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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The integration of Artificial Intelligence into military frameworks by India and Pakistan is reshaping regional security dynamics, fueling a doctrinal shift with profound implications for strategic stability. As AI-driven systems enhance military capabilities, the accompanying risks of miscalculation, escalation, and ethical dilemmas demand urgent dialogue and regulatory measures to mitigate potential conflict. The rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a transformative technology has reshaped global dynamics across various domains, including national security. As states increasingly incorporate AI into military frameworks, the implications for strategic stability, particularly in nuclear-armed regions like South Asia, are profound. The militarisation of AI by India and Pakistan, underpinned by their historical rivalry, is catalysing a doctrinal evolution with both opportunities and risks for regional security. AI is becoming a cornerstone of military innovation in South Asia with capabilities of autonomous weapons systems, surveillance technologies, and decision-making frameworks becoming increasingly relevant. The development of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, often termed “killer robots,” epitomises the dual-use nature of AI—it offers strategic advantages but also raises concerns about malfunction, miscalculation, and escalation. These concerns are amplified when AI technologies are integrated into nuclear and conventional military frameworks, especially in volatile regions like South Asia. India’s AI-driven military modernisation India has positioned AI as a central element of its strategic ambitions, supported by initiatives such as the Defense AI Council and the establishment of the Centre for AI and Robotics (CAIR) under its Defense Research and Development Organization. The country’s AI-focused projects include developing multi-agent robotic frameworks, advanced surveillance systems, and AI-powered drones. Additionally, HAL Tejas, a multi role combat aircraft, has been modernised by CAIR to assists in maintaining Indian Air Force systems. Meanwhile, the acquisition of over five thousand drones in 2016 have come into action in defence frameworks.  The multi-agent robotic drones work in groups by forming teams for swarms. Collaborative efforts with international partners, including Israel and Japan, have further bolstered India’s AI capabilities, including in teaming initiatives. The integration of disruptive technologies has come along way, evolving with doctrinal changes, particularly with the Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces (2017) and the Land Warfare Doctrine (2018). While both included the potential for AI capabilities, the LWD placed specific emphasis on multi-front environmental frameworks, hybrid warfare, and the incorporation of disruptive technologies in the military domain to secure strategic edge. The deployment of AI-enabled systems along sensitive borders, such as its northwestern frontier with Pakistan, underscores an intent to enhance both offensive and defensive operations. Pakistan’s Response to AI Militarisation Pakistan has also begun integrating AI into its military strategies, albeit this has taken place at an earlier stage. Initiatives such as the establishment of the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Computing and the Army Centre of Emerging Technologies highlight Pakistan’s focus on leveraging AI for defense and cybersecurity. Pakistan’s collaborations with China, a global leader in AI, have facilitated the development of unmanned systems and other AI-enabled technologies. For instance, a joint venture with Chinese Chengdu Aircraft Company is helping to develop unmanned aerial vehicles. Meanwhile, Pakistan has purchased from China Cai Hong drones (Rainbow4/CH-4) that can be effectively deployed for strike missions and reconnaissance. Evolving Nuclear Doctrines India’s nuclear doctrine, historically anchored in a no-first-use (NFU) policy, has evolved to reflect greater flexibility and ambiguity. Statements by Indian officials, coupled with advancements in AI and surveillance technologies, indicate a potential shift toward counterforce strategies. This can be assessed from the statements by national security officials, including 2010 national security advisor Shivshankar Menon, who remarked that “India’s NFU doctrine applied to non-nuclear weapons states, implying that the NFU would not apply to Pakistan.” Rajnath Sing, tthe current Indian defense minister, hinted at flexibility of NFU by saying that “India has strictly adhered to this doctrine. What happens in future depends on the circumstances.” Doctrinal transformations, such as the Land Warfare Doctrine further highlights India’s focus on leveraging AI to enhance its strategic edge. These changes, coupled with the deployment of AI-enabled surveillance systems along borders, signals India’s intent to strengthen its deterrence posture while maintaining the flexibility to adapt to emerging threats. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has evolved from a first-use policy to a more nuanced approach encapsulated in the Full Spectrum Deterrence and Quid Pro Quo Plus strategies. The policies of quid pro quo plus and full spectrum deterrence conveys that Pakistan would respond to any kind of cross border military adventure from India in more than a tit-for-tat, a clear message that the response would be a notch higher on the escalation ladder while still posturing the threat of nuclear retaliation at every step of the escalation ladder. These frameworks aim to counter India’s conventional and nuclear superiority by maintaining credible deterrence across the escalation spectrum. These include the development of tactical nuclear weapons and advancements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Challenges and Risks The militarisation of AI in South Asia introduces several challenges, including the erosion of strategic stability, the lowering of the nuclear threshold, and the risk of accidental escalation. AI-driven systems, while efficient, lack the nuanced judgment of human operators. This increases the risk of unintended escalation during crises. Additionally, the integration of AI into nuclear command-and-control systems could compress decision-making timelines, heightening the risk of hasty or ill-informed actions. The proliferation of AI technologies also raises concerns about their acquisition by non-state actors, who could exploit these systems for malicious purposes. Finally, the deployment of autonomous weapons systems poses ethical dilemmas and challenges existing frameworks of international humanitarian law. To address these challenges, it is imperative for South Asian states to adopt regulatory frameworks and confidence-building measures. Potential steps include bilateral and multilateral dialogues. For instance, India and Pakistan could engage in dialogue to establish norms and protocols for the use of AI in military operations. Additionally, transparency initiatives, such as data-sharing mechanisms and joint exercises, can help reduce mistrust and prevent miscalculation. Prioritising AI applications for defensive purposes, such as enhanced surveillance and early warning systems, can also mitigate risks while strengthening deterrence. Conclusion The militarisation of AI is reshaping the strategic landscape of South Asia, driving doctrinal evolution, and altering the balance of power. The integration of AI in the military domain is leading India and Pakistan towards a potentially deepening security dilemma. This demonstrates that South Asia, in the age of AI militarisation, will be dominated by feelings of mistrust and erosion of strategic stability. By fostering dialogue and adopting regulatory measures, South Asian states can ensure that AI serves as a tool for stability rather than a catalyst for conflict. In an era of rapid technological advancement, the imperative to manage AI’s military applications responsibly has never been greater. