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The European Union will continue to provide strong military, financial, economic, and diplomatic support and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. The EU leaders decided on the matter on the closing day of the European Council held in Brussels on 26–27 October. Prime Minister Petteri Orpo represented Finland at the meeting. Prime Minister Orpo highlighted the importance of the EU’s pledge to provide security commitments to Ukraine in the future. “It is important that we reach an agreement quickly on the EU’s security commitments to Ukraine. We should be ready to make political decisions on the matter at the December European Council,” Orpo said. The EU leaders had already exchanged views on Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine in a video discussion with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the first day of the Council. The EU will speed up the delivery of military support, such as missiles, ammunition, and air defence systems, to Ukraine. “We must strengthen the EU’s defence sector and reinforce the capacity of the European defence industry as quickly as possible. A strong EU also strengthens NATO and transatlantic cooperation,” said Prime Minister Orpo. Prime Minister Orpo also called for progress on the use of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine. The Euro Summit held in connection with the European Council focused on the overall economic and financial situation and economic policy coordination. In Prime Minister Orpo’s view, the EU must be more competitive both internally and globally given the current geopolitical situation. “A well-functioning and competitive single market, for example in the service sector, plays a key role. Fair competition is an important factor in ensuring growth capacity. We must return to the normal State aid rules as soon as possible,” said Prime Minister Orpo. In its conclusions, the European Council emphasises the need to speed up work on developing digital services, clean technology, and clean energy production, transitioning towards a more circular economy and reducing the regulatory burden. “The EU must continue to be a global leader in the energy transition and clean technology solutions. I highlighted the potential of the bioeconomy and circular economy in renewing European industry. At the same time, we must reduce the regulatory burden on businesses,” Orpo emphasised. On the last day of the meeting, the EU leaders also held a strategic discussion on migration. Prime Minister Orpo stressed that migration is a common European challenge and called for long-term solutions. “We need to build well-functioning partnerships with countries of origin and transit. We must also be able to return people who do not have a legal right to reside in the European Union,” said Prime Minister Orpo. In their discussion on other items, the EU leaders condemned the recent terrorist attacks in Belgium and France, which killed and injured Swedish and French nationals. The discussion on external relations focused on the tensions between Kosovo and Serbia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and on the situation in the Sahel. The European Council also received an update on the preparations for the UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai.

As the war in Ukraine continues, China sees greater economic and political openings in Central Asia, the region extremely wary of Russian military ambitions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reverberated far and deep across the Eurasian continent. One region which especially susceptible to the pace of changes is Central Asia. Here, Russia, China, and Iran, the three former imperial powers willing to change the present world order, seek to impose a version of regionalism that excludes non-regional powers, chiefly the US and the EU, from playing an active role. However, the trend is not limited to the region, with similar developments taking place elsewhere across the continent, whether it is in the Black Sea, South Caucasus, or the South China Sea, where the race towards establishing spheres of influence has accelerated. The most significant game-changer to the geopolitical situation in the region is, of course, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Among other effects, Moscow’s aggression against its neighbor risks undermining the balance Moscow and Beijing have successfully maintained in Central Asia. The unofficial division of labor where Russia is a major security player and China focuses on the economic engagement has often been challenged as Beijing made inroads into security areas, too. Now, the pace of change could further accelerate. Russia’s war put its Central Asian neighbors on high alert, in fear that Moscow might use the same tactics as in Ukraine. Seeing Vladimir Putin fixated on making dreams of recreating the imperial map of Russia a reality, the former subjects to Moscow’s suzerainty cannot feel safe. This is especially true with Kazakhstan which shares a 7,644-kilometre border with Russia and northern parts of which are populated with ethnic Russians. While the tensions between Kazakhstan and its northern neighbor rarely get to the surface, they can hardly be dismissed. The friction was on public display at the latest St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Speaking at the gathering, the  first deputy chairman of the committee of the State Duma for the CIS and relations with Russian nationals abroad, Konstantin Zatulin, rather ominously remarked that “[Kazakhs] know too well that a number of regions, settlements with a predominantly Russian population had little to do with what was called Kazakhstan.” This followed a rather unexpected exchange between the Kazakh president, Kassim-Jomart Tokayev, and Russia’s notorious propagandist, Margarita Simonyan, in which the Kazakh president said his country will not be recognizing Lugansk and Donetsk separatist republics – the policy Kazakhstan has pursued also toward other separatist entities supported by Moscow. What is more interesting, however, is that the exchange took place in Vladimir Putin’s presence. Later, unconfirmed reports emerged that Kazakhstan stalled 1 700 railcars of Russian coal on its territory in response to Moscow’s decision to block Kazakh oil. Many linked the development to Tokayev’s statements. Yet, this was not a one-off deviation from supporting Russia, as Kazakhstan has consistently refused to toe the Russian line. In April, one Kazakh official argued that Kazakhstan will not help Russia to evade Western sanctions imposed on Moscow.Confident KazakhstanTo many, Kazakh behavior seems dangerous with geopolitically far-reaching effects on its relations with Russia and the security of the northern territories. Comparisons with Georgia and Ukraine go rampant – a similar fate might await Kazakhstan. An established analysis argued Kazakhstan feels vulnerable especially after the unrest in early 2022 when Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) troops were deployed to Kazakhstan. The thinking was that beholden Tokayev would have to keep close to Russia. Though this analysis is not entirely unfounded, a closer look reveals that Kazakhstan could actually be far more confident than other Russia’s neighbors. One critical factor to consider is that any major military move against Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity risks deteriorating Moscow’s ties with Beijing, which sees Kazakhstan as a gateway to Europe and a vital part of the sprawling Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This gives Kazakhstan greater space for maneuver. As the Russian invasion creates cracks in Moscow’s ties with its Central Asian neighbors, a widening space for diplomatic and economic maneuver will allow Beijing to gain a firmer hold in the region’s affairs. China will, nevertheless, be careful. Beijing will not make major moves to undermine its ties with Russia – larger issues such as competition with the US take precedent and Beijing has consistently made it clear that it is willing to give Russia political support on the international stage despite its war on Ukraine. Yet, the emphasis on greater Chinese engagement with Central Asia and especially Kazakhstan is nevertheless to be expected. A spillover effect from the troubled Russian economy (including a decreased level of remittances) will be pushing Central Asian states to embrace Chinese investments more readily. Moreover, increased cooperation with China can be a way to hedge against the military threat from Russia. These sentiments were visible in early June when the third China-Central Asian states summit (C+C5) was held where participants agreed to develop a structure for regular meetings between the informal groupings’ heads of state. The conference also approved four joint documents, including on data security and strengthening connectivity. The Chinese side stressed that Beijing would always stand behind Central Asian nations in respecting their sovereignty and independence, which bears particular relevance in the current context The parties also agreed on 10 points covering cooperation under the BRI, and maintaining indivisible regional security. While here, China essentially echoes Russia’s thinking toward security in the immediate neighborhood, at the same time, it signals that also Russia is not to be allowed to threaten China’s own security interests by encroaching upon its neighbors.The Middle CorridorConnectivity has long been a key topic on the agenda for China-Central Asia cooperation, but its relevance is bound to increase further. The Russian invasion set in motion massive changes in the connectivity of the Eurasian continent. The Russia route used by China to reach Europe by rail is hobbled by anti-Russia sanctions and, quite naturally, Beijing seeks alternative routes to ensure unimpeded trade flows. This puts Kazakhstan in an advantageous position as the Middle Corridor stretching from Turkey to the Caspian Sea would not be operative without Kazakh ports. Early signs of the re-emergence of the Middle Corridor are quite promising. Cargo transshipment across Central Asia and the Caucasus is expected to increase sixfold to 3.2 million metric tons year-on-year. In April, Maersk, a Danish shipping corporation, started a new train service along the Middle Corridor in response to the changing geopolitical situation in Eurasia. Another company, Finland’s Nurminen Logistics, started running a container train from China to Central Europe through the trans-Caspian route on May 10. The developments are also spurring cooperation among regional actors along the route. In early May, a Georgian Railway team met in Ankara with counterparts from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan to discuss the Middle Corridor of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route project. On May 25, Georgia’s state railway company said that it was working with businesses from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to develop a new shipping route employing feeder vessels between Georgia’s Poti and Romania’s Constanta. This follows a joint declaration by Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey in late March on improving the region’s transportation potential. In re-invigorating the middle Corridor China and Kazakhstan also seek greater support from other players, namely, Turkey. While Turkey may lag behind China and Russia in what it can offer to the regional states, it also presents an alternative to those who fear Russia but also feel uncomfortable relying heavily on China. A quest for diversification of diplomatic and economic ties creates a favorable momentum for Turkey’s increased penetration into the region. Recently, there has already been a noticeable upsurge in active diplomacy by Ankara, seeking to capitalize on the developments with diplomatic visits and pledges to enhance bilateral trade among Turkic nations. The growing interest to circumvent Russia was reflected in the messages Kazakhstan’s Tokayev conveyed to his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the visit to Ankara in May as well. The joint statement included an interesting passage on connectivity when the two countries agreed to enhance cooperation in transport and logistics, praised the growth of cargo transit via the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, and stressed the importance of the Middle Corridor. Hence, Russia’s war creates significant opportunities for China in Central Asia. Even if Beijing will be careful not to upend the balance straight away, it will chip away at Russia’s influence and use the emerging openings, such as by helping Kazakhstan to diversify its economic and political dependence away from Russia or building the Middle Corridor as a potential alternative to the Russian route. In Russia, this is sure to cause grievances, but Moscow finds itself in an unenviable position when it cannot really openly oppose Chinese moves without compromising their mutual understanding on joint resistance to the collective West. At a time when the end of the war in Ukraine is nowhere in sight, having China’s backing seems far more critical.

