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The steps taken by the parties following Russia’s suspension of the New START, signed in Prague in 2010, as well as statements made by key officials, make it possible to offer a cautious forecast of the medium-term future of arms control between the two leading nuclear superpowers. February freeze In late February, the consistent degradation of relations between Moscow and Washington has also affected strategic nuclear arms limitation: during his address to the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin voiced his decision to suspend the New START, which was promptly implemented with a respective law taking effect on February 28. Ironically, almost exactly two years earlier, the prolongation of the treaty was formalized (even a little quicker). It was not possible to reach agreement on prolonging the treaty with the Trump administration, so after Joe Biden’s arrival to the White House, the expiration of the New START was a couple of weeks away. As a result of the decision made, the validity of the Treaty was extended until February 5, 2026. However, despite such an optimistic start to the dialogue with the new administration, active work on the future of post-START strategic arms control never got underway. The reason was both the rather significant time specified in the treaty (that would expire during the next presidential tenures in the United States and Russia) and the long list of accumulated problems in the field of ensuring strategic stability. Russia was increasingly concerned about further limitations on strategic nuclear weapons, pointing to the nuclear missile capabilities of the America’s NATO allies—the United Kingdom and France, as well as to the growing countervailing capabilities (aimed at defeating the nuclear triad and control centers) of long-range precision non-nuclear weapons. Hand in hand with the latter was the expansion of NATO and the spread of its military infrastructure even closer to Russia’s borders. Another serious concern was an uncontrolled development of global ballistic missile defense (BMD), even if in the distant future. In the event of further reductions in Russia’s strategic forces, these factors could seriously undermine its confidence in the ability to launch a guaranteed retaliatory strike with a force sufficient to ensure reliable deterrence. On the other hand, the U.S. was reluctant to see further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons without them being linked to other issues. First and foremost, Washington is concerned about the radical growth of China’s nuclear capabilities—under the Trump presidency, Beijing’s inclusion in strategic arms control was, for some time, a mandatory condition for as much as extending the New START. Under the Biden administration, this issue was still in the initial stages, implying a softer touch, though it has never completely left the agenda and would probably rise to its full scale, should substantive negotiations commence. For two years by now, the U.S. top brass has been talking about the need “to deter two virtually equal adversaries simultaneously and independently”, as the most difficult and previously unprecedented challenge. Besides, Washington is concerned about Russia’s much larger and more advanced arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. In the inception of a long journey possibly leading to a new agreement or a set of agreements, a format for a comprehensive bilateral dialogue on strategic stability was announced in June 2021. However, only two face-to-face meetings were eventually held within its framework, which was clearly not enough. Once the Ukrainian crisis broke out, the U.S. announced the suspension of this format. A simple coincidence also played a negative role in the fate of the treaty as inspections thereunder were suspended in the early 2020s through a coordinated decision due to the pandemic. They would probably have been reinstated if the situation were normal in 2022. The parties were already negotiating extra security measures until a sharp deterioration of bilateral relations affected this purely technical dialogue (which it was in the beginning). A separate problem was the Western sanctions against Russia that included a ban on commercial and government aircraft flights from Russia in the airspace of the Western nations. Although Washington later stated that it would have allowed an aircraft with inspectors on board to fly in, it seems that it could not guarantee operational approvals from its junior allies, which meant that the suddenness of inspections would have been compromised. In the very least, there is no talk of equality among the parties to the treaty. The comments made by the U.S. side that Russians could use commercial flights with connections in third countries cannot be seen as anything other than boorish. Consultations on finding a way out continued, when in August 2022 the U.S. side decided to cut the Gordian knot by notifying the Russian side of an urgent inspection as if everything had been resolved. Russia immediately responded to this “attempted assault” by suspending inspections. An opportunity to resolve the differences could arise during the meetings within a special format, the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), which was to be held in Cairo, Egypt, in late November or early December, but Moscow refused to participate at the last moment. As a result, the New START was deprived of the main elements of compliance verification and the mechanism of conflict resolution. Amid this situation, the denunciatory voices of American lawmakers and hawks from other spheres were getting ever louder about Russia’s violation of the New START. After these steps had been taken, declaring a withdrawal from the treaty would seem a logical step to secure and legitimize the de-facto state of things. But the Russian authorities chose not to burn all boats and—instead of withdrawing from the treaty—suspended it, demonstrating readiness to resume participation. However, it must be admitted that the conditions put forward for resumption, namely “the repudiation of hostile policies towards Russia by the United States and its allies”, are rather vague while it is hard to imagine that their fulfilment can seriously be expected in the foreseeable future. The most important difference between the suspension of the New START and a complete withdrawal from the treaty was the cessation of “information exchange” within its framework while maintaining quantitative indicators of deployed carriers and warheads of strategic nuclear forces (SNF). (Not only do the parties exchange general quantitative indicators but they also regularly report on changes in the status of components in their nuclear forces.) Moscow has repeatedly emphasized this at all levels, from the initial presidential statement to statements on the part of lawmakers. The same is expected from Washington—in fact, even the first detailed official commentary on the suspension contained a call on the United States to “refrain from steps that could prevent the resumption of the New START Treaty.” The U.S. took a negative view of the Russian initiative, accusing Russia of violating the treaty and calling for a return to compliance. Yet, those accusations would have been released anyway. That said, administration officials tried to keep a calmer tone. In the following months, the United States announced that it would stop providing Russia with relevant information on the status of its strategic nuclear forces (SNF), but it did not formalize the suspension of the treaty, which drew ironic rebukes from Moscow. This may be due to Moscow’s reluctance to both break the New START and “legitimize” the format of “suspension” as the United States always claimed that Russia had no right to take such actions because they were not directly stipulated in the treaty. Recent statements of American speakers—in particular, the speech of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan that drew a lot of attention in the field and among Russian politicians—make us think that Washington, as of today and in the short term, has resigned itself to the current state of affairs. It appears that the Biden administration will not formally withdraw from the treaty and will be fighting any attempts on the part of lawmakers to force it to do so. Washington, like Moscow, has repeatedly emphasized that it does not plan to exceed the stipulated ceiling of deployed strategic nuclear forces, proposing to think about agreements for the post-START period, separating strategic arms control from the broader scope of problematic issues in relations. Fashion for the 1980s Although some Russian speakers have criticized Sullivan’s references to the times of the Cold War, when the two countries were engaged in arms control despite their confrontation, we see in fact a situation that closely resembles the fate of the 1979 Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-2). The agreement, which has no legal basis for political reasons, continues to be implemented as mutually beneficial from a practical point of view. In the absence of an inspection regime, the parties have no other option but to do business on trust: It is particularly ironic since mutual trust has been at a very low ebb. A similar situation could be observed in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite some détente in the Cold War throughout the 1970s, direct on-site inspections were unthinkable. Concluding the 1972 Provisional USSR-U.S. Agreement on Certain Measures to Limit Strategic Offensive Arms (better known as SALT-1, although it would be more pertinent to include the ABM Treaty in that acronym), the parties undertook a five-year cessation of the quantitative build-up of launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To monitor compliance, it was proposed to use “national technical means of verification,” a mild euphemism for satellite reconnaissance. To clarify that this involved nothing more, it was stated that means of control should only be used “in a manner