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Defense & Security
Red Sea - IMG_0150.JPG

Navigating the Red Sea: Addressing threats and harnessing potential

by Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga , Farea Al-Muslimi , Lisa Boström , Veera Tuomala

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Photo credit: Flickr/Sailing Nomad - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/ Ambassador Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga, Farea Al-Muslimi, Lisa Boström and Veera Tuomala In recent months, the Red Sea has drawn global attention, particularly due to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the deal between Ethiopia and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland on access to the Gulf of Aden, which sparked a dispute with Somalia. The rising tensions and increasing military responses risk worsening conflicts in a highly volatile region. The renewed focus on the Red Sea, however, also provides an opportunity to redouble commitment to multilateralism and enhance the collective action needed to address threats facing the region. This blog post gives an overview of current issues in the region and possible ways to address them, building on the outcomes of a panel discussion at the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. Geopolitical competition in the Red Sea region The Red Sea has become a major flashpoint for global and regional contestation, with local, regional and global conflict dynamics deeply intertwined. Regional and global powers are constructing naval bases and military installations around the Red Sea to enhance their power projection, fuelling existing tensions and exacerbating ongoing conflicts. This has aggravated already dire humanitarian conditions, contributing to fragility across the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and North Africa. In Sudan, competition between Gulf states is widely considered a driving factor behind the civil war. In Somalia and Yemen, external influences have fuelled internal disputes and aggravated tensions, undermining state-building efforts and incurring particularly devastating consequences in Yemen. Climate change and a scramble for scarce natural resources and critical commodities, including water, agricultural land and food supplies, may reinforce this dynamic. Gulf states, in particular, have invested billions in agriculture and manufacturing in the Horn of Africa in recent years to secure food production and tap into the region’s burgeoning labour markets. Regional insecurity escalates Insecurity in the Red Sea region reached a critical point in early 2024 when the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in response to the ongoing conflict in Gaza, further threatening regional and international stability, upending trade and disrupting global markets. In response, the United States and the United Kingdom carried out airstrikes against targets in Yemen, while the European Union took a more defensive approach with the launch of Operation ASPIDES to protect vessels. This escalation delayed peace negotiations in Yemen, weakening the fragile trust needed to agree on an extended ceasefire and a roadmap to peace. The Houthi attacks also further compounded humanitarian challenges, disrupting the flow of essential goods and humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region more widely, thus worsening shortages and human suffering. In Sudan around 26 million people, more than half the population, are suffering acute food insecurity. In Yemen, around 22 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, with about 17 million facing acute food insecurity. Instability on both coasts has also increased migration across the Red Sea. The number of migrants from the Horn of Africa arriving in Yemen has nearly tripled in recent years, with tens of thousands making the dangerous crossing annually in search of better economic opportunities. Additionally, the rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia has exacerbated regional insecurity, with reports of coordination between the Houthis and the Al-Shabaab armed group in the Horn, increasing the risk of human trafficking and forced migration. Opportunities to strengthen multilateralism, cooperation and collective action The barriers to effective cooperation in the Red Sea region are significant but not insurmountable. Historical rivalries and political instability have eroded trust among countries in the region, and the diverse priorities and strategic interests of these countries complicate collaboration. Despite these challenges, the region holds immense potential for growth and development. The strategic location and resources of countries on both shores, if harnessed constructively and collectively, could spur economic prosperity and regional stability. However, the region can realize its potential and accelerate socio-economic development only through inclusive growth, innovation and addressing long-standing developmental challenges. In this regard, prioritizing economic and regional integration is critical to unlocking the region’s vast potential. Indeed, the geographical proximity between the Horn of Africa and Yemen across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has brought about initiatives such as the Bridge of the Horns, proposed in 2007 between Djibouti and Yemen, which represented a bold vision for a more integrated, peaceful and prosperous region. While the project did not materialize, it is symbolic of the potential for deep and mutually beneficial economic, cultural and political ties across the Red Sea. While there are currently no operational overarching mechanisms or forums for multilateral cooperation around the region, the establishment in 2020 of the Red Sea Council—formally the Council of Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden—could fill this gap. Once operational, it could help to mitigate tensions and foster cooperation towards a shared vision for the region. Moving forward There are several areas where enhanced cooperation is achievable and could benefit the Red Sea region as a whole. For example, establishing joint coastal patrols and information-sharing mechanisms could significantly enhance maritime security and combat piracy, smuggling and terrorism along the vital maritime corridor. Developing regional trade agreements and infrastructure projects could boost economic growth and interdependence, reducing the likelihood of conflict. Collaborative efforts to address climate change, manage shared water resources and protect marine ecosystems could promote sustainability and reduce resource-related tensions. Coordinating humanitarian responses and development programmes could address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, food insecurity, and poor access to education and healthcare. Finally, establishing platforms for dialogue and mediation could help to resolve disputes peacefully, preventing the escalation of conflicts. By focusing on these areas, the countries of the Red Sea region could move towards a more cooperative, stable and prosperous future. Strengthening cooperation through robust multilateral frameworks is vital to addressing the factors that underpin regional insecurity as well as to promoting sustainable development. Regional solutions should be led by the region, rather than relying on external entities whose priorities and resources are currently focused elsewhere. Countries on both coasts of the Red Sea need to view each other as partners for common goals and stability, prioritizing cooperation to connect their needs and interests effectively. As United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres notes in the New Agenda for Peace, rebuilding consensus around shared norms and developing new ways for states to act cooperatively is crucial to addressing collective challenges and meeting shared objectives. SIPRI is pleased to share a series of guest blog posts from partners of the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. This blog builds on a panel discussion at the Forum on the topic ‘Red Sea Security in a Time of Disorder’, which was organized by CMI–Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation.

Defense & Security
Calcutta,West Bengal,India,14 September ,2023:Anti Israel rally of Indian Muslim with poster , banner and war photograph to support Palestine, demanding to stop war,save child and women and civilian

Political Insights (10): India’s Position Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood and Israeli War on Gaza Strip

