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Defense & Security
Bombings and war between Israel and Hamas

Israel has a history of unsuccessful invasions of Lebanon. Will this time be any different?

by Amin Saikal

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Following a massive bombardment of Lebanon, Israel has begun a land invasion of its northern neighbour. Troops have entered southern Lebanon in a bid to push Hezbollah back beyond the Litani River, 29 kilometres from the Israeli border. The stated goal is to facilitate the return of some 60,000 displaced Israelis to their homes in northern Israel. By killing Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah and several of his commanders over the weekend, Israel has already struck a serious blow to the group. This has boosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s profile, despite a majority of Israelis wanting to see his departure. Israel is now set to repeat its Gaza operations in Lebanon, with a view to reordering the Middle East in its own interests. But has it bitten off more than it can chew? Unsuccessful track record  Israel has been here before. It invaded Lebanon as far as the capital Beirut in 1982, in an attempt to eliminate the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It was trying to extinguish the Palestinian resistance to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem that had existed since the 1967 Israeli–Arab War. 1982 was also the year Hezbollah was formed with the help of the recently established Islamic government in Iran. Israel empowered its Lebanese Christian allies to massacre hundreds of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut. It also forced the Palestinian Liberation Organisation to shift its headquarters from Beirut to Tunisia. Israel then carved out a security zone to the north of its border, but faced stiff resistance from Hezbollah. As Israeli casualties mounted, the then prime minister Ehud Barak made a unilateral withdrawal in 2000. The pullout amplified Hezbollah’s popularity and strength as a formidable political and paramilitary force against Israel and its allies. Israel invaded Lebanon in 2006 in a bid to wipe out Hezbollah. It failed to achieve its objective. After 34 days of bloody fighting and substantial costs for both sides, it accepted a United Nations Security Council resolution for a ceasefire, with Hezbollah emerging triumphant. Defiant warfare  Netanyahu feels confident of success this time. He also has the backing of his extremist ministers, especially those of national security, finance and defence. He depends on their support for his domestic political survival. Israel has more firepower than ever before. It has displayed it in the Gaza war while revenging Hamas’s killing of more than 1,000 Israelis and abducting some 240 Israeli and foreign nationals on October 7.   In scorched-earth operations, the Israel Defense Forces have flattened swathes of the Gaza Strip and killed more than 40,000 of its civilians – 35% of them were children – with two million more having been repeatedly displaced. In this, the Netanyahu leadership has ignored the norms of warfare, international humanitarian law, a UN Security Council resolution for a ceasefire, and the International Court of Justice’s warning against genocidal actions. Further, he has brazenly deflected widespread global condemnation of Israeli actions. Buttressing his defiant stance has been the United States’ “iron-clad” military, financial and economic support of Israel. Washington has just approved a further US$8.7 billion (about A$12.5 billion) aid package in support of Israel’s Lebanon campaign. Netanyahu has had no compelling reason even to be amiable to Washington’s calls for restraint or ceasefire. Will this time be different? Netanyahu’s confidence is reinforced still further by Israel’s nuclear capability. Although undeclared, Israel reportedly possesses many nuclear weapons for regional deterrence and military supremacy in the region. Netanyahu and his supporters have claimed their use of disproportionate force to be legitimate in self-defence against what it calls the terrorist tentacles (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah) of the Iranian octopus. With the US and several of its Western and regional Arab allies having shared his posture, Israel is now focused once more on the unfinished business of uprooting Hezbollah. Hezbollah forms a key element of Iran’s “axis of resistance” against Israel and the US. Netanyahu knows destroying the group would mean the breakup of Iran’s national and regional security system. He is not averse to risking a direct confrontation with Iran, while remaining assured of full US support in such an event. Tehran cannot be expected to abandon Hezbollah, but it also has other domestic and foreign policy priorities. Newly elected Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian has assumed power with promises to reduce theocratic political and social restrictions and improve living conditions for most Iranians. Pezeshkian is also committed to improving Iran’s regional and international relations, including reopening negotiations with the West (particularly the US) regarding Iran’s nuclear program, so as to end US-led sanctions. Pezeshkian appears to have the backing of the powerful Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has shown a willingness to be pragmatic when needed. His foreign minister Abbas Araghchi has stated that Hezbollah is capable of defending itself. For now, Tehran’s approach is to let Israel be trapped in Lebanon, as on previous occasions. Hezbollah is not Hamas: it is damaged but still quite well armed and strategically placed. The group will be able to wage an endless resistance to Israeli occupation. This could come at high human and material costs for the Jewish state that could also prevent many Israelis from returning home to northern Israel. At this stage, it is important to remember two points. One is that after a year-long pernicious campaign, Israel still has not completely succeeded in extinguishing Hamas’s resistance. The job of taking on Hezbollah in a ground war could prove to be much harder and more hazardous. The other is that, like Netanyahu, former US president George W. Bush sought to reorder the Middle East according to US geopolitical preferences. He intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq under the guise of a war on terrorism and promoting democracy. But America’s actions further destabilised the region. Since World War II, the application of brute force has rarely served as a viable substitute for diplomacy in managing world problems.

Defense & Security
Cape Town, Western Cape, South Africa - December 10 2023: Pro- Palestinian murals in solidarity with Gaza murals in Bo Kaap district

Political Insights (12): South Africa’s Stance and the Impact of Operation al-Aqsa Flood

by Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction  The historical legacy of the Israeli-South African relationship has contributed to the current ambiguity between the two parties. During the early stages, South Africa’s political landscape was divided between a regime that pursued racial discrimination and viewed Israel as an ally from 1948 to 1994. This relationship intensified after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and continued to develop rapidly until 1987, when international efforts to isolate South Africa’s apartheid regime began. Over these two decades, Israeli-South African relations expanded across various fields, including cooperation on the Israeli nuclear project. With the collapse of the apartheid regime and the victory of the nationalist forces led by the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994, South Africa’s relationship with Israel began to diverge without completely rescinding its recognition of Israel as a state. At that time, Israel maintained an embassy in Pretoria and a commercial office in Johannesburg, while South Africa had an embassy in Tel Aviv. There were also reciprocal visits between officials of the two countries. Notably, South Africa’s first president, Nelson Mandela, visited Israel in 1999, though he had previously hosted Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir ‘Arafat in South Africa a year earlier. Current Nature of the Relationship  The Israeli-South African relationship is characterized by South Africa’s support for Palestinian statehood in the 1967 occupied territories, while still maintaining recognition of Israel despite occasional strains. These strains have included several notable events: the recall of the South African ambassador in 2010, the operation of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) Movement in South Africa since 2012, the hosting of a Hamas delegation in 2015, the withdrawal of the South African ambassador and embassy staff from Israel in November 2023 following the first month of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, and finally, South Africa’s filing of a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accusing Israel of “genocide of the Palestinian people” in December 2023. Major Changes Following Operation al-Aqsa Flood  In the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa flood, the relationship between Israel and South Africa experienced two key developments that will shape the future of their relationship: 1. The results of the June 2024 elections in South Africa, which saw 52 parties contesting, with 18 parties securing seats in parliament. Notably, the outcome of these elections highlights: a. The ANC, which has been the strongest advocate for the Palestine issue, has diminished in influence. Comparing its seat count from the 2019 to the 2024 elections, the number decreased from 230 to 159 seats, representing a loss of 71 seats, or 31% of its total voting power. b. This outcome suggests that the ANC will no longer be able to unilaterally pass its decisions, particularly in foreign policy, as it has been able to since 1994, when it enjoyed a comfortable majority to advance its governmental decisions. c. To further complicate the situation, other political forces that, to varying extents, opposed the ANC’s stance on the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood have made significant progress and are now part of a national unity government. These forces include: • The Democratic Alliance (DA), which primarily represents white communities and supports Israel, increased its seats from 84 to 87 between 2019 and 2024. • The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), representing Zulu communities, grew its representation from 14 to 17 seats. • The Patriotic Alliance, which declared its support for Israel following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, secured 8 seats. These election results have diminished the ANC’s ability to monopolize decision-making, placing it in a difficult position as it balances its commitment to Palestine with its interest in maintaining the government coalition. 2. A growing number of countries have joined South Africa in bringing the genocide case against Israel before the ICJ under Articles 62 and 63 of the Court’s Statute. The following countries have formally requested to join the case: Nicaragua (February 8), Belgium (March 11), Colombia (April 5), Turkey (May 1), and Libya (May 10). Additionally, several countries have expressed their intention to join, including Egypt (May 12), Maldives (May 13), Mexico (May 24), Ireland (May 28), Chile (June 2), Spain (June 6), not to mention Palestine (June 3), and Cuba (June 22). However, the court has not yet ruled on any of these requests. The growing number of accession requests strengthens the credibility of South Africa’s case, reflecting the increasing international criticism of Israel. Future Role  South Africa is a significant center of influence on the African continent, ranking sixth in terms of population. However, its internal situation will play a critical role in determining its ability to maintain its political stance on the Middle Eastern conflict. The structure of the coalition government—led by President Cyril Ramaphosa of the ANC, with a deputy from the DA—complicates decision-making, as previously noted. Additionally, traditional power dynamics suggest a country with diminishing regional and international influence. Beyond South Africa’s moral authority, rooted in its history of overcoming apartheid, the country faces considerable challenges. It ranks first globally in the Gini index [Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution]. Furthermore, its score of –0.72 on the Political Stability Index, coupled with a 33.55% unemployment rate, undermine its capacity to exert influence. An essential facet of South Africa’s international diplomacy is its efforts to shape global rules, aiming to achieve a “soft balance” with dominant regional and international powers. South Africa has effectively leveraged its diplomatic resources to strengthen its ties to various international networks and to reshape the global framework to its advantage. This success is exemplified by its early membership in the BRICS group, its active role in conflict resolution in Africa—having contributed to the settlement of nine African conflicts—and its efforts to enhance the African Union’s role. Notably, South Africa outpaced many global powers in drafting resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly between 1994 and 2023. This achievement is reflected in South Africa’s rise on the political globalization index, moving from approximately 47 points to about 89 points between 1994 and 2022. Additionally, South Africa’s leadership in raising the issue of “genocide” against Israel and the influx of countries from all continents seeking to align with South Africa further underscores this diplomatic trend, which the Palestinian resistance should strategically leverage. Conclusion  South Africa will continue to support the Palestine issue in the foreseeable future, though this support may be less effective due to the recent election results. However, it is crucial to strengthen ties with the ruling ANC and leverage its alliance with Al Jama-Ah Islamic party (which holds two seats) and other pro-Palestine parties, especially in advising on managing relations with South Africa. Additionally, it is important to capitalize on South Africa’s moral standing and its advancements in political globalization indicators.

