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The low-profile and high-impact meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on August 5 and 6 was never intended to produce a road map for ending the war in Ukraine; neither was it a summit, since the invitations sent to some 40 countries specified the level of representation as national security advisers. It can, nevertheless, be called a peace conference, following up on the meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, on June 24, and preparing the ground for a wider peace summit proposed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. What makes the format of the Ukraine-initiated meeting, for which Saudi Arabia agreed to provide a venue, unique is that it brought together members of the US-led Western coalition and key states of the Global South, which generally prefer to keep a safe distance from the war (Nezavisimaya gazeta, August 3). The main purpose was to grant Ukraine an opportunity to impress upon the countries that are worried about the costs and risks of maintaining their traditional ties with Russia—such as India, Brazil or South Africa—that the only road to peace leads through a full withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territories (Kommersant, August 3).  The Kremlin noted sourly that it would monitor the proceedings, and mainstream commentators confidently predicted the meeting would end in failure (Izvestiya, August 3). The main argument was that it made no sense to discuss ways and means of ending the war in Ukraine without Russia, which has allegedly consolidated its influence in the Global South (Rossiiskaya gazeta, August 3). The argument might appear sound, but it omits the increasingly obvious fact that it makes even less sense to discuss peace initiatives with Russia, as Moscow’s formal annexation of five Ukrainian regions (Crimea being the first) leaves no space for even minimal compromises (The Moscow Times, July 31). The Ukrainian leadership can only indicate its readiness to negotiate peace arrangements with a post-Putin regime in Moscow, assuming that the commitment to prolonging the Kremlin’s aggression would expire with the departure of the autocrat obsessed with asserting Russia’s “greatness” through territorial expansion (Republic.ru, July 31). The meeting in Jeddah signified a key success in Ukrainian policy aimed at blocking and rolling back Moscow’s intrigues in the Global South, which reached a new high at the Russia-Africa Summit on July 27 and 28 (Forbes.ru, August 2). President Vladimir Putin made an extraordinary personal effort at courting the 17 leaders who opted to come to St. Petersburg, but the lavish entertainment was a poor compensation for the plain refusal to revive the “grain deal,” canceled a week prior to the pompous event (Meduza, July 28; see EDM, July 31). The African leaders were keen to combine their peace initiative with a compromise that would allow the resumption of wheat and corn exports from Ukraine by sea; however, the extra-short joint statement that the Kremlin finally released a week after the meeting made clear that their efforts were wasted (Kremlin.ru, August 4). Another worrisome development for many African countries is Putin’s warm embrace of the leaders of the military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, which indicates that the Wagner Group could expand its activities in the trouble-rich Sahel region, perhaps even toward Niger (Svoboda, August 1). Moscow pundits were certain that China would abstain from partaking in the Jeddah meeting, much the same way it had skipped the meeting in Copenhagen; thus, Moscow’s disappointment was all the more palpable when Beijing announced on August 4 that Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui would attend the discussions in person (RBC, August 5; RIA Novosti, August 5). It was perhaps a bit of an over-statement calling Li Hui’s participation a “super-breakthrough,” as Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba did, because no deviation from Beijing’s Chinese “peace formula” could be expected (Interfax-Ukraine, August 4). Yet, even this carefully worded position paper contains the point on Ukraine’s territorial integrity. As such, it is possible for Ukrainian diplomats to elaborate on it and build a broad consensus in the Global South for the restoration of Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders through the full withdrawal of Russian troops (Meduza.io, August 5). In Chinese foreign policy, a distinct new emphasis is being placed on facilitating stability in global markets driven by the need to overcome the country’s worrisome economic slowdown, and the escalation of tensions in the Black Sea following Moscow’s cancellation of the “grain deal” does not fit this approach (Forbes.ru, August 4; The Bell, August 5). Ukrainian threats to Russian oil exports from Novorossiysk add a new urgency to the question of Moscow’s falling petro-revenues, which pertains to the delicate issue of Moscow’s relations with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries cartel, particularly with Saudi Arabia (Izvestiya, August 4). The unpleasant surprise of Saudi involvement in organizing the Ukraine-friendly meeting in Jeddah has produced a stream of speculations about the