by Dr. Mohammad Makram Balawi

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indian politicians believed that rapprochement with the US could best be achieved through strengthening ties with Israel. Consequently, India quickly established diplomatic relations with Israel, leading to significant developments in various fields, particularly in security and military areas. As a result, the Palestine issue became a marginal concern for India. However, the relationship has gained significant attention in the Arab world with the onset of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, which this paper will explore. First: Key Aspects of India’s Position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood In the early hours of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on 7/10/2023, Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted a strong condemnation of the Palestinian side, echoing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric. It was later revealed that this statement was made without consulting the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, which released a more measured response the following day. This was followed by a series of actions aligned with the policies of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Notably, Indian authorities, particularly in Uttar Pradesh, imposed restrictions, including arrests, on demonstrators showing sympathy for Palestinians facing a genocidal war in the Gaza Strip (GS). Similar actions were observed in other states, including the capital, Delhi, suggesting that this was an Indian official policy. In contrast, Hindu right-wing extremists were permitted to express support for Israel’s war and accuse Palestinian sympathizers of being jihadists and unpatriotic, despite widespread sympathy for Palestinians on social media. At the media level, despite the reluctance of official authorities, particularly the Ministry of External Affairs, and their tendency to take ambiguous stances on the issue, mainstream media has generally maintained a professional and somewhat sympathetic tone towards the Palestinians. Second: Unrestricted Collaboration It was notable that India’s partnership with Israel remained unaffected despite Israel’s crimes against humanity against the Palestinians. In fact, this partnership, particularly in military manufacturing, appears to have a direct impact on Israel’s war efforts. Some drones used by Israeli forces were jointly manufactured with the Indian company Adani. Additionally, munitions originating from India were found in the field, with further discoveries made when Spanish authorities intercepted an Indian ship attempting to bypass the Houthi embargo in the Red Sea. India’s military cooperation with Israel is well-established, having previously participated in the Israeli Blue Flag exercises. Beyond military and security cooperation, India is also deeply involved in the economic sector. Following the withdrawal of Thai workers from Israel’s agricultural sector after 7/10/2023, which severely impacted the Israeli economy, India stepped in to address the labor shortage by sending 100 thousand workers to Israel, where work is already in progress, in an environment that is dangerous, to say the least. Third: Duality of Positions Regarding India’s performance in international organizations, it has generally aligned with the majority of global countries and adhered to the “two-state solution,” notably omitting any reference to East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state. This represents a significant shift in India’s position. However, at the bilateral level, India continues to steadily develop its relationships across various fields. This is interpreted as a gesture of gratitude to Israel, which was the only country to supply India with weapons during the Kargil War with Pakistan. India has also sought to avoid antagonizing the US administration by not adopting a policy that contradicts the US stance on Ukraine and Palestine. It is noteworthy that some Arab positions, particularly those of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are in alignment with India’s stance. Fourth: The impact of the Recent General Elections on the Indian Government’s Stance on the Palestine Issue It seems that the decline in the ruling party’s performance in the Indian general elections held in May 2024 did not affect its stance on the Palestine issue. This can be attributed to the persistent determinants that have shaped this position from the outset. Key among these are India’s desire to strengthen its relationship with the US, particularly in the context of countering China through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), commonly known as the Quad, and its aim to enhance economic performance by attracting foreign investment. Additionally, there is ideological alignment between the ruling party and the Zionist movement. Most notably, the Arab push towards normalization and the establishment of relations with Israel has alleviated any pressure on India to reconsider its policies regarding Israel. Consequently, India finds itself in a favorable environment that aligns with its current position. Conclusion India’s policy has focused on strengthening ties with Israel at various levels, while maintaining formal and limited relations with the Palestinian Authority. Its approach to the Palestine issue has been through the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Unlike Russia and China, which have established relations with Hamas and hosted Palestinian delegations in the name of reconciliation, India has not taken this route. The Indian press often deliberately conflates Palestinian resistance with terrorism, despite the fact that India has not officially designated any Palestinian movements as terrorist organizations. A ceasefire that aligns with Israel’s acceptable conditions, which India views as a potential alleviation of the “Palestinian headache,” would be in line with the policy of the current Indian government. This administration appears receptive to any solution supported by the US and the Arab countries. Such a stance enables India to uphold its partnerships with Israel, the US and its Arab allies while avoiding ethical dilemmas related to the beliefs held by some Indian elites regarding India’s historical anti-colonial stance and its support for the Palestine issue. The possibility of India following the example of Russia and China by establishing open relations with Palestinian resistance movements seems unlikely. India’s entry into the Arab world has been facilitated through countries that hold negative attitudes towards these movements, and India may be cautious not to antagonize both the US and the Arab leaders who have normalized relations with Israel.

Defense & Security
Paris, France, Europe, May 01, 2024, pro-Palestinian demonstrator at the Paris procession on May 1

Political Insights (8): European Positions on Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli War on Gaza Strip:

by Hossam Shaker

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Consistent with past behavior observed in previous instances of wars against Gaza Strip (GS), European capitals swiftly and predictably condemned the attack by Palestinian resistance forces on Israeli targets on 7/10/2023 in strong terms. This event was often portrayed with a clear bias towards Israel’s narrative, overlooking its background and context, and disregarding its military objectives, which primarily targeted Israeli occupation bases and barracks. Some European capitals took considerable time to reassess their positions and strive for a more balanced approach. Hasty Initial Positions In the first weeks of the war, political and media narratives in most European countries leaned towards portraying Israeli occupation as the victim, depicting the resistance’s actions as typical terrorist attacks akin to tragic events in Western countries. This narrative provided propaganda support to justify the brutal assault on GS. The aggression was justified by emphasizing “Israel’s right to self-defense,” echoing Israeli leadership’s claims of the resistance “using civilians as human shields,” all while neglecting international law and the safety of Palestinian civilians. Some European countries reacted vehemently during the genocidal war. They suspended aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for a period, then penalized the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) by withholding funding following Israel’s inflammatory accusations against the agency, only to later reverse these actions. Trends in European Positions Generally speaking, European positions during the GS war diverged along at least three lines, with relative differences in attitudes within each line: • Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other countries adopted an overwhelmingly pro-Israeli position that remained almost unchanged. • A trend that increasingly criticized the genocidal war and moved in a positive direction. This was evident in Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Malta, Norway and Slovenia. • A third trend avoided clear criticism without being at the forefront of partisanship, or vacillated in some positions, as in the case of France, which relatively modified its position in the second month of the war. These trends were evident in the positions on the ceasefire during the first months of the war, in voting behavior in international bodies, in taking punitive measures against the PA and UNRWA, and in the position on imposing sanctions on settlers. Implications of Positions on the European Union (EU) This divergence in positions has placed a burden on the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell to articulate a coherent position representing the Union during this war. Non-EU member states, such as Britain, have adopted positions aligned with the US, while Norway has expressed critical attitudes toward the war. The prolonged duration of the war, the exposure of its brutality, and the growing public and elite opposition to it have led to a weakening of support for the war within Europe and have encouraged the opposite front. The divergence in positions was evident in that the EU was only able to reach a joint resolution supporting a ceasefire in GS in March 2024. This came with great difficulty due to the intransigence of capitals overwhelmingly aligned with Israel, which obstructed this step for almost half a year of the war. European positions have been weakened and discredited due to their contradictions, particularly regarding the Ukraine war. Positions favoring a brutal genocidal war have severely tarnished the image of the concerned European countries. Germany was even brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after Nicaragua filed a lawsuit against it for “facilitating the commission of genocide” against Palestinians in GS via its arms exports to Israel. It is clear that the positions of many European countries are causing significant losses in terms of image, soft power and the privilege of moral guardianship that they once enjoyed as traditional defenders of “human rights” and “universal values.” These positions have also galvanized massive public protests within European countries, although these protests have not prompted significant political responses. Weaknesses in European positions have become apparent due to the lack of diplomatic initiatives from the EU or any of its member states, despite the active involvement of European actors across the region. Calls for a diplomatic solution, an end to the war or even statements advocating “restraint” have notably been missing from the primary European positions on the GS war. This omission can be attributed to the current alignment with the US administration and the influence of the prevailing support for the Israeli narrative of the war within Europe. Position on the Two-State Solution Merely expressing support for the “two-state solution,” pledging aid, and expressing concern for the humanitarian situation of Palestinians in Gaza Strip often serves as a superficial gesture, aligning more with the ongoing occupation and the devastating war on GS. These positions may also involve condemning Israeli “settler violence” in the West Bank (WB) and issuing threats of punitive actions against certain individuals, while simultaneously absolving the Israeli military of any accountability and deflecting criticism from the war on GS. The critical position toward Israel became evident through early voting behavior favoring a ceasefire in international forums, initiatives within EU bodies supporting this inclination, and the near-simultaneous recognition of the State of Palestine in Madrid, Dublin, Oslo and Ljubljana. This exerted pressure on other European countries, despite their customary declarations of support for the “two-state solution,” to reconsider their positions. However, major European capitals of influence, such as Berlin, Paris, London and Rome, still refrain from taking clear positions in pressuring Israel or recognizing the state of Palestine. Efforts to Contain War Expansion Since the war began, European capitals involved in decision-making have been eager to contain the war within GS. The prolonged duration of the war exerts pressure in this direction, particularly amidst concerns over potential escalation at the volatile Lebanese front and ongoing tensions and attacks near the Yemeni coasts and in the Red Sea region. European countries have taken noticeable steps in response, highlighted by French diplomatic efforts in Lebanon and the surrounding areas. Concurrently, European countries have refrained from participating in military maneuvers in the Red Sea, aligning themselves distinctively from US and British forces, thereby signaling a strategy to avoid direct entanglement in regional tensions. Western Strategic Polarization The positions of European decision-making centers have been notably influenced by the manifestations of Western strategic polarization in the wake of the Ukraine conflict, with Europe notably aligning with the US administration. Western powers seem to acknowledge the potential geopolitical ramifications of either losing the current war in GS or allowing it to escalate regionally. Moreover, the ongoing war serves as a significant test for the effectiveness of Western weapons, security and defense systems, particularly following the sudden blow on 7/10/2023. European parties’ concern for the strength of the Western alliance and transatlantic ties also motivates them to avoid weakening the position of President Joe Biden’s administration. Biden faces a challenging electoral test to renew his presidential term against Donald Trump, whose potential return to the White House raises concerns among Europeans. Conclusion Despite the mounting European criticisms of the Israeli occupation and the brutal genocidal war, the influential European position continues to refrain from imposing significant censure or punitive measures against Israel. Furthermore, it appears to align with the positions of its US ally on this matter, actively seeking harmony with them. However, Israel is increasingly posing a burden on Europe. While there is a gradual and hesitant shift towards greater recognition of the impossibility of Israel remaining above the law, along with an increased acknowledgment of the rights of the Palestinian people and the urgency to address them, this trend is becoming increasingly apparent. This is accompanied by waning confidence in the ability to overcome Palestinian resistance. Moreover, there is a growing unity among the Palestinian population in support of resistance, in the wake of the failure of the Oslo process and the pursuit of a peaceful solution.

