “coalition of the willing” aiming to protect Europe and its partners. This can take the form of a “European pillar” within NATO and/or a European defence union, among other options. Although these are remarkably ambitious goals, challenging times warrant more decisive actions. Shockwaves from Washington, and how to navigate them In the Euro-Atlantic area, Washington is the informal though undisputed leader within NATO; in the Indo-Pacific, it is at the helm of a ‘hub and spokes system’ of alliances and partnerships. This latticework of security architectures has guaranteed stability for US allies – and US primacy – for around 80 years.[10] Today, this unprecedented collective security endeavour faces not only external challenges – chiefly Russian and Chinese revisionism – but also internal ones due to Trump’s destabilising policies. The latter are creating divisions among NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, preoccupations among Indo-Pacific partners (Taiwan above all) and, conversely, greater confidence among systemic rivals. While Washington’s sudden unreliability in supporting Ukraine cannot be fully compared to the Taiwan case – chiefly due to the US grand strategy’s emphasis on the IndoPacific – the Trump administration’s recent foreign policy demands higher cooperation between NATO’s members and global partners. Stronger support for maritime security, interoperability, reciprocal access agreements and cooperation on non-traditional security issues are necessary. Nevertheless, this shouldn’t necessarily take place with NATO’s official aegis, given the Indo-Pacific’s traditional wariness of security-based initiatives, hard power politics and confrontational approaches more in general, which has led to many states adopting “hedging postures” over the years. Amidst the volatile 2020s, two final implications stand out. First, the IndoPacific’s sheer importance can no longer be ignored. While other regions acknowledged it long ago, Europe is making up for the time lost, although it still lacks a unified approach. Second, as the US adds to global uncertainties rather than addressing them, allies and partners must assume greater international roles while hoping that cooperation eventually resumes. This should prompt greater EuropeIndo-Pacific-NATO cooperation in light of growing economic, political, and security interdependence.  Some recent developments – the Draghi and Letta reports for the EU, the European Commission’s response to them, NATO’s resilience amid this uncertainty – are promising, though only time will tell if they will produce the foreign policy shifts that are required to adapt to a more challenging 21st century. NOTES & REFERENCES [1] This op-ed draws on the author’s contribution to a recent high-level roundtable organised by the NATO Defense College Foundation. See “A Roma esperti a confronto sul futuro ruolo della Nato nell’Indo-Pacifico”, in Agenzia Nova, 4 March 2025, https://www.agenzianova.com/news/?p=395219.  [2] Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index 2023: Australia,https://www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/countrySheetPage?countries=36&years=2023. [3] NATO, Relations with Partners in the IndoPacific Region, 24 October 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/el/natohq/topics_183254.htm. [4] They entail the passage (without military exercises) through international or territorial waters as granted by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.[5] Gabriele Abbondanza and Thomas Wilkins, “Europe in the Indo-Pacific: Economic, Security, and Normative Engagement”, in International Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 5 (November 2024), p. 640-646, https:// doi.org/10.1177/01925121231202694; Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index 2023, https://www.globalpresence. realinstitutoelcano.org/en. [6] Gabriele Abbondanza, “Italy’s Quiet Pivot to the Indo-Pacific: Towards an Italian Indo-Pacific Strategy”, in International Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 5 (November 2024), p. 669- 679, https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231190093. [7] Gorana Grgić, “Ambition, Meet Reality: The European Union’s Actorness in the Indo-Pacific”, in International Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 5 (November 2024), p. 680-689, https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231191275. [8] Giulio Pugliese, “How to Facilitate NATOIP4 Defense Industrial Cooperation: The Case of Italy and Japan”, in Liselotte Odgaard (ed.), Moving the NATO-IP4 Partnership from Dialogue to Cooperation Maritime Security and Next-Generation Technologies, Washington, Hudson Institute, March 2025, p. 32-35, https:// www.hudson.org/node/49515. [9]  Gaia Ravazzolo and Alessandro Marrone, “EU Defence Industrial Initiatives: A Quantum Leap Is Needed”, in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|79 (December 2024),https://www.iai.it/en/node/19309. [10] Thomas Wilkins, “A Hub-and-Spokes ‘Plus’ Model of US Alliances in the Indo-Pacific: Towards a New ‘Networked’ Design”, in Elena Atanassova-Cornelis Yoichiro Sato and Tom Sauer (eds), Alliances in Asia and Europe. The Evolving Indo-Pacific Strategic Context and Inter-Regional Alignments, London, Routledge, 2023, p. 8-31. 

