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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In a few days, an election campaign for the European elections will begin, and you can bet that migration will dominate the debates. Unfortunately, we won't hear any proposals to improve the situation in Africa. There is very little time left until the European elections. Voting will take place next Sunday, June 9, and in just one week, on Friday, May 24th, the election campaign will begin. Towns and cities across Spain and the EU countries will be filled with posters containing messages to attract citizens' votes. And during these campaign days, across Europe, there will be a lot, a great deal, of talk about immigration. It's no coincidence that two days before the start of the campaign across Europe, fifteen countries, led by Denmark, published a joint document calling on the European Union, that vague 'Brussels' so often used as a subject in European information, to explore the measure of creating centers outside the community territory to which migrants rescued at sea can be taken. Denmark, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, and Finland, through a joint letter agreed upon by their interior ministers, call on the European Commission to implement “innovative formulas” to curb the arrival of migrants in Europe. They seek more agreements like those signed with Tunisia, for example, and the establishment of such centers in third countries, inspired by the agreement reached by the Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, to take migrants rescued at sea to a non-EU country like Albania in exchange for money, even violating the globally accepted precepts since the early '80s, as outlined in the Montego Bay Convention regarding the rescue of lives at sea, the definition of international waters, and disregarding the humanitarian concept of ‘shipwrecked.’ The United Kingdom, already outside the European Union after the Brexit, began to pave the way by announcing an agreement with Rwanda, which, although initially challenged by British judges, is on its way to become a law. That the European Union, as a consequence of socially misguided policies, has created the ideal environment for the growth of the far right (fueled further by the indiscriminate use of disinformation) is neither new nor surprising. In fact, the recently approved European Pact on Migration and Asylum, which received final approval just two days ago, is clear evidence of this. Faced with the upcoming elections and the highly predictable rise of the far right, they facilitated an agreement that many countries (most of them signatories of the document calling for innovative ways to externalize borders) considered weak: what they really want is to achieve a ‘Fortress Europe’, an isolated continent where entry is not possible, even though they are aware that our economic system will require many, many thousands of migrants in sectors such as agriculture, for example. That's why I have mentioned several times in these articles that this issue, migration, will be one of the main topics, if not the most important, dominating the debates and arguments of candidates eager to secure the well-paid seats in Brussels and Strasbourg, the two locations of the European Parliament. What is also becoming increasingly evident to me is that the more we talk about migration, the less we talk about Africa. It might sound like a contradiction, but it's true. Within the narrative framework about the African continent that the far right has managed to impose around migration, migration is a nebulous threat, with hundreds of thousands of 'military-aged young men' desperate to reach our land and do whatever it takes to survive at the expense of our well-being, our health, and our privileges. I trust you have understood my irony and the anger it causes me to see that beyond these simplistic and stereotyped statements, there is no real conversation about Africa, about Africans, and about the need for us to radically change our policies to stop turning our backs on them and focusing everything on the threat of boats and rafts. In this campaign, there will be no talk about conflicts like the one in Sudan, cruelly fueled by the spurious interests of global geopolitics, nor will there be much discussion about insecurity in the Sahel, exacerbated after the departure of European missions (even if they were little or not at all effective). There will be no talk about climate change in Africa, its brutal impact it is having, and the famines it generates. Africa will not be discussed in terms of economic potential, the necessary development of its electrical infrastructure, its privileged position to develop renewable energies, or generate green hydrogen. There will be no talk of African technological development, startups, or the significant advances they are making through mobile phone payments, an area in which they are pioneers. For long time, by Europeans, Africa has been seen as the separate continent, as a region distant from the rest of the world and simply described as a passive victim of the slave trade that has not been compensated for the human and natural exploitations it has suffered. Future Members of the European Parliament must be aware that African citizens are tired of European paternalism and have become aware of their power and capacity as peoples. Africa is the second-largest continent in the world, also the second most populous, with spectacular population growth. However, it is indeed the poorest region on the planet, with a GDP that barely represents 3% of the global total. Sadly, despite our geographical proximity, Europe has been diminishing the intensity of its ties with Africa, resulting in increased political connections with other powers such as Russia, China, Turkey, or with the United Arab Emirates or Qatar’s petrodollars. In the new Cold War between the European Union and Russia, African countries have become valuable pieces from a political-military perspective. From past European paternalism, we have moved to new situations in which China has become the primary investor in the African continent, displacing Europe, and the United States. As we mentioned in previous articles, China has done this by exchanging infrastructure for raw materials, but also leaving behind a financial debt that creates absolute dependence, a trap for many African countries. Ladies and gentlemen, future Members of the European Parliament: Europe cannot afford to become a secondary actor in an Africa that has decided to seek new partners to support its legitimate aspiration to play a greater role in world politics, as evidenced by its demand for presence in the G-20 and the United Nations Security Council. If Europe continues to cease being a priority partner for the African continent, the problem will affect Europeans more than Africans. The Africa-Europe relationship requires a new strategy that entails a more equitable balance of benefits and responsibilities, with a shared and long-term vision. We need to strengthen the European Union-African Union relations, and I doubt that this improvement can be achieved by implementing cruel "imaginative measures" that involve subcontracting migrant prisons in third countries, no matter how secure they claim to be. Who can build trust that way? In the Canary Islands, don't forget, we have a lot at stake. Geographically, our islands are African; it's our neighborhood and, in a way, our close family. And family needs to be treated and cared for properly. Article published in Kiosco Insular, eldiario.es, and Canarias 7 on May 17th and 18th, 2024.