Defense & Security
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant in Tel Aviv

The Primacy of Foreign Policy in Reverse: Israel’s War Aims After the Assassination of Ismail Haniyeh

by Benedict Moleta

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Whether or not Israel claims responsibility for the death of Ismail Haniyeh, his assassination abroad may not have improved Israel’s prospects at home. Bringing the war to a conclusion will require a credible correlation of ends and means. In diplomatic history, the “primacy of foreign policy”—with its emphasis on managing external threats, dealing with geography, and the uses of diplomacy—is a concept associated with nineteenth-century German historian Leopold von Ranke, and with the calculations by which Otto von Bismarck brought a Prussian-led Germany into existence. In twentieth-century historiography debates, Eckart Kehr was one figure who argued from the opposite corner, proposing that the primacy of domestic politics exerted its force on statecraft through economic interests, social conditions, and other factors shaping foreign policy from within. In the United States, interactions between domestic interests and foreign policy were analysed by John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt in their 2006 paper “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.” The authors argued that their country’s Middle East policy was “due almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the activities of the ‘Israel Lobby’.” Their paper, and subsequent book, have been both influential and contested—though of course the idea that such a lobby exists was not new. The 1961 memoirs of Sherman Adams (President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff) include remarks on the “many well-organized pro-Israel lobbies that were always effective and influential in the Capitol.” In the case of Israel itself, management of security at and within sovereign borders has been distinctively complicated since Israel’s declaration of statehood in 1948, which provoked five Arab states to send in their armies in contestation of the borders Israel had proclaimed. The status of these borders, and what constitutes Israel’s rightful contiguous territory inside them, have been the subject of ongoing contention and intermittent war ever since. With the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords) of 1993, it was thought by some that political, territorial, and institutional dimensions of a Palestinian state were now realities that could be brought into existence alongside Israel. Whether noble or credulous, such thoughts have not produced political realities during three subsequent decades of administrative activity overseen by the Palestinian Authority (PA)—an entity that has rested on an unpromising basis, especially since the Middle East Quartet disqualified Hamas from being its governing party, following Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006. Financially dependent on external beneficence and Israeli tax and banking, and cooperating with Israel in managing security in the West Bank, the PA since 2006 has also operated without obvious popular legitimacy. While Israel has not been threatened by the forcible establishment of a Palestinian state over these decades, managing Palestinians in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and especially in Gaza has been an ongoing challenge for Israel’s government and security establishment. Hamas’ attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 ended what Tareq Baconi has described as the containment of Palestinian resistance in Gaza. Over the following ten months, Israel’s siege on Gaza and responses to volatility in the West Bank have had aims that could be called domestic policy; to eliminate Hamas militarily and kill its leaders, to rescue Israeli hostages in Gaza, and to restore domestic security in Israel by preventing a Hamas-led threat from ever confronting Israel again. As of August 2024, Israel’s war aims have yet to be achieved, although Hamas’ military capabilities have been reduced, senior figures have been killed, and a small number of hostages have been rescued. Meanwhile violence between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank, civil unrest in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and difficult domestic matters such as the drafting of haredi (ultra-orthodox) Jews into the Israeli Defense Forces have accompanied disunity in Israel’s government and divisions and disagreements between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Defense Minister and military Chief of Staff. With the domestic objectives of the war unachieved, and the restoration of post-war stability not yet within Israel’s grasp, the primacy of international factors has come more obdurately into view over the course of the year. This is not only a matter of international threats (arising from an incipient multi-front war), but also a matter of international progress toward a ceasefire—since internationally-mediated hostage diplomacy (via Qatar and Egypt) is the only mode in which limited negotiation between the adversaries has been possible, and was the only means through which, in November 2023, a large number of Israeli captives could be released. But while internal and external factors have neither merged into an Israeli victory, nor been resolved into separately successful domestic and foreign policies, the assassination of Hamas’ leader Ismail Haniyeh on 31 July, and the subsequent appointment of Yahya Sinwar as head of Hamas on 6 August, have now brought domestic and international aspects of Israel’s war into newly fraught relations. The combination of volatility and stasis can be seen both abroad and in Gaza. Abroad, Israel has not claimed responsibility for the death of Haniyeh. But since the assassination happened in Iran (during Haniyeh’s visit to attend the swearing-in of new President Masoud Pezeshkian), Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has said it is Iran’s “duty” to “avenge the blood” of Haniyeh. The threats may not lead to significant Iranian action, considering the consequences that Iran might then face from an Israeli counter-attack. But regardless of the prospect of retaliation by Iran itself, regional tensions have only risen as a result of Haniyeh’s death—and this can only be a source of increased uncertainty for Israel. In Gaza, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh abroad has produced a condition for Israel that we could call the primacy of foreign policy in reverse. This condition pertains to headship of Yahya Sinwar, and to the internationally-mediated ceasefire and hostage talks through which Israel aims to save its citizens’ lives. Third-party mediators have played an essential role in the successes of hostage diplomacy thus far. But mediators—Qatari, Egyptian or others—can only mediate on the basis of demands made by the parties themselves, and those demands will necessarily be made by the senior decision makers on each side. Having eliminated a political chief who could operate independent of the siege on Gaza, it might be thought that Israel’s aim to dismantle Hamas is now coalescing in the prospect of killing one senior terrorist, contained in the coastal enclave. But such embodiment of war aims in one Hamas target is obviously spurious, and, as Khaled Hroub wrote a quarter of a century ago: “Even if the current organization is eliminated, it will reproduce itself once again in a new guise.” But the greater uncertainty following the assassination of Haniyeh pertains to the future of hostage negotiations with a Hamas now led by Sinwar. Assuming Sinwar is still located somewhere in Gaza, it does not seem likely that he will be any more accommodating as a hostage negotiator than he has been detectable as a target for assassination. Prime Minister Netanyahu may be drawn to accept US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recommendations for the talks’ next steps—but Blinken is expecting a lot by stating “It’s now incumbent on Hamas to do the same.” In these new conditions, the primacy of foreign policy in reverse consists in the fact that, having successfully eliminated a senior Hamas leader abroad, Israel may have reduced its chances of bringing its hostage citizens home alive.