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the return to power of the center-left coalition "Broad Front" (Frente Amplio, FA) in 2025, Uruguay has entered a new political cycle. Although Uruguay is a very stable country by Latin American standards, various forecasts about possible changes in the country's foreign policy under the new president, Yamandú Orsi, have already started appearing in the media. Most expectations focus on the regional dimension, which is logical for several reasons. Firstly, the regional subsystem of international relations plays a crucial role in Uruguay's participation in global politics, particularly in advancing key foreign policy priorities that are important to all ideological camps in the country, such as conflict mediation, development assistance, support for international law, and human rights. Secondly, a critical stance toward Latin American integration structures became a hallmark of the outgoing conservative government of Luis Lacalle Pou (2020–2025), which left office on March 1, 2025. His presidency was marked by debates over the direction of regional integration, including discussions on the potential revival of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), strengthening the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in response to crises in energy, healthcare, and food security during the 2020s, and overcoming the stagnation of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). Uruguay consistently positioned itself as a staunch and vocal skeptic on all these matters. According to one of Uruguay’s leading international relations experts, Nastasja Barceló, this stance has harmed national interests by contributing to the "isolation of Uruguay and a break with the country’s traditional foreign policy approaches".  Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that the team of the newly elected president openly emphasizes the priority of the regional dimension. A key figure in Yamandú Orsi’s team is Álvaro Padrón, his advisor on international political affairs, who, in an interview, outlined the concept of "concentric circles" in Uruguay's foreign policy: "The first circle consists of bilateral relations with Argentina and Brazil… the second is MERCOSUR… the third is South America". According to Padrón, aligning positions on various international issues with South American and Latin American neighbors should serve as the foundation for advancing Uruguay's interests on global platforms. Orsi’s allies also highlight that his government aims to leverage regional opportunities to facilitate Uruguay’s integration into the evolving multipolar world order. Thus, the election of Yamandú Orsi has raised hopes that Uruguay will significantly strengthen its presence in regional integration groups. At the very least, this is expected to apply to CELAC, UNASUR, and MERCOSUR, which are frequently mentioned in the rhetoric of the future president, Vice President Carolina Cosse, Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin, advisor Álvaro Padrón, as well as in the still-limited assessments of international affairs experts. Naturally, questions arise about the specific opportunities and challenges on this path: what tools and strategies can Uruguay use to "revitalize" the regional framework? How will the new government's Latin American agenda align with its global policy? While it is difficult to provide definitive answers before Orsi officially takes office, contradictions are already apparent that may weaken the positive impact of the change in power on regional integration. Challenges to Regional Integration and Uruguay's Approach In a conceptual sense, projects like CELAC and UNASUR are associated with the so-called idea of the "Greater Latin American Homeland", which rose on the wave of the "left turn" of the 2000s - early 2010s. One of the brightest supporters of this philosophy was the popular Uruguayan President (2010-2015) José Mujica, who still exerts a significant influence on the balance of power in the "Broad Front". His support for the candidacy of Yamandú Orsi in the last elections was so obvious that the future president was literally nicknamed the "heir" of J. Mujica. In light of the close ties between the two politicians, it seems logical that J. Orsi will also promote the idea of the "Greater Latin American Homeland", defending the consolidation of his region on the international arena in the face of major powers that have their own interests in Latin America. In the speeches of J. Orsi and A. Padrón, there are indeed calls to strengthen CELAC so that Latin America can have more weight in international affairs, or to structure leadership in South America, but in real life there are challenges to the implementation of such plans. One of them is the reactive position of Iain Orsi's team on the Venezuelan issue. Over the past decade, discussions about the right of Nicolás Maduro to remain in power have polarized Latin America and prevented the development of unifying initiatives. The administration of L. Lacalle Pou has solidified its refusal to recognize the legitimacy of N. Maduro's government, which limits the possibilities of cooperation with the Chavistas. Although Iain Orsi has stated in connection with the Venezuelan issue that the importance of dialogue with states is higher than judgments about political regimes, his team has not made any special changes on the Venezuelan vector. After N. Maduro was re-elected to his post once again in the summer of 2024, Iain Orsi said that there is a “dictatorship” in the Caribbean country, and none of the key figures of the CF went to N. Maduro's inauguration in January. At one time, Jose Mujica offered his good services to Colombia, where the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC took the difficult path of reconciliation, and one might expect that the moderate leftist J. Orsi would try himself in the role of mediator of the internal political crisis in the Bolivarian Republic. But for agreements and mediation, Caracas and Montevideo need at least to restore normal diplomatic interaction, which was frozen after the elections in Venezuela in July 2024. As noted in the media, the prospect of "defrosting" is absolutely unclear. The second challenge is doubts that Uruguay under J. Orsi will be able to contribute to the consolidated and independent positioning of Latin America in the current geopolitical conditions. As far as can be judged now, the team of the elected leader is distinguished by an extremely evasive position on the crises around Ukraine and Gaza, combining emphasized official neutrality, non-participation in sanctions and diplomatic demarches, but also a certain sympathy for the Western point of view. This is hinted at, for example, by J. Orsi's positive attitude to sending a Uruguayan delegation to the summit on Ukraine in Bürgenstock in June 2024 and his statements about Russia in the spirit that "perhaps other points should have been included" in the program of principles of the "Broad Front", condemning US and NATO imperialism. In the Middle East drama, J. Orsi, like his vice-president K. Kosse, while agreeing with the Palestinians' right to claim statehood, does not condemn Israel's actions. This differs from the position of many other left-wing leaders in the region, which some critical