International efforts, such as the Paris Agreement, aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But experts say countries aren’t doing enough to limit dangerous global warming. Summary Countries have debated how to combat climate change since the early 1990s. These negotiations have produced several important accords, including the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Governments generally agree on the science behind climate change but have diverged on who is most responsible, how to track emissions-reduction goals, and whether to compensate harder-hit countries. The findings of the first global stocktake, discussed at the 2023 UN Climate Summit in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), concluded that governments need to do more to prevent the global average temperature from rising by 1.5°C. Introduction Over the last several decades, governments have collectively pledged to slow global warming. But despite intensified diplomacy, the world is already facing the consequences of climate change, and they are expected to get worse. Through the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, countries agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere keeps rising, heating the Earth at an alarming rate. Scientists warn that if this warming continues unabated, it could bring environmental catastrophe to much of the world, including staggering sea-level rise, devastating wildfires, record-breaking droughts and floods, and widespread species loss. Since negotiating the Paris accord in 2015, many of the 195 countries that are party to the agreement have strengthened their climate commitments—to include pledges on curbing emissions and supporting countries in adapting to the effects of extreme weather—during the annual UN climate conferences known as the Conference of the Parties (COP). While experts note that clear progress has been made towards the clean energy transition, cutting current emissions has proven challenging for the world’s top emitters. The United States, for instance, could be poised to ramp up fossil fuel production linked to global warming under the Donald Trump administration, which has previously minimized the effects of climate change and has withdrawn twice from the Paris Agreement. What are the most important international agreements on climate change? Montreal Protocol, 1987. Though not intended to tackle climate change, the Montreal Protocol [PDF] was a historic environmental accord that became a model for future diplomacy on the issue. Every country in the world eventually ratified the treaty, which required them to stop producing substances that damage the ozone layer, such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The protocol has succeeded in eliminating nearly 99 percent of these ozone-depleting substances. In 2016, parties agreed via the Kigali Amendment to also reduce their production of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), powerful greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992. Ratified by 197 countries, including the United States, the landmark accord [PDF] was the first global treaty to explicitly address climate change. It established an annual forum, known as the Conference of the Parties, or COP, for international discussions aimed at stabilizing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. These meetings produced the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Kyoto Protocol, 2005. The Kyoto Protocol [PDF], adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005, was the first legally binding climate treaty. It required developed countries to reduce emissions by an average of 5 percent below 1990 levels, and established a system to monitor countries’ progress. But the treaty did not compel developing countries, including major carbon emitters China and India, to take action. The United States signed the agreement in 1998 but never ratified it and later withdrew its signature.  Paris Agreement, 2015. The most significant global climate agreement to date, the Paris Agreement requires all countries to set emissions-reduction pledges. Governments set targets, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs), with the goals of preventing the global average temperature from rising 2°C (3.6°F) above preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to keep it below 1.5°C (2.7°F). It also aims to reach global net-zero emissions, where the amount of greenhouse gases emitted equals the amount removed from the atmosphere, in the second half of the century. (This is also known as being climate neutral or carbon neutral.) The United States, the world’s second-largest emitter, is the only country to withdraw from the agreement, a move President Donald Trump made during his first administration in 2017. While former President Joe Biden reentered the agreement during his first day in office, Trump again withdrew the United States on the first day of his second administration in 2025. Three other countries have not formally approved the agreement: Iran, Libya, and Yemen. Is there a consensus on the science of climate change? Yes, there is a broad consensus among the scientific community, though some deny that climate change