true intentions of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (Topwar.ru, August 4). Moscow is perfectly aware that a few countries, Saudi Arabia being one, as well as India and Turkey, are able to benefit from the market distortions caused by the war, which does not make them sympathetic toward Russia’s stance, as Putin’s uneasy dialogue with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seemingly confirms (Nezavisimaya gazeta, August 2). What gradually transpires is that the extra profits these states extract come at the expense of the Russian economy, which is profoundly affected by Western sanctions and is now experiencing the negative impacts from accumulated stress in the financial system, including the declining value of the ruble and rising inflation (The Moscow Times, August 3). No amount of anti-colonial, Western-bashing rhetoric emanating from Moscow can make Russia an attractive and reliable partner for key states of the Global South; however, Ukraine cannot count on gaining their support by commanding the moral high ground. It is rather too obvious for Brazil, India and South Africa, who will come together in two weeks at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg (where Putin will be present only virtually), that the massive economic support the West provides Ukraine means less funds for humanitarian aid to the poorest counties. Thus, Ukraine needs to convince these countries that it is able to cut the long war short, and its diplomatic “counteroffensive” can succeed only if its brigades achieve greater success on the battlefield. Ukrainian resolve and Western unity make Russia’s defeat nearly inevitable, and the meeting in Jeddah has conveyed to the states of the Global South that every contribution they are able to make in accelerating this outcome answers their collective interests.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Consistent with past behavior observed in previous instances of wars against Gaza Strip (GS), European capitals swiftly and predictably condemned the attack by Palestinian resistance forces on Israeli targets on 7/10/2023 in strong terms. This event was often portrayed with a clear bias towards Israel’s narrative, overlooking its background and context, and disregarding its military objectives, which primarily targeted Israeli occupation bases and barracks. Some European capitals took considerable time to reassess their positions and strive for a more balanced approach. Hasty Initial Positions In the first weeks of the war, political and media narratives in most European countries leaned towards portraying Israeli occupation as the victim, depicting the resistance’s actions as typical terrorist attacks akin to tragic events in Western countries. This narrative provided propaganda support to justify the brutal assault on GS. The aggression was justified by emphasizing “Israel’s right to self-defense,” echoing Israeli leadership’s claims of the resistance “using civilians as human shields,” all while neglecting international law and the safety of Palestinian civilians. Some European countries reacted vehemently during the genocidal war. They suspended aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for a period, then penalized the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) by withholding funding following Israel’s inflammatory accusations against the agency, only to later reverse these actions. Trends in European Positions Generally speaking, European positions during the GS war diverged along at least three lines, with relative differences in attitudes within each line: • Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other countries adopted an overwhelmingly pro-Israeli position that remained almost unchanged. • A trend that increasingly criticized the genocidal war and moved in a positive direction. This was evident in Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Malta, Norway and Slovenia. • A third trend avoided clear criticism without being at the forefront of partisanship, or vacillated in some positions, as in the case of France, which relatively modified its position in the second month of the war. These trends were evident in the positions on the ceasefire during the first months of the war, in voting behavior in international bodies, in taking punitive measures against the PA and UNRWA, and in the position on imposing sanctions on settlers. Implications of Positions on the European Union (EU) This divergence in positions has placed a burden on the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell to articulate a coherent position representing the Union during this war. Non-EU member states, such as Britain, have adopted positions aligned with the US, while Norway has expressed critical attitudes toward the war. The prolonged duration of the war, the exposure of its brutality, and the growing public and elite opposition to it have led to a weakening of support for the war within Europe and have encouraged the opposite front. The divergence in positions was evident in that the EU was only able to reach a joint resolution supporting a ceasefire in GS in March 2024. This came with great difficulty due to the intransigence of capitals overwhelmingly aligned with Israel, which obstructed this step for almost half a year of the