experts have already noted. When analyzing the roots of these approaches, two key points emerge. First, it is likely that under this president the liberal attitudes characteristic of the mainstream of Uruguayan elites will be preserved. They may also be relevant for the moderate left within the “Broad Front”, to which Yamandú Orsi belongs, who defines himself as a “pragmatist” and “non-Marxist.” The consequence of adherence to such a political philosophy usually becomes a loyal attitude to the course of the Euro-Atlantic powers and their closest allies, so it is unlikely that Uruguay under Yamandú Orsi will oppose the Western-centric world order. Secondly, the involvement of major powers in geopolitical contradictions, the adoption of obligations or parties in this regard, including the unambiguous label of “non-alignment”, does not fit into Montevideo’s line of behavior on the global stage at all. The positioning of this small South American state in the context of the formation of a multipolar world, as built in the discourse of political elites, presupposes an economic-centric strategy and “free hands”. The key idea is to interact with various actors, especially for the implementation of the goals of trade and investment diversification, and to promote a positive image of Uruguay as a neutral and peace-loving state focused on socio-economic development. The U.S. dimension deserves special mention, as distancing from Washington and challenging its dominance has traditionally been a defining feature of proponents of Latin American patriotic unity. Uruguay has maintained relatively stable relations with the United States, though previous administrations under the "Broad Front" encountered certain areas of disagreement. One key issue has been hemispheric security and the functioning of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), which the "Broad Front" views as repressive and outdated. This stance was evident under the last left-wing government led by Tabaré Vázquez (2015–2020), which initiated Uruguay’s withdrawal from the treaty. However, the administration of Luis Lacalle Pou reversed this decision, leaving Montevideo’s future participation in the Rio Pact uncertain as of the 2024 elections. The program of principles of the "Broad Front" for 2025-2030, which the coalition formulated on the eve of the elections, stated that Uruguay should secure the support of the region and finally withdraw from the controversial treaty - "a legacy of the Cold War" and "a symbol of Latin America's status as the backyard of the United States." Moreover, as one of the "main experiments" of regionalism, it mentions the South American Defense Council (SADC). It operated under the auspices of UNASUR and was focused on developing common South American solutions in matters of military security and peacekeeping, excluding the influence of external powers. In Orsi's entourage, nothing has been said about Uruguay's attitude to either the Rio Pact or the SADC. On the other hand, shortly after his electoral triumph, Orsi met with US Ambassador Heidi Fulton, who confirmed that Washington and Montevideo have common views, including on security issues. In light of this, it currently appears that the Uruguayan leader is not interested in being at the forefront of critics of US influence in Latin and South America. The emergence of Donald Trump at the helm of the US, who in the first weeks of his presidency has already managed to enter into a rhetorical conflict with the heads of Mexico, Colombia and Central American states, may further encourage J. Orsi to behave cautiously. Especially considering that Uruguay is one of the few countries in the region under leftist rule that has not received its share of criticism from D. Trump and his Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a “hawk in Latin American affairs”. The desire to maintain a calm, positive interaction with Washington, which the outgoing administration of L. Lacalle Pou achieved, can also be perceived as a consequence of J. Orsi’s pragmatism and moderation, despite his leftist orientation. It certainly cannot be considered a resource for uniting the regional neighbourhood with the idea of fighting against the “North American dictate”. Thus, at this stage, the new president’s approach to international affairs appears too passive and cautious to actively support any bloc identity in Latin America. Therefore, if strengthening CELAC and restoring UNASUR remain priorities for the new government, its focus will likely be on the inclusivity and representativeness of these platforms rather than their sovereigntist positioning. Nevertheless, although J. Orsi does not seem to be a figure who will strengthen political integration in the spirit of the "Greater Latin American Homeland", he may well increase the overall regional presence of Montevideo. The politician has repeatedly emphasized that in the Latin American field, the development of multilateralism and presidential diplomacy are important to him. Under his leadership, Uruguay will be able to show itself in individual initiatives and working groups under the auspices of CELAC or UNASUR on environmental issues, human rights, and sustainable development. For example, in December 2024, J. Orsi already discussed plans to promote a "regional alliance" on clean energy and joint efforts to preserve the Amazon with his Colombian counterpart Gustavo Petro. A New Phase for MERCOSUR? Regarding MERCOSUR, the "Broad Front" (FA) has a clear stance—to strengthen and expand it. This position is shared by the new president's team, and it seems to be more than just rhetoric. Even before the end of 2024, Yamandú Orsi met with all the bloc’s neighboring presidents except Javier Milei—Brazil’s Lula da Silva, Paraguay’s Santiago Peña, and Bolivia’s Luis Arce. During these meetings, the Uruguayan leader emphasized regional unity and expressed his commitment to developing MERCOSUR. Relations with Brazil are of decisive importance and have become a strategic priority for J. Orsi. Under L. Lacalle Pou, interaction with the northern neighbor was pragmatic. Lula da Silva's ambitions to turn MERCOSUR into a tool for promoting Brazil on the international stage irritated the Uruguayan president. Now, however, completely different assessments have begun to be heard from the Uruguayan side: A. Padron calls Brazil a regional "heavyweight", stating that, by increasing its own global role, Uruguay must "accompany Brazil's leadership". In his view, such "accompaniment" presupposes support for multilateral groups led by the northern neighbor, among which MERCOSUR plays a key role as the oldest organization. At the same time, the circle of J. Orsi is characterized by the established ideas in the political elites of Uruguay that MERCOSUR still requires reforms and should follow the path of open regionalism. On the one hand, this assumes that the economy remains a priority area of cooperation in the bloc, the improvement of the common market requires the growth of the organization's importance among all economic entities in the member states, the correlation of its work with the tasks of technological and innovative development of its participants. On the other hand, MERCOSUR must adhere to the principles of free trade and build up external relations in order to strengthen the positions of its participants in the international division of labor. At the same time, today the association finds itself in conditions where globalization is slowing down, the struggle for strategic resources is intensifying, and supply chains are being restructured. Given these circumstances, several areas can be identified that may be of interest to the government of J. Orsi, both from the point of view of revealing Uruguay’s competitive advantages in MERCOSUR and from the point of view of modernizing the bloc.  