is a problem, including politicians in the United States. When negotiating teams meet for international climate talks, there is “less skepticism about the science and more disagreement about how to set priorities,” says David Victor, an international relations professor at the University of California, San Diego. The basic science is that:• the Earth’s average temperature is rising at an unprecedented rate; • human activities, namely the use of fossil fuels—coal, oil, and natural gas—are the primary drivers of this rapid warming and climate change; and,• continued warming is expected to have harmful effects worldwide. Data taken from ice cores shows that the Earth’s average temperature is rising more now than it has in eight hundred thousand years. Scientists say this is largely a result of human activities over the last 150 years, such as burning fossil fuels and deforestation. These activities have dramatically increased the amount of heat-trapping greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere, causing the planet to warm. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a UN body established in 1988, regularly assesses the latest climate science and produces consensus-based reports for countries. Why are countries aiming to keep global temperature rise below 1.5°C? Scientists have warned for years of catastrophic environmental consequences if global temperature continues to rise at the current pace. The Earth’s average temperature has already increased approximately 1.1°C above preindustrial levels, according to a 2023 assessment by the IPCC. The report, drafted by more than two hundred scientists from over sixty countries, predicts that the world will reach or exceed 1.5°C of warming within the next two decades even if nations drastically cut emissions immediately. (Several estimates report that global warming already surpassed that threshold in 2024.) An earlier, more comprehensive IPCC report summarized the severe effects expected to occur when the global temperature warms by 1.5°C: Heat waves. Many regions will suffer more hot days, with about 14 percent of people worldwide being exposed to periods of severe heat at least once every five years. Droughts and floods. Regions will be more susceptible to droughts and floods, making farming more difficult, lowering crop yields, and causing food shortages.  Rising seas. Tens of millions of people live in coastal regions that will be submerged in the coming decades. Small island nations are particularly vulnerable. Ocean changes. Up to 90 percent of coral reefs will be wiped out, and oceans will become more acidic. The world’s fisheries will become far less productive. Arctic ice thaws. At least once a century, the Arctic will experience a summer with no sea ice, which has not happened in at least two thousand years. Forty percent of the Arctic’s permafrost will thaw by the end of the century.  Species loss. More insects, plants, and vertebrates will be at risk of extinction.  The consequences will be far worse if the 2°C threshold is reached, scientists say. “We’re headed toward disaster if we can’t get our warming in check and we need to do this very quickly,” says Alice C. Hill, CFR senior fellow for energy and the environment. Which countries are responsible for climate change? The answer depends on who you ask and how you measure emissions. Ever since the first climate talks in the 1990s, officials have debated which countries—developed or developing—are more to blame for climate change and should therefore curb their emissions. Developing countries argue that developed countries have emitted more greenhouse gases over time. They say these developed countries should now carry more of the burden because they were able to grow their economies without restraint. Indeed, the United States has emitted the most of all time, followed by the European Union (EU).   However, China and India are now among the world’s top annual emitters, along with the United States. Developed countries have argued that those countries must do more now to address climate change.   In the context of this debate, major climate agreements have evolved in how they pursue emissions reductions. The Kyoto Protocol required only developed countries to reduce emissions, while the Paris Agreement recognized that climate change is a shared problem and called on all countries to set emissions targets. What progress have countries made since the Paris Agreement? Every five years, countries are supposed to assess their progress toward implementing the agreement through a process known as the global stocktake. The first of these reports, released in September 2023, warned governments that “the world is not on track to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.” That said, countries have made some breakthroughs during the annual UN climate summits, such as the landmark commitment to establish the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. The fund aims to address the inequality of climate change by providing financial assistance to poorer countries, which are often least responsible for global emissions yet most vulnerable to climate disasters. At COP28, countries decided that the fund will be initially housed at the World Bank, with several