HR/VP blog – Defence was at the centre of the last European Union Council. This was the culmination of intense work on EU’s security and defence with the preparation of the European Defence Industrial Strategy and the creation of a new fund to step up our military support to Ukraine. We took stock also of the progress made in implementing the Strategic Compass. Power politics are reshaping our world. With the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the war that has flared up again in the Middle East, coups in the Sahel, tensions in Asia… we witness at the same time the return of ‘old’ conventional wars and the emergence of ‘new’, hybrid warfare characterised by cyberattacks and the weaponisation of anything, from trade to migration. This deteriorating geopolitical environment is putting Europe in danger, as I anticipated when presenting the Strategic Compass, the new EU Defence and security strategy, in 2022. Four years ago, when we were facing the COVID-19 pandemic, many said that the EU was living a Hamiltonian moment because we decided to issue a common debt to alleviate the consequences of this crisis as Alexander Hamilton did after the US independence war. We are now probably entering a Demosthenes moment, in reference to the great Greek politician mobilising its fellow Athenian citizens against Macedonian imperialism 2400 years ago: we are finally becoming aware of the many security challenges in our dangerous environment. What are we doing to address these multifaceted threats? The month of March marks two anniversaries: the third of the creation of the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the second of the adoption of the Strategic Compass. These tools have been central to our geopolitical awakening during the last years. It is the right moment to reflect on what has been done and where we are heading on security and defence. Supporting Ukraine militarily in an unprecedented way The European Peace Facility (EPF) is an intergovernmental and extra-budgetary EU fund. It was established in 2021 to allow us to support our partners with military equipment, which was not possible via the EU budget. We started with €5 billion, today the financial ceiling of this fund stands at €17 billion. While it was not originally created for this purpose, the EPF has been the backbone of our military support to Ukraine. So far, we have used € 6.1 billion from the EPF to incentivise the support to Ukraine by EU Member States and, with them, the EU has delivered in total € 31 billion in military equipment to Ukraine since the beginning of the war. And this figure is increasing every day. Thanks to these funds, we sustained our military support to Ukraine. Among other actions, by this summer, we will have trained 60.000 Ukrainian soldiers; we have donated 500.000 artillery shells to Ukraine and by the end of the year it will be more than 1 million. Additionally the European defence industry is also providing to Ukraine 400.000 shells through commercial contracts. The Czech initiative to buy ammunition outside the EU comes in addition to these efforts. However, it is far from being enough and we have to increase both our capacity of production and the financial resources devoted to support Ukraine Last Monday at the Foreign Affairs Council, we have decided to create a new Ukraine Assistance Fund within the EPF, endowed with € 5 billion, to continue supporting Ukraine militarily. I have also proposed last Wednesday to the Council to redirect 90% of the extraordinary revenues from the Russian immobilised assets into the EPF, to increase the financial capacity of the military support for Ukraine. Reinforcing our global security and defence partnerships But the European Peace Facility does not only help Ukraine. So far, we have used it to support 22 partners and organisations. Since 2021, we have allocated close to €1 billion to operations led by the African Union and regional organisations, as well as the armed forces of eight partner countries in Africa. In the Western Balkans, we are supporting regional military cooperation, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia. We are also supporting Moldova and Georgia in the Eastern neighbourhood, and Jordan and Lebanon in the Southern Neighbourhood. Since the beginning of my mandate, we have launched nine new missions and operations under our Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The last one, Operation ASPIDES in the Red Sea and Gulf region to protect commercial vessels, has been set up in record time. With operations Irini in the Mediterranean, Atalanta near the Horn of Africa and our Coordinated Maritime Presences in the Gulf of Guinea and the Indian Ocean, we are becoming more and more a global maritime security provider. We launched also last year two new civilian missions in Armenia and in the Republic of Moldova. However, our missions in Niger had to be suspended due to the military coup and our military mission in Mali has been put on hold. We are currently reconsidering the form of the support we can offer to our partners in the region: in this context, we have set up last December a new type of civilian-military initiative to help our partner countries in the Gulf of Guinea fight the terrorist threats stemming from the Sahel. We have also reinforced our cooperation with NATO in various key domains such as space, cyber, climate and defence and critical infrastructures. We have broadened and deepened our network of tailored bilateral security and defence partnerships with Norway, Canada, as well as countries in the Eastern neighbourhood (Georgia, Moldova), Africa (South Africa, Rwanda), Indo-Pacific (Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia) and Latin America (Chile, Colombia). The first Security and Defence Schuman Forum in March last year, bringing together security and defence partners from more than 50 countries, was a success. We will build on this when we meet for the next Schuman Forum on 28 and 29 May. Enhancing the capacity to react to crises abroad One of the main deliverables foreseen by the Strategic Compass was the creation of a new EU Rapid Deployment Capacity to be able to quickly react autonomously to crisis situations, for instance to evacuate Europeans in case of an emergency like in Afghanistan in August 2021 or in Sudan in April 2023. It will become operational next year, but to prepare for it, we organised the first ever EU military Live Exercise last October in Cadiz, in Spain. It involved 31 military units, 25 aircrafts, 6 ships and 2,800 personnel form Member States’ armed forces. A second Live Exercise will take place at the end of the year in Germany. A new Crisis Response Centre is also now operational in the EEAS to coordinate EU activities in case of emergencies, including the evacuation of European citizens. We are also strengthening our military and civilian headquarters in Brussels. Investing more in defence together and boosting the EU defence industry At home, we need also to invest much more and help our defence industry to increase its production capacities. There is no other solution if we look at the magnitude of the defence needs for Ukraine but also for our Member States that need to replenish their stocks and acquire new equipment. EU Member States are already spending significantly more on defence with a 40 % increase of defence budget over the last ten years and a € 50 billion jump between 2022 and 2023. However, the € 290 billion EU defence budget in 2023 only represents 1.7% of our GDP under the 2% NATO benchmark. And in the current geopolitical context, this could be seen as a minimum requirement. However, the global amount of our expanses is not the only figure we have to follow carefully. To use our defence expenses efficiently, we have also to take care of filling gaps and avoiding duplications. As I have already said in many occasions, we need to spend more but also better, and better means together. In 2022, the European armies have invested 58 billion in new equipment. For the fourth year in a row, it exceeded the benchmark of 20 % of the defence expenses. However, only 18% of these defence investments are currently done in a collaborative manner, far below the 35% benchmark set by EU Member States themselves in 2007. Since the start of the Russian war of aggression, 78 % of the equipment bought by EU armies came from outside the EU. We are also lagging behind in our investments in Research and Development. That is the reason why I presented earlier this month together with the Commission the first-ever European Defence Industrial Strategy. We need to incentivise much more joint procurement, better secure our security of supplies, anchor the Ukrainian defence industry in Europe and organise a massive industrial ramp-up. We also need to catch up on new military technologies like drones or Artificial Intelligence. With its innovation hub, the European Defence Agency will continue to play a key role in these efforts. To succeed, we will need to ensure much better access to finance for the European defence industry, notably by adapting the European Investment Bank lending policies. We should also foresee issuing common debt to help finance the major necessary investment effort in defence capabilities and defence industry, as we did to face the COVID-19 crisis. However, we have still a lot of work to do to reach an agreement on that subject. Finally, we will also need to reinforce our defence when it comes to hybrid and cyber threats, foreign information manipulation and interference and resilience of our critical infrastructure. As detailed here, a lot has already been done in recent years, however I am very much aware that a lot more remains to be done to match the magnitude of the threats we are facing. We need a leap forward in European defence and European defence industry.