Defense & Security
(From left): Yahya Sinwar, Karim Khan, Benjamin Netanyahu.

No one can act with impunity: ICC arrest warrants in Israel-Hamas war are a major test for international justice

by Amy Maguire

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The request by Karim Khan, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), for arrest warrants for Israeli and Hamas leaders is a significant step in the effort to bring justice to the victims of international crimes in Israel and Palestine. Khan has asked ICC judges to issue warrants on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes against Yahya Sinwar (head of Hamas in Gaza), Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri (also known as Mohammed Deif, the commander of the military wing of Hamas) and Ismail Haniyeh (head of Hamas’ political bureau, based in Qatar). They are alleged to bear responsibility for international crimes on Israeli and Palestinian territory at least since October 7 2023. Khan has also requested arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, again for war crimes and crimes against humanity. They are alleged to be responsible for crimes in the Gaza Strip since October 8 2023. What have they been accused of? Sinwar, Al-Masri and Haniyeh are charged in relation to the attacks on Israeli civilians on October 7, in which an estimated 1,200 Israeli civilians were killed and at least 245 taken hostage. In addition, the Hamas leaders are accused of other crimes in the context of the ongoing conflict in Gaza. These include: • extermination • murder • hostage taking • rape and other acts of sexual violence • torture • cruel treatment Khan said in his statement: I saw the devastating scenes of these attacks and the profound impact of the unconscionable crimes charged in the applications filed today. Speaking with survivors, I heard how the love within a family, the deepest bonds between a parent and a child, were contorted to inflict unfathomable pain through calculated cruelty and extreme callousness. These acts demand accountability. Khan noted his office conducted extensive investigations, including site visits and interviews with victim survivors, and relied on evidence relating to the conditions in which Israeli hostages have been held in Gaza. Netanyahu and Gallant are alleged to be criminally responsible for a number of international crimes since Israel launched its military action against Hamas in Gaza on October 8, including: • starvation of civilians as a method of warfare • wilfully causing great suffering • wilful killing • intentional attacks against a civilian population • extermination and/or murder • persecution. The prosecutor said the alleged crimes: … were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the Palestinian civilian population pursuant to state policy. These crimes, in our assessment, continue to this day. Noting the horrific suffering of civilians in Gaza, including tens of thousands of casualties and catastrophic hunger, Khan alleged that the means Netanyahu and Gallant chose to pursue Israel’s military aims in Gaza …namely, intentionally causing death, starvation, great suffering, and serious injury to body or health of the civilian population – are criminal. What does this mean in practice? The next step in this process is for three judges in the ICC pre-trial chamber to decide if there are reasonable grounds to believe war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed. If so, they will issue arrest warrants. It could take months for the judges to make this assessment. If arrest warrants are issued, however, they are very unlikely to be executed. And if none of the accused can be arrested, then no trial will take place because the ICC does not try people in absentia. So, why is it unlikely the accused will be arrested? There are several reasons. First, none of the accused will hand themselves in for prosecution. Netanyahu was outraged by Khan’s decision, calling it “a moral outrage of historic proportions” and accusing him of antisemitism. Hamas has issued a statement strongly denouncing the issuing of arrest warrants against its leaders, claiming it equates “the victim with the executioner”. Second, none of the accused are likely to put themselves in a position to be arrested and turned over to the ICC. Israel is not a signatory to the Rome Statute that established the ICC. Its chief ally, the United States, is also not a member. This would guarantee Netanyahu and Gallant could travel to the US without fear of arrest. Meanwhile, Haniyeh is based in Qatar, which is also not an ICC member state. He may need to curtail travel to other states to avoid risk of arrest. The other two accused Hamas leaders are believed to be hiding in Gaza – they appear more at risk of being killed by Israeli forces than arrest. However, Palestine is an ICC member state, so technically it is obliged to cooperate with the court. In practice, though, it is hard to see how this will happen. Third, the ICC relies on its member states to enforce its actions. It has no independent police force or capacity to execute arrest warrants. The ICC has 124 state parties, while the United Nations has 193 member states. This disparity makes clear the gap between what the ICC seeks to achieve – namely, universal accountability for international crimes – and what it can practically achieve when it lacks the support of implicated or nonaligned countries. What does this mean for the ICC? Khan’s move is unprecedented in one respect. This is the first time the prosecutor’s office has brought charges against a head of state who is supported by Western nations. The move triggered a predictable response from the US. President Joe Biden called it “outrageous” and added: […] there is no equivalence – none – between Israel and Hamas. We will always stand with Israel against threats to its security. But Khan emphasised the importance of the ICC’s independence and impartiality, as well as the equal application of law. No foot soldier, no commander, no civilian leader – no one – can act with impunity. The ICC has previously confirmed its jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed by the five leaders this week. The prosecutor will be confident the pre-trial chamber will issue the arrest warrants, based on the highly visible nature of the alleged crimes and the volume of evidence available to show reasonable grounds for prosecution. The request for arrest warrants undoubtedly complicates relations between Israel and its allies that are ICC member states. In such a politically charged context, it is fair to describe this effort as a test of the international community’s commitment to the goal of ending impunity for international crimes.

Defense & Security
Displaced Palestinians set up their tents next to the Egyptian border. They fled to the city of Rafah on March 8, 2024 after the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip cities.

Rafah, between ceasefire announcements and the resumption of fighting: Israel’s strategic dilemma.