Firstly, this is an emphasis on the integration of production chains with neighbors, the promotion of "friendshoring" in MERCOSUR. This is supported by the fact that Uruguay's industrial supplies are primarily focused on the bloc's members. The electric transport industry, pharmaceuticals and the production of organic food products are growth points for the industrial and innovative potential of the Uruguayan national economy and at the same time create a field for complementarity of economies in MERCOSUR. For example, Uruguay is the record holder in South America for the prevalence of electric vehicles, and it also has the most extensive network of charging stations for them in the unification zone. However, the country's own production of cars and batteries has not been established and remains an important task for the future, as noted in a report prepared in 2023 by the Technological University, the National Institute of Employment and Vocational Education and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security of Uruguay. Resources to solve this problem can be found within MERCOSUR. The bloc now includes Bolivia, which is aiming to industrialize its vast lithium sector and has national expertise in producing electric cars. Secondly, Uruguay has traditionally been distinguished by its special attention to the concept of sustainable development, which is consistent with the concept of building bioeconomy in the South American Common Market. Recently, it has been discussed by scientists as an alternative to import-substituting industrialization, which guided the bloc until the 2010s and began to stall after the onset of the 2014–2015 crisis. According to IDB estimates, Uruguay has some of the highest standards in Latin America for the implementation of renewable energy sources, environmental awareness practices in organizational, managerial and production activities. Such competencies increase its importance for MERCOSUR if the bloc decides to focus on the energy transition and promote the formation of circular economies. For now, these plans seem hypothetical, but the appearance of an association agreement with the European Union on the horizon will make them relevant. Given that MERCOSUR not only reached a trade agreement with the EU in December 2024, but is also considering the formation of FTAs with China, Korea and Singapore, another important area for Uruguayan diplomacy will clearly be building the bloc's relations with external powers. The rhetoric of J. Orsi and K. Cosse, as well as A. Padron, shows that the Uruguayan side expects to combine all these areas and rely on its neighbors in order to strengthen its position in negotiations and reduce the asymmetry in interactions with larger global players. It was in this vein that the decision was made for J. Orsi to abandon a separate FTA agreement with China, which the outgoing government of L. Lacalle Pou sought. The beginning of the widespread protectionist offensive of the United States under D. Trump really creates an opportunity for MERCOSUR to open its doors to European and Pacific partners. Uruguay, which champions free trade principles, can take advantage of this. At the same time, the options related to the bloc leave their unspoken. The most obvious of them is the coordination of interests with Argentina, which, as mentioned, will be included in the “first circle” of the foreign policy strategy of the new government. Although J. Orsi optimistically declared that he would reach a consensus with Javier Miley, this has not yet been possible. Plans to hold talks with this eccentric leader at the MERCOSUR summit in Montevideo in early December 2024 have failed. The lack of mutual understanding with the far-right J. Miley remains a problem, because without the political consent of its members, the association is in principle unable to evolve. Argentina also plays an important role in the industrial and infrastructural potential of MERCOSUR, without its participation it is difficult to imagine initiatives to promote economic complementarity in the bloc. Another issue is the compatibility of plans to modernize the organization and accelerate cooperation with external actors. Thus, from the point of view of the prospects of the agreement already reached with the EU, the MERCOSUR zone attracts it primarily as a pool of strategic natural resources and food, which is especially true for Uruguay. In turn, the automotive, textile, pharmaceutical and chemical industries are viewed by Europe as niches for the expansion of its goods and services and its presence in South America. Such a view cannot but affect investment preferences, including plans for new models of MERCOSUR development. In one form or another, these layouts can be repeated in the interaction of the bloc with China and other highly industrialized players. Therefore, for Uruguay and its neighbors, no matter which option for increasing the global competitiveness of the association through openness they choose, the strategic problem will remain the preservation of industrial sovereignty and limiting the reprimarization of their economies. It is worth adding that similar warnings were already voiced at a meeting between Yamandú Orsi and representatives of the scientific and business communities in June 2024. What is the bottom line?  It is safe to say that the new Uruguayan government will increase its attention to regional integration. If Luis Lacalle Pou called MERCOSUR a "suffocating corset" that can and should be gotten rid of, then with the election of Yamandú Orsi, the integration platforms, on the contrary, emphasize the useful function of supporting national interests. Although calls to reform multilateral groups so that they better correspond to specific policy objectives and the spirit of the times have not gone away. In Latin American political science thought, participation in integration groups is often presented as a way to achieve autonomy or, as one of the leading Argentine international theorists, Juan Carlos Puig, put it, “the ability to independently make foreign policy decisions, taking into account the objective conditions of the real world.” The autonomist course is usually associated with left-wing forces, but it does not necessarily imply the creation of blocs like the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), which directly challenge the West. Pragmatic diversification of ties with major powers, support for regional leaders, neutrality and non-interference can also be reflections of such a course. If we look at the rhetoric and first steps of I. Orsi’s team from this angle, we can link his attitude to regional structures with the search for autonomy in the international arena. Of course, with an adjustment for the traditional principles and limitations of Uruguayan diplomacy. At the same time, a significant shift or revitalization of Latin American regionalism is unlikely to result from Uruguay's leadership change. This is not only due to Uruguay's relatively small geopolitical weight but also because the new president does not seem inclined to challenge the regional status quo, forge a distinct identity, or promote it on the global stage. Uruguayan political analyst Daniel Buquet, reflecting on how Yamandú Orsi's victory might impact the leftist forces supporting integration, used a chess metaphor: “It’s like winning a pawn, but not a bishop”—a rather fitting analogy.  This article was supported by the Russian Science Foundation grant No. 23-78-01030, within the project "Latin America and the Concept of a Multipolar World: Key Approaches, Impact on Foreign Policy, and Relations with Russia".