Defense & Security
American nuclear button concept. USA missile launches from its underground silo launch facility, 3D rendering

Revision of US Nuclear Operational Guidelines

by Kim Tae-Woo

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Kim Tae-woo, former head of the Institute for Unification Studies Today, I would like to tell you that the US nuclear strategy is changing . As President Biden’s term draws to a close, the US is changing its nuclear weapons operational guidelines. President Biden , like President Obama, originally argued for a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons. That is why, when he took office as president in 2020, he advocated for sole purpose nuclear use and no first use (NFU). ‘Sole purpose nuclear use’ means that the US will only use nuclear weapons when it is directly attacked by nuclear weapons, and NFU is an abbreviation for ‘No First Use’, which means that it will not use nuclear weapons before its adversary. When a president changes, the US publishes a strategy document called the ‘Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)’, which declares its nuclear strategy and nuclear operational policies to the outside world. Allies were concerned that if President Biden included such content in the NPR, they would distrust the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. Perhaps conscious of these concerns, the 2022 NPR did not include such content, but President Biden’s nuclear philosophy was reflected throughout the strategy book. As a result, the United States decided to stop developing submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and retire the B83-1 (1.2 mt) missile, an aircraft-delivered nuclear weapon. The Biden administration has changed. In March, it ordered the US military to create nuclear operational guidelines to prepare for a situation in which China, Russia, and North Korea cooperate to launch a nuclear attack on the US, and approved the newly created guidelines. At the same time, it also ordered the development of necessary new weapons and the modernization of the nuclear operational system. In June, the director of the White House National Security Council (NSC)’s nonproliferation office also said, “If the nuclear threat from China, Russia, and North Korea increases, the US will also increase its deployed nuclear weapons,” and hinted at the possibility that “nuclear weapons can be used in conventional warfare.” This is a reversal of President Biden’s policy of giving up preemptive nuclear use. In this way, President Biden is adopting new nuclear operational guidelines and nuclear doctrine while changing his previous position with less than a year left in his term. The reason for this change in the US nuclear doctrine is that he is taking the nuclear arms buildup of China, Russia, and North Korea very seriously in the new Cold War situation, and the strategic focus on the North Korean nuclear issue is changing from ‘North Korea’s nuclear abandonment’ to ‘prevention of nuclear use.’ Although the sensitive parts of the newly created nuclear weapons operational guidelines have not been made public, it is known that they contain explicit concerns about China’s nuclear arms buildup. The guidelines are based on the US Department of Defense’s estimate that China’s nuclear weapons will increase to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, and are intended to prepare for the possibility that China could threaten the US by cooperating with Russia and North Korea on nuclear weapons. The same goes for North Korea. In March, the US, through the NSC and experts, mentioned the need for “interim steps” that are a step back from the goal of “denuclearization,” and said, “We are willing to talk to North Korea unconditionally for negotiations.” The terms “denuclearization of North Korea” and “CVID,” or “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,” disappeared from the platforms of the US Democratic and Republican parties announced ahead of the November presidential election. North Korea may say that “the US has recognized our possession of nuclear weapons,” but that is a misinterpretation. It does not mean accepting, or tolerating, North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but rather recognizing, and is trying to lower the nuclear threat through dialogue, recognizing that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons immediately, but responding strongly if North Korea refuses. As such, the nuclear issue is now reaching a dead end. As the military closeness and nuclear cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea intensifies, it is ultimately triggering a response from the US. Naturally, South Korea cannot just keep watching. In Korea, civic groups are currently conducting a campaign to collect 10 million signatures calling for nuclear armament, but it is unclear how much this movement will change national policy in the future. If this trend continues, there may be countermoves in Japan and Taiwan as well. It is difficult to understand why North Korea should really increase its nuclear weapons and strengthen its military power with drones and artillery, even though food shortages are starting again, the youth are opposing the one-party dictatorship, and the elite are increasingly defecting to seek freedom. “Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org.”

Energy & Economics
The concept of a fragile, vulnerable, unstable world order.