With the possibility of a second Trump presidency looming, it is high time to Europeanise NATO’s defence plans Lest anyone had missed the point, Donald Trump has now provided helpful clarification of his attitude towards America’s NATO allies – and specifically those that fail to spend the benchmark 2 per cent of their GDP on defence. If elected he would, he declared at a campaign rally, “encourage” Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to underspending NATO allies. Reacting to a storm of protest from European leaders, he was happy to repeat himself: “Look, if they’re not going to pay, we’re not going to protect. OK?”. Nowadays, it is less easy for complacent Europeans to shrug off such observations as typical Trumpisms. They have evidence that Trump redux would be likely to apply his malevolent instincts much more efficiently than he did in his chaotic first term as president. And the chances of him having the opportunity to do so are increasingly likely: he has now steamrollered the opposition in the early Republican primaries, and is ahead of Joe Biden in the polls. No one can any longer ignore the real possibility that in less than a year’s time the occupant of the White House could toss the whole responsibility for keeping Ukraine in the fight against Russia into European laps, whilst insisting that from here on in they see to their own defence. It would therefore hardly be premature if Europeans began to explore how each other views the situation; to make contingency plans; and even to take some precautionary steps. The two key challenges are obvious. The first is how to get more weapons, and especially ammunition and air-defence missiles, to Ukraine. Since Russia’s invasion, Europeans have done better at this than might have been expected – but they have not done as well as the need now demands, and not nearly enough to support Ukraine if the United States withdraws its aid. The EU, and especially the European Commission, have played a prominent role here, providing financial incentives for member states to donate from their own stocks and to expand production facilities. But talk of moving European defence industries onto a war footing has yet to be realised; and although the commission will shortly unveil proposals for an ambitious European defence industrial strategy, this can only succeed if member states evince more enthusiasm for collective action than they have so far shown. Only three months ago France, Germany, Italy, and Spain jointly warned the commission to stay off their turf and respect national “prerogatives” on defence. The second key challenge that Europeans should be facing up to is how they would defend themselves without US backing against a Russia that had – the possibility can no longer be discounted – imposed a humiliating ‘peace’ on Ukraine. The “dormant NATO” plans being proposed by right-wing US think-tanks foresee a wholesale withdrawal of US ground forces from Europe. But Europeans have huge psychological difficulties in bringing themselves to discuss the US as they would any other foreign power, even in situations where their own strategic interests are manifestly different from those of the superpower. NATO’s disastrous involvement in Afghanistan, for instance, would never have dragged on for so many fruitless years had not its European members studiously avoided any collective discussion of a campaign which each saw exclusively through the prism of its own bilateral relations with the US. Compounding these challenges is the fact that there is no institutional setting in which Europeans could confer. Their task is, in effect, to Europeanise NATO’s defence plans, but this can hardly be discussed in NATO. That organisation, after all, is where European militaries gather to be told what to do by Americans, but the current US administration can scarcely be expected to lead a discussion premised on its own defeat in the November presidential election. The EU has neither locus nor credibility in military operational matters. The reality is that, if a strategy for defending Europe without the Americans is to emerge, this can only be on an ‘intergovernmental’ basis – through bilateral and minilateral discussion amongst Europe’s main defence players. At the alliance’s 2022 Madrid summit, NATO doubled down on its strategy of forward defence. Russia’s war on Ukraine has demonstrated that we are in a technological era in which defensive systems have the advantage over the traditional means of attack. Destroying massed Russian armour turned out to be relatively easy; getting Russians out now that they have dug themselves in is the devil’s own job. So in Madrid allies resolved to reinforce NATO’s “enhanced forward presence” – boosting in-place forces in eastern and central Europe. But predictably, Europeans have been happy to leave this largely to the Americans, who reinforced their presence in Europe with an additional 20,000 troops. The challenge for European chiefs of staff and defence planners now is to work out how, if the need arises, to substitute for US in-place forces in the frontline states; what capabilities and defensive infrastructure will be needed to halt any assault at the borders; and how to organise the communications and data networks necessary to form an effective system that ties together disparate sensors and missile, drone, and artillery assets. Such planning is now an urgent requirement, not just as a matter of military preparedness, but for psychological reasons. Europe’s frontline states have long felt their western European allies lack not only US military credibility, but also a serious understanding of the scale of Putin’s threat. Europeans will only hang together under a second Trump presidency if they are ready to trust each other, and specifically if the most vulnerable states see a real prospect of western European states putting many more of their bodies on the line as in-place forces. The last couple of years, in which predominantly eastern European states have agreed to purchase an astonishing $120 billion of weapons from American contractors, suggests a fatal tendency to believe that maybe Trump can be propitiated by such largesse. Fortunately, the return of Donald Tusk as Poland’s prime minister has substantially increased the odds of Europeans hanging together even in a Trump 2.0 scenario. The foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland (the Weimar Triangle) have just met to discuss strengthening Europe’s efforts. If, as expected, the British Labour party returns to government later this year, then the United Kingdom would be an obvious addition to this group. Indeed, a necessary one: it is hard to envisage a credible European defence of the continent that did not clutch in Europe’s second nuclear power. Keir Starmer has made clear his ambition to restore defence ties severed by Brexit. There is no time to waste: the prime minister-in-waiting could usefully make an early trip to Paris to initiate conversations with the UK’s closest continental ally.

The three Baltic states jointly announced on Jan. 19, 2024, their intention to build a defensive line along their borders with Russia and Belarus. Initial details are scarce. The defensive line will not include coastal defenses — Baltic coasts will be defended against the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet in other ways, such as anti-ship missile capabilities and sea mines. Estonia, which divulged the greatest amount of detail, estimated that it would build 600 bunkers, together with support points and distribution lines, for a cost of €60 million starting in 2025. There are no plans to place mines, barbed wire, or dragon’s teeth (anti-tank defenses) during peacetime, although the necessary supplies are anticipated to be held in local reserve for quick deployment if and when necessary. At the very least, Estonia also anticipates some difficulties in situating bunkers on private land near the border, which will take time and negotiation with potentially thousands of landowners to resolve. A Baltic defensive line is a huge project. It is worth reflecting on its origins, challenges, and operational-strategic implications. The Baltic ministers of defense identified two primary points of origin for such a defensive line. First is NATO’s communiqué from the 2023 Madrid Summit, which confirmed that the alliance would fight for every meter of its ground. The proposed defensive line reflects a Baltic intention to take this pledge seriously. Second, the Baltic defense ministers also pointed to their lack of substantial geographical depth. The Baltic states believe that they cannot give up ground, which means recognizing that they need to be prepared to contest a Russian invasion from the first moments following the violation of Baltic borders. An obvious third point may also be added: In the face of Russian genocidal atrocities in Ukraine, Baltic governments cannot be seen to be abandoning their populations to the Russians, nor do they want to do so. In Ukraine, the Russians have committed multiple known mass murders (such as at Bucha and Izyum), they have kidnapped children and fast-tracked their adoption and citizenship in Russia, and they are already settling new colonizers on occupied land, especially in the cities. Any one of these is fundamentally unacceptable, and Russia is actively pursuing all three. For the Baltic states, giving up land means giving up people — especially for Estonia and Lithuania, which have substantial population centers on or not far from the border, such as Narva and Vilnius. In this specific regard, Latvia is slightly better placed as its easternmost province of Latgale is also one of the most sparsely populated, with an overall population density of 46 per square mile. Challenges for the defensive line are substantial. First are the lengths of each national border. Estonia’s hostile border is the shortest at 183 miles, most of which is covered by Lakes Peipus and Pihkva or strengthened by the Narva River. Latvia’s borders with Russia and Belarus are 133 and 107 miles, respectively, bereft of natural boundaries. Lithuania’s borders are the longest, reaching nearly 422 miles with Belarus and nearly 171 miles with Russia’s Kaliningrad oblast. These are substantial distances. Estonia’s planned 600 bunkers, likely to be concentrated on the 129 miles of border north and south of Lake Peipus, suggest a density of four to five bunkers per linear mile — yet defensive lines are not simply built linearly but also in depth. Nonetheless, Latvia would need to build 1,116 bunkers and Lithuania 2,758 at similar densities. Bunkers are stationary objects whose effectiveness decreases the better their exact positions are known. The defensive line is likely to incur a challenge to Baltic counterintelligence to prevent Russia from identifying bunker