wealthy countries, such as the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and EU members, initially pledging around $430 million combined. At COP29, developed countries committed to triple their finance commitments to developing countries, totalling $300 billion annually by 2035. Recently, there have been global efforts to cut methane emissions, which account for more than half of human-made warming today because of their higher potency and heat trapping ability within the first few decades of release. The United States and EU introduced a Global Methane Pledge at COP26, which aims to slash 30 percent of methane emissions levels between 2020 and 2030. At COP28, oil companies announced they would cut their methane emissions from wells and drilling by more than 80 percent by the end of the decade. However, pledges to phase out fossil fuels were not renewed the following year at COP29. Are the commitments made under the Paris Agreement enough? Most experts say that countries’ pledges are not ambitious enough and will not be enacted quickly enough to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C. The policies of Paris signatories as of late 2022 could result in a 2.7°C (4.9°F) rise by 2100, according to the Climate Action Tracker compiled by Germany-based nonprofits Climate Analytics and the NewClimate Institute. “The Paris Agreement is not enough. Even at the time of negotiation, it was recognized as not being enough,” says CFR’s Hill. “It was only a first step, and the expectation was that as time went on, countries would return with greater ambition to cut their emissions.” Since 2015, dozens of countries—including the top emitters—have submitted stronger pledges. For example, President Biden announced in 2021 that the United States will aim to cut emissions by 50 to 52 percent compared to 2005 levels by 2030, doubling former President Barack Obama’s commitment. The following year, the U.S. Congress approved legislation that could get the country close to reaching that goal. Meanwhile, the EU pledged to reduce emissions by at least 55 percent compared to 1990 levels by 2030, and China said it aims to reach peak emissions before 2030. But the world’s average temperature will still rise more than 2°C (3.6°F) by 2100 even if countries fully implement their pledges for 2030 and beyond. If the more than one hundred countries that have set or are considering net-zero targets follow through, warming could be limited to 1.8˚C (3.2°F), according to the Climate Action Tracker.   What are the alternatives to the Paris Agreement? Some experts foresee the most meaningful climate action happening in other forums. Yale University economist William Nordhaus says that purely voluntary international accords like the Paris Agreement promote free-riding and are destined to fail. The best way to cut global emissions, he says, would be to have governments negotiate a universal carbon price rather than focus on country emissions limits. Others propose new agreements [PDF] that apply to specific emissions or sectors to complement the Paris Agreement.  In recent years, climate diplomacy has occurred increasingly through minilateral groupings. The Group of Twenty (G20), representing countries that are responsible for 80 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas pollution, has pledged to stop financing new coal-fired power plants abroad and agreed to triple renewable energy capacity by the end of this decade. However, G20 governments have thus far failed to set a deadline to phase out fossil fuels. In 2022, countries in the International Civil Aviation Organization set a goal of achieving net-zero emissions for commercial aviation by 2050. Meanwhile, cities around the world have made their own pledges. In the United States, more than six hundred local governments [PDF] have detailed climate action plans that include emissions-reduction targets. Industry is also a large source of carbon pollution, and many firms have said they will try to reduce their emissions or become carbon neutral or carbon negative, meaning they would remove more carbon from the atmosphere than they release. The Science Based Targets initiative, a UK-based company considered the “gold standard” in validating corporate net-zero plans, says it has certified the plans of  over three thousand firms, and aims to more than triple this total by 2025. Still, analysts say that many challenges remain, including questions over the accounting methods and a lack of transparency in supply chains. Recommended Resources This timeline tracks UN climate talks since 1992. CFR Education’s latest resources explain everything to know about climate change.  The Climate Action Tracker assesses countries’ updated NDCs under the Paris Agreement. CFR Senior Fellow Varun Sivaram discusses how the 2025 U.S. wildfires demonstrate the need to rethink climate diplomacy and adopt a pragmatic response to falling short of global climate goals. In this series on climate change and instability by the Center for Preventive Action, CFR Senior Fellow Michelle Gavin looks at the consequences for the Horn of Africa and the National Defense University’s Paul J. Angelo for Central America. This backgrounder by Clara Fong unpacks the global push for climate financing.