World Order Transformation: Economy, Ideology, Technology

by Aleksandr Dynkin

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The concept of a multipolar (or polycentric) world order [1] was first coined by Academician Yevgeny Primakov in 1996 [Primakov 1996]. Like everything new, it was not immediately accepted, but ultimately became a significant contribution to both domestic and world theory of international relations, offering a compelling alternative to Western approaches, particularly the one proposed in Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations [Huntington 1993]. It informed the idea of trilateral cooperation between Russia, China and India, implemented by Primakov and later embodied in the BRICS group. By now, the idea of multipolarity has been recognized in global political science, has entered the conceptual framework and the language of international diplomacy and is used in Russia’s doctrinal documents. In 2015, we proposed the scenario of a new bipolarity [2] as one of the possible trajectories for global development. Today, many scholars, both Chinese and American, [3] suggest that China-centric and U.S.-centric poles are emerging. This article discusses the “multipolarity — new bipolarity” dichotomy. Long Global Macro-Transformations World history shows that a new world order typically emerges after the end of a major war (see Table 1). Table 1. International system (world order)    Source: systematized by A.A. Dynkin, IMEMO RAS Europe was usually the “kitchen” where the world order was cooked. Take the last 200 years. After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Concert of Europe emerged and lasted for 100 years. The century-long stability of that system could be explained by the homogeneity of the political organization of its guarantor states. All members of the Concert of Europe were monarchies. World War I produced the Versailles system, which lasted only 20 years. One of the reasons for its short life was the exclusion of the Soviet Union, Germany and China. The Yalta-Potsdam system was formed by the victors in World War II. Its guarantors were the “Big Three” powers—the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the UK—along with France and China. The three defeated powers—Germany, Japan and Italy—were discriminated and disenfranchised. This system existed for 45 years and was initially thought to be polycentric, but quickly degenerated into a bipolar order, and the Cold War commenced. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the system became unipolar, dominated by the West, primarily the U.S. It disregarded Russia’s interests and, from 2018 onward, began discriminating against China as well. February 2022 can be considered the formal date of the unipolar world’s demise. However, today’s predictions suggest it will take at least 10 years before the new post-unipolar system becomes stable. The economic center of gravity is a spatial indicator of the economic strength of states, borrowed from physics. To put it simply, this is a geographical point of equilibrium for GDP, trade and investment flows of different countries. Figure 1 shows a map of how the world’s economic center of gravity shifted for over a thousand years. It appeared in Central Asia, on the territory of the Ghaznavid Empire (modern-day Afghanistan). The center then migrated northwest, while the devastation in post-war Europe forcefully pushed it (within just 10 years) to the West, toward Greenland. Then it turned east again. The sharpest shift, to the southeast, occurred in 2000–2010 and is associated with the rise of China. The economic center of gravity has almost returned to the same meridian but remained more than 2,000 km north of the starting point, which indicates a return to the millennial balance of economic power between the West and the East. Figure 1. “Journey” of the three-dimensional economic center of gravity    Source: Dobbs R., Remes J., Manyika J. et al. Urban world: Cities and the rise of the consuming class. McKinsey Global Institute, 2012. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/urbanization/urban-world-cities-and-the-rise-of-the-consuming-class. Statistic calculations by IMEMO RAS for 60 years of peace (1960–2021) indicate the stability of the center’s latitudinal (horizontal) position. This suggests a relatively consistent proportion of GDP production by the countries in the Global South and Global North, under the economic leadership of the Northern Hemisphere. The shift to the East has also been clearly confirmed. According to our projections up to 2050, the future position of the globe’s center of economic activity will lie on the border of India and China. This method of analysis reveals a high level of inertia in time and geographic monotonicity of changes in the balance of economic power of states. It also shows that wars can drastically disrupt the natural course of events. The center of gravity method can also be applied to the arsenals of strategic and tactical weapons (see Figure 2). For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. had a huge advantage, but then there was a clear pivot to the northeast—the creation of superior nuclear capabilities in the Soviet Union. With the onset of arms control in 1993, a reversing loop emerged, heading southwest. This was followed by a curve to the east with an implied southward inclination, which reflects the growing nuclear stockpiles of India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the rapid buildup of strategic and tactical nuclear forces in China. The military center of gravity follows its economic peer with a lag of 20 years, reflecting the geopolitical ambitions of Asian powers. These interpretations also clearly demonstrate the end of unipolarity and point to the rise of multipolarity. Figure 2. Movement of the nuclear center of gravity Source: calculations by K.V. Bogdanov, Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS, based on the data from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/. Technology. Politicians tend to be techno-optimists. Barack Obama predicted that 3D printing would transform the entire world. [4] George W. Bush promised that decoding the human genome would revolutionize medicine. [5] All false starts. Economists traditionally measure the rate of technological progress (TP) using the total factor productivity (TFP) index. To put it simply, this is the part of economic growth driven not by an increase in inputs—labor and capital—but rather by improvements in the efficiency of their use. Technological progress means not only the generation of new scientific and technological ideas but also their mass replication. Without economic validation of the impact of wide dissemination of innovations, scientific or technological achievements remain in history as brilliant breakthroughs with only local economic effects, giving rise to journalistic generalizations at best, such as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” or “the sixth techno-economic paradigm.” Statistical metrics rely on data of technologically advanced nations, while catching-up countries have room for growth by approaching the TP frontier, i.e. adopting and improving existing ideas and technologies. Technological leaders spend more resources pushing the TP frontier, while those catching up can accelerate at lower costs, effectively staying in the “wind shadow” of the leaders. The TFP index growth rate has been steadily declining in developed countries for many years, but this has been especially conspicuous since the mid-2000s. Today, the growth is below 1.5% and even 1% per year (see Figure 3). Figure 3. Average annual growth of total factor productivity, % Source: calculations by IMEMO RAS based on the data from the International Productivity Monitor. No. 38, Spring 2020. http://www.csls.ca/ipm/ipm38.asp#:~:text=Martin%20Neil%20Baily%2C%20Barry%20P.%20Bosworth%20and %20Siddhi%20Doshi%0ALessons%20from%20Productivity%20Comparisons%20 of%20Germany%2C%20Japan%2C%20and%20the%20United%20States%C2%A0; Innovative China: New Drivers of Growth. World Bank Group, and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P.R. China. 2019. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1335-1. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/833871568732137448/pdf/Innovative-China-New-Drivers-of-Growth.pdf. A similar pattern of dramatic TFP deceleration was observed in China. The consensus interpretation of these figures is that the main effects of the Third Industrial (i.e., computer) Revolution have largely been exhausted, and no new general-purpose breakthrough technologies (such as electricity, internal combustion engines, or computers and mobile communications) have emerged. However, it seems that the intellectualization of technologies and approaches to project management, as well as informatization, simply do not fit into the traditional factor-based view of progress that was established many years ago. The scale of knowledge is growing, new professions are springing up, the role of emotional intelligence and cognitive functions is increasing. All this dramatically changes the structure of capital assets (see Figure 4). From the beginning of the 21st century and until the 2008 crisis (2000–2007), equipment accounted for over 50% of the increase in capital’s contribution (investment) to output growth, whereas in 2019–2021, almost 63% of this increase was attributable to intellectual property assets. This result of our research suggests a refocusing of technological progress from final products to intellectual technologies, enabling the production of a range of innovative goods and services tailored to highly segmented demand. Figure 4. Transformation of the capital structure in the U.S. private sector Source: Total Factor Productivity for Major Industries—2022. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/prod3_03232023.htm. There are now hopes that the pace of technological progress may accelerate due to the development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, which will spark a new industrial revolution. An indirect sign of its imminence is the sharp rise in the rate of business births and deaths in the U.S. economy in 2020–2022. [6] The spillover of labor from companies that are losing efficiency to corporations with increasing market shares has also accelerated. These are some sort of leading indicators that suggest the structural results of TP are approaching. Similar developments occurred 30 years ago, on the cusp of the computer revolution. The above-mentioned intellectualization of fi ed capital, where trusted AI will be applied, adds credibility to these hopes. In addition, AI is one of the critical areas of technological sovereignty. It is no coincidence that Vladimir Putin described AI as “crosscutting, universal and essentially revolutionary technology.” [7] The Russian President announced the preparation of a new edition of the National AI Development Strategy and a respective decree. I believe that this prioritization is justified. China’s experience in the semiconductor race is a good model to be emulated (see Figure 5). Its distinguishing feature is the focus on companies as drivers of development, with massive, cumulatively growing state support. Figure 5. Focusing on China’s priorities (nanometer chip race) Source: Systematized by I.V. Danilin, IMEMO RAS The U.S. strategy of curbing technological development of Russia (in all areas) and China (in semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing and electric cars) leads to stiff competition in high technology, which is fraught with fragmentation, diversification of technical standards, legal norms and rules. And this is another argument in favor of a new bipolarity. Demographic processes. According to UN projections, by the middle of the 21st century, Russia will drop from its current 9th place to 14th in terms of population, while remaining the most populous country in Europe. [8] A more significant problem for Russia is population aging. The proportion of elderly people, who are typically not part of the labor force, is increasing. Japan, Spain and Italy are leading this