locations in overly substantial detail. However, bunker density is unlikely to be consistent along the entire combined Baltic border as not every part of the border is equally useful for Russian invasion, which necessarily requires roads and railways. Again, Estonia is best placed. North of Lake Peipus, there is only a single crossing point over the Narva River at Narva itself, although there are roads on the Russian side of the river that would enable some degree of near-and even cross-river Russian logistical sustainment. South of Lake Peipus are two major roads and one rail crossing, but also a handful of minor cross-border roads could be used to distribute advancing Russian forces across a broader front. Latvia has one rail and two major road crossings apiece with both Russia and Belarus, along with at least a handful of minor roads directly crossing the border and other Russian roads leading to or running alongside the border. Lithuania has two rail crossings apiece with both Russia and Belarus, along with up to seven major road crossings, two with Russia and five with Belarus, besides various minor roads as well. These are places where bunkers are likely to be concentrated. It is unrealistic to sustain major operations nearly, if not actually, totally off-road. The final challenge is bunker placement in a tactical sense. It seems unlikely for bunkers to be within line of sight from the far side of the Baltic borders, merely giving Russians a chance to scout them during peacetime without danger or even controversy. Higher ground is generally more tactically advantageous than lower ground, and bunkers positioned to generate enfilading fire and be mutually supporting rather than isolated from one another are preferable. While Russian logistical demands lead to a focus on roads and rail, the same is true for Baltic and NATO forces; units fighting on the defensive line have to be logistically sustained as well. These are all lower-level details that will be crucial to the success of the defensive line in case of actual invasion. Finally, what are the operational-strategic implications of the defensive line once it is built? First, it runs counter to the doctrinally preferred Western — and especially American — defensive posture, which is an operationally elastic defense premised upon maneuver warfare. In maneuver defense, terrain (and, by implication, the people populating that terrain) is not valued highly in an operational sense; the land is to be given up if necessary and then recaptured later in the course of counterattacks. The main premise is to engineer the best circumstances in which to destroy advancing enemy forces with as disproportionately few friendly losses as possible, all other considerations being secondary at best. A good in-depth defense premised on bunkers and trenches may provide tactical elasticity, but it clearly identifies operational elasticity as undesirable. There is clear incompatibility here, and in this Baltic case, NATO has politically positioned itself in a way that will require some sort of move away from maneuver defense, at least on a major geographical scale. An orientation toward an operationally static, even if in practice tactically elastic, defense will put emphasis on fires into the Russian rear and deep to attrite Russian forces and damage Russian logistics so that they experience difficulties deploying forces opposite the defensive line itself, let alone directly attacking it. Yet Western political leaders may be squeamish about such attacks — witness their present injunctions against Ukraine’s use of Western weapons against targets in Russia itself. The damage Russia has sustained inside its own borders suggests that the West’s fear of escalation is overblown and, given the combination of regime control over the media and the Russian population’s own considerable apathy, constant scenes of savaged Russian convoys and destroyed Russian transport infrastructure in Russia itself may contribute to turning the Russian population against a hypothetically ongoing Russian attempt to invade the Baltic states. Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian purchases of HIMARS rocket launchers and ATACMS (long-range, guided missiles with a range of up to 300 kilometers) demonstrate that the Baltic states are at least serious about having the capability to strike deep. However, in the event of a major Russian invasion, Baltic artillery, and emerging multiple-launch rocket system arsenals — the HIMARS the Baltic states have ordered from the United States — would be unlikely to sustain such interdiction for long. The ultimate hope is that the increasing preparedness of the Baltic states and the wider alliance to fight Russia, among which the construction of the Baltic defense line would be counted, would be sufficient to convince the Kremlin to be deterred. Neither the Baltic states nor the West as a whole has any direct control over the outcome of such a decision. At best, all it can do is present an intimidating picture of negative consequences for Russia to consider. If and when the Baltic defense line is completed, the prospect of denying Russia plausible victory in the Baltic theater in a war against NATO should be stronger and may weigh heavier on the minds of Russian decision-makers. Unfortunately, we can almost never know for sure, as there is no way to know why someone has not done something — deterred, never interested, or is it simply not time yet? The Baltic defensive line is a totally logical response to the particular geostrategic challenges Balts face against Russia, even though it will incentivize ways of fighting against Russians with which, for varying reasons, their Western allies may find themselves tactically, operationally, strategically, or even politically uncomfortable. However, preferred Western alternatives — maneuvering defense and possibly limiting strikes into Russia — would be politically, strategically, operationally, and tactically counterproductive for a NATO that fights against Russia on the eastern flank. The Baltic defensive line should nonetheless contribute to a geostrategic picture of denying the prospect of victory in the Baltic, which will hopefully help induce Russia to choose to be deterred. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

The EU should try to attract more business from Taiwan, though Taiwan’s January 2024 election hasn’t made the job easier Taiwan’s economy has transformed since 2016 under the leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In particular, the Taiwanese economy has diversified away from mainland China, while reliance on semiconductors is now even more acute than eight years ago. In elections in January, the DPP won the presidency for a third term but lost overall control of Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan. In contrast to the previous two terms, the DPP therefore needs to agree policy, including economic policy, with other parties. this could signal a softer approach in relation to the continuation of diversification away from the mainland. Ongoing diversification Mainland China remains Taiwan’s biggest export and investment destination, despite the share of Taiwan’s exports that go to China reducing from 40 percent on average between 2016 and 2019 to 35 percent in 2023 (Figure 1). This has happened even though Taiwan signed a free trade agreement with mainland China in 2010 – the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) – which at the time led to an increase in Taiwanese exports to the mainland. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 also triggered a sharp increase as the rest of the world entered a deep recession, but the trend has not lasted. Since 2021, the share of Taiwanese exports going to the mainland has dropped significantly, influenced by US export controls on high-end semiconductors, with a clear knock-on effect on Taiwanese exporters.   Taiwanese FDI into mainland China has also shrunk rapidly, from 65 percent of total Taiwanese FDI on average from 2008-2016 to 34 percent on average from 2017-2023 (Figure 2). The difference between these periods is that in the former, Taiwan was governed by the Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party), which favours closer relations with the mainland, while in the latter period the DPP was in charge. There are both geopolitical and economic reasons for mainland China’s falling share of Taiwanese FDI. First, the ECFA trade and investment agreement, reached under the first term of KMT President Ma Ying-jeou, was not extended when a new round of negotiations started in 2012, to include technological cooperation, finance and people-to-people exchanges. A broader economic agreement between Taiwan and the mainland, mostly focusing on services – the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) – fell victim to lack of consensus among Taiwan’s main political parties, increased tensions in the Taiwan Straits and student protests in Taiwan (the so-called Sunflower movement) in 2014.1 Second, with the DPP victory in 2016, the new Southbound Policy 2 was launched, offering incentives for Taiwanese companies investing in 18 Asian countries, including ASEAN 3, India and other South Asian and Australasian nations. In addition, rising labour costs in mainland China, the ongoing trade war between the US and China, an increased regulatory burden in the mainland and political tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait also pushed Taiwanese businesses to look elsewhere to invest. -    The new political reality and geographical diversification While the election-winning DPP wants to see further diversification away from the mainland, the more pro-China party, the KMT, wants reinforced economic relations with China.4 Because of the now-hung parliament, the DPP will need to take some of the KMT’s wishes into account it wants pass new rules, including those related to geographical diversification. Beyond the two parties’ preferences, two other important issues also need to be factored in. First, geographical diversification requires open markets but Taiwan is increasingly unable to open any market through trade or investment deals. Taiwan has spent the last eight years negotiating bilateral deals with its closest allies, Japan and the US, but the DPP administration has not even been able to complete these. Incoming President Lai has said that Taiwan should continue to push to be part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to which it applied in September 2021, but the reality is that Taiwan’s application has little hope of success. China officially applied to be a member of the CPTTP only a couple of days before Taiwan. Since then, the United Kingdom has become a member of CPTTP, but the negotiation processes with Taiwan and mainland China have not