With China’s rise and Russia’s war, the unipolar moment after the triumph of the West in the Cold War is over. Five scenarios for a new world order. With the invasion of Ukraine, Russia effectively destroyed the European peace order. Now, Europe needs to find ways to contain its aggressive neighbour, while its traditional protector, the United States, continues its shift of focus to the Indo-Pacific. This task, however, becomes impossible when China and Russia are driven into each other’s arms because, if anything, the key to end the war in Ukraine lies in Beijing. China hesitates to be dragged into this European war as bigger questions are at stake for the emerging superpower: Will the silk road be wrecked by a new iron curtain? Shall it stick to its ‘limitless alliance’ with Russia? And what about the territorial integrity of sovereign states? In short: for China, it is about the world order. The unipolar moment after the triumph of the West in the Cold War is over. The war in Ukraine clearly marks the end of the Pax Americana. Russia and China openly challenge American hegemony. Russia may have proven to be a giant with clay feet, and has inadvertently strengthened the unity of the West. But the shift of the global balance of power to East Asia is far from over. In China, the United States has encountered a worthy rival for global predominance. But Moscow, Delhi, and Brussels also aspire to become power hubs in the coming multipolar order. So, we are witnessing the end of the end of history. What comes next? To better understand how world orders emerge and erode, a quick look at history can be helpful.What is on the menu?Over the course of the long 19th century, a great power concert has provided stability in a multipolar world. Given the nascent state of international law and multilateral institutions, congresses were needed to carefully calibrate the balance between different spheres of interest. The relative peace within Europe, of course, was dearly bought by the aggressive outward expansion of its colonial powers. This order was shattered at the beginning of the World War I. What followed were three decades of disorder rocked by wars and revolutions. Not unlike today, the conflicting interests of great powers collided without any buffer, while the morbid domestic institutions could not mitigate the devastating social cost of the Great Transformation.    With the founding of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the foundations of a liberal order were laid after the end of World War II. However, with the onset of the Cold War, this experiment quickly ran into a quagmire. Pinched between two antagonistic blocs, the United Nations was in a deadlock for decades. From the Hungarian Revolution over the Prague Spring to the Cuban missile crisis, peace between the nuclear powers was maintained through the recognition of exclusive zones of influence. After the triumph of the West in the Cold War, American hyperpower quickly declared a new order for a now unipolar world. In this liberal world order, rule-breaking was sanctioned by the world’s policeman. Proponents of the liberal world order pointed to the rapid diffusion of democracy and human rights around the globe. Critics see imperial motifs at work behind the humanitarian interventions. But even progressives place great hopes in the expansion of international law and multilateral cooperation. Now that the West is mired in crises, global cooperation is again paralysed by systemic rivalry. From the war in Georgia over the annexation of Crimea to the crackdown in Hong Kong, the recognition of exclusive zones of influence is back in the toolbox of international politics. After a short heyday, the liberal elements of the world order are jammed again. China has begun to lay the foundations of an illiberal multilateral architecture.How will great power competition play out?In the coming decade, the rivalries between great powers are likely to continue with undiminished vigour. The ultimate prize of this great power competition is a new world order. Five different scenarios are conceivable.  First, the liberal world order could survive the end of the unipolar American moment. Second, a series of wars and revolutions can lead to the total collapse of order. Third, a great power concert could bring relative stability in a multipolar world but fail to tackle the great challenges facing humanity. Fourth, a new cold war may partly block the rule-based multilateral system, but still allow for limited cooperation in questions of common interest. And finally, an illiberal order with Chinese characteristics. Which scenario seems the most probable? Many believe that democracy and human rights need to be promoted more assertively. However, after the fall of Kabul, even liberal centrists like Joe Biden und Emmanuel Macron have declared the era of humanitarian interventions to be over. Should another isolationist nationalist like Trump or others of his ilk come to power in Washington, London, or Paris, the defence of the liberal world order would once and for all be off the agenda. Berlin is in danger of running out of allies for its new value-based foreign policy. In all Western capitals, there are broad majorities across the ideological spectrum that seek to up the ante in the systemic rivalry with China and Russia. The global reaction to the Russian invasion shows, however, that the rest of the world has very little appetite for a new bloc confrontation between democracies and autocracies. The support for Russia’s attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine – values especially smaller countries unwaveringly adhere to – should not be read as sympathy for a Russian or Chinese-led order, but as deep frustration over the US empire. Seen from the Global South, the not-so-liberal world order was merely a pretext for military interventions, structural adjustment programmes, and moral grandstanding. Now, the West comes to realise that in order to prevail geopolitically, it needs the cooperation of undemocratic powers from Turkey to the Gulf monarchies, from Singapore to Vietnam. The high-minded rhetoric of the systemic rivalry between democracies against autocracies is prone to alienate these much-needed potential allies. But if even the West were to give up on universalism of democracy and human rights, what would be left of the liberal world order? Are the great power rivalries that play out in the background of the war in Ukraine, the coups in Western Africa and the protests in Hong Kong only the beginning of a new period of wars, coups, and revolutions?  The ancient Greek philosopher Thucydides already knew that the competition between rising and declining great powers can beget great wars. So, are we entering a new period of disorder? Not only in Moscow and Beijing, but also in Washington, there are thinkers that seek to mitigate these destructive dynamics of the multipolar world through a new concert of great powers. The coordination of great power interests in fora from the G7 to the G20 could be the starting point for this new form of club governance. The recognition of exclusive zones of influence can help to mitigate conflict. However, there is reason for concern that democracy and human rights will be the first victims of such high-powered horse-trading. This form of minimal cooperation may also be inadequate to tackle the many challenges humankind is facing from climate change over pandemics to mass migration. The European Union, an entity based on the rule of law and the permanent harmonisation of interests, may have a particularly hard time to thrive in such a dog-eat-dog world. Not only in Moscow, some fantasise about a revival of imperialism that negates the right to self-determination of smaller nations. This dystopian mix of technologically supercharged surveillance state on the inside and never ending proxy wars on the outside is eerily reminiscent of George Orwell’s 1984. One can only hope that this illiberal neo-imperialism is shattered in the war in Ukraine. The Russian recognition of separatist provinces of a sovereign state have rung the alarm bells in Beijing. After all, what if Taiwan follows this model and declares its independence? At least rhetorically, Beijing has returned to its traditional line of supporting national sovereignty and condemning colonialist meddling in internal affairs. There are debates in Beijing whether China should really side with a weakened pariah state and retreat behind a new iron curtain, or would benefit more from an open and rules-based global order. So, what is this ‘Chinese Multilateralism’ promoted by the latter school of thought? On the one hand, a commitment to international law and cooperation to tackle the great challenges facing humankind, from climate change over securing trade routes to peacekeeping. However, China is only willing to accept any framework for cooperation if it is on equal footing with the United States. This is why Beijing takes the United Nations Security Council seriously, but tries to replace the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund with its own institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. If Chinese calls for equal footing are rejected, Beijing can still form its own geopolitical bloc with allies across Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America. In such an illiberal order, there would still be rule-based cooperation, but no longer any institutional incentives for democracy and human rights.Hard choices: what should we strive for?Alas, with a view of containing an aggressive Russia, a rapprochement with China may have its merits. For many in the West, this would require an about-face. After all, the recently fired German admiral Schönbach was not the only one who wanted to enlist Russia as an ally for a new cold war with China. Even if Americans and Chinese would bury the hatchet, a post-liberal world order would pose a predicament for Western societies. Is the price for peace really the right to self-determination of peoples? Is cooperation to tackle the great challenges facing humankind contingent on the rebuttal of the universality of human rights? Or is there still a responsibility to protect, even when the atrocities are committed in the exclusive zone of influence of a great power rival? These questions go right to the West’s normative foundation. Which order will prevail in the end will be determined by fierce great power competition. However, who is willing to rally around the banner of each different model differs significantly. Only a narrow coalition of Western states and a handful of Indo-Pacific value partners will come to the defence of democracy and human rights. If this Western-led alliance of democracies loses the power struggle against the so-called axis of autocracies, the outcome could well be an illiberal world order with Chinese characteristics. At the same time, the defence of international law, especially the inviolability of borders and the right to self-defence, are generally in the interest of democratic and authoritarian powers alike. An alliance for multilateral cooperation with the United Nations at its core finds supports across the ideological spectrum. Finally, there could be issue-based cooperation between different centres. If ideological differences are set aside, hybrid partners could cooperate, for instance, in the fight against climate change or piracy, but be fierce competitors in the race for high-tech or energy. Thus, it would not be surprising if the United States were to replace their ‘alliance of democracies’ with a more inclusive coalition platform. Politically, Germany can only survive within the framework of a united Europe. Economically, it can only prosper in open world markets. For both, a rules-based, multilateral order is indispensable. Given the intensity of today’s systemic rivalry, some may doubt its feasibility. However, it is worth remembering that even at the heyday of the Cold War, within the framework of a constrained multilateralism, cooperation based on common interests did occur. From arms control over the ban of the ozone-killer CFC to the Helsinki Accords, the balance sheet of this limited multilateralism was not too bad. In view to the challenges facing humankind, from climate change over pandemics to famines, this limited multilateralism may just be the best among bad options. For what is at stake is the securing of the very foundations of peace, freedom, unity, and prosperity in Europe. 