consistent with the generally recognized principles of international law”: Only 10 years had passed since the failed flight of F. Powers, so aerial espionage was a very real threat. On the other hand, the countries pledged not to interfere with each other’s satellite reconnaissance, including measures of structural and facility camouflage. It is noteworthy that these articles had been migrating from one agreement to the other until the New START, where they are quoted verbatim (except for the clarification that ICBM camouflaging was permitted on a limited scale). It was emphasized in the very name and text of SALT-1 that the treaty was temporary, pending the conclusion of a more profound agreement. In June 1979, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2) was signed, and that one already stipulated specific numerical caps and even an onset of a cautious process of arms reduction. However, U.S. lawmakers—partly because of the domestic struggle with the Carter administration, partly because of their hawkish views and distrust of the USSR—began to oppose the entry of this treaty into force quite vibrantly. One of the most important reasons for criticism was the lack of effective verification tools, which was more important than before, since not just the carriers were limited, but partly also their combat load. In October, a big stir caused by an “unexpected discovery” of a Soviet brigade in Cuba played out, while Soviet troops were marched into Afghanistan on December 25. Under those circumstances, in the year of presidential election, it was political suicide to continue insisting on the ratification of SALT-2, and Jimmy Carter told the Senate a week later that he no longer thought it necessary because of the altered environment. However, neither this, nor the arrival of Ronald Reagan in the White House a year later, who being one of the most convinced anti-Soviet American presidents opposed the treaty during his campaign, prevented its de-facto observance, even if not de-jure. SALT-2 was to remain in force until late 1985, when it was to be replaced by a more substantive treaty. The initial total number of carriers was limited to 2,400, and to 2,250 by early 1981. The USSR, which declared 2,504 carriers at the time of signing, had to reduce a small part of that fleet in two stages, which it did not do, given the U.S. refusal to ratify the treaty. Even so, the Soviet Union did not exceed the initial quantitative cap, while actively replacing obsolete systems with new, more advanced ones. The U.S. was initially within the limits (declaring 2,284 carriers at the time of the conclusion) and exited them at the end of November 1986 in the process of rearming the B-52 family of bombers with new cruise missiles. Thus, absurd as it may seem, the treaty, while not finalized, was quite successful. Yes, there were mutual reproaches within its framework such as when the USSR openly played the hypocrite by presenting the mobile ICBM RT-2PM Topol (SS-25 «Sickle») system as a simple upgrade of the old RT-2P (SS-13 «Savage») missile, and the U.S. began “research” towards a global missile defense system. Yet, these actions were a lame excuse for an aggressive demarche by the opposite side in the form of initiating a large-scale, dangerous conflict through an attempt to create a preponderant quantitative build-up of strategic nuclear forces. In all candor, U.S. military argued that Topol was violating the letter of SALT-2, while strengthening strategic stability because that system was optimized for dealing a retaliatory strike. However, such “business on trust” had limited potential, especially in the midst of a chronically negative attitude of U.S. lawmakers towards this approach to strategic relations with the USSR, as congressmen were looking for an excuse to publicly bash the “naïve” executives, who were outsmarted once again. As in the case of SALT-2, the agreements that the U.S. presses for sometimes fall victim to political games. Under the Reagan administration, the U.S. began pushing for detailed on-site inspections that should accompany the agreements on strategic arms control and reduction. The motto of the U.S. side was “trust but verify” as the American president asked his advisors to collect Soviet jokes and traditional Russian sayings for him to make an impression during the negotiations. He liked the phrase “Doveryai no proveryai” (“trust but verify”) so much that he kept reiterating it time and again so that Mr. Gorbachev seemed to be sick of hearing it. Time wheel Since then, U.S. interest in the inspection of strategic arms reduction agreements has not diminished. The collapse of the USSR and subsequent events could not help but play a role in this as one can still find the opinion that only a watchful oversight from overseas saved the Soviet nuclear legacy from being “dragged apart”. In the professional community, there even remains the maxim that “the U.S. wants inspections to be included in the START, while Russia needs caps.” It seems that the U.S., for the near future, is losing the part of the treaty that it values so much, which is surely fraught with its complete cancellation on its own initiative. At least, the “hawkish” part of the political leadership is already calling for this move—thus, in May, a bill under the telling title “No START Treaty Act” was entered in the Senate: It requires that the country officially withdraw from the New START no later than one year after the document’s approval. The given bill is interesting in its own right as a likely vision of arms control by Washington hawks, but it is worth being considered only if it gets further traction in Congress. What about the caps and why are they important for Russia, as the simplified formula from above suggested? Although there is no objective of maintaining strict quantitative parity with the U.S. in all parameters of the SNF, a significant superiority of the opponent in the number of SNFs would threaten the deterrence by maintaining the capabilities for dealing a retaliatory strike with the desired power, especially given U.S. allies possessing nuclear potential as well as a significant arsenal of non-nuclear cruise missiles. In the future, that may be accompanied by non-nuclear medium-range ballistic / hypersonic missiles. In this situation, limiting the upper ceiling (cap) of the Strategic Nuclear Defense Forces allowed more funds to be allocated for conventional weapons—obviously, this issue has only become more pressing for Russia over the past year. The START caps have not been fully used. According to the latest data, as of 1 September 2022, Russia had 540 deployed carriers out of 700 permitted under the Treaty. It is possible to commission 10 more Borey-type submarine missile carriers in one go, in compliance with within the agreed limits. Certainly, there is the issue of warheads, where Russian SNF is close to the permitted upper limits, but they could be distributed more evenly in the formation of the triad, increasing overall stability. In any case, this parameter is likely to decrease in the near future with the withdrawal of the heavy R-36M2 Voyevoda (SS-18 Mod 6 «Satan») ICBMs. In the conditions of preserved military nuclear complex, warheads are a lot less costly than carriers. It is not surprising that Russia currently has no need to announce plans to launch a quantitative strategic nuclear missile arms race, so that military expenditures could easily be reallocated to meet other urgent needs. The U.S. is also incapable of any significant build-up of arsenals in the medium term: In reality, they can only begin the process of refitting Minuteman III ground-based ICBMs from one warhead to three warheads, increasing the load of Ohio-class submarines from 20 to 24 Trident II missiles and refitting them with more warheads. Yet, the former would take a long time and would be visible, while this would probably be possible on only a fraction of the fleet. In response, Russia would also upgrade its missiles, so the benefit would be minimum. The option of increasing the strike power of the submarine component in the nuclear triad seems alluring for the United States, but the availability of “backup” warheads is then in question. Given the collapse of the U.S. military nuclear complex and plans to resume the serial production of thermonuclear charges in the early 2030s at best, it is unlikely that U.S. warehouses are bursting with serviceable warheads. In this situation, the scenario when both parties will generally continue to adhere to the provisions of the New START for as long as it is effective and maybe even longer, despite regular mutual reproaches, looks quite plausible, as in the case of SALT-2. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov, speaking at the PIR Center, commented negatively on Sullivan’s proposals and noted that it might be worthwhile not to try create a complex treaty in strategic arms control including an inspection regime but rather to embark upon the path of “parallel unilateral self-restrictions.” After all, the largest initiative in history to reduce nuclear arsenals was just that. We are not talking about a series of STARTs—this rather refers to the elimination of huge arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons, whereby, by foreign estimates, the U.S. would get rid of all but a relatively small number of B61 bombs, whereas Russia would reduce them by some 90 per cent relative to the late Soviet Union levels (while still maintaining a significant advantage over anyone else in the end). In the late 2020s, however, the much-delayed radical upgrading of the U.S. nuclear triad should start bearing fruit, whereas Washington will be a lot more concerned over Beijing’s burgeoning arsenal. Today, it is difficult to predict which way to maintain strategic stability can be found in the new architecture of relations between the nuclear powers, which is much more complex than the U.S.-Soviet system. Perhaps, the future lies in the dialogue between the five major nuclear powers, which continues even at this challenging time, with the presidency just passed on to Russia.