by Giuseppe Dentice

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In the last 48 hours, a series of events and situations have significantly contributed to redefining the military and diplomatic scenario in Gaza. It all began on the night of May 5, when Hamas launched several rockets that hit Israel, causing some civilian casualties. At the same time, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) responded to the act with massive artillery bombardments against several Hamas positions in the al-Zahraa, al-Mughraqa, and Nuseirat camps (in the central-northern areas of the Gaza Strip) and took control of the Kerem Shalom crossing, which separates the enclave from Israeli territory. However, the IDF's actions went further with the announcement on May 6 of the expansion of the humanitarian area of al-Mawasi (in the coastal south of the Strip). This choice seems to be driven by the political will to regain control of the southern strip of Palestinian territory through the forced evacuation of Palestinian refugees from Rafah and Khan Younis towards al-Mawasi (where it is estimated that over 100,000 people will arrive shortly), also guaranteed by the Israeli resumption of the Gaza side of the Rafah crossing. All these actions seem to suggest a green light from the war cabinet for the launch of the repeatedly announced Israeli ground operation in the area. Simultaneously with the war preparations, just a few hours later, came the unexpected announcement from Hamas that it had accepted a proposal for a ceasefire in Gaza. The terms of the ceasefire – admittedly still very unclear given the often-unreliable media reports – were reportedly mediated by Egypt and Qatar, with U.S. approval, which reportedly infuriated representatives of Tel Aviv. Based on the details announced by Hamas officials, the proposal is expected to outline a three-phase plan. The first phase involves a 42-day ceasefire period during which Hamas would release 33 hostages in exchange for the release of some Palestinian militants detained in Israeli prisons. In the second phase, Tel Aviv would partially withdraw its troops from Gaza and allow the free movement of Palestinians from the south to the north of the Strip. After this preliminary phase, another 42-day period would be activated only if it clearly emerged that both parties were willing to restore a climate of "sustainable calm" in Gaza, which would also favor the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the area and the final release of the reservists and IDF soldiers held by Hamas. To crown this prolonged "silence of arms," the final step would be reached: the establishment of a true ceasefire and the start, among other things, of a reconstruction phase, including the end of the total Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, according to a plan supervised and shared by Qatar, Egypt, the USA, and the United Nations. Based on leaks and fragmented information, it is very difficult to make precise assessments, but it is plausible to imagine that if the terms of the agreement were as presented here, it would be very difficult – almost impossible – for Israel to accept the Egyptian-Qatari proposal. It would be much more satisfying for their expectations to continue with a military operation in Rafah. In the preceding days, the Israeli war cabinet had also explained the necessity of maintaining its action in Gaza unchanged, with or without an agreement with Hamas, as it was fundamental and strategic to achieve its primary objective: the destruction and eradication of the Islamist organization from the Palestinian enclave. Given this evidence, both the nature and complete terms of the diplomatic proposal accepted by Hamas, as well as the Israeli willingness to follow through on the agreement, are fundamental to creating a positive development in the current dynamics. However, no actor (regional or international) involved in the negotiations is under the illusion that a turning point has been reached, given both the opposing positions of the contenders and the operation in Rafah, which is now about to enter the heart of the action. This latter element is crucial to understanding the behavior and calculated risk taken by Hamas. In fact, at least until late afternoon on May 6, the organization had shown no interest in the Egyptian-Qatari proposal. The change of pace would suggest that the Islamist organization may have wanted to take advantage of the situation to put the ball back in the opponent's court, shifting all responsibility to Israel in the event of its refusal to follow through with the ceasefire, preferring instead military action in Rafah. In this regard, it could be argued that Hamas's twist of events was as clever as it was politically significant in contributing to weakening Tel Aviv's position. Not surprisingly, the movement led by Ismail Haniyeh understands that Israeli mediators cannot accept any negotiation that involves the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza, the end of the total blockade of the enclave's borders, but above all, the continuation in power of the organization towards, which Benjamin Netanyahu himself has declared, their destruction as an undeniable objective. A position that, regardless of whether Israel accepts the agreement already approved by Hamas in whole or in part, as well as its rejection, would expose Israel to a difficult condition of internal contention and to some strategic considerations that the Islamist movement knows well and has already exploited precisely to launch that tremendous attack on the heart of the country on October 7, 2023. In the perspective of Tel Aviv, the acceptance or rejection of the proposal by Egypt and Qatar, as well as the start of the operation in Rafah, raise a series of questions on multiple fronts, in which Netanyahu plays his usual game of political survival. If his government were to follow through with the agreement and stop/postpone the operation in Rafah, it would undoubtedly benefit diplomatically, enjoying a resurgence of credit after the storms of recent months. However, this would also mean opening an internal front, especially within his government, with extremist ministers threatening the fall of the executive. Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich have clearly stated that without the destruction of Hamas and the conquest of Rafah (and the entire Strip), the government would have no reason to exist. At the same time, even more moderate figures in the war cabinet, such as Defense Minister Yoav Gallant or Ministers Benny Gantz and Gady Eisenkot, have not taken a clear position, wavering between the possibility of a more contained humanitarian ceasefire and the wavering political opportunism on the military operation in Rafah in a challenge that seems more oriented towards the country's future and the conquest of the conservative electorate and the national right, the current Prime Minister's target audience. However, it is equally true that even in the face of a rejection of the international proposal, some clear repercussions would emerge: Israel would worsen its position and reputation, although it could keep that government in place that is now pushing relentlessly on Rafah. Such a situation would not avoid, either, domestic social protests by the families of the hostages, who demand guarantees from the government not to endanger the lives of their loved ones. In both cases, Tel Aviv would be called into question and would risk losing internal and external credibility, along with the political and security dilemma (mainly supported by the military establishment) linked to the failure to eradicate Hamas. Such a fluid and unpredictable scenario with potential repercussions even on different levels of the regional and international context. In fact, a resumption of hostilities in Rafah would have the opportunity to activate the Lebanese scenario in a different way than what has happened so far (where violent exchanges of fire have been occurring along the Blue Line border areas for days) and lead to a worsening of security conditions in the West Bank (especially in the triangle between Tulkarem-Nablus-Jenin, where IDF raids have become more pressing). A similar situation could open the door to external actions by other actors interested in instability, such as Iran, which would benefit from the role played by its proxies in Syria and Iraq, as well as the potential and renewed threat from the Yemeni Houthi militias to exert pressure on Israel, but also on other regional players involved in the ongoing dynamics - the thought in these cases essentially revolves around Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, which for different reasons have so much, and perhaps even too much, to lose from an escalation of the Gaza scenario. No less decisive must be considered the international impact of Tel Aviv's rejection of the Egyptian-Qatari proposal, especially considering how the United States has been engaged in recent weeks in trying to convince its ally to reconsider its positions on Iran and advocate for particular attention to the humanitarian situation in Gaza. In this sense, Washington has clearly expressed its warning to its ally about the risks associated with a possible miscalculation that could open up various considerations. Not surprisingly, the White House can always leverage the issue of military supplies as a tool of pressure. Just last week, the United States suspended a shipment of ammunition to Israel without providing details on the reasons. It could have been a simple bureaucratic error or a signal, but it's evident that considering such a scenario would provide new space and considerations for both internal and external detractors of the Biden Administration. Conversely, such a development could give new impetus to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has never hidden his strained relationship with almost all US administrations he has collaborated with during his 15 years in office. With the sole exception of the Trump Administration, which in the post-election American context could see the New York tycoon returning as the new occupant of the White House and Israel's key partner in the Middle East. Therefore, the assessments remain complex and highly susceptible to changes due to the volatility of the local scenario. However, it is undeniable that from this initiative, Israel has much to lose, and the concrete risk is that Hamas has carefully assessed this "trap" with the intention of further weakening Tel Aviv. License under Creative Commons Attribution – ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-SA 3.0).

Defense & Security
Map of Israel and Iran with Flags

What happened between Iran and Israel?