process today, but neither China nor India will be spared. Nigeria appears to be the only major country where population and the share of young people will continue to grow until the end of the 21st century. As of December 2023, one in 10 people worldwide was aged 65 or over, with health spending taking up 10% of global GDP. [9] In this context, the importance of medical technologies cannot be overstated, as they can extend not only people’s life expectancy but also the duration of their healthy and socially active life, thereby easing labor market pressures. Needs always steer technological progress toward overcoming economic growth constraints tied to the scarcest resource in any given historical period. A serious risk associated with the problem of aging is a slowdown in innovation, since it is people under 40—the age group that will shrink throughout the 21st century—who are the primary drivers and consumers of innovation. So far, this risk has been mitigated by the large youth cohorts in China and India. This is why these two nations are experiencing almost exponential growth in patenting, massive reengineering and, consequently, in middle-class numbers. Demographics give India an edge until around 2060, which is already evident in the growth rates of Indian economy. Combined with the influx of hi-tech investments and the contribution of the Indian diaspora, India has good prospects, making its position crucial to the future architecture of the world order, regardless of how it evolves. The U.S. understands this and has been figuratively “clinging” to this nation for the past 20 years. I believe that the Russian Academy of Sciences should significantly bolster scientific and educational ties with India and its dynamically developing neighbors in Southeast Asia—Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. The anticipated tension in the global market of new generations of innovators aggravates inter-country competition for this scarcest resource. I think that the international reputation of the Russian Academy of Sciences is a powerful tool to attract and retain young people and foster their creative motivation. We should reassert this as we celebrate the 300th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences. Ideology. Dirigisme [10], or statism, is the main trend in both economic theory and economic policy of the West. A pivot to a more state-controlled economy began with the disappointing outcomes of the Washington Consensus, which aimed to guide post-socialist countries from planned to market economies. The 2008–2009 financial crisis cemented the trend toward statism, and the COVID-19 pandemic elevated it to unprecedented proportions. In the U.S., Democrats are among the most vocal proponents of greater government intervention in all spheres of life, but they are not alone. Republicans are also actively advocating industrial policy, repudiation of free trade, as well as strict control over Big Tech, among other measures. The popularity of the so-called cultural Marxism is on the rise. [11] Its origins go back to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (H. Marcuse, E. Fromm and others). These ideas are moving from the realm of ideological and theoretical confrontations into political activism. For example, the leaders of the BLM movement publicly self-identify as “trained Marxist organizers.” The essence of the strategy inspired by “cultural Marxism” is the rejection of direct political struggle on the barricades, since the proletariat has been “bought off by the bourgeoisie and is no longer capable of anything,” and the ranks of the classic proletariat are rapidly thinning. The direction of social change is set, on the one hand, by intellectuals with personal power and, on the other hand, by marginalized groups seeking to assert their “right to identity.” The strategy of activists who form this paradoxical combination of intellectuals and marginalized individuals is the creeping takeover of the main institutions of power and society by planting “correct” ideas in the mass consciousness. In the U.S., the fighters for political correctness have already hijaked the school system, university campuses, major media outlets and the entertainment industry (Hollywood). Civil servants are forced to take courses in critical race theory, which postulates not only the socially constructed nature of race and the recognition of systemic racism [Delgado, Stefancic 2017: 45] but also a sense of guilt in one part of society toward another. This, in turn, allegedly requires addressing moral and material injustices by organizing public life in line with such an ideology. Similar concepts are being pushed into public discourse as well. It is already dominated by the ideas of radical feminism, cancel culture, anti-systemic racism and postcolonialism, the fight against global warming and the green agenda, which claims to be universal and non-negotiable. As a result, the energy transition is motivated more by ideology than by the comparative market efficiency of energy supplies. Different environmental-political discourses—eco-nationalism, eco-imperialism and green growth—are competing in shaping the green agenda, eroding the attractiveness of the dominant sustainable development model. Another universal weapon in fighting any dissent is political correctness. Large corporations, government agencies and universities are developing and implementing strategies to promote DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) principles, which are nothing but tools of ideological control over employees. Universities are required to fi reports on their compliance with such principles and efforts to promote them, which causes mounting criticism as they violate academic freedom and cultivate ideological conformity. [12] However, ideological censorship has already taken deep root in various spheres of public life, and questioning its compatibility with democracy is deemed politically incorrect. Revising cultural norms has become a cultural norm in and of itself, deepening divisions in modern polarized societies, primarily in the U.S., but also in Old Europe [Semenenko 2023: 27-35]. Another curious phenomenon is associated with the new agenda. In the 20th century, the left championed progress, advocating faster economic growth, rapid technological advancement and better social welfare. Now the ideas of zero or even negative growth and post-growth are popular among them. [Buchs, Koch 2017: 218]. Such ideological narratives exacerbate the question of how to treat the poor countries of the South, but also their own poor: the welfare state for all no longer fit into this agenda. On the contrary, it becomes a selective tool of backing the “right” minorities. This creates a breeding ground for stronger positions of populist forces. Such contradictory internal political processes distort public consciousness as well as domestic and foreign policy decision-making. The new elites are extremely ideologized. The U.S. political system is becoming less effective at regulating the economy. Two rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings, have downgraded the U.S. credit rating to AA+ from the top mark of AAA. In November 2023, Moody’s lowered its outlook on the U.S. credit rating to “negative” from “stable.” All three agencies agree on the main reason for the downgrade: the growing dysfunctionality of the political system. In foreign policy, the U.S. has withdrawn from 16 major international treaties and agreements on arms control, global trade, climate and the Arctic since the beginning of the century [Dynkin 2020]. In other words, the unipolar world order with its unbridled appetite for expansion has brought the world into a zone of extra-high risks. And the paradigms that are dominant in the West have proven incompatible with either Russian or Chinese value-oriented political projects. Therefore, the ideological sphere will inevitably see increased confrontation, marking another step toward bipolarity. IMEMO RAS researchers have repeatedly warned about the West’s miscalculated strategic hopes: 1) that Russia would face an economic catastrophe because of an unprecedented sanctions war in modern history; 2) that the unipolar world order would remain unchallenged; 3) that a global blockade of Russia’s export-oriented economy would be feasible. And we were not the only ones who made these warnings. In response, we only heard propagandistic clichés like “a gas station masquerading as a country,” “a regional power” and “Russia is isolated with its economy in tatters”. This kind of “expertise” led the Washington establishment to believe that Russia is a “declining power” whose strategic interests could be safely neglected. This “strategic lunacy” is a consequence of a universalist mindset—a product of the West’s political experience and culture, which tends to elevate Anglo-Saxon and European historical tradition to absolutes—and of a failure to understand the shifts in the balance of power in the 21st century. Today, Russia is the world’s fourth-largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP), while the top fi e global economic powers include three BRICS nations and none from the blooming “garden” of Josep Borrell, the EU foreign policy chief who has recently been fired. Now a new narrative has been launched into the propaganda orbit: “Russia is about to attack Eastern Europe.” The logical gap between the image of a declining power and that of an “aggressive bear” is conveniently ignored. This primitive, one-dimensional perception of complex non-linear processes can only lead to disappointment—just as it did when the West lulled itself into believing that Chinese reforms would eventually lead to political pluralism. As a result, the West has an inexhaustible stream of surprises. It appears that their experts are increasingly out of touch with Russian (and any other non-Western) realities. Figuratively speaking, they are staring into a distorting rearview mirror constructed by their own rhetoric and propaganda. But the main real surprise was the fantastic resilience of the Russian economy. I dare say that no other economy in the world, not even China’s, could withstand such aggressive pressure. The high resistance of the Russian economy to external shocks can be explained by three fundamental reasons. First, it is the result of difficult, sometimes agonizing institutional and structural reforms. These efforts have ultimately produced a self-sufficient, adaptive and highly diversified market economy. Second, the crisis of 2022 was the fifth (!) in the history of post-Soviet Russia. The government, federal regulators and the Bank of Russia have accumulated hard-earned professional experience in crisis management and counter-cyclical strategies. The same can be said about business. Our economic entities have demonstrated time and again that there are always more effective solutions than there are problems. Finally, the West miscalculated its ability to isolate our economy. The dual containment of Russia and China, in fact, only strengthens ties between the BRICS member states. Transformations of the 2020s. The first half of the 2020s has fi y buried what was once known as “European security.” It is impossible to glue this “broken cup” back together without Russia. The unwillingness of the Ukrainian side and the West to stop the armed conflict at its very beginning, the dangerous escalation, NATO’s constant violation of its own “red lines” and the accession of Sweden and Finland to the North Atlantic Alliance are all symptoms of the European security system transforming into a transatlantic one. Meanwhile, the Eurasian security system is taking shape. The outcomes of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China hint that the “political East” is starting to form, if not as an alternative to the long-standing “political West,” then at least as an equal partner. Without considering its interests, any debate about “rules-based” global security will be mere fantasy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Moscow after his recent reelection is in the same vein. Of course, geography cannot be changed, and