war. European positions have been weakened and discredited due to their contradictions, particularly regarding the Ukraine war. Positions favoring a brutal genocidal war have severely tarnished the image of the concerned European countries. Germany was even brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after Nicaragua filed a lawsuit against it for “facilitating the commission of genocide” against Palestinians in GS via its arms exports to Israel. It is clear that the positions of many European countries are causing significant losses in terms of image, soft power and the privilege of moral guardianship that they once enjoyed as traditional defenders of “human rights” and “universal values.” These positions have also galvanized massive public protests within European countries, although these protests have not prompted significant political responses. Weaknesses in European positions have become apparent due to the lack of diplomatic initiatives from the EU or any of its member states, despite the active involvement of European actors across the region. Calls for a diplomatic solution, an end to the war or even statements advocating “restraint” have notably been missing from the primary European positions on the GS war. This omission can be attributed to the current alignment with the US administration and the influence of the prevailing support for the Israeli narrative of the war within Europe. Position on the Two-State Solution Merely expressing support for the “two-state solution,” pledging aid, and expressing concern for the humanitarian situation of Palestinians in Gaza Strip often serves as a superficial gesture, aligning more with the ongoing occupation and the devastating war on GS. These positions may also involve condemning Israeli “settler violence” in the West Bank (WB) and issuing threats of punitive actions against certain individuals, while simultaneously absolving the Israeli military of any accountability and deflecting criticism from the war on GS. The critical position toward Israel became evident through early voting behavior favoring a ceasefire in international forums, initiatives within EU bodies supporting this inclination, and the near-simultaneous recognition of the State of Palestine in Madrid, Dublin, Oslo and Ljubljana. This exerted pressure on other European countries, despite their customary declarations of support for the “two-state solution,” to reconsider their positions. However, major European capitals of influence, such as Berlin, Paris, London and Rome, still refrain from taking clear positions in pressuring Israel or recognizing the state of Palestine. Efforts to Contain War Expansion Since the war began, European capitals involved in decision-making have been eager to contain the war within GS. The prolonged duration of the war exerts pressure in this direction, particularly amidst concerns over potential escalation at the volatile Lebanese front and ongoing tensions and attacks near the Yemeni coasts and in the Red Sea region. European countries have taken noticeable steps in response, highlighted by French diplomatic efforts in Lebanon and the surrounding areas. Concurrently, European countries have refrained from participating in military maneuvers in the Red Sea, aligning themselves distinctively from US and British forces, thereby signaling a strategy to avoid direct entanglement in regional tensions. Western Strategic Polarization The positions of European decision-making centers have been notably influenced by the manifestations of Western strategic polarization in the wake of the Ukraine conflict, with Europe notably aligning with the US administration. Western powers seem to acknowledge the potential geopolitical ramifications of either losing the current war in GS or allowing it to escalate regionally. Moreover, the ongoing war serves as a significant test for the effectiveness of Western weapons, security and defense systems, particularly following the sudden blow on 7/10/2023. European parties’ concern for the strength of the Western alliance and transatlantic ties also motivates them to avoid weakening the position of President Joe Biden’s administration. Biden faces a challenging electoral test to renew his presidential term against Donald Trump, whose potential return to the White House raises concerns among Europeans. Conclusion Despite the mounting European criticisms of the Israeli occupation and the brutal genocidal war, the influential European position continues to refrain from imposing significant censure or punitive measures against Israel. Furthermore, it appears to align with the positions of its US ally on this matter, actively seeking harmony with them. However, Israel is increasingly posing a burden on Europe. While there is a gradual and hesitant shift towards greater recognition of the impossibility of Israel remaining above the law, along with an increased acknowledgment of the rights of the Palestinian people and the urgency to address them, this trend is becoming increasingly apparent. This is accompanied by waning confidence in the ability to overcome Palestinian resistance. Moreover, there is a growing unity among the Palestinian population in support of resistance, in the wake of the failure of the Oslo process and the pursuit of a peaceful solution.