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Latin America has been a long-standing policy focus for the United States, aimed at keeping external influences out and maintaining stability in the region. This commitment began with the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary and continued through the Cold War. Under the current administration, there has been a renewed emphasis on Latin America due to rising Chinese influence, drug cartel activity, and immigration issues. The most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) states that no region impacts the United States more than the Western Hemisphere and emphasizes the need to “protect against external interference or coercion, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).” However, the United States has not had a coherent strategy or policy toward Latin America in decades, leading to outcomes contrary to its stated goals. The PRC has been rapidly expanding its influence in the region. Since 2010, China has nearly tripled its trade with Latin America, with several nations signing on to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Additionally, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) continue to affect the United States through drug, weapon, and human trafficking, while also forcing migrants north due to unsafe living conditions in their home countries. Given this situation, the United States must develop a coherent two-pronged strategy toward Latin America. This strategy should involve expanding economic investments to counteract Chinese influence while also strengthening regional security to address the threats posed by TCOs. Recognizing that the PRC and TCOs are different from the Soviets and Marxist guerrillas, US policy during the Cold War provides valuable lessons on what this two-pronged approach could entail. US Cold War Policy in Latin America In the early days of the Cold War, the United States was concerned about the spread of communism in Latin America but initially failed to take meaningful action. It relied instead on outdated policies from the 1920s. This approach continued until the late 1950s, when significant changes occurred in the hemisphere. By then, ten of thirteen dictators had been replaced, economic challenges had intensified, and the prices of Latin American exports had plummeted. This social and political unrest carried over into the 1960s, as the region became “aflame” with Marxist revolutions. The CIA reported that twelve out of twenty-three nations in the southern hemisphere were at risk of falling to communism. This urgency prompted the United States to act, determined to prevent the region from succumbing to Soviet influence and instability. The Kennedy administration identified economic struggles and monetary insecurity as the principal vulnerabilities that could allow communism to take root. To address these issues, the administration launched the Alliance for Progress, a ten-year initiative where the United States would provide $20 billion in loans, grants, and investments, while Latin American governments aimed to generate $80 billion in funds and implement land reforms, tax systems, and other socio-political changes. In tandem with economic initiatives, the United States employed covert actions, counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics, and military support to suppress Marxist revolutions. For instance, in Guatemala, US-backed military forces fought against Marxist revolutionaries with American military assistance. Similar operations took place in El Salvador, Chile, Paraguay, and Brazil. Although not executed flawlessly, this two-pronged strategy ultimately succeeded in keeping Soviet and communist influences largely at bay in the region. Economic assistance and support helped stabilize democracy in Venezuela, while land redistribution and reforms from the Alliance for Progress undermined financial support for Marxist guerrilla groups in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Despite being conducted with a certain level of negligence, US-backed COIN operations across the region weakened guerrilla movements, leading to factional splits and self-defeating behaviors. Notably, US-supported operations included the capture of Che Guevara by a US-trained Bolivian military unit in 1967. Applying a Cold War-like Policy Today Economic challenges are once again prevalent in Latin America, and China is seizing the opportunity. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has expanded its influence and bolstered regional ties. Twenty Latin American countries have signed onto the BRI, while Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru have established free trade agreements with the PRC. In 2010, trade between China and South America amounted to $180 billion, which surged to $450 billion by 2021. The United States needs to consider a strategy similar to the Alliance for Progress to effectively compete with the PRC and maintain its influence in the region, as it is currently falling short in this area. In 2023, China invested $9 billion in Latin America through its Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI), while the United States contributed only $2 billion for the same year. As the new administration shapes its foreign policy, it is essential to allocate more economic investment to Latin America. This should involve a deliberate economic policy and investment plan that focuses on trade, port infrastructure, and technological development—all areas where the PRC is currently providing support. The bipartisan Americas Act of 2024 is a good starting point, but it is insufficient to counteract the PRC’s advances. While some might argue that boosting economic investment is too expensive, such efforts would enable the United States to compete with China while stabilizing the region and reducing northward immigration. In tandem with economic investment, the United States must advocate for stronger regional security to combat TCOs, thus fostering stability and improving living conditions. Specifically, the United States should collaborate with Latin American countries to enhance security institutions by expanding advisory and assistance operations with regional militaries, similar to COIN operations during the Cold War. In recent years, the United States military has maintained a significant presence in countries like Colombia, Panama, and Honduras to conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations, aimed at preparing partner forces to effectively combat TCOs. FID and Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations should include US military support for other nations in the region, such as El Salvador, Bolivia, and Mexico. Historically, countries like Mexico have been hesitant or resistant to accepting US military support; however, this trend has recently shifted. In a positive development, the Mexican Senate has approved a small contingent of US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to assist Mexican SOF personnel. In addition to expanding FID operations, the United States might explore granting broader authorities to allow US military forces to assist regional partners in targeting and operational planning against TCOs. While some may oppose this option, expanded authorities should not come as a surprise, given that the new administration has designated several TCOs as terrorist organizations. This designation opens the door for discussions on expanded authorities. Conclusion During the Cold War, Latin America was a primary focus of US policy. The United States worked diligently to maintain regional hegemony and prevent the spread of communist ideology in the Western Hemisphere. Today, Latin America