Russia has been and will remain a European power. However, it is also the geographic center of Eurasia, providing the infrastructure backbone for the Eurasian partnership—from the Northern Sea Route and up to the Trans-Siberian Railway, Baikal–Amur Mainline, Trans-Asian Highway and cross-continental pipelines. The “post-Ukrainian” world seems to be moving toward a new, indivisible Eurasian security architecture, relying on existing institutions: the Union State, CSTO, EAEU, CIS, BRICS, SCO and ASEAN. Minsk has put forward an initiative to develop a Eurasian Charter for Diversity and Multipolarity—a strategic vision for a new system of international relations to replace the “rules-based” world order. An important event of 2024 in this context is the expansion of the BRICS club (see Figure 6). Its combined economic power could potentially reach $67 trillion, surpassing the total GDP of the G7 countries. Figure 6. Economic potential of BRICS countries Source: calculations by A.A. Dynkin, IMEMO RAS, based on the data from the IMF, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Steel Association, Energy Transition Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2023, International Energy Agency. And there are still 28 more countries on the “waiting list”. In several important markets such as metals, automotive industry, oil and mineral fertilizers, BRICS already matches or exceeds the potential of the G7 nations. Russia, which took over the BRICS rotating presidency in 2024, faces the task of energizing the harmonized economic and technological policies of the members. This approach is the institutional cornerstone of the future polycentric world. What will the coming world order look like? It is difficult to say which of the two trends—bipolarity or polycentrism—will prevail in the end. It is more likely that they will coexist: for example, rigid bipolarity in the Global North and polycentrism in the Global South. Signs of military, economic and technological bipolarity are already visible in the North. Interestingly, New Delhi tends to categorize China as a country of the North [Jaishankar 2020: 240]. This viewpoint has substance, as China is far ahead of other countries of the Global South in terms of GDP per capita ($12,541). For comparison, India’s GDP per capita is $2,612. [13] The decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies has not affected trade flows yet, but only technology and investment. In 2023, China saw a reversal of foreign direct investment inflows, with funds previously invested being withdrawn. Negative trends took hold, and the outflow approached negative $1.5 trillion (see Figure 7). Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific macro-region is gaining greater internal dynamics, unlike Europe or North America. Figure 7. U.S.–China Economic Decoupling Source: UN Comtrade Database. https://comtradeplus.un.org/; State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) of the People’s Republic of China. https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/. Meanwhile, the trend toward political polycentricity persists. For example, New Delhi and Ankara were initially poles apart on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. This is also the dawning of post-unipolarity, where the new centers of power are increasingly guided by their own interests in decision-making rather than by any “rules” or advice from Washington, Beijing or Moscow. It would be unrealistic to expect that the future world order will be free of conflict. The world will retain its diversity, with different potentials of countries and their competition. It is crucial that, despite their differences, the interests of larger and smaller nations are respected, and problems are solved through constructive dialogue. Russia was the first to challenge the notorious unipolar world order. Today we can state that most countries in the Global South have responded to this challenge and refused to subscribe to the Western interpretation of the conflict in Ukraine . The future world order is taking shape right before our eyes. I am sure that a multipolar world is preferable for Russia as a developed, self-sufficient and sovereign nation. But this world also requires a new system of global governance, development and strengthening of its institutions, such as BRICS, G20, SCO and EAEU. For instance, the EAEU member states (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan) are faring much better than the five other post-Soviet countries. In 2022, GDP per capita in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union was 3.5 times higher than the average for the fi e other CIS states that are not part of the EAEU (Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) (see Figure 8). Our strategy in these organizations requires a solid approach and “stereoscopic” vision from socio-economic, scientific, technological and political perspectives. Here, the Russian Academy of Sciences should play a major role as a leader of scientific and expert community. Figure 8. Economic trends of EAEU and CIS countries Source: EEC. https://eec.eaeunion.org/?ysclid=lr7rtdg7np631919243; IMF. https://www.imf.org/; World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/.  Conclusion In conclusion, there are compelling arguments both for multipolarity and for a new bipolarity. Leading U.S. experts are asking similar questions: “What order will replace the crumbling US-led system is far from certain. Will China push aside the United States as the global hegemon to lead a world according to rules written in Chinese characters? Will the world become bipolar, divided between two more or less rigidly defined blocs led by the United States and China? Will a genuinely multipolar world emerge based on several states or coalitions of more or less equal strength?” [Graham 2023: 272]. These questions are yet to be answered, and definitive conclusions in this case are premature. Given this high uncertainty, one should be prepared for any scenario. The essential prerequisite for such readiness is Russia’s strategic autonomy based on military-strategic parity with the U.S. The fundamental question to which the author has no answer today is: how likely is the emergence of a new world order without a major war? In 2024, presidential or parliamentary elections will take place (or have already taken place) in 50 countries, which account for more than 45% of the world’s GDP and population. Perhaps their results will clarify our vision of the near future. Dynkin A.A. (2024). World order transformation: economy, ideology, technology. Polis. Political Studies, 5, 8-23. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2024.05.02 This article was prepared with the support of a grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation for major scientific projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development No. 075-15-2024-551 “Global and regional centers of power in the emerging world order”. The author expresses gratitude to his colleagues at IMEMO RAS R.I. Kapelyushnikov, V.D. Milovidov, I.S. Semenenko, I.V. Danilin, S.V. Zhukov, K.V. Bogdanov, A.P. Guchanova for consultations and assistance in preparing this article. References Büchs, M., & Koch, M. (2017). Critiques of growth. In M. Büchs, & M. Koch. Postgrowth and Wellbeing: Challenges to Sustainable Welfare (pp. 39-56). London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3319-59903-8_4 Delgado, R.,& Stefancic, J. (2017). Critical race theory. Anintroduction. New York: New York University Press. Graham, T. (2023). Getting Russia right. UK: Polity Books. Huntington, S.P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22-49. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations Jaishankar, S. (2020). The India way: strategies for an uncertain world. New Delhi; New York: Harper Collins Publishers India. Kupchan, C. (2021). Bipolarity is back: why it matters. The Washington Quarterly, 44(4), 123-139. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020457 Yan Xuetong. (2016). Political leadership and power redistribution. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 9(1), 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow002 Dynkin, A.A. (2020). International turbulence and Russia. Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 90(2), 127-137. https://doi.org/10.1134/S101933162002001X. Primakov, E.M. (1996). Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya nakanune XXI veka: problemy, perspektivy [International Relations on the eve of 21st century: problems, prospects]. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’, 10, 3-13. (In Russ.) Semenenko, I.S. (2023). Razdelyonnye obshchestva [Divided societies]. In I.S. Semenenko (Ed.), Identichnost’: lichnost’, obshchestvo, politika. Novye kontury issledovatel’skogo polya [Identity: The Individual, Society, and Politics. New Outlines of the Research Field] (pp. 27-35). Moscow: Ves’ Mir. (In Russ.) https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/publ/2023/Identichnost-Semenenko-2023.pdf Литература на русском языке Дынкин А.А. 2020. Международная турбулентность и Россия. Вестник РАН. Т. 90. № 3. С. 208-219. https://doi.org/10.31857/S0869587320030032. EDN: WINCQO. Примаков Е.М. 1996. Международные отношения накануне XXI в.: проблемы, перспективы. Международная жизнь. № 10. С. 3-13. Семененко И.С. 2023. Разделенные общества. Идентичность: личность, общество, политика. Новые контуры исследовательского поля. Отв. ред. И.С. Семененко. М.: Весь Мир. С. 27-35. https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/publ/2023/Identichnost-Semenenko-2023.pdf. EDN: NTQYRB. 1. The world order or international system is a stable set of institutions and norms of military-political and economic relations, which is institutionalized and legitimate in the international legal sense. The world order remains stable during the active life of at least one generation—a universal measure of social time. However, in the wake of geopolitical macro-crises, illegitimate systems emerge, forcibly imposed by the winner. This was the case with the unipolar world order. 2. Dynkin A., Burrows M. Here’s the Playbook for Getting U.S.–Russian Cooperation Back on Track. The National Interest. 07.12.2015. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/heres-the-playbook-getting-us-russian-cooperation-back-track-14527. 3. For example, see: [Yan Xuetong 2016; Kupchan 2021]. 4. Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address. The White House. President Barack Obama. 12.02.2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address. 5. President Bush Calls on Senate to Back Human Cloning Ban. Remarks by the President on Human Cloning Legislation. The East Room. The White House. President George W. Bush. 10.04.2002. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020410-4.html. 6. Private sector establishments birth and death, seasonally adjusted. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 25.10.2023. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cewbd.t08.htm. 7. Artificial Intelligence Journey 2023 conference. President of Russia. Official website. 24.11.2023. http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/72811. 8. World Population Prospects 2024, Online Edition. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024). https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/MostUsed/. 9. Global Health Expenditure database. World Health Organization. https://apps.who.int/nha/database. 10. Dirigisme is a policy of active state intervention in the national economy, pursued by France and the UK in mid-1940s. 11. Mendenhall A. Cultural Marxism is Real. The James G. Martin Center for Academic Renewal. 04.01.2019. https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2019/01/cultural-marxism-is-real/. 12. AFA Calls for an End to Required Diversity Statements. Press Release. AFA. Princeton, NJ. 22.08.2022. https://academicfreedom.org/afa-calls-for-an-end-to-required-diversity-statements/. 13. World Economic Outlook Database (October 2023 Edition). International Monetary Fund. 10.10.2023. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October.