started. Australian’s prime minister, Anthony Albanese, has expressed severe doubts about Taiwan’s ability to become member of CPTTP because of lack of international recognition of it as a nation-state.5 Second, while the DPP is likely to continue to offer more fiscal incentives to promote diversification in Southeast Asia and India (under the Southbound Policy), the fastest-growing destination for both exports and foreign direct investment from Taiwan is the United States, followed by Japan. This can be explained by the ongoing artificial intelligence revolution, which needs semiconductors, and the decisions of some key Taiwanese chip companies (especially TSCM) to open factories overseas for chip production, with the US and Japan as the most important destinations. In other words, the DPP’s push for geographical diversification might not be the main reason why diversification has happened; rather, it has been driven by market forces and business opportunities. This also means that the KMT push to maintain – if not deepen – economic ties with mainland China might not succeed unless China’s currently underwhelming economic performance turns around. Implications for the European Union So far, the EU has benefitted little from Taiwan’s trade and investment diversification, at least when compared to the US and the rest of Asia. The EU’s export share into Taiwan has remained practically stagnant (while the US has doubled its share), notwithstanding a large increase in exports from the Netherlands for a single item – ASML’s lithography machines for chip production. The EU lacks a trade or investment deal with Taiwan, but so do some of Taiwan’s other trading partners, including the US. Considering that the EU is the largest foreign direct investor in Taiwan, the question arises of whether the EU should do more to foster more bilateral economic relations. The gains could be substantial, especially from inbound FDI as Taiwanese investment focuses on high-end manufacturing. There has been some movement. A €5 billion investment in France by a Taiwanese company (ProLogium) was announced in May 2023 to build a battery factory 6 . TSMC announced in August 2023 a €4.5 billion investment in a semiconductor factory in Germany 7 . But for the EU to catch up with Japan and the US as a recipient of outbound FDI from Taiwan, the result of Taiwan’s elections could be an obstacle. This is because the DPP will have less control of the economic agenda because it does not control the Legislative Yuan. The close-to-impossible negotiation of a trade and investment deal between the EU and Taiwan – as shown by Taiwan’s difficulties in relation to Japan, the US and the CPTTP – does not point to any improvement in the institutional framework for economic relations to improve. The question, then, is what can the EU offer to attract high-end foreign direct investment from Taiwan? Subsidies to attract semiconductor factories cannot be the only answer, given the very large amounts needed and the pressure such subsidies put on EU member states’ already stretched finances (Legarda and Vasselier, 2023). Working with business associations and chambers should be a key driving force to improve business relations between Taiwan and the EU, especially considering that the EU is the largest foreign foreign direct investor in Taiwan, while Taiwanese companies have been absent from the EU single market until recently. Overall, the US and the rest of Asia have been the main winners from Taiwan’s rapid diversification of its economy away from mainland China. The EU, which is lagging, should work to enhance its economic exchanges with Taiwan. Hopefully the January 2024 election results will facilitate this. Most importantly, the EU should aim to attract more high-tech FDI from Taiwan. Unfortunately, a better institutional framework through a trade/investment deal seems highly unlikely, for geopolitical reasons. This puts all the burden on chambers of commerce and other forums to improve business relations. References 1- The Sunflower Movement was a student-led protest that occuped Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan to put pressure on the KMT government against signing a second cooperation deal with mainland China. See Ho (2018). 2- See the New Southbound Policy portal at https://nspp.mofa.gov.tw/nsppe/. 3- Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 4- Alicia García-Herrero, ‘Taiwan’s future economic direction hinges on the election outcome’, First glance, 12 January 2024, Bruegel https://www.bruegel.org/first-glance/taiwans-future-economic-direction-… 5- Claudia Long and Stephen Dziedzic, ‘Albanese says Australia is unlikely to support Taiwan 6- France24, ‘Taiwanese battery maker Prologium to invest €5 billion in French factory’, 12 May 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230512-taiwanese-battery-maker-pro…. 7- DW, ‘Taiwan’s TSMC to build semiconductor factory in Germany’, 8 August 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/taiwans-tsmc-to-build-semiconductor-factory-in-ge…. Ho, M.-S. (2018) ‘The Activist Legacy of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 August, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/08/02/activist-legacy-of-taiwan-s-sunflower-movement-pub-76966 Legarda, H. and A. Vasselier (2023) ‘Navigating Taiwan relations in 2024: Practical considerations for European policy makers’, China Horizons, 21 December, available at https://chinahorizons.eu/our-research/policy-briefs/278-navigating-taiwan-relations-in-2024-practical-considerations-for-european-policy-makers

Beijing seeks normalisation of ties with Europe; however, for Brussels, reconciliation will be conditional on Beijing’s willingness to address fundamental divergences On 7-8 December, European Commission President von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel will be in Beijing for the 24th European Union (EU)-China summit, but the first in-person one in four years, taking place at a critical juncture in EU-China ties. At the previous EU-China virtual summit in April 2022, the Ukraine conflict was the primary talking point for the Europeans and other issues such as climate and economics were relegated to the back burner. This time, the focus is likely to be economics. A relatively constructive meeting between United States (US) President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping on 15 November, which led to the resumption of US-China high-level military dialogue and Xi’s assurances on Taiwan, has contributed to paving the way for the EU to focus on ironing out economic irritants. Deficits, dependencies and de-risking With daily EU-China trade amounting to 2.2 billion euros, the EU is concerned about its widening goods trade deficit with China—400 billion euros in 2022—referred to by EU Ambassador to China, Jorge Toledo, as the “highest in the history of mankind”. In the context of China’s restrictive environment for foreign companies, the EU is keen for a level playing field and greater reciprocity in trade. Another major area of contention is Chinese overcapacity through subsidies in key industrial export sectors such as electric vehicles (EVs) that are undermining European automotive industries. The European Commission has already launched a probe for the EVs sector and is now considering other major sectors including wind energy and medical devices. In addition, Europe is heavily dependent on critical raw materials such as lithium and gallium from China, which are intrinsic to its green transition. While over 90 percent of the EU’s supply of raw materials comes from China, the EU aims to address this dependency through its Critical Raw Materials Act. Factors such as Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, human rights violations in Xinjiang, and pandemic-era supply chain disruptions have deteriorated European perceptions of China. The downswing in EU-China ties was further accentuated by Beijing’s posture in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the failure of European leaders to coax China to positively use its influence with the EU’s most immediate security threat, Moscow. Thus, a major trust deficit has accompanied the trade deficit. On 6 November, only a month before the summit, von der Leyen in her speech warned against “China’s changing global posture” with its “strong push to make China less dependent on the world and the world more dependent on China”. While acknowledging China as Europe’s most important trading partner, she emphasised the “explicit element of rivalry” in the relationship. Another dialogue of the deaf? The EU and its member states are recalibrating their China policies, with countries such as Germany even releasing China-specific documents outlining their approach. The EU’s “de-risking” strategy aims to reduce dependencies in critical sectors, and through an expansion of its policy toolbox, the Union is implementing a range of measures including greater scrutiny of inbound-outbound foreign investments, anti-coercion instruments, and export controls for dual-purpose technologies. In this context of an evolving European approach, the upcoming summit is a much-anticipated one for EU-China watchers. Despite the strain in relations, high-level diplomatic exchanges have continued in full swing, many of which, such as von der Leyen’s visit to China in April, EU Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis’s visit in September, and EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell’s visit in October were conducted in preparation for this summit. A sluggish Chinese economy gives Europe room to wield its economic leverage. However, grey areas in Europe’s China policy remain, especially with regard to the implementation of measures and the need for more effective coordination, often compromised by a lack of unity amongst member states and tendencies of leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to prioritise business interests over all else. Thus, straddling the fine balance between economic opportunities and security risks will continue to be a test for how Europe manages its interdependence with the lucrative Chinese market. Previous EU-China summits have not produced a joint statement, and according to sources, this summit is unlikely to produce one as well. Yet it is an opportunity for the EU to put forward unresolved concerns and forge some common ground. Without concrete deliverables, the upcoming summit risks being another “dialogue of the deaf” as Borrell famously described the previous one. Amidst renewed transatlantic solidarity, Beijing’s rhetoric indicates that it seeks normalisation of ties with Europe and a more independent European policy towards China away from Washington’s influence. Yet for Brussels, reconciliation will be conditional on Beijing’s willingness to address fundamental divergences.