by Guillermo Suárez Borges

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The definitive rise of Iran as the primary regional power in the Middle East, following its deterrent strike against Israel, is just the latest of many pieces of evidence of the failure of US foreign policy in that region. The shaping of a ‘New Middle East’ [1] has failed. At the beginning of this century, the former President of the United States, George W. Bush, would have to make a bold and controversial decision regarding his policy towards the Middle East. He would have to choose between Iran and Saudi Arabia, two of the regional oil giants. Deciding whom to be friends and whom to make enemies with. Whom to ally with and whom to wage war against. Beyond the clear differences between Riyadh and Tehran, one Arab and the other Persian, one leaning towards Sunni Wahhabi Islam and the other Shiite Islam, both shared something very negative for the United States: being enemies of Israel, Washington's main ally in the region, its primary recipient of arms, and connected to a powerful lobby [2], rumored to have the power to influence the occupant of the White House. It was not an easy task, by US political standards, as both countries were undesirable. They had government systems contrary to Western democratic principles, and religious beliefs, prevalent in both systems, often guided citizens' lives in ways not convenient for Washington. Studies indicated that women's and minority rights were not respected. People from the south were immediately associated with armed groups like Al-Qaeda or the Palestinian resistance Hamas, while those from the north were seen as behind the Lebanese resistance led by ‘Hezbollah’ (Party of God) or the Houthi movement ‘Ansar Allah’ (Supporters of God) in Yemen. Internal pressures within the United States, much greater after the bloody attacks of September 11th, 2001, led W. Bush to outline an aggressive policy towards the Middle East, with the primary goal of forever changing the region and making it more like the West. Bush would define his objectives very clearly: Combat terrorism, which meant war and death for the region. Promote democracy, meaning soft coups and color revolutions. Combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, justification with which they attacked Iraq and, at the very least, allowed a medieval, public execution of its president Saddam Hussein, which also reflected in tight control over Iran due to alleged Persian interest in obtaining nuclear weapons. As part of the "war against terrorism", Washington took the war to Iraq and Afghanistan. It sought unsustainable justifications that cost dearly in credibility and ethics for prominent figures in Anglo-Saxon politics like Colin Powell, while "spontaneous" color revolutions emerged in several Middle Eastern countries like Egypt and Tunisia. Finally, as part of that ‘New Middle East’ and in a "noble purpose," the United States aimed to address what it considered the main problem in the region: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, advocating for a two-state solution. However, it has just shown us that of the two, only one interests it, as the United States has just vetoed, on its own, the creation of a Palestinian state in the UN, very recently. Of course, facing that complex agenda of regional change would initially involve defining "those who are with me and those who are against me". George W. Bush made this very clear when, during a visit by King Abdullah in April 2002, at that time the leader of the House of Saud of Saudi Arabia, to the Crawford Ranch in Texas, when both leaders walked hand in hand as a sign of unbreakable unity. [3] But much has happened since then. In order to achieve that ‘New Middle East’ that Bush wanted, they launched Israel against Lebanon in 2006, an adventure that ended in a resounding failure for the Zionists. They plunged Syria and Yemen into bloody wars, signed a nuclear deal with Iran in the White House under Obama, which Trump would later break months later. In a clear violation of red lines, they assassinated Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in 2020 in an evident revival of targeted killings. Finally, they struck the Iranian consulate in Damascus, massacring those present. Iran would respond. Everyone knew that. The question remained on how and when. It remained to be seen if, despite years of Western sanctions and import limitations, Tehran had managed to develop its military technology to a point where it could punish Israel for its affront. But this article is not where you will find an analysis of the number of missiles Tehran fired, how many reached their target, and how many did not. Or how much destruction they caused, no. The greatest impact of Iran's response to Israel is not military, it is political and will be enduring. More than just a barrage of rockets, Tehran made a show of authority. While its missiles and drones made their way to Israel, celebrations emerged in several Middle Eastern countries, regardless of whether several governments in the region politically condemned the response. Suddenly, Iran became the most direct punisher of Israel for its genocide in Gaza and the resistance movements it is said to sponsor, ‘Hezbollah’ and ‘Ansar Allah’, the most active against Zionism in solidarity with Palestine, while other regional powers have preferred to stop at condemnation. With this response, which undoubtedly brought the world to the brink of a larger conflagration, Iran overrides the confessional differences that have marked relations among Middle Eastern countries, and through which the West has managed to perpetuate the conflict and favor its interests and those of Israel. With this response, Iran becomes the leader of the anti-Zionist resistance and the most pro-Palestinian of all Palestine's neighbors. Regardless of what the West says, Iran has responded within the law and in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It directed its missiles at military sites, without the need to strike a city in Israel and kill hundreds of civilians to restore deterrence, while Israel, with its provocative attack on the Iranian Consulate in Damascus, clearly violated the Vienna Convention, adding to the indiscriminate killing of civilians it has carried out in the Gaza Strip, which is already nearing a death toll of 35,000. Saudi Arabia, the friend chosen by Bush back then, and its current leader, the charismatic Mohammed bin Salman, have already realized that the world is changing and it's likely necessary to let go of the hand of the United States to move forward. In March 2023, in a bold decision, their foreign minister and Iran's would seal, with a handshake, an initial meeting, no less than in Beijing, the capital of China. Bin Salman would also receive the Russian president in Riyadh, almost two years after the start of the Special Military Operation by Russia against NATO and Ukraine, considered another snub to the West, which already expected its demonization campaign to force Vladimir Putin to stay in Moscow. Days later, one of the main topics they discussed would be known when Riyadh announced its entry into the BRICS geopolitical bloc, joining forces with China, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and, contradictorily for Washington, Iran. References [1] https://carnegieendowment.org/files/new_middle_east_final1.pdf&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwjBppjpjtmFAxXNfDABHZR7B_wDFnoECAkQAg&usg=AOvVaw2dc6U3GhCrMZkzq5FQtfsp [2] https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2024-02-28/ty-article-magazine/.premium/aipac-explained-the-inside-story-of-americas-powerful-and-divisive-pro-israel-lobby/0000018d-e4ac-d972-a5bf-efaf96c60000 [3] https://es.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archivo:Saudi_Crown_Prince_Abdullah_and_George_W._Bush.jpg

Defense & Security
Tehran Enghelab Iran - April 29, 2022: Al Quds day march against Israel in Iran

Iran Has Retaliated Against Israel for Its Killing of Several Quds Force Generals

by Michael Young

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Spot analysis from Carnegie scholars on events relating to the Middle East and North Africa. What Happened? On the night of April 13–14, Iran retaliated for the killing by Israel of senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, including Brig. Gen. Mohammed Zahedi, the commander for Syria and Lebanon, Gen. Hossein Aminullah, the chief of staff for Syria and Lebanon, and Maj. Gen. Mohammed Hadi Haj Rahimi, the commander for Palestine. The Iranians fired around 200 missiles, cruise missiles, and drones at Israel, but Israeli military officials said most were shot down and the destruction was minor. The Iranian retaliation had been expected, with U.S. officials even predicting the exact time of the anticipated attack to news outlets. The considerable publicity before the event, Iranian assurances that the response would seek to avert a regional conflict, and the fact that Iran knew that Israel and the United States would be able to monitor the launches of the missiles and drones early on and shoot down a large number of them, suggest the Iranians may have been looking to achieve more of a psychological impact than cause major death and destruction. In this regard, few images were more powerful from the Iranian perspective than that of missiles flying over Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. This symbolized best Iranian ambitions to liberate one of Islam’s holiest sites from Israeli control, while personifying Israel’s vulnerabilities against the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. Why Is It Important? Israel has long assumed that it’s security can only be guaranteed by ensuring that the balance of military power with its enemies leans heavily in its favor. This harks back to the notion of the “iron wall,” first enunciated by the Revisionist Zionist thinker Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who argued in an essay in 1923 that Jewish colonization of Palestine had to proceed behind an “iron wall” of Zionist military superiority. The only way that Arabs would agree to the Jewish presence in Palestine, he wrote, “is the iron wall, which is to say a strong power in Palestine that is not amenable to any Arab pressure. In other words, the only way to reach an agreement in the future is to abandon all idea of seeking an agreement at present.” Today, that principle has been expanded by Israel to encompass the entire region. Though Jabotinsky was an enemy of the Labor Zionists who ultimately dominated Israeli political life for decades, his idea of an “iron wall” has been embraced by Israel’s leadership and military for some time. That is why the response to the October 7 Hamas attacks in Gaza has been so ferocious. It is also the reasoning behind the so-called “Dahiya Doctrine,” which was notably articulated by an Israeli general, Gazi Eisenkot, currently a government minister. The doctrine, which first emerged during Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, holds that Israel will engage in a disproportionate destruction of its foes’ civilian and military infrastructure in order to dissuade them from ever attacking Israel. However, when Israel bombed the Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus on April 1, it crossed an Iranian red line. While the Iranians had more or less accepted the systematic Israeli killing of IRGC figures over the years in Syria, along with members of Hezbollah, this could be justified by the fact that Iran was successfully setting up a military infrastructure in southern Syria with which to bomb Israel and the occupied Golan. It made no sense to jeopardize that effort by entering into a major conflagration with the Israelis, and perhaps even the United States. The embassy compound attack was a different matter. Not only did it affirm Israel’s willingness to ignore diplomatic protection (even though Israel’s supporters argued that the building where the IRGC figures were killed was not, technically, a diplomatic facility), it took place in a broader context since October 7 in which Israel has sought to alter the rules of engagement in Syria and Lebanon to their advantage, narrowing Iran’s and Hezbollah’s margin of maneuver. In other words, it went to the heart of the rivalry between Israel and Iran over regional hegemony, and it was obvious that Iran would not allow this to happen. More worryingly, the embassy compound bombing could also have been an effort by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to drag the United States into a conflict with Iran. To decisively weaken the Iranians and their nuclear program are Israeli priorities, but Israel needs U.S. participation in any bombing campaign against the Islamic Republic for this to succeed, with the added hope that Iran’s leadership can be overthrown. Washington has repeatedly avoided this. According to NBC News, President Joe Biden expressed concern about Netanyahu’s intention to provoke a wider war, and he quickly moved to limit Israel’s options. What Are the Implications for the Future? For the immediate future, the main news item on the morning of April 14 was Biden’s conversation with Netanyahu in which he made two things clear: First, that Iran had failed to do much damage, so that Israel should consider this a success. “You got a win. Take the win,” Biden reportedly said. And second, in light of the Iranian failure, the United States saw no need to escalate the situation further and provoke a region-wide conflict. Therefore, if Israel decided to hit back against Iran, the Biden administration would not participate in any such operation. How Israel will react to this remains unclear. Israel’s defense minister, Yoav Gallant, said that the tensions with Iran “were not over,” after Netanyahu had stated, on the evening of April 13, that “Whoever harms us, we will harm them. We will defend ourselves against any threat and will do so level-headedly and with determination.” It’s conceivable that Netanyahu will chose to respond on his own, but if the aim is to reestablish an equitable deterrent, the prime minister cannot afford to allow such a response to come up short. All the signs are that Iran retains a wide array of means to harm Israel and wear it down through a thousand small cuts. Moreover, Netanyahu’s forces are still fighting in Gaza, so that escalating the conflict regionally would only further complicate the grinding battle against Hamas. More generally, for the first time in its history, Israel looks dangerously exposed. The country may not be facing an existential threat, but it is reaping the fruits of a cynical policy largely built on ignoring Palestinian and Arab rights, while blocking all avenues that might force Israel to surrender occupied land. The Iranians have exploited this well, and even if their latest attacks did not cause major devastation, subsequent strikes, particularly ones with less prior signaling, may be much bloodier. On its own, this is enough for Iran to say that it has reimposed a balance of deterrence, even if it remains to be seen whether further attacks against Iranian officials in Syria will invite similar retaliation from Iranian territory. It is this perception of helplessness that is stuck in the craw of Israeli leaders. Israel has long projected an image of strength. The Iranians have succeeded in scratching that image. It’s difficult to see how Netanyahu can go along with Biden’s suggestion that he “take a win,” when everything about Iran’s assault suggested less than that.