and the southern border have again become focal points for the current US administration. With the rising influence of China in the region and the ongoing impact of TCOs on American life, the United States must develop deliberate policies and strategies to maintain its hegemonic influence while promoting stability. This strategy should consist of a two-pronged approach that emphasizes both economic investment and regional security. Such an approach could disrupt Chinese influence while fostering a safer and more stable region, ultimately reducing migration northward—a key objective for the current administration. Article, originally written by and published in Small Wars Journal under the title "Same But Different: Cold War Strategy in 21st Century Latin America." Consult here: https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/06/same-but-different-cold-war-strategy-in-21st-century-latin-america/. This translation is shared under the same Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The question of migration occupies a central and divisive place in US politics. Yet critical questions are rarely asked about why migrants decide to leave their homes in the first place and what role US foreign policy might play in that decision. This oversight is especially glaring when it comes to one of the most common tools of US foreign policy: broad economic sanctions. There is overwhelming evidence (1) that migration1 is driven in large part by adverse economic conditions and (2) that sanctions can have severe, harmful economic and humanitarian consequences for civilians in targeted countries. The cases of Cuba and Venezuela demonstrate this relationship clearly: The imposition or tightening of sanctions by the US government have, in recent years, fueled economic crises that in turn have led to record migratory outflows. Addressing migration at its roots will require rethinking US sanctions policy as part of a broader research and policy agenda that considers the role of US foreign policy in fueling migratory push factors abroad. Economic Hardship Drives Migration The decision to emigrate — often involving leaving one’s home, family, and community to undertake a perilous journey to a new country with a different language and culture, without any guarantee of safety, accommodation, or employment — is not typically one that is taken lightly. Such a life-altering decision is rarely reducible to a single factor but is rather made in the context of multiple and interrelated push and pull factors. However, one of the most well-established sets of factors that impact migration are economic. There is broad consensus that economic conditions in the country of origin are a major determinant of the desire to migrate. A recent review of 72 peer-reviewed, survey-based analyses of migration aspirations found an overwhelming relationship between the desire to migrate and economic factors, including perception of national economic conditions, employment opportunities, household financial situation, food security, contentment with public services, and expectations of future economic conditions. A similar relationship holds true of realized migration. Many have hypothesized an inverted U-shaped relationship between development and migration, whereby higher GDP per capita is associated with increased migration as would-be migrants gain the means to do so, until a certain point — after which higher income is associated with decreased migration. However, recent research suggests that this U-shaped relationship, though observed in cross-sectional analyses, does not hold for a given country over time.2 Rather, the relationship is clearer: poor or deteriorating economic and humanitarian conditions cause people to migrate from developing countries while growth and stability lead people to stay home. Sanctions Fuel Economic Hardship Over the past two decades, the number of US-imposed sanctions has grown nearly tenfold. The United States is by far the most prevalent user of sanctions, with one-third of all countries — and over 60 percent of low-income countries — facing US sanctions in some form. While many sanctions are narrowly targeted against particular individuals or entities, others target entire sectors or even the entire economy of a country. Such broad-based sanctions are indiscriminate and can have profound impacts on the economies, and therefore civilians, of targeted nations (and even purportedly targeted sanctions can have significant spillover effects). Broad-based sanctions can impede economic growth, potentially triggering or extending recessions and even depressions; restrict access to critical resources like medicine, food, and energy; disrupt humanitarian aid (despite nominal exemptions); and consequently exacerbate poverty, illness, and hunger. As a result, sanctions can lead to a significant number — in some cases tens of thousands — of preventable deaths. In a 2023 literature review for CEPR, economist Francisco Rodríguez determined that 94 percent of peer-reviewed econometric studies on the subject found substantial, statistically significant “negative effects on outcomes ranging from per capita income to poverty, inequality, mortality, and human rights” as a result of sanctions. One study associated sanctions with, on average, a 26 percent drop in GDP per capita — roughly the size of the Great Depression. Another tied sanctions to a 1.4-year decline in female life expectancy — comparable with the global impact of COVID-19. Yet another found a 2.5 percent increase in childhood HIV infection rates. While such indiscriminate impacts are often denied by the policymakers that impose sanctions, it is difficult to reconcile this denial with the fact that major macroeconomic factors such as growth rates, oil production, foreign reserves, currency stability, and the cost of essential goods are widely used — often by these very same policymakers — as metrics of “success” of sanctions. That these macroeconomic factors would in turn impact civilians is all but undeniable. In fact, there are significant reasons to believe that the broad economic and humanitarian impacts of certain sanctions regimes are intentional — and therefore are not a matter of calibration, but are inherent to the policy itself. Sanctions Induce MigrationIf migration is driven in part by economic hardship and sanctions can cause great economic and humanitarian suffering, then it follows that sanctions can substantially contribute to migration. This is not just borne out logically, but can be seen in the data. In October 2024, the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization published what may be the first and only systematic cross-national empirical analysis of how such sanctions impact international migration. The findings are striking. Using data on migration flows from 157 countries over more than half a century, the authors find that Western multilateral sanctions3 have increased emigration from target countries by, on average, 22 to 24 percent. Notably, they also find that “migrant flows return to their pre-sanction level once sanctions are lifted.” In few cases is this relationship between sanctions and migration clearer than in the cases of Cuba and Venezuela. Trump-Biden Sanctions Spur Cuban Depopulation The US embargo against Cuba — referred to by many as a blockade due to its extraterritorial impacts — is the US’s oldest and most comprehensive sanctions regime. Beginning in 1960 with export prohibitions in response to the Castro government’s agrarian reforms and nationalizations, successive administrations soon escalated this embargo into a comprehensive ban on nearly all trade, travel, and financial transactions, with the goal of destabilizing and ultimately