In early November 2023, Estonia announced a decision to allow Taiwan to open an unofficial, non-diplomatic economic and cultural representative office in Tallinn. The opening of an office does not mean that Tallinn and Taipei are establishing official diplomatic relations, nor does it mean that Estonia is opening its own office in Taiwan. It is following in the footsteps of countries around the world that have unofficial ties with Taipei and want an unofficial government presence in the country to facilitate economic relations. For its part, Beijing has expressly condemned the decision by Tallinn to allow Taipei to decide if it wants an office in Estonia, with China’s Foreign Ministry making a clear statement calling for Estonia to reverse course. Estonia’s announcement occurred just before Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu embarked on a three-country tour of the Baltic states — a rare trip for the foreign minister to visit three countries with which Taiwan does not have formal diplomatic relations. Baltic leaders and ministers stated that they had no plans to meet directly with Wu, though Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis spoke at the same event as Wu, and his grandfather, the first president of post-Soviet, Lithuania Vytautas Landsbergis, did meet with Wu. Estonia’s move to open a representative office comes after Lithuania made a similar decision, sparking controversy and drawing political and economic ire from Beijing. The Vilnius office, which opened in November 2021, is called the “Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania,” which balks the traditional use of “Taipei” over “Taiwan” to avoid Beijing’s complaints and any alleged notions of formal relations. The opening of the Vilnius office resulted in the downgrading of the bilateral relationship with China and the expulsion of the Lithuanian ambassador from Beijing; the removal of Lithuania as a “country of origin” for Chinese trade; and a formal World Trade Organization complaint against China, supported by the United States and European Union. Beijing’s main complaint at the time was that the office provided legitimacy to Taiwan by using the word “Taiwanese,” thus the reason for the strong reaction. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda conceded the point, “I think it was not the opening of the Taiwanese office that was a mistake, it was its name, which was not coordinated with me.” Now, with Estonia’s announcement, that complaint has proven hollow. It is not the “Taiwanese” reference with which Beijing has a problem — the real issue is the expansion of Taiwan’s international space. As I argued in January 2022, “The name of the office [in Lithuania] is the supposed sticking point, but the reality of the matter is that Beijing wants to prevent the expansion of Taiwan’s international space. The mere opening of an office, regardless of name, represents the expansion of Taiwan-Lithuania ties. Likewise, any new de facto embassy would be perceived as offensive to Beijing. … As more countries build ties with Taiwan, leaders will be able to better assess the risks and benefits of diplomacy with Taiwan. Beijing’s wolf warriors now cry foul at any perceived attempt to foster closer relations with Taipei.” Beijing perceives any “win” by Taiwan as a direct threat to its long-term plan to completely isolate Taipei. A possible office in Estonia provides Taipei with the ability to more easily interact with the Estonian people, expand bilateral trade, and demonstrate itself to be a good international partner — all of which threaten Beijing’s ability to shape the narrative regarding cross-Strait relations. As expected, PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin made clear the Lithuania office name issue was fake. During his regular press conference on November 8, Wang called for Estonia to change course, making no mention of the prospective name of a future office: “We firmly oppose any form of official interaction between the Taiwan region and countries having diplomatic ties with China and oppose any action supporting ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces. We call on Estonia to stay committed to its solemn commitment of adhering to the one-China principle, not to allow Taiwan to set up any organization of official nature, and earnestly safeguard the political foundation of its relations with China.” Wang’s language and warnings are less strident than what could be expected, but given that the announcement of the office in Estonia was just made, details are not yet firm. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna hinted to Politico that the office would be “representation—economical representation—of Taipei, not Taiwan,” which, if the name is the true issue, should appease Beijing’s concerns. As more is known, Beijing will assuredly increase its pressure on Estonia, which already includes the Chinese ambassador in Estonia threatening to leave the country if the office opens. The true test will come once details about the office are released. How will Beijing seek to punish Estonia for the move? Will the reaction be less severe than what China did to Lithuania? How will the European Union and the United States support Tallinn should Beijing utilize its coercive toolkit again? Beijing’s response to the office will demonstrate a few key things in the aftermath of the Lithuania example. How Beijing responded to Lithuania created immense international support and attention for Vilnius. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen opened up a $1 billion fund for joint Taiwanese-Lithuanian projects and another $200 million fund for Taiwanese investment in Lithuania’s industrial sector to show support for the decision, and the Biden administration announced a $600 million credit line. Because Beijing initiated pressure on other countries, such as Germany, to push Lithuania to change course, the overreaction became a critical case study in China’s coercive toolkit. The collective West closed ranks, supported Lithuania for the decision, and warned Beijing against further reprisals. If Beijing treats Tallinn in a similar way as Vilnius, then it will be clear that Beijing will ignore international warnings to serve its own goals — bluster over substance and compromise. The most important thing for Estonia to do in the coming days and weeks is to be resolute in the decision. Divisions within Vilnius prolonged Beijing’s attempt to pressure politicians into changing course. Knowing how angry President Nausėda was about the ordeal provided an opening, but other actors did not back down. At the moment, Estonia’s Foreign Minister Tsahkna is taking the lead in publicly responding, but the coalition government needs to adhere to the same line to diminish Beijing’s ability to pressure specific politicians. If Estonia does not back down, the country could stand to benefit from new Taiwanese-Estonian projects. Since the Taiwanese and Lithuanian offices opened in the respective capitals, Taipei has agreed to assist in building an 8-inch semiconductor wafer production line in Lithuania. The two also agreed to open a joint research center on laser technology in Taiwan. Lithuania is home to two projects funded by Taiwan’s National Development Fund (NDF). Another Lithuanian company, Solitek, received around $8.5 million from the $1 billion fund. During a recent visit to Taipei by Seimas Speaker Viktorija Cmilyte-Nielsen, the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding on health and made a decision to eliminate double taxation — the latter of which is still an issue that Taiwan has with the United States. Progress between Taipei and Vilnius has been slow, but it has gained steam with these investments. Tallinn can expect to reap some new investments with a Taiwan office and take part in the NDF. However, the benefits that Tallinn receives not only from Taiwan but also from the United States will likely depend on how loudly and forcefully Beijing complains — and acts on those complaints. No matter how much investment Estonia receives as a result of this new office opening, Tallinn is now a part of the cross-Strait competition — in an election year. With the upcoming January 2024 presidential election in Taiwan, Tallinn may have inadvertently become a foreign policy issue for the candidates, but that largely depends on Chinese retaliation. Any office will likely open under a new leader in Taipei, so while the announcement and prospective investment promises will occur under President Tsai, the implementation of such things will be up to her successor. After Lithuania defied China and its intense pressure to reverse course, Beijing is now in a situation where another Baltic country has allowed Taiwan to expand its unofficial international space — and thus expanded the threat landscape in its push to eliminate Taiwan’s presence abroad. The more these seemingly small countries defy China and the more they are backed by large countries (and, more importantly, fulfilled promises from Taiwan), the harder it will be for Beijing to keep the next case of Taiwan fever from spreading. The views and opinions expressed in this article solely belong to the author and do not represent the perspectives or stance of World and New World Journal, nor do they reflect the opinions of any of our employees. World and New World Journal does not endorse or take responsibility for the content, opinions, or information presented in this article. Readers are encouraged to consider multiple sources and viewpoints for a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. Thank you for your understanding.