Putin’s rule over Russia will come to an end at some point, but when it will end as well as what the policy preferences of his successors might be are uncertain. It would be in the interests of the United States and Europe to signal on what terms they would be willing to cooperate with a post-Russian leadership. Vladimir Putin has been the ruler of Russia since the turn of the century. He may remain in power through 2036, as the 2020 revision of the Russian constitution allows him to, or perhaps even longer. Then again, he may be ousted suddenly and surprisingly any day now, as the recent Wagner mutiny and the apparent lack of effective opposition to it within the Russian security services and public suggest is possible. Maybe he will decide not to run for re-election in 2024, though this does not seem likely. Sooner or later, though, Putin’s rule over Russia will come to an end. What is not at all certain, of course, is who will replace him and what sort of foreign policy the new leader will pursue. It would appear, though, that there are only a few possibilities. One is that Putin will be succeeded by someone just like him who will continue Moscow’s hostile policies toward Ukraine and the West in general. Another is that Putin will be replaced by someone within his circle that decides Moscow needs to cut its losses in Ukraine and rebuild good relations with the West both to revive Russia’s economy and to hedge against an increasingly powerful China. While this might seem unlikely, Russian and Soviet history are replete with examples of new autocratic leaders dramatically reversing key aspects of their predecessor’s policies. Yet another post-Putin possibility is an authoritarian leader who wants to cut Moscow’s losses in Ukraine but who sees the survival of both autocratic rule and even Russia’s territorial integrity as best served through increasing reliance on Chinese support and guidance. It is also possible that Putin’s rule will end as a result of the rise of democratic forces which want Russia to become part of the West and cooperate or join the EU or even NATO. For this scenario to occur, there would have to be a dramatic change of heart within the Russian security services about what is in Russia’s and their own interests. While this seems highly unlikely, there have been examples in other where military-backed autocratic rule gave way to democracy. Finally, whether Putin’s successor is autocratic or democratic, he or (much less likely) she may simply be weak as a result of having to deal with a compounding internal crisis resulting from Putin’s policies, including popular discontent over Russian casualties in Ukraine, economic decline, and secessionism in non-Russian or even Russian regions of the Russian Federation. What Can Europe and the United States Do? Russia’s post-Putin leadership and its policy preferences, whatever they may be, will have an enormous impact on Europe and the United States as well as other countries and regions of the world. But while obviously they hope to see Putin succeeded by a new leader who will end the war, withdraw from Ukraine, and improve Moscow’s ties with the West, Europe and the United States will have very little ability, if any, to affect the post-Putin transition — especially if the person who succeeds  him comes from within his inner circle. Putin has sought to rally Russian public support for his war in Ukraine through claiming that the West wants to bring about the breakup of Russia. Whether Putin himself actually believes this, there appears to be no possibility of changing his mind about the West being his implacable enemy. The United States and Europe, though, would do well to signal to whoever might succeed Putin that this is not the case. Specifically, Washington and Brussels should make clear how they would like to relate to post-Putin Russia. Such messaging should include the following points: Just as the United States and Europe support the territorial integrity of Ukraine, they also support the territorial integrity of Russia. The West has no interest in seeing the breakup of Russia. The United States and Europe will lift their economic sanctions on Russia (including those on Moscow’s exports of oil and gas) in response to Russian withdrawals from Ukrainian territory. The more occupied territory that Russia returns to Ukraine, the more Western economic sanctions against Russia will be lifted. While Europe and the United States would like to see Russia become a Western-style democracy, they acknowledge that whether it does so or not is an internal matter which Russians alone will determine. The United States and Europe are prepared to have normal relations with any type of Russian government — democratic or autocratic — which is willing to behave non-threateningly toward the West, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics. While they respect the Russian government’s desire to continue cooperating closely with China, Western governments want Moscow to know that the United States, NATO, and the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (US, Japan, India, Australia) are willing to discuss common security concerns about China (which many Russians besides Putin have had) if and when the new Russian leadership wishes to discuss them. The articulation of these messages by the United States, Europe, and, regarding the last point, Quad governments, will not magically lead the Russian people, much less Putin’s inner circle, to oust Putin and embrace the West. Indeed, it is possible that a Putin loyalist successor will spurn them. But if the United States and Europe do not signal under what terms they would be willing to cooperate with a post-Putin leadership, then Washington and Brussels may reduce the chances that a post-Putin leadership will be willing to cooperate with the West.

Dear President Zelenskyy, dear Ukrainian friends, Two years ago I represented the EU at the first international summit of the Crimea Platform. And I stated clearly that Ukraine’s territorial integrity must be fully restored. And this applied to Crimea and this applied to the region of Donetsk and Luhansk. And I stand by that today. Since Russia invaded your country, you have suffered nearly 550 days of death and destruction, and Crimea is being used as a strategic springboard to launch its brutal attacks. And last September, just like they did in Crimea, Russia tried to illegally annex Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, and this is again a cynical attempt to grab more land, to steal the identity of Ukrainian citizens, to abduct your children and to drive people from their homeland, like they are doing to the Tatars. I pay tribute to Mustafa Dzhemilev, the leader of the Crimean Tatar people, who travelled to Saudi Arabia with you, President Zelenskyy, in search of peace. Russia is perfecting the toolbox of terror and persecution that they applied in Crimea over nine long years, and they are now committing atrocities in cities and villages in the whole of Ukraine, many amounting to war crimes. The EU will continue to call for full accountability for these crimes, including for the crime of aggression, and will not recognise any illegal attempt to change the status of Ukraine’s territories, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, because respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries is a basic principle of the UN Charter and that’s why we support you, President Zelenskyy, and your peace formula based on these very principles. In Ukraine you are fighting for your freedom, you are fighting for your future and for your homeland, and in the EU we know you are also fighting for our common values. And that’s why we have imposed massive sanctions against Russia and that’s why we are supporting you with weapons and ammunition, and we will strengthen this support. We are also helping to meet your humanitarian needs, and we are determined to back your country with strong financial support. We stand with you in your fight for freedom, and we will stand with you as you rebuild your country. Our total support for Ukraine amounts to more than €76 billion. And we are preparing a multiannual financing plan of roughly €50 billion. Russia also continues to weaponise food, including by blockading and attacking your seaports. And this cruel Russian tactic hits the most vulnerable around the globe hardest. In the EU we continue to support the efforts of the United Nations and Turkey to get the Black Sea Grain Initiative back up running. And we are also strengthening our Solidarity Lanes through the EU to help get Ukrainian agricultural products to global markets. Ladies and gentlemen, this war is also a fight for your future, for your dream of a bright, democratic and more prosperous future within the EU. Last year Ukraine received EU candidate status. So your European Union future is no longer a question of if, it is a question of when. And later this year, the European Council will discuss the possibility of opening accession negotiations. And I am confident that the Ukrainian people and the leaders will rise to this historic moment. You can count on my personal support, you can count on the EU. We will stand by your side for as long as it takes. Slava Ukraini!