AbstractRussia’s war in Ukraine has been an exceptional threat to the European security architecture, and a peaceful and democratic development around the world. This war has led to the displacement of people, human sacrifices, damages of civilian property, material and financial loss. The imperial ambitions and the revisionist policy of the Russian Federation have created a new dramatic reality for the whole world. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has raised a significant alarm in the Republic of Moldova in terms of the aggravation of the country’s security problems, the wider regional political and strategic ramifications. This study examines Moldova’s response to the consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine with special focus on the multiple vulnerabilities, social-economic tensions, energy problems as well as refugee and humanitarian crises.The long struggle between the East and the West has reached its peak. The endpoint of the difficult way for interacting with sanctions mechanisms after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 has become the war in Ukraine, radically changing the European security architecture. The end of the post-Cold War era of peace is accompanied by the threat of nuclear weapons. Autocrats have created a more favorable international environment for themselves over the past decade and a half, empowered by their own political and economic might, as well as by the waning pressure from democracies, which is grounded in autocrats’ shared interest in minimizing checks on their abuses and maintaining their grip on power. Rising Russian authoritarianism has contributed to a context that has made the unprovoked aggression in Ukraine possible. Increasing authoritarianism in Russia and some other countries, coupled with gradual democratic erosion around the world, poses an exceptional threat to a rules-based global order, and consequently to peace, prosperity and sustainable development. Global freedom faces an increasingly dire threat since non-democratic regimes have become more authoritarian in the last five years. According to the dates of the Global State of Democracy Report 2021, the percentage of non-democratic regimes with statistically significant declines on at least one sub-attribute over a five-year period increased from 21 percent in 2015 to 45 percent in 2020, the highest ever. Putinism is a form of autocracy that is conservative, populist, and personalistic. Putinism is due to an authoritarian regime, which has infiltrated the Russian political activists, the mass media, and the judicial system. Corruption at the highest level of government, disinformation of the population, closing the independent media (Russia is ranked 150th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2021 World Press Freedom Index), and violations of basic citizen’s rights – are the main features of Putin’s policies. During his reign, the image of Putin’s popularity bolsters his actual popularity and the consequence of this is the right-wing populism in Europe as a reflection of the Putinism influence. Features of Russian influence enable different effects on neighboring countries. Russia has long resisted Ukraine’s move toward European institutions, and NATO, in particular, disregarding Ukraine’s right on the choice of pursuing a civilizational way of development. For Ukraine, this is to make its own sovereign choice, but for Russia, it is a question of a different nature – loss of its “sphere of influence”. The same thing applies to the Republic of Moldova, which for a long time was the traditional sphere of Russian influence. The so-called “Russian world” continues to remain that community uniting the cultural, ideological and linguistic components. The Republic of Moldova is a multicultural country, located on the geopolitical fault line, which combines various cultural traditions and languages. The struggle for the influence of the East and West, including the fight between the Russian and Anglo-Saxon worlds had a direct impact on Moldova. At present, in the world, there is a clearer trend toward the replacement of the Russian world, which is due to the Russian foreign policy itself. At the same time, the features of Russian influence and Putinism in Moldovan society persist. These features are frequently constituted as additional triggers for political speculations and dividing lines in society. The pro-Russian forces are in opposition, in the context of the current political agenda of the Republic of Moldova, but at the same time, their influence remains substantial enough. The promotion of Russian influence and support of Putin’s policy is popular among the pro-Russian forces in Moldova. The war in Ukraine marks the end of the post-Cold War era of peace. It demonstrates that the US power is not absolute and the threat of nuclear escalation remains as close and implacable as ever. Diplomacy has been exhausted. The parties involved cannot seem to find common ground for negotiation or consensus. The result of the struggle between democracy and autocracy reflects the crisis of diplomacy and the role of diplomatic negotiations for a peaceful solution to the conflict. After four rounds of diplomatic negotiations between Russia and Ukraine without any significant progress, this process has been suspended. The dark cloud of war remains menacing. Moldova’s response to the consequences of the Russian war in UkraineThe Moldovan parliament declared a state of emergency for 60 days across the country after Russia invaded Ukraine. In accordance with the provisions of Order no.1 from February 24, 2022, of the Commission for Exceptional Situations of the Republic of Moldova: The Civil Aviation Authority, jointly with the Ministry of Defense, shall decide on the prohibition of the use of the airspace of the Republic of Moldova for civil and state aircraft (national and foreign), depending on requests and the provisions of international conventions. Moldova’s airspace has been reopened for civil aviation only on March 21. This decision was taken following a meeting of the Interdepartmental Airspace Management Commission, whose members, after assessing the current security situation, decided to open part of the airspace so that passenger air transportation could be resumed. Moldova as a neutral state does not join any sanctions either. According to the announcement of the Moldovan Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Nicu Popescu: “A decision to impose sanctions on Russia is not an easy decision, this is a very hard decision that could be made by stronger and more prosperous countries than Moldova. The decision was made for economic considerations, as the Moldovan economy is too dependent on relations with Russia, including those economic”. The key argument of the Moldovan political elite, since the beginning of the war, was that Moldova is neutral and advocates for peace in Ukraine and the region at large. The neutrality of the country has always been a highly politicized, contentious, and divisive issue. Refugee crisisMoldova, which borders Ukraine, has been directly affected by a huge inflow of Ukrainian refugees. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, over 460 thousand refugees from Ukraine entered Moldova and nearly 100 thousand of them decided to settle in Moldova until they will be able to return safely to their homes in Ukraine. Of those 460,000, about 65% arrive via the Palanca and Tudora crossing points in the south of the country, and about 25% via the Otaci and Creva crossing points in the north. Moldovan citizens opened their homes and hearts to Ukrainian refugees. Despite being one of the poorest and smallest nations in Europe with very limited resources, Moldova has caused admiration from many countries by being able to make the border crossing easier for the refugee flow, ensure protection and grant shelter to Ukrainian refugees. Among the Ukrainian refugees, most are women, children and older people (almost 90% of the total number of refugees – this being one of the most vulnerable groups of people) who have crossed into Moldova since the beginning of the war on February 24.  According to the Operational Data Portal Ukraine Refugees Situation dates on the period as of 28 June, in the Republic of Moldova were registered 82,700 – Individual refugees from Ukraine recorded across Europe; 515,432 – border crossing from Ukraine; 146,939 – Border crossing to Ukraine. Due to the assistance of external partners, the Government of the Republic of Moldova now has the infrastructure in place to support incoming refugees and is working with its international partners to create protection action plans. The EU humanitarian operation in the Republic of Moldova enhances assistance for refugees through the European Humanitarian Response Capacity. Such a humanitarian crisis occurred for the first time in the history of independent Moldova. For the Republic of Moldova, this is the first experience of finding a response to a refugee crisis – large wave of refugees that puts pressure on basic services in Moldova and the surrounding region.Tensions in Transnistria ring alarm bells in MoldovaThe Transnistrian region located between the Dniester River and the Moldovan–Ukrainian border, a region in a protracted conflict, remains to be one of the most sensitive issues for Moldova, and tensions around it have arisen amid the intensification of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Transnistria extends for about 400 kilometers between the eastern bank of the Dniester River in Moldova and the country’s border with Ukraine, being home to a population of about 470,000 predominantly Russian speakers. Moldovan authorities are following with caution and vigilance the events taking place on the territory controlled by the Tiraspol regime. There are tensions between different forces within the region interested in destabilizing the situation. This makes the Transnistrian region vulnerable and creates risks for the Republic of Moldova. The authorities condemn any provocations and attempts to draw the Republic of Moldova into actions that may endanger peace in the country. Chisinau continues to insist on a peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.The possible scenarios of a dangerous development of Russian plans are quite thoroughly analyzed in the analytical overview of the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies.   Particularly, there are mentions that the Russian military operation could be extended towards Moldova. In the Transnistrian region there are concentrated 500 Russian peacekeepers and around 1,000 Russian military personnel. The Transnistrian military is thought to have around 4,000 active troops. The Moldovan authorities argue that there had been no change in the military situation, but with the beginning of the second phase of Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, the situation in the Transnistrian region worsened.On April 26, tensions flared as Transnistrian authorities announced the “red level” of terrorist threat for 15 days across the territory. The announcement came after alleged attacks on two communication towers and a state building in the self-declared capital, Tiraspol, as well as an incident involving a military unit in the village of Parkany. Moldovan President Maia Sandu convened a Security Council meeting to prevent tensions and the escalation of the conflict.During the meeting of the Supreme Security Council on the subject of the incidents in the Transnistrian region and the security developments in the region, on April 26, the Supreme Security Council noted the facts of escalation and recommended to public institutions the following: – increase the intensity of movement checks in the vicinity of the security zone; – increase the intensity of patrolling and checks on the territory of the Republic of Moldova and at the border; – increase the level of alert in securing the critical infrastructure; – increase the level of alert of all institutions responsible for ensuring public order and security. In this complex and tense situation, the President assured that all necessary measures would be taken to prevent escalations, strengthen the security of the state, and protect Moldovan citizens, calling on the media, opinion formers, and social and political leaders to behave during this period with maximum responsibility, share only verified information and avoid using emotional manipulation for the sake of increasing public ratings. While the Moldovan government has repeatedly called for the removal of the Russian contingent, the Russian military troops remain on this territory. The Republic of Moldova does not intend and does not carry out a blockade of the Transnistrian region, remaining open to continuing the dialogue for the settlement of the conflict in the region in a peaceful, diplomatically negotiated manner that will give the people of Moldova, including those in the Transnistrian region, the chance to have a peaceful and prosperous life. It is important to mention that about an additional Ukrainian 8,000 refugees who have decided to stay are in the Transnistrian region. Providing support to refugees in the region has its own challenges and is still lagging. Economic and energetic consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war for the Republic of MoldovaThe Russian war in Ukraine is having serious economic and energetic consequences for the Republic of Moldova, the Black Sea region, and the global economy.  