Obstacles created by Poland’s outgoing government and the deteriorating economic situation make the post-election outlook highly challenging. The victory of the opposition alliance in Poland’s 15 October elections showed that even an unfair and manipulated election can lead to a peaceful rejection of autocratic regime if society is mobilised sufficiently. However, tackling the populist legacy of the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) government will be neither easy nor fast, for several reasons. First, it remains unclear when a political transition can take place. President Andrzej Duda (closely associated with PiS) has sworn in a PiS minority government that is likely to be short-lived, and has made clear that he will defend PiS’s political and institutional legacy and use his veto power to stop legislation adopted by the new parliament. Overcoming a presidential veto requires a 60% majority in the Sejm (a lower house of the Polish parliament), which a democratic coalition is short of. This will make it challenging for a post-PiS government to restore constitutional principles of democracy, rule of law, the legal independence of many institutions (which have been packed with PiS loyalists, especially in the judiciary) and public media pluralism, at least until summer 2025, when President Duda’s term expires. Most of these changes will require new legislation. Rolling back unconstitutional PiS legislation in the Constitutional Court will be hard. The terms of PiS placemen and women in the court will expire between 2024 and 2031. The Constitutional Court can also block legislation passed by a new majority. This could mean difficulties with unfreezing money earmarked for Poland from the European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility. Access to the funds is conditional on meeting rule-of-law criteria that have been violated systematically by the PiS government. However, the most significant challenges wait for the new government in the economic sphere. Eight years of socioeconomic populism, with large-scale spending programmes (including generous family benefits, which will increase by 60% from January 2024), chaotic tax system changes and a freeze on energy tariffs, have led to an explosion of the general government deficit, set to reach 5.8% of GDP in 2023. The transparency of public finances deteriorated dramatically because of several off-budget funds and quasi-fiscal operations conducted by state-owned banks and energy companies. Therefore, the actual deficit may be higher than officially reported. Because of ultra-loose and politically motivated monetary policy since 2016, inflation has been above the National Bank of Poland target (2.5%) since December 2019. has been above the National Bank of Poland target (2.5%) since December 2019In March 2022, it jumped to a two-digit level, reaching 17.2% in March 2023. Since then, it has started decreasing, but its October 2023 level (6.3%) is still too high and may increase. Despite highly accommodating monetary and fiscal policies, the annual real GDP growth rate, once varying between 4% and 6%, is expected to decline to 0.4% in 2023. Thus, the Polish economy is experiencing stagflation. Meanwhile, a gradual increase in the retirement age to 67 for both men and women, introduced in 2013, was reversed by PiS in 2017, despite Poland’s shrinking working-age population – a consequence of population aging and large-scale emigration. The share of state ownership has been increased, especially in the banking and energy sectors. The latter became less competitive after several administrative mergers of state-controlled companies (for example, creating a super-conglomerate ORLEN). Investment in green energy has slowed in the face of various administrative and financial obstacles. To what extent a new government will be ready to tackle these problems remains unclear. During the election campaign, opposition parties sought to compete with PiS by offering more public spending programmes and lower taxes. They promised never to increase the retirement age. They were silent about privatisation, only pledging more professional and nepotism-free management of state-controlled companies. Since the election, several opposition promises detrimental to public finances have been repeated. The economic chapter in the coalition agreement between parties forming the future government is vague. The multi-party character of a future government (from the left to centre-right), and forthcoming local and European elections (both in spring 2024), may further discourage necessary economic reforms and fiscal adjustment. If such a political scenario prevails, the Polish economy risks slipping towards even deeper macroeconomic disequilibria and zero growth. This will not guarantee popularity and future election success for a coalition government. Therefore, despite all the political and legislative obstacles, the incoming government’s economic policy programme must address the root causes of the current troubles and respect fiscal constraints. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Heather Grabbe, Ivo Maes, Lucio Pench, and Nicolas Veron for their comments and suggestions on a draft of this commentary.