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine imposed a sudden energy shock on Europe 18 months ago. Faced with the prospect of much less Russian gas, there were fears that Europe’s energy infrastructure would not cope with winter 2022-23, causing economies to crumble.   Yet a mild winter and the EU’s gradual rollout of a plan to reduce its energy consumption and buy more from alternative suppliers saw it emerge shaken but not beaten on the other side.  Germany, Italy and other gas-reliant nations pivoted from Russian dependency without major electricity shortages. Since then, there has been more good news. Energy prices have fallen steadily in 2023, while Europe’s gas storage levels hit 90% capacity three months ahead of the November target and could even hit 100% in September.    According to politicians like the German energy minister, Robert Habeck, the worst of the energy crisis is over.  Yet, as we shall see, it’s a little early to be so confident.  New vulnerabilities  The share of EU piped gas imports from Russia fell from 39% to just 17% between early 2022 and early 2023. To cope with this shift, the EU has become much more reliant on shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) than before.  LNG’s total share of EU gas imports rose from 19% in 2021 to around 39% in 2022, amid a rapid upgrade to infrastructure that aims to have grown LNG capacity by one-third between 2021 and 2024. (Indeed, 13% of LNG imports into the EU actually still come from Russia, whose shipments have also significantly increased since the invasion).  This LNG increase has made European countries vulnerable to volatility in that market – particularly as 70% of these imports are bought at short notice rather than using the long-term oil indexed contracts that prevail in Asia.  For example, we’ve seen Europe’s benchmark gas price ticking upwards in recent weeks due to concerns over strikes at Australian LNG plants. This shows that supplies remain tight and that there are many potential disruptions in our highly interconnected world market.  To synchronise demand for LNG, the European Commission has introduced initiatives like the EU Energy Platform, an IT platform that makes it easier for supplier companies in member states to jointly buy the fuel. However, it is uncertain what level of supplies can be channelled through this instrument as it remains untested. Additionally, the industry fears this kind of state intervention could backfire and undermine the functioning of the market.  As for pipeline gas, Norway has overtaken Russia to become Europe’s leading supplier, providing 46% of the requirement in early 2023 (compared to 38% a year earlier). This extra load has strained Norway’s gas infrastructure. In May and June, delayed maintenance work caused sluggish flows that drove up prices, again showing how tight the European market is at present. Extended maintenance work in Norway leading to more obstructions in future looks distinctly possible.  Meanwhile, the EU is still expected to have to buy around 22 bcm (billion cubic metres) from Russia this year. That’s the equivalent of around 11% of all the pipeline gas used by the bloc in 2022. A large proportion is coming through Ukraine, and with the current Russia-Ukraine transit agreement unlikely to be renewed after it expires in 2024, this supply route is in jeopardy.  As part of the pivot away from Russia, the EU managed to reduce gas consumption by 13% in 2022, according to the International Energy Agency (against a target of 15%). In the months ahead, war-weary EU states may not do so well on this front.  It will not help that prices have fallen, nor that some states didn’t pull their weight last winter. Only 14 out of 27 EU members introduced mandatory energy reduction policies, while eastern states like Poland, Romania and Bulgaria did little to reduce consumption. Should there be a physical shortage of gas in continental Europe this winter, this might undermine calls for solidarity.  What comes next  The harsh reality is that for at least another two or three winters, Europe will have to hope for mild weather across the northern hemisphere without major interruptions to global LNG supply if it is to avoid significant gas price spikes.  Even as things stand, European gas prices remain around 50% above their pre-invasion long-run average, which is hurting both households and businesses. This is particularly important for Germany, the EU’s industrial powerhouse, with its energy-intensive automotive and chemical industries. There are growing concerns that continued high energy prices could promote de-industralisaton as energy-intensive industries move elsewhere.  The good news is that pressure on gas should at least subside from the mid-2020s. Significant new supplies of LNG will come online in the US and Qatar and the market will re-balance. European gas demand should also get significantly lower – down 40% by 2030, according to the energy reduction plan.  There is even talk of a supply glut by the end of the decade, depending on renewable energy deployment accelerating in Europe, and a new generation of nuclear power stations coming on stream. This would significantly reduce Europe’s need to import gas for good, but will only happen if the bloc coordinates effectively.  We saw what can be achieved in the months after the invasion when France supplied gas to Germany to help reduce its dependence on Russia, then Germany later supplied more electricity to French cities to help with outages caused by nuclear reactor maintenance.  The challenge is to take the same approach to decarbonisation. While France tries to gather support for nuclear modernisation both at home and elsewhere in Europe, it is facing opposition from the likes of the German-led “Friends of Renewals” group, which advocates building out only renewable energy. Divisions like these may prove a serious obstacle in achieving a more rapid energy transformation away from fossil fuels.  So while Europe has managed to pivot away from Russia’s pipeline gas, it will remain exposed to the volatility of global gas markets unless it reduces its gas demand significantly in the coming years.

While it is prudent to be cautious, it may also be wise to explore cooperation in those areas where there are shared interests rather than assume that the BRICS and the West are strategic rivals on all fronts. This analysis was first published in the Global Observatory, 30 August 2023. When Jim O’Neill coined the BRIC acronym in 2001, the point he was trying to convey was that the global economic system needed to incorporate the world’s largest emerging economies. His advice fell on deaf ears and in 2009, Brazil, China, India and Russia decided to take matters into their own hands and formed the BRIC grouping. South Africa joined the group in 2010 to form the BRICS. This July, the group held its 15th summit in South Africa, where they decided to add six new members: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. More are likely to join in the future, including countries like Indonesia and Nigeria.  What these countries have in common is a frustration, if not a grievance, about being side-lined to the periphery of the world economy. Together, the BRICS represent approximately 40% of the world’s population. The combined size of their economies are approaching approximately 30% of the world’s GDP, which puts them roughly on par with combined size of the economies of the G7 countries, depending on whether size is measured in GDP or PPP.  More importantly, in the next few decades, the combined size of the BRICS economies will surpass that of the G7. Despite this growing parity, all the members of the BRICS, with the exception of Russia, self-identifies as being part of the Global South, i.e., they feel excluded from a global system dominated by the Global North. Their stated aim is to work towards a future system of global governance where they will have equal political and economic say in global institutions, and where no one state will dominate others. In pursuit of this aim, BRICS countries have established their own development bank, set up their own contingency reserve arrangement, are developing their own payment system, and have started to trade with each other in their own currencies.  The BRICS want to free their economies from the dollar-based international financial system. They feel exposed to United States interest rates that can have a negative effect on their economies, for no domestic reasons. The dollar-based financial system also provides the US with significant advantages in the global economy, which the BRICS see as unfair. They also feel a dollar-based financial system gives the US hegemonic influence in global affairs, through for example, exerting US jurisdiction on all dollar-based trade or investments that flow through US banks or financial institutions.  While the BRICS countries have these clear shared macro-economic interests, many of the members also have competing interests in other domains. China and India are geopolitical rivals in South Asia. Egypt and Ethiopia are at loggerheads over the Nile. Brazil, India, South Africa and the newly-added Argentina are democracies, while other countries in the group are governed by a diverse set of autocratic regimes, which could set up an irreconcilable clash of values on some issues. Many of the members of the BRICS also have close ties to the United States and Europe, including Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in a televised statement to the nation on the eve of hosting the BRICS summit in South Africa, explained that South Africa remains non-aligned, and he announced that in 2023 the country will also host a major United States-Africa trade meeting and an EU-South Africa summit. South Africa will also host the G20 in 2025, the first in Africa. For many countries, membership of the BRICS does thus not necessarily imply aligning themselves with one global alliance versus another, but rather cooperation in a group around a series of shared interests.  Where does this place the BRICS on the Russian war in Ukraine? The BRICS summit in Johannesburg steered clear of taking a position on the war, other than welcoming mediation aimed at resolving it through dialogue and diplomacy. Some BRICS members like Iran are clearly supporting Russia, while most others have stopped short of either supporting or condemning Russia. For many such as Egypt, the war has adversely affected their economy. Two of the BRICS members, Egypt and South Africa, are part of an African initiative to seek a mediated end to the conflict, which is perhaps the first African initiative to mediate an international conflict. Overall, however, the BRICS have their eyes on the medium- to long-term transformation of the global macro-economic and financial system, and countries like China are probably frustrated that the Russian war in Ukraine has drawn attention away from this larger objective.  Are the BRICS and the West headed for a new cold war? The shift in the center of gravity of the global economy to the East is an unstoppable fact driven by demographics and economic factors like the cost of production. At the same time, Europe and the United States will remain major economic players. In tandem with these changes in the global economy, it is clear that the global political order will become more multipolar, with China, Europe, India, and the United States representing some of the major centers of influence.  In an August 27 article, Jim O’Neil argues that the influence of the BRICS will be determined by their effectiveness, not their size. An expanding BRICS will most likely succeed in helping its members to break free from a dollar-based international financial system, but that will take several decades of incremental change before it reaches a tipping point. Whether that is a good or bad thing depends on the degree to which your economy is tied to the United States. Many of the BRICS countries, including China, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa all have economies whose prosperity are closely tied to the Unites States. They will thus have an interest in a slow, stable freeing up of the international financial system, and this should give everyone that is prudent time to adapt.  The same logic also applies to changes in global governance architecture. Apart from Russia, all the other BRICS countries have an interest in making sure that changes in the global order are managed at a slow steady pace that does not generate instability. All the BRICS countries, apart from Russia, are also strong supporters of multilateralism, with the United Nations at its center. Many Western countries and BRICS members may thus have more shared interests than the doomsday headlines suggest. While it is prudent to be cautious, it may also be wise to explore cooperation in those areas where there are shared interests rather than assume that the BRICS and the West are strategic rivals on all fronts.