The war is triggering global ripple effects through multiple channels, including commodity markets, trade, financial flows, displaced people, and market confidence. The damage to Russia’s economy will weigh on remittance flows to many neighboring countries. Disruptions to regional supply chains and financial networks, as well as heightened investor risk perceptions, will weaken regional growth. Prices for commodities that Russia and Ukraine supply, including energy, wheat, fertilizers, and some metals, are sharply higher. In the Republic of Moldova as well as in many emerging markets and developing economies, rising food and energy prices are exacerbating poverty and, in some cases, food insecurity, heightening inflation pressures that were already building. The Russian Federation and Ukraine are prominent players in the global trade of food and agricultural products. Domestically, limited economic activity and increasing prices could undercut the purchasing power of local populations. Moldovan apple farmers are already feeling the consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Their main trade route through the Ukrainian port of Odesa has been cut off. Normally, Moldova exports just under a fifth of its agri-food products to Russia. Now, 120,000 tons of apples are laying in cold storage – and they have to be sold before the next harvest begins. The support of Moldova’s Government is essential to help small-scale farmers respond to the crisis and remain resilient. Although there are some opportunities to export to Romania, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry is estimating steep losses in the fruit sector alone. According to the National Statistics Bureau, Moldova imports about 300,000 tons of fertilizer annually, the vast majority from Russia and Belarus. The national Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry estimates that, without fertilizer, the production of staple foods – like wheat, corn, and barley – will drop by at least 30 % this year alone. Mitigating the effects of the war on lives, livelihoods and economic growth will require carefully calibrated policies. A concerted effort will be needed to house refugees, meet their basic needs, and foster smooth integration into host communities. When the war subsides, a large mobilization of resources will be needed for reconstruction in Ukraine. Because of their substantial direct trade, financial, and migration ties with Russia and Ukraine, neighboring countries in Eastern Europe, especially the Republic of Moldova, are expected to suffer considerable economic damage. Currently, Moldova has no alternative for Russian natural gas, and the price of supply from other channels, in any case, would be higher than that of Russia. Given the high energy poverty in the country, it is highly unlikely that the majority of Moldovan people would want lower gas prices to be traded off for geopolitical gains. The supply of natural gas is one of the most sensitive issues that the Moldovan government has to deal with. Moldova is one of the countries that were most severely hit by the rise in natural gas prices and the recent sharp increase in gas prices became perhaps one of the most acute economic problems for the people of Moldova. In October 2021, Moldova extended its gas contract with Russia’s Gazprom following a bitter stand-off over price hikes. Moldovagaz, the national energy company half-owned by Gazprom, made the outstanding payment of a 74 million USD gas debt to Gazprom at the same time. The energy crisis due to the dependence on Russian gas, the price of which has almost tripled, has continued since last autumn.  On March 16, 2022, however, after years of preparatory work and in the middle of the war, the electricity grid of Ukraine and Moldova was successfully linked to the continental European network on a trial base. This will allow both Moldova and Ukraine to import electricity from the EU. The energy dimension of security in Moldova largely depends on the strategy of diversification of sources.Moldova’s response to Russian disinformation and propaganda during the warAfter the beginning of the “special operation” in Ukraine the independent media were closed in the Russian Federation. Echo of Moscow and Rain TV channel have been blocked, recognized by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation as foreign agent media; many editorial offices, including Znak.com, and the BBC Russian Service announced the suspension of their activities because they do not see any opportunity to work under the conditions that the authorities have announced; other media faced being blocked, such as Meduza, the same for the BBC and, for some reason, The Village. Putin’s regime has focused on spreading disinformation and propaganda rhetoric both in the country and abroad. The perception of popularity, which has been created using media resources and PR technologies gives additional points for trust among the Russian population around the world. The level of trust in Vladimir Putin in Russia is very high – 77%. According to the dates of Moldova’s Public Opinion Barometer of the Institute of Public Policies, a great deal of trust in Vladimir Putin in 2021 had been placed – 28.8% of Moldovans respondents.Despite the European integration trajectory and the significant assistance received in this process from neighboring Romania, the main strategic partner of Moldova 32.5% perceived by respondents in the middle of 2021was Russia, 28.1% – Romania. The position of Moldovan authorThe position of Moldovan authorities in terms of combatting Russian propaganda and disinformation became more pronounced. Russian media remain influential in the Moldovan media landscape with high-rating TV stations, print and online media. Russian information resources continue to exert an obvious manipulative influence by spreading disinformation, in particular about the war, the position and actions of Ukrainian officials and Western countries. The impact of the Russian propaganda and disinformation is very high, especially for such regions as Transnistria, Gagauzia and the Northern regions of Moldova. The war in Ukraine does not seem to have changed radically people’s attitude toward Russia in these core Russophile regions of Moldova. In order to spread awareness about the Russian manipulative campaign, Moldovan president Maia Sandu promulgated in June the Informational Security Law, which bans the broadcast in Moldova of Russian TV news and political analysis. The law, designed to counter Russian propaganda about the war in Ukraine, says that the ban will still apply after the expiration of the state of emergency established in Moldova after Russia invaded Ukraine. The normative act prohibits news and analytical broadcasts from countries that have not ratified the Convention on Transfrontier Television. It stipulates that 50 percent of TV content must come from EU countries, the United States and those states that have ratified the Convention. Fast forward to EuropeThe challenges the Republic of Moldova is currently facing in the security context are created by the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has brought instability and uncertainty to the region – but also a chance to rebuild the balance of power on the continent based on new, fairer rules. The new reality has shown us that authorities must act decisively if we want to anchor Moldova in a community that can offer stability and development. The European integration of the Republic of Moldova has enabled significant progress in terms of the country’s development over the past decade. According to the Public Opinion Barometer (2021), 65.1% of respondents were in favor of the future of Moldova in the EU.The positive perception of the European vector of development by the citizens of Moldova has significantly increased over the years of the existence of the Eastern Partnership, which is mainly the result of effective public diplomacy and the EU’s “soft power”.  For the Republic of Moldova, the European Union is, first of all, a peace project. Therefore, Moldova signed the EU membership application on March 3. EU accession is the only strategic option that offers the Republic of Moldova the chance to remain part of the free world. Moldova has an ambitious development agenda in cooperation with the European Union, but development requires peace. The Republic of Moldova has shown so far, a strong political will to promote the European agenda and pursue the necessary reforms. The Republic of Moldova is carrying out an intense lobbying campaign, having Romania, an EU member state, working side by side with Chisinau, to achieve this goal. In fact, all the states in the Eastern bloc support a favorable decision for the Republic of Moldova. The most difficult part was the process of completing the European Commission’s Questionnaire in an extremely short time (in the case of other states the process took up to several years), which required unprecedented synergy of actions. All this has demonstrated an amazing capacity of the authorities to mobilize, which despite the many crises facing our country, have allocated the necessary resources to achieve the national strategic objective. On June 23, 2022, the European Council decided to grant EU candidate status to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. This is a victory for the citizens of Moldova and a victory for the strong political leadership of our country. ConclusionThe war requires a coordinated response at the national, regional and global levels. Political authorities of the Republic of Moldova need to avoid introducing distortive policies in response to surging commodity prices, opting instead to offer targeted support to vulnerable households and expand social safety nets. Pressures on fiscal space and increasing vulnerabilities also call for protecting essential basic services like health and education, and special approaches for the protection of vulnerable populations, especially low-income groups, refugees and the elderly. A still unfolding economic crisis requires carefully calibrated policies to ensure, in practice, the functionality and effectiveness of special crisis response measures. It is important to consider the direct and indirect economic consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war. A steep slowdown in Russia and Ukraine will affect neighboring countries, including Moldova, through disruptions to trade, financial, and remittance flows. The negative effects will lead to the severance of supply chains and transport links, and also impacts digital connectivity and associated services. The heightened risk perceptions by investors will result in a reduced level of foreign investments necessary for the sustainable development of the country. Higher energy prices will have important knock-on effects on the affordability and financial viability of electricity and heating services. Measures to increase energy efficiency will emerge as a key point. If the war, which is already affecting the Black Sea region and the global economy through large and unanticipated changes in the movement of people and commodities, is protracted, the conflict will affect major fiscal and financial implications. At the same time, tackling the conflict’s many spillovers, including the refugee flows, commodity market disruptions, food insecurity, and heightened financial market volatility will necessitate a comprehensive menu of national Moldovan policy priorities. Under these conditions, the Republic of Moldova will have to continue pursuing internal reforms and the modernization of the state, making efforts to promote the European integration. More attention should be paid to strengthening the control mechanisms for carrying out domestic reforms, as well as to the effectiveness of the political course and security policy, built on the principle of achieving practical results in ensuring and maintaining security on the European continent.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has pushed the climate crisis off the agenda. But we need a ceasefire and global demilitarisation for a 1.5°C world War brings death and destruction – not least to the environment and climate. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine offers a depressing reminder of that fact, and further increases the military sector’s already enormous global CO2 footprint. In addition, the eastern Ukrainian cities where fighting is taking place are home to fossil fuel infrastructure such as chemical factories, oil refineries, and coal mines, the bombing of which produces a cocktail of toxic substances that has devastating environmental impacts. Efforts to arm the two sides, moreover, are consuming materials and resources that could otherwise go towards tackling the climate crisis. Based on the global C02budget, humanity has less than eight years to ensure it still hits its 1.5-degree warming target. To do so, we need to urgently implement reforms in all areas, to bring about ‘systemic change’, as the IPCC report from early April puts it. The military sector barely gets a mention in this almost 3,000-page document, however, with the word ‘military’ coming up just six times. You might thus conclude that the sector is of little relevance to the climate emergency. The reality is rather different. Using military hardware results in huge quantities of emissions. In the war in Ukraine, 36 Russian attacks on fossil fuel infrastructure were recorded in the first five weeks alone, leading to prolonged fires that released soot particulates, methane and C02 into the atmosphere, while oil infrastructure has been ablaze on the Russian side too. The oil fields that were set on fire in 1991 during the second Gulf War contributed two per cent of global emissions for that year. While greenhouse gas emissions are one of the most significant impacts of war, the quantity emitted depends on the duration of the conflict and on what tanks, trucks, and planes are used. Another is the contamination of ecosystems that sequester CO2. Staff from Ukraine’s environment inspectorate are currently collecting water and soil samples in the areas around shelled industrial facilities.Military emissionsThe ramifications for the climate can be catastrophic in scale. According to a study by the organisation Oil Change International, the Iraq War was responsible for 141 million tonnes of C02equivalent emissions between its outbreak in 2003 and the report’s publication in 2008. By way of comparison: some 21 EU member states emitted less CO2equivalent in 2019, with only six states topping that figure. Post-war rebuilding also produces significant emissions. Estimates suggest that reconstruction in Syria will lead to 22 million tonnes of CO2 emissions. The rebuilding in Ukraine, too, will consume vast amounts of resources. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that at least 5 billion US dollars of reconstruction funding was needed per month. Every effort should thus be made to achieve an immediate ceasefire – both for the sake of the climate and to avoid further human suffering. Emissions from armed forces and military equipment cause considerable environmental harm around the globe. And yet, bowing to pressure from the US, military CO2 emissions were excluded from climate treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the Paris Agreement of 2015. As a result, they do not form part of their binding agreements and are neither surveyed systematically nor published transparently. The consequent lack of data means we can only make vague estimates as to the military sector’s impact on global heating. According to a study by Neta Crawford, co-director of the Costs of War project at Brown University, the US defence ministry alone is a bigger contributor to the climate crisis than individual countries such as Sweden or Portugal. This makes it the largest institutional source of greenhouse gases in the world. Globally, the military sector is estimated to generate around six per cent of all CO2emissions.Germany’s roleWith its new €100bn fund for the military, Germany seems willing to countenance further far-reaching climate impacts. This military investment will tie up financial and intellectual resources, making it highly unlikely that the 1.5-degree target can be achieved. That countries wish to better protect themselves against potential Russian aggression is understandable. But the public debate around this issue needs to balance an uncertain increase in security against a reduction in our ability to fight climate change. The German military was already responsible for around 4.5 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions in 2019, significantly more than the 2.5 million tonnes contributed by civilian aviation within Germany. This is now set to increase. Just one of the F-35 jets ordered from Lockheed Martin emits around 28 tonnes of CO2 equivalent per tank of fuel. For comparison: the average annual emissions footprint in Germany is 11.2 tonnes per head. The income from the sale of fossil fuels provides ongoing funding for Russia’s war of aggression. From 24 February to 24 April 2022, the country’s fossil fuel exports via sea routes and pipelines had an estimated value of €58bn. The EU accounts for 70 per cent of that total, or €39bn, while Germany is the largest single importer of Russian fossil fuels at €8.3bn worth. Our fossil fuel dependency is thus a factor in both the climate crisis and the invasion of Ukraine. And yet representatives of politics and business are using the war as an excuse to delay the necessary socio-ecological transformation. While corporations still stuck in the fossil fuel age – such as BP, Shell, and Saudi-Aramco – are posting record profits, the climate crisis continues apace. The likes of Rheinmetall and NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg may champion climate-neutral warfare using eco-friendly tanks and hydrogen fuel, but this is surely not the answer. Western armed forces, security experts, and arms manufacturers are well aware of the significane of climate change, as evidenced by the numerous security strategies, policy statements, and sustainability reports published on the subject in recent years. These outline ways to adapt to a changing climate while ensuring the doctrines of growth and hegemony are nonetheless defended against any and all resistance.Ceasefire nowTogether with the EU and NATO, Germany is preparing for scenarios such as war, environmental disaster, and influxes of refugees in order to ensure its foreign policy will still be fit for purpose and its security interests protected. A cynical approach given that the worst affected – those who, as some see it, Germany needs protecting from – will be those who have contributed least to global warming. And one that seems even more absurd when you consider that the environmental destruction brought about by military investment and resource-related conflicts will help to further heat the climate. At the same time, steps are being taken to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. Nonetheless, a Greenpeace report published last year demonstrates that the majority of all EU military missions have links to the protection of oil and gas imports. This dangerous relationship between fossil fuels, military missions, and war needs to end. More arms mean more damage to the climate, not greater security. Rising defence budgets among NATO states will simply convince Russia and China to increase military investment in turn. At $2.1 trillion, global arms spending has already reached record levels. As the war in Ukraine goes on, the biggest challenge of the 21st century – the climate crisis – has slipped down the agenda. We mustn’t forget, though, that efforts to tackle that crisis can only succeed if all countries – including Russia – work together. The immediate demand is for a ceasefire, followed by measures to build trust, such as international disarmament treaties. Moreover, Russia will need outside help if it is to transition to a climate-friendly energy industry. What’s required is a fundamental socio-ecological transformation, with policy-making dictated by the needs of all. That may seem inconceivable at present, but what’s the alternative? Unchecked global warming would be catastrophic for the planet’s entire population.

Kazakhstan is generally regarded as Russia’s closest ally after Belarus, so Moscow could have been forgiven for expecting some kind of support for its war with Ukraine from the Central Asian country. After all, Kazakhstan has always participated in all of Russia’s integration projects, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), where Kazakhstan cooperates with Russia on defense. Additionally, it was largely thanks to the Kremlin that Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev retained power in January when the country was rocked by political disturbances and violent clashes. Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, however, many in Russia have regarded Kazakhstan’s actions as being unworthy of an ally. It has adhered to Western sanctions against Russia, and in an appearance at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June, in the presence of President Vladimir Putin, Tokayev stated that Kazakhstan would not be recognizing the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics.” Kazakhstan’s defiant rhetoric has been backed up by action, with Kazakh authorities sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine and maintaining contact with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Russian military propaganda symbols have been banned in public places in Kazakhstan; the May 9 Victory Day parade was canceled; and official approval was even given for an anti-war rally in Almaty. When Kazakh oil being shipped through Russia ran into unexpected difficulties, therefore, many wondered if this was Russia exacting its revenge. Against this backdrop, it’s not surprising that a hastily deleted post by former president—and now deputy chair of the Security Council—Dmitry Medvedev suggesting that after Ukraine, Moscow might turn its attention to the fate of northern Kazakhstan, was taken at face value by many people. But could Russia really enter into conflict with another of its neighbors?Kazakhstan has made political gestures in the past that have displeased Moscow, but they never prevented close cooperation between the two countries. Now, however, economic differences appear to have emerged, with the Kazakh side in no rush to help Russian companies bypass Western sanctions, opposing legalizing parallel imports and preventing Russian and Belarusian truckers from bringing in goods from Europe. In a move that is unlikely to be warmly received in Moscow, Kazakhstan is also giving a warm welcome to companies that are leaving Russia. Russia certainly has a variety of ways in which it can remind Kazakhstan of the price it will pay for worsening relations. It could cut off Kazakhstan’s main source of income: its lucrative oil exports. The oil and gas sector accounts for over 40 percent of the Kazakh state’s revenues, and 80 percent of its oil exports pass through Russian territory via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), of which Russia is the largest stakeholder (31 percent). There are other possible export routes—via the port in Baku, by pipeline to China, or by rail to Uzbekistan—but they can’t match the CPC in terms of volume, price, or speed of delivery. By cutting off this key source of income for Kazakhstan, Moscow could also put pressure on the Central Asian state’s main customer, the European Union, demonstrating that a rejection of Russian oil would come with an additional loss for the EU of upwards of a million barrels of Kazakh oil a day. It’s possible that this was the veiled threat being sent when Russia twice—in mid-June and early July—brought the CPC’s operation to a standstill, citing technical issues. Both incidents followed statements from Tokayev that would have done little to please Moscow: one on Kazakhstan’s intention to observe anti-Russian sanctions, and the other on the country’s readiness to help stabilize the situation on Europe’s energy markets. Both stoppages were short-lived, but could have led to emergencies at Kazakh enterprises with continuous production cycles. Oil exports are by no means the only Kazakh pressure point that the Russians could exploit. Kazakhstan is critically reliant on imports from Russia for a range of food items, notably cooking oil, sugar, and milk. Russia is also a key source of petrochemicals, iron, and fertilizer for Kazakhstan, as well as imported car parts. Overall, Russia accounts for a fifth of Kazakhstan’s total external trade, while over half of Kazakhstan’s cargo flows pass through Russia. Again, alternative routes—to Europe via the Southern Caucasus, to the south through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, or by rail to China—are far more expensive. How the situation will develop is a matter of some debate. Following the invasion of Ukraine, almost anything in Russian foreign policy seems possible, and rational criteria cannot be relied upon to predict Moscow’s actions. It is unlikely, however, that Russia was counting on a great deal of support from Kazakhstan as it prepared its invasion. It’s also unlikely that Moscow would put up with direct criticism, but Kazakhstan hasn’t yet crossed that line, so Russian-Kazakh relations have not undergone a fundamental change. In Central Asia in general, Russia’s main priority has always been to reinforce friendly political regimes. Putting pressure on Kazakhstan now—throttling it economically, forcing it to support the war, and demanding a break with the West—would weaken the current leadership, which hasn’t yet fully recovered from the upheaval of January. Meanwhile, Tokayev’s readiness to publicly stand up to Moscow has only reinforced his position in Kazakh society. People are beginning to see him as an independent politician who is no longer reliant on his predecessor Nursultan Nazarbayev, or on Putin. If the Kremlin attempts to force Tokayev to retreat from his position, it risks provoking a new wave of public discontent in Kazakhstan which, in turn, will impact the economic issues that have yet to be resolved. For now, Moscow appears keen to give the impression that Ukraine only has itself to blame and that it’s business as usual for Russia’s other neighbors and allies. Now that Russia is isolated from the West, it needs to demonstrate it has good relations elsewhere, not least in Central Asia. No surprise, then, that Medvedev’s post caused so much concern. Although the text was later removed and its authenticity denied, it reflected the expectations of the hawks in Russian society and is entirely in keeping with the current political dialogue within Russia, where hardly anything is taboo. Similar criticisms of Kazakhstan are regularly heard from Russian officials, not to mention the extremes reached by non-officials. The key factor here, though, is that Medvedev’s post simply transferred the same logic that it is applying to Ukraine to its relations with Kazakhstan. If the Kremlin sees that logic as being sufficient to justify a military invasion, what is to stop it doing the same in other former Soviet republics? For now, Moscow sees Kazakhstan as a friendly regime, but Russia’s criteria for friendship are becoming ever more amorphous. The regimes of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are closely intertwined, but Kazakhstan is now seeking its own path forward with a renewed leadership, a freer market economy, and an absence of hostilities with the West. As time goes on, Russia and Kazakhstan’s trajectories will become increasingly divergent, creating new sources of tension between them. As a result, there are now serious doubts that Moscow, with its varied arsenal for putting pressure on Kazakhstan, will be willing to let this ally go its own way without retribution.By:Temur Umarov