toppling the Cuban government. While these sanctions have been periodically tightened or relaxed over the years, this foundational, comprehensive embargo has remained intact for over six decades and has since been enshrined into law through the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996. During his last two years in office, President Barack Obama took significant steps toward the normalization of bilateral relations with Cuba by, among other things, formally resuming diplomatic relations, loosening restrictions on travel and remittances, and removing Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SSOT) list, a measure that had effectively cut the island off from much of the global financial system. However, under the first Donald Trump administration, these policies were largely reversed, and the embargo was expanded to an unprecedented level. President Joe Biden, despite campaign promises to change the course of Cuban policy, maintained most of President Trump’s measures. Days before leaving office, Biden issued executive orders undoing Trump’s harshest sanctions measures only to see them predictably rescinded immediately following Trump’s return to the White House. In the case of both Trump and Biden, Cuban policy appears to have been driven in large part by electoral considerations in Florida, where hawkish Cuban American voters have long (and questionably) been seen as a key demographic in both parties’ efforts to win the state. The US embargo has long hindered Cuban economic growth and development, particularly since the late 1980s when the Soviet Union and its COMECON partners discontinued economic support for the island. In 2018, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean validated the Cuban government’s estimates that the six-decade embargo had cost the country $130 billion. By 2024, that estimate had grown to $164 billion. A recent econometric study on changes in US policy toward Cuba between 1990 and 2020 found a “substantial negative impact of sanctions policy shifts on Cuban economic growth.” Further, “this impact on GDP is concentrated in the component of household consumption” — in other words, Cuban citizens bear the highest burden. Over the last few years, Cuba’s economic situation has deteriorated further, in large part as a result of Trump-Biden policies. Measures such as returning Cuba to the SSOT list (despite no evidence of Cuban support for terrorism), restricting remittances, and prohibiting US citizens from doing business with dozens of “restricted entities” have greatly limited Cuba’s access to foreign exchange. This has, in turn, prevented Cuba from importing many essential goods (including critical pharmaceutical and agricultural inputs) and services (including maintenance services for Cuba’s ailing energy infrastructure), servicing its external debt, and perhaps most crucially, stabilizing the local currency following a major monetary reform in 2021. Another Trump measure — his decision to implement Title III of the LIBERTAD Act — has had a significant chilling effect on foreign investment in Cuba only a few years after the enactment of a reform opening up most sectors of the economy to foreign investors. This controversial provision, which allows for lawsuits against US or foreign persons doing business with Cuban entities that use or benefit from property expropriated at the beginning of the Cuban Revolution, had been waived by prior presidents and by Trump himself, until April 2019. The far-reaching negative impact of these and other Trump measures are part of the reason why Cuba’s economy has failed to significantly recover from the global economic downturn triggered by the COVID pandemic. Cuba has been plunged into the most serious economic and humanitarian crisis of its contemporary history, characterized by repeated blackouts, water shortages, fuel shortages, rising food costs, the deterioration of basic services such as garbage collection, and the spread of preventable diseases. Cuba’s fledgling private sector, which greatly expanded following Obama’s normalization measures and domestic liberalization measures in 2019 and 2021, is facing an uncertain future as a result of the crisis and new, stricter Cuban regulations designed in part to offset the effects of sanctions by capturing increasingly scarce foreign exchange. This economic crisis has in turn spurred a migration crisis. Data from the national statistics office of the government of Cuba shows skyrocketing net emigration following 2020 (see Figure 1). By August 2022, the outflow of migrants had surpassed that of the famous 1980 Mariel boatlift and the 1994 Balsero/Rafter crises combined.   Independent research — later confirmed by the Cuban government — estimates an even larger increase than those published by the national statistics office: the departure of over one million people, representing 10 percent of the country’s entire population, in 2022 and 2023 alone. As one researcher warned in 2022: “Cuba is depopulating.” While not all of these migrants ended up in the United States, the years 2022 and 2023 saw record-breaking numbers of encounters with Cuban migrants by the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In 2022, the CBP encountered more Cubans than any other nationality except Mexicans. Cubans constituted more than 10 percent of all encounters.4 Given the Trump administration’s, and particularly Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s, apparent commitment to maintaining the current policy toward Cuba — and perhaps even hardening it with yet more sanctions — we can expect out-migration from the island to continue at record levels for the foreseeable future. “Maximum Pressure” Sanctions Fueled Venezuelan Exodus While the US has maintained limited sanctions on Venezuela since 2005, the current sanctions regime is defined by the “maximum pressure” campaign initiated during the first Trump administration in an attempt to push President Nicolás Maduro out of office. In August 2017, Trump blocked the government of Venezuela, including the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), from accessing financial markets. In late 2018, Trump sanctioned the gold sector. Perhaps most significantly, the oil sector and PDVSA were designated as sanctioned entities in January 2019. Additional sanctions on the financial and defense sectors and the central bank soon followed, alongside the escalation of secondary sanctions against third parties. The US’s and many of its allies’ policy of nonrecognition of the Maduro government has also led to effective sanctions, such as the loss of access to roughly $2 billion in reserves held at the Bank of England and $5 billion in Special Drawing Rights at the International Monetary Fund. These “maximum pressure” policies were largely maintained under the Biden administration, with a few significant exceptions. Since November 2022, Chevron Corporation has been permitted to produce and export oil from Venezuela. In October 2023, Biden issued a General License temporarily lifting most oil sector and PDVSA sanctions but allowed the license to expire six months later (while leaving a wind-down period). Though Venezuela’s economic crisis — driven in part by both misguided economic policies and falling global oil prices — began prior to the imposition of sanctions, US sanctions have substantially contributed to the severity and longevity of the contraction. Sanctions impact the Venezuelan economy through numerous channels, but perhaps none more significantly than through oil. The Venezuelan economy is highly dependent on oil exports, historically relying on the sector — and its main actor, PDVSA — for 95 percent of its foreign exchange. From 2.4 million barrels per day (bpd) prior to the crisis, oil output hit a low of 0.4 million bpd in mid-2020 — an 83 percent collapse. Even with today’s Chevron license, output has yet to break 1 million bpd. A 2022 analysis by Francisco Rodríguez attributes 797,000 bpd of this decline to the 2017 sanctions alone. Other assessments point to similar figures, with some attributing more than half of the decline to sanctions. As Rodríguez points out, new sanctions are associated with marked downward inflection points in Venezuelan oil output (see Figure 2).   