Europeans should allow their countries to be hosts for free debate among the Russian emigrés of the 21st century. But they should resist the temptation to view the exiles as channels of influence to reform Russia.  Life as a refugee is always difficult. And being a Russian exile in Europe is difficult in its own way. You are blamed for the war you opposed. You might fight the blame, or you might own it and try to atone – either way, there is little you can do. And what you are able to do inevitably proves inadequate: it is hard to convince Europeans that Russian society does not bear blame for Vladimir Putin’s war; and you can never apologise enough to shake away the guilt. Alternatively, you might be of the opportunistic type, who arrives with a sense of entitlement in search of the good life – and also ends up disappointed by the cool welcome. Either way, you start slowly losing touch with home, while never quite agreeing with the worldview of your new neighbours.  The politically motivated exodus of Russians to Europe started slowly in around 2012 and dramatically intensified over the past year and a half. The exiles come with a panoply of views. There are those who indeed feel guilty about the war, because, as Russian citizens, they feel responsible for failing to prevent it. There are those who think of themselves first and foremost as victims of the Putin regime and refuse to be answerable for its crimes. There are those who do not bother with questions of guilt at all, but just come in search of a safe haven – for their money, perhaps, or from mobilisation. There are those who worked for the Putinist system before becoming disillusioned or falling out of favour; there are those who kept their distance from the very start. And finally, there are surely those who have not truly fled at all, but have been planted among the refugee community by the Russian special services.  Europeans and the European Union lack a common policy towards the exiles. While Ukrainian refugees will correctly remain Europeans’ priority, what should European decision-makers do about the fleeing Russians: embrace them; reject them; or put them on probation?  What should European decision-makers do about the fleeing Russians: embrace them; reject them; or put them on probation?  Some in Europe view the exiles as our best link to civil society in Russia; as a group who could be instrumental to democratising the country in the future. They suggest welcoming them, helping them, and working with them. Behind the scenes, though, many others, especially European officials working on security matters, are governed by caution: ‘We don’t know who these people really are,’ they say in private. ‘They might be anti-Putin, they might be undercover FSB. And if they are effective in their anti-Putin activities, the Kremlin might send assassins after them – which won’t help our security either.’  A third approach is to approve of Russians as long as they think and behave in particular ways. In many places the exiles are welcome as long as they conform to local expectations, which vary widely, and are maximalist in some places. A good illustration of this is the fate of TV Dozhd. Russia’s last-remaining liberal television channel moved its operations to Latvia, but soon lost its licence for its programming’s lack of Latvian subtitles, for referring to the Russian army as “our army,” and for using (probably accidentally) a map that showed Crimea as part of Russia. Consciously or otherwise, the Latvian government seems to have hoped TV Dozhd would become essentially a Russian-language Latvian television channel, taking Riga’s official line and helping to sway the views of Latvia’s extensive Russian diaspora. When TV Dozhd continued to operate as part of the Russian debate and media landscape – hence its reference to the Russian army as “ours” – it went beyond the bounds of the expectations of the Latvian authorities.  All approaches have their logic and merit. All have shortcomings too.  It is likely true that, for the time being, the exiles are Europe’s best link to Russian society. Most have friends and family in Russia, with whom they communicate on a daily basis. However, if the standoff endures, over time these links will weaken. Former friends, some of whom stayed, some of whom left, will take separate paths in life. They will be part of different debates, with different social codes. The exiles will slowly lose their authentic ‘feeling’ for Russia; they could start projecting their own hopes and fears upon reality. At that point, anyone who relies on the political analyses of the exile community alone will need to start double-checking its members’ assessments.  It is also hard to say what part the exile community can play in post-Putin Russia. To an extent this will depend on the length of time they are away. The Russians who fled the Bolshevik revolution after 1917 believed they would soon head back – and as a result lived out of suitcases for most of their lives. By contrast, those who left in the 1970s and 1980s expected never to return – but many had done so by the early 1990s. We simply do not know what the future holds for today’s emigrés.  It is also impossible to predict the influence they will have if they go back. In some societies – the Baltic states, for instance – returning exiles adapted smoothly and played important political and social roles following the collapse of the USSR. Not so in Russia – in the 1990s, the homegrown networks of post-Soviet Russian politics proved fairly impenetrable to those who had been away. This may change after Putin; or it may not.    It is unlikely that Europeans will ever have a truly common policy towards their Russian exile community. The questions of Russia and Russians are of different levels of sensitivity in different countries, and different states’ policies will always reflect that. Accepting this will make life easier for everyone, and Europe is diverse enough to welcome Russians in various ways. For instance, TV Dozhd may have moved to Latvia in the hope of being close to Russia in a town inhabited by exiles. But ultimately it may be better off in its new home in the Netherlands, where society is less instinctively suspicious of everything Russian.  Also, much of what regulates the daily life of Russian exiles – rules on visas, border crossing, residence permits, asylum – will remain in the competence of interior ministries, and thus outside the regulatory reach of the EU. Its institutions may still wish to draw up a list of recommendations or best practices, which could help member states at least streamline their actions, so that unilateral steps by some do not leave others exposed. (Think, for instance, of how the visa bans introduced by the Baltic states last year increased the migration pressure on Finland and Norway – until they too restricted the movement of Russians.) This would also help address the Kafkaesque set of regulations inside the EU faced by the exiles. But truly uniform policies across the bloc or the Schengen visa space are probably unrealistic for the time being.   Of course, the exiled Russians need to adapt to the societies where they have settled. They need to follow local rules and laws, and put up with local views about Russia – there is no avoiding that. However, their hosts should allow them to be themselves – Russian Russians – not just Russian-speaking Europeans.  Ultimately, Europeans’ approach should be to provide space for Russians without over-investing in them or instrumentalising them. Allow them space to live, safe from the Kremlin. Enable them to talk freely about Russia – painful and necessary as it is. For now, exile is the only place where there can be a Russian debate about the country’s political system, how to fix it, and how to atone for its crimes. Parts of their soul-searching may connect with the discourse in Russia, although there is no guarantee of this. But above all, Europeans should not view them as a column that will smash the Putinist regime. Do not embrace them as such, do not project your hopes onto them, and do not try to micromanage Russian politics with the help of exiled political leaders (even if they ask you to).  The rationale for welcoming Russians should be that Europe is Europe: a place that provides shelter for refugees and a home for honest debate. Europeans’ reasoning should not be rooted in any expectations about the political influence exiles will have in a future Russia – because that may never materialise. If those who departed eventually acquire such influence, it will be a welcome surprise. Above all, the more that Europeans steer clear of intra-Russian intrigues and political manipulation, the more likely it is that such influence will be worth the steadfastness of circumspection.