Notwithstanding the ongoing negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan with the involvement of international mediators amid peace-building process, recurring tensions reflect the fragility of the process indicating repercussions in a way towards the realization of economic projects. Respective steps for normalization have continued following the trilateral meetings in Brussels as well as in Russia with some decisions adopted, however, no tangible results have been achieved, yet. The peace process should be based on concrete measures without wasting further time. Delays and the non-implementation of the agreements could lead to new conflicts. The course of the developments, in particular following the 13 September clashes, in the post-war peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan give signals of possible failure of the efforts. The situation in the region at the moment remarkably shows war-related signs. It is therefore urgent for the international community to take all possible measures to ensure the implementation of the ceasefire. The conflict which recently flared up once more indicated the fragility of the situation and negotiations held on the path towards peace treaty. The signed treaty reflects the provision of ceasefire for a certain period which can be concluded either with a permanent and sustainable peace deal or with a treaty. To boost the region’s economic potential, unblocking communications and establishment of the transport infrastructure and connectivity is of crucial significance for all sides and for the region on the whole. The determination of Azerbaijan which is bolstered by its actions in building connectivity infrastructure in a shorter period reverse the ones of Armenia. Refusal of the opening of Zangazur corridor and replacement of it with a cross-country highway again breeds the grounds for conflict and depletes the region from various opportunities that may be generated by the Zangazur corridor. Zangazur corridor is being distinguished with numerous perspectives to be taken into account. The restoration of the corridor will lead to faster development of the liberated regions of Azerbaijan including the tourism industry there thanks to the inter-wined location. In economic terms, it can enable to implement railway and transportation projects with the neighbourhood being an integral part of the cross-continental logistics channel that can generate additional revenues to the economies of the countries involved contributing to the enlargement of the North-South and East-West transport line including the South-West. On the other hand, the blocking of the corridor by Armenia wards off economic opportunities for regional countries as well which can act as a shorter cross point for Iran, Turkey, Russia to export their goods and services at affordable rate improving the diversification of the economy. Furthermore, substitution of the Corridor with a highway may shrink continental transport infrastructure weaking the potential robustness of transport infrastructure. In terms of energy, potential conflict may deprive Azerbaijan from a number of opportunities from exporting energy to the investments in the renewable energy in liberated territories to utilize the available capacity. To a large extent, the solution of the conflict could be strongly beneficial for the Armenian economy which remained and still remains in blockade for three decades. Armenia has certainly huge economic and transport potential due to central geographical location that can translate into huge financial benefits. Massive development of the region stipulates the need for a faster regional economic integration that needs to be underpinned by joint actions and strong commitment of all sides. The necessity to regionally and economically integrate the countries is in the interest of many parties from the east to the west. Currently, the hopes of the both sides are pinned on the purposeful intervention of the European Union to reach a solution of the conflict providing a permanent security on the verge of the continent. As long as a peace treaty is not reached, tensions are likely to occur along the borderline that will certainly generate unavoidably detrimental consequences to the development and integration of the region. In this vein, Europe should intensify its participation in conflict solution and hold frequent meetings to solve the feud in a timely manner. The one and only way to the development of the region is based on mutually signed comprehensive peace treaty that must be based on the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders. Under the scenario of the recent international developments and geopolitical tensions, currently there is a possibility that mutual consensus can be reached through a collective commitment to sign a peace treaty which is highly likely can bring to the region sustainable peace deal and to the implementation of different projects envisaged in 10 November and subsequent agreements. Such a collective commitment can be a significant milestone in stepping up the preparedness of the region towards integration. External actors should strengthen their activities towards the conclusion of a peace agreement. This is very important for the security and economic development of the Caucasus. Currently, the existing regional and world order provides conditions for signing a peace agreement. But if this is not done in the near future, then the region will not be able to get rid of conflicts for many more years.

At the end of August, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg visited Canada: he went to the Canadian High Arctic Research Station in Cambridge Bay (Nunavut), which is one of the facilities of the Northern Warning System, and the Canadian Forces Base in Cold Lake (Alberta). Based on the itinerary and official statements, it was not exactly a courtesy visit. Obviously, as part of the transformation of the NATO concept, Canada is expected to take more active measures in key fronts. And this is not only an increase in defense spending, which is a traditional requirement of the US for all NATO members. The United States and its NATO allies expect that Canada's strategic approach to developing its defense policy will take into account new challenges that, in their opinion, pose a growing threat to the security and defense capabilities of all members of the alliance in the long term. The allies list two blocs among the key challenges requiring the intensification of Canadian participation in NATO. First, these are non-military threats, including those related to climate change, which contribute to the growth of instability in this region. In accordance with the NATO Strategic Concept 2022, one of the goals and strategic challenge for the member countries of the organization Is the problem of climate change. Secondly, the threats associated with the intensification of the actions of China and Russia in the Far North. It is in this direction that Canada's policy is considered by the allies as key in terms of developing and strengthening the defense capability of the alliance. The very fact of the NATO Secretary General's visit to the northern territories testifies to possible changes in the position of the current liberal government regarding the expansion of cooperation with NATO. Previously, Canada has been reluctant to engage with allies other than the United States in discussing specific initiatives, such as conducting joint military exercises in the country's northern territories. Now the participation of the allies, according to Canadian Defense Minister A. Anand, is "acceptable." Although there is no talk of specific agreements on conducting exercises under the leadership of NATO in the Far North region. In 2019, Canada adopted a new Arctic strategy, the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework. According to the document, increasing regional competition and the strategic interest that the region represents for various countries pose threats to Canadian security. To mitigate threats, the government, in addition to increasing investment and infrastructure projects, has pledged to strengthen the presence of the armed forces and Canadian Rangers to ensure national security and protect sovereignty in the region, as well as to increase the participation of Arctic and non-Arctic allies and partners in operations in the Canadian Arctic, including in the framework of NATO. The need to expand the military presence in this region is also mentioned in the Defense Policy of Canada in 2017 (“Strong Secured and Engaged”). In this regard, the government of J. Trudeau undertook to modernize NORAD, as well as to update the composition of the combat aircraft fleet. However, according to Canadian experts, the liberals are still allocating very little money for these purposes compared to, for example, Finland or Denmark, while the socio-cultural and environmental spheres remain strategic priorities. Although the Defense Policy notes that the Arctic is a springboard for contradictions in the field of global security, however, potential conflicts among the Arctic powers are not currently visible. Indeed, for now the Canadian Arctic strategy affects the defense sphere only in the most general way, focusing on non-military threats associated with climate change, and the strengthening of the military presence implies the expansion of non-military functions of the armed forces (for example, participation in rescue operations or the fight against man-made disasters). However, Canada's readiness to come up with such an initiative can be realized in the event of increased activity on the part of China or Russia in this region, for example, in the implementation of the Russian strategy for the development of the Arctic until 2035, adopted in 2020. The implementation of the tasks set in the Russian strategy to strengthen the presence of armed forces in the Arctic zone will be perceived as a deliberate escalation that can destabilize the situation and pose a threat to regional security. At the same time, changes in the positions of legislators regarding the Arctic agenda and interaction with NATO in this direction have been outlined already at the stage of formation of the Policy Framework for the Arctic and the North. Then the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development published a multi-page report entirely devoted to Canada's Arctic policy. In addition to climate change, it lists Russia's significant military presence as well as China's Arctic ambitions as security threats to the Canadian Arctic region. In this regard, the government of J. Trudeau was recommended to expand cooperation and interaction with NATO allies in order to quickly analyze and respond to these threats through joint efforts. Canada's position in relation to increasing its defense capabilities in the Arctic region is perceived by the United States as a factor in the alliance's vulnerability in the northwest direction. Therefore, it can be expected that pressure from the allies will intensify. Both the NATO Secretary General and the countries that are members of the block will bilaterally demand that the Canadian authorities fulfill their obligations to improve the defense potential in their northern territories, as well as to respond in a timely manner to threats, in their opinion, emanating from China and Russia. Since the alliance is one of the key factors in the Canadian security and defense system, the growing strategic competition / confrontation between NATO and the Russian Federation will dictate the conditions for Canada to interact with the Russian side in the Arctic zone, while requiring military modernization and strengthening of military potential not only to combat non-military threats. Canada will be challenged by allies to adapt to the threat of potential conflicts over access to resources, unresolved border disputes, governance issues in the Arctic region. 