Defense & Security
Washington DC, USA - October 21, 2023: Pro-Palestine, anti-Israel protesters.

Gaza: a litmus test for the humanitarian sector’s commitment to decolonisation?

by Zainab Moallin , Nosheen Malik , Leen Fouad

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Despite shifts in governance, vast sums of international aid and various peace talks, the Occupied Palestinian Territories cannot escape perpetual crisis due to Israel’s decades-long occupation. Amidst the latest surge of violence in Gaza since 7 October, the world contends not only with a devastating civilian death toll but also a battle of narratives – with questions of how this violence is being framed, depicted and portrayed publicly, or the ‘stories’ that are shaping the public’s perception of the conflict. The limits of neutrality While much of the world has, quite rightly, focused on unpicking the narratives shaped by political figures and the media, as well as their consequences, much less attention has turned to narratives emanating from the humanitarian sector. Profound disagreements are rife between humanitarian leadership and staff, revealing concerns about the presence of ‘neutrality’ as staff highlight insufficient acknowledgement of longstanding Palestinian oppression and question the proximity of some United Nations agencies’ leadership to the United States government. The repeated refusal of the United Kingdom and the US governments to call for a ceasefire has been mirrored by some international organisations, and many of those who did used underwhelming language when talking about Palestinian rights and Israeli accountability. The New Humanitarian reports on a disconnect between aid workers from the Global South, where most humanitarian activity is situated, and the sector’s disproportionately Western decision-makers, raising the question: is the humanitarian principle of neutrality increasingly at odds with decolonisation? By promoting an objective, non-partisan approach, neutrality inadvertently aligns with ‘saviourism’, implying that international aid actors are the only ones capable of fair and neutral arbitration. This notion reflects disturbing racist underpinnings, as it appears to privilege international actors above community members. Ending the occupation For many international organisations, neutrality is seen to improve access to affected populations in conflict. However, if aid agencies are willing to trade access for truth and justice, what is the genuine purpose of humanitarianism? Many aid professionals are urging humanitarian organisations to step out from behind the long-held tones of measured neutrality to instead be ‘more representative of the Global South’. According to one aid worker, ‘It did not start with the war on Gaza. Our organisations know better. It is a bit shocking to see that some organisations are even reluctant to say, “end of occupation.”’ Prior to the Oslo Accords, most aid to Palestinians was ‘emergency’ in nature. However, following the agreement, the focus shifted towards supporting the establishment of a two-state solution – a goal that remains unachieved 30 years later. This shift has overlooked a critical issue: humanitarian efforts have not effectively confronted the root cause of the need for aid, which is effectively Israel's occupation. Across the Occupied Palestinian Territories, UNRWA’s presence has enabled Israel to maintain its system of control, without having to assume full responsibility for the livelihoods, essential services and basic rights of the occupied population. In other words, by not directly challenging the root causes of Palestinian suffering, humanitarian aid has placed Palestinians on life support for the last 75 years. The interplay between humanitarianism and decolonisation The enduring challenges faced by the humanitarian sector are not without precedent. The ‘first wave’ of global NGO expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, a period marked by widespread decolonisation, saw humanitarian efforts aiming to fundamentally alter the course of the newly independent nations. This reciprocal influence between a decolonising world and the evolving field of humanitarianism set the stage for both its achievements and its limitations. But nowhere were the moral hazards of humanitarianism during twentieth-century decolonisation more apparent than in relation to the forced resettlement of civilians. Forced resettlement, often undertaken in the guise of humanitarian intervention, laid bare the complex ethical dilemmas and unintended consequences that can arise when aid intersects with political agendas and colonial legacies. Today, over 80% of Gaza’s population has been internally displaced since October, and Israel’s military offensive has turned much of Gaza’s landscape into uninhabitable land as whole neighbourhoods and agricultural land have been erased. The Israeli government has not publicly confirmed any plan for Gaza’s population, but Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel suggested in December that an ‘option’ would be ‘to promote the voluntary resettlement of Palestinians in Gaza, for humanitarian reasons, outside of the Strip’. An active commitment to decolonisation In confronting Israel’s settler-colonial military tactics, the humanitarian sector must stay true to its decolonisation commitments. The sector can learn from the ways in which humanitarian need was framed during the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. As the anti-apartheid movement developed into a global political discourse, it revealed how Black South Africans were not only victims of racial injustice, but of a system designed specifically for collective punishment. A humanitarian discourse against apartheid developed, highlighting it as a driver of crisis that must be dismantled. Global solidarity was paramount. Decolonisation is not an academic pursuit. It is not a metaphor, nor is it a box-checking exercise. The humanitarian sector’s commitment to decolonisation is more critical now than ever – it is essential when entire families are wiped out, countless Palestinian children are orphaned and hundreds of thousands of people are on the precipice of famine. It is vital when Western media continues to peddle age-old racist and Orientalist tropes of ‘violent’ and ‘savage’ Arab men to justify Palestinian suffering. Decolonisation means the humanitarian sector must amplify Palestinian narratives, highlighting the ways in which Palestinians have endured decades-long occupation and oppression. Humanitarians’ influence must be leveraged for long-term justice for Palestinians. Anything less will perpetuate the sector’s role as an ineffectual bandage to a 75-year-old wound.