Energy & Economics
offshore oil platform and gas drillship with illumination

Undersea geopolitics and international law: Deepsea mining in the Indo-Pacific

by Abhishek Sharma , Udayvir Ahuja

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The pursuit of critical minerals does not come at the expense of the environment; a global moratorium on deep-sea mining should be the natural course of action The world is looking at a potential geopolitical and environmental point of conflict, which will affect every country in more ways than one. This dispute stems from a search for critical minerals in the deep sea. Critical minerals are considered the building blocks of contemporary technology. To say that they are crucial to the economic and national security of every country would be an understatement. Due to the inherited complexities of mining and attaining critical minerals from challenging geographies, the hunt for them has intensified. Beyond land, many countries are now looking at space as an alternative. Finding and commercially harnessing minerals from celestial bodies like the Moon and asteroids, however, is still a challenge. Therefore, the search for critical minerals in the deep sea has now entered a new phase of competition, where countries are no longer waiting but are actively engaged in the process of deep-sea mining. In this race, while some countries such as China, India, and South Korea (see Table 1) are preparing to grab the opportunity and are trying to build capacities and capabilities, others have raised the environmental and ecological impacts of deep-sea mining. Against this background, it is crucial to identify the key players in this race and understand the accompanying international legal nuances. Table 1: Exploration Contracts issued by the International Seabed Authority (ISA)   Source: ISA. What’s the rush? The urgency of the critical mineral problem is exacerbated by two factors: Fast-depleting reserves of critical minerals for human use and their rising demand. Behind this sudden rush are two important reasons: Firstly, the focus on clean and renewable energy, which is crucial in driving the green energy transition, and secondly, the increasing consumption of high-technology products, which depends on the heavy use of critical minerals. As an illustration, consider its application in high-tech items of various sizes, such as smartphones, electric car magnets, and intricate machinery like F35 stealth aircraft. A F35 aircraft, for example, needs 920 pounds of rare earth elements, demonstrating the significance of these minerals for any nation. Although deep-sea mining is not an exclusively Indo-Pacific phenomenon, competition is most felt in this region due to the high stakes involved. The major actors involved in this race are China, India, South Korea, and even non-state actors, such as private companies such as the Metals Company (TMC, a Canada-based company, which have considerable stakes in the space. International Seabed Authority: China and influence politics Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the International Seabed Authority (ISA) was constituted with the mandate to ‘organise and control all mineral resources-related activities’ and guarantee ‘effective protection of the marine environment’ on the seabed of international waters, which are a global commons. ISA is constituted by the Assembly, Council, and Secretariat. ISA’s key advisory body, the Legal and Technical Commission (LTC), should help the authority frame the rules, regulations and procedures (RRPs) to govern mining activities on the international seabed. While the conversation on setting a legal framework for undersea mining has been in process since 2016, ISA has garnered increasing international attention due to the triggering of the ‘two-year rule’ by the island nation of Nauru back in 2021. As per UNCLOS, if the Council of ISA fails to adopt the relevant RRPs within two years of receiving the application for approval of a plan of work for exploitation, the council will have to consider and approve such plan ‘based on the provisions of the Convention and any rules, regulations and procedures that the Council may have adopted provisionally, or based on the norms contained in the Convention and the terms and principles contained in this Annex as well as the principle of non-discrimination among contractors.’ Since this incident, negotiations have naturally picked up, with China playing the leading role in shaping the deep sea mining code, as it wants to influence and is eager to push forward the negotiations in its infancy phase. In the 2023 ISA Council’s July meeting, China blocked the motion introduced by France, Chile, and Costa Rica to discuss a moratorium on deep sea mining. The absence of the United States (US) from the ISA elevates Beijing's role to a prominent position. This discussion will likely have severe implications for the future of the high seas, which cover 60 percent of the world’s oceans. At the ISA’s Council meeting in July 2023, China and other states like Nauru, Japan, Australia, India, Norway, and Russia supported deep-sea mining against a group of 20 countries that opposed it due to lack of scientific evidence and are pushing to put a moratorium in place. France was the exception, calling for a total ban on deep-sea mining. Apart from nation states, many international Multinational Corporations (MNCs) like Google, Samsung, BMW, Volvo Group, and Tesla have also joined the call for a moratorium on deep-sea mining. This call includes 804 marine science and policy experts from 44 countries recommending a ‘pause until sufficient and robust scientific information’ is obtained. The call for a moratorium has increased since the discovery of “dark oxygen” on the seafloor. Even the European Union has adopted a resolution to support a moratorium in response to Norway’s decision to initiate deep-sea mining in the Arctic . Stuck in a limbo As commercial deep-sea mining comes closer than ever to being a reality, it is critical to analyse and take stock of the complex interplay of geopolitical, environmental, and legal challenges that will define the future of international relations and environmental stewardship. As nations such as China, Norway, South Korea, and even India accelerate their efforts to exploit these untapped resources, the world faces a crucial decision: To prioritise immediate economic and technological gains or the fragile ecosystems of the deep ocean. China's geopolitical and strategic goals and its growing influence on international organisations, including the ISA, must be kept in mind while taking a call when the stakes are undeniably high, not just for the Indo-Pacific but for the entire planet. The moratorium is also being proposed as per the established precautionary approach. This approach is a broad legal and philosophical principle that suggests a pause and reassessment in case of a human innovation/activity that could potentially result in harm given the lack of scientific knowledge. In light of the pressing concerns raised by scientists, environmentalists, and several nations, a global moratorium on deep-sea mining should be the natural course of action. While some have argued that such a precautionary pause would not be in accordance with UNCLOS, including the current Secretary General of ISA, it would be an obligation under the constitution of the oceans. In an advisory opinion, the International Tribunal on Law of Sea (ITLOS) has confirmed a trend of precautionary approach becoming a part of customary international law and stated that it is a ‘binding obligation’ on both states and the ISA. This approach is enshrined in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. An example of such a moratorium under international law is the International Whaling Convention, which was adopted based on the precautionary approach and has been largely followed for the past 35 years. As the global community navigates this uncharted territory, it must ensure that the pursuit of critical minerals does not come at the expense of the environment that sustains us all. The choices made today will have far-reaching consequences, shaping the geopolitical landscape and determining whether the international community can unite in the face of shared challenges or whether the race for resources will lead to further fragmentation and conflict.

Defense & Security
London, United Kingdom - April 29th 2023: Sudanese Protesters Outside Downing Street Protesting against the war in Sudan between the Military and the RSF.

Is peace possible between Sudan’s warring parties?

by Moses Chrispus Okello

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Achieving lasting peace requires parties to negotiate with adversaries – no matter how difficult this may be. Ever since conflict erupted in Sudan on 15 April 2023, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been engaged in an attritional war, with support from various armed allies and proxy actors. The war is complicated by power struggles and ideological differences at both domestic and international levels, and has ethnic undertones. Can multiparty negotiations resolve the conflict that has killed an estimated 16 000 people and displaced millions ? And how feasible would talks be, given the zero-sum stakes involved? The SAF and RSF have numerous armed and unarmed allies that can become significant forces in their own right. The two are also proxies for a network of international actors, such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States (US), and Russia. These groups’ and Sudanese interests in continuing the conflict or resolving it aren’t always aligned. Amid this, the civilian group Taqaddum is positioning itself as an alternative and interlocutor between the RSF and SAF.   When the conflict started, multiple mediation channels were opened. The initial attempt was the May 2023 Saudi-US mediation process, which led to unsuccessful negotiations in Geneva in August 2024. The African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Quartet, Egyptian initiative, and United Nations Envoy are also engaged in separate but supposedly coordinated processes. These efforts have been ineffective due to the SAF’s preconditions, the RSF’s battlefield successes, and a lack of mutual acknowledgement by all factions. Additionally, the mediation entities have recently been competing with one another or taking sides with the factions. All processes appear to lack the leverage required to facilitate dialogue between the parties. Although these factors contribute to prolonging conflict, they’re not the main barriers preventing the factions from resolving their disagreements. The numerous unsuccessful negotiations suggest that the parties have different preferences for mediation formats and strongly oppose each other. Power struggles and ideological differences at domestic and international levels complicate Sudan’s war Furthermore, the various mediators’ strategies follow a predictable incremental logic, starting with a humanitarian ceasefire and aiming for a power-sharing arrangement. All parties can anticipate the steps in this process and are hesitant to engage in processes that could result in outcomes similar to the failed pre-conflict setup. More importantly, Sudan’s various factions have different visions for the country’s future.   The RSF’s unwillingness to integrate into the national army, as stipulated by the political Framework Agreement, indicated their suspicion of National Congress Party (NCP) members who hold high-ranking positions in the SAF. This mistrust sparked the conflict. Since then, their ambitions have evolved, principally due to the SAF’s inept diplomacy, and now encompass acquiring political power and radically altering Sudan’s political landscape. The RSF’s vision for Sudan excludes NCP members and purported Islamists, whose fusion of state and religion is partially blamed for the country’s misrule. On the other hand, SAF members who are remnants of the NCP and Islamists perceive the RSF as their protégés, amateur soldiers, and even traitors who are undeserving of leadership roles. In contrast to the SAF’s lower ranks, the NCP holds deep resentment towards the RSF and believes military action is a fitting response to what they view as a betrayal. Similarly, the SAF is displeased with the RSF for failing to implement Jeddah agreement commitments. It also seems the SAF is more inclined to break apart than to share power with Taqaddum, who are believed to be internationally influential but insignificant in domestic politics. Despite professing impartiality, Taqaddum’s antipathy towards the Islamists and NCP has resulted in their association with the RSF, despite their denial of any formal ties. However, Taqaddum competes for influence with offshoots of the Forces of Freedom and Change, Democratic Bloc, and Resistance Committees, making it hard to assert leadership in a fragmented civilian landscape. These perspectives are shaped by ideological differences among the parties involved, making a swift resolution improbable. Parties are hesitant to engage in processes that could result in outcomes similar to the failed pre-conflict setup The NCP and Islamists present a singular challenge for Taqaddum and the RSF. The RSF, which includes ethnic groups linked to the NCP and Islamists, must engage in negotiations with an opponent whose fundamental beliefs challenge its very existence. In contrast, a secular government in post-conflict Sudan is an unnegotiable demand for many Darfur armed movements. This position is acceptable to Taqaddum and the RSF – but it is a red line for the Islamists and NCP. Negotiating with the RSF poses significant legal and ethical challenges for all parties, given its checkered history of human rights abuses dating back to the 2003 Darfur conflict and its continuing transgressions. Despite this, the RSF’s control over almost half of Sudan’s landmass makes its participation indispensable in any peace process. While the full extent of Taqaddum’s ambitions remains uncertain, one could speculate that their end goal is to gain political power. To achieve this, they must either ally with one of the armed factions, openly or secretly, or enhance their standing among civilian groups. Nonetheless, partnering with the SAF or RSF comes with political risks. Despite this, some consider the RSF a more dependable choice than the SAF, owing to its perceived history of reliability. The inflexibility of all parties is transforming Sudan into a hybrid of Libya and Somalia, with implications for the broader Horn of Africa. Taqaddum’s equivocation at July’s Cairo Conference of Political and Civil Forces and the AU preparatory Inter-Sudanese dialogue meeting weakened both processes. The RSF’s control over almost half of Sudan’s landmass makes its participation indispensable in any peace process By declining to join the January IGAD summit and the Geneva discussions in August, and pulling out of the less publicised but more practical Manama talks, the SAF enabled the RSF to present itself as more open to peaceful resolution. Nevertheless, this shouldn’t be interpreted as a genuine willingness on the RSF’s part to engage in negotiations. It’s also been hesitant to implement the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan, even though doing so would remove the SAF’s primary reason for not participating in many processes. Despite opposing parties’ sharp differences, achieving peace requires engaging in negotiations with adversaries, regardless of how reprehensible they may be. This approach is consistent with the recommendations of IGAD, AU, and UN for an ‘all-inclusive’ process. If the parties insist on a ‘most-inclusive’ solution, they’ll exclude key factions, leading to inevitable post-conflict relapse and the real possibility of disintegrating Sudan. Sudan’s parties can learn from their own past experiences and those of countries like South Africa, Columbia and former Yugoslavia with multi-level and multimodal negotiations. These involved antagonistic actors and issues but led to outcomes that helped alleviate armed conflict. By addressing core issues first, they can realistically tackle the interests of secondary actors such as the UAE, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, US and Russia, which are increasingly overshadowing internal Sudanese disagreement and dominating the conflict. The article was publilshed by ISS Today. Original article here (please add the link to ISS Today website https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-peace-possible-between-sudan-s-warring-parties)