China’s silence towards the European Union’s electric vehicle probe could mean that a more harmful retaliation is on its way During her State of the Union address on 13 September, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the European Union would undertake an anti-subsidy probe against the Chinese electric vehicle (EV) sector. This signalled a major step in the EU’s shift to a more aggressive trade defence against China and raises the question of how China will react, given the importance of the Chinese market to key sectors of the European economy (including the auto and luxury sectors), and also given China’s crucial role in providing goods to the EU for the green transition? An EU-China High Economic and Trade dialogue on 25 September in Beijing, between EU Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis and his Chinese counterparts, may have given a glimpse into China’s mindset. There were fears Chinese officials would respond aggressively to von der Leyen’s announcement during Dombrovskis’s visit but this was not the case. Nevertheless, the silence may be deceptive. Three main factors should be taken into account when considering potential Chinese retaliation. Subtle but harmful retaliation First, China might file its own anti-subsidy investigation at the World Trade Organisation against key European sectors. This would not be difficult since Europe has ramped up its subsidies massively since the pandemic, and more recently has attempted to gain more ‘strategic autonomy’ in sectors including semiconductors. There is very little the EU can do about this potential retaliation, which would be costly for the sectors targeted and for the EU’s image as a free-trade and WTO champion. Second, China could try to persuade EU governments that the Commission-led investigation should be withdrawn. A similar probe happened in early 2014, when the EU launched an anti-subsidy investigation into solar panels produced in China. President Xi Jinping visited then Chancellor Angela Merkel right after the anti-subsidy investigation was announced. Subsequently, the issue was settled quickly, with the Commission withdrawing the case from the WTO. Based on this previous experience, China might prefer to take up the issue bilaterally, possibly with Germany again, rather than enter discussions with the Commission. But a major difference this time is the relative importance of the auto sector in the EU compared to solar power. The auto sector accounts for 14 million jobs in Europe and a good part of the EU’s exports. Exports of cars and components are heavily concentrated in a few EU countries, especially Germany. These exports to China have plummeted in 2023, with a close to 30% drop, and Chinese competition in third markets and even the EU market, has become much more intense. Third, also unlike the solar-panel probe, it is the Commission and not the sector being harmed that has filed the case. It will be harder for the Commission to withdraw the investigation because it would lose credibility. Merkel decided to accommodate Xi Jinping’s request in 2014 because she wanted to save the auto sector, even at the cost of hurting a smaller part of the German economy – the solar panel companies. The new investigation aims to protect the automotive sector. There could be consequences for major European auto companies producing electric vehicles in China, but jobs in Europe are now more important than the future of those companies in China. In any case, the future of European manufacturers is bleak; they seem to have already lost the EV race to their Chinese competitors. China will find it much harder to move the EU away from its decision to pursue an anti-subsidy investigation, differently to what happened in 2014. Lessons to learn There might be a lesson for Europe in what happened to Apple in China in September. Days before Apple’s launch of its new iPhone 15, Huawei launched its Mate 60 with upgraded functionalities which require high-end semiconductors. Beyond raising doubts about the effectiveness of US-led export controls on advanced semiconductors, this announcement constituted a direct challenge to Apple’s phone sales in China. Chinese officials were also prohibited from using iPhones and rumours spread in Chinese media in advance of the Apple launch about the underwhelming quality of the iPhone 15. Investors dumped Apple stock globally and the company lost about 6% of its value in a few days. China’s retaliation against the Commission’s anti-subsidy investigation might not be as direct and transparent, but it will still be harmful and might offer less room for the EU to respond. Europe’s strategic dependence on China is greater than in 2014 and this probe has the potential to cause a bigger fall-out for the EU. China has strengthened its position as a global power and uncompetitive behaviour could hit European core sectors harder because China has more power to retaliate. On the flip side, the stakes are higher for the EU given the importance of the auto sector in terms of jobs and exports. For that reason, China may not manage to deter the EU’s investigation as easily as it did in the past. But this may prompt China to threaten even larger retaliation.

The Polish elections are a harbinger of hope that populism and illiberalism, however entrenched, are reversible. Amidst a week of global headlines captured by terror attacks and hospital bombings, it was easy to miss a general election that took place on October 15 in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet the Polish elections, with their ramifications beyond Poland’s borders, were a crucial event for Europe and the future of democracy worldwide. An existential election The election yielded a loss for the Eurosceptic right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party—a party that has ruled Poland for eight years since 2015 and was responsible for much democratic backsliding, leading Poland down the rabbit hole of illiberalism and authoritarianism. The Opposition, led by Donald Tusk’s (former Polish Prime Minister and President of the European Council) liberal Civic Platform, won 30.7 percent of the total vote and 157 seats in the Parliament and is likely to form a coalition government with the centre-right Third Way. Third Way has 14.4 percent of the vote and 65 seats, and the New Left has 8.6 percent of the vote and 26 seats. Together, the three parties won 248 out of the 460 seats in the Parliament. Even though the ruling PiS at 34 percent won the most votes and 194 seats in the Parliament in this tight election, its alliance with the far-right Confederation that won 7.2 percent of the vote and 18 seats was insufficient to form a majority. This is despite a heavily polarised and inflammatory campaign, where the odds were in the ruling party’s favour, given its capture of state media, institutions, and resources. The statement from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Election Observation Mission in Poland deemed the election as taking place on “an uneven playing field”. Besides the elections, the ruling party also held a referendum with questions involving immigration that would cast a negative light on the European Union (EU), and by extension the pro-EU Opposition, and which rewarded localities with the highest voter turnouts, particularly small towns in rural areas that are supportive of PiS. PiS’s socially conservative agenda and dramatic takeover of Poland’s democratic institutions including the judiciary led to bitter rule of law disputes, with the European Commission withholding €36 billion of pandemic recovery funds until this backsliding was reversed. Under PiS rule, Poland saw poverty and unemployment decline and the economy grow by over 50 percent. Yet the repercussions from the pandemic and the Ukraine war amounted to Poland suffering amongst the highest inflation rates, at over 18 percent in parts of 2022, in Europe. Scandals such as PiS officials allegedly selling visas for bribes also contributed to dwindling support amongst voters. Thus, in a record voter turnout of 74.4 percent—greater than the turnout of 63 percent recorded in the historic 1989 Polish election when voters rejected communism—the 2023 polls were existential in nature, marking a moment of truth for the overall direction and future of Poland as a liberal European democracy. This close win by progressive pro-European forces marks an opportunity for the EU’s fifth-largest country with a GDP of US$ 700 billion to return to the European mainstream. A string of reversals Amongst a new Tusk-led government’s top aims will be the unblocking of EU funds, a reversal of illiberal reforms including the reinstating of judicial and media independence, and restoration of abortion and LGBTQ+ rights. Yet unwinding a lot of what PiS put in place will not be an easy task, starting with the transition of power, which will likely be complicated by Poland’s PiS-aligned President Andrzej Duda, who will remain in power until 2025 and will initially give PiS, the party with the largest votes, the chance to form a government. Besides, ideological differences within Tusk’s coalition could also complicate decision-making. Crucially, Poland is a front-line state in the Western coalition against Russia and amongst the staunchest supporters of Kyiv, both in terms of political support and military supplies. The country is hosting over a million Ukrainian refugees and has become a critical Western transit hub for arms and aid. However, relations between Warsaw and Kyiv came under strain with the Polish embargo on Ukrainian grain imports in a bid to appeal to Polish farmers for votes, with even talks of halting military aid and cutting back support for Ukrainian refugees. A new government in Warsaw is likely to iron out these tensions and continue supporting Kyiv, which is good news for an increasingly fragile Western alliance. Brussels’ delight Despite looming political uncertainties, the results will reset Poland’s relations with the EU and restore Polish credibility. This presents opportunities for Warsaw to reposition itself from ‘pariah’ to power centre in the EU and NATO, particularly as Europe’s centre of gravity shifts from West to East. A progressive government in Poland will also break with the anti-EU Budapest-Warsaw alliance—an alliance that was tearing apart at the foundations of the EU itself, given that the EU is a rule of law construct—and render it incapable of playing spoiler at the EU level in tackling issues such as migration. Ultimately, the Polish elections are a harbinger of hope that populism and illiberalism, however entrenched, are reversible. And a reminder that every vote counts. The folks in Brussels are right to rejoice.