Defense & Security
Jerusalem, Israel-November 2023

The Return of the Political to the National Discourse: Implications for National Resilience During War

by Meir Elran , Anat Shapira

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Five months into the war, and it seems that the political and social divisions of October 6 have returned to the center stage, reshaped by issues relating to what is happening on the battlefield, the future of the war, and the fate of the hostages. This may have serious consequences for Israel’s social resilience and national security Political disputes and polarization have, of late, returned to the forefront of the public and media discourse in Israel. While one could view this trend as seemingly signaling a return to some kind of normalcy, which is a positive aspect during wartime, it also poses significant challenges to the resilience of Israeli society. A polarizing discourse harms social solidarity, undermines trust in state bodies and the decision-making process, and casts doubts regarding the motives of civil-society organizations. Considering this, policymakers and politicians in Israel should pay very close attention to the situation and try to avoid adding to the toxic and hurtful political discourse. Primarily, they should refrain from portraying sensitive issues related to the war—disagreements over which are perfectly legitimate—as polarizing political issues, such as the issue of the hostages. Over the past few weeks, the political and social disputes within Israeli society have returned to the forefront of the social and media discourse in Israel. Until then, the nation had been preoccupied with the war, creating an image of unity around the goals of the war. Recently, however, the social-political crisis within Israeli society—which was created due to the government’s attempts to advance its judicial/regime reform/revolution—has again reemerged in the public discourse over various issues, including those related directly to managing the war in Gaza. In general, these rifts manifest themselves in part in the context of the incumbent government, its priorities, and its conduct, as well as regarding civilian aspects of the war. These include, for example, the state budget that was recently approved in its first reading by the Knesset, or the amendments to the Military Service Law. This is in addition to politicians trading personal insults with each other and allegations that the prime minister wants to continue the war out of personal considerations and is not giving top priority to releasing the hostages held in Gaza, as most do not come from his traditional base of supporters. At the same time, the political disagreements have grown more extreme in terms of balancing between the goal of toppling Hamas by means of “an absolute military victory” and the efforts to free the hostages. Even the public campaign waged by the hostages’ families vis-à-vis the government has become more acute and could assume a political tone, partly because of disputes among the families that are being portrayed as political. The escalation in the political discourse on social media includes accusations of a campaign aimed to discredit the hostages’ families, as revealed in a report by the Fake Reporter organization, which alleged that social media influencers supporting the prime minister have attempted to portray the campaign of the hostage families as illegitimate and inauthentic. Similarly, the issue of humanitarian aid to residents of the Gaza Strip also has led to demonstrations at the border crossings, some of which have been violent, requiring police intervention. There has also been significant political debate regarding “the day after” the war. This includes the far-right’s proposal to resettle Gaza and debates on the feasibility of incorporating Palestinian factions into any future agreements concerning the governance and civilian management of Gaza. Research and polls have suggested that these disagreements often align with the political positions that these people had before the war. During the first weeks of the war, any extremist political discourse was widely deemed as inappropriate, with emphasis placed on fostering national unity (“Together we will win”). Even those conducting political polls were criticized, although polls have since become routine again. The resurgence of the political rifts is reflected in the resumption and spread of public protests—on both sides of the political divide and on a variety of issues. Demonstrations calling for the prime minister to resign have resumed, and many organizations—such as the Kaplan Force and Brothers in Arms—have announced their intention to intensify their protests. In this context, 56 percent of the respondents in the latest poll conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies on February 4 said that they were concerned or very concerned about the state of Israeli society on the day after the war.[1] The resurgence of the political discourse and protests in Israeli society could be seen as a positive sign of recovery from the paralysis caused by the collective trauma of the events of October 7. Research literature recognizes the phenomenon of “rallying round the flag”; when a crisis threatens the fundamental values of a given society, the public will join forces and unconditionally support the decisions of the political leadership regarding how to resolve that crisis. Immediately after October 7, Israeli society became unified in support of the war’s objectives and the IDF, setting aside pre-existing divisions and rifts from before Hamas’s attack. This unity, still largely maintained today, is reflected in the mainstream media. Additionally, early in the war, civil-society organizations—including those previously identified as political—joined together in volunteer efforts and, most importantly, agreed to set aside divisive political discourses. As the war shifts into a low-intensity conflict, which could last many months, Israeli society seems to be adapting to a “war routine.” This shift has resulted in a diminished need for unity, bringing the socio-political divisions back to the forefront of the discourse with renewed vigor. The reappearance of political disputes poses a challenge to the resilience of Israeli society and its capacity to endure a prolonged and strenuous war. Polarization could hinder Israel’s recovery from the crisis on several levels. The polarizing discourse erodes social solidarity, a crucial component of social resilience; solidarity enables a society to unite and work together, including through extensive civic involvement, to rebuild the ruins— both metaphorical and literal. Polarization also affects a society’s self-perception and the levels of hope and optimism, which are vital to social resilience. The return of the polarizing discourse—especially if it becomes violent—undermines the social solidarity as it places an emphasis on what divides and distinguishes different sectors in society, undermines trust in the state’s institutions, and threatens the necessary civic cooperation. An illustration of the negative impact of renewed polarization is evident in the INSS poll from February 4 (see figure 1), which showed a decline in Israel’s sense of solidarity, and therefore its social resilience for the first time since the war began. It is still true that, in most of the resilience indices, the positive trends remain and are relatively stable. Nonetheless, the data signals a concerning shift in the public sentiment, with the resumption of a toxic public discourse already causing damage.   For a society to successfully recover from a profound and severe crisis, trust in the decision-making process and the country’s leaders is essential, partly to ensure that the public will cooperate with the implementation of decisions and to bolster the general sense of security. The resumption of the divisive political discourse stains many of the decisions that are currently being made—on civic and military matters—with a political hue. For example, in the poll conducted on February 4, 56 percent of respondents claimed that they disagreed with the statement that the decisions of the political leadership regarding the hostage issue were based on relevant considerations rather than political considerations. In the same survey, 64 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that the decisions taken by the political leadership regarding the war were based solely on military considerations and not political ones (see figure 2). This is a significant increase compared to the findings of the previous poll, conducted on December 31, which asked the same questions. These percentages, reflecting a lack of public trust in the government’s decisions, should be considered along with the low level of trust that the public expressed, in the February 4 survey, in the government itself (24 percent) and the prime minister (30 percent). Further evidence of the negative impact of the politicization of the discourse can be found in surveys conducted by Kimchi and others, showing that respondents who support the government perceive resilience to be higher across all parameters: national, communal, and personal. One explanation for this phenomenon is that supporters of the government have more trust in its decisions.[2]   It should be noted that while at the beginning of the war, civil society organizations, including groups that were active in the social protests, played a central role in ensuring that the Israeli economy and society continued to function, resuming their political involvement will make it difficult for them to serve as connecting social capital, which is essential for overcoming the internal crisis, especially in the face of the government’s weakness. The more their activities become tainted with toxic political overtones, the more the genuine disputes among the public will undermine the ability of these organizations to aid any aspect of the Israeli war effort; this, in turn, will weaken social resilience. In conclusion, the resumption of the political discourse and the polarization could significantly harm the ability of Israeli society to build its social resilience needed to recover from this major crisis. To limit these negative effects, Israeli policymakers should shun toxic political discourse as much as possible and avoid deepening the rifts and the polarization that exists in Israeli society as a whole—and especially as it relates to the war. [1] The surveys were based on a representative sample of the adult Jewish population in Israel and included 500 respondents. The surveys were conducted between October 12 to February 4, led by the Data Analytics Desk of INSS. The field work was conducted by the Rafi Smith Institute and was based on internet questionnaires. The maximum sampling error for each sample is ±4 percent at a 95 percent confidence level. [2] Shaul Kimchi and others, “Research Report: The Connections Between Public Resilience, Coping Indices, and Support for the Government, Three Months After the Outbreak of the War,” [Unpublished].