Diplomacy
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Turkish flag background. + Portrait of Nicolas Maduro, 46th President of Venezuela.

Turkey could play a key role in finding a resolution to Venezuela's crisis

by Imdat Oner

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Erdogan’s Turkey could not only, once again , become a mediator in Venezuela and push for a solution. It could also become a safe haven for an exiled Maduro As Nicolás Maduro loses support domestically and among regional allies, he may be inclined to accept a deal or amnesty to secure a future away from the uncertainty in Venezuela. The opposition pledged not to seek “revenge” or to persecute members of Maduro’s administration. However, without his grip on power, Maduro may not feel safe in Venezuela – even with an amnesty. Recently, The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. had explored all options in secret negotiations, including offering Maduro an amnesty from drug-trafficking charges in exchange for him stepping down. The President of Panama, José Raúl Mulino, proposed facilitating Maduro’s safe transit through Panama to a third country so that he could leave office peacefully. But, at this point, Turkey could emerge as a potential refuge if he decides to leave power. Since 2016, Turkey has become a key strategic partner for the Maduro regime, joining countries like China, Russia, Iran, and India. This relationship has been bolstered by frequent visits from Maduro and public support from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Although Erdogan has not officially congratulated Maduro yet following the contested election, he was among the few leaders to speak with him afterward. During their call, Erdogan praised the Venezuelan people for a peaceful election and invited Maduro to Turkey soon to further advance bilateral projects. Pro-government Turkish media quickly picked up the news, highlighting that Maduro will soon be visiting Turkey. If he leaves power and moves abroad, Maduro is likely to prefer an autocratic destination like Turkey over a democratic one. His strong ties to Turkey and comfort with Erdoğan are quite evident. Maduro has officially visited Turkey more than any other country in the past seven years, frequently praising its culture and becoming a fan of Turkish TV shows. His connection to Turkey gained further attention when a viral video showed him and his family dining at an upscale Istanbul steakhouse during a 2018 visit, which sparked outrage in crisis-hit Venezuela at the time. Additionally, Maduro is quite popular among the Turkish public. During his legitimacy crisis in January 2019, Turkish citizens showed strong support on social media with hashtags like “#WeAreMaduro” and “#WeWontLetThemTakeMaduroDown.” His firm stance on the Palestine issue particularly resonated with the Turkish people, and some even prayed for his conversion to Islam. Financially, Turkey could be Maduro’s best option. There are several allegations that Maduro may have hidden wealth in Turkey. The Venezuelan government’s big volume of transfer of gold to Turkey in exchange for food supplies is well-documented. While Venezuelan officials claimed the gold would be returned once refined, it never came back and is suspected to be held in Turkish banks. The U.S. authorities have highlighted several corruption scandals involving shell companies in Turkey linked to the gold for food program. Turkey’s financial system has already faced scrutiny for money laundering, and in 2021, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) placed Turkey on its gray list due to concerns about money laundering and terrorist financing. Additionally, Turkey has a history of granting residency to individuals with international criminal warrants. Through its “golden passport” program, Turkey offers citizenship to those who can afford it, providing a haven for international criminals. Given these factors, Maduro and his associates might see Turkey as a viable option for securing both their financial freedom and safety. Legally, Maduro might worry that while Washington could drop its charges against him, it can’t prevent an investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) into his regime’s human rights abuses. Turkey’s non-membership in the ICC could offer Maduro a sense of security from such potential charges. While Turkey signed the Rome Statute, establishing the ICC, it has not ratified it and is thus not bound by the court’s rulings. For instance, Turkey ignored an ICC request to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who attended an Istanbul summit in 2017 despite facing genocide and war crimes charges. Under Erdoğan’s government, Turkey’s relatively lenient stance on legal issues could provide a safe haven for Maduro and his associates seeking to escape international scrutiny. As the Biden administration pushes Brazilian President Lula to persuade Maduro to step down and facilitate a transition, Turkey could emerge as an attractive asylum option for him. Ankara has previously attempted to mediate between Maduro and the Venezuelan opposition, but those efforts stalled due to the opposition’s internal conflicts. Recently, Maria Corina Machado asked Turkey to play a role in resolving Venezuela’s presidential crisis. The Venezuelan opposition might convince Turkey to support a transitional government by promising to safeguard Turkish investments in the post-Maduro era. Erdoğan’s Turkey, eager to enhance its international reputation as a mediator after its attempts in the Ukraine, Gaza and Ethiopia conflicts, would likely be interested in re-engaging and playing a role in Venezuela’s negotiations. This presents a unique chance to negotiate Maduro’s exit and prevent Venezuela from descending into a worse political conflict.

Defense & Security
Flag of Palestine and The State of Qatar National flag.