Thank you very much.  Dear Mr. Speaker Stephanchuk, Distinguished Members of the Verjovna Rada,Excellencies, dear friends. I am very grateful to be here today, on this very special day for my country. Today, 1st July,  Spain assumes the great responsibility of becoming the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the next six months. And I wanted that the very first thing I did in my new capacity was to address the people of Ukraine through their Verjovna Rada. I wanted to tell you that we are and will be with you as long as it takes. I wanted to tell you that we will support Ukraine no matter the price to pay. That we will be with you in the achievement of your aspirations to be a free and sovereign  country that decides its own destiny as a member of the European family. In short, I am here to express the firm determination of Europeans and Europe to fight against the illegal, unjustifiable and unjustified Russian aggression to Ukraine. Once again, I have the honour to address all of you in this temple of Ukrainian democracy. My first address took place in February, on the first anniversary of Russia’s aggression against your sovereignty and territorial integrity. Things have changed since then. Today Ukraine is in the midst of the counter-offensive against an enemy that is showing signs of weakness. We have all seen the events of last week. They speak for themselves. And, if one side shows weakness, it is because in front of him there is someone who shows the opposite: determination. It's what I can see, right here, and right now: determination, strength and courage. What I can see is a whole country that refuses to be subjected and fights for its independence with immense dignity. I know the price to pay is enormous. Especially in human lives lost. Nothing I can say here today can comfort a family that has lost a daughter, a son, a mother, a father or a husband. Men and women who gave their lives defending a free and democratic Ukraine.  Still, I want to do it from the bottom of my heart on behalf of my country, Spain. A country that mourns with you. A country that condemns every Russian attack against Ukrainian civilians, like the one at Kramatorsk. Victoria Amelina, a Ukrainian writer was there. Severely injured, now fights for her life. Victoria was close to the front line, because she wanted to document the tragedy. She wanted to collect the memory of infamy. The lost heritage. The broken lives. The crimes committed. We need women Victoria Amelina, to write history. To tell the facts as they happened and preserve the memory of those who suffer this tragedy. Excellencies, dear friends, we do not forget that the European aspiration of the Ukrainian people was one of the excuses that triggered the Russian reaction and, in turn, the invasion. It was only fair to honour this aspiration by granting you the status of candidate to the European Union. No one deserves it more than you, than Ukraine. However, I know that this is not an easy process, especially with an ongoing war. To become a member state requires changes, reforms and sacrifices. Not long ago, Spain faced this challenge as a candidate country. But, let me tell you, that the process to become an European Union member taught us important lessons. One of them is that undertaking reforms has a value in itself. Reforms make your governance and your economy better, more modern and transparent. They bolster international confidence and proximity. They attract investment. And, in time, they will grant you access to our European Union. A Union, which is more than just the largest internal market in the world. Which is, above all, a community of values: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Last week, the European Commission made a positive assessment of Ukrainians, of Ukraine’s progress concerning the required reforms. I congratulate you for the progress made, especially thanks to the legislative work of this Rada, and I encourage you to keep up with it. It is worth the effort. Congratulations. And of course we will be eagerly awaiting the report of the European Commission in the fall, which will set the basis for the future. Excellencies, We want a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Only Ukraine can set terms and times for peace negotiations. Other countries and regions are proposing peace plans. The involvement is much appreciated, but, at the same time, we cannot accept them entirely. This is a war of aggression, with an aggressor and a victim. They cannot be treated equally. And ignoring the rules should in no way be rewarded. That is why we support President Zelenski’s peace formula, which is respectful with International Law and the UN Charter. Ukraine is paying a heavy prize in terms of destruction of cities and infrastructure. So, we need to make sure that the country is rebuilt, thus creating the conditions for its growth and prosperity. And we have already started. Today, Spain has decided to dedicate another 55 million euros, including offering 51 M€ through the World Bank Group to help finance Small and Medium Enterprises in Ukraine, as well as 4 M€ to the UN Development Program to provide schools in Ukraine with green-friendly and resilient energy systems. Reconstruction will take time and investment in many sectors. Spain is committed to accompanying Ukraine in this process. There are some areas, such as the railway infrastructure, in which our companies have the know-how that can make the difference. The Spanish government will support finance the necessary investments to adapt and upgrade infrastructures and productive sectors in your country. Yet, we understand that reconstruction and prosperity will only arrive if real, long-term security is achieved. My friends, in my view, it is clear that we cannot rely on the promises made after the Cold War anymore. We have to adapt to a different security environment, one in which concepts like peace, sovereignty or territorial integrity can no longer be taken for granted. The aggression on Ukraine has shown us that they need to be effectively defended. Not just with words, but with facts. Therefore, we will need to rethink the security framework to ensure that your country, Ukraine, will be able to live free from aggression or intimidation. As the President said, we are approaching the NATO Summit in Vilnius, which will follow on the commitments we made last year, in Madrid, the capital of Spain. Spain supports enhancing the political participation of Ukraine through the creation of a NATO-Ukraine Council, where you will no longer be an invitee, but a member, a full member. We are also in favour of enhancing the practical cooperation, to continue to adapt your defence sector to NATO Standards. These are, my friends, big steps forward that will be further discussed during the upcoming NATO Summit in Vilnius. Spain will continue to do its part as well: we are delivering more Leopard tanks, armoured personnel carriers and a field hospital with surgical capacity. We also continue to reach out to other countries and continents, to explain what is really happening here in Ukraine, but also to listen to their concerns, especially those related to food and energy security or insecurity, in this case. Excellencies, Last February, before my trip to Kyiv, someone in Madrid, in my city, was  wondering about the Ukrainian’s state of mind and asked me: “Do you think they are afraid?”. When I came back, after the visit, I had a clear answer to this question and I told them: Look, they are not afraid. They are going to win. It will take them weeks, or months. It will take tears, blood and sweat, but Ukraine is going to win this war. And they asked me “Pedro, Pedro, why?, why?”. And I said, “Because there are two battles. One happens in the battlefield. The other happens in the mind, because it’s a battle of ideas. And that one, the Ukrainian people have already won it”. Ukraine has chosen democracy in the face of those who despise it. Ukraine has chosen openness and freedom, in the face of those who fear it. Ukraine has chosen to sit, and discuss, and vote, and change, and evolve, in the face of those who only believe in force and obedience. Ukraine has chosen to be independent, to move freely, to trade, to invest, to prosper, to have hope, in the face of those who still have delusional dreams about old empires. The Ukrainian people have chosen the European way. The Ukrainian people ARE, you are Europeans. And you are Europeans not only because of a geographical imperative. You are Europeans by moral and spiritual commitment. So, dear friends. During this years, I have learned many things about Ukraine. Even some Ukrainian words. For instance, I have learned that "Mriya" (emriya) means “dream” in English, we say in Spanish Sueño. That was the name of the largest plane in the world, located at the Hostomel airfield when it was destroyed by Russian troops in February 2022. That plane brought medical supplies during the pandemic or carried humanitarian aid in natural disasters. It was a symbol, a pride for Ukraine. They destroyed the symbol, but they couldn’t destroy the idea. Now, I have learnt that Ukrainian engineers are already working on the reconstruction of that giant of the skies. Let me tell you that you are not just rebuilding an airplane: you are rebuilding a dream. One day, that dream will cross the skies again. And from there, here on the ground, we will see a new Ukraine reborn from the ashes of destruction. That’s what you fight for. You fight for peace, for security and prosperity for your children. And every Ukrainian soldier knows it. Russian soldiers fight because they are scared they will be punished if they don’t. They ask themselves everyday “what are we doing here?”. You are united, you stand on the moral high ground. They even rebel, as we saw a few days ago. That’s why they cannot win and you cannot lose. I came here today to tell you that Europe is open to those who make the choice. The European Union was built to prevent new wars. We chose to get together, to be “united in diversity”, and that made us stronger. Europe is with you, and you are one with Europe. Mui Yevropa! [¡Somos Europa!] Slava Ukraini [¡Viva Ucrania!]