In the same way that it is difficult to say whether a single event in the last few decades marks Russia’s decisive breaking away from democratic path of development, it is difficult to say the same about the events of the last decade in Georgia. Nevertheless, this breaking away has taken place, although Estonia, the European Union, the United States, all Georgia’s Western friends have made powerless attempts to keep Georgia on track.Many observers think the turning point was July 2021, when Georgian Dream, the political party that has been in power since 2012, and is controlled by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, unilaterally revoked an agreement with the opposition on Georgia’s political organisation and the future development of its governance.This agreement was signed on 19 April 2021. It was mediated by the European Union, represented by President of the European Council Charles Michel during the last stage of the negotiations, and the Ambassador of the USA in Tbilisi. The agreement provided for ending the opposition’s boycott of the parliament (the opposition had been boycotting the work of the parliament since the parliamentary elections held in October 2020, because they considered the elections dishonest), releasing of important political prisoners (like Chairman of the United National Movement Nika Melia), strengthening the role of opposition in the parliament, judicial reform, pausing the appointments to the Supreme Court until elections, and election reform, including (partial) depoliticisation of the Central Election Commission.Although part of the opposition did not join the agreement, the EU considered it an important step in saving Georgia’s democracy. Charles Michel said at the signing ceremony, “This agreement is the starting point for your work towards consolidating Georgia’s democracy and taking Georgia forward on its Euro-Atlantic future.”Georgia’s ‘Yanukovych moment’On 28 July 2021, the Georgian Dream announced that they would unilaterally leave the agreement, accusing the opposition of the situation. Before that, the Government had appointed several judges to the Supreme Court in contravention of the 19 April agreement, earning the discontent of the EU and the Embassy of the US.A number of politicians saw the annulment of the agreement as Georgia’s “Yanukovych moment”, a turning point like the refusal to sign the EU association agreement by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych who chose to pursue the policy of Moscow. It is possible to see similarities here, but the blurring of Georgia’s course towards the West, the decline of Georgia’s success story began much earlier. Actually, by July 2021, the relations between Europe and the Government of Georgia had been worsening for years. Although Europe did not want to admit it, and does not want to admit it up to now, the beginning of Georgia’s big troubles is connected with the coming to power of Bidzina Ivanishvili at the elections of 2011. This in its turn is directly connected with the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and the course chosen by the West for resolving the post-conflict situation.As we remember, the ceasefire agreement between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 was mediated by the then President of France Nicolas Sarkozy. A six-point peace plan was signed, where Russians committed to withdraw all their armed forces to the positions held before 8 August, to allow international monitoring of the region, to grant access to humanitarian aid, and to open international discussions on the modalities of security and stability of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In reality, the commitment to return armed forces to their usual quarters was met only by Georgia. Instead, a few weeks later Russia recognised the “independence” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.Understandably, the dominating interest of the West was to pacify, to “diffuse” the conflict – even Sarkozy’s ceasefire agreement was called a plan to diffuse the conflict in official EU documents. And with this, diffusing of Georgia’s democracy began.Although Europe did not want to admit it, and does not want to admit it up to now, the beginning of Georgia’s big troubles is connected with the coming to power of Bidzina Ivanishvili at the elections of 2011.Russia’s military objectives in Georgia were about security policy as much as domestic policy: reversing Georgia’s course towards the West, ending Georgia’s aspirations to NATO membership, and bringing about a government in Georgia that would be more or less in line with Russia’s interests. In the opinion of the majority of the great powers, it seemed to be in the interests of the West to have a Georgia that would not cause a new conflict with Russia. Since the government of Mikheil Saakashvili (President in 2004–2013) had no intention of changing the country’s NATO course or of seeking a compromise with Russia on the issue of Georgia’s sovereignty, the result was a situation in which Saakashvili was controversially in the way of both Western peacemakers and Vladimir Putin.With the wisdom we have today, many have admitted that the West’s weak reaction to the annexation of Crimea encouraged Putin to take the next steps. Less has been spoken about the even weaker reaction to Russia’s invasion against Georgia.In the summer of 2008, too, the Russian escalation was visible to Western intelligence services: aggressive rhetoric, Putin’s threats in Munich and Bucharest in spring 2008 (“We’ll do you Kosovo”), troop build-up, and so on. Yet the main interest of the West in the aftermath of the war, about which Georgia repeatedly warned in the summer of 2008, was to calm down the situation and Saakashvili and save the face of the Russians, i.e., not to blame them.An example of this policy is the so-called Tagliavini Report, commissioned by the European Union, which had to analyse the causes of the war and assess the responsibility of the parties. The Report found that both sides were guilty, Georgia should not have “started” and Russia “overreacted”. In the background, there was the dissolution process usual at the time, where Brussels said to the Georgian government something like this: put up with this report, we can’t make Putin angry and we have to blame you a bit, but you can get four billion in aid from us and we’ll go on being friends.Mistakes of the WestIn March 2009, Barack Obama’s administration announced a “reset policy” in the US-Russia relations. In other words, seven months after an act of aggression against a sovereign state, in which part of the blame was placed on the victim of the aggression to pacify the aggressor, Washington gave a signal to Moscow that all was forgotten, or at least forgettable. And forgivable.At a post-war meeting between Russia and the United States, where the conflicts between the two countries were discussed, the final communiqué contained a point that the only serious disagreement was the issue of Georgia. Tbilisi was happy with it, not realising that the reset policy in the US-Russia relations is more important than the security interests of a small country.Ivanishvili’s rise to power in Georgia belongs, at least contextually, to the policy of reset and saving of Putin’s face. In 2011, the Russian reputation makers, and possibly the US ones too, had so successfully spread the tales about Saakashvili’s madness, the Germans and the French were so “tired” of Saakashvili’s aggressiveness, that everyone – Washington, Brussels and Moscow – breathed a sigh of relief when “that madman” lost the elections. When Urmas Reinsalu, who was the Minister of Defence of Estonia at the time, drew attention to Ivanishvili’s Russian connections in the Wall Street Journal, it caused a widespread outrage in both the US and Estonian foreign ministries.Distancing from the Western orbitSince the defeat of the Saakashvili’s government in the elections of 2011, Georgia has been ruled by in the style of oligarchic party government for, to put it simply, two periods. In the first period, which lasted until around the 2018 presidential elections, at some levels until Joe Biden was elected US President in 2020, the Georgian Dream was at least formally pro-Western, kept NATO and the EU course, and the relations with Russia were cool on the surface. At the same time, several important steps were taken that did not bring about any special setbacks in Brussels, but were most probably welcomed in Moscow.Already in 2012, the systematic harassment, imprisonment and driving to exile of Saakashvili-era politicians began. The West found that it had to be tolerated to a certain extent. Most of Russia’s agents were released from prison. Visa freedom with Russia was restored, and it was done unilaterally. It is in force also now – all who have Russian passport can go to Georgia without a visa for a year.From election to election, the use of taxpayers’ money in the campaign of the ruling party became more dominant; essentially, the Georgian voter has had no real opportunity for free elections since 2011. Formally it is possible, but due to the biased media picture, massive pushing from the authorities and sometimes also physical harassment of the opposition, it is in fact impossible.Seven months after an act of aggression against a sovereign state, in which part of the blame was placed on the victim of the aggression to pacify the aggressor, Washington gave a signal to Moscow that all was forgotten, or at least forgettable.Ivanishvili’s clan also started taking over the economy. Initially, this was seen as almost inevitable; under Saakashvili, too, the government had its favourites, and when they were pushed aside, the majority of the voters really had nothing against it.Georgia’s quiet distancing from the Western orbit became more apparent in 2014. The reactions of the government of Georgia to the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s aggression in Donbass were extremely reserved. There were no contacts between Kyiv and Tbilisi, while the whole East Europe, Georgia’s old friends were doing all they could to support Ukraine. The first phone call between Prime Minister of Georgia Bidzina Ivanishvili and President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko after the annexation of Crimea took place in 2015, when Ivanishvili demanded the extradition of Saakashvili, who was working as an adviser to the Ukrainian government, to Georgia.Ukraine and Georgia essentially parted ways from 2014. The former tandem, who tried to get into NATO together and were mentioned in the final document of the Bucharest Summit in 2008, have since then been in somewhat different camps at official level. At the same time, a number of the Saakashvili-era Georgian officials have found employment at the Ukrainian government, working in the areas of law enforcement, anti-corruption and judicial reform. Since 2014, an entire unit of Georgian volunteers has been fighting in Ukraine, and it was on the basis of the Georgian Legion that the Ukrainian International Legion was created in February this year. At the same