Political Insights (11): Determinants of the Qatari Policy on Operation al-Aqsa Flood

by ‘Atef al-Joulani

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Qatar emerged as a key player during Operation al-Aqsa Flood conflict, solidifying its role as the leading mediator in the region’s crises and conflicts. Despite the potential challenges posed by the operation on 7/10/2023, given Qatar’s hosting of much of the Hamas leadership, it effectively transformed this challenge into an opportunity. This bolstered Qatar’s influence, strengthening its political standing on both regional and international fronts. First: Determinants of the Qatari Position The Qatari stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was shaped by several key factors, foremost among them: 1. Qatar’s unwavering commitment to the Palestine issue and its consistent support for Palestinians in both the West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS). Alongside significant contributions to the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) budget, the Qatari grant, ongoing since 2018, has been a crucial financial resource in bolstering the resilience of the people of GS against the severe blockade imposed on them since 2007. 2. Qatar’s proactive policy and continuous ambition to enhance its regional and international presence and political influence have been evident through its strategy of serving as a mediator in various conflicts. Over the past years, this approach has solidified Qatar’s reputation as a trusted and preferred mediator, particularly by the US, as demonstrated in its mediation efforts between the US and the Taliban, Iran and Venezuela. Its recent attempts to mediate between Palestinian resistance movements and Israel represent the culmination of a sustained record of diplomatic successes. 3. Qatar’s openness to various Palestinian factions, its ability to maintain positive and balanced relations, and its hosting of Hamas’s political bureau since 2012 have significantly contributed to building strong ties with the movement. This, in turn, has bolstered Qatar’s role and influence in the Palestinian issue, establishing it as a preferred mediator for Hamas, which has openly expressed appreciation for Qatar’s efforts to support the Palestinian people and to manage constructive and neutral mediation during critical phases. 4. Qatar’s strategic relations with the US have enabled it to play significant roles in the Palestine issue, including hosting Hamas leadership under Qatari-US agreements. In 2022, US President Joe Biden designated Qatar as a major non-NATO ally. 5. Qatar possesses many elements and tools of influence and soft power in the diplomatic, media and economic fields, and its success in utilizing its soft power efficiently has contributed to many political achievements. Second: Aspects of Qatari Position Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood Although Qatar, like other political actors, was initially taken by surprise by Operation al-Aqsa Flood , it swiftly adapted to the evolving situation. Key aspects of Qatar’s response during Operation al-Aqsa Flood include: 1. Qatar condemned the Israeli war on GS, attributing the escalation and regional instability to Israeli policies. It also denounced the massacres and acts of genocide committed by the Israeli forces against the Palestinian people in both GS and WB. 2. Throughout Operation al-Aqsa Flood , Qatar consistently called for a ceasefire, de-escalation and the restoration of calm in the region. The country actively engaged in political and diplomatic efforts to halt the aggression against Gaza and played a prominent role in the joint extraordinary Arab and Islamic Summit held in Riyadh on 11/11/2023. Qatar also pushed for concrete actions to stop Israeli crimes. During his speech at the summit, the Emir of Qatar stated, “You all know the position and feelings of our people regarding what is happening…. we must take deterrent steps to stop the ongoing war crime, in a way that will also project the weight and leverage of Islamic states.” 3. Qatar addressed the political and media campaigns that sought to incite against it and blamed it for the 7/10/2023 attack due to its hosting of Hamas leadership and financial support for GS with calmness and resolve. On 13/10/2023, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani stressed that the “State of Qatar’s commitment to its role as a partner in peacemaking and a mediator in resolving conflicts should not be used to harm its reputation by leveling accusations that were proven to be false and the bad faith of its promoters exposed.” A statement from the Qatari Foreign Ministry on 16/10/2023 clarified that “Qatar is not a financial backer of Hamas. It provides aid to Gaza, and the destination of the money is crystal clear.” “Qatari aid to the Gaza Strip is fully coordinated with Israel, the United Nations and the United States.” 4. During the crisis, Qatar’s most notable official role was its active diplomacy and leadership in mediating a ceasefire and facilitating prisoner exchange deals between the Palestinian resistance and Israel, with direct US supervision and sponsorship. 5. The Qatari media played a pivotal and influential role during the war, effectively delivering detailed on-the-ground reports and covering political and popular movements both within and beyond Palestine. This represented a significant milestone in media coverage of the war’s developments. In response, on 5/5/2024, the Israeli government unanimously voted to shut down Al Jazeera’s operations in the occupied territories and confiscate its television equipment, citing allegations of incitement and threats to national security. Third: Projections Qatar’s numerous achievements in political mediation underscore the success of its strategy, which emphasizes building long-term relationships with diverse global actors. This approach has afforded Qatar significant leverage, enabling it to effectively mediate many crucial issues. Moving forward, Qatar is anticipated to continue its strategic and active mediation efforts, aiming to secure a ceasefire agreement in GS, despite the obstacles posed by Benjamin Netanyahu’s intransigence and his insistence on continuing aggression. The effect of possible regional escalation on Qatar’s mediation efforts is still unclear, especially if Israel ramps up its confrontation with Iran and Hizbullah in the wake of the recent assassinations of Hamas political bureau chief Isma‘il Haniyyah and Hizbullah military official Fuad Shukr. Additionally, the potential impact of a Donald Trump victory in the upcoming US presidential election on Qatar’s diplomatic and mediation roles in the Palestine issue remains uncertain.

Diplomacy
Macron-Barnier

Macron-Barnier, a couple in “coalitation”?

by Olivier Guyottot

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In the weeks leading up to the appointment of Michel Barnier as France’s new prime minister, there was one word in particular to hang on the lips of those at the Elysée Palace – “coalitation”. The portmanteau of “coalition” and “cohabitation”, “coalitation” serves to refer to the situation of acute governmental deadlock in which France finds itself, more than two months after the snap parliamentary elections called by Emmanuel Macron failed to land any party an absolute majority of seats. Under the Fifth Republic, France has known three cohabitations following parliamentary elections won by the opposition to the president’s party. The first was between the socialist president François Mitterrand and conservative prime minister Jacques Chirac from 1986 to 1988; the second, between president Mitterrand and Édouard Balladur from 1993 to 1995, and the third between president Chirac and socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin from 1997 to 2002. Under such circumstances, the president took on a secondary role, including tasks such as appointing the prime minister or presiding the council of ministers, while the prime minister and national assembly set the political agenda. However, the current situation is very different, recalling more the paralysis of the Fourth Republic than any of the duos listed above. While the presidential camp lacks even a relative majority, none of the parties or coalitions from the recent legislative elections come close to securing one either. Michel Barnier will therefore have to rely on a new coalition or new ad hoc agreements to get his legislative proposals passed and avoid being censured. The French neologism coalitation is therefore more appropriate to describe the situation in which Emmanuel Macron and Michel Barnier find themselves. A notion of performance In addition, such a state of affairs is not without recalling expressions used in the labour world, such as ‘remote working’, ‘presenteeism’, ‘management’ and ‘coworking’. In the 1980s, the expressions ‘management’ and ‘managers’ became widely used terms in France to describe the challenges of optimising resources and managing people in organisations. This period marked the proliferation of neologisms, particularly of English origin, in the business world. It highlighted the importance of individual and collective performance, helping French companies compete in an increasingly global market. By the 1990s, expressions like “New Public Management” and “New Managerialism” emerged in English-speaking countries. These terms were particularly applied to setting performance targets – especially financial ones – in organisations originally serving the public interest, such as health and education sectors. An expression used by Macron? The term “coalitation” was first coined by advisers to the President of the Republic. We can read its use as an attempt to downplay the lack of a presidential majority and to ease the transition into the upcoming cohabitation. This strategy can be seen as a way for the President to maintain the upper hand despite his party’s defeat in the parliamentary elections. It functions as a semantic tool that allows Macron to frame this cohabitation in a modern and new way, setting it apart from previous ones. But the links between this term and management-inspired neologisms also reflect Macron’s profile as a “politician manager” and his managerial approach to politics. An advocate of free enterprise and entrepreneurship, often associated with the “start-up nation” concept, Emmanuel Macron embodies a political philosophy directly influenced by the business world. His terms in office have stood out through their use of team-building seminars, the use of consultants from private firms, and staff reshuffles following unmet performance targets. Inability to renew? Back home, the seemingly contradictory term also echoes the president’s fondness for the expression of “En même temps” (“At the same time”) that has become part of the Macron brand. The adverbial phrase sees him lay out a position, only to deconstruct it and espouse its contrary proposition. Critics say it shows the centrist president’s inability to adopt a stance, opting instead for a verbal fudge of saying one thing, then its opposite and ultimately, nothing at all. The neologism coalitation also embodies a new form of the Macronist “at the same time” philosophy by emphasising the need to find common ground between opposing programmes and political forces. For supporters of the president, this term highlights the relevance and timeliness of an approach developed by Emmanuel Macron. In this context, Michel Barnier’s profile as a negotiator and moderate can be seen as a reaffirmation of this strategy. Historically, however, the use of such neologisms has sometimes served to mask the challenges of ineffective or risky strategies. Some researchers have questioned whether introducing expressions like ‘management’ and ‘manager’ into the French vocabulary truly changed how companies and social relations worked, emphasising the sometimes artificial nature of these approaches. The same applies today to the term “coalitation” as this neologism seems to illustrate Emmanuel Macron’s struggle to offer a new way of doing politics despite the promises made on the night of his re-election. Macron France French Politics Barnier Politics

Defense & Security
japan,australia,usa and india friendship against china.Quad plus countries flags Quad plus countries flags over china flag.Quad plus countries. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Trump II and US Nuclear Assurances in the Indo-Pacific

by Liviu Horovitz , Elisabeth Suh

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.