The changing global order has created an enabling environment for the recent spike of takeovers in Africa’s ‘coup belt’ – with Russia and newly assertive middle powers offering themselves as partners to putschists  Coups d’états have returned to Africa. In the 1990s and 2000s, the number of forced takeovers of power on the continent fell; but the figure began to creep back up around 15 years ago. This deterioration has come to particular prominence with the emergence of a ‘coup belt’ spanning from Sudan to Niger (and mostly recently Gabon), where eight coups have taken place in the last three years.   The drivers behind coups range from state fragility to weak economic development. But such factors were also a constant in the decades immediately after the end of the cold war – when Africa experienced fewer coups.  The overlooked factor is the weakening of global order and the coup-enabling international environment it has created. Policymakers should consider, in particular, the role that activist ‘middle powers’ and Russia are now playing in taking advantage of an increasingly lawless international setting. US retrenchment, selective AU enforcement As the United States retrenches to pursue its strategic competition with China, its capacity to invest seriously in both strategic imperatives and values-led foreign policy objectives is coming under strain. With the essential taking precedence over the good, upholding democracy in Africa has slipped down the list of America’s strategic priorities.  Africa’s own system for deterring takeovers has also weakened considerably. The African Union’s  enforcement of its coup-prohibiting rules grew increasingly inconsistent during the same period, during which time it began to enforce only selectively, due to the whims of powerful AU member states. This started with the coup in Mauritania in 2008, and was followed by President Sisi’s post-coup election in Egypt, and more recently by coups in Chad and Sudan. The interregnum and the rise of the middle powers To paraphrase Gramsci, the international rules-based order has not yet died so the new order cannot be born. The world thus finds itself in an interregnum in which the rules-based order is fraying but where the next iteration of global order is yet to emerge.  Aware that the world around them is changing, African leaders worry that a new version of cold war is developing, and that they are at risk of being forced to choose a side – America or China. But a cold war-style scenario is not a given, which means African leaders may be preparing for the wrong thing. This risks obscuring a major challenge created by the interregnum: the rise of assertive middle powers.    With global order in flux, middle powers seek to maximise their sovereignty and expand their influence. For middle powers in the Gulf, to Egypt and Turkey, those twin ambitions translate into treating the Horn of Africa as their near abroad. Russia surges into the coup belt sharing the same middle power motivations, but it differs on one count: desire to undermine the West. The opportunity generated by coups determines where Russia chooses to engage. But pursuing its rivalry with the West provides a second motive for Russia’s focus on the western half of the coup belt: it works to push back the strongest European influence, namely France’s presence in francophone Sahel states.  Naturally, Russia’s and middle powers’ engagement in Africa pre-dates the interregnum, but the opportunity presented by the evolving global order supercharges their interventions. Russia and middle powers exploit US retrenchment and eroding AU norms by offering themselves as partners to putschists. Seeing the opportunity to gain influence in power-grabs, they move in and back their preferred horse. These include the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey throughout the Horn of Africa, where Turkey is more focused on Somalia; the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are more focused on Sudan. In the Sahel, Turkey is tentatively exploring economic and security cooperation in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Russia plays a role across the Horn of Africa and Sahel sections of the coup belt; its deepest footprint is in Mali and Burkina Faso. All active middle powers are eyeing the prize of Libya as part of the strategic rationale for getting involved in its bordering countries.  With increasing numbers of autocratic political entrepreneurs in the coup belt bidding for power, the opportunities for engagement multiply. Middle powers – and Russia, to a lesser degree – place serious political and financial capital behind their engagement as well as no-questions-asked security support. This creates outsize impact compared to the mid-level Western official engagement and more conditional provision of financial and security support. Even though they wield greater firepower, the abilities of middle powers’ diplomatic and security institutions have yet to catch up with the demands placed on them by their political masters’ robust will to act. The impact can be of the bull in the china shop variety.  Russia and middle powers create an enabling environment for Africa’s autocrats by making their international and African-regional isolation impossible. The previous, unipolar period allowed the US, with European flanking, all behind an African lead (generally the AU), to deploy carrots and sticks while corralling other external powers. But middle powers’ assertive go-it-alone policies hamper the formation of a critical mass of international support to disincentivise rule-breaking.  How to navigate this new landscape African leaders grasp that changing global order is creating greater interest in Africa. They encourage new partners as a welcome means of diversification beyond the former confined choice of the US, old colonial powers such as France and Britain, or China. But the impact of Russian and middle power engagement in the coup belt demonstrates the pitfalls of such diversification. Rather than creating an additionality of options for Africa’s benefit, Russian and middle power engagement strengthens African autocrats and feeds state destabilisation.  There will be no return to the unipolar US-led order; no American linchpin to hold together the rules-based order against coups in Africa. Even if the US were to reallocate political capital to this end, the interregnum phase has already created shifts in global order of a magnitude that makes assertive middle powers and Russia near impossible to contain.  Nor can muscular engagement by France in its former colonies – the Sahel swathe of the coup belt – fill the US leadership gap. As much as France struggles to retain its primus inter pares role among European powers in the Sahel, the fever-pitch of anti-French sentiment in its former Sahel colonies constrains its efficacy.  When encouraging all-comers to support development in their countries, African leaders may have lingered too little on the drawbacks of Russia’s and middle powers’ engagement. If their fear was of Africa’s instrumentalisation by China and the US, then Russia and middle powers are not creating greater African agency. As it stands, they simply add to the number of actors instrumentalising Africa. That is the true wake-up call sounded by the Niger coup.

The meeting of the presidents of Belarus and Russia, Aleksandr Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin, took place in St. Petersburg on 23 July. The heads of state arrived at Konstantinovsky Palace together.  "Aleksandr Grigorievich, we are meeting today as agreed...", the Russian leader began the protocol part of the meeting. The Belarusian president remarked: "We agreed on the meeting six months ago."  "It's true. That's right. We agreed about this a long time ago," Vladimir Putin noted. “We are meeting in St. Petersburg today. The weather is good. It is a Sunday afternoon, but we always have something to talk about. At the beginning of the meeting, I would like to note that all our plans are being implemented, even at a better pace than we expected." The Russian leader noted the good state of the economies of the two countries, the expected economic growth by the end of the year: "I looked at the latest data. The Belarusian economy is expected to grow by 3.7% in 2023. These are the projected figures, but still. Our growth forecasts are a little lower. But this is a good indicator for us too. We expect the growth of more than 2%. Unemployment is low. In general, all the main indicators give us reason to believe that we will pass this year well and will have good growth." "Our plans in terms of the Union State are being fully implemented. We are moving confidently in all areas. Trade is growing. According to various sources, the data vary a little. According to our data, it is around $43.7 billion, if we speak in dollar terms. According to Belarusian statistics, it is almost $45 billion," the Russian president said. Aleksandr Lukashenko said that the cost of services provided should be into account too. "You are right," the Russian president concurred. The presidents also noted the successful operation of the Belarusian nuclear power plant. Its second unit has already been launched this year.  "We have made progress, satisfactory progress, to put it modestly. Of course, we will also talk about security issues in the region. I hope that today and tomorrow we will have the opportunity to discuss all this in an informal setting, in great detail," Vladimir Putin said. In his opening remarks, Aleksandr Lukashenko touched upon many issues, including the course of the special military operation, the lack of results of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, and NATO's military build-up in Poland. Another important topic is plans for the development of economic cooperation between Belarus and Russia. "We won't be able to do it in a day. Therefore, we will meet tomorrow. As far as I understand, you will find time for us to talk," the Belarusian president said addressing his counterpart. "Of course. I changed some of my plans. We can spend one and a half to two days," Vladimir Putin confirmed. "Great! We will settle these issues in a day and a half. Thank you for finding the time for the meeting we agreed six months ago. Therefore, there is nothing extraordinary here. We have been planning the meeting for a long time. When a need arises, we meet and discuss our tactical and strategic issues," the Belarusian head of state said. "As for the economy, I would like to suggest that our governments think through some kind of economic plan. The point is self-reliance. We will not kowtow to anyone. We have got brains. Resources are more than enough. We need a plan for the development of our Fatherland. As I say: two states, one Fatherland. We can do it. The main forces have been here, in Russia, since old times. It will be good if our governments come up with such a plan," the head of state said.  "Even if things are a little worse off, people will understand and support us. Because there will be the light at the end of the tunnel," the Belarusian leader said.  