Ultimately, the Venezuelan crisis saw a 71 percent collapse in GDP per capita. As Rodríguez notes, this was the equivalent of three Great Depressions and the largest peacetime economic contraction in modern history. By Rodríguez’s assessments, more than half of this decline was attributable to sanctions and related political acts. Whatever claims policymakers may make about the targeted nature of sanctions, such broad macroeconomic effects inescapably and indiscriminately impact civilians. In addition to the general effects of economic contraction and the loss of foreign exchange with which to import essential goods such as food and medicine, sanctions have also inhibited shipments of COVID vaccines and other medical supplies; contributed to the degradation of the energy grid and frequency of electrical shortages; and otherwise furthered the deterioration of public health, education, and water services. Indeed, the UN special rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures reports that sanctions on Venezuela have “prevented the earning of revenues and use of resources to maintain and develop infrastructure and for social support programs, which has a devastating effect on the entire population of Venezuela, especially — but not only — those living in extreme poverty, women, children, medical workers, people with disabilities or life-threatening or chronic diseases, and the indigenous population.” According to one CEPR estimate, sanctions likely led to tens of thousands of excess deaths in one year alone. Unsurprisingly, such a dire humanitarian crisis has contributed to an unprecedented mass exodus. In the last decade, over seven million Venezuelans have left the country. In one of the few direct quantitative studies on the impacts of sanctions on migration, Francisco Rodríguez finds that over four million of these seven million left “as a result of the economic deterioration caused by sanctions and toxification effects.” Rodríguez further estimates that a return to “maximum pressure” policies would result in the emigration of an additional one million Venezuelans in the coming five years. While the vast majority of these Venezuelan migrants ended up in countries closer to home, such as Colombia and Peru, a growing number have made their way to the US border as well (see Figure 3).   In 2023 and 2024, CBP encountered more migrants from Venezuela than any other country except Mexico.5 According to survey data from the Migration Policy Institute, Venezuela is the single fastest growing country of birth of immigrants to the US since “maximum pressure” began in 2017 (alongside other sanctioned countries, such as Afghanistan — number 2 — and Nicaragua — number 7). The Trump administration was repeatedly warned that mass migration was a likely consequence of its sanctions policy, yet pursued it anyway. According to one senior US Department of State official: “This is the point I made at the time: I said the sanctions were going to grind the Venezuelan economy into dust and have huge human consequences, one of which would be out-migration.” To Address Migration, Lift Economic Sanctions Though migration has many causes, and it is difficult to precisely quantify the contribution of sanctions to overall emigration levels, the following are nonetheless clear: 1. Migration is driven in large part as a reaction to adverse economic conditions.2. Economic sanctions often have profound adverse economic impacts.3. Econometric evidence indicates that sanctions directly contribute to migratory flows.4. In Cuba and Venezuela, economic sanctions are associated with mass migration. While fearmongering and anti-migrant sentiment should be flatly rejected, it is plainly preferable that people in other nations not be forced into circumstances that compel their displacement. To achieve this goal, broad economic sanctions must be lifted. Recognition of the link between sanctions and migration has been growing among US policymakers. In May 2023, 21 members of Congress — led by members representing border states that have witnessed an influx of large numbers of migrants — sent a letter to President Biden urging the easing of sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela to mitigate push factors for migration. A separate letter from over 50 economists and other scholars shortly followed, corroborating the claim that lifting sanctions would help ease migration. Former Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador, whose country is also impacted by migratory flows, has said the same. An Alternative Approach to Migration Is Available This relationship between US economic sanctions and migration further suggests the need for a research and policy agenda that considers migration within the context of global inequalities and underdevelopment and critically considers the role of US foreign policy — including but not limited to sanctions — in reproducing and exacerbating migratory push factors. In other words, addressing migration at its root requires rethinking and rectifying the US’s approach to Latin America as well as other parts of the Global South. While the Biden administration proclaimed a “root-causes” strategy toward addressing migration from Central America, intending to address push factors in countries of origin, including corruption, crime, and economic insecurity, the strategy failed to consider how the US’s own policies might exacerbate these conditions. In contrast, the recently established Congressional Caucus to Address Global Migration and the Migration Stability Resolution introduced by its co-founder, Rep. Greg Casar (D-TX), take a more comprehensive approach, aiming to — in Rep. Casar’s words — “[change] the failed US policies that cause displacement abroad and force people to flee their home countries.” Tackling broad economic sanctions, anti-worker trade agreements, US security assistance for repressive governments, inequalities in the global financial system, and more, these efforts offer an alternative path toward addressing migration: a path that is both more humane and more effective. Footnotes 1. For the purposes of this article, “migration” is used to refer specifically to international migration.2. Moreover, as CEPR Senior Research Fellow Francisco Rodríguez explains, even if there were truth to the U-shaped hypothesis, it would be a story of the long-run structural and societal transformations that accompany development and would not contradict a thesis that short-run economic contractions — such as those that might result from the imposition of sanctions — fuel migration across income levels. Indeed, short-run fluctuations in growth and employment are observed to significantly impact migration.3. While this study assessed joint US-EU sanctions specifically, one can expect a similar relationship to hold in unilateral US sanctions, given the dominant role of the United States in the global financial system and given that EU sanctions policy often follows the lead of US policy.4. Authors’ calculations based on CBP nationwide encounters data, converted from fiscal to calendar years.5. Authors’ calculations based on CBP nationwide encounters data, converted from fiscal to calendar years.