time, since the beginning of the new phase of the war, the Georgian government has prevented Georgian volunteers from going to war in Ukraine.Ivanishvili as the grey cardinalThe internal political situation that prevailed in Georgia after transition of power in 2011 changed at the beginning of 2021 at the latest. Maybe the historians will one day find out what exactly caused this change. Probably, it came about due to both domestic and foreign policy factors.On the one hand, the domestic political situation had been becoming increasingly tense, the opposition was increasingly critical. The opposition does not recognise the results of the parliamentary elections of October 2021, and since then, part of the opposition has been boycotting the parliament.Europe was increasingly dissatisfied with the stalling of reforms, and the government may have felt that a heavier hand was needed to stay in power. At the same time, after Joe Biden’s election victory, Putin probably began to actively prepare for war in Ukraine as well as to neutralise potential opponents of war from neighbouring countries.2021 began with Ivanishvili’s declaration that he was resigning from politics. Formally, he has not held any political office since then, but no one who knows Georgia seems to think that he does not continue to control the country.Decline of Georgian democracyWith the resignation of Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia in February 2021, a new and significantly more aggressive period began in Georgia. Gakharia, who has now also left the Georgian Dream to form his own political party, ostensibly resigned because he did not agree with the decision of the Georgian Dream to jail opposition leader and chairman of the United National Movement Nika Melia. Ivanishvili, who formally is not involved in politics, replaced Gakharia with his old ally and confidant Irakli Garibashvili. Garibashvili was the Prime Minister also in 2013–2015, but resigned due to his extreme unpopularity both in Georgia and in the West.Melia was sent to prison; in May 2021, the principal owner and head of the opposition-minded Mtavari TV Nika Gvaramia was also jailed. The founder of this TV channel and opposition politician Giorgi Rurua was already waiting for him there. Since then, the decline of Georgian democracy has become faster. The government is imposing control over the judiciary and constitutionally independent institutions (such as the national ombudsman and the election commission), the special services are taping opposition politicians and journalists and publishing the tapes selectively in the media, the government is harassing civil society.Georgia has officially taken the position that it will stay out of the war and accuses the USA of trying to draw Georgia into the war against Russia.Rapid deterioration of relations with the European Union began, culminating in the withdrawal from the so-called Michel’s agreement. The government also began to condemn openly, aggressively and offensively the restrained criticism of Georgia by both Europe and the USA. When the European Union announced after July 2021 that Georgia would no longer qualify for a loan meant for judicial reform, the Prime Minister of Georgia said that Georgia would refuse the loan and was not interested in criticism from Europeans. “But who exactly is the European Union?” asked the Minister of Defence of Georgia when a journalist interviewed him about the EU’s criticism towards the government of Georgia in September 2021. In the summer of 2021, it was found that the Georgian secret services had secretly also recorded the phone calls of Western diplomats. The representative of the Georgian government called the outrage expressed over this “overstepping the boundaries of the Vienna Convention”.The future will be decided in UkraineAfter 24 February 2022, the situation has changed for the worse. Georgia has officially taken the position that it will stay out of the war and accuses the USA of trying to draw Georgia into the war against Russia. There is a nearly constant public and hostile exchange of words between the US ambassador and the representatives of government and parliamentarians of Georgia.On the other hand, at the beginning of the war, Russia lifted several sanctions on Georgian agricultural products. Business between Russia and Georgia is thriving: Georgian goods are flowing to Russia and Georgian ports service Russian goods. According to Transparency International, more than 6000 companies with Russian owners have been registered in Georgia since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Recently, a group of Ukrainian parliamentarians accused Georgia of helping Russia evade sanctions. In June, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a proposal to the US Congress to impose sanctions on Ivanishvili for violating the policy of sanctions against Russia.With such a policy, the government of Georgia has probably lost quite a lot of its already low support among the Georgian voters. Public support for Ukraine is general among Georgians, and the biggest demonstrations held this year have been against the war.The European Union took its first bold step in June, when the Summit decided to grant the status of candidate country to Ukraine and Moldova, but not to Georgia. The government’s criticism of Europe in reaction to this decision most probably did not convince the Georgians. An absolute majority of the Georgian people still support the accession to both the EU and NATO.

I see two important aspects here. The first one is military. The second is political. The news of the Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu's order to withdraw from Kherson did not come as a surprise to me. On the other hand, it was really a pleasant surprise. It was clear that Russia's chances of keeping the right-bank part of Ukraine were decreasing day by day, and this is not an opinion of a cheering patriot or propagandist, because it is next to impossible to keep such a contingent, estimated at around 40,000, with all the equipment and logistics needs, while the two supply channels are under the enemy fire. Therefore, the question was only "when", or "how Kherson will be liberated": will it be retaken, or the occupiers will flee Kherson. Why did Russia delay this decision until now? This unfavourable situation was clear to them as soon as Ukraine started striking bridges with HIMARS. There are two important aspects here, in my opinion. The first one is military. The second is political. When Sergey Surovikin, as the newly appointed commander, spoke on October 18 about his readiness for "difficult decisions", he obviously had this in mind. But he, like any other Russian general, understood that he would not be allowed to do so without the go-ahead from the top. And it doesn't matter how he reasoned this retreat. Like any Russian general, he was afraid to tell Putin the truth. There is a Russian proverb about what happens to the one who brings bad news. Therefore, Surovikin tried to convey that a disaster awaited them on the right bank of the Dnieper in Kherson region, if they don’t decide to withdraw. The political value of Kherson is absolutely obvious. Russia (Kremlin, Putin) put themselves in a situation that could not be worse by declaring this territory Russian. Which could be an even more painful blow to the image of this great macho, who in fact showed his weakness? It involves both political and personal risks for Putin as the head of state, who presented himself as a macho man who had everything under control. In my opinion, either Evgeniy Prigozhin or Surovikin (by the way, there are rumours in Russian expert circles about agreements between Surovikin and Prigozhin), or both, might have convinced Putin that it was a necessary decision, and the political risks would be less catastrophic than if such a decision was not taken. Here, perhaps, lies the greatest danger, because such a decision might go with something that obviously should stop this information wave "everything is lost" in Russia. Our readers should at least mentally prepare for some unpleasant surprises awaiting us in the coming days. I think that our military leadership has calculated these risks and is preparing preventive measures. The next question, which is of interest not only to me, is how this retreat will take place? The thing is that compared with the "gesture of goodwill" at the end of March, then Ukrainian opportunities to pursue the retreating units were quite limited. So it was hardly a gentlemanly gesture on our part. Let's not take the Snake Island, because its case was special due to its location, but in September — October, we saw an uncontrolled process of Russians fleeing in the Kharkiv region. All — thanks to the fact that the Ukrainian forces could counterattack and pursue them. What is the Russian scenario of withdrawal from Kherson? What will be the tactics of our military? In open sources, I did not see any hint of the existence of, I would not say, political but some kind of gentlemen's agreements, that in exchange for such a "gesture of goodwill" Ukraine would allow these troops to leave the right bank unhampered. They are extremely vulnerable precisely for the reason I mentioned earlier — there are only two main ways to the left bank. They are under the Ukrainian artillery control. The fewer Russian forces are left on the right bank, the easier it will be for Ukrainians to cut this retreat altogether. So I don't know what the tactics of the Ukrainian side will be. Can they just be allowed to leave? Maybe so. But we understand that these 40,000 will not go to the Kerch Bridge — they will be immediately redeployed in another direction. So, if we allow them to leave quietly, in a week or two they should be expected near  Donetsk or Zaporizhia, and will try to storm them from the south. Obviously, there will be no lull in the coming days and weeks. It will not be like the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, when there was an agreement between the command and the enemy side that they would not touch the convoys moving towards the USSR. I do not think that the withdrawal from Kherson region is a bluff or a deceptive manoeuvre, despite all the Russian treachery. It is really impossible to hold Kherson region on the right bank, the price is extremely high. They will explain this withdrawal on their TV: Apparently, the Ukrainians threatened to blow up the Kakhovka dam, so they decided to save the lives of both military and civilians. For me, this gives some understanding that the threat of its explosion is minimal, at least at the moment. The intact Kakhovka dam is better for the Russians than if it were blown up. However, the risk of its explosion is not eliminated, only postponed, and when Russia is forced to demonstrate another "gesture of good will" — leave Nova Kakhovka and lose control of the Kakhovka dam — this threat will be extremely high. The Kakhovka dam means not only flooding of the territories downstream of the Dnieper but also a real threat to the Zaporizhia NPP — a threat of a disaster comparable to Japanese Fukushima.