The countries have already begun to work in this direction, advancing cooperation in all areas, including in microelectronics, space, and agriculture. "We see good results everywhere. So we need to put everything together into a plan, appoint people in charge. Thus we will do our job strategically," the Belarusian president said. Aleksandr Lukashenko brought a map showing the deployment of Polish troops at the border of the Union State to a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The head of state noted that one of the Polish brigades is now deployed 40km away from Brest, another - about 100km away from Grodno. Aleksandr Lukashenko noted that there is no Ukrainian counteroffensive. "No, there is. It's just failed," the Russian president said. "It failed indeed. There are no results," the Belarusian leader confirmed. “What's next? They, as you said recently, have begun to engage Poland. They are making active use of mercenaries. I brought you a map showing the deployment of the Polish Armed Forces at the borders of the Union State, which you talked about. We see that they are setting the stage. One of the brigades has been deployed 40km away from Brest. They used to be 500km away, now the distance is 40km. We see it all. Another brigade has been deployed a little more than 100km away from Grodno. They have a division, but so far these are brigades. Poland opened a facility to repair Leopards on their territory. Rzeszow is becoming more active. The Americans are using its airfield to send hardware and so on.” The head of state noted the increased militarization of Poland, the deployment of significant forces to the borders of the Union State. "Naturally, Poland wants something in return. It's clear it will get money, weapons. This is understandable. But now there is a lot of talking ‘to admit Ukraine into NATO in parts’. You also noted this. What's behind it? This is a smokescreen," the president said. “Tear off western Ukraine. Under the guise of admission to NATO, so that the population is ok with that."    "They want to chop off western Ukraine and annex it to Poland. This is a payment to Poland for its active participation in this operation against the Russian army. The Americans support this," the Belarusian leader added. Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko lauded the successes of the Russian army in the special military operation.  "Yesterday was a difficult day. This is according to our data. You will also share your opinion on this. It was a very difficult day. Fortunately, it ended well. According to our data, more than 15 Leopards [German-made tanks] and more than 20 Bradleys [US infantry fighting vehicles] were destroyed in one battle. This, I think, has never happened before," the head of state said.  “On the other side they used units fully equipped with foreign hardware," Vladimir Putin said. Aleksandr Lukashenko stressed that the destruction of such a number of hardware also testifies to the heavy losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: "We can estimate how many soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine died considering the number of destroyed hardware. I know this because I served as an officer in the armored army back in the day. Therefore, I understand what it means to destroy so many infantry fighting vehicles and, most importantly, much vaunted Leopards.” The Belarusian president cited the U.S. estimates which indicate that the Armed Forces of Ukraine lost 26,000 soldiers since the start of the counteroffensive. "More," Vladimir Putin responded. "It's already more. Well, a week ago they estimated Ukraine’s irretrievable losses at over 26,000. From 4 June [from the launch of the counteroffensive]. I put their data down," the Belarusian president said. "Even more," the Russian leader said affirmatively.  Aleksandr Lukashenko continued: "Yesterday showed that this is the war against the entire NATO. They arm them; send a lot of mercenaries there. Yesterday was an important day because they made use of the main strategic reserves. This suggests that this thoughtless policy of throwing untrained people and mercenaries into hell will lead nowhere. During the meeting, Vladimir Putin noted that foreign mercenaries also suffer significant losses. "Huge losses. Because of their tactics," Aleksandr Lukashenko said.  "Because of their stupidity," the Russian leader replied. "They move in groups," the Belarusian president said. In turn, Vladimir Putin stressed that people of the countries whose governments are sending people to the war zone should also be aware of what is happening. "We will communicate this to the people so that they assess the actions of their rulers," he said. Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko thanked the Russian president for the security guarantees to Belarus. "I would like to thank you. You are the first person in Russia who spoke about this openly and clearly. Aggression against Belarus will be like an attack on Russia. We take this into account in the construction of our Armed Forces," the head of state said during at the talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg. The presidents of Belarus and Russia toured the landmarks in Kronstadt after the official part of the talks in Konstantinovsky Palace. The heads of state first came to the Island of Forts Museum and Historical Park. There they were shown the main exhibit - the first Soviet nuclear submarine K-3 "Leninsky Komsomol". She was delivered to the Museum of Naval Glory in Kronstadt from Murmansk Oblast in the autumn of 2022. Another point of the joint informal program of the presidents was a visit to the Stavropegic St. Nicholas Naval Cathedral in Kronstadt, also known as the Naval Cathedral of St. Nicholas.

The apparent assassination of Yevgeny Prigozhin in the crash of his private jet between Moscow and St. Petersburg represents an inflection point in Russian-African relations. Prigozhin, as leader of the notorious Wagner Group, had been the point man for Russia in Africa since Wagner first began operations on the continent in 2017. More than a single entity, the Wagner Group is an amalgamation of shell companies deploying paramilitary forces, disinformation and political interference in Ukraine, Syria and Africa. Its leaders have been sanctioned by 30 countries for the group’s destabilising activities.  Prigozhin was believed to be living on borrowed time after he led a short-lived insurrection – part of a power struggle with the Russian military leadership – in June. While he quickly backed down, the action embarrassed Russian president Vladimir Putin and triggered chatter that Putin’s perceived weakness would embolden other challengers to his authority. Prigozhin advanced Russian influence in Africa by propping up politically isolated and unpopular authoritarian leaders. As a result of Wagner’s support, these leaders were beholden to Russian interests. Wagner’s backing took a variety of irregular forms, like paramilitary forces, disinformation campaigns, election interference, intimidation of political opponents, and arms for resources deals. Prigozhin referred to this interlocking set of influence operations as “The Orchestra”, which he conducted. Wagner deployed forces to Libya, the entral African Republic, Mali and Sudan. It has also been interfering in domestic politics and information narratives in some two dozen African countries. I research the role of governance in advancing security and development as well as the influence of external actors in Africa, including Russia. Democratic transitions and institutions of democratic accountability are among my interests. The breadth of Russian political interference in Africa points to Russia’s strategic objectives for the continent. It aims to secure a foothold in North Africa and the Red Sea, undermine western influence, normalise authoritarianism and displace the UN-based international system. None of these objectives are about making Africa more prosperous or stable. Rather, the continent is primarily a theatre to advance Russia’s geostrategic interests. Attempting to maintain the lucrative and influential operations of the Wagner Group in Africa after Prigozhin’s death will make it hard for Russia to deny that it uses irregular and illegal actions to extend its influence. Maintaining Wagner without Prigozhin The Wagner model has seen Russian influence expand rapidly in Africa. That’s despite Russia investing very little on the continent. Most of Wagner’s costs have been covered through cash and mineral concessions provided by host regimes. By some accounts revenues from mining operations in the Central African Republic and Sudan generate billions. It is no surprise that Russia would want to keep the Wagner enterprise going. Tellingly, on the day of Prigozhin’s plane crash, deputy defence minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov was in Libya to reassure warlord Khalifa Haftar of Russia’s ongoing support. Yevkurov later visited the military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso to deliver the same message. The question will be whether the Russian military has the capacity. Russia needs soldiers in Ukraine. So, it may not have experienced fighters to spare in Africa. It is also an open question whether Wagner troops will agree to sign contracts with the Russian defence ministry, given the way their leader was dispatched. The Russian government would also need to recreate the multidimensional dealings that made Wagner’s operations effective in shoring up client regimes. For years, Russia has promoted hybrid warfare – the fusion of conventional and subversive tools. Synchronising this across multiple African contexts will require greater dexterity than the Russian security bureaucracy is likely capable of, however. Finally, Russia has benefited from the plausible deniability that Wagner has provided while doing Putin’s bidding. In every context in which Wagner forces have been deployed, they have been credibly accused of human rights abuses including rape, torture and extrajudicial killings. In Mali, Wagner is linked to more than 320 incidents of human rights abuses and hundreds of civilian deaths. Wagner has also been accused of driving away local communities where it has secured mining concessions, effectively annexing African territory. By directly taking over the mantle of Wagner operations in Africa, the Russian government can no longer claim ignorance or impotence to do anything about these unlawful and destabilising actions. Russia has largely escaped serious reputational costs for Wagner’s thuggish activities in Africa. But this will change when it owns the repressive tactics Wagner has deployed. Reassessments in Africa What of Wagner’s African clients? Leaders of these regimes have come to power through extraconstitutional means. They restrict opposition voices and media. They are isolated internationally. Simply put, they cannot survive without Moscow’s support. So, we should not expect a change in receptivity from the military juntas in Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, the co-opted leadership in the Central African Republic, or the Libyan warlord, Haftar. What will be telling is the reaction from other governments on the continent. Some will continue to see value in flirting with Russia as a way of hedging against international criticism. Russia’s reach in Africa may be exceeding its grasp, however. There is a growing awakening on the continent of how little Russia actually brings to Africa in terms of investment, trade, jobs creation or security. Its deployment of mercenaries, disinformation, political interference and arms for resources deals mean it actually amplifies instability on the continent. The symbolism of this was vividly brought home in the days before the Russia-Africa Summit at the end of July. Russia pulled out of the Black Sea grain deal that had enabled 33 million tonnes of grain to get from Ukraine to Africa and other parts of the world. The deal had eased supply chain restrictions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Not only did Russia scuttle the deal: it bombed the Ukrainian ports that were exporting the grain, wasting 180,000 tonnes in the process. The contempt Putin showed for African interests by this action was hard to ignore. This disregard, coupled with recognition that Russia offers relatively little to Africa, contributed to only 17 African heads of state attending the St. Petersburg summit. By comparison 43 African heads of state attended the Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi in 2019. The way that Prigozhin was eliminated must also give African leaders pause. Putin speaks often of his desire to create a new international order. Russia’s lawlessness at home and abroad is bringing into sharp focus